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CSC vs DACOYCOY

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, respondent.


April 29, 1999
PARDO, J.

FACTS: On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar,
filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness,
misconduct and nepotism. The accusation on Nepotism was brought on by Dacoycoys 2 sons (Rito and Ped) being
recommended by him and subsequently recommended by Mr. Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of BCAT
which was then approved by DECS Regional Director Dioko, w/ provision that such shall be under Daclags immediate
supervision. As for Ped Dacoycoys appointment as casual utility worker, Dacoycoy was the one who certified that funds
are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and even rated his performance as very satisfactory.
Ped stated in his position description form that his father was his next higher supervisor.

Civil Service Commission Regional Office found Pedro Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the
appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment
under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and
Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

On appeal to the CA, it reversed and set aside the CSC, saying that Dacoycoy did not appoint his sons.

ISSUE: WON a public official could be liable for nepotism even if he did not appoint his relative, but his relative is under
his immediate supervision. (YES)

RATIO: In this case the circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Daclag was a
subordinate of Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Daclag to recommend the appointment of
first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Daclag recommended the appointment of Dacoycoys two
sons and placed them under his immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions
are career positions.

The law defines nepotism as follows:
"Sec. 59. Nepotism. - (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing
or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over
him, are hereby prohibited.

"As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree
either of consanguinity or of affinity.

(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity,
(b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular
instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission."

Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a
violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision
over the appointee.

DEBULGADO vs. CSC is NOT APPLICABLE: The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is covered by
the prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original appointments to the civil service, and
whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment
given to petitioner after the Commission had earlier approved that appointment. Debulgado never even impliedly
limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recommending authority for appointing a
relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the Court emphasized that Section 59 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary
language: x x x The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court had neither
authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction there.
The nepotism ban was meant to be comprehensive.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. Decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

LIBAN vs GORDON
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED
CROSS, Intervenor.
January 18, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: Liban, et al., were officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter, filed with the SC what they
styled as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against Gordon, who was
elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors while he was Senator.

Liban, et al. alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon ceased to be a member
of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that *n+o Senator . . . may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a
government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any
subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded,
and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are
private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC
Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it
creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that *t+he Congress
shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless
such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court
thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to
intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision
with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC
Charter.

ISSUE: WON it was correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the
PNRC charter. (NO)
Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC. (Private)

RATIO: The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined
in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. The Court should not have declared void
certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter,
especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the
PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party
to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in
terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is
merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC
that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935
Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its
amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the
Court now.

By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of
July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as
an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a
private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although the PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary
thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman
thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a
private corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the
Corporation Code. The sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a
case-to-case basis.

DISPOSITIVE: MR GRANTED, previous Decision of the SC is MODIFIED.

PLM vs IAC
PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MAYNILA, petitioner vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. FILEM0N FERNANDEZ, JR., HON. ALBINA
MANALODANS as Commissioners of Civil Service Commission and HERNANI P. ESTEBAN, respondents.
November 13, 1985
GUTIERREZ, JR., J

FACTS: Dr. Hernani Esteban was the Vice President for Academic Affairs of the Philippine College of Commerce, due to
streamlining, his position was abolished. PLM President Dr. Consuelo Blanco invited him to be ad interim temporary
appointed as Vice-President for Administration on June 28, 1973. This appointment was renewed to last until June 30,
1975, with the approval of the Board of Regents. Dr. Esteban was not recommended for permanent appointment
despite his 2 and a half years of service at PLM. On August 1, 1975, PLM President appointed him Ad Interim as
Professor III and designated him as Director of the Institute of Continuing Education and Community Service. On August
7, 1975, PLM President terminated Dr. Estebans appointment as Vice President for Administration effective July 31,
1975.
The Civil Service Commission ruled that, the temporary appointment extended to Dr. Esteban may be terminated at any
time with or without cause. However, upon a motion for reconsideration, CSC reversed and certified Dr. Esteban for
appointment under permanent status. Upon PLMs MFR, CSC ruled that the certification does not mean it is ordering
PLM to reinstate (more confusing than clarifying) As a de facto officer, Dr. Esteban was entitled to be paid the salary of
that position..On June 6, 1978, PD 1409 was issued creating the Merits System Board CSC ruled that the appointment is
permanent, because PLM refused and denied the existence of Board Resolution 485 of the BOR approving the
appointment of Dr. Esteban, and ordered his immediate reinstatement. When the best evidence of which the case in its
nature is susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the evidence is withheld for some sinister motive and
that its production would thwart his evil or fraudulent purpose.RTC reversed, saying that the appointment was invalid,
and Dr. Esteban was merely a de facto officer.IAC reversed the RTC, and also ordered payment of full back salaries.

ISSUE: WON appointment of Dr. Esteban is temporary or permanent. (PERMANENT)

RATIO: The confusion is from the term ad interim The term refers to the manner in which the appointments were
made, it is done by the President of PLM in the meantime while the BOR is unable to act. The list of permanent
personnel submitted to CSC by the president of PLMincluded Dr. Estebans name and was recognized by CSC in its first
indorsement dated April 18, 1975.

The power to appoint is in essence discretionary, but it should be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws or valid agreements, and provided further that such prerogatives are not exercised in a malicious, harsh,
oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite.

Esteban is a permanent appointee, so he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that the term ad
interim as used in the Philippines does not literally translate to temporary. In this jurisdiction an ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment. This was explained in the landmark case of Summers vs Ozaeta:

an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress. It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is
disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an acting appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is
issued.

In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely nominates while the Board issues the
appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments. Such
appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointees
term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. In the case at bar, apparently, Esteban was confirmed
by the Board of Regents in 1975. Blanco however did not relay this confirmation to Esteban. The latter was made to
believe (due to souring relationship with Blanco) that his appointment was extended but only as an extension of
temporary appointment.

DISPOSITIVE: Pwtition DISMISSED. Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

LUEGO vs CSC
FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondents-appellees.
August 5, 1986
CRUZ, J.

FACTS: Luego was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was
described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final action taken in the protest filed
by the Tuozo and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the Tuozo better qualified than the Luego for the contested position and, accordingly
directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the Luego whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the
Tuozo was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

Luego, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondents
appointment.

ISSUE: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement. (NO)

The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements
of the Civil Service Law.

When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The appointment of the petitioner was not
temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it
temporary.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. Thus, unlike the Commission on
Appointments, the Civil Service Commission is limited only tothe non-discretionary authority of determining whether or
not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law. This political detachment will be
impaired if the security of tenure clause in the Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the Civil Service are
revoked and changed at will to suit the motivations and even the fancies of whatever party may be in power.

DISPOSITIVE: Resolution of the CSC is SET ASIDE. Luego is entitled to the office in dispute via permanent appointment.

REGIS vs OSMENA
DEOGRACIAS A. REGIS, JR., petitioner, vs. SERGIO OSMEA, JR., VICENTE PACIFICO, CITY OF CEBU, CITY COUNCIL OF CEBU, CITY TREASURER AND
CITY AUDITOR, respondents.
May 23, 1991
DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS: On Jan. 18, 1958 Regis was appointed by Mayor Duterte as driver, Motorized Division of the Cebu Police
Department and the CSC approved his appointment provisionally on the condition that he meet the requirement of
passing the Civil Service Exams which he eventually did. He was appointed 3 more times for salary adjustments. On April
14, 1964, he was removed from his position in the Cebu Police Department without prior investigation or hearing, the
termination having been made in a letter of dismissal. Mayor Osmena, Jr. (replaced Duterte) replaced him with a non-
civil service eligible. RTC held that the appointment to Regis was temporary and can be revoked anytime.

ISSUE: WON Regis could be removed from his appointment without cause. (NO)

RATIO: The confusion lies in Regis appointment being provisional. The Civil Service law differentiates provisional
appointments from temporary appointments.

RA 2260 Civil Service Law, Section 24.
(a.) Provisional Appointments. A provisional appointment may be issued upon prior authorization of the Commissioner
in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereto to a person
who has not qualified in an appropriate examination but who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a
regular position in the competitive service, whenever a vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest
of the serviceand there is no appropriate register of eligibles at the time of appointment.
(b.)Temporary Appointment. a person may receive a temporary appointment to a position needed only for a limited
period not exceeding 6 months, provided that a preference in filling such position be given to persons on appropriate
eligible lists.

In the case of Festejo V. Barreras:
Provisional certain work be done or functions be performed by a regular employee, only there is no one with
appropriate eligibility, who can be appointed to do it, hence any other eligible may be appointed to perform such work
or functions in the meanwhile that a suitable eligible does not qualify for the position.
Temporary occasional work or job to be done which is expected to be finished in not more than 6 months

In Ata, et. al. V. Namocatcat, et. al. (1972)
Temporary without definite tenure, dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power
A provisional appointment can only be terminated 30 days after the receipt by the appointing power of a list of eligibles
from the CSC.

RA 6040 (1969), Section 18
All provisional appointments made or appointments approved by the CSC under Section 24 (c) of RA 2260 prior to the
approval o f this act shall automatically be permanent under the provisions of Section 24 (b) thereof as amended by this
act, subject to the provisions of Section 16 (h) of said Act as herein amended.

DISPOSITIVE: Decision appealed from is REVERSED. Regis is to be reinstated with backwages.

ACHACOSO vs MACARAIG
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, petitioner, vs. CATALINO MACARAIG and RUBEN D. TORRES, in their capacities as Executive
Secretary and Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), respectively; and JOSE N.SARMIENTO,
respondents.

FACTS: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. In
compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines, he filed a courtesy resignation. This was
accepted by the President with deep regrets. The Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the
Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge. He protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office
because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President's directive. Jose N. Sarmiento was
appointed administrator of the POEA. Achacoso filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, this
petition for prohibition and mandamus.

Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure, which
is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as distinguished from the Non-Career Service. His argument is that in
view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the officials (provided in the Civil Service Decree), it was beyond the
prerogatives of the President to require them to submit courtesy resignations. Such courtesy resignations, even if files,
should be disregarded for having been submitted under duress, as otherwise the President would have the power to
remove career officials at pleasure, even for a capricious reasons.

Macaraig et. al. assert that Achacoso is not entitled to the guaranty because he is not a career official. They contend that
as he was not a career executive service eligible at the time of his appointment, he came under the exception to the rule
and so was subject to the provision that he shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination
and that he shall not be promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies in such examination. Not having taken that
examination, he could not claim that his appointment was permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure in his
position.

ISSUE: WON Achacoso is entitled to security of tenure. (NO)

RATIO: The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure to
its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications.

The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person todischarge the same pending the selection of a permanent or anotherappointee. In these
circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method of terminating official relations known in the law of public
officers as expiration of the term. The acting appointee is separated precisely because his term has expired. Expiration of
the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure. A permanent appointment can be issued
only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed."Since Achacoso was not a career executive service eligible at the time of his
appointment, his permanent employment was under the condition that he "shall subsequently take the required Career
Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies in such examination."
Not having taken that examination, he could not claim that his appointment was permanent and guaranteed him
security of tenure in his position. Achacoso was not able to meet all the qualifications. At best, his appointment could be
regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a moment's
notice," conformably to established jurisprudence.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DISMISSED.

MAROHOMBSAR vs ALONTO
DR. EMILY M. MAROHOMBSAR, petitioner, vs. AHMAD E. ALONTO, JR., in his capacity as President of the Mindanao State University, and CORAZON
BATARA, respondents.
February 25, 1991
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS: Marohombsar was designated as OIC of the Office of the Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs (OVCAA) of
Mindanao State University in a concurrent capacity with her position then as Vice-President for External studies. The
Office of the VP for Externals was merged with the OVCAA and, as such, the functions of the former were to be
exercised by the latter. Marohombsar was appointed as acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs on the same day.
The Board of Regents of MSU approved her appointment as such.

Afterwards Alonto, the President of MSU, decided that he wants to tap the Marohombsars talent for the MSU system as
VP for Academic Affairs which is under the administrative staff of the President. She declined because she has already
started several projects as OVCAA which she wants to see through. The President designated Corazon Batara to replace
Marohombsar as OIC of the OVCAA.

ISSUE: WON Marhombsar may be removed from her appointed position by Alonto even without cause. (NO)

RATIO: The special order confirmed by the Board of Regents specifically designated Marohombsar as Acting Vice-
Chancellor for Academic Affairs. A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary and revocable in
character and the holder of such appointment may be removed anytime even without hearing or cause.

A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity extended and received without any protest or reservation
and who acts thereunder for a considerable time cannot later be heard to say that the appointment was, in reality,
permanent and therefore there can be no removal except for cause. There are circumstances, however, which rule
against the routine or blind application of the principle which governs acting appointments to this case. The essence of
an acting appointment is its temporary nature. It is a stop gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until a
permanent appointment is extended or a new appointee is chosen.

The nature of an acting appointment limits not only the claims of the appointee to a lengthy tenure but also defines the
authority of the appointing power. A public officer appointed in an acting capacity cannot claim that the appointment
shall in time ripen into a permanent one. However, neither can the appointing power use the principle of temporary
appointments to evade or avoid the security of tenure principle in the Constitution and the Civil Service Law. This is
similar to the rule that the head of an office cannot arbitrarily convert permanent positions to primarily confidential
items so that he can more freely fire and hire or rehire subordinates at his personal discretion. It is the nature of the
functions attached to a position, not the nomenclature or title given by the appointing authority which determines its
primarily confidential nature. For the same reason, the Court may inquire into the true nature of an "acting"
appointment to determine whether or not it is used as a device to circumvent the security of tenure principle.

In this case, the intent to make Marohombsar serve at the pleasure of the MSU President is obvious. The VP External
Studies was merged with the OVCAA, and she was appointed OVCAA. The effect, therefore, was to abolish her
permanent office and give her a temporary appointment in the supposedly new office which replaced or absorbed the
former office. Another result was the loss of her permanent status.

The power to designate is vested in the MSU President. The designation must be less than one year. It must be reported
to the Board of Regents at the next regular meeting. After the meeting, another designation must be issued if no
permanent appointment was made. The earlier designation becomes void as the Board is expected to fill the item
permanently, not merely leaving it temporarily occupied.

On the other hand, the power to appoint is vested in the Board of Regents as follows:
If the President merely designates, the Board of Regents does not confirm the designation. Since it is only for the
information of the Board, the President's action should be merely "noted."

When the Board of Regents confirmed the appointment of Marohombsar on May 16, 1989, it was acting on an ad
interim appointment effected by the President. No other interpretation can be validly made. If it was a mere
designation, it needs no confirmation. The fact that confirmation was needed shows that it is an ad interim one. An ad
interim appointment is one made during the time when the appointing or confirming body is not in session and there is
an existing clear and present urgency caused by an impending obstruction or paralyzation of the functions assigned to
the office if no immediate appointment is made. When the Vice-Presidency for External Studies was abolished and its
functions were merged with the Vice-Chancellorship for Academic Affairs, both the security of tenure of the occupant
and the needs of the new office called for the ad interim appointment.

Alonto cannot use the device of an ambiguous designation to go around the security of tenure principle. Under the MSU
Code, a designation requires a fixed period of not less than one year. The appointment given to Marohombsar was
indefinite. She would serve at the pleasure of the MSU President who is not even the head of the institution because the
head is the Board of Regents.

The intent to convert permanent items into temporary ones is apparent. Marohombsar states that the purpose "is to
hold the sword of Damocles hanging over the head of all MSU employees and officers." The Board of Regents
cooperated in the plan. Practically, all top officers below the President were converted into positions where the
occupants serve at the pleasure of the President and presumably, the Board of Regents. Thus, at the May 16, 1989
Board of Regents' meeting at the Army and Navy Club alongside the Luneta in Manila, several acting appointments were
submitted for approval or confirmation.

Alonto argues that the permanent item of Marohombsar is Professor VI, saying that she has not refuted the fact that
the position she actually occupies is that of Professor VI. This is precisely the reason why her designation as Acting VCAA
cannot be deemed a regular or permanent appointment because, if it were so, the anomalous situation of one
permanently appointed to two public positions simultaneously would arise.

As early as 1963, this Court ruled that UP Deans and Directors enjoy security of tenure and any attempt to remove them
by limiting their terms of office from permanent to a five (5) year term is unconstitutional. Deans and Directors are
selected from faculty members. An appointment as Professor is also needed for salary rating purposes but does not
detract from the permanent nature of the administrative position. The fact that Professor Tapales was given another
appointment as Director of the U.P. Conservatory of Music does not mean that the second appointment is only
temporary in nature. In the present case, the fact that Professor Marohombsar has a permanent appointment as
Professor does not detract from the permanent nature of her present appointment as Vice-Chancellor, especially since
the same was duly confirmed by the MSU Board of Regents. The only difference is that her position as Vice-Chancellor
has a fixed term while that of Professor Tapales was until he retired or resigned.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. Marohombsar to remain as the lawful occupant in a permanent capacity of the
position of Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs of MSU Marawi until the end of her three-year term or her tenure is
otherwise lawfully terminated.







SINON vs CSC
ELISEO A. SINON, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-REORGANIZATION APPEALS BOARD AND JUANA
BANAN, respondents.
November 5, 1992
CAMPOS, JR., J.

FACTS: A resolution issued during a reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) by the Department of
Agriculture Reorganization Appeals Board (DARAB) revoked Sinon's permanent appointments as Municipal Agriculture
Officer (MAO) and appointed, in his stead, Banan. The CSC affirmed the appointment of the DARAB.

Prior to the reorganization, Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) while Sinon occupied the
position of Fisheries Extension Specialist (FES) II in the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR).

However the reorganization of the MAF into the Department of Agriculture called for the evaluation of the employees
for the 29 positions of MAO. The list done by the Placement Committee included Sinon but not Banan.

Thus Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-evaluation. His request was granted. In the ranking of the 29
employees, Banan replaced Sinon in the 29th position. However, Sinon received an appointment based on the first
evaluation done. Banan filed a MR in which she pitted her qualifications against Sinon for the last slot in the 29 available
MAO positions. CSC granted the MR of Banan. According to the CSC, the decision of the RAB has the imprimatur of the
Secretary as compared to the findings of the Placement Committee whose functions are merely recommendatory.

ISSUE: WON the CSC committed grave abuse discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the qualifications of Sinon. (NO)

RATIO: With the reorganization of the MAF into the DA with Executive Order No. 116, it became imperative to "protect
the security of tenure of Civil Service Officers and employees in the implementation of government reorganization".
Thus, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6656. It was under the same law of R.A. 6656 that the Placement Committee
was created:

Section 6. In order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in any reorganization, there shall be
created a Placement Committee in each department or agency to assist the appointing authority in the judicious selection and
placement of personnel. The Committee shall consist of two (2) members appointed by the head of the department or agency,
a representative of the appointing authority, and two (2) members duly elected by the employees holding positions in the first
and second levels of the career service: Provided, that if there is a registered employee association with a majority of the
employees as members, that employee association shall also have a representative in the Committee: Provided, further, that
immediately upon the approval of the staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned, such staffing pattern shall be
made known to all officers and employees of the agency who shall be invited to apply for any of the positions authorized
therein. Such application shall be considered by the committee in the placement and selection of personnel.

To "assist" means to lend an aid to, or to contribute effort in the complete accomplishment of an ultimate purpose
intended to be effected by those engaged.

In contrast, to "recommend" is to present one's advice or choice as having one's approval or to represent or urge as
advisable or expedient. It involves the idea that another has the final decision.

Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the duty of exercising the same discretionary functions as the
appointing authority in the judicious selection and placement of personnel when the law empowered it to "assist" the
appointing authority.

The same law also allows any officer or employee aggrieved by the appointments to file an appeal with the appointing
authority who shall make a decision within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. If the same employee is still not
satisfied with the decision of the appointing authority, he may further appeal within ten (10) days from the receipt
thereof to the CSC.

In the case at bar, the Circular of the Office of the President created the agency Reorganization Appeals Board to
address the problem of employees affected by the reorganizations. The foregoing legal measures spell out the
remedies of aggrieved parties which make it impossible to give the status of finality to any appointment until all protests
or oppositions are duly heard. Thus, while it is true that the appointment paper received by petitioner Sinon for the
position of MAO had not conferred any permanent status and was still subject to the following conditions attached to
any appointment in the civil service:

"Provided that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the
appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment."

Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the qualifications filed by Banan was pending, Sinon cannot claim that he had
been issued with a "complete" appointment. Neither is there any point in asserting that his appointment had "cured"
whatever change was subsequently recommended by the DARAB. The fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating
the findings of the Placement Committee only to find that Sinon is not qualified should not be taken as a grave abuse of
discretion.

Besides, in affirming the appointment of Banan as recommended by the DARAB and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture, the CSC is only being consistent with the law. Section 4 of R.A. 6656 mandates that officers and employees
holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved
staffing pattern comparable to their former positions. Also, the term incumbent officer and the privileges generally
accorded to them would more aptly refer to Banan and not to petitioner Sinon whose appointment was never
confirmed completely. 19 There is no dispute that the position of MAO in the old staffing pattern is most comparable to
the MAO in the new staffing pattern.

Finally, the Solicitor General in behalf of the CSC correctly noted that the petitioner Sinon had conveniently omitted the
then Secretary of Agriculture who had affixed his approval on the findings of the DARAB. Petitioner Sinon knew fully well
that as head of the agency. The Secretary of Agriculture was the appointing authority.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED.

PROVINCE OF CAMSUR vs CA
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR through its GOVERNOR, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and PROVINCIAL TREASURER, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TITO B. DATO, respondent.
July 14, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS: In January 1, 1960, Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov. of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.
In 1972, he was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr. He had no civil
service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanent appointment.
He was extended a temporary appointment, which was renewed annually.

In 1974, Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's
representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status
however, was not favorably acted upon by the CSC reasoning that Dato did not possess the necessary civil service
eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was
extended to him.

In 1976, Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard
for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from
confinement. Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur
Unit of the CSC, wrote the Governor a letter informing him that the status of Dato has been changed from temporary to
permanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be
made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination. Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the
appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted Dato's name from the Governor's plantilla. He
was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Gov. for reinstatement and
backwages. His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action before the RTC whichrdered the payment of backwages of
Dato equivalent to five years. Province of Camarines Sur appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed RTCs decision.

ISSUE: WON Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on
March 16,1976. (NO)

RATIO: CSC argues that when Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the employment status from temporary
to permanent, which the CSC approved as only temporary pending validation of the results of Dato's examination for
supervising security guard, the Datos appointment in effect remained temporary. Hence, his subsequent qualification
for civil service eligibility did not ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent. In this case, what is
required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment
these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority.

Dato rests his case entirely on the letter dated March 19, 1976 communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Governor of
Camarines Sur. Such is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to the appointing authority. Time and again, the
Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil
Service Commission.

In Luego v. Civil Service Commission,

it was ruled that CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set
before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the
employment status of an employee. The CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position
and if it finds the person qualified it must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is
to attest appointments and after that function is discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases. In this
case, CSC should have ended its participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it
confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing
communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the
discretion vested solely upon the latter. Moreover, the Court is not prepared to accord said letter any probative value,
the same being merely a purported photocopy of the alleged letter, initialed and not even signed by the proper officer
of the CSC.

DISPOSITIVE: Appealed Decision is REVERSED.

GLORIA vs DE GUZMAN
SEC. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine State
College of Aeronautics (PSCA); JULIAN J. LOLENG, JR., in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge of PSCA; and BOARD OF TRUSTEES of PSCA, petitioners, vs.
HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., Presiding Judge of Branch 113, Regional Trial Court of Pasay, Metro Manila; VIRGILIO R. RAMOS, LEONY P.
SENDIN, ROSARIO V. CERILLO, ANDREA A. PESTANO, ARTHUR V. RODRIGUEZA, LENI V. DIMAYUGA, JAIME ABON, RIZALDO O. VALLE, JOIE ARCEO,
SHIRLEY PESTANO, SERVANDO SACUEZA, JAIME C. PONEGAL, EDGARDO MERCADO, CRISTINA BULADO, BENIGNO T. AQUINO, RODEL PESTANO, JUN
JAY PARMA, NILO B. ELLO, and NELSON SACUEZA, respondents.
October 6, 1995
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

FATCS: Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) by virtue of
temporary appointments because at the time of their appointment, they lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or
otherwise failed to meet the necessary qualification standards for their respective positions. One of them was Rosario
Cerillo who was appointed as Board Secretary II of PAFCA. However she was relieved from the position by reason of loss
of confidence. Subsequently, she was designated as "Coordinator for Extension Services". Said appointments expired
when the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA (Philippine State College of Aeronautics). Aggrieved, Cerillo et.
al. filed a Petition for Mandamus and Reinstatement for reinstatement before the RTC of Pasay. Petitioners filed an
answer stating that mandamus will not lie to compel reinstatement because the reappointment prayed for is
discretionary on the part of the appointing power (Board of Trustees). Judge de Guzman rendered a decision ordering
the reinstatement of Cerillo as coordinator for extension services. Sec. Gloria filed a petition for certiorari to the SC.

ISSUE: WON Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services." (NO)
RATIO: The fact is that Cerillo's assignment to the said position was a mere designation. Not being a permanent
appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. The fact that Cerillo
passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after the termination of her temporary appointment is no reason to
compel petitioners to reappoint her.

Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the appointing
authority are: performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and, more importantly, as in this
case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power, considering that the
position of Board Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily confidential.

Reappointment to such position is an act which is discretionary on the part of the appointing power hence it cannot be
the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus. Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which
is essentially discretionary, to be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary
power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing
authority.

Thus the order of the lower court for the reinstatement of the private respondent amounts to an undue interference by
the court in the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees. To the question as to the legality
of the termination of the services of the petitioners, the only answer is there was no termination to speak of.
Termination presupposes an overt act committed by a superior officer. There was none whatsoever in the case at bar. At
most, PSCA Chairman of the Board of Trustees Col. Julian gave notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their
respective contracts, Petitioners appointment or employment simply expired either by its very own terms, or because it
may not exceed one year, but most importantly because the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. Challenged petition declared NULL and VOID.

MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and
GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.
April 2, 2002
Carpio, J.

FACTS: On February 1999, Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs Education and Information
Department by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, Benipayo was
appointed Comelec Chairman together withother commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad
interim appointment, Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring Matibag to
the Law Department. Matibag requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7, reminding heads
of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo
denied her request for reconsideration citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, exempting Comelec from the coverage of
the said Memo Circular. Matibag appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.
She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261 (h)of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, Matibag filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively. She claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUE: WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued
by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (NO)

RATIO: Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman. The ad interim appointments to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do
not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by1987 Constitution ARTICLE IX-C Sec 1, Par 2.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. Ad interim appointments take effect at once. This is to avoid
interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices,
including the 3 constitutional commissions.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC,
subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor General Felix Bautista
in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by
the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent", this provision should be harmonized with
the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will
negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to
give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.

The reappointments are valid pursuant to:
RULES OF COA: Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President.
Nominations or Appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the
close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are
made, shall not again be considered by the Commission.
The ad interim appointments in this case are by-passed because the COA failed to organize and did not decide upon
the merits of the appointments. The president may renew.
What the Constitution prohibits is the reappointment of disapproved appointments.
When there will be no reappointments all with confirmation of the COA:
1.when the appointee serves his full 7 year term;
2.when the appointee serves a part of his term, then resigns before his 7yr term ends;
3.where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee c
ompletes the unexpired term;
4.where the appointee has previously served a term of less than 7 yrs, under the truncated term of 5 or 3 years - and a
vacancy arises from death or resignation.

The ad interim appointments are for a fixed term expiring February 2, 2008. There is no approval by the COA yet. The
reason for the prohibition is to insure that no member of the Commission will serve for more than 7 years, or for more
than his term. (if less than 7yrs)

The transfer of Matibag is valid because her appointment was temporary, and can be withdrawn at will by the
appointing authority and at a moments notice;: she is not a Career Executive Service (CES) Officer, required by the
position of Director IV; COMELEC en banc via Resolution 3300 approved transfers and reassignments of personnel by the
COMELEC Chairman, the official authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC Personnel.

DISPOSITIVE: Patition DEISMISSED for lack of merit.


ERASMO VS. HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORP.
MA. ERLY P. ERASMO, petitioner, vs. HOME INSURANCE & GUARANTY CORPORATION, respondent.
August 29, 2002
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS: Earasmo started working with HIGC in 1982 and held various positions therein. The nature of her appointment
was promotion and her employment status was temporary since the position is a Career Executive Service office
(CESO) and she lacks the required CES eligibility. She was then charged with 1) neglect of duty, 2) incompetence in the
performance of official duties and 3) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and 4) directly or indirectly
having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of her office.

In the meantime, Erasmo appealed the status of the temporary appointment to the CSC. The CSC ruled against her
stating that even if she possesses eligibility, the appointment still cannot be considered permanent unless an
appointment to the rank has been granted by the President of the Philippines.

She was subsequently terminated from service. She is now asking for reinstatement and backwages because of an
opinion of the executive Director of the Career Service Board which said that an administrative case does not
automatically revoke the appointment nor does it affect the validity of the temporary appointment, and that for the
termination to be effective, there must be a categorical and/or positive act of termination of service.

ISSUE: WON is entitled to be reinstated to the position of Vice-President of TS/GCIG of respondent HIGC. (NO)

RATIO: The facts of this case indubitably show that Erasmos promotional appointment as Vice-President of TS/GCIG is
merely temporary in nature. Her appointment papers dated June 11, 1992 clearly indicate it. This is because she did not
possess a career executive service eligibility which is necessary for the position of Vice-President of TS/GCIG, it being a
career service executive office. Her new appointment, being temporary in character, was terminable at the pleasure of
the appointing power with or without a cause, and she does not enjoy security of tenure.

Matibag vs. Benipayo citing Achacoso vs. Macaraig: it is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only to a
person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriated
eligibility prescribed. The mere fact that the position belongs to the career service does not automatically confer security
of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualification. Such right is dependent on the nature
of the appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place, or as an exception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him
cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED for lack f merit.

PADILLA VS. CSC
REMEDIOS S. PADILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT, respondents.
May 8, 2003
CORONA, J.

FACTS: Padilla assumed the permanent position of Clerk II in the Ministry of Labor and Employment. She was promoted
to the position of Labor Department Assistant. Without waiting for the CSC approval, she assumed office. Her
appointment was denied for her failure to meet the requirements for the position. She subsequently resigned from the
service citing personal reasons.

She then took the Career Service Examination and passed. She re-applied at the DOLE and was offered the position of
Casual Research Assistant and then afterwards, Casual Technical. Due to the implementation of RA 6758, known as the
Salary Standardization Act of 1989, casual items such as the position of the petitioner were abolished. She was offered
the position of Clerk II but she declined. She became Casual Clerk III. After the expiration of her appointment as a
casual employee, petitioner was no longer given any position. She then requested the monetary conversion of
her unused sick and vacation leaves which respondent DOLE granted. She is now contesting her termination to
the CSC which dismissed her petition. Her appeal was further dismissed by the CA.

ISSUE: WON Padillas dismissal was proper. (YES)

RATIO: Padilla used to occupy the permanent position of Clerk II before the disapproval of her appointment for Labor
Development Assistant, a higher permanent position. Thereafter, she voluntarily resigned and later came back to occupy
casual positions only despite passing the eligibility requirement for a permanent position. Like removal for just cause,
voluntary resignation results in the abdication of all present and future rights accorded to an employee and in the
severance of all work-related ties between the employer and the employee. When she returned to work for respondent
DOLE, the same was not a continuation of her previous service but the start of a new work slate. Petitioner could not
therefore demand from respondent DOLE her reinstatement to a permanent position under Section 24 (d) of PD 807
inasmuch as she was never unjustly removed.

When she re-applied for and was offered the position of Casual Research Assistant and later Casual Technical, she
readily and unqualifiedly accepted the said offer. Having accepted the position of a casual employee, petitioner should
have known that she had no security of tenure and could thus be separated from the service anytime.

After finishing her contract as a Casual Technical, DOLE offered her the permanent position of Clerk II (the only available
permanent position then) for which the Selection Board deemed her qualified. However, she declined the offer and
instead opted to accept another casual position as Casual Clerk III. DOLE therefore gave her the opportunity to re-
assume a permanent position but she was apparently bent on acquiring a position equal to a Labor Development
Assistant, a position she could not obtain by right due to her earlier resignation. On the ground of estoppel, she is barred
from asserting her right to a permanent position.

Not having been unjustly removed from the service, it follows that Padillas right to due process was not violated. In fact,
there was no need to furnish her a notice of termination since, as a casual employee, petitioner was aware of the date
of expiration of her temporary appointment.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED.

CSC VS. DELA CRUZ
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ, respondent.
August 31, 2004
CORONA, J.

FACTS: Dela Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office, DOTC, presently holding the position of chief Aviation
Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. His promotion to said position was duly attested to by the CSC.
Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC) her protest against the promotional appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety
Regulation Officer, claiming among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said
position. This was declined. Upon appeal, however, the CSC-NCR upheld the protest of Calamba. The CA, on the other
hand, ruled in favor Dela Cruz.

The CSC contends that the appellate court erred in approving Dela Cruzs appointment as Chief Aviation Safety
Regulation Officer despite his failure to meet the minimum four-year managerial and supervisory qualification for the
position. Dela Cruzs completion of the required experience during the pendency of the present case cannot be counted
in his favor because compliance with the prescribed mandatory requirements should be as of the date of issuance of the
appointment and not the date of approval by the CSC or the resolution of the protest against the appointment.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in its decision. (NO)

RATIO: As noted by the CSC-NCR, the contested position required four years of work experience in managerial
position(s) per the Qualification Standards Manual prescribed by MC No. 46, s. 1993 and/or four years of experience in
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations
pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools
per the above-stated ATO-DOTC Qualification Standards.

The CSCs insistence that Dela Cruz failed to meet the four-year managerial and supervisory experience requirement is
misplaced. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the use of the term and/or means that the word
and and the word or are to be used interchangeably. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and
independence of one thing from another. Thus, the use of the disjunctive term or in this controversy connotes that
either the standard in the first clause or that in the second clause may be applied in determining whether a prospective
applicant for the position under question may qualify.

Dela Cruz would indeed lack the required years of work experience to qualify for the contested position if the
managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly followed. At the time of his permanent appointment on
November 28, 1994 as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, respondent had a little over one year of managerial
experience from his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division during the latter part of 1993. However,
the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment was well within the supervisory
standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety
laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the
activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his
appointment.

Before Dela Cruz was appointed to the contested position, he had held several other positions in the ATO. These
positions, spanning more than 13 years, in four of the five sections of the Aviation Safety Division of the ATO definitely
met the minimum supervisory experience required of respondent for the position.

The rule that appointees must possess the prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so strictly interpreted as to
curtail an agencys discretionary power to appoint, as long as the appointee possesses other qualifications required by
law. The appellate court was therefore correct in setting aside the assailed CSC resolutions and considering the
respondents total work experience as sufficient to meet the supervisory standards under the second clause, thereby
finding respondent qualified for appointment to the contested position.

Dela Cruzs promotional appointment was issued in accordance with CSCs selection process. Dela Cruz passed the rigid
screening of the ATO Personnel Selection/Promotion Board as well as the oral and written examinations of the DOTC
Selection Board. His multifarious experiences and trainings in air transportation were taken into account when he was
chosen for the subject position. Respondent not only showed a continuing interest to improve his expertise in the field
of air transportation, he also acquired an Airline Transport Pilots License in 1998. As a privileged holder of such license,
Dela Cruz exercised administrative supervision and control over pilots, cabin and crew members to ensure compliance
with air safety laws, rules and regulations.

It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the
proper authority. In Salles vs. Francisco, et al., in the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority
considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and
seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice
which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those
who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected
and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority.

We, however, agree with petitioner that the reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the
date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of resolution of the protest
against it. We need not rule on petitioners assertion that respondents subsequent compliance with the experience
standards during the pendency of the case should not be counted in his favor since respondent was anyway qualified for
the position at the time of his appointment.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
CSC VS. DARANGINA
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. ENGR. ALI P. DARANGINA, Respondent
January 31, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

FACTS: Engr. Darangina was a development management officer V in the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA). He was
extended a temporary promotional appointment as Director III, Plans and Policy Services in the same office. The CSC
approved the termporary appointment. The newly appointed OMA Executive Director terminated the temporary
appointment of respondent on the ground that he is not a career service eligible. The ExecDir appointed another person
who is also not career service eligible, and thus, the CSC disapproved his appointment.

The CSC also issued a resolution sustaining the termination of his temporary appointment but ordering the payment of
his salaries from the time he was appointed until his separation. This was later modified, directing the OMA to pay
respondent up to the time of the expiration of his temporary appointment. Respondent also insists for his reinstatement
as director III.

ISSUE: WON the pre-termination of Daranginas temporary appointment is valid and WON he can be reinstated. (NO)

RATIO: Section 27, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended,
classifying the appointment status of public officers and employees in the career service, reads:

SEC. 27. Employment Status. Appointment in the career service shall be permanent or temporary.

(1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and
standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.

(2) Temporary appointment. In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed
twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

It is clear that a permanent appointment can issue only to a person who possesses all the requirements for the position
to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility. Differently stated, as a rule, no person may be
appointed to a public office unless he or she possesses the requisite qualifications. The exception to the rule is where, in
the absence of appropriate eligibles, he or she may be appointed to it merely in a temporary capacity. Such a temporary
appointment is not made for the benefit of the appointee. Rather, an acting or temporary appointment seeks to prevent
a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection of a
permanent appointee. In Cuadra v. Cordova, this Court defined a temporary appointment as "one made in an acting
capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary character and its terminability at pleasure by the appointing power."
Thus, the temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition that he shall surrender the office when called
upon to do so by the appointing authority. Under Section 27 (2), Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same Code,
the term of a temporary appointment shall be 12 months, unless sooner terminated by the appointing authority. Such
pre-termination of a temporary appointment may be with or without cause as the appointee serves merely at the
pleasure of the appointing power.

Under the Revised Qualifications Standards prescribed by the CSC, career executive service eligibility is a necessary
qualification for the position of director III in Plans and Policy Services, OMA. It is not disputed that on September 25,
2000, when respondent was extended an appointment, he was not eligible to the position, not being a holder of such
eligibility. Hence, his appointment was properly designated as "temporary." Then on October 31, 2000, newly-appointed
OMA Executive Director Tomawis recalled respondents temporary appointment and replaced him by appointing
Alongan Sani. It turned out, however, that Sani is not likewise qualified for the post. A game of musical chairs then
followed. Sani was subsequently replaced by Tapa Umal, who in turn, was succeeded by Camad Edres, and later, was
replaced by Ismael Amod. All these appointees were also disqualified for lack of the required eligibility XwL1Cglql.

The Court of Appeals ruled that such replacements are not valid as the persons who replaced respondent are not also
eligible. Also, since he was replaced without just cause, he is entitled to serve the remaining term of his 12-month term
with salaries.

This Court has ruled that where a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, his replacement by another non-eligible
is not prohibited.

Moreover, in Achacoso cited earlier, this Court held that when a temporary appointee is required to relinquish his office,
he is being separated precisely because his term has expired. Thus, reinstatement will not lie in favor of respondent.
Starkly put, with the expiration of his term upon his replacement, there is no longer any remaining term to be served.
Consequently, he can no longer be reinstated.

As to whether respondent is entitled to back salaries, it is not disputed that he was paid his salary during the entire
twelve-month period in spite of the fact that he served only from September 25, 2000 to October 31, 2000, or for only
one month and six days. Clearly, he was overpaid.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. Resolution of the CA REVERSED. Darangina ordered to refund the salaries he received
after his termination in October 2000.