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FACTS: Navarro filed charges against Judge Hernando Domagtoy for
gross misconduct and inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
In relation to the first charges against him, Judge Domagtoy
solemnized the wedding between Tagadan and Borga despite his
knowledge that Tagadan is separated from his first wife. He merely relied
on the affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar
confirming the fact that Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other
for almost seven (7) years giving to the presumption that she is already
Second charge against him is that he performed a marriage between
Sumaylo and del Rosario outside his jurisdiction. The wedding was
perfomed at the respondents residence in the municipality of Dapa which
does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized by the respondent judge
are valid under the Family Code.

HELD: First marriage is null and void. Article 41 of the Family Code
requires that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract
a subsequent marriage. The marriage solemnized has resulted in a
bigamous marriage as provided under Article 35 of the Family Code.
Affidavits saying that Tagadans wife has not been heard of for almost
seven years are not sufficient proof.
Second marriage is valid. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one
of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing
officer. Under Article 7(1), marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent
member of the Judiciary within the Courts jurisdiction. Respondent Judge
holds jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Maria-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. And also stated in Article 8 of the Family code where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.


FACTS: Maria Ferrer was married to Mariano Trias, who, later on, died.
Ferrer then contracted a subsequent marriage.
Pugeda and his witness, Ricafrante, testified that in the afternoon of
January 5, 1916, Pugeda and Ferrer went to the office of Justice of Peace
to ask Ricafrante to solemnize the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer. The
marriage was celebrated in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom
was Salazar and another Prudente. After the usual ceremony, Ricafrante
asked parties to sign two copies of marriage contract. He delivered one
copy to the contracting parties and another to the President of Sanitary
Division. However, there was no celebration of the marriage was held
because Pugeda was busy campaigning and Ferrer was already on the
family way. The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and
introduced a phostatic copy of the record of marriages in the municipality of
Rosario, Cavite in the month of January, 1916, which showed that no
record of the alleged marriage existed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer existed.

HELD: Witnesses were introduces that after the marriage, Pugeda and
Ferrer lived together in the house of the latter. Evidence was also
submitted that the first issue was baptized on August 26, 1917 and the one
who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Ferrer. The baptismal
certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the issue of spouses
Pugeda and Ferrer. The registry of said birth also states that the father is
Pugeda and the mother is Ferrer. Furthermore, it is not denied that Pugeda
and Ferrer cohabited as husband and wife until the death of the latter,
publicly and openly as husband and wife.
After a review of the testimonial and documental evidence, the judge
arrived at the conclusion that Pugeda was in fact married to Ferrer. The
court cited Art. 53 of the civil code: As to marriages contracted
subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil
register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or
have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the
marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind.


FACTS: Elias Borromeo and Susana Taborada were married and their
marriage bore one child. On the noon of July 3, 1981, it was reported that
Borromeo killed his wife using a kitchen bolo and thus convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. There were witnesses and
police officers who testified against him. He claims that he cannot be
charged with parricide and should only be liable for homicide, since he was
never legally married to the victim on the grounds that the officiating
priest testified against it and there was no marriage contract executed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Borromeo can be considered married to the victim
and be liable for parricide.

HELD: Yes. The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the
marriage registry does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present. People living together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society. Hence, he can be convicted for the crime parricide.


FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime, he
contracted three marriages. With his first wife in 1953, he begot 4 children;
with his second wife in, a daughter. Lupo and Felipa, the third wife, were
alleged to have been lawfully married sometime in 1930. They had three
children. At the time of Lupos death, he left certain properties which he
acquired when he was still unmarried. Lupos descendants by his first
and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated unto themselves said lot. Lupos children by his third
marriage now claim that they were deprived of their respective shares in
the lots. They pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and
annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the children by the third marriage are entitled to
successional rights over the said lots.

HELD: Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are
legitimate children of the deceased. A marriage may be presumed to have
taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. Article 172 of the said Code provides that the
filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The private
respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and therefore,
prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the
filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit
prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-
ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner.

TENEBRO VS CA, GR 150158, February 18, 2004

FACTS: Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. They lived
together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Tenebro thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a
certain Nilda Villegas. Anjacas also verified that Tenebro was indeed
married to Villareyes in the form of a handwritten letter made by Villareyes.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against Tenebro. He denied
that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no
wedding ceremony took place to solemnize their union. Furthermore, he
argues that his second marriage has been declared void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: The prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove the
existence of the first marriage, between Tenebro and Villareyes. Evidence
presented was in the form of: 1. a copy of a marriage contract which was
solemnized at the Manila City hall before Rev. Torres; 2. Handwritten letter
from Villareyes to Ancajas, informing her that Villareyes and Tenebro were
legally married. The subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of Tenebros valid marriage to Villareyes, Tenebros marriage
to Ancajas, would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Thus, as soon as the second
marriage to Ancajas was celebrated in 1990, during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.

RP vs DAYOT, GR 175581 MARCH 28, 2008

FACTS: Felisa and Jose Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall in
1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they
had lived together for at least 5 years. In 1993, Jose filed a complaint for
annulment. He contended that his marriage was a sham as no marriage
ceremony was celebrated between them. According to Jose, he was
introduced to Felisa sometime in 1986. He lived in Felisas house as a
border. Three weeks later, Felisa requested to accompany her to the Pasay
City Hall to claim a package sent by her brother. Upon arrival, a man asked
Jose to sign papers so that the package could be released. He refused but
Felisa cajoled him. In 1987, Jose discovered that he signed a marriage
On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. In 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Jose
claimed that he did not consent to the marriage with Felisa. Joses sister
was put into the stand and she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate. Case
was brought to the CA and but the CA did not accept Joses assertion that
his marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that
they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD: It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage. The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to
the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified
their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the
law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under
oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio.


FACTS: SPO4 Santiago S. Cario contracted two marriages, the first was
in 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao-Cario with whom he had two
offsprings; and the second was in 1992, with respondent Susan Yee-Cario
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting
way back in 1982. Cario passed away, due to illness, under the care of
Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Yee admitted
that her marriage to Cario took place during the subsistence of and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the
previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who
introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios
marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the
required marriage license.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the first marriage is valid considering that
Cario and Nicdao contracted marriage w/o marriage license.
2. Whether or not the subsequent marriage is valid since the
marriage was contracted w/o first obtaining a judicial declaration of
the previous marriage.

HELD: 1. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof
renders the marriage void ab initio. There is no question that the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt
from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage.
2. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.

FACTS: Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony without the knowledge of Castros parents. Cardenas processed
the documents required for the celebration of marriage, including the
procurement of marriage license. They did not immediately live together
and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they
decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was
adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was
brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a
petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer
then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the
celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted
to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to
the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

HELD: The court affirmed the impugned decision that the certification
issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of
suspicion sufficiently proves that the office did not issue a marriage license
to the contracting parties. Although, the fact that the testimony of Castro is
not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition.
Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

NIAL VS BADAYOG, GR 133778 MARCH 14, 2000

FACTS: Pepito Nial was married with Teodulfa Bellones 1974. They had
children. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death in 1985. 1 year
and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident in 1977. After
his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of
marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void

HELD: The applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit stating that they
cohabited for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about
20 months had elapsed. The fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. Therefore, Pepitos marriage to Norma is void.