92 views

Uploaded by Maria Parra

- Art of Reasoning, The - Kelley, David [SRG]
- Paul OGrady Relativism Central Problems of Philosophy 2002
- Public Reason - Volume 1, Number 1, February 2009
- John Dewey - Human Nature and Conduct
- Hume’s Problems with Induction
- Von Plato J.-elements of Logical Reasoning-CUP (2014)
- Modal Logics and Philosophy (Girle)
- Theory of Interpretation
- Bertrand Russell and the Origins of the Set-Theoretic 'Paradoxes'. Alejandro R. Garciadiego
- ARISTOTLES SYLOGISTIC Jan Łukasiewicz
- Symbolic Logic
- 12.3 Appraising Analogical Arguments
- Hermann Weyl - The Continuum: A Critical Examination
- Logic and Critical Thinking
- Handbook of Philosophical Logic Second Edition 10
- Schindler Set Theory 3319067249
- Logic for Law Students
- ContinuumHypothesis
- Georg Henrik Von Wirht - Explanation and Understanding - 1971
- Handbook of Philosophical Logic Second Edition 11

You are on page 1of 390

SYNTHESE LIBRARY

STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,

LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Managing Editor:

JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Florida State University, Tallahassee

Editors:

DONALD DAVIDSON, University of California, Berkeley

GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden

WESLEY C. SALMON, University of Pittsburgh

VOLUME 181

FREGE

SYNTHESIZED

Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work

of Gottlob Frege

Edited by

LEILA HAAP ARANT A

Academy of Finland

and

JAAKKO HINTIKKA

Department of Philosophy, Florida State University

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY

A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP

DORDRECHT/BOSTON/LANCASTER/TOKYO

Library of Congress Catalogingin-Publication Data

Frege synthesized.

(Synthese library; v. 181)

Bibliography: p.

Includes indexes.

1. Frege, Gottlob, 1848-1925. 1. Haaparanta,

II. Hintikka, Jaakko, 1929-

B3245.F24F72 1986 193 8tHi523

Leila, 1954-

ISBN13: 9789401085236 eISBN13: 9789400945524

001: 10. 1007/9789400945524

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,

P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.

Sold and distributed in the U.SA. and Canada

by Kluwer Academic Publishers,

190 Old Derby Street, Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed

by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group

P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland

All Rights Reserved

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

Reprint of the original edition 1986

and copyrightholders as specified on appropriate pages within

No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or

utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,

including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and

retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

INTRODUCTION

LEILA HAAP ARANT A and JAAKKO HINTIKKA / General

Introduction 3

JOAN WEINER / Putting Frege in Perspective 9

PART II

SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

J. VAN HEIJENOORT / Frege and Vagueness 31

HANS SLUGA / Semantic Content and Cognitive Sense 47

THOMAS G. RICKETTS / Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege's

Metaphysics of Judgment 65

TYLER BURGE / Frege on Truth 97

LEILA HAAPARANTA / Frege on Existence 155

PART III

LOGICAL THEORY

MICHAEL D. RESNIK / Frege's Proof of Referentiality 177

NINO B. COCCHIARELLA / Frege, Russell and Logicism: A

Logical Reconstruction 197

ROBERT B. BRANDOM / Frege's Technical Concepts: Some

Recent Developments 253

PARl'IV

PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

PHILIP KITCHER / Frege, Dedekind, and the Philosophy of

Mathematics 299

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

G REG 0 R Y CUR R IE / Continuity and Change in Frege's

Philosophy of Mathematics 345

A. W. MOORE and ANDREW REIN / Grundgesetze, Section

10 375

INDEX OF NAMES 385

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 388

PART I

INTRODUCTION

LEILA HAAPARANTA AND JAAKKO HINTIKKA

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Gottlob Frege's philosophical and foundational work was by any token

a major factor in the development of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Some say he was the grandfather of the whole tradition, some think of

him merely as its godfather. In either case, one might expect that his

work has been studied exhaustively. However, this turns out not to have

been the case. Someone - it was probably Burton Dreben - once said

that the worst-known period in the history of philosophy is always the

time fifty to a hundred years ago. The intensive work on Frege which

has been going on in the last decade and a half at first seems to belie this

dictum, but in a looser sense it fits the facts well. For it is only the

developments of the last couple of decades, largely of the last few years

when Frege's work has reached the hundred-years mark, that have

brought to light facts and issues which have shown that our understand-

ing of Frege was seriously incomplete. In recent literature, one can also

find a wealth of new and sometimes controversial viewpoints. For

instance, Jean van Heijenoort has called our attention to an important

but neglected aspect of Frege's attitude to logic and language that he

calls "logic as language". Hans Sluga has challenged on a large scale the

received view of Frege as a lonely figure in nineteenth-century phi-

losophy whose ancestry goes to medieval objectivists rather than his

German predecessors. Sluga wants to place Frege firmly in the middle

of the German philosophical tradition of his day. It is indeed unmistak-

able that there are, for instance, Kantian elements in his thinking that

had earlier been overlooked. Indeed, the idea of logic as language is

likely to be one of them. Another one is the sharp contrast between the

realm of thinking and understanding and the realm of sense and intui-

tion. Sluga's influence is illustrated amply in several papers in this

volume. In an attempt to reverse the traditional priorities, Jaakko

Hintikka has suggested, relying partly on van Heijenoort's interpreta-

tion, that the crucial part of Frege's work in semantics lies in his ideas

about the semantics of the familiar elementary logic (truth-functions and

quantification) rather than in Frege's theory of sense and reference,

which is merely intensional frosting on a more important extensional

3

L. Haaparanta and 1. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 3-8.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

4 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

cake, even though it is typically given the pride of place in expositions in

Frege's semantics. As a part of this attempted reversal of emphasis,

Jaakko Hintikka has also called attention to the role Frege played in

convincing almost everyone that verbs for being had to be treated as

multiply ambiguous between the "is" of identity, the "is" of predication,

the "is" of existence, and the "is" of class-inclusion - a view that had

been embraced by few major figures (if any) before Frege, with the

exception of John Stuart Mill and Augustus De Morgan. Hintikka has

gone on to challenge this ambiguity thesis. At the same time, Frege's

role in the genesis of another major twentieth-century philosophical

movement, the phenomenological one, has become an important issue.

Even the translation of Frege's key term "Bedeutung" as "reference" has

become controversial.

The interpretation of Frege is thus thrown largely back in the melting

pot. In editing this volume, we have not tried to publish the last word on

Frege. Even though we may harbor such ambitions ourselves, they are

not what has led to the present editorial enterprise. What we have tried

to do is to bring together some of the best ongoing work on Frege. Even

though the ultimate judgment on our success lies with out readers, we

want to register our satisfaction with all the contributions.

The first paper included in this volume is an exploratory attempt to

reach a general perspective on Frege's work. Joan Weiner stresses in her

paper 'Putting Frege in Perspective' that once we start trying to under-

stand Frege's work as a reaction to Kantian epistemology, it is urgent to

pay attention to it also as an important part of the background of other

philosophical work. According to Weiner, the problem will be "how one

would connect Frege, the nineteenth-century neo-Kantian, with Frege,

the first twe.ntieth-century philosopher of language and mathematics".

Weiner suggests an answer to the question. She holds the opinion that

Frege subscribed to most of Kantian epistemology. However, since he

substituted his new logic, "the real formal rules of thought", for tradi-

tional Aristotelian logic, he had to modify his Kantian This,

according to Weiner, was the basic' content of virtually all of Frege's

subsequent work. Weiner points out that what we regard as Frege's

philosophical work was for him not a genuine philosophical theory but

could only be a. set of SUbjective clues. On Weiner's view, it was

designed to get us into the proper frame of mind "for understanding the

purpose and significance of his real philosophical work - the work we

think of today as his mathematical work." .

Weiner's paper thus essays into the same general direction Jaakko

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 5

Hintikka's reversal of the traditional view of Frege's semantical prior-

ities mentioned in the beginning of this Preface.

This volume is divided in four parts. The second part consist of

articles dealing with Frege's semantical and epistemological doctrines.

Jean van Heijenoort discusses in his paper Frege's view of vagueness.

He states that Frege's principle of completude (Grundsatz der Vollstiin

digkeit), according to which any function must be defined for all objects,

is closely connected with the requirement of sharpness of concepts, for

Frege takes both lack of completude and lack of sharpness to be a

failure of universal bivalence. Van Heijenoort concludes that Frege

could have rejected the principle of completude, and still preserved

bivalence, and that even if Frege had to ignore vagueness and other

vagaries in his own project, it is perhaps time for us to look at them

more carefully.

In his article 'Semantic Content and Cognitive Sense', Hans Sluga

compares Russell-style theories of meaning with Frege-style ones. In the

former theories, it is assumed that a satisfactory theory of meaning can

be built by means of a binary relation, while the supporters of the latter

theories regard a three-place relation (an expression e refers to an entity

r through having a sense s) as necessary. Sluga discusses Frege's view,

according to which a satisfactory theory of meaning must explain the

difference between trivially true and informatively true identity state-

ments, and attempts to show that Russell-style theories can, at least

partially, satisfy Frege's requirement after all, provided that we are con-

cerned with the difference between semantically trival and semantically

informative identity statements. Furthermore, Sluga argues in his paper

that it was the problem of the status of arithmetical truths that made

Frege take a critical stand against earlier semantic doctrines and intro-

duce a cognitive notion of sense.

Thomas G. Ricketts argues in his article that, for Frege, ontological

categories are secondary with respect to logical ones, and that under-

standing the character of Frege's contrast between objective and sub-

jective may help us see the primacy of judgment in Frege's thought.

According to Ricketts, "our grasp of the notion of an object ... is

exhausted by the apprehension of inference patterns and the recognition

of the truth of the basic logical laws in which these [first-level] variables

figure." Ricketts takes similar remarks to apply to the notion of concept.

Thus he argues that, in Frege's philosophy, the objecthood of thoughts

does not explain the objectivity of judgment but presupposes it.

lt is clear that Ricketts' starting-point is a number of observations

6 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

closely related to van Heijenoort's results mentioned in the beginning of

this Introduction.

In his paper, entitled 'Frege on Truth', Tyler Burge suggests that

Frege's odd-sounding conclusion about truth and falsity should be taken

seriously. In the first section of his article he claims that too little

attention has ben paid to the pragmatic basis of Frege's view that truth

values are objects. According to Burge, Frege is committed to the

doctrine that logic is primarily concerned with the normative notion of

truth. The second section of Burge's paper consists mainly of the

criticism of Dummett's interpretation of Frege's theses on truth values.

In section III Burge purports to show how Frege's identification of the

truth values with particular objects has its sources in "some of his

deepest philosophical conceptions". He holds the view that "in particu-

lar, it proceeds from a theory about the nature of logical objects, from a

thesis about the aim and ordering of logic, and from his conceptions of

assertion and truth."

In her article 'Frege on Existence' Leila Haaparanta emphasizes that

Frege's greatest insight was the idea of first-order language, which, to a

large extent, motivated the rest of his innovations. Haaparanta focuses

her attention on Frege's concept of existence, which receives special

attention in Frege's thought in connection with the thesis concerning the

ambiguity of such words for being as the English 'is'. The ambiguity

thesis was an important part of the Fregean paradigm of first-order

logic. Haaparanta argues that Frege does not only assume the word 'is'

to be ambiguous but that he considers 'exists', or the 'is' of existence, to

be an equivocal word. She suggests that the equivocity view has a meta-

physical and epistemological background in Frege's thought. Her paper

thus pushes a great deal further the suggestions of laakko Hintikka

mentioned earlier in this Introduction.

The third part of this volume is mainly focused on Frege's logical

theory. Michael D. Resnik's paper 'Frege's Proof of Referentiality' deals

with Frege's methodological principle according to which in a properly

constructed scientific language every name must have a reference. Frege

tries to prove in the Grundgesetze that his own system satisfies the

principle. Resnik shows that Frege's proof contains a number of serious

mistakes and that it would not prove what Frege wanted even if it were

correct. Moreover, he argues that reasonable demands of rigor do not

even require such a proof.

It is a widely held opinion that logicism is of no importance, as far as

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 7

current discussion of the foundations of mathematics is concerned. Nino

B. Cocchiarella, for his part, believes that logicism can be defended in

essentially the same philosophical context in which it was originally

presented. He formulates separate reconstructions of Frege's form of

logicism and of Russell's early form of logicism, which he takes to be

closely similar. He reconstructs both of the logicisms as second-order

predicate logics in which nominalized predicates are allowed to occur

as abstract singular terms. The basic difference between Frege's form

of logicism and Russell's early form of logicism is, according to

Cocchiarella, that for Frege there is a sharp distinction between

concepts denoted by usual predicates and concept-correlates denoted

by nominalized predicates, whereas for Russell concepts are their own

concept-correlates.

In the paper 'Frege's Technical Concepts: Some Recent Develop-

ments' Robert Brandom praises Dummett's work on Frege, for Dummett

realizes both the necessity of considering Frege's technical concepts in

the framework of contemporary philosophy and the possibility of

considering contemporary philosophical issues in relation to Frege's

technical concepts. He reviews two recent books, David Bell's Frege's

Theory of Judgment and Hans Sluga's Gottlob Frege, against the back-

ground of Dummett's work and of current interpretive controversies.

Finally, he discusses the justification of the definition of a value-range

(or a course-of-values, Werthverlauf) in the Grundgesetze, which yields a

criticism of Frege's procedure in introducing such concepts as reference,

sense, and function, as well as logical objects like numbers.

The articles included in the fourth part of this volume deal with

Frege's philosophy of mathematics. In his paper, 'Frege, Dedekind, and

the Philosophy of Mathematics,' Philip Kitchel' argues that Frege

accepts most of Kant's philosophy of mathematics, but tries to improve

it by showing how the whole of mathematics could be traced to the

sources of a priori knowledge and how arithmetic can be traced to the

sources of a priori analytic truths instead of pure intuition. Kitcher

defends the claim that, due to his philosophical conviction, Frege

bequeathed to his successors a misguided picture of the central prob-

lems of the philosophy of mathematics. Instead of the Fregean view,

Kitcher recommends us a Dedekindian view of mathematics, which is

also Kantian but which differs from Frege's approach in certain im-

portant respects. Frege tries to find a firm route from basic principles of

logic to the theorems of arithmetic, while Dedekind tries to show why

8 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

our representations are inevitably arithmetically structured. It is true

that Frege mentions in the Grundlagen that mathematics seems to be

inescapable in our representation of experience, but unlike Dedekind,

he does not develop the idea in more detail.

In his paper 'Continuity and Change in Frege's Philosophy of Mathe-

matics', Gregory Currie presents a largely historical analysis of Frege's

theory of real numbers in a framework which includes Frege's concept

of a value-range and his view of the relation between arithmetic and

geometry. More specifically, Currie discusses the role of the following

three principles in the development of Frege's thought: (1) To every

concept there corresponds an object, the extension of that concept. (2)

The applicability of the real numbers to measurement marks a theore-

tically important distinction between them and the natural numbers. (3)

There is a sharp distinction between the sources of arithmetical and of

geometrical knowledge. Currie concludes that the rejection of the first

principle brought about the rejection of the third principle, which, for its

part, brought about the rejection of the second principle.

The paper by A. W. Moore and Andrew Rein is an attempt to resolve

a problem in Section 10 of Frege's Grundgesetze, which Michael

Dummett calls Frege's permutation argument. The argument seems to

show that, if there is one assignment of objects to value-range terms

which satisfies Axiom V, then there are several. Frege suggests that we

can overcome the resulting indefiniteness by demanding that it is

specified for every function, when it is introduced, what values it takes

on for value-ranges and other objects (if such there be) as arguments.

However, this does not help us to ensure that a unique assignment of

objects to value-range terms satisfies Axiom V. By strengthening the

permutation argument, Moore and Rein establish a more radical form

of indeterminacy, which says that "there is no distinguishing, from

within a given theory, between isomorphic models of that theory". They

argue that the real import of the argument is that it cannot be

determined whether or not either truth-value is the value-range of any

given function and that, elaborated this way, the problem suggests its

own solution.

JOAN WEINER

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE

Until recently, there have been few attempts to read the work of Gottlob

Frege in historical context. Many of those who read Frege's writings

today believe that the usual reasons for reading a piece of philosophy in

historical context do not apply to those pieces Frege produced. This

may be a result of the popularity of two views concerning the nature of

Frege's work. One is that Frege's work has no serious philosophical

background. This view seems somewhat plausible given that Frege was

trained as a mathematician, corresponded with mathematicians through

out his career, and seems to have done work only in the quite specialized

areas of philosophy which are directly concerned with mathematics.

According to the story which goes with this view, Frege began with

philosophy of mathematics (investigating problems involved with his

mathematical work which were not exactly mathematical problems) and

saw that some work in the philosophy of logic (and later in the

philosophy of language) was nef'essary. Thus, almost accidentally, Frege

was pulled deeper and deeper into the problems of philosophy. If this

story were true, it would not be unreasonable to assume that his worries

and problems would not have been muddied by the sort of philosophi

cal assumptions and philosophically loaded terms whose prevalence in

other philosophical writings makes it so important that one considers

their historical context.

The tremendous influence Frege has had on contemporary analytic

philosophy has also led people to ignore historical context. Frege is not

only responsible for formulating modern logic, but also seems respon

sible for quite a number of the philosophical terms used and for the

philosophical questions asked today. Many philosophers believe them

selves to be working on Fregean projects and at least one of Frege's

philosophical papers, 'On Sense and Reference', is read in most intro

ductory courses in the philosophy of language. If we regard ourselves as

Frege's direct philosophical heirs, it might seem unlikely that we should

have to read his work in historical context in order to make sense of it.

For, if we are involved in, or reacting to, Frege's projects and argu

ments, surely we understand their significance as well as we understand

the significance and motivation of our own projects and arguments. 1

9

L. Haaparanta andi. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 9-27.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

10 JOAN WEINER

However, in the years since Michael Dummett's book, Frege: Philo

sophy of Language, first appeared, philosophers have begun increasingly

to realize that Frege's work and its motivation are not as transparent as

they traditionally have been taken to be. Of late, there have been a

number of attempts to understand Frege's work by giving it a reading

which is sensitive to historical context. In particular, there has been a

great deal of interest in the extent to which Frege's work can, and

should, be linked to Kant. Philip Kitcher has argued that there is an

important sense in which Frege's work should be viewed as having been

motivated by a concern with Kantian epistemology,2 and Hans Sluga

has argued that Frege's work intended as a contribution to a 19th

century German neo-Kantian movement. 3

I think this sort of reading of Frege's work must be correct. No sense

can be made of Frege's motivation unless we view Frege as responding,

in some serious way, to what he understood as Kantian epistemology.

But, while some of these readings have provided a clearer pictUre of the

philosophical background against which Frege's work should be read,

there has been less attention paid to the sense in which Frege's work,

given such a reading, might be taken as forming part of the background

of other philosophical work. This becomes a pressing issue once we

start trying to understand his work as a reaction to Kantian episte-

mology. For it seems unlikely that the considerable impact Frege has

had on twentieth century analytic philosophy can have been a complete

accident; yet it is not obvious how one would connect Frege, the 19th

century neo-Kantian, with Frege, the first 20th century philosopher of

language and mathematics. To sketch the outlines of how such a connec-

tion might be made, I want to examine certain tensions in Frege's

views and the constraints which taking Frege's concerns as epistemo-

logical (and, in some sense, Kantian) will impose on any Fregean

responses to these tensions. There is little evidence that Frege was

aware of these tensions; he certainly does not seem to have mentioned

them explicitly. However, I believe many of his later writings can be

read as responses I to these tensions which meet the epistemological

constraints. When Frege's later writings are read in this way, an entirely

different picture begins to emerge. This picture will end up coinciding

in remarkable ways with a plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein's

Tractatus. Indeed, this sort of reading of Frege's work might enable us

to understand how the view of the Tractatus could have grown out of

Wittgenstein's appreciations of tensions in Frege's work.

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE 11

I will begin with a brief sketch of the sense in which I think Frege's

work should be read as having been motivated by both a dissatisfaction

with some of the details of Kantian epistemology (as Frege understood

it) and by a desire to make a version of Kantian epistemology work.

Kant, as Frege understood him, believed that traditional Aristotelian

logic set out the formal rules of all thought or, as Frege might have said,

that all inferences which follow from the necessary laws of reason alone

can be shown to be valid using Aristotelian logic. But Frege was

convinced that Kant was mistaken here. Frege thought that the formal

rules of all thought licensed more than those inferences licensed by

Aristotelian logic and that his logical notation, the Begriffsschrift, was

designed to set out the true formal rules of all thought. Frege's overall

project was to modify Kantian epistemology in order to incorporate the

real formal rules of all thought. This project might not seem to require

much more than the formulation of the formal rules of all thought and

the substitution of these rules for those of Aristotelian logic. However,

the substitution of Frege's new logic for traditional Aristotelian logic

created tensions in what Frege saw as the Kantian picture. I think that

virtually all of Frege's subsequent work can be viewed as attempts to

deal with the problems which he saw as having resulted from this

substitution. But in order to make this plausible, it is necessary to say

something about how Frege took himself to be a Kantian. I will try to do

this in the next few pages. My aim will not be to detail and defend such

a reading, but only to make clear, in broad outline, the perspective

which makes the tensions in Frege's own views so revealing.

It is not easy to pin down the sense in which Frege took himself to be

a Kantian. Many of Frege's explicit claims seem to indicate that his

pretensions were quite modest - that his aim was merely to patch up

trivial problems in the comers of Kantian epistemology. For instance,

on those questions which Frege does not discuss (e.g. the source and

justification of our knowledge of geometry) he refers us directly to

Kant's answers. He also says about Kant

4

I feel bound, therefore, to call attention also to the extent of my agreement with him,

which far exceeds any disagreement.

and,

If Kant was wrong about arithmetic, this does not seriously detract, in my opinion, from

the value of his work. His point was, that there are such things as synthetic judgments a

priori; whether they are to be found in geometry only, or in arithmetic as well is of less

importance.

12 JOAN WEINER

Since Frege claims that the project of the Grundlagen is part of an

attempt to show that arithmetic is not synthetic a priori, these comments

might be taken to indicate that Frege views his work as an attempt to

correct an almost incidental mistake of Kant's. But it would be wrong to

take this too seriously. While Frege uses many Kantian terms and

distinctions in his writings, he reinterprets them. One such distinction is

the analytic/synthetic distinction. On Frege's definition a proposition is

analytic if and only if it can be proved from definitions of the concepts

involved using only general logical laws, and this is certainly not Kant's

definition. Thus Frege's claim that Kant was wrong in saying that arith

metic was synthetic a priori requires some explanation. We must

understand the claim in light of Frege's reinterpretation of the Kantian

analytic/synthetic distinction, and this reinterpretation must be regarded

as more than a minor emendation of a detail of Kantian epistemology. It

is important to keep these considerations in mind when we attempt to

give an account of the meaning and significance of Frege's claims of

allegiance to Kant.

I think that Frege's explicit claims that he is following Kant can be

explained without much difficulty. Frege believed that our knowledge

could be divided into three categories. The first of these categories is

knowledge which is justified, if we understand the concepts involved,

merely by virtue of the rules without which thinking is impossible. The

second category is knowledge which is possible only with the aid of pure

intuition, but for which sense experience is unnecessary. Finally, the

third category is knowledge which cannot be justified without appealing

to sense experience. The purpose of Kant's a priori/a posteriori and

analytic/synthetic distinctions was, Frege thought, to mark off these

three categories. An analytic proposition was one which could be

known through the mere form of reason. But knowledge of a synthetic

proposition must have either pure intuitiort or experience as its source.

Kant's point, Frege says 5 is to show that there are synthetic judgments a

priori; i.e. that we can make judgments for whose support experience is

not necessary (or, which are a priori) but, since they are not justifiable

immediately by our understanding the concepts involved, for whose

support something additional is necessary (or, which are synthetic).

Thus when Frege says in the conclusion to the Grundlagen that Kant did

a great service in drawing the analytic/synthetic distinction

6

but that he

drew it too narrowly 7 and also when Frege earlier claims only to be

making clear what Kant meant by analytic and synthetic 8 he is talking

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE 13

about the failure or success of Kant's distinction in marking off sources

of knowledge. Frege's point is that, assuming traditional Aristotelian

logic sets out the formal rules of all thought, Kant's distinctions do

characterize propositions according to the sources of our knowledge of

them. However, on the introduction of Frege's new logic, Kant's distinc-

tions will not be able to play this role. For, given that Frege's logic sets

out the true formal rules of all thought, Kant's distinctions have been

drawn too narrowly. Frege's redefinition of the analytic/synthetic

distinction is designed to characterize propositions appropriately

according to sources of knowledge. Frege can thereby claim to be draw-

ing the distinction so that it plays the role which Kant intended it to play

or, saying what Kant really meant by analytic and synthetic.

The most obvious objection to this sort of reading has to do with

the purported relation between Frege's and Kant's analytic/synthetic

distinctions. For Frege and, on this reading, Frege's Kant, both the

analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions have to do with

justification. However, Kant's actual formulation of the analytic/synthetic

distinction (unlike that of the a priori/a posteriori distinction) concerns

content, not justification, of propositions.

There is a straightforward answer to this objection, for it is easy to find

evidence that Frege did in fact take Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction

to have something to do with justification. For instance, it is clear from

Frege's discussion of Kant is section 12 of the Grundlagen that he takes

Kant's claims that arithmetic is synthetic a priori to be a claim that pure

intuition is ''the ultimate ground of our knowledge of such judgments".

And Frege not only quotes from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason - many

of his remarks echo passages from it. Thus when Frege reworks Kant's

analytic/synthetic distinction in an attempt to draw the line between

those judgments which can be made merely on the basis of understand-

ing the concepts involved and those for which some additional support

(i.e., "truths of some special science" 9) is needed, it does not seem

unreasonable to take this as Frege's version of such passages as 10

It would be absurd to found an analytic judgment on experience. Since, in framing the

judgment, I must not go outside my concept, there is no need to appeal to the testimony

of experience in its support.

If we take this as Frege's understanding of the Kantian analytic/

synthetic distinction, his redefinition of the distinction can be motivated,

in part, by a careful consideration of some of Kant's passages which

14 JOAN WEINER

seem to conflict when the Begriffsschrift is substituted for the traditional

logic. In a passage which Frege cites, II Kant seems to hint that analytic

truths can be seen to be true from the principle of contradiction alone

while for synthetic truths some additional support (i.e. another synthetic

proposition) is necessaryP But Kant also says that our knowledge can

be extended only by synthetic truth.

13

Since traditional Aristotelian logic

yielded no surprises, it may well have seemed that a truth of logic (or a

truth which follows from the principle of contradiction) cannot extend

our knowledge, and thus there would be no conflict between these two

characterizations. And, since the application of the traditional logic

could result in no new knowledge, its results could not be counted as

additional support (or synthetic propositions). Thus we could under

stand analytic truths as those which can be seen to be true from logic

alone. But while these remarks do not conflict at all if we understand by

"logic" traditional logic, Frege's new logic makes the conjunction of these

passage look odd. As Frege notes,14 some of the truths of the new logic

(which should, thereby, be analytic by the first characterization) seem to

extend our knowledge (and ought, therefore, to be synthetic by the

second characterization). As Frege formulated it, the central role of the

analytic/synthetic distinction was to separate those judgments for which

support in addition to the concepts involved was necessary from those

which can be made without additional support (or truths of a special

science). However, it is not immediately clear whether or not Frege's

new logic should be counted as additional support.

Frege would have been able to preserve many of Kant's actual words

by counting his new logic as a special science (i.e. as synthetic). How

ever, this position is not open to Frege since it conflicts with his view of

what his logic does. Frege took his logic to provide a unified account of

how the parts of a proposition contribute to determining its truth or

falsity. Such an account cannot be broken up into substantive and

nonsubstantive parts; it is meant to be nothing more nor less than a

means of setting out the formal rules of all thought, the rules which

make the use of the understanding possible. But such rules can hardly

be counted as synthetic or as truths of a special science, for they must

underlie all knowledge. Given the aims of his Begriffsschrift, Frege has

no choice but to take its results to be analytic. Thus Frege characterizes

analytic judgments as those which follow from logic and an understand

ing (or analysis by means of definitions) of the concepts involved.

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE 15

Frege's characterization of analyticity introduces new complexities

into the project of categorizing a proposition as analytic or synthetic.

Thus Kant's arguments for taking arithmetic to be synthetic a priori

seem too simple, and it is not at all surprising that Frege found them

inadequate. One of the explicit motivations of the Grundlagen was to

determine the source of arithmetic knowledge, to show whether arith

metic was a priori or a posteriori, synthetic or analytic. But the explicit

project of the Grundlagen is to define the number one and the concept

of number. It is not immediately obvious that such a definition will help

in determining the source of our knowledge of arithmetic. I believe that

the first chapter of the Grundlagen should be read as an argument for

Frege's claim that definitions of the number one and the concept of

number will be necessary for determining the source of our knowledge

of arithmetic.

In his first chapter, Frege indicates that there are primitive notions

(e.g. the notion of point) which cannot be defined. And a claim that

something is not definable has epistemological consequences. In particu

lar, consider the consequences of assuming that the numbers cannot be

defined. Then arithmetic is the science of the peculiar irreducible

objects we call numbers. Now consider the claim that zero is less than

one. Since "zero" and "one" are not definable, this claim cannot be

justified by logic from the definitions of the concepts involved. Further

more, since no number words appear in Begriffsschrift, it cannot be a

straightforward logical truth. Thus, if the numbers are not definable,

arithmetical truth cannot be analytic. And Frege is quite convinced that

arithmetical truth is analytic. The reason for this seems to be that Frege

believes that everything thinkable can be numbered and thus that our

knowledge of arithmetic should not be dependent on pure intuition or

sense experience (since not all thought is). This, then is Frege's reason

for being dissatisfied with Kant's account of arithmetical truth as

synthetic a priori. If Frege could give definitions of the numbers which

showed arithmetical truth to be analytic, he would have succeeded in

correcting another of what he saw as the errors in Kantian epistemology.

It should be noted that we can understand Frege's dissatisfaction with

Kant's account without understanding Frege's Begriffsschrift. I believe

that this dissatisfaction with Kant's account of the source of our knowl

edge of arithmetical truth was one of Frege's original divergences from

Kant. We can view Frege's Begriffsschrift as an attempt to show that

16 JOAN WEINER

analytic truths can be substantive and also as having been motivated, at

least in part, by Frege's original conviction that arithmetical truth must

be analytic.

If the above account of Frege's motivations is accurate, we can give a

very easy explanation of the purpose of Frege's arguments against Kant

and Mill. The importance of the Grundlagen project of defining the

numbers results from Frege's conviction that arithmetical truth is

analytic. Although Frege gives his reasons for thinking this in the

Grundlagen, the only conclusive argument would consist of defining the

numbers and showing that arithmetic is in fact analytic. But Frege needs

to motivate the project of defining the numbers for those who are not

antecedently convinced that arithmetic is analytic. Frege's strategy is to

use Kant's and Mill's accounts of the source of our knowledge of arith-

metic to shake his readers' confidence in the claim that the numbers are

well-understood and indefinable.

If numbers were indefinable and well-understood, one would expect

it to be easy to give an adequate account of the source of our knowledge

of arithmetic. In the first chapter of the Grundlagen Frege argues that

the available accounts of our knowledge of arithmetic are either clearly

wrong (Mill's) or inadequate (Kant's). Thus it makes sense to take

seriously the possibility that numbers are not primitive and irreducible

and to try to come up with acceptable definitions. Frege's first chapter

can be viewed as an argument that the source of our knowledge of

arithmetic has not yet been determined and that the most plausible way

of undertaking the investigation of the source of this knowledge is to

attempt to define the numbers.

Clearly all numbers must be defined for Frege's project to succeed.

Thus Frege notes in the Grundlagen that all numbers can be defined

from the number one, increase by one, and the concept of Number. And

the projects of giving definitions of these three notions are intertwined.

1 5

Hence Frege describes the project of the Grundlagen as that of defining

the number one and the concept Number. But while this is clearly a part

of the overall project of determining the source of our justification of

arithmetical propositions, the definitions alone will not suffice. Having

given these definitions in the Grundlagen, Frege's next step is to show

that all arithmetical truths can (or cannot) be derived from these

definitions by logic alone. This step was to be accomplished in the

Grundgesetze. Had no error been discovered, this work would have

completed Frege's overall project.

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE

17

In the last few pages I have given an outline of the views of Frege, the

historical person. In order to understand what these views come to,

however, it is necessary to focus on some of the tensions which Frege,

the historical person, may not have recognized. I will outline some of

these below. After the Begriffsschrift, Frege's central task is to give

rigorous logical proofs of the truths of arithmetic from the primitive

truths on which these arithmetical truths depend. Once such proofs are

given, the status of the arithmetical propositions will be determined by

whether the primitive truths on which they depend are analytic or

synthetic. In order to carry out this project, we must answer two

questions. First, what are the primitive truths? Second, how do we

determine whether the primitive truths are analytic or synthetic? The

answers to these questions are deceptively simple. A primitive truth is

either a proposition all of whose terms are primitive (i.e. indefinable), or

a definition in which the only definable term is the definiendum. And

this notion of primitive truth allows an easy way of answering the

second question, for it follows that determining whether a primitive

truth is analytic or synthetic is trivial. If all its primitive terms are logical

terms (terms which are part of Begrijfsschrift), the proposition is

analytic. If some of its primitive terms are nonlogical terms, the proposi

tion is synthetic.

There are important gaps in the above description which cannot be

filled in by simple references to passages in the Grundlagen. For

instance, if we are to have general criteria for determining whether

Frege has given proofs adequate for establishing arithmetical truth as

analytic, an account of definability seems necessary. But there is no

explicit account of definability in the Grundlagen. And, given some of

the remarks in the Grundlagen, it is not entirely clear what definition is

for Frege. In particular, Frege indicates that definitions often require

justification.

16

Is the justification required for a definition which appears

in a proof part of that proof? In the Grundlagen Frege also gives no

explicit accounts of the notion I)f definition, the sort of justification

required for a definition, or the role the justification of a definition

might play in a proof which uses the definition.

Frege does have accounts of definition and of definability which will

serve the requisite epistemological roles, but these are not explicit in his

writings. Such an account of definition, for instance, is a consequence of

the views expressed in Frege's correspondence with Hilbert and some of

his papers, in particular, two papers entitled "On the Foundations of

18 JOAN WEINER

Geometry" which grew out of that correspondence. I think that this

account of definition is implicit in the Grundlagen. However, it would

have been awkward to make this explicit in the Grundlagen because,

without the sense/reference distinction, it would follow that all ordinary

language is meaningless.

While it is beyond the scope of this short paper to indicate the

arguments for taking Frege to have the views on definition I attribute to

him, they can be easily summarized here. One of Frege's most explicit

statements appears in a letter to Hilbert.

l

?

Every definition contains a sign (expression, word) which previously has had no

reference and which is given a reference only through this definition. Once this has

happened, one can make out of this definition a self-evident proposition which is then to

be used like an axiom. But we must adhere to the tenet that in a definition nothing is

asserted: rather, something is stipulated. Therefore what requires a proof or some other

reasoning to establish its truth ought never to be presented as a definition. 18

There are three ways in which this seems to conflict with Frege's

Grundlagen, although there is little evidence that Frege was aware of

any of these conflicts. The first is that in this passage Frege seems to say

that definitions require no justification, while in the Grundlagen Frege

said that definitions do require justification. The second conflict is that

from the above passage it follows that, if Frege defined "one" in the

Grundgesetze, then it must have previously had no reference. But Frege

did take himself to have defined "one" in the Grundgesetze, and yet it

seems rather implausible that "one" should have had no reference

before Frege did this. Finally, the third conflict is that Frege does not

give an arbitrary definition of "one" in the Grundlagen, yet the views on

definition expressed in the above passage do not seem to leave room for

any constraints on definitions. In the next few pages I will briefly

indicate how these problems are to be answered and how the answers to

these problems lead to a completely new way of viewing Frege's work.

The first question concerns the justification necessary for a definition.

As I read the above passage, Frege is claiming that it is never necessary

to justify assigning a particular referent to a particular word. However,

this does not rule out requiring some justification to show that a

purported definition actually meets the criteria which Frege requires of

definitions. Frege says 19

I demand from a definition of a point that by means of it we be able to judge of any

object whatever - e.g. my pocket watch - whether it is a point.

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE 19

Frege says this because he requires that any definition of a concept-

word must give us a description, in primitive terms, which either holds

or does not hold of each object. Similarly a definition of an object-word

must consist of a description, in primitive terms, which picks out one

and only one object. These are Frege's - admittedly very strict -

requirements on definitions. Thus some justification may be required for

a definition; it may be necessary, for instance, to prove that a certain

description holds of one and only one object. And Frege explicitly

applies this criterion of adequacy. In section 64 of the Grundlagen, he

rejects a definition of direction because

it will not, for in,tancc, decide for m whether England is the the direction of the

Earth's axis.

Thus it is not that the truth of a definition may require justification, but

rather that it may be necessary to show that the description used in a

definition is actually a defining description in Frege's strict sense.

Let us now turn to the second problem. Frege seems committed to

saying that "one" and "I" had no reference prior to his investigation in

the Grundlagen. How serious a problem this is clearly depends on the

nature of Frege's notion of reference. I think it is possible to argue that

Frege's notion of reference is a very peculiar one and that, given this

notion of reference, it would not be untoward to take "one" to have had

no reference before the work of the Grundlagen.

The passage I quoted earlier was written after "On Sense and Refer-

ence", and thus we cannot take the notion of reference which is used in

that passage to be the notion of Bedeutung in the Grundlagen. However,

these notions are related. In fact, I believe that the development of the

later notion of reference can be viewed as a response to tensions

between Grundlagen-Bedeutung and Grundlagen-definition. To see this

tension, we should first note that, in the Grundlagen, a definition fixes

the meaning (Bedeutung) of a word.

20

Furthermore, we can ask for the

meaning (Bedeutung) of a word only in the context of a proposition; to

fix the Bedeutung of a word, one must fix the meaning of the proposi-

tions in which it appears.21 Defining (i.e. fixing the Bedeutung of) the

number one entails fixing the sense of "zero is less than one". Thus it

seems that Frege may be committed to saying that "zero is less than

one" is meaningless before his work in the Grundlagen. Furthermore,

our use of most ordinary words does not determine a definition in

Frege's strict sense. For instance, there are people who are neither

20 JOAN WEINER

clearly bald nor clearly not-bald. Thus no description of our ordinary

concept of baldness will meet Frege's criteria. It is not obvious that this

is a serious problem, for the sense in which Frege is committed to

holding that such propositions are meaningless is not clear, and he

certainly does not seem to believe that he was committed to this. But I

think this is symptomatic of an important tension in the Grundlagen.

We can regard Frege's sense/reference distinction as providing a

partial response to his apparent commitment to the view that ordinary

language is meaningless. If the notion of sense plays the intuitive role of

meaning, we can take the notion of reference to play the highly technical

role which is needed for working out Frege's project. To have reference,

then, is to be either primitive or used in a way which determines a

definition, in Frege's strict sense, from primitive terms. Thus, given the

vagueness of our ordinary language, most non-primitive terms will have

reference only if an explicit Fregean-style definition has been given.

Having recognized this distinction, we can take "zero is less than one" to

have (hence to be meaningful) but no reference before Frege's

work. It does, of course, follow that the sentence had no truth-value

before Frege's work. But this, I will argue, is a view to which Frege is

firmly committed.

The final problem has to do with the constraints to which Frege

subjects his definition of the number one. Given Frege's discussion of

definition, it would seem that any way of fixing the reference of "one" is

as good as any other. But Frege is only willing to consider a certain sort

of definition. However, this is not because there are any constraints on

what referent can be stipulated for "one", rather it is because Frege

wants to use his definition for a particular purpose.

In order to see that it is legitimate to impose constraints on defi-

nitions, it is useful to consider Frege's paradigmatic example of a

definition the mathematical definition of the continuity of a function.

Clearly we could assign any number of descriptions to "fis continuous"

which would not enable us to express the mathematical theorems which

the standard definition helps us express. But such definitions would not

have served the purpose for which the standard definition was drawn.

Thus it is perfectly reasonable for Frege to impose constraints on his

definition of "one" if he wants the definition to play a certain role. And

he does. Frege wants to give a definition of "one", from primitive terms,

which will make 'true all those propositions containing "one" which we

have already judged to be true. In this way, the definition will provide

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE 21

the sort of foundation for arithmetic which Frege requires any science to

have. This is the sense in which the definition will constitute an analysis

of our concept of what it is to be the number one. Frege says 22

The real importance of a definition lies in its logical construction out of primItive

clements. And for that reason we should not do wIthout it, not even in a case like this.

The insight it pcrmlts into thc logical structure IS a condition for insight into the logIcal

linkage of truths. A definition is a constituent of the system of a sCIence.

The problem with this is that the propositions we take to be the truths of

arithmetic do not determine a definition, in Frege's sense, of the number

one. Frege deals with this problem in a 1914 paper, 'Logic and

Mathematics'.23

Now we have to consider the difficulty we come up in giving a logical

analy,is when it is problematic whether this analysis is correct. Let us a,sume that A IS

the long established sign whose sense we have attempted to analyse

logically by constructing a complex expression which the analysis. Since we are not

certain whether the analysis is we are not prepared to pre,ent the complex

expression as one whieh can be replaced by the simple sign A. If it is our intention

to put forward a definition proper. we are not entitled to choose the sign A, which

already has a but we must choose a fresh sign B, say, which has the sense of the

complex expression only in virtue of the definition. The question now is whether A and

B have the same sense. But we can bypass thi, question altogether if we are constructing

a new system from thc bottom up; in that case we shall make no further use of the

A - wc shall only use B ... If we have managed in this way to con<;truct a system for

mathemalles without any need for the sign A, we can leave the matter there; there is no

need at all to answer the question concerning the sense in whIch - whatever It may be -

this sign had been used earlier ... However it may be felt expedient to use sign A

instead of sign B. But if we do this, we must treat it as an entirely new sign whIch had no

sense prior to the definition.

This tells us how we are to understand the project of the Grundlagen.

Before the Grundlagen, "one" did not have a referent, in Frege's strict

sense, Frege wants to build arithmetic up from primitive terms. Thus he

is required to construct a description of an object, in primitive terms,

which can replace "one" or "I" in the propositions of arithmetic without

appreciably altering mathematical practice. If this can be done, there is

no harm in using that description as a definition of "one". However,

assigning this referent to "one" rather than to some newly formulated

word should be viewed as a heuristic, not as an important elucidation of

our ordinary use of "one".

The view outlined above contains a significant gap - the lack of an

account of primitiveness. While we can recognize and give definitions,

22 JOAN WEINER

Frege has given no explicit criteria for distinguishing between definable

and indefinable terms. And here, it may seem, we hit a real dead end.

Frege does not seem to have said what it is for a term to be primitive,

although he sometimes gives examples of primitive terms or hints about

what primitiveness comes to. On my reading of Frege's work, there is an

important reason for this. It is that the notion of primitiveness is itself

primitive, that is, indefinable. In order to understand fully the signifi

cance of this gap, it is important to consider the relation between

primitiveness and Frege's notion of objectivity.

Frege says very little about objectivity. His most sustained discussion

of the subject seems to be the discussion in section 26 of the Grundlagen.

In that section, he seems to offer three explicit criteria for objectivity.

He says that what is objective is what is expressible in words, what is

subject to laws, and what is independent of sensation, intuition, and

imagination, but not what is independent of the reason. While the

connection between these criteria may not be immediately apparent, I

have argued elsewhere that they are tightly bound together and that they

all delimit the same realm of objectivity.24 I have argued that, for Frege,

to be objective is to be subject to the laws of Begriffsschrift and that it is

this view which binds the above criteria.

If what is objective is what is subject to the laws of Begriffsschrift, then

a good deal of work is required to show that a proposition is objective.

In particular, if a proposition is subject to the laws of Begriffsschrift, all

its terms must have fixed reference. But, as I mentioned earlier, few of

our ordinary terms have fixed reference in Frege's sense. It seems, then,

that definitions of each definable term are required. But how are we to

know when this has been done? We can only recognize the completion

of such a task if we can recognize primitive terms. Frege assumes that

we can recognize primitive terms, and it remains to be seen whether this

assumption will get him into serious trouble. However, there is a more

immediate problem. It is not clear that the task has been completed

once the original proposition has been translated into a proposition

whose terms are all primitive. We must still show that all its terms have

fixed reference. Thus we must say something about what it is for a

primitive term to have reference and how we can show that a primitive

term has reference. Until now, the only means available for showing that

a term has reference have been the use of definitions. But primitive

terms cannot be defined.

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE 23

While Frege has given us no explicit account of primitiveness, this

does not mean that we know nothing about what it is to be a primitive

term. The primitive terms are the indefinable terms which underly all

terms usable in communication. While we often communicate by using

vague terms, the success of such communication is possible only

because what is communicated can be made unambiguous. Thus one of

the conditions necessary for communication is that what is communi-

cable must be expressible in terms which either have fixed reference or

can be defined from terms which have fixed reference. Primitive terms

cannot be defined thus, if they can be used in communicating, they must

have fixed reference. For instance, the terms "function" and "object" are

primitive and are necessary for the explication of the logical regimenta-

tion of propositions in Begriffsschrift. Furthermore, there is an answer to

whether or not a proposition has been correctly regimented. The

regimentation must be objective and hence the terms "function" and

"object" must have reference. But what does this sort of reference come

to?

It is important to note that the above does not amount to saying that

the words "function" and "object" refer to whatever they must refer to if

Begriffsschrift regimentation is to be objective. One of Frege's most

fundamental assumptions is that Begriffsschrift regimentation is objective

- this is the foundation of Frege's very understanding of objectivity. It

follows that "function" and "object" must have reference. But there is no

way of specifying, describing, or giving structure to what these words

refer to. The closest we can come is to give hints, i.e., to use these words

in propositions. The claim that these terms have reference is nothing

more than the claim that regimentation is objective. Thus, in the end, the

notion of reference drops out altogether.

One of the most striking features of this notion of objectivity is that it

seems that everything is objective. Certainly, for instance, we communi-

cate about the character of our mental images and if what is objective is

what is communicable, it would seem that these claims concerning our

mental states must be objective. But this is especially surprising since

Frege says that the character of our mental images is subjective. This

is best explained by carefully considering the one discussion in the

Grundlagen which deals with the subjective realm.

Frege gives an example in the Giundlagen of two beings who intuit

only projective properties and relations. One of them intuits as a plane

24 JOAN WEINER

what the other intuits as a point, etc .... Thus what one will intuit as a

line joining two points, would be intuited by the other as a line of

intersection of two planes. Now it is important that the two beings intuit

projective, not Euclidean, properties and relations. In projective geome

try, what is true of planes is precisely what is true of points. Thus these

two beings would agree on all axioms and theorems of geometry.25 Since

they obey the same geometrical axioms and could not discover any

difference in their intuitions through language, the objective meaning for

both beings of "point" and "plane" is the same. Thus, although there

seems, from Frege's description of these beings, to be a difference in the

characters of their intuitions, they are both intuiting the same things.

The point of this example was to convince us that pure intuitions have

both objective and subjective sides. The objective side is what is express

ible and the subjective side is the character of the intuitions which is

not expressible. How is this supposed to work? Because the axioms of

geometry are known by pure intuition, they are justified by the construc

tion of mental pictures. By setting the situation out as he has, Frege has

asked us to construct the mental pictures we would imagine each of the

two beings constructing and to examine the difference between the two

pictures. I will discuss the images the two beings would construct in

order to assure themselves of the justification of the axiom which tells us

that any two points determine exactly one line. Frege's assumption, I

believe, is that we will construct two pictures which look something like

my Figure 1:

A.

,

,

,

POINTS -;_' B.

,

i,' LINE

(

,

,

Fig. 1

POINT

These pictures are very different and, in some way, this difference is

supposed to exhibit the subjective difference. At first glance, however,

this might seem somewhat suspect. For the difference between these two

pictures is an objective, physical difference which can be described in

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE 25

words. And one might suspect that the two beings <lescribed by Frege

could discover their difference by examining these pictures. But this

creates no problem for Frege. It is possible to imagine that one of the

beings, when looking at picture A, has the same experience the other

has when looking at picture B.

26

The point is that the objective difference

between A and B is a difference between the geometrical configurations

of pen marks on paper, not a difference between mental images. Frege is

not asking us to examine these objective differences, but rather to

construct these two pictures in our minds and examine the difference in

appearance (that is, the subjective difference) between the two pictures.

Now it is important to realize that it follows that Frege is not making

an objective argument. Frege's example works only if his readers

construct two mental images which are different in appearance, that is,

subjectively different. But, although the pictures he constructs might be

subjectively different, there is no way for him to guarantee that the

pictures constructed by his readers are subjectively different. This is a

case in which we must grant Frege the grain of salt he asks for in "On

Concept and Object". For Frege has nothing to say to someone who

considers his example and claims to experience no subjective difference

in the images she constructs. Subjective difference, after all, cannot be

described. Frege's example cannot be an argument, it can only be

considered a hint.

I have grawn numerous conclusions about Frege's motivations and

about underlying views which would allow Frege to respond to tensions

in his explicit picture; however, it is not entirely clear that Frege was

aware of these tensions. I will end by discussing a consequence of my

reading of the example discussed above. This consequence is something

of which, I believe, Frege was almost certainly unaware.

I have argued that, for Frege, it is not possible to do more than hint at

the difference between the subjective and objective realms. It is certainly

not possible to describe this difference objectively. But it follows from

this that the difference is not objective. This may not seem too prob-

lematic. The subjective realm is, in an important sense, empty and it does

not seem all that strange to say that everything is objective for, since we

cannot talk about the subjective, everything we can discuss must be

objective. Furthermore, Frege has said very little about objectivity, and

very little seems to be at stake for him. We can regard what Frege does

say as a few innocent hints. But this problem does not apply only to

Frege's comments about objectivity. Frege's discussions of the differ-

26

JOAN WEINER

ence between objects and concepts, and of why number statements are

about concepts - in fact almost all of what we might be tempted to call

Frege's theoretical framework - also must have the status of hints.

If we read this consequence back into Frege's project, the perspective

shifts dramatically. I began by arguing that Frege's mathematical work

was philosophically motivated and that Frege intended us to draw

philosophical morals from it. What we think of as his philosophical

work was intended to show how we are to draw philosophical morals

from the mathematical work. None of this has really changed. However,

the implication of reading Frege's work in that way seemed to be that

the most important work was what we call his philosophical work, for

this is where Frege set out his philosophical theories. But it now appears

that Frege cannot have any philosophical theories. Far from being the

presentation of the philosophical theory within which Frege's mathe-

matical work was to play a role, what we think of as his philosophical

work can only have had the status of subjective hinting designed to get

his readers into the proper frame of mind for understanding the purpose

and significance of his real philosophical work - the work we think of

today as his mathematical work.

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank Burton Dreben, Warren Goldfarb, Mark Kaplan, Hilary Putnam,

and Thomas Ricketts for criticism and advice.

NOTES

1 It is not easy to find support for this sort of view in writing, since people who believe

this tend to be pursuing Frege's questions,.not worrying about what he meant. However,

I have found that quite a number of people will defend such a view in conversation.

2 Philip Kitcher, 'Frege's Epistemology', The Philosophical Review 88 (1979), 235-

262.

3 Hans Sluga, Gottlob Frege, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).

4 Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, translated by J. L. Austin (Evanston:

Northwestern University Press, 1978), pp. 10 1-102.

5 Frege, Foundations, p. 102.

6 Frege, Foundations, p. 101.

7 Frege, Foundations, p. 99.

8 Frege, Foundations, p. 3.

PUTTING FREGE IN PERSPECTIVE 27

9 Frege, Foundations, p. 4.

10 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New

York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), A 7 /B12.

II Frege, Foundations, p. 100.

12 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B14.

13 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A8, B12.

14 Frege, Foundations, p. 101.

15 Frege, Foundations, p. 25.

16 See, for instance, Frege, Foundations, pp. 4, 77.

17 See the Frege-Hilbert correspondence in On the Foundations (!If Geometry and

Formal Theories of Arithmetic, translated by Eike-Henner W. Kluge (New Haven and

London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 7.

18 While Frege is talking about mathematical definitions here, it is important to note

that his definition of the number one is intended to be used in proofs and hence is

mathematical.

19 Frege, 'On the Foundations of Geometry' in On the Foundations of Geometry, p. 63.

20 See, for instance, Frege, Foundations, p. 9.

21 Frege, Foundations, p. 73.

22 Frege, 'On the Foundations of Geometry' in On the Foundations of Geometry, p. 60.

23 Frege, 'Logic and Mathematics' in Posthumous Writings, edited by Hans Hermes et

al., translated by Peter Long et al. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979) p.

210.

24 Joan Weiner, Putting Frege in Perspective (Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard Univer-

sity,1982).

25 A projective plane can be constructed from a Euclidean plane by adding, for each

line in the original plane, exactly one point at infinity. Lines which were parallel in the

original plane share a point at infinity in the projective plane. Furthermore, the points at

infinity in this plane determine a single line at infinity. Two planes which are parallel in

Euclidean space share a line at infinity when the points at infinity are added to each.

Frege's doctoral dissertation, 'Uber eine geometrische Darstellung der imaginaren

Gebilde in der Ebene', is concerned with providing the kind of foundation for these

infinitely distant (or imaginary) points which he later attempts to provide for the

integers.

26 This is undoubtedly what Frege would have us imagine if his two beings could see.

Of course, since Frege follows Kant in including sensation under intuition and since, by

hypothesis, these beings intuit only projective properties and relations, it follows that

they cannot see.

PART II

SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

J. VAN HEIJENOORT

FREGE AND VAGUENESS

If it is Yes, say Yes; if it is No, say No. Anything else

comes from the EVil One.

Matthew 5, 37

Whoever undertakes to scrutinize logical arguments conducted outside

mathematics cannot but wince at the flightly conduct of words. Their

meanings have no exact lines of demarcation. What an adjective conveys

may depend on the noun that follows ('white wine'). We often have

difficulty in grasping the exact meaning of a verb if we do not know its

subject and complement(s). When we look up a word in a dictionary, we

see how the word's uses have come to diverge ever more from its

primary meaning and have branched out in many directions. Metaphors

lose their sparkle and, like dead stars, come to lead an obscure existence

('source of grief). Words in ordinary language are far from having neat

definitions, like that of 'even' in arithmetic. Every predicate is vague, in

the sense that there are individuals for which it is intrinsically indeter

minate whether the predicate holds or not.

In his first logical work, Frege had to point out how the vagueness of

a predicate can wreck a logical argument. Theorem 81 in 27 of his

1879 can, in modern language, be stated as follows: Let R * xy be the

closed iterate (to use Quine's expression) of a binary predicate Rxy; that

is, R*xy is to Rxy what 'x is an ancestor of y' is to 'x is a parent of y'.

Then, for any unary predicate Px which is inductive over Rxy, that is,

such that

VxVyPx& Rxy)::::l Py),

we have

VxVyPx& R*xy) ::::l Py).

Let Px be interpreted as: x is a heap of beans; and Rxy as: y is

obtained from x by the removal of one bean. Then Theorem 81 would

imply that a single bean, or even none at all, would be a heap of beans.

31

L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 31-45.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

32 J. VAN HEIJENOORT

To overcome the difficulty, Frege claims that the predicate Px is not

inductive over Rxy because, u being one of certain objects, the sentence

Pu 'cannot be taken as being a judgment' (,ist unbeurtheilbar') on

account of the 'indeterminateness' (' Unbestimmtheit') of the predicate

Px. The definition of the closed iterate of Rxy contains a universal

quantifier ranging over unary predicates. If a certain unary predicate is

not included in that range, then Theorem 81 does not apply to that

predicate. The criterion that Frege uses for excluding a predicate

from the range is its' Unbestimmtheit', which leads to 'unbeurtheilbare'

sentences. With these few remarks Frege puts vague predicates outside

the pale of logic.

Let us specify our terms. For us, a predicate is a linguistic expression;

thus, if unary, it corresponds to Frege's Begriffswort and, if binary, to his

Beziehungswort. Since Frege maintains that a concept whose delimita-

tion is 'blurred' ('verschwommen') is in fact no concept at all (1969, p.

133), we shall speak of vague predicates, and not of vague concepts.

Let us briefly recall what Frege's ontology is. He has a fixed universe,

which comprehends all objects whatsoever. An object may be abstract,

like a natural number, or concrete, like the Moon. Over these objects

there are first-level functions of one or two arguments and, since he has

to quantify over these functions, he has first-level variables. The impor-

tant point for us here is that Frege does not divide his universe into

various sorts and he requires that any function (in particular, any

concept) be defined for all objects. This is what he calls his principle of

completude (,Grundsatz der Vol!standigkeit') , presented and defended

in 56-65 of 1903 and subjacent in all his work.

In his presentation of the principle Frege takes exception to what he

calls piecemeal definitions (,stuckweise Definieren'). An example of such

a definition would be addition, originally defined for natural numbers,

then successively extended to signed integers, rational numbers, and so

on. Weare dealing here with different operations: we should in each

case use a different sign and speak of the isomorphism between a system

of numbers and a certain proper part of the new system. There never

was any misunderstanding on that score in the mind of qualified

mathematicians. But some expositors chose to stress how the definitions

of addition for various kinds of numbers successively grew out of one

another, sometimes speaking of a genetic definition. Frege severely

criticizes such procedure: 'Concept-like constructions that are still in a

state of flux, that have not yet received final and sharp limits cannot be

FREGE AND VAGUENESS 33

recognized by logic as concepts; and that is why it must spurn all

piecemeal defining' (1903, p. 71). And: 'Thus nowhere do we have firm

ground under our feet. Without final definitions, no final theorems. One

would not come out of imperfection and vacillation' (1903, p. 74). If

these strong words were directed only against some occasional defective

presentations, there would be little to say, except that they perhaps

overshoot the mark. It turns out, however, that what Frege condemns in

the piecemeal definition is its being restricted to a certain domain of

mathematical objects. Every predicate, every operation has to be

defined for all objects in the Universe. If addition were not defined for

the Moon and the Moon, 'the question whether the sum of the Moon

and the Moon is 1 or whether the Moon falls under the concept

something that added to itself gives 1 could not receive an answer; in

other words, what we called a concept would in fact not be a genuine

concept, because the sharp delimitation is lacking' (1903, p. 76).

A second consequence of Frege's principle of completude is his

rejection of conditional definitions. Consider, for example, for a binary

predicate Rxy of natural numbers, a definition that would read as

follows:

(1) VxVyNx& Ny) (Rxy= . .. )),

Nx being interpreted as: x is a natural number. Peano had called such

definitions 'deJinizioni condizionate' or 'deJinizioni con ipotesi'. Frege

calls them 'bedingte Erkliirungen' and rejects them because, in the case

of definition (1), if a and b are not natural numbers, the sentence

(2) (Na& Nb) (Rab == .. )

has the truth value t for whatever syntactic object we put at the place of

the three dots; hence, for objects a and b that are not natural numbers,

(1) does not specify anything for Rab.

In a letter to Peano dated September 29, 1896, Frege writes (1976,

pp. 182-183, or 1980, p. 114; I modified the translation): 'A condi-

tional definition of the sign for a concept decides only for some cases,

not for all, whether an object falls under the concept or not; it does not

therefore delimit the concept completely and sharply. But logic can

recognize only sharply delimited concepts. Only under this presupposi-

tion can it set up precise laws. The logical law that there is no third case

beside "a is b" and "a is not b" is really just another way of expressing

our requirements that a concept (b) must be sharply delimited. The

34 J. VAN HEIJENOORT

fallacy known by the name of "Acervus" rests on this, that words like

"heap" are treated as if they designated a sharply delimited concept

whereas this is not really the case'. Frege's ban of conditional definitions

directly springs' from his principle of completude.

In his defence of that principle, Frege asks whether 'x + y' may have

a Bedeutung only when the two objects considered as arguments are

natural numbers, and he answers negatively. If the answer were posi

tive, the sentence 'The sum of the Moon and the Moon is l' would be

neither true nor false and, he claims, 'no scientific investigation can

culminate' in such a sentence (1903, p. 76). In that whole discussion

Frege's arguments are somewhat repetitious and circular. Why would

there be something unscientific in the sentence? Because some truth

value would be left indefinite. We are back to completude. Frege also

argues that, if addition were not defined for all objects in the Universe,

we would not know the number of solutions of the equation x + x = 1;

some a such that a + a = 1 might pop up in a comer where we do not

expect it. A strange and circular argument! Once we have defined the

function x + yover a definite domain, all solutions of x + x = 1, if any,

are in that domain.

Frege finally presents a more elaborate argument. From (2), by

sentential logic, we obtain

(3) Rab =f: ) & Na):::> - Nb,

hence we are led to consider an object, namely b, which is not a natural

:pumber, or, as Frege writes, 'here it is impossible to maintain the restric

tion to the domain of numbers. The state of affairs has a force that

irresistibly acts so as to break down such barriers' (1903, p. 78). But the

argument remains inconclusive; it certainly does not establish the

necessary existence of a universal domain comprehending all objects. In

(1) the quantifiers may very well range over a sufficiently large domain

of mathematical objects, and in that domain a subdomain is cut out by

the predicate Nx. In fact, when natural numbers are defined as certain

sets, the quantifiers in (1) range over sets. A mathematician would not

use definition (1) unless a definite mathematical domain has been

introduced for the quantifiers; if no such domain is under consideration,

he would replace (1) by

(4) VxVy(Rxy == ),

with the understanding that the quantifiers now range over the natural

numbers. With (4), Frege's argument cannot get started.

FREGE AND VAGUENESS 35

Frege's requirement of completude is intimately connected with that

of sharpness. For him, in fact, the two requirements seem to fuse into

one. Countless times in his writings, we find the words 'complete' and

'sharp' conjoined. Discussing completude, all of a sudden he brings in

examples of vagueness (lack of sharpness), like the word 'heap' in his

letter to Peano quoted above or the word 'Christian' at the end of 56

of 1903. For Frege, lack of completude and lack of sharpness are both a

failure of universal bivalence and thus seem to merge one into another.

Let us try to distinguish them. For an atomic sentence Pa, universal

bivalence may fail in three cases:

(1) Although 'a', by its form and its grammatical role, appears to

name an object, it actually does not; this is the well-known problem of

empty descriptions raised by Bertrand Russell. We shall say that here

the individuation has failed; as no individual is apprehended by 'a', the

question whether the predicate 'P' holds or not does not arise, and Pa

has no truth value. (If 'a' is a definite description, we may, as Russell

does, look at Pa as a relation between predicates and not analyze it as a

subject-predicate sentence.)

(2) An object is denoted by 'a', but this object is not one of which the

question whether the predicate' P' holds can be raised. Is the number 7

blue? A good dictionary says of an adjective 'is said of ... " thus

indicating its domain of applicability. This pigeon-holing is constantly

questioned by metaphoric ('sharp mind') or poetic (Rimbaud: A black,

E white, ... ) uses of words, but it certainly is an integral part of the

working of any natural language.

(3) A definite individual is apprehended by 'a' and for that individual

the question whether the predicate 'P' holds is meaningful. Nevertheless,

the criteria connected with the application of 'P' are not such that a

truth value is assigned to Pa. For example, I see this vase perfectly well,

the light is good, but is the vase blue or green? I don't know how to

answer; I grope for a new word: 'bluish', 'blue-green'.

Failure of individuation may occur in mathematical language ('the

largest natural number') or in ordinary language ('the present king of

France'). In mathematics the proper use of the singular definite article

requires an existence and uniqueness proof. In ordinary language failure

of individuation is likely to stop communication. If I start a sentence

'The present king of France is ... ',my interlocutor is liable to stop me:

'What are you talking about? France has no king now'. As for Frege, he

proscribes nondenoting individual constants from any properly con-

structed language. In 1893, p. 19, he introduces the slanted boldface

36

J. VAN HEIJENOORT

stroke for the description operator; applied to (the Werthverlauf of) a

concept, it yields the object falling under the concept in case there is one

and only one such object; otherwise, it yields the Werthverlauf itself.

Mathematics knows no completude in Frege's sense. A universe

embracing 'everything' is repugnant to mathematicians. Hilbert (1904,

p. 175, or van Heijenoort 1967, p. 130) already reproached Frege for

imposing no restriction on the range of his universal quantification, and

he introduced a system in which the quantifiers range over objects

recursively constructed from two basic objects; another mathematician,

Poincare (1906, p. 18, or 1908; pp. 181-182), was prompt to stress the

difference between the well-delimited domain thus introduced by Hilbert

and the all-embracing universe of Frege and Russell. The closest

approximation that mathematics would have to a universal domain

would be the (a?) universe of sets. But one cannot speak today of a

fixed, well-delimited universe of sets in which every mathematician

would embed the entities he is working with. Moreover, such a universe

would still be far from Frege's universe since it would not comprehend

nonmathematical objects. As to natural language, it respects sorts and

natural kinds. We do not feel obliged to ascribe a truth value to the

sentence 'The number 7 is blue'. Even in Frege's system, it is not clear

why completude, in his sense, is required. He wants bivalence, but

bivalence, in the sense that each predicate has a definite domain of

applicability and either holds or does not hold of each object in that

domain, can obtain in a many-sorted logic. No, Frege is adamant, a

predicate or a function not defined for all objects whatsoever in the

Universe would somehow be deficient. It would not be impossible, it

seems, to reconcile Frege's ontological assumptions with a many-sorted

bivalent logic. In imposing his brand of complete bivalence, Frege seems

to have fallen prey to some kind of extremism.

We can, of course, assign a truth value to the sentence '7 is blue'.

Using

'v' x( x is blue :::J x is a physical object),

where the quantifier ranges over all objects, and

7 is not a physical object,

we obtain

7 is not blue.

FREGE AND VAGUENESS 37

This argument may be in need of some improvement. Although the sky

is hardly what we would call a physical object, it is blue. The problem is

to circumscribe a fixed and well-delimited universe of discourse con-

sisting of all objects, that is, of all ground-level entities. Frege assumed

the existence of such a universe, without paying much attention to the

problem hidden in this notion. Once a universe is postulated, predicates

can, of course, be defined, or considered to be defined, for each object

in it. We make the blanket decision that, if a is not in the domain of

applicability of'P', Pais false.

The situation, though, is somewhat different with functions, or opera-

tions. Consider the predicate Sex, y, z), taken to mean: x, y, z are natural

numbers and z = x + y. Take the predicate to be false whenever an

argument is not a natural number. Then, for every z, S(the Moon, the

Moon, z) is false, and the equation z = the Moon + the Moon has no

solution. Hence, though the predicate S is defined over the whole

universe, the function + is not. Frege, who wants functions, just as well

as predicates, to be defined over the whole universe, must, to the

predicate associated with a function, assign the value t for some objects

that are outside what we would consider to be its domain of applicabil-

ity, and the blanket solution of equating meaninglessness to falsity is not

open to him.

What are the criteria that govern the assignment of truth values

outside the domain of applicability? For Frege, it seems, the assignment

is arbitrary. The point I want to make here is not that such an enterprise

cannot be carried out, but rather that neither mathematics nor ordinary

language proceeds thus.

Since vagueness pervades natural language, Frege is led to postulate,

behind each vague predicate of ordinary language, an exact 'objective'

predicate, so that logic can operate without a hitch. In 1884, 26, or

1953, pp. 36 and 36e, he writes: 'The word "white" ordinarily makes

us think of a certain sensation, which is, of course, entirely subjective;

but even in everyday speech it often bears, I think, an objective sense.

When we call snow white, we intend to express an objective quality,

which we recognize, in ordinary daylight, by a certain sensation. [ ... 1

Even a color-blind man can speak of red and green, in spite of the fact

that he does not distinguish between these colors in his sensations.

[ ... 1 By being objective I understand being independent of our sensa-

tion, intuition [Anschauen] and imagination [Vorstellen], and 9f all

construction of mental pictures out of memories of earlier sensations,

38

J. VAN HEIJENOORT

but not independent of reason'. Frege is saying that what an empirical

word of our natural language means for us is not constituted by the

training acquired through ostension learning ('memories of earlier

sensations'), but that, behind the word, we comprehend some objective

property. A bit earlier in the same section (1953, pp. 35 and 35e; I

modified the translation), Frege had written: 'Objective here is what is

subject to law, conceptual, adjudicable, what can be expressed in words'

('Objektiv ist darin das Gesetzmiipige, BegrijJliche, Beurtheilbare, was

sich in Warten ausdriicken liipt'). Frege's words ('subject to law', 'con-

ceptual', 'can be expressed in words', 'not independent of reason')

suggest that the objective property he assumes behind every empirical

term has a definition not unlike that of 'even' in arithmetic. If there were

such a definition of 'red' or 'green', then, of course, a color-blind man

would comprehend these words. Frege has to adopt this panrationalism

because he wants to fit the natural language to his bivalent logic. His use

of the word 'beurtheilbar' already suggests that the objective property

behind the empirical term is bivalent. This is reinforced by the use of

'objective' at other places in Frege's writings (for instance, in 1892, p.

34, or 1952, pp. 63-64, where objectivity is connected with bivalence).

What Frege is in fact suggesting is that one can disregard the vagueness

prevalent in a natural language because many words are learned by

ostension. But this conception of the objective property is so contrary

to the actual working of a natural language that he has to hedge ('often',

'I think').

In this letter to Peano quoted above, Frege writes (1976, p. 183, or

1980, p. 115; I modified the translation): 'The task of our vernacular

languages is essentially fulfilled if the persons having verbal intercourse

with one another connect, with one sentence, the same thought, or

approximately the same thought. For this it is not at all necessary that

the individual. words should have a Sinn and a Bedeutung of their own,

provided only that the whole sentence has. a Sinn. Whenever inferences

have to be drawn, the case is different; it is then essential that the same

expression occurs in two sentences and that it has exactly the same

Bedeutungin both.'

Here Frege deals with a pressing problem, namely the statUs of

logical arguments conducted in ordinary language; but we may wonder,

since the lines are taken from a letter written with a running pen, how

much exegesis each word can bear. When some sentences are used in a

logical argument, each part of a sentence is to have the same Bedeutung

FREGE AND VAGUENESS 39

at each of its occurrences, and each sentence has a Bedeutung, that is, a

truth value. Speaking a bit more precisely, we could say that, if we

consider the premiss( es) and the conclusion of a rule of inference, a

predicate symbol is to occur in more than one of these formulas; and the

correctness of the rule would vanish if, to two different occurrences of

the predicate symbol, we were to assign different subsets of (a Cartesian

product of) the universal domain when we interpret the formulas. On

the other hand, when ordinary language is used only for communication,

parts of a sentence may have no Sinn and no Bedeutung, although the

sentence has a Sinn. Since no Bedeutung is mentioned for the sentence,

does it mean that the sentence is truthvalueless?

How can a word have no Sinn and/or no Bedeutung? This could be

because the word is used syncategorematically. But, first, not all words

of a sentence can be syncategorematic. And, second, this would not fit

well with Frege's systems, in 1879 and in 1893-1903, since in these

systems no sign is syncategorematic; each has a Bedeutung (and a Sinn);

the sign for negation, for example, denotes a certain function. We would

seem to be more justified, in the light of Frege's writings, in assuming

that a word has no Bedeutung because it is vague. Remember, a pre

dicate whose delimitation is 'blurred' denotes no concept. So Frege

seems to think that words of ordinary language have neither Sinn or

Bedeutung because they are vague, but that, somehow, the whole

sentence has a Sinn (though perhaps no Bedeutung, that is, no truth

value). All that remains quite schematic, and the manner in which a

sentence composed of words having no Sinn has itself a Sinn is certainly

obscure.

In a manuscript written two or three years after his letter to Peano

and left unpublished, Frege wrote (1969, p. 168, or 1979, p. 155; I

modified the translation):

Inference from two premisses often, if not always, rests on there being a concept

common to both. If a fallacy is not to occur, not only must the sign for the concept be

the same, but this sign must also have the same Bedeutung [dasselbe bedeuten]. It must

have a Bedeutung independent of the context, and not first obtain one in the context,

something that is, however, very often the case with words of [ordinary] language.

Here Frege repeats what he has said in our quotation from his letter to

Peano, but only in part. He no longer speaks of words without Sinn

constituting a sentence that has Sinn. The initial remark, that in an

inference from two premisses a predicate symbol is to occur in each,

40 J. VAN HEIJENOORT

reminds us of the role of the middle term in an Aristotelian syllogism

and is not correct for modern systems; if, however, we consider all the

premisses and the conclusion of any rule of inference in any modern

system, we can safely say, I think, that every predicate symbol occurs at

least twice. And, in any interpretation, the same set has to be assigned to

each occurrence of the symbol.

Frege's view is that vagueness does not prevent communication, but

wrecks logical inferences. A word, at its two occurrences in two

different sentences, has different Sinne, that is, strictly speaking, has no

Sinn. Within a sentence, each word has a local Sinn, and these Sinne

succeed in combining in such a way that the sentence as a whole has a

Sinn; but, as we go from sentence to sentence, the Sinn of a word varies,

and these changes play havoc with logical inferences, because these

necessarily involve more than one sentence.

Frege's conception would involve, it seems, a considerable amount of

elaboration and justification. But it may be right. Vagueness is omni-

present in ordinary language, in the sense that every word has a fringe of

indeterminacy. The word 'man' is vague (and that in at least three

directions: 'adult' versus 'boy', 'Homo sapiens' versus 'ape', 'male' versus

'female'), but the word is nevertheless a serviceable component of our

language. Ordinary language is quite nimble at taming vagueness. It

makes use of all the information that the context can provide in order to

curb the vagaries of words. If that does not succeed and the indefinite-

ness of a word threatens the mutual understanding between speaker and

hearer, we drop the word and shift to another way of speaking.

Logical inference puts more severe constraints on language than does

the mere impartment of information; it tolerates less wobbling in the

senses of words, perhaps no wobbling at all. The Greeks began to worry

about the Heap and the Bald when their language became an instrument

of argumentation, whether mathematical or philosophical. Since the best

we can do, in ordinary language, is to locally reduce vagueness, but not

eliminate it, and since logic has been built on the same lines as mathe-

matics, that is, with initial bivalent predicates plus rules that maintain

bivalence (set-theoretic semantics), what is the status of logical argu-

ments conducted in ordinary language, with vague words? Shady, some

would say. Behind a vague word we perceive (imagine? assume?) a

bivalent predicate, and the argument is actually conducted with that

predicate in mind; when the words are again taken as belonging to

ordinary language, the conclusion, it is to be hoped, will remain valid.

FREGE AND VAGUENESS

The enterprise has an 'as if' character. In the syllogism

All Athenians are men,

All men are mortal,

Therefore, all Athenians are mortal,

41

the predicates ' ... is an Athenian', ' ... is a man', ' ... is mortal' are vague;

but nobody would question the validity of the argument. On the other

hand, when we try to apply mathematical induction to the predicate ' ...

is a heap', we reach an absurd conclusion, and precisely because of the

vagueness of the predicate. Here, if we would simply argue as if the

predicate ' ... is a heap' were exact, our convention would seem

glaringly artifical and leave us with a feeling of dissatisfaction. The first

Greek who drew our attention to the Heap wanted us to reflect on how

logical arguments can at all be conducted with vague words.

When we introduce logic to students, we are prone to gloss over

vagueness and we will not demur, perhaps, at giving the sentence 'It is

raining or it is not raining' as an example of the law of the excluded

middle. We carry out, without always saying so, Quine's regimentation,

that is, we assume a universe of discourse with bivalent predicates.

Quine, however, is more sophisticated than Frege about this regimenta-

tion. For him (1977, p. 195), 'the regimentation is not a matter of

eliciting some latent and determinate content of ordinary language'.

Eliciting a latent and determinate content is precisely what Frege is

doing when, behind the word 'white', he discovers the bivalent 'objec-

tive' whiteness. Quine continues: 'It is a matter rather of freely creating

an ontology-oriented language that can supplant ordinary language in

serving some particular purpose one has in mind'.

Although Frege and Quine give a different ontological status to the

universe of discourse, both agree that ordinary language has to be

supplanted if logic is to be able to function. Ordinary language is

somehow too weak to stand the stress of bivalence and should not be

asked to bear up against the requirements of logical rigidity. A logical

argument conducted in ordinary language is to be successful only

whenever we can discern, behind ordinary words, bivalent predicates, as

we perceive the watermark behind the surface of a sheet of paper.

Russell comes to a similar conclusion. According to him, we are to

imagine a precise meaning for the words of ordinary language, and logic

is 'not applicable to this terrestrial life, but only to an imagined celestial

42 J. VAN HEIJENOORT

existence' (1923, pp. 88-89). And some years later (1937, p. xi) he

writes: 'none of the raw material of the world has smooth logical

properties, but [ ... ] whatever appears to have such properties is

constructed artificially in order to have them'.

Russell's artificial construction of a bivalent world by imagination is

closer to Quine's free creation of an ontology-oriented language than to

Frege's objective realism. But the three of them, Frege, Russell, Quine,

agree on one point, namely that ordinary language has to be supplanted

by a bivalent regimented discourse if logic is to function properly.

Regimentation comes in various forms. Frege's universal domain is a

fixed Universe that comprehends all objects, the number 7 as well as

Julius Caesar, with functions on top. One could claim, as Bachmann did

in his 1975, that the individuals whose existence is imposed by the

axioms of Frege 1893 and 1903 constitute a denumerable universal

domain of purely logico-mathematical objects. But, first, even in

1893-1903 Frege constantly adduces persons or heavenly bodies as

examples of objects and uses them as counterexamples to theses that he

wants to refute; and, second, his discussion of a number of key notions,

Wirklichkeit for example, clearly indicates that he puts all objects,

whether abstract or concrete, in the same ground domain of individuals.

Hence the denumerable domain isolated by Bachman constitutes a

minimal core, but it is difficult to maintain that Frege restricts himself to

that core. (The point deserves further discussion and I hope to come

back to it on another occasion.) Russell has an infinitely stratified

hierarchy, which is not, it seems, ontologically anchored. to a fixed

ground domain. As he writes (Whitehead and Russell 1910, p. 169, or

1925, p. 161), 'lilt is unnecessary, in practice, to know that objects

belong to the lowest type, or even whether the lowest type of the

variable occurring in a given context is that of individuals or some other.

For in practice only the relative types of variables are relevant; then the

lowest type occurring in a given context may be called that of individ-

uals, so far as that context is concerned'. As for Quine, he has theories,

changed according to our needs, each of which having, it seems, a

universal domain comprehending everything that there is (in the theory).

For Frege, regimentation is global, in the sense that the supplanting

of ordinary language is done en bloc. Perhaps also for Russell, with the

difference that Frege's universe is unique and fixed, while Russells'

hierarchy can, so to speak, move up and down. But Russell's quotation,

with its reference to a given context, opens a path that we may enter and

FREGE AND VAGUENESS 43

along which we may go farther than Russell. Logic is to be used locally

to test the correctness of arguments in ordinary language. Only the few

sentences that constitute the argument are considered. We pick the

universal domain that suits us locally, introduce predicates and connec-

tives, and check the argument. We now have a logic utens rather than a

logic magna. Logic has no longer any ontological import. The question

whether the number 7 and Julius Caesar are to be put in a common uni-

versal domain of objects belongs perhaps to ontology or metaphysics,

but not to logic. Frege, no doubt, would have considered such a use of

logic to be mere bricolage. But his global supplanting of ordinary

language by a system of bivalent predicates everywhere defined over a

fixed universal domain takes us far away from the problems of ordinary

words. These words are inherently vague because the process through

which we learn them involves a finite number of instances. We have

learned how to live with that vagueness, and we may want to understand

how ordinary language works, in particular how it works in spite (or,

perhaps, because) of vagueness. But this is not a task that Frege

welcomes. 'A large part of the philosopher's task consists - or at least

should consist - in a struggle with language', he writes (1969, p. 289,

or 1979, p. 270). Frege carries on that struggle, and brushes aside

vagueness.

What he does is to introduce an ontology that would allow his new

logical laws to function in a way that should be unobstructed and,

moreover, as simple as possible; it should be so simple that he is even

reluctant to divide his universe into sorts. He could not have tackled the

problems of vagueness at the moment he was introducing these logical

laws without extremely complicating his ontological view of the world.

We can even say more: he would not have been able to formulate these

laws without leaving vagueness out of the picture. The only way to

proceed at an early stage in the development of a science is by bold

simplification and abstraction. As Kreisel reminds us, this was Galileo's

successful strategy, he 'found immensely manageable laws by simply

excluding the vagaries of friction and air resistance in suitable experi-

mental setups' (1984). So Frege's disregard of vagueness and other

vagaries was, in a way, inevitable. But his logical laws have been

formulated more than hundred years ago, and it is now perhaps time to

look at the vagaries.

Stanford University

44

J. VAN HEIJENOORT

REFERENCES

Bachmann, Friedrich

1975 'Frege als konstruktiver Logizist', in Thiel 1975, 160-168.

Frege, Gottlob

1879 Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen

Denkens; English translation by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg in van Heijenoort

1967, 1-82.

1884 Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung

uber den Begriff der Zahl; see Frege 1953.

1892 '(fuer Sinn und Bedeutung,' Zeitschrift fUr Philosophie und philosophische

Kritik, new series, 100,25-50; English translation in Frege 1952,56-78.

1893 Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, vol. 1.

1903 Grundgesetze der Arithmetik; begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, vol. 2.

1952 Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter

Geach and Max Black; 2nd ed., 1960.

1953 The Foundations of Arithmetic, German text and English translation of Frege

1884 by J. L. Austin, 2nd revised edition.

1969 Nachgelassene Schriften und wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, vol. 1, Nachge-

lassene Schriften.

1976 Nachgelassene Schriften und wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, vol. 2, Wissen-

schaftlicher Briefwechsel. .

1979 Posthumous Writings.

1980 Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence.

Hilbert, David

1904 'Uber die Grundlagen der Logik und der Arithmetik', Verhandlungen des

Dritten 1nternationalen Mathematiker-Kongresses in Heidelberg vom 8. bis 13.

August 1904; English translation by Beverly Woodward in van Heijenoort

1967, 129-138.

Kreisel, Georg

1984 'Frege's Foundations and Intuitionistic Logic', The Monist 67, 72-91.

Merrill, Kenneth R.

See Shahan, Robert W., and Kenneth R. Merrill.

Poincare, Henri

1906 'Les mathmatiques et la logique', Revue de metaphysique et de morale 14,

17-34.

1908 Science et methode.

Quine, Willard Van

1977 'Facts of the Matter', in Shahan and Merrill 1977, 176-196.

Russell, Bertrand

1923 Vagueness, The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 1, 84-92.

1937 The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed.

See 'Whitehead, Alfred North, and Bertrand Russell.

Shahan, Robert W., and Kenneth R. Merrill

1977 American Philosophy from Edwards to Quine.

FREGE AND VAGUENESS

Thiel, Christian (ed.)

1975 Frege und die moderne Grundlagenforschung.

Van Heijenoort, Jean (ed.)

1967 From Frege to Godel, A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-193l.

Whitehead, Alfred North, and Bertrand Russell

1910 Principia Mathematica, vol. 1.

1925 Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed.

45

HANS SLUGA

SEMANTIC CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SENSE

1.

We can characterize the disagreement between adherents of Russell-

style theories of meaning and those of Frege-style theories as follows:

RS theorists assume that a satisfactory theory of meaning can be

built with the binary relation - e refers to r - whereas FS theorists

maintain that a three-place relation - e through having sense s

refers to r - is required.

l

It should be clear from this characterization that anything an RS theory

can do can also be done by an FS theory, since the crucial notion of RS

theories, the binary reference relation, is available in any FS theory; for

we can define

e refers* to r= df' 3 s (e through s refers to r).2

The question in the dispute between the two theories is then whether

there are conditions of adequacy only FS theories can satisfy.

On my account the disagreement is not over the issue of how definite

descriptions are to be analysed. According to Russell a semantic theory

should not be expected to assign meaning directly to expressions of the

from "the f," but only to sentences in which such phrases occur. A

sentence of the form "the f is g" is then to be taken to have the same

meaning as a sentence of the form "there is one and only one thing

which is both f and g." On Frege's analysis, on the other hand, expres-

sions of the form "the f" are to be taken as proper logical constituents of

propositions which say, in effect, that the semantic theory should assign

meaning directly to such expressions.

It might seem at first sight that there is a logical link between FS

theories of meaning and the Fregean analysis of definite deSCriptions

and likewise between RS theories and the Russellian analysis of definite

descriptions. That is, however, not the case. For fairly obvious reasons

an FS theorist could consistently adopt the Russellian analysis since it is

structurally equivalent to Frege's analysis of expressions of the form "all

47

L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 47-64.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

48 HANS SLUGA

f" and "some f" which, in tum, is presumably compatible with an FS

theory.

But the claim that a Fregean analysis of definite descriptions is

incompatible with RS theories of meaning is initially more plausible. If

we treat expressions of the form "the f" as referring expressions and not

merely as having contextual meaning, we must, it seems, distinguish

between their reference and how they characterize that reference. The

expression "the teacher of Alexander the Great" refers to Aristotle and

characterizes him as a teacher of Alexander whereas the expression ''the

author of the Prior Analytic" refers to that same person, but charac

terizes him as an author rather than a teacher. Such a distinction

between the reference of an expression and how that reference is

characterized seems to demand an FS account in terms of the notions of

the reference and the sense of expressions. I will try to show that this is

not so.

A satisfactory theory of meaning in the sense in which I have spoken

of it in characterizing the disagreement between the two parties is a

theory which satisfies certain conditions of adequacy. Any such condi

tion met by an RS theory will obviously be satisfiable by an FS theory.

But Frege argues in the essay "On Sense and Reference" that there are

conditions of adequacy which only his style of theory can satisfy. One of

them, he claims, is the following:

Condition A: A satisfactory theory of meaning must explain the

(intuitively obvious) difference between trivially true and informa

tively true identity statements.

For the reasons given by Frege himself I assume that theories of this

style satisfy the condition. My question is whether RS theories also can

satisfy it. If they can, condition A cannot serve as a criterion for

determining which of the two styles of theory is preferable.

I will argue that RS theories can, in fact, satisfy condition A, but only

partially so. We can then ask whether the condition is valid only to the

extent to which both styles of theory can satisfy it. Reasons for that

claim can be produced. Even if those reasons are ultimately rejected, we

can learn something about the basic difference between RS and FS

theories by considering them.

There are other conditions of adequacy which Frege claims only his

style of theory can satisfy. Thus, he argues, that only an FS theory can

account for the logic of belief contexts and that only an FS theory can

SEMANTIC CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SENSE 49

explain the use of names which lack reference. For the purpose of the

present discussion we can set their consideration aside.

2.

In order to show that RS theories can, at least, partially satisfy condition

A, I introduce a notion of semantic content. The claim is that this notion

can be explained by means of syntactic terms and the binary relation "e

refers to r" but can do much of what Frege's notion of sense is meant to

do. I will first illustrate the notion informally.

Given two mathematical functions f and g which we explain as

f(x) = x + 7 and g(y) = 12 - y

we can form the true equation

f(2) = g(3).

It is here obvious that the two functional expressions "f(2)" and "g(3)",

while both referring to the number 9, do- so in different ways. But in

order to describe the difference in their way of specifying the number 9,

we have no need to talk about the supposed sense of the two functional

expressions. All we need to consider is the reference of the two func-

tional terms as laid down in the initial specification, the reference of the

expressions "2" and "3" and the way the functional terms and the

number terms are combined into the complete functional expressions

"f(2)" and "g(3)". There is then a notion of semantic content, specifiable

in referential and syntactic terms alone, which allows us to say that in

the equation "f(2) = g(3)" the functional expressions have the same

reference, but differ in semantic content.

In order to make the notion of semantic content precise we need to

determine both when two expressions have the same semantic content

and when they have different ones. We must do so first for simple

expressions (proper names and functional terms) and then for complex

ones formed from them.

3

Since intuitively we mean by semantic content the information con-

veyed by the composition of an expression given the reference of its

constituents, it seems plausible to say that for simple expressions, i.e.,

those without composition, semantic content varies with reference. In

other words:

Two simple expressions have the same semantic content if and

only if they have the same reference.

50 HANS SLUGA

And for complex expressions we can lay down:

Two complex expressions have the same semantic content if and

only if they are constructed in the same way out of constituents

with the same semantic content.

Thus, if "f" and "g" have the same semantic content and so do "a" and

"b", then "f(a)" and "g(b)" have the same semantic content. But if "a"

and "b" have different semantic content, then "f(a)" and "g(b)" also

have different semantic content, though they may have the same refer-

ence. Given a two-place relation "h", the two expressions "h(a, b)" and

"h(b, a)" have different semantic content since they are built up in

different ways, though they are built from the same constituents and

may have the same reference.

It should be obvious how we can give a Fregean analysis of definite

descriptions in terms of this notion of semantic content. Treating

definite descriptions as expressions of the form ''f(g)'' we can distinguish

between the reference and the semantic content of the definite descrip-

tion. Thus, ''The teacher of Alexander the Great" and "the author of the

Prior Analytic" are expressions with the same reference, but with

different semantic content.

It should also be immediately clear how we can use the notion of

semantic content to distinguish between trivial and informative identity

statements. An identity statement is informative if the two expressions

connected by the identity sign have the same reference, but different

semantic content. Thus, the sentence "The teacher of Alexander the

Great is identical with the author of the Prior Analytic" is informative

because the first expression refers to Aristotle as a teacher and the

second refers to him as an author.

3.

It remains to be shown that the distinction between trivial and informa-

tive identity statements is only partially characterizable by means of the

notion of semantic content. That will become clearer, if we consider

what different kinds of identity statement there are.

Assuming "a" and "b" to be simple names and "m" and "n" complex

referring expressions, we can distinguish three kinds of identity state-

ment:

SEMANTIC CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SENSE 51

(1) thoseoftheform "a= b"

(2) those ofthe form "a = m" or "n = b" and

(3) those of the form "m = n".

When we test for each of those three kinds of statement how well the

notion of semantic content accounts for a distinction between trivial and

informative ones, we discover that it seems to fit the third kind of

statement, but that there are problems with the first and the second.

According to our characterization of the notion of semantic content,

all true identity statements of the first kind must be trivial. And similarly

no true identity statements of the second kind can be trivial.

That seems not to conform to our intuitions and it is here where an FS

theory appears to have an advantage. According to Frege every simple

name has a sense as well as a reference. An identity statement of the

first kind is informative for him, if the two names "a" and "b" have the

same reference but different sense. Similarly an identity statement of the

second kind is trivial for him, when the name "a" in it has the same

sense as the complex expression "m" occurring in the statement. Such

distinctions are not available in the account built on the notion of

semantic content as we have defined it, since we have laid down that

two simple names have the same content if and only if they have the

same reference.

We can remove part of the problem by changing our original defini-

tion to say:

When an expression has been explicitly introduced by means of a

definitional specification, the semantic content of the simple

expression will be the same as that of the original specification.

Two simple expressions not introduced in that way have the same

content if and only if they have the same reference.

For all identity statements of kinds (1) and (2) which contain names to

which the first part of this characterization applies the distinction can

now be made in terms of the notion of semantic content. Consider the

sentence "Cicero is identical with Tully." According to the original

characterization of the notion of semantic content the statement is

trivial; but according to the new one it is informative, if one of the

proper names has been introduced by a definite description. If both

have been introduced by definite descriptions, the statement may again

tum out to be trivial, namely when the two descriptions have the same

semantic content.

52 HANS SLUGA

There are other possible and plausible modifications of the notion of

semantic content that make it possible to draw the trivial/informative

line of distinction closer to the intuitive one. We might, for instance,

specify that two complex expressions have the same semantic content if

one is a transformation of the second according to specifiable rules and

if the corresponding constituents in the two expressions have the same

semantic content. Such rules might state that expressions of the form "m

and n" and "n and m" have the same semantic content and likewise for

"m or n" and "n or m", as well as for "m" and "not-not-m".

Such modifications are, however, unlikely to change the fact that we

cannot completely capture the intuitive distinction between trivial and

informative identity statements in terms of such a (modified) notion of

semantic content. The case seems to be different for an FS theory, and it

is easy to see why. Frege holds that every expression with a reference

must also have a sense, for the sense is meant to determine the way the

object is given. He argues with some plausibility that in order for us to

identify or re-identify an object, we must recognize it as a something or

other. It is this mode of recognition that constitutes the sense of the sign

referring to the object. In terms of this notion of sense we can explain

why an identity statement of the first kind can be informative, and one

of the second trivial. If the two kinds of identity statement contain

proper names not introduced through definitional specifications, the

account of,the trivial/informative distinction in terms of the notion of

semantic content will not coincide with the Fregean account. And since

it is the Fregean account that is closer to the intuitive distinction we

seem to have a criterion for choosing between FS and RS theories of

meaning. The former can satisfy condition A more fully than the latter

and on that account seems to be preferable.

4.

But this conclusion follows only if we uphold condition A without

restriction. One might argue instead that the condition is, in fact, not a

completely suitable criterion for choosing between semantic theories.

One might argue that the notions of triviality and informativeness are, in

fact, not at all unified concepts, that there are hidden semantic and

cognitive elements which must be separated when we consider require-

ments of semantic theories.

SEMANTIC CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SENSE 53

Consider the propositions "Aristotle is Aristotle" and "Aristotle was

the teacher of Alexander the Great." The former is trivial because it is

formally an instance of the principle of identity; we need not consider

how Aristotle is to be identified in order to recognize the truth of the

proposition; all we need to know is that the two occurrences of the

name refer to the same man. The second sentence, on the other hand, is

not at all trivial in this sense. It can convey information; but to an

Aristotle scholar or a Greek historian the sentence may still be a

triviality.

I call the first sentence semantically trivial and the second semanti

cally informative. But what is semantically informative may still turn out

to be cognitively trivial for a particular speaker, as illustrated above. The

sentence "Aristotle is Aristotle" is, for most of us, both semantically and

cognitively trivial; but there are also sentences which are semantically

trivial though cognitively informative; "war is war" comes to mind. It is

less clear whether there can also be sentences which are semantically

informative and cognitively trivial. I will argue below that Frege, at least,

thought that there could and that this conviction motivated his introduc

tion of the theory of sense and reference.

Having distinguished the two sets of notions we are now in a position

to say why condition A may not be a suitable criterion for judging

semantic theories; for we may reasonably hold that a semantic theory

should have to explain only semantic distinctions and not cognitive

ones. Condition A should then give way to:

Condition A': a satisfactory theory of meaning must explain the

difference between semantically trivial and semantically informa

tive identity statements.

This condition, we can argue, is in fact satisfied by both RS and FS

theories and can therefore not serve as a criterion for choosing between

them.

What reason have we for considering the notion of sense a cognitive

rather than a semantic notion? Consider again the sentence "Aristotle

was the teacher of Alexander the Great." According to Frege the

sentence is trivial, if we connect with the name "Aristotle" the sense "the

teacher of Alexander the Great." There is nothing in the expression

itself nor in the fact that this expression is a name of a particular person

which determines the sense in which the name is to be taken. If semantic

54 HANS SLUGA

notions are those which can be explicated in terms of the nature and

structure of linguistic expressions and what they stand for, the notion of

sense is obviously not a semantic notion at all. Frege's argument for

holding that names must have sense is this: that for speakers to be able

to refer to objects they must be able to identify and re-identify objects,

objects must be given to them in particular ways. Such considerations

seem epistemic in character, rather than semantic.

4

It might be useful to distinguish more sharply than the philosoplftcal

literature has done so far between the semantics and the epistemology

of language. Recent work in the theory of meaning has shown how

complex issues can become in that field and for that reason alone it

might be helpful to keep its boundaries as narrowly defined as possible.

I formulate this suggestion in hypothetical terms, because I have

certainly not shown beyond doubt that a sharp distinction between

semantic and cognitive issues can be drawn in the way I have suggested.

My intention here was simply to argue that condition A is not an

uncontroversial criterion for choosing between semantic theories. If we

consider it unrestrictedly valid we commit ourselves to a view that does

not distinguish sharply between semantic and cognitive aspects of

language. My conclusion is simply that FS theories cater to such an

amalgamation, whereas RS theories demand a separation of the two

aspects.

We can see how FS theories lead to an amalgamation of semantic and

cognitive issues by considering how Husserl used the Fregean notion of

sense and by generalizing it to the notion of noema generated a whole

cognitive theory from it.5 In recent work John Searle and Michael

Dummett illustrate two alternative directions in which such an amalga-

mation can lead. Searle, travelling a path parallel to Husserl's, has now

generalized the theory of sense into a theory of intentionality; the theory

of meaning has become embedded for him in a cognitive theory.6

Dummett, on the other hand, has made the theory of meaning absorb

the theory of knowledge.

7

In either case the boundary between the

theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge has been traversed.

5.

The notion of semantic content appears to me of obvious interest for

systematic work in the theory of meaning. But I have introduced it

primarily for another purpose - to clarify the origin of Frege's doctrine

SEMANTIC CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SENSE 55

of sense and reference. That doctrine is closely tied to Frege's under

standing of the logical character of identity statements which, in turn, is

related to his concern with the nature of arithmetical truths.

Frege's conviction that arithmetical truths are reducible to logic, a

conviction that shaped so much of his work, is almost certainly derived

from Hermann Lotze's Logik of 1874.

8

There Lotze develops the

reducibility thesis in conjunction with a theory of identity that is closely

akin to Frege's own early theory in the Begriffsschrift. In order to

understand the latter it is useful to go back to Lotze's account.

Lotze, in contrast to Kant and the Kantian tradition, holds that "all

calculation is a kind of thought and that the fundamental concepts and

principles of mathematics have their systematic place in logic." (p. 26)

At the same time he agrees with Kant that arithmetical equations do not

"rest simply upon the principle of identity." (p. 504) He agrees with

Kant against Hume that such truths are necessary, but not tautologous.

Lotze, like Kant, takes the principle of identity to say no more than "a =

a", and it is obvious that the usual arithmetical truths cannot be derived

from this principle alone. Nevertheless, Lotze asserts:

We must not forget that calculation in any case belongs to the logical activities, and it is

only their practical separation in education which has concealed the full claim of

mathematics to a home in the universal realm of logic (p. 110).

For Kant the principle of identity is, of course, the one on which all

logic rests. If arithmetical truths are not derivable from that principle

alone they cannot be logical truths for him. Lotze, on the other hand,

takes a somewhat different line by introducing a distinction between the

form and the content of expressions in identity statements. And it is this

distinction which he believes will reconcile the claims that arithmetical

truths are logical, but no mere instances of the principle of identity.

If two different expressions refer to the same thing, they have for

Lotze the same content, but different form. As a matter of fact Lotze's

distinction of form and content corresponds precisely to the previously

given distinction between semantic content and reference.

9

The distinc

tion allows Lotze to say that an arithmetical equation like "7 + 5 = 12"

has the same content as the principle of identity, "a = a", but a different

form. He says of this equation that we have in it "a perfectly identical

judgment as regards its matter, and it is only synthetical formally

because it exhibits the number 12 first as the sum of two quantities and

then as determined by its order in the simple series of number" (p. 64).

56 HANS SLUGA

As far as its content is concerned every identity statement (and every

arithmetical equation) is, thus, a necessary truth which says the same as

"a = a." But this necessary truth can be represented under different

forms. According to its form an identity statement can be empirical or a

priori. There can thus be empirically necessary and a priori necessary

identity statements.

lO

Lotze says that as far as the form is concerned all

nontrivial identity statements are synthetic, some synthetic a posteriori

and some synthetic a priori. Arithmetical equations are characteristically

both identical (and hence necessary) propositions and synthetic a priori.

That seems to bring Lotze close to the Kantian view of arithmetic,

but the impression is misleading, since he does not hold that arith-

metical truths are based on an intuition of space and time. He says

rather of the exemplary equation "7 + 5 = 12":

For that which all turns upon is in fact nothing more than the assertion which is

contained in the sign of addition - viz. that quantities can be summed so as to compose

another and a homogeneous quantity; a proposition the importance of which we may

once more be tempted to ignore, because it seems to us self-evident and a mere identical

proposition defining the nature of numerical quantity as such. And so it undoubtedly is,

but how do we arrive this piece of self-evident knowledge? (p. 508).

And the answer to that question is that,

This very fact, that there is such a thing as quantity to be found in the world of ideas

... is a fact of immediate perception . .. The proposition therefore that quantities can be

summed is undoubtedly an identical proposition; but that the subject and predicate of

that proposition appear as valid in the world of ideas . . . does not follow from the

principle of identity (p. 509).

The realm of objective ideas is for Lotze the realm with which logic is

concerned. The truths that obtain in it are the truths of logic. But our

knowledge of those truths, the forms under which they appear, is

synthetic a priori knowledge. It depends on our direct apprehension of

what is to be found in the world of ideas. In order to understand the

necessity of the arithmetical truths we must apprehend that summable

quantities belong to that world. Such apprehension is synthetic a priori

in so far as it is intuitive and immediate rather than conceptual and

discursive.

With this argument Lotze has, in fact, concluded that the truths of

arithmetic cannot be derived from the principle of identity alone, that

additional logical principles, a richer logic that Kant's are required in

order to carry out the derivation. He writes:

SEMANTIC CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SENSE 57

Turning to the discovery of mathematical truth, we shall not dispute the validity nor yet

the importance of the principle of identity, but we must dispute its fruitfulness; we must

insist that if it were the only principle we had to start from, mathematical truth could

never be discovered at all (p. 505).

Lotze is convinced that mathematics is an "independently progressive

branch of universal logic" (p. 26), but he never tries to spell out the

additional logical principles that he considers necessary for the logical

derivation of the mathematical and, in particular, the arithmetical truths.

That is a task Frege takes upon himself.

6.

In so far as we can speak of a conception of meaning in Frege's early

work, it was an RS conception built on the binary relation of a name to

its content. Following Lotze's usage Frege employed the term "content"

in this period to mean as much as the reference of a name, that which

the name stands for. The account of identity statements which he offers

in his earliest publication, the Begriffsschrift, presupposes such an RS

conception and is essentially equivalent to the account given here in

terms of the notion of semantic content.

There are, to be precise, two aspects to the Begriffsschrift account of

identity which it is important to separate. The first is that identity

"applies to names and not to contents ... for it expresses the circum

stance that two names have the same content."l1 The second is that

statements can be informative because "the same content can be

completely determined in different ways." The informative identity

statement says that two ways of determining the content can yield the

same result. Frege writes:

Before this judgment can be made, two distinct names corresponding to the two ways of

determining the content must be assigned to what these ways determine. The judgment,

however, requires for its expression a sign of identity of content, a sign that connects

these two names. From this it follows that the existence of different names for the same

content is not always merely an irrelevant question of form; rather, that there are such

names is the very heart of the matter if each is associated with a different way of

determining the content (p. 21).

There is no question that Frege's distinction between the content of a

name and its way of determining a content is derived from Lotze's

account of identity and like it corresponds to our distinction between

reference and semantic content.

58 HANS SLUGA

At the same time there is one important difference between Frege's

and Lotze's account. For Frege an identity statement is a statement

about signs, whereas Lotze makes no such assumption. One reason for

Frege's departure from Lotze's account suggests itself immediately. The

latter has the peculiar consequence that identity statements can turn out

to be both identical (and thus analytic in their content) and synthetic in

form. In the Begriffsschrift Frege may have considered it possible to

simplify the story by considering identity statements as statements about

signs. In that case, he can say that statements of the form "a = a" are

analytic and that identity statements in which two expressions of differ

ent form stand for the same content are synthetic. This is, in fact, what

he indicates when he says about the latter:

In that case the judgment that has the identity of content as its object is synthetic, in the

Kantian sense (ibid.).

But this simplification has the unfortunate consequence that Frege is no

longer able to explain how any but the most trivial arithmetical equa

tions can turn out to be logical truths. This, however, was a point he

came to appreciate only later.

While Frege allowed in the Begriffsschrift that signs can sometimes

stand for what they signify and sometimes for themselves, he later came

to reject such a "bifurcation" violently. It was, presumably, the confron

tation with mathematical formalists who assumed that number state

ments are statements about numerical signs which made Frege aware of

the need to distinguish sharply between the sign and the signified. Given

the fact that he believed that his early account of identity statements

depended on taking them as statements about the signs, we can see, at

least, one reason why he may have wanted to modify his early theory.

He writes in the essay 'On Sense and Reference':

What is intended to be said by a = b seems to be that the names "a" and "b" designate

the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation

between them would be asserted.i2

It is clear that he finds this no longer plausible; but the reason he offers

for why the earlier account is implausible is peculiar. He continues:

But this relation would hold between names and signs only in so far as they named or

designated something. It would be mediated by the connexion of each of the two signs

with the same designated thing. But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use

any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something. In that case the

SEMANTIC CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SENSE 59

sentence a = a would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of

designation; we would express no proper knowledge by its means (ibid.).

This explanation of what is wrong with the earlier account is peculiar

because if consists in a mere repudiation of what he had previously

affirmed without really adding new arguments. In the Begriffsschrift he

had said that "the existence of different names for the same content is

not always merely an irrelevant question of form," but he now asserts

blandly that "nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible

event or object as a sign for something."

It seems at this point that the earlier account is, in fact, more

plausible. Every simple word in the language could, of course, have a

reference different from the one it has, but once the reference of simple

words is fixed, the reference of complex terms formed from them seems

no longer arbitrary. Why then did Frege feel himself forced to abandon

his earlier account? Surely not just because he had come to reject the

idea the identity statements are statements about the signs.

7.

There is, in fact, no way in which we can understand the motivations for

Frege's shift by looking exclusively 'On Sense and Reference.' Instead

we must turn to the essay 'Function and Concept,' published shortly

before 'On Sense and Reference,' where the new semantic theory is

discussed for the first time.

'Function and Concept' is clearly part of Frege's work on the thesis

that arithmetic is reducible to logic. In it he introduces the notion of the

value-range of a function, meant as a generalization of the notion of

class. And he argues for a principle which he considers essential for his

reductionist program which says that statements of the form "the value-

range of the function f is identical with that of the function g" are

equivalent to "the functions f and g have the same value for identical

arguments." He writes:

The possibility of regarding a general statement to the effect that the values of functions

are equal as an equality, namely as an equality of value-ranges is, I think, not capable of

proof, but must be considered a basic law of logic (p. 26).

In the Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Frege's main work, the principle recurs

as one of the logical axioms (Axiom V) from which arithmetic is to be

60 HANS SLUGA

derived. In accordance with his practice of regarding equivalences as

identity statements, it is stated there as:

(x/(x) = yg(y = 'VZ(j(Z) = g(Z14

Since Frege was aware of the fact that this axiom was essential for his

derivation of arithmetic, and since his project was to show that arith-

metic is nothing but an extended logic, he must have asked himself

immediately upon formulating the axiom what reasons there were for

considering it a logical principle at all.

The Begriffsschrift account of identity statements can, in fact, provide

no such reasons. The expressions on the two sides of the identity sign

obviously have different semantic content and, according to the

Begriffsschrift, statements of that sort are synthetic rather than analytic.

A new account of identity statements and a new account of meaning is

required, if Axiom V is to come out as a logical (and analytic) truth.

Frege begins the essay 'Function and Concept' by recalling the

Lotzean distinction between form and content (p. 22). But this termi-

nology is now set aside in favour of another one, the sense-reference

terminology, which occurs for the first time in the context of the

discussion of the supposed basic law of logic concerning value-ranges.

Considering the step from a statement of the form x/ex) = yg(y) to one

of the form 'Vx(j(x) = g(x, Frege writes that the latter "expresses the

same sense, but in a different way" (p. 27). It is at this point that the

new, technical notion of sense is made to do work for the first time.

The point seems clear. If we are to regard a statement of the form

"a = b" as a logical truth, we must assume that the two expressions "a"

and "b" do not only stand for the same thing, they must also have the

same meaning. But the notion of sameness of meaning that is here

required is not one that can be spelled out in terms of the notion of

semantic content. The whole point of Axiom V is to say that statements

of different form (and hence of different semantic content) can be

logically equivalent. Axiom V is meant to be semantically informative,

but cognitively obvious.

A different notion of meaning, one not explicable in purely semantic

terms, is required in order to assure us that Axiom V is indeed a logical

principle. The notion of sense is that new concept. According to Frege,

Axiom V shows us how the same content can be apprehended in two

different ways. This apprehension of sameness, which guarantees the

status of the axiom as a logical principle, does not express itself in the

formal structure of the axiom. It is an immediate, intuitive apprehension.

SEMANTIC CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SENSE 61

It is clear then that the notion of sense serves here as a cognitive notion;

it concerns our conception or apprehension of a particular truth.

Michael Dummett has recently said that Frege never repeated the

claim made in 'Function and Concept' that the two sides of Axiom V

have the same sense. He writes that

in the Grundgesetze, where much space is devoted to justifying the introduction of value-

ranges, the assertion is not repeated .... The remark in Function und Begriffis surely a

residue from his earlier style of thought, before sense and reference had been distin-

guished; when he had reflected further on the new distinction, he realized that he could

not sustain the claim.15

Dummett's assertion is, in fact, open to doubt. In the Basic Laws of

Arithmetic Frege writes:

I use the words "the function f(x) has the same value-range as the function g(x)" as

gleichbedeutend with the words "the functions f(x) and g(x) have the same value for

identical argument (p. 36).

The word I have left untranslated seems, at first sight, appropriately

rendered by "denoting the same as" or by "standing for the same thing

as."16 But there is a question whether such renderings are, in fact, right.

In 27 of the Basic Laws Frege explains:

We introduce a name by means of a definition by stipulating that it is to have the same

sense and the same reference as some name composed of signs that are familiar.

Thereby the new sign becomes gleichbedeutend with that being used to explain it (pp.

82f.),17

Here the word "gleichbedeutend" obviously means as much as "synony-

mous" and not just "having the same reference." And if the former is the

correct translation, then Frege is clearly still convinced that the two

sides of Axiom V have the same sense.

Even if ultimately he changed his mind on this point, the fact remains

that he initially introduced the notion of sense in order to explain why

Axiom V is not a synthetic truth and not because of the unsatisfactory

argument at the beginning of the essay 'On Sense and Reference.'

8.

Dummett is, of course right that in the Basic Laws Frege did not justify

the introduction of the sense-reference distinction in terms of the needs

of his philosophy of mathematics. In the introduction to that book he

62 HANS SLUGA

gives a different account of what he considers to be the most important

aspect of the new semantic theory. He writes:

Formerly I distinguished two components in that whose external form is a declarative

sentence: (1) the acknowledgment of truth, (2) the content that is acknowledged to be

true .... This last has now split for me into what I call "thought" and "truth-value," as a

consequence of distinguishing between sense and reference of a sign .... How much

simpler and sharper everything becomes by the introduction of truth-values, only

detailed acquaintance with this book can show (pp. 6f).

It may at first seem strange that Frege puts no emphasis at all in this text

on the new semantics of names and definite descriptions which he had

described in the essay 'On Sense and Reference'; but then it becomes

clear from looking more carefully at the Basic Laws that this part of the

sense-reference theory is of no significance for the logic he lays out in

that book or for the attempted derivation of arithmetic from the logic.

Going back to the essay our attention is drawn to the fact that the

largest portion of it is devoted to the defence that declarative sentences

under normal circumstances have truth-values as references, and not to

the semantics of names and definite descriptions.

The question remains why Frege should have considered the introduc-

tion of truth-values such a significant achievement. Michael Dummett

once said that Frege's doctrine that sentences refer to truth-values

"proves to have very implausible consequences."18 He was thinking then

of the assimilation of sentences to names and of predicates to functions

that goes with that doctrine. Frege obviously considered the possibility

of such an assimilation one of the great advantages of the new theory.

While he had made a distinction between semantic content and refer-

ence in his early work (or mode of designation and content, as he said in

the Begriffsschrift), he had not applied that distinction to the semantics

of complete declarative sentences. In the case of such sentences he had

simply spoken of their content. In the 1890s when he introduced his

new semantic theory he came to think that various technical simplifica-

tions would be possible, if the distinction of sense and reference was

systematically applied to all meaningful expressions, names, definite

descriptions, functional expressions, and sentences alike. In retrospect

he treats that discovery as the important breakthrough of the doctrine of

sense and reference.

But it should be clear that it was only a historical accident that had

stopped Frege from adopting the same kind of assimilation in the

SEMANTIC CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SENSE 63

Begriffsschrift. He could have distinguished there between the semantic

content and the reference of declarative sentences and he could have

taken all true sentences to have the same reference and all false ones,

too. The new semantic theory was, thus, not at all necessitated by the

introduction of truth-values. It was rather, as I have shown, the question

of the status of arithmetical truths that made the break with the earlier

semantic doctrines inevitable for him and forced him to introduce a

cognitive notion of sense.

University of California

Berkeley

NOTES

I The fact that I am describing here a conflict between RS theories and FS theories

does not mean that I assume all theories of meaning to be of one or the other of the two

kinds. The verificationist theory of the Vienna Circle is an example of a totally different

sort of theory.

2 I introduce the term "refers*" here in order to obviate possible objections from FS

theories that the newly defined term is not the same as the binary term used in RS

theories. It is sufficient for my purpose to show that RS theories can be modelled in FS

theories.

3 I make the Fregean assumptions here that all expressions are either names or

functional expressions and that either kind can have reference. If we allow functional

terms to refer to partially defined functions (Le., functions that lack values for certain

possible arguments) we can account for the fact that expressions can have semantic

content but no reference.

4 Michael Dummett writes that "to give an account of the sense of an expression is ...

to give a partial account of what a speaker knows when he understands that expression."

('Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference' in Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 122.) I know, in fact, of no better arguments

against taking the notion of sense as a semantic notion than the ones Dummett produces

in this essay in support of that idea.

Arguments for taking the notion of sense as a cognitive notion are also provided by

Tyler Burge, 'Sinning Against Frege,' Philosophical Review, vol. 88, 1979, pp.

398-432. While I agree with much of what Burge says, I do not quite agree with him

that Frege never intended to give a semantic theory in terms of the notion of sense. It

was just that his reflections drove him to amalgamate semantic and epistemi<; questions.

5 The best account of this is given in Dagfinn F0llesdal, 'Husser!'s Notion of Noema,' in

B. Dreyfus, ed., Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science, Cambridge, Mass: MIT

Press, 1982, pp. 73-80.

6 John Searle, Intentionality, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

7 Michael Dummett, 'Can Analytical Philosophy Be Systematic and Ought it to Be?' in

Truth and Other Enigmas, pp. 437-458; as well as in many other places, Vol. 65,

1964-65.

64 HANS SLUGA

8 Hermann Lotze, Logic, trans!. B. Bosanquet, Oxford: Clarendon, 1884. All refer-

ences will be to this edition. I try to justify the claim that Frege was influenced by Lotze

in Hans Sluga, Gottlob Frege, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

9 It is unfortunate that my term "semantic content" is so close to Lotze's (and Frege's)

term "content," when the terms mean quite different things. I retain my use here for the

sake of terminological continuity with an earlier paper discussing these issues. Cf. Hans

Sluga, 'On Sense,' Proc. of the Arist. Soc., vo!., 651964-65, pp. 25-44.

10 Lotze's account has here obvious similarities to that given recently in Saul Kripke's

Naming and Necessity.

11 Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift, in J. v. Heijenoort, ed., From Frege to Godel, Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 20. All further references will be to

this edition.

12 Peter Geach and Max Black, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob

Frege, Oxford: Blackwell, 1977, p. 56. All references to the essay 'On Sense and

Reference' will be to this edition.

13 References will be to the Geach-Black volume.

14 G. Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, ed., M. Furth, Berkeley/Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 1967, p. 105. Notation slightly altered.

15 M. Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, London: Duckworth, 1981, p.

532.

16 Furth gives the former translation (Basic Laws, p. 36); Geach and Black give the

latter (Translations, p. 154).

17 Furth is aware of the problem of how to translate "gleichbedeutend" and renders it

here as "having the same meaning." He adds in a footnote: "In view of the previous

sentence, it seems best to translate this in the manner of the ordinary German gleich

bedeuten and not to restrict it to Frege's technical use." He does not, however, see the

relevance of this point to the earlier passage.

18 Michael Dummett, 'Frege's Philosophy,' in Truth and Other Enigmas, p. 107.

THOMAS G. RICKETTS

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD:

FREGE'S METAPHYSICS OF JUDGMENT*

The question famed of old, by which logicians were

supposed to be driven into a comer ... is the ques-

tion: What is truth?

To know what questions may reasonably be asked is

already a great and necessary proof of sagacity and

insight. For if a question is absurd in itself and calls

for an answer where none is required, it not only

brings shame on the propounder of the question, but

may betray an incautious listener into absurd answers,

thus presenting, as the ancients said, the ludicrous

spectacle of one man milking a he-goat and the other

holding a sieve underneath.

Critique of Pure Reason A 58 = B 82

The first of three fundamental principles Frege enunciates at the

beginning of The Foundations of Arithmetic bids us "always to separate

sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the

objective."! As commonly understood, this principle represents little

more than Frege's insistence on the distinction between mind-indepen-

dent objects and mind-dependent states, and so expresses his rejection

of subjective idealism. Such an ontological construal of the objective-

subjective distinction in its turn supports a very common reading of

Frege according to which he is the archetypical metaphysical platonist.

The mind-independent existence of things is for Frege a presupposition

of the representational operation of language: it explains how our state-

ments are determinately true or false apart from our ability to make or

understand them. On this reading, Frege's novelty lies in his theory

of language, a theory that offers an impressively general and precise

account as to how the truth-value of a sentence is determined by the

reference of its well formed parts. Frege is thus canonized the father of

formal semantics. Furthermore, application of this theory to particular

stretches of discourse enables us to uncover the ontological presupposi-

tions of the discourse. Frege, in The Foundations of Arithmetic, provides

the paradigm for philosophical application of formal semantics in

65

L. Haaparanta and 1. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 65-95.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

66 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

arguing that the objective truth of the statements of pure and applied

arithmetic requires the mind-independent existence of numbers.

The crucial feature of this line of interpretation is its taking ontologi-

cal notions, especially that of an independently existing thing, as prior

to and available apart from logcal ones, from notions of judgment,

assertion, inference, and truth. The explanatory priority of ontological

notions renders intelligible and inevitable the questions, "How does

language hook on to reality?" and "How do we know that the ontologi-

cal presuppositions of our discourse are satisfied?" The contemporary

consensus is that such answers to these questions as can be extracted

from Frege are patently inadequate. Frege's most promising response

might appear to lie with his doctrine that the sense expressed by a word

determine to what, if anything, the word refers. But a moment's thought

shows that Frege's doctrine, whatever other uses and motivations it has,

only splits our original question into two equally intractable ones: how

do words become associated with senses, and how do the senses, our

words express determine their referents? Reading Frege like this, we

read much subsequent philosophy of language as attempts to bridge the

gulf between language and the world that now looms so starkly. Russell's

logical atomism resting on direct acquaintance with sensory items

was an early attempt to give semantics an epistemological foundation.

Causal theories of reference are more recent attempts to do the same.

There is another philosophically more interesting and historically

more apt construal of Frege's work, one which denies to ontological

notions the independence and primacy they have on the platonist

interpretation. As I read Frege, ontological categories are wholly super-

venient on logical ones. This supervenience is the product of the

fundamental status Frege assigns to judgment. That judgment should be

the starting point for Frege's philosophy is unsurprising, given his

animus toward the naturalism and empiricism prevalent in mid-nine-

teenth century German philosophy and his corresponding sympathy

with Kant and Leibniz.

2

The priority of judgment is to guarantee its

objectivity, as exhibited in the linguistic practice of assertion, against any

general challenge. Thus, it is meant to render unintelligible the chasm

between thought and reality that is the consequence of the platonist

reading.

This is not to say that Frege's metaphysics of judgment is entirely

coherent. The priority of judgment shapes Frege's conception of logic

and motivates the identification of his Begriffsschrift as logic. There are,

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD

67

however, deep tensions in Frege's thought that arise from the failure of

Frege's logical doctrines, harnessed as they are to the execution of his

logicist program, to be true to the conception of judgment that moti-

vates them. These tensions can even be said to open up a gap between

language and reality, though one whose character is rather different

from that just described. Moreover, I hold that Wittgenstein in the

Tractatus exploits these tensions to motivate the distinctive logical

doctrines of that work. By systematically criticizing Frege's philosophy,

Wittgenstein, unfettered by Frege's constructive interests, attempts to

rework a Fregean conceptiori of judgment into a complete and coherent

account of logic, language, and the world. We shall not, however, be in a

position to identify the difficulties in Frege's thought or to assess their

influence on subsequent philosophy without understanding the sources

of Frege's notions and doctrines in judgment. It will emerge that

anything like formal semantics, as it has come to be understood in the

light of Tarski's work on truth, is utterly foreign to Frege.

Frege's conception of judgment is best approached through an exami-

nation of his rejection of psychologism. Frege's extensive polemic is

more than the deserved dismissal of a nest of scientifically crude and

philosophically confused views. By scrutinizing the terms of criticism he

brings to bear against psychologism, we shall see that the contrast

between objective and subjective is not an ontological one. Understand-

ing the character of this contrast will prove to be the first and decisive

step toward appreciating the primacy of judgment in Frege's philosophy.

Indeed, it is in this primacy that Frege himself locates his break with

traditional logic:

For in Aristotle, as in Boole, the logically primitive activity is the formation of concepts

by abstraction .... As opposed to this, I start from judgments and their contents, and

not from concepts.

3

Psychologism maintains that logic is a branch of psychology: accord-

ingly, logical laws are generalizatiqns about the inferential operations

of the human mind. Frege, of course, has no quarrel with the empirical

study of human cognitive faculties, but he takes the psychologistic

logician's denial that there are non-psychological laws of logic to mani-

fest a confusion of the objective and the subjective. For this denial, we

68 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

shall see, forces an assimilation of assertions to the ventings of inner

states, to cries of pain and shouts of joy. This contrast is, I hold, the

source of Frege's conception of objectivity and logic.

To see how psychologism involves confusing the subjective and the

objective, let us consider a line of argument extractable from the intro-

duction of The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. The psychological logician

who maintains that the laws of logic are empirically established general-

izations is committed to the intelligibility of encountering and recogniz-

ing beings whose own thought is governed by laws different from those

that describe our own. So, to use Frege's example, we might encounter

beings who do not accept the principle of identity, who sometimes or

always deny the statements of the form "t = t" that we unhesitatingly

affirm. The psychological theory describing our inferential habits says,

as Frege puts it, "It is impossible for people living in the year 1893 to

acknowledge an object to be different from itself."4 The psychological

theory describing the logical aliens denies this of them. There is, of

course, no inconsistency between the two theories, as the claims of

each are suitably circumscribed so as to apply only to the appropriate

population. The possibility of logical aliens raises the question as to

which inferences are correct, ours or theirs. This seems to be an extra-

psychological question; for neither the psychologist's description of our

inferences nor his description of the aliens' addresses the question of the

self-identity of every object. Were the psychological logician to admit

the legitimacy of this question, he would concede the existence of a

nonpsychological study of inference. This concession would be lethal to

his position.

The psychologistic logician can turn aside this question only by

identifying the content of the principle of identity with that of the

psychological law that asserts the universal acceptance, by us, of the

principle. This identification is ill founded because, as Frege says:

There is no contradiction in something's being true which everyone takes to be false ....

If it is true that I am writing this in my chamber on the 13th of July, 1893, while the

wind howls out-of-doors, then it remains true even if all men should subsequently take it

to be false.

5

We should not, however, take this observation - one the psychologist

would find question-begging - as the resting point for Frege's criticism.

The imagined encounter with the logical aliens serves rather to highlight

the special role logic plays in discourse, a role belied by the psycholo-

gistic account.

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD

69

What makes radical disagreement over logic so peculiar is that the

principles of logic provide us with a shared background, context, or

framework that enables us, first, to recognize disagreement, and second,

to arbitrate the consequent debate. Once two of us recognize that we

have made contradictory judgments, we each put forth reasons for our

opposed claims. Application of the principles of logic enables us to

measure the relevance of these further claims to the original dispute. It

also enables us to locate the source of our controversy within the bodies

of belief we each bring to bear on the dispute. Once we have done this,

characteristically, we will be in a position to use the basic laws and

methods of the particular subject matter under consideration to resolve

the difference. So, when we imagine logical aliens, we are imagining

beings with whom we cannot reason. Small wonder that Frege remarks

that to encounter logical aliens would be to discover a new type of

insanity and warns that the psychologistic logician, in both adhering to

the standards of consistency logic provides but refusing to reject the

aliens' thought as contradictory, is attempting to jump out of his own

skin.

6

The psycho logistic logician, if he is to maintain his monopoly on

the study of logic, must adopt a more tolerant attitude toward the

aliens. But how does the psychologist resist Frege's suggestion that he

ought to reject the aliens' thOUght as contradictory while investigating

the causal antecedents of their malady? The tolerance of the psycholo-

gist stems from his identification of logical principles with psychological

laws. From the vantage point of his theory, our appeal to the principle

of identity in rejecting the aliens' claims as contradictory amounts to

no more than an insistence that we think like this - a claim whose

content is dispassionately spelled out in the causal laws describing our

thought. This identification reveals that the psycho logistic logician is

treating disagreement in judgment as merely a species of psychological

difference. As such, the recognition of disagreement no more raises

an issue of correctness than does the acknowledgment of any other

personal idiosyncracy. Disagreement receives special treatment only

in that if I have judged p to be true and you have judged p to

be false, then, according to the laws describing our thinking, neither

of us can adopt the judgment of the other without relinquishing his

previous one.

It is this treatment of disagreement that reveals the psychologistic

logician's confusion of the objective and the subjective. Consider three

diners who have just shared a sumptuous repast. Two sigh with satiated

70

THOMAS G. RICKETTS

contentment and one groans with distended discomfort. The groan in no

way contradicts the sighs. It merely gives public expression to a state

that is causally incompatible with the the sighs express. The

incompatibility by itself raises no issue among our diners. One may

accuse another of shamming a feeling, but such an accusation does not

contradict the supposedly dishonest expression. Nor do the two diners

who sigh agree with each other. Each diner expresses his own feeling;

and even if the feelings are exactly similar, nonetheless, each in sighing

gives vent to his own. This last observation is just the reverse side of the

preceding one: the possibilities of agreement and disagreement go hand

in hand. If I cannot contradict your cry of pain, neither can I affirm it.

The psycho logistic treatment of judgment and assertion is perfectly

parallel to the preceding description of inner states and their expression.

Judgments are assimilated to inner states and assertions to the ventings

that manifest them. The price of this identification is the conflation of

contradiction with causal incompatibility. This conflation underlies the

psychologist's refusal to see any issue between the logical aliens and us.

But it also forces on us a falsified conception of judgment, one whose

misconstrual of the possibilities of agreement and contradiction im-

manent in discourse leads to a sort of solipsism of judgment. Frege

rejects this solipsism in a memorable passage:

If every man designated something different by the name "moon", namely one of his

own ideas, much as he expresses his own pain by the cry "Ouch", then of course the

psychological point of view would be justified; but an argument about the properties of

the moon would be pointless .... If we could not grasp anything but what was within our

own selves, then a conflict of opinions [based on] mutual understanding would be

lacking .... There would be no logic to be appointed arbiter in the conflict of opinions?

On the interpretation I have been presenting, the absurdity Frege is here

evoking is not the picture of the self trapped within the veil of its own

ideas unable to claw its way through to epistemic contact with the

material world. The solipsism Frege has in mind is one of communica-

tion, in which it is impossible for people to contradict each other and

hence impossible for them to agree either - the solipsism of refined

society in which every assertion is met with the demurral, "That's your

opinion." Frege thus rejects the psychologistic account of judgment for

its conflation of assertions with the ventings of inner states. These two

acts are entirely different, as the impossibility of contradicting another's

groan or affirming another's sigh shows.

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 71

It should be noted in passing that Frege thinks that the psychologist's

confusion is natural enough; for the vast portion of our uses of language

serve both to manifest judgments in assertion and also to give vent to

feelings, emotions, and ideas. Frege's tirelessly repeated admonition to

distinguish the ideas or images associated with a word or sentence from

its content, its sense and meaning, is to re-enforce our appreciation of

the radical difference between these two functions of language.

8

He goes

so far as to urge that logicians master several foreign languages to assist

them in readily applying this distinction:

It is true .hat we can express the same thought in different languages, but the psycho-

logical trappings, the clothing of the thought, will often be different. That is why the

learning of foreign languages is useful for one's logical education. Seeing that the same

thought can be worded in different ways, we learn better to distinguish the verbal husk

from the kernel with which in any given language, it appears to be organically bound

Up.9

I have maintained that Frege's distinction between the subjective and the

objective lodges in the contrast between asserting something and giving

vent to a feeling. We now need to consider how this contrast gives rise

to Frege's conception of objectivity. Let us begin with an examination of

the interconnections Frege draws among a raft of notions - assertion,

judgment, content of judgment or thought, understanding, and inference.

None of these notions can be understood apart from the others, and it is

by attention to language and our linguistic practices that these notions

are to be collectively elucidated. For example, Frege's characterization

of assertion as the manifestation of a judgment does lend a certain

priority to the latter notion. The sentences we utter when we make

assertions, considered as series of sounds, have no communicative

powers in their own right. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think

that we have any understanding of what an act of judgment is apart from

the given by the formula that judgments are what assertions manifest.

Frege's characterization of judgment as the recognition of the truth of

a thought gives a structure of judgment. Let us begin with the distinction

between the act, jUdging or recognizing to be true, and the object or

content of the act. Frege introduces this distinction by observing that we

need to distinguish between understanding or grasping a thought and

recognizing it either to be true or to be false. The precedent for this

distinction lies in the intimate relation between yes-no questions and the

assertions that answer them. Frege describes this relation by saying that

72 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

an assertion that affirmatively answers a yes-no question manifests the

recognition of the truth of the thought that the question puts forward for

consideration. To distinguish between understanding or grasping a

thought and recognizing its truth is to acknowledge that we can

genuinely ask a question without being in a position then and there to

answer it, even if we know what sorts of reasoning and investigations

would answer it.

This way of thinking about judgment is bound up with Frege's insist-

ence that several people can all grasp the same thought and judge it true

or false. In this respect judging differs from feeling: no one can have my

pain. So Frege says things like the following:

Thus I can also acknowledge thoughts as independent of me. Other men can grasp them

just as much as I: I can acknowledge a science in which many can be engaged in

research. We are not owners of thoughts as we are owners of our ideas.! 0

Passages like this should not be taken to fund the platonist reading of

Frege. The platonist interpretation supposes the identification of

thoughts as abstract mind-independent objects to give an ontological

foundation to the distinction between subjective and objective. Frege's

language for talking about judgment is rather a means for systematically

redescribing selected features of our linguistic practices, those which

elucidate the various aspects of Frege's conception of objectivity. I talk

here of redescription to preclude the idea that Frege is presenting the

ontological underpinning that secures the objectivity of our judgments.

From the perspective Frege acquires in starting from judgments and

their contents, the distinction between objective and SUbjective exhibited

in our linguistic practice needs no securing and admits of no deeper

explanation. We have seen how the distinction between the act and

content of judgment is enforced by our appreciation of the relation

between questions and their answers. Talk of several people grasping

the same thought just restates the possibility of agreement that Frege

takes to be intrinsic to assertion.

We have considered the genesis of Frege's distinction between the act

and content of judgment. Let us now focus on the act, in particular on

die significance of the phrase "recognize the truth of". Frege remarks,

"A propositional [yes-no] question contains a demand that we should

either acknowledge the truth of a thought or reject it as false."!! To

grasp a thought is then to be faced with the question of whether it is to

be affirmed or denied; or, as Frege will say in order to avoid the

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 73

unnecessary introduction of two parallel species of judging, it is to be

faced with the question whether the thought or its opposite, its negation,

is to be recognized as a truth. To talk of opposition here is to observe

that the same thought may not both be affirmed and denied; one and

only one of a thought and its opposite may be recognized to be a truth.

This observation should be distinguished from the claim that a person

can not affirm and deny the same thought, that it is psychologically

impossible to do so. This second claim is an empirical claim about our

mental constitution concerning which Frege is agnostic. Frege distin-

guishes between these two claims by locating our appreciation of the

impermissibility, the incorrectness, of affirming outright contraditions in

our understanding, and hence the incorrectness itself in the opposition

between the thoughts grasped. On this picture, the contents of judgment

impose standards on our acts of judging. These "standards", unlike the

sort of standards that apply, say, to gymnastic performances, are in-

escapably applicable to any judgment; we cannot opt out of them and

still take ourselves to be making judgments. This point will receive

closer examination in Section II.

Frege takes his stand against psychologism by insisting on the

trichotomy of agreement, disagreement, and mere difference in judg-

ment. We noted how the possibilites of agreement, disagreement, and

mere difference in judgment come together. We now see the distinction

between the act and the content of judgment together with Frege's talk

of thoughts and their opposites as providing a structured way of

marking out this distinguishing feature of judgment.

There is more to our understanding of a thought than just the

appreciation that it and its opposite may not both be affirmed. A person

who understands,. for instance, both the thought that every philosopher

is wise and the thought that Socrates is a philosopher but not wise,

realizes that these two thoughts are contradictory. Here though, the

second thought is not the opposite of the first; nothing in our grasp of

them precludes their joint denial. I have been speaking of our appre-

ciation of patent inconsistencies. The other side of this appreciation

is our awareness of elementary implications, of the basis that the

recognition of the truth of one thought provides for further judments.

Frege's primary given is this awareness of obvious implications and

contradictions - I speak loosely and nontechnically here. It is this

awareness that enables us to discern agreement and disagreement, 10

reason together, and so, in the fullest sense, to communicate.

74 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

It is in this context that Frege distinguishes causal explanation of

person's beliefs from justification of those beliefs, and so separates logic

and psychology. According to Frege, there are two ways in which a

judgment may be justified: "We justify a judgment either by going back

to truths that have been recognized already or without recourse to other

judgments. Only the first case, inference, is the concern of Logic."12

Characteristically, to justify an assertion, one presents reasons for the

assertion: that is, one puts forward further assertions from which the

given assertion may be inferred. Such a procedure, of course, may only

push the question of justification back a step, to the justification of the

premises. Eventually, we arrive at primitive truths whose assertion is not

inferentially justified. These will presumably include the basic laws of

the discipline within whose purview the original assertion lies and, in the

case of empirical claims, observationally established assertions concern-

ing the properties and relations of material objects. Frege has almost

nothing to say about noninferential justification, His interest lies exclu-

sively with the first species of justification, with inference.

II

While we have the capacity to recognize elementary implicational

relations and with it the capacity to construct chains of reasoning that

justify various judgments, our exercise of this last ability is often

haphazard. The problem Frege sees with our argumentative practice

lies not so much in our unwitting fallacies as with enthymatic reasoning.

Often the truth of a conclusion drawn from an explicity stated premise

depends on a body of unstated assumptions. Because even our explicit

reasoning leaves so much unspoken, what passes for a demonstration of

a claim may leave us in doubt as to the judgments that justify the claim

and hence in doubt as to the ultimate epistemic status of the claim.

Frege is particularly exercised by this carelessness on account of his

desire to maintain against Kant that pure intuition plays no role in

mathematical reasoning. Frege speaks of " ... chains of deductions with

no link missing such that no step in it is taken which does not conform

to some one of a small number of principles of inference recognized as

purely logical," and goes on to complain:

To this day, scarcely one single proof has ever been conducted on these lines; the

mathematician rests content if every transition to a fresh judgment is self-evidently

correct without inquiring into the nature of this self-evidence, whether it is logical or

intuitive.13

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 75

Logic must aim to state general principles whose application enables us

to determine if one statement, by itself, implies another, and so forces us

to identify all the premises of any proof. Application of the principles of

logic will then enforce on us the standards of explicitness, clarity, and

rigor that are the prerequisites for rational communication.

In order to play this role, the principles of logic must be applicable to

any topic whatsoever. This universal applicability of the principles of

logic constrains the form the statement of these principles may take. The

principles must not draw on the terms of any special science in such a

way as to preclude the application of logic to other subjects. Logic

cannot lie in the purview of any other subject. Nor does logic have a

restricted subject matter all its own.

Frege says, "Just as 'beautiful' points the way for aesthetics and 'good'

for ethics, so do words like 'true' for logiC."14 It might seem from this

remark that just as ethics provides us with a compilation of principles by

which to assess the moral goodness of actions, so logic enables us to

assess the truth or falsity of thoughts. Frege quickly rejects this sugges

tion, noting in the next sentence:

All sciences have truth as their goal; but logic is also concerned with truth in a quite

different way. Logic has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight or heat.

To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discoverer the laws of

truth.

Frege's negative point is clear enough. Every special science is con

cerned with truth insofar as it aims to state those general principles

which enable us to infer the truth or falsehood of further claims that lie

within the province of the discipline. How then are we to understand

logic's special and defining interest in truth?

It is tempting to read the previously quoted passage from "Thoughts"

to be suggesting that the laws of logic are about truth in much the same

way that the laws of physics are about weight and heat. The logician as

well as the physicist aims the state truths; however, the statement of

the logician's truths, unlike the physicist's, requires the use of a truth

predicate. This interpretation seems confirmed by the examples of

provisional statements of principles of inference that Frege provides in

'Compound Thoughts' for instance:

(If B, then A) is true;

Bistrue;tl1erefore

Ais true.

15

76 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

It looks then as if the principles of logic take the form of the identifica-

tion of elementary valid inference patterns. These principles may be

conceived as asserting that any statement or thought of some given form

is true. From such a principle and the identification of some particular

thought as having the requisite form, the attribution of truth to that

thought follows. Then by use of an instance of a quasi-disquotational

paradigm like that enshrined in Tarski's Convention T, the f>tatement

itself follows. Thus, from the principles of logic together with the

auxiliary premises just mentioned, follow claims couched in the vocabu-

lary of the special sciences. The universal applicability of logic to the

provision and evaluation of argumentation in any discipline is thus

secured. The principles of logic, so conceived, generalize over the forms

of statements as regards their truth; this character is rendered patent by

the use of schematic letters and a truth predicate in their statement.

Frege's conception of the form of logical laws then appears close kin to

Quine's. 16

This impression, however, is mistaken. For Frege as well as early

Russell, the generality of logic is substantive, not schematic.

l

? On Frege

and Russell's view, the basic laws of logic generalize over every thing

and every property. These laws do not mention this or that thing; nor do

they generalize over things with respect to various properties or rela-

tions, at least no ordinary property - for example, being mortal - that

belongs to the subject matter of a special science. Any letters that

appear in the statement of logical laws must be understood as variables,

not as schematic letters. Moreover, the quantifiers that appear in these

laws, and in any conclusion drawn with their aid, are understood to be

unrestricted over entities of the appropriate logical type. This view of

logic contrasts sharply with the more contemporary one just canvassed.

That conception depends on a notion of a logical schema subject to

varying interpretations; logical laws are thus applicable to a range of

languages without regard to their (nonlogical) vocabulary or the range

of their quantifiers. But the notion of a logical schema that admits of

multiple interpretations is foreign to Frege's thought.

Nor is it possible, through reasonable emendations, to read the

contemporary view back into Frege.

18

For the contemporary view

requires the ineliminable use of a truth predicate. Such a use is anti-

thetical to Frege's conception of judgment. This conception of judgment

precludes any serious metalogical perspective and hence anything

properly labeled a semantic theory.

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 77

Frege, we have seen, draws our attention to the distinguishing

feat]Jres of judgment by use of the slogan that judgment is the recogni-

tion of the truth of a thought. He denies, however, that such remarks

constitute an informative definition of judgment.!9 If we now take truth

to be a property of thoughts, then we must take the slogan to be offering

just such a definition. So understood, it tells us that judgment is a special

kind of recognitional capacity. We have, for example, the ability, under

suitable circumstances, to identify the colors of things. Judgment now

seems to be the capacity to recognize that some thing (a thought) has

some property (truth). But this is absurd. Judgment is not itself a special

recognitional capacity, a species of some genus. Judgment is itself the

genus - to recognize anything to have a property is ipso facto to make a

judgment.2o Nor can judgment be characterized by comparing it with

our particular recognitional capacities. As these capacities are capacities

to recognize the truth or falsehood of some range of thoughts, they do

not provide an independently understandable model through which

judgment is elucidated. How, though, does taking truth to be a property

of thoughts force on us this confusion of genus and species?

The answer to this question emerges from a consideration of Frege's

curious objection to the correspondence theory of truth?! The corre-

spondence theorist treats truth as a property of thoughts and goes on to

offer a definition of this property in terms of some favored relation

between the contents of judgment and the world. Let us use the phrase

'corresponds with Reality' as a placeholder for whatever definition the

correspondence theorist offers. If truth is a matter of correspondence

with Reality, then in order, for example, to determine whether (it is true

that) Socrates is mortal, it is necessary to inquire whether the thought

that Socrates is mortal corresponds with Reality. But once again, to

determine whether (it is true that) the thought that Socrates is mortal

corresponds with Reality, one should inquire whether the thought that

the thought that Socrates is mortal corresponds with Reality itself

corresponds with Reality. And so on. A parallel regress arises for

judging as well as inquiry.

This brief argument is unsatisfying. It is obvious neither that the

regress it turns on is unavoidable, nor that the regress, even if inevitable,

is vicious. Frege's objection to the correspondence theory is an all too

casual articulation of the fundamental status he assigns to judgment. It is

cogent only in the context of the conception of judgment outlined in the

previous section. Moreover, in that context, the availability of the

78 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

objection illuminates the content of this status. Let us then consider the

genesis of the regress more closely.

Why, on the correspondence theory, must one inquire whether the

thought that Socrates is mortal corresponds with Reality in order to

determine whether Socrates is mortal? The connection between judg-

ment and truth is not casual. We saw in the previous section how our

appreciation of the trichotomy of agreement, contradiction, and mere

difference in assertion gives us a conception of standards of correctness

imposed by the contents of judgment on our acts of judging: a thought is

either to be affirmed or to be denied; it is either true or false. We cannot

take someone to be making assertions in complete disregard of the

correctness of what he asserts; such a person would be understood to be

play-acting or perhaps merely mouthing words. To take truth to be

definable forces a particular construal on this talk of standards of

correctness. For to have a definition of truth is to have a general

description of the conditions that have to be satisfied for a judgment to

be correct. So, if truth is definable, then any person who makes a

judgment must have ascertained, or taken himself to have ascertained,

whether these conditions, applied to the thought under consideration,

are satisfied. If I judge that Socrates is mortal, then I must have deter-

mined that the thought that Socrates is mortal corresponds with Reality.

But to ascertain that some condition holds is to make a judgment. So the

regress begins. Given the definition of truth, a person cannot have

judged that the thought that Socrates is mortal corresponds with Reality

unless he has judged that the content of this second judgment corre-

sponds with Reality. On the correspondence theory then, a person is

never in a position to make a judgment; for no one is ever in a position

to have satisfied, or even think of himself as having satisfied, the

standards for judgment that would ipso facto be provided by its

definition of truth.

Frege concludes his argument against the correspondence theory

with the somewhat hesitant statement, "So it seems likely that the

content [Inhalt] of the word 'true' is sui generis and indefinable."22

Frege's talk of indefinability in this context should be understood

differently from his other uses of this notion. Elsewhere Frege talks of

one concept's being definable in terms of other prior concepts. Through

such definitions the grounds for one branch of science may be seen to

lie in some other body of knowledge. Frege's definition of the concept

of number is an example of this sort of definition. Correlative to this talk

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 79

of definition, Frege speaks iIi a number of places of primitive concepts,

concepts that admit of no definition in any more basic terms.23 Truth, I

suggest, cannot be understood to be a primitive unanalyzable property

of thoughts; for this position conflicts with the argument just examined.

We observed that the argument does not turn on the details of the

correspondence theorist's definition; indeed, Frege himself generalizes

the argument to any proposed definition. In fact, nothing in the argu

ment turns on taking truth to be definable in terms of any other

concepts. The vitiating regress is generated by the assumption that truth

is a property of thoughts. The proper conclusion to the argument is not

that truth is a primitive property, but that truth is not a property at all.

Frege cautiously voices this conclusion two pages later in 'Thoughts'.

Having observed that the statement 'I smell the scent of violets' has the

same content as the statement 'It is true that I smell the scent of violets.'

Frege goes on to say:

So it seems then that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property

of truth. . . . May we not be dealing here with something which cannot be called a

property in the ordinary sense at all? In spite of this doubt I will begin by expressing

myself in accordance with ordinary usage, as if it were a property, until some more

appropriate way of speaking is found.

24

Returning now to the topic that sparked this discussion of truth, let us

examine how the strong conclusion I draw from Frege's objection to the

correspondence theory motivates his identification of logical principles

with maximally general truths.

It is an upshot of the regress argument that the standards of correct

ness we think of our judgments as satisfying cannot be thought of as a

set of general conditions on the contents of judgment. The conception of

judgment in which this argument is embedded does not permit any real

metaperspective. All of this is not, however, to say that the standards of

correctness are ineffable. In denying that logical principles have a

normative status that distinguishes them from the principles of physics

or geometry, Frege observes, "Any law asserting what is can be con

ceived as prescribing that one ought to think in accordance with it."25

To think in accordance with a law is not just to affirm the law; it is also

to refrain from affirming any thought that contradicts the law. As we

observed in Section I, the other side of this prohibition is the license

that these general laws give us for making further judgments on the basis

of them. Frege thinks that the content of any developed discipline is

80 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

constituted by a body of basic laws, laws which are basic in that they

cannot be justified by appeal to other laws couched in the vocabulary of

the discipline that admit of independent justification. These laws thus

present standards for making judgments in that discipline. They consti

tute a framework to which other judgments must conform on pain of

contradiction. Frege's conception of judgment does then admit of

general standards of correctness, but the generality of these standards

does not involve any metaperspective. The general standards for the

judgments of a discipline are not provided by statements about the

discipline. They are provided by judgments within the discipline.

We are now in a position to appreciate the identification of the laws

of logic with maximally general truths. Maximally general truths are

truths that do not mention any particular thing or any particular

property; they are truths whose statement does not require the use of

vocabulary belonging to any special science. Thus, in the same way that

the basic laws of chemistry give standards for judgments in chemistry,

so maximally general truths give us standards for judgment in any

subject matter. No judgment about any individual thing and no judg

ment that generalizes over individuals with respect to a particular

property may contradict a maximally general truth. Frege clearly articu

lates this conception of logic in an unpublished writing:

How must I think in order to reach the goal, truth? We expect logic to give us the

answer to this question, but we do not demand of it that it should go into what is

peculiar to each branch of knowledge and its subject matter. On the contrary, the task

we assign logic is only that of saying what holds with utmost generality for all thinking

whatever its subject .... Consequently we can also say: logic is the science of the most

general laws of truth.

26

To say that the laws of logic are the most general laws of truth is to say

that they are the most general truths. The laws of physics are the laws of

truth about mass, motion, heat, and light. In mastering these laws we

come to understand physical truth. The laws of logic generalize over

every thing and every property. It is then in studying logic that we learn

whatever there is to be learned about truth simpliciter. As Frege puts

the point, "The meaning [Bedeutung] of the word 'true' is spelled out in

the laws of truth."Z7

If we thus identify the principles of logic as substantive laws in their

own right and so fundamentally similar to the laws of the special

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 81

sciences, how are we to understand the applicability of these principle::

in providing gap-free proofs to supplant commonplace enthymatic

reasoning? Frege's basic picture is clear enough. Suppose on the basis of

having judged p, I wish to prove q. In the simplest case, I might begin by

finding a logical truth whose variables may be instantiated by constants

in such a way as to yield the conditional whose antecedent is p and

whose consequent is q. The proof then begins with an assertion of this

law. On the basis of this assertion, the desired conditional is obtained.

Then p is asserted. On the basis of the assertion of the conditional and

the assertion of p, q is asserted. And characteristically, the logical law

with which the proof begins will be inferred from other simpler, more

perspicuous general truths. There is, as far as Frege is concerned,

nothing to be said about the justification for our recognition of those

basic laws of logic to be truths:

The question why and with what right we acknowledge a law of logic to be true, logic

can answer only by reducing it to another law of logic. Where that is not possible, logic

can give no answer.

2M

Moreover, the maximal generality of these laws precludes their infer-

ence on the basis of the truths of any other discipline.

The universal applicability of the laws of logic is then secured by

their generality. This conception of generality is original to Frege and is

the product of his construal of the quantifier-variable notation of his

begriffsschrift. As traditionally conceived, logic is concerned with the

form rather than the content of judgment. A sharp distinction between

the form and content of judgment was to explicate the sense in which

logic abstracted from the content of the claims of the special sciences.

So, for example, Kant remarks:

That logic should have been thus successful is an advantage which it owes entirely to its

limitations, whereby it is justified in abstracting ... from all objects of knowledge and

their differences, leaving the understanding nothing to deal with save itself and its

form.

29

Such talk of form insinuates that logic is somehow concerned with

judging itself, and this suggestion in turn can serve as the thin edge of

the wedge of psychologism. The conception of generality that Frege's

quantifier-variable notation makes available transforms the old distinc-

tion between form and content. The claims logic makes still "abstract"

82 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

from the differences that distinguish the content of the claims of the

various sciences, but this abstraction does not give logic a special

subject matter of its own - the forms of judgment. Nor does this

rob the claims of logic of content, as though they concerned

merely the "empty forms" of judgment. Frege's variables enable him to

take his analogues of the laws of traditional logic to be making substan-

tive claims in their own right, claims that are, nevertheless, applicable to

reasoning in the special sciences on account of the relation between

generalizations and their instances.

So far, the principles of logic have been identified with the basic laws

of logic. These laws get applied in the provision of proofs only through

our discerning implicational relations between logical laws and their

instances, and among the claims of the special sciences. Or to speak in a

more Fregean vein, the application of the laws of logic in proofs

depends on our making one assertion on the basis of another. If these

proofs are to be taken to be gap-free with all the premises necessary for

the proof of the conclusion explicity stated, then we will need to have

isolated a small number of principles of inference, asserting one thing on

the basis of another only when the conditions laid down in these prin-

ciples are satisfied. These principles of inference are then as necessary

as the basic laws of logic for the replacement of everyday argumentation

with proofs. Indeed, seeing how the basic laws of logic are statements

like any other that get used in proofs by our asserting further claims on

the basis of them, it appears that the inference rules rather than the

logical laws more properly deserve the title "principles of logic". For it is

the inference rules that deal with what is the defining concern of logic -

the assertion of one thought on the basis of another.

Frege's statement of rules of inference follows the pattern exhibited

by the following formulation of modus ponens:

From a conditional and the antecedent of that conditional, the consequent of th

conditional may be inferred.

30

What licences this permission ? We recognize the inference rule to be

valid; and to talk of recognizing the validity of an inference appears to

making a judgment. Our question then is: what thought do we affirm

when we recognize this inference rule to be valid and what basis, if any,

is there for this judgment?

It is tempting, at first blush, to identify the apprehension of the

validity of the inference rule with the recognition of the truth of the

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 83

corresponding logical law. In the case of MP this law reads something

like:

If P and also if p then q, then q.3!

However, this identification obviates the distinction between logical laws

and rules of inference. Frege is clear on the difference here between

asserting a conditional and asserting one thing on the basis of a previous

assertion.

32

Indeed, this difference is another of the central linguistic

precedents lying behind Frege's distinguishing the content of judgment

from the act of judging. If I assert q on the basis of having asserted p and

you deny q, you contradict me. You do not contradict me, if you deny q

in the face of my assertion of the conditional 'If p, then q'. Moreover,

were use of an inference rule to be justified by the judgment of a general

law, we would encounter the vicious regress in the provision of proofs

that Lewis Carroll pointed out. For then, in order to make a proof

complete, any use of an inference rule would have to be accompanied

by an assertion of a corresponding logical law. Only in this way would

all the premises on whose correctness the conclusion depends be

explicitly stated. But this added statement creates the need for further

inferences, each of which would need to be similarly accompanied by

assertion of justifying laws. This regress would make completed proofs

impossible.

At this point, recourse to a metaperspective seems inescapable. On

the contemporary conception of logic, the acceptance of MP as a

correct rule of inference is vouchsafed by our metalogical judgment that

if a conditional is true and its antecedent is true, then so is the

consequent. This judgment is not supposed to appear as a premise in

every proof employing MP; it rather is a part of our reason for accepting

derivations in some given formal system as proofs. But a statement of

the validity of MP unavoidably involves taking truth to be flatly a

property of thoughts. This treatment of truth is precluded by Frege's

conception of judgment. The proper conclusion for him is that our

apprehension of the validity of MP is not a judgment. It is not mani

fested in any single assertion and so is, in this important sense, ineffable.

TID" apprehension is, however, manifested linguistically in the inference

we make and accept.

Once truth is excluded as a property, Frege has no nonsyntactical

metalogical vocabulary. It is then misleading to have talked earlier of

recognizing a thought to be contradictory, or of recognizing one thought

84 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

to imply another. The recognition of a thought to be contradictory is not

a judgment to the effect that a thought has some property. It is rather an

apprehension manifested by the refusal to affirm the thought while

affirming the opposite. Similarly to recognize that one thought implies

another is to be prepared to accept the second on the basis of the first.

Again, there is no judgment that gives expression to this notion of on the

basis of, implication is no more a relation between thoughts than truth is

a property of them.

We have seen how the attempt to make our apprehension of the

validity of an inference rule over into a judgment leads to the use of the

truth predicate that the regress argument excludes. This flawed attempt

at a statement is the best that can be done; and its failure shows why the

essence of inference, of logic, is ineffable. In an unpublished jotting

entitled "My basic logical Insights" Frege notes the redundancy of

attributions of truth and then says:

But it is precisely for this reason that this word ['true') seems fitted to indicate the

essence of logic ... it allows what corresponds to the assertoric force to assume the

form of a contribution to the thought. And although this attempt miscarries, or rather

through the fact that it miscarries, it indicates what is characteristic of logic. . . what

logic is really concerned with is not carried in the word 'true' at all but in the assertoric

force with which a sentence is uttered.

33

III

It remains to examine how ontological categories are supervenient on

logical ones for Frege. The treatment of this topic provides the oppor-

tunity to apply, albeit in an incomplete and only partially defended

manner, the interpretive perspective of the previous two sections to

Frege's central and celebrated distinctions and doctrines.

We noted at the beginning of Section II Frege's demand that proofs

be gap-free. Having made this demand, Frege goes on to observe two

obstacles to satisfying it. First, there is the comparatively minor barrier

posed by the sheer tedium of advancing in argument step by step in

conformity with a small number of antecedently marked out inference

patterns. Second and much more important, there is, as regards every-

day language, the difficulty of isolating out some small number of logical

laws and inferences sufficient for Frege's logicist goals. Frege complains,

"the excessive variety of logical forms that has gone into the shaping of

our language makes it difficult to isolate a set of modes of inference

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 85

which is both sufficient to cope with all cases and easy to take in at a

glance."34 He continues:

To minimize these drawbacks, I invented [erdenken] my Begriffsschrift. It is designed to

produce expressions which are shorter and easier to take in, and to be operated like a

calculus by means of a small number of standard moves.

Frege's function-argument analysis of language with its associated talk of

the truth-value of a statement being determined by the meanings of its

parts must be understood against the backdrop of this project.

35

How then can Frege proceed - or think of himself after the fact as

having proceeded - with the construction of a logically perspicuous

language? We observed that the starting point for Frege's conception of

objectivity is our appreciation, at least in straightforward cases, that one

statement may be asserted on the basis of the assertion of another

statement. This datum was presented at the level of the apprehension of

individual inferences. Reflection on these individually correct inferences

leads the logician to the isolation of inference patterns, patterns like

those that are eventually set forth in the inference rules. Frege is

describing the logician's reflection when he says:

Kerry holds that no logical rules can be based on linguistic distinctions; but my own way

of doing this is something that nobody can avoid who lays down such rules at all. For we

cannot come to an understanding with one another apart from language, and so in the

end we must always rely on other people's understanding words, inflexions, and

sentence-constructions in essentially the same way as ourselves ... to this end I

appealed to the general feeling for the German language.

36

The apprehension of inference patterns involves thinking of statements

as logically segmented into significant parts. Consider, for example, the

inference pattern set forth in Leibniz's law. Inferences that instance this

pattern lead from the assertion of a statement containing occurrences of

a term t and the assertion of an equation 'i = S', to the assertion of the

result of replacing occurences of t in the original statement by occur-

rences of s. The appreciation of the validity of this inference pattern

goes hand in hand with seeing statements to be segmented into proper

names and predicates, a predicate being the result of removing one or

more occurrences of a proper name from a statement. Of course, our

grasp of these two categories is not exhausted by Leibniz's law; reflec-

tion on inferences concerning generality plays a crucial role in imposing

this segmentation into proper names and predicates. In the end, it is not

86 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

the apprehension of a single inference pattern, but of an interlocking

series of basic inference patterns, that constitutes the recognition of

parts and features of statements as logically functioning units that

belong to various logico-syntactic categories.

This observation is indeed the point of Frege's enigmatic Context

Principle that bids us "never to ask for the meaning of a word in isola-

tion but only in the context of a statement [Satzzusammenhang)."37 It is

ultimately our appreciation that one statement may be asserted on the

basis of another and the ensuing apprehension of inference patterns that

gives us the idea of words having a meaning.

38

To ask after the meaning

of a word is then, first of all, to ask after its logical category; such

inquiry is answered by reflection on the implicational relations of state-

ments in which the word occurs. Thus it is that, in the body of The

Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege recurs to the Context Principle at the

conclusion of a discussion of statements of the form 'There are n P, a

discussion that argues in effect that the numeral must be reckoned as a

proper name.

39

By attention to selected simple inference patterns within everyday

language, Frege discerns amidst the ill-defined welter of inferences

found there, the logical segmentation that provides the scaffolding for

pruning and reforming everyday language into a Begriffsschrift. The

segmentation of statements into proper names and predicates is a

crucial aspect of this enterprise. This segmentation enables Frege to

explain the (first-level) quantifier as a second-level predicate - an

expression which, when completed by a first-level predicate, yields a

statement. Exploiting this insight, Frege eliminates the grammatically

chaotic and ambiguous ways everyday language has of expressing

generality in favor of the perspicuity of the quantifier-variable notation.

The way is then prepared for Frege's greatest achievement - the

complete and accurate depiction of the patterns of polyadic quantifica-

tional inference.

To think of statements as logically segmented is to think of the

expressions thus segregated as logical units, as playing a uniform role in

the determination of the truth or falsehood of the statements in which

logical analysis discovers them. Of course, it is not the expressions

themselves - the bare marks and noises - that so contribute. Frege is

always thinking of statements and their component expressions as

significant. Talk about the meaning of expressions of various categories

in terms of the contribution they make to the truth-value of statements

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 87

points toward the source of logical segmentation in inference patterns.

Such talk is of a piece with the attempt mentioned at the end of Section

II to state the warrant for making inferences in accordance with syn-

tactically stated rules. It tries to say what cannot be said but only shown

in the inferences we make and accept. However, such gesturing is

Frege's indispensible means for instructing us in the use of the

Begriffsschrift. By talking about truth-value determination, he obtains

our affirmation of the basic laws of his formal system, our apprehension

of the validity of his inference rules, and, generally, an understanding of

the notation that extends to those Begriffsschrift formulas for which

there are no readily intelligible analogues in everday language.

In setting forth his logical notation, Frege talks of proper names as

meaning objects and predicates as meaning concepts. Against the

backdrop of the connection just surveyed between logical segmentation

and significance, the phrase 'means an object' serves to label that feature

proper names share by which they all make the same sort of contribu-

tion of the truth-value of statements. So, as regards proper names by

themselves, ,we could use the less opaque phrase 'significant proper

name' instead. Similar remarks hold for predicates. The dichotomy

between objects and concepts comes into its own not as regards proper

names and first-level predicates but rather in introducing and distin-

guishing first-level generality (over objects) from second-level generality

(over concepts). This logical difference is masked in everyday language,

including the language of mathematics.

We observed that Frege's first-level quantifier is a second-level

predicate. The meaning of this quantifier may be specified as follows.

Completion of the empty position in the quantifier by a predicate yields

a truth just in case every object falls under the concept meant by the

predicate. In this elucidatory context, unlike those that concern just

proper names ,and predicates, 'object' is used outside the phrase 'means

an object'. Moreover, the phrase 'every object' is being used in contrast

with 'every concept' to call attention to a second sort of generality,

generality over concepts. Frege's quantifier over concepts is a third-level

predicate that stands to second-level predicates as the qUantifier over

objects stands to first-level predicates. However, the use of 'object' and

'concept' to contrast these two levels of generality can seriously mislead.

The phrases suggest the availability of a quantifier over entities of which

objects and concep\s are genera; for, in Frege's elucidating remarks, the

words 'object' and 'concept' alike appear to be first-level predicates.

4o

88 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

Frege's conception of generality precludes any such quantifier, any such

notion of entity.

This last point is worth some elaboration, as it is essential for under-

standing how the basic laws of logic abstract from the particular content

of the statements of the special sciences. This abstraction is glossed in

terms of the relation between generalizations and their instances. A

variable may be substituted for any significant expression in a statement,

a transformation that yields a statement that speaks generally where the

given one spoke specifically. The mark of this generality lies in the

replaceability of the variable in its turn by any expression of the same

category as the original expression to obtain an instance of the general-

ization. So to each logical category of expression there corresponds a

type of variable.

Suppose ,Jlow that we attempt to get by with one level of generality.

Even restricting attention to simple statements from which generality is

absent, we observe that the replacement of the grammatical subject by a

grammatical predicate produces nonsense. This fact presumably indi-

cates that the grammatical predicate is combining two distinct roles - .

the presentation of a concept and the expression of the copula. The

understanding of the relationship between generalizations and their

instances, variables and constants, just surveyed requires that these two

roles be separately discharged in a logically perspicuous notation. To

this end, an expression, 'falls under', might be introduced to express the

copula. So, we obtain as renderings of everyday statements, statements

like

Socrates falls under the concept of being wise,

and

If x falls under the concept of being a philosopher, then x falls under the concept of

being wise.

Generalizing on the direct object position of our new expression as well

as its subject position, we can use it in the obvious way to state logical

laws.

However, our new relational predicate is an expression of a distinct

logical category; after all, no statement results from replacing it with a

proper name, with an expression that may occur in the positions on

which we are generalizing. In thus admitting an expression of a distinct

logical category, we ipso facto allow for second-level generality and with

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 89

it, further logical laws. But once second-level generality is acknowl-

edged, there is no call to treat predicates as playing the same logical role

as proper names and so forming with them a single logical category. The

acknowledgment of the distinct logical category of 'falls under' might be

resisted by maintaining that this relational predicate suffers from the

same duality of logical role it was introduced to correct - it both

presents a relation and is a copula. It should now be clear that there is

no way of disentangling these roles without reintroducing an expression

in which they are once again combined. The conclusion here is that

there are not two distinct roles played by predicates; or, as Frege says,

the concept is predicative, unsaturated.

41

The distinction of levels of generality is of the highest importance to

Frege. The first fruits of this distinction is his logical definition of the

ancestral of a relation. This definition enables the principle of mathe-

matical induction to be deduced from logical laws. Thus, the distinction

between generality over objects and generality over concepts is the

immediate source of the centerpiece of Frege's logicism: the reduction

of "the argument from n to (n + 1), which on the face of it is peculiar to

mathematics, to the general laws of logic."42 Small wonder then that the

third guiding principle of The Foundations of Arithmetic advises us

"never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object."43

We are now in a position to understand how ontological categories

are, for Frege, supervenient on logical ones. The logico-syntactic source

of the notion of an object lies in first-level generality. To be an object is

to be indefinitely indicated by first-level variables. Our grasp of the

notion of an object - simply the notion of an object, not an object of

this or that kind - is exhausted by the apprehension of inference

patterns and the recognition of the truth of the basic logical laws in

which these variables figure.

44

We encounter at this juncture the central

elucidatory use for the phrase 'means an object' (bedeuten). This phrase

is used in contrast with the phrase 'indefinitely indicates an object'

(andeuten) to call attention to the inferential difference between state-

ments where first-level generality is present and where it is absent, and

so to distinguish first-level variables from proper names.

Similar remarks hold for the notion of a concept. The logico-syntactic

source of this notion lies in our apprehending basic inference patterns

turning on second-level variables. It is worth observing that for con-

cepts, or rather functions - for Frege this is the prior and more general

notion - there is an expression of this attitude at the outset of Frege's-

90 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

paper 'Function and Concept.' Frege there notes that mathematicians

had no use for the general notion of a function so long as they were

occupied with establishing facts about particular functions. The need for

the general notion of a function arose only when mathematical attention

turned to abstract generalizations about functions, for instance that any

function everywhere differentiable is everywhere continuous, but not

vice versa. Frege says:

The first place where a scientific expression appears with a clear-cut meaning is where it

is required for the statement of a law. This case arose as regards the function upon the

discovery of higher Analysis. Here for the first time it was a matter of setting forth laws

holding for functions in general.

45

And the introduction of the general notion of a function is signaled not

so much by the use of the word 'function' as by the appearance of

variables over functions. From the Fregean vantage point, the unclarity

surrounding the notion of a function in mid-nineteenth century analysis

was the product of an inadequate understanding of variables, including a

failure to distinguish sharply first-level from second-level variables,

objects from functions.

We have seen how Frege's talk of meaning serves to instruct us in the

use of the Begriffsschrift. One aspect of this talk calls for further exami-

nation - Frege's notorious doctrine that statements mean truth-values

in the same sense in which, say, 'Venus' means a planet. The position

appears outlandish. Frege seems to begin with the familiar and pre-

theoretical paradigm of the relation between an ordinary proper name

and the person, animal, edifice, etc. that bears it. The suspicion is that,

however motivated Frege's other extensions of the name-bearer relation

are, the analogy snaps when applied to the relation between statements

and truth-values.

I suggest that this line of objection to Frege's controversial thesis both

misevaluates its significance and gets the connection between Frege's

talk of meaning and the name-bearer relation backwards. We saw in

Section I how the conception of judgment that emerges from the

contrast between the objective and the subjective includes the idea of

standards of correctness. But correctness or truth cannot be thought of

as a property of the contents of judgments. How then are we to think of

it? In 'Thoughts,' Frege says that the meaning of the word 'true' is sui

generis.

46

In 'On Sense and Meaning,' Frege denies that the relation of

a thought to truth is the relation of a subject to a predicate and talks

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 91

instead of a difference in level between thoughts and truth-values. He

says, "Judgments can be regarded as advances from a thought to a truth

value."47 and, "We are therefore driven into accepting the truth value of

a sentence as constituting its meaning .... These two objects [the True

and the False] are recognized, if only implicitly, by everybody who

judges something to be true ... "48 Frege's talk of a difference of level

between thoughts and truth-values and of judgment as a movement from

one level to the other attempts to introduce a way of thinking about

truth in contrast to taking truth to be a property of thoughts. The

notorious doctrine should then be undet'stood as an elaboration of this

contrast; it is the more appropriate way of speaking to which Frege

alludes in 'Thoughts'.49

Nor should we take Frege's thesis to draw on our familiarity with the

name-bearer relation for its motivation. If the preceding interpretation

of the source of Frege's notion of meaning in the apprehension of

inference patterns is correct, the relation between a statement and its

truth-value is the paradigm for the meaning relation, a paradigm in

terms of which the familiar name-bearer relation is re-interpreted. Frege

acknowledges the generalization

If x = y, then Fx if and only if Fy,

to be a logical law. The inferential links between first-level variables and

proper names together with the foregoing conception of meaning practi-

cally force the identification of a colloquial proper name's having a

meaning with its having a specific bearer.

Thus understood, truth is not, properly speaking, ineffable. To treat

statements as proper names, and hence truth-values as objects, renders

the True and the False as effable as any object. The ineffability that

lurks in Frege's discussions of truth should attach instead, I suggest, to

the meaning relation thought of as pairing linguistic expressions with the

items meant by those expressions. After all, the availability of such a

relation would give us the means for converting Frege's remarks about

truth-value determination into a genuine theory containing the resources

for defining a concept of correctness or truth. It is through his talk of the

meaning relation that Frege speaks of truth-value determination for the

purpose of instructing us in the Eegriffsschrift. Once this end is achieved,

talk of meaning is to drop away; it plays no further role in logic.

There is a final topic that requires at least brief consideration -

Frege's distinction between sense and meaning. In Section I it was noted

92 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

that some of the ways Frege has of talking about thoughts lend credence

to the platonist reading - the ontological status of thoughts as atem-

poral abstract objects guarantees the objectivity of judgment. It was

claimed, however, that Frege's vocabulary for talking about assertion

and judgment - particularly the notion of thought - was introduced in

order to redescribe systematically those features of our linguistic practice

that fund Frege's conception of logic. It is through Frege's identification

of thoughts with the senses of sentences that thoughts obtain the status

of objects within Frege's system. The immediate source of Frege's

notion of sense lies in the application of his Begriffsschrift to the logical

analysis of the observations about judgment, belief, and assertion that

are behind his conception of objectivity. There is, after all, no way to

direct attention to the distinguishing features of judgment without using

locutions such as those of the form 'x asserts that p'. These observations,

couched as they are in familiar vocabulary, are clear cases of significant

statements; they are also examples of statements that contain the subor-

dinate clauses of indirect discourse. Frege takes the familiar apparent

failures of Leibniz's law here - including his extension of it to materially

equivalent statements - to show that the statements and expressions of

indirect discourse do not have the same significance they have in other

settings. The sense/meaning distinction provides a delineation of this

pervasive ambiguity that logical analysis uncovers. The details of Frege's

about sense are largely the result of his reflections on the char-

acter of truth-preserving substitutions within indirect discourse.

Frege has other uses for his notion of sense. But it is the foundational

role that observations about assertion and judgment play in Frege's

philosophy that suits the notion of sense for those uses. Of course, it is

debatable whether the notion of sense, introduced in the manner just

sketched, can discharge these other roles; and even Frege's conclusions

about truth-preserving substitutions within indirect discourse are con-

troversial. The serious problems surrounding Frege's notion of sense lie

beyond the scope of this paper.

My present point concerns the status of the senses of proper names,

including sentences, as objects. Frege's identification of thoughts as

objects is owed entirely to the logical segmentation he discerns within

indirect discourse. He takes sentences in indirect discourse to be

logically functioning units, proper names. Thus it is that Frege's concep-

tion of the objectivity of judgment and his associated view of logical

segmentation and meaning eventuate in me claim that thoughts are

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD 93

objects. We find then talk of thoughts occurring in two different places

in Frege's philosophy, places he does not clearly demarcate in his writ-

ings. Talk of thoughts occurs at the very beginnings of his philosophy,

introduced to redescribe the central features of our practice of assertion.

It also occurs subsequently, once logic is in place, in discussing the

logical segmentation of indirect discourse. Understood in this way, the

objecthood of thoughts, far from explaining the objectivity of judgment,

presupposes it.

University of Pennsylvania

NOTES

* The ideas in this essay reflect many conversations about Frege with Burton Dreben. I

am deeply and pervasively indebted to Warren Goldfarb, both for instruction received

from his 1977 lectures on Frege and for countless ensuing discussions. My interpreta-

tion of Frege's anti-psychologism has been influenced by an unpublished paper of Susan

Neiman. I have benefited from conversations with Michael Friedman, Peter Hylton, and

Joan Weiner. Prof. Weiner, in her dissertation Putting Frege in Perspective (Harvard

University, 1982), arrives at an understanding of the point of Frege's talk about

Bedeutung similiar to that presented in Section III.

1 Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, translated by J. L. Austin (Evanston:

Northwestern University Press, 1978), p. x.

2 A discussion of Frege's philosophical antecedents that convincingly portrays Frege's

work as a kind of rationalist reaction to a naturalistic empiricism is given by Hans D.

Sluga in Gottlob Frege (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), chapters one and two.

I am indebted to Peter Hylton for awakening me to the affinity between post-Kantian

Idealism and early Analytic philosophy that lies behind the obvious and important

discontinuities.

3 Frege, 'Boole's Logical Calculus and the Concept-Script; in Posthumous Writings,

edited by Hans Hermes et al. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp.

15-16.

4 Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System, translated and edited

by Montgomery Furth (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,

1967), p. 14.

5 Basic Laws, p. 13. See also Foundations, p. vi.

6 Basic Laws, p. 14 and p.l5.

7 Basic Laws, p. 17.

8 For instance, see Frege, 'On Sense and Meaning' in Translations from the Philo

sophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited and translated by Peter Geach and Max Black

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), p. 61; see also Frege, 'Thoughts' in Logicallnvestiga

tions edited by Peter Geach; translated by Peter Geach and R. H. Stoothoff (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 8-9.

94 THOMAS G. RICKETTS

9 Posthumous Writings, p. 142.

10 'Thoughts,' p. 24; but see also the material surrounding the quoted passage,

especially Frege's footnote about grasping.

11 Frege, 'Negation' in Logical Investigations, p. 31. See also Posthumous Writings, p. 7.

12 Posthumous Writings, p. 175; see also p. 3. See also Foundations, pp. 3-4, especially

the last paragraph of section three.

13 Foundations, p. 102.

14 'Thoughts,' p. 1. Similar remarks are scattered through Posthumous Writings. For

example, see p. 2, p. 126, p. 128, p. 253.

IS Frege, 'Compound Thoughts,' in Logical Investigations, p. 71.

16 See W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), sec. 56,

especially p. 273; see also Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,

1970),pp.l0-13 and pp. 47-50.

17 The point is established in Warren D. Goldfarb, 'Logic in the Twenties,' The Journal

of Symbolic Logic 44 (1979), especially pp. 341-44 and in Jean van Heijenoort, 'Logic

as Calculus and Logic as Language,' Synthese 17 (1967), especially pp. 325-27.

18 This, I take it, is Michael Dummett's strategy in his masterful interpretation of Frege.

At this juncture then, we encounter a consequence of the difference between my

understanding of the priority Frege attaches to judgment and Dummett's. 1 sketch in this

essay an alternative to Dummett's interpretation of Frege; I have not, either at the level

of exegesis or of argument, defended my interpretation against Dummett's.

19 'On Sense and Meaning,' p. 65.

20 This observation, I take it, is behind Frege's remarking that to recognize anything to

have any property carries with it, after a fashion, a predication of truth. See 'Thoughts,'

p. 5 and Posthumous Writings, p.129.

21 'Thoughts,' p. 4. See also Posthumous Writings, pp. 128-29.

22 'Thoughts,' p. 4.

23 See Frege's letter to Hilbert of Dec. 27, 1899, letter IV/3 in Frege, Philosophical and

Mathematical Co"espondence, edited by Gottfried Gabriel et al., abridged from the

German edition by Brian McGuinness and translated by Hans Kaal (Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press), pp. 36-37. See also Frege, 'On Concept and Object,' in

Translations, pp. 42-43.

24 'Thoughts,' p. 6. See Posthumous Writings, p. 251; see also 'On Sense and Meaning,'

p.74.

25 Basic Laws, p. 12.

26 Posthumous Writings, p. 128.

27 'Thoughts,' p. 2.

28 Basic Laws, p. 15.

29 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New

York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), p. 18 (B ix); see also p. 98 (A 60 = B 85).

30 See Basic Laws Section 48, pp. 105-09 for Frege's formulation 01 the inference

rules for the formal system of Basic Laws. Rule 6 on p. 106 is Frege's version of MP.

31 Frege, thanks to his horizontal function that associates every object with a truth-

value, in the formal system of Basic Laws formulates truth-functional laws using

unrestricted first-level variables.

32 See 'Negation,' p. 34.

33 Posthumous Writings, p. 252.

OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTHOOD

95

34 Foundations, p. 103. Frege makes the same point a bit more sharply in 'On Herr

Peano's Begriffsschrift and My Own,' translated by V. H. Dudman Australasian Journal

of Philosophy 47 (1979), p. 2.

35 Until the fmal paragraphs of this section, Frege's distinction between sense and

meaning will be put to one side; and the term 'statement' will be used with the same

ambiguity that Frege uses 'Satz' in his pre-1891 writings. I also follow the growing

practice of using 'meaning' and its cognates as the English equivalents of Frege's uses of

'Bedeutung' and its cognates.

36 'On Concept and Object,' p. 45.

37 Foundations, p. x. Austin translates 'Satz' by 'proposition'.

38 Frege can be read as marking this point in his letter to Peano of Sept. 29, 1896, letter

XlV /7 , in Correspondence, p. 115.

39 See Foundations, p. 72 and p. 73.

40 See 'On Concept and Object,' p. 54.

41 'On Concept and Object,' p. 43. The argument of the last two paragraphs is in

essence the one Frege gives in the penultimate paragraph of this paper; see pp. 54-55.

42 Foundations, p. 93.

43 Foundations, p. x. I am indebted in this paragraph to Warren Goldbarb. The section

as a whole bears the imprint of Burton Dreben's repeated insistence on the role of

Frege's mathematical training and interests in shaping his philosophy.

44 These remarks about Frege's conception of objecthood should be distinguished from

superficially similar things Quine says. Quine puts forward his maxim "To be is to be a

value of a variable," in the context of a discussion of ontological commitment. Applica-

tion of the standard of ontological commitment it provides is made in a metalanguage

into which we may have occasion to semantically ascend in the course of certain

investigations and disputes. For present purposes, the important point is that the notion

of ontological commitment, and with it this maxim, belong to the theory of reference

and thus invoke the semantical perspective Frege eschews.

45 Frege, 'Function and Concept,' in Translation, p. 21. See also p. 41.

46 'Thoughts,' p. 4 and p. 6.

47 'On Sense and Meaning,' p. 65.

48 'On Sense and Meaning,' p. 63.

49 See 'Thoughts,' p. 6; and see above pp. 22-23.

TYLER BURGE

FREGE ON TRUTH

From a natural perspective, Frege's view that sentences denote

(bedeuten) objects appears to be an irritating peculiarity. His claim that

there are only two objects denoted by sentences and that these are

Truth and Falsity has seemed to many to advance from the peculiar to

the bizarre. Indeed, a standardized form of philosophical humor has

grown up around talk of "naming the True". I think that the natural

perspective is sound and that the humor has its point. But understanding

Frege's motivations for these views provides insight into the fundamen-

tals of his philosophical standpoint and method. Such insight enriches

the natural perspective.

The importance of Frege's views on truth values in his system has

been appreciated by a number of philosophers. Michael Dummett

characterizes Frege's claim that sentences denote objects as "an almost

unmitigated disaster" for Frege's later philosophy of language (FPL,

196,643-4).1 Several authors have seen in Frege's writings the skeleton

of an a priori argument, later given by Church and Godel, that sentences

must denote only Truth or Falsity. And Frege's method of identifying

the truth values with certain courses of values has been construed as

indicating a non-realistic attitude toward numbers. I think that each of

these interpretations is mistaken. But they correctly suggest that Frege's

odd-sounding conclusions about truth and falsity should be taken seri-

ously as a key to his philosophies of language, logic and mathematics.

My aims here are historical. I shall argue in Section I that Frege's

view that sentences denote only truth or falsity has profound and

natural motivations, and that his view that truth values are objects is

more pragmatically based - and therefore less strange - than has

usually been thought. In Section II I criticize Dummett's influential

interpretation of Frege's theses on truth values and his evaluation of the

effect of those theses on Frege's philosophy of language. I also delineate

the development of Frege's views on assertion and truth between

Begriffsschrift and Basic Laws. In Section III I argue that Frege's identifi-

cation of the truth values with the particular objects he identifies them

with undergirds his realism about logical objects, and proceeds from

97

L. Haaparanta and f. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 97 -154.

1986 by Tyler Burge.

98 TYLER BURGE

some of his deepest philosophical conceptions. In particular, it proceeds

from a theory about the nature of logical objects, from a thesis about the

aim and ordering of logic, and from his conceptions of assertion and

truth.

In order to lay the groundwork for our discussion of Frege's concep-

tions of assertion, truth, and logical objects, I will have to go over a fair

amount of familiar ground in Section I. Some readers may wish to work

through this section quickly in order to concentrate on Sections II and

III. I should caution, however, that although many of the doctrines

discussed in Section I are well-known, the ways they fit together and the

means Frege uses to motivate them are less well recognized. Under-

standing these ways and means is critical to a proper appreciation of

Frege's use of the notion of truth in his philosophy of logic and mathe-

matics - and indeed, to an appreciation of his depth as a philosopher.

Although defective in various ways, Frege's views on truth are richer

and more central to his logical theory and much of his philosophy of

mathematics than is often realized. One reason why these views are

underappreciated is that Frege refused to allow a meta-theoretic seman-

tics, as we know it, to be part of his logical theory. Another reason is

that Frege's presentation of his views has tended to encourage concen-

tration on his philosophy of language or his mathematical work as some-

what separate enterprises. The philosophy of language is expounded

largely in the great articles of the 1890's and in unpublished writing,

with little discussion of its connection to logicism. The mathematical

project is spun out in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, which is cast in the

form of a traditional mathematical treatise - its philosophy kept to a

minimum. Underlying Frege's work is, however, a remarkably integrated

vision. We shall try to layout the central place that Frege's views on

truth have in this vision.

It is useful to separate Frege's views on truth values into several theses,

although the theses are interrelated and his arguments for them overlap.

The relevant theses are

(a) Sentences (when not defective) have denotations (Bedeu

tungen).

(b) The denotation of a sentence is its truth value.

FREGE ON TRUTH 99

(c) Sentences are of the same logical type as singular terms.

(d) The denotation of a sentence is an object.

Frege tends to develop support for the theses in the order in which they

are listed. (See Note 6 below for a qualification.)

Frege's arguments often presuppose his distinction between sense

and denotation (which he first draws for singular terms). They almost

always presuppose or make use of his groundbreaking composition

principles:

(1) The denotation of a complex expression is functionally dependent only on the

denotations of its logically relevant component expressions.

(2) The sense of a complex expression is functionally dependent only on the senses

of its logically relevant component expressions.

(I omit certain qualifications on these principles that are irrelevant to

our concerns.) The first principle is the critical one in Frege's thinking;

the second makes important but only occasional appearances.

Thesis (a)

Frege argues that the sense of a sentence - its cognitive value, the

thought that it expresses - remains the same regardless of whether or

not the sentence's component expressions (particularly, the singular

terms) have denotations: The sense of a sentence is fixed independently

of its components' denotations [G & B, 'S & R', 63/KS 148; Cor 165/

BW 247; PPW 193-4/NS 210.] It follows from (1) and (2) and these

considerations that the sense of a sentence cannot be conceived as its

denotation.

Frege further argues that one cannot reasonably hold that sentences

in general lack a denotation. In at least one passage he draws this

conclusion almost directly from the arguments of the preceding para-

graph:

It follows that there must be something associated with a sentence that is different from

the thought, something for which it is essential whether the parts of the sentence have

denotations. This is to be called the denotation of the sentence. (PPW 194/NS 210-11)

This inference clearly relies on the Composition Principle (1).

Now one might feel that the inference begs any question one might

have about whether sentences have denotations - about Thesis (a). Why

100 TYLER BURGE

should sentences be included among the complex expressions that have

denotations? The last sentence of the passage just cited suggests some-

thing wrong with the question. Frege is not using the term 'denotation'

with a fixed, meaning in arguing for (a). Rather he is

determined to give his Composition Principle (1) a comprehensive role

in logical theory, and he is intending to fit the term 'denotation' to the

role that the principle might fruitfully play in a logical theory about

sentences. "The denotation" of a sentence is whatever is most fruitfully

seen as functionally dependent on the denotations of its parts. So far the

phrase 'the denotation' has no specific logical grammar or ontological

implications. Since the arguments for (a) do not presuppose Thesis (d),

there is so far no reason to consider the view that a sentence's denota-

tion is an object. One may at this point regard talk about sentence

denotation as potentially a de parler for an important semantical

aspect of sentences. The ontological import of such talk, if any, is left

thoroughly open.

Of course, the term 'denotation' (,Bedeutung') was not devoid of

intuitive content in Frege's arguments. 'Bedeutung' is a common word in

German, usually translated 'meaning'. In German there is no oddity in

saying that sentences have a "Bedeutung". Frege did, however, appro-

priate the term for his theoretical uses and introduced it in the essays

'Function and Concept' and 'On Sense and Denotation' through exam-

ples of singular terms ('The Evening Star', 'Odysseus' - which lacks a

denotation - '1', '2 + 2', 'the capital of England'). The examples suggest

that naming or reference - considered as relations between names and

their bearers or between a complex singular term and the object it picks

out - is one primary sort of "Bedeutung". But since Frege also used his

term to apply to a semantical relation between expressions (such as

predicates), that he emphatically did not regard as singular terms, on

one hand, and non-linguistic entities, on the other, one must view these

initial examples with some caution. They are aids in building a theory.

The point I want to press regarding Frege's quick inference to (a)

from his composition principle is that the inference is indicative of his

pragmatic attitude toward his terminology. As he repeatedly noted, the

term 'number' had expanded in its application (from the natural num-

bers, to negatives, rationals, reals,' complex numbers) under pressure

from the requirements of mathematics. Semantical terminology could be

expected to undergo similar stretching in response to the demands of

logical theory.

FREGE ON TRUTH 101

Frege provides a closely related, but different argument for (a). This

argument occurs in 'On Sense and Denotation' and is repeated in his

correspondence with Russell and his posthumously published writings.

The following passages suggest the argument:

The fact that we concern ourselves at all about the denotation of a part of the sentence

indicates that we generally recognize and expect a denotation for the sentence itself. (G

& B, 'S & R' 63/ KS 149)

Now it would be impossible to see why it was of value to us whether or not a word had a

denotation if the whole sentence did not have a denotation and if this denotation was of

no value to us; for whether or not that is so [whether or not the words have a

denotation] does not affect the thought. (Cor 1521 BW235)

[If a sentence had no denotation] the denotation of any part would be a matter of

indifference, for, regarding the sense of a sentence, only the sense not the denotation of

its parts comes into consideration. (Cor 1581BW 240; cf. also Cor 165, 163nlBW 247,

245n; PPW232INS250-1)

These claims are embedded in discussion of examples of nondenoting

names and in an argument for Thesis (b). But in view of the obvious

generality of their intent, I think that they are worth isolating.

Frege's argument is that we would not concern ourselves with the

denotations of sentence-parts if we were not interested in the denota-

tions of whole sentences; we clearly do concern ourselves with the

denotations of sentence-parts - we often care whether singular terms

denote something; so we are interested in the denotations of whole

sentences.

The argument must again be seen in the light of the centrality of the

Composition Principle (1) and of Frege's pragmatic use of the term

'Bedeutung'. Denotations of sentences are whatever can be seen as both

central to logical theory and functivnally dependent on the denotations

of the logically relevant parts of sentences. But this argument adds a

further claim. Our interest in the denotations of words is derivative from

our interest in the denotations of sentences. That is, word denotation is

important because and only because of the importance of some feature

of sentences that is central to logical theory and functionally dependent

on word denotation.

This further claim appears to be an expression, or outgrowth, of the

context principles that Frege had enunciated earlier in The Foundations

of Arithmetic. These enunciations preceded the development of the

distinction between sense and denotation, and they took a variety of

102 TYLER BURGE

nonequivalent forms. But they all emphasized that the analysis of the

"meaning" of a word (in retrospect, presumably, its sense and its

denotation) was to be carried out in the context of an analysis of its role

in a sentence. Frege appears to be invoking the primacy of sentences in

his argument that sentences have denotations. Our interest in the

denotations of words had to be connected in logical and linguistic

theory with some feature of sentences. Frege forged the connection by

means of the Composition Principle (1), and he called the relevant

feature of a sentence its denotation.

It is worth noting that Frege's ,reasoning is prima facie incompatible

with the idea that the notion of the denotation of a term has no other

content than that provided by an analysis of the contribution of the term

in fixing the denotation (or, truth value) of a sentence.

The argument presupposes that we have a co-equal understanding of

and application for the notion of the denotation of a term.2 Indeed it

presupposes that the notion of term-denotation is more familiar than

that of sentence denotation, though perhaps not more familiar than

that of truth value. The argument claims that whether terms have any

denotation at all is of importance to us only relative to our interest in

relevant semantical properties of sentences. It does not suggest that the

notion of term-denotation can be exhaustively defined, or characterized,

or reduced by attempting to analyze the relevant semantical properties

of sentences in total abstraction from one's ordinary understanding of

the notion of term-denotation (reference). The ordinary understanding

of term denotation is assumed to be sound. (One could produce numer-

ous passages from Frege's opposition to formalism to substantiate this

point.) The argument simply demands that such ordinary understanding

has to be connected, in one's theory, to the semantical properties of

sentences, interest in which motivates interest in the denotations of

terms.

Thesis (b)

The role of value and "interest for us" in Frege's argument for (a) needs

articulation. Frege saw logic as revealing certain norms governing ideal

thought. The sentence was the linguistic correlate of thought. We think,

according to Frege, only by means of sentences. So any logical theory

had to ground itself in an analysis of the properties of sentences that

revealed the relevant norms. Our interest in the denotations of terms,

FREGE ON TRUTH 103

and of functional expressions, was motivated by interest in normative

properties governing thinking, normative properties whose laws logic

sought to uncover.

This focus on the normative implications of logical theory underlies

Frege's primary argument for Thesis (b). Frege specifies what it is about

sentences that motivates our interest in the denotations of their parts.

The relevant property is the sentence's truth value.

The fact that we concern ourselves at all about the denotation of a part of the sentence

indicates that we generally recognize and expect a denotation for the sentence itself. The

thought loses value for us as soon as we recognize that the denotation of one of its parts

is lacking. We are therefore justified in not being satisfied with the sense of a sentence,

and in asking also for its denotation. But why do we then want every proper name to

have not only a sense, but also a denotation? Why is the thought not enough for us?

Because, and to the extent that, we are concerned with its truth value. This is not always

the case. In hearing an epic poem ... we are interested only in the sense of the sentences

and the images and feelings thereby aroused. In response to the question of truth we

would abandon aesthetic delight and turn to a scientific investigation. Hence also it is a

matter of no concern to us whether the name 'Odysseus', for example, has denotation so

long as we accept the poem as a work of art. It is the striving for truth that drives us

always to advance from sense to denotation. (G & B, 'S & R'63/KS 149)

When we merely want to enjoy the poetry we do not care whether, for example, the

name 'Odysseus' has a denotation ... the question first acquires an interest for us when

we take a scientific attitude - the moment we ask, 'Is the story true?', that is, when we

take an interest in the truth value .... Now it would be impossible to see why it was of

value to us whether or not a word had a denotation if the whole sentence did not have a

denotation and if this denotation was of no value to us; for whether or not that is so

does not affect the thought. And this denotation will be something that will have value

for us precisely when we are interested in whether the words have denotation (bedeu-

tungsvoll Sind), therefore when we ask after truth. (Cor 152 BW 235)

... if it is not a matter of indifference to us whether the signs that make up a sentence

have a denotation, then it is not just the thought that matters to us, but also the denota-

tion of the sentence. And this is the case when and only when we ask after truth. Then

and only then does the denotation of the sentence enter into our consideration; it must

therefore be most intimately bound up with truth. (Cor 165/BW247)

That the name ... designates is of value to us when and only when we are concerned

with truth in the scientific sense. So our sentence will have a denotation when and only

when the thought expressed in it is true orfalse. (PPW 232/NS 250-1)

Frege's argument for Thesis (b) clearly presupposes his arguments for

Thesis (a). It thus presupposes the primary importance of sentences in

logical theory. In fact, the language of the first three passages directly

echoes the first statement of context principle in The Foundations of

104 TYLER BURGE

Arithmetic: "never to ask for the Bedeutung of a word in isolation, but

only in sentential context". The phrases I have translated "asking for its

denotation" and "ask after truth" in these three passages from 'On

Sense and Denotation' and the correspondence with Russell use the

same phrase 'zu fragen nach der Bedeutung' that occurs in the introduc-

tion to Foundations. It is almost inconceivable that Frege did not intend

to associate the passages with his slogan. The reason that the denota-

tions of words must be "asked for" only in sentential context is that the

relevantly related semantical feature of sentences - the denotation of

sentences - motivates our interest in word denotation. Our interest in

the denotation of words derives from our interest in the truth value of

sentences, or of the thoughts that they express. Truth is the relevant

norm governing our use of and interest in sentences and thoughts. The

point of logical theory should be the analysis of the most general laws

governing this norm.

Frege's argument for Thesis (b), the thesis that the denotation of a

sentence is its truth value, is not and is not intended as a deductive argu-

ment. There. is no attempt to deduce (b) from "first principles". In 'On

Sense and Denotation', he twice calls the thesis a conjecture (Vermutung

- conjecture, supposition, surmise) - (G & E, 'S & R' 64, 65/ KS 150,

151). And the remainder of article is presented as a series of "tests" of

the conjecture. After considering these tests in detail, he writes at almost

the end of the article: 'From this it follows with sufficient probability

that the cases where a subordinate clause is not replaceable by another

with the same truth value proves nothing against our view that a truth

value is the denotation of a sentence whose sense is a thought'. (G & B,

'S & R' 78/KS 162)

There is a closely related argument, proposed by Church, G6del and

others, that does take deductive form. Frege has sometimes been

constructed as giving an ellipitical, or even invalid, approximation to this

argument. I think that such a construal is very poor history. Frege's

argument rather has the form: In view of the normative aims of logical

theory and in view of the considerations that actually motivate our

interest in the denotations of terms, the appropriate feature of sentences

to connect with the denotations of the sentence's constituent parts via

the composition principle, is the sentence's truth value. We shall discuss

the Church-G6del argument shortly.

There is a supplementary argument for Thesis (b). This argument is

roughly: a sentence's truth value is dependent on the denotations of its

FREGE ON TRUTH 105

constituent terms in just the way that the Composition Principle (1)

requires. So given the way the notion of a sentence's denotation is

introduced, truth values are well-suited to be the denotations of sen-

tences.

In 'On Sense and Denotation' and elsewhere Frege proposes this

argument as a confirmatory consideration or an essential test of the

conclusion of the previous argument: 'If our conjecture that the denota-

tion of a sentence is its truth value is correct, the latter must remain

unchanged when a part of the sentence is replaced by an expression

having the same denotation. And this is in fact the case." (G & B,

'S & R', 64/KS 150)

Taking the appeal to the Composition Principle (1) as a confirmation

or supplement to the previous argument seems to me to be Frege's most

reasonable presentation of the relation between the two arguments for

Thesis (b). But sometimes Frege seems to place the appeal to the

composition principle in a different light. He asks, "what else but the

truth value could be found, that belongs quite generally to every

sentence, to which the denotation of its constituent parts is relevant, and

that remains unchanged by substitutions of the kind in question?"

(G & B, 'S & R', 64/KS 150; ct. also Cor158, 165/BW240, 247)

Although Frege cannot be expected to have foreseen this, his question

prompted Russell to open a semantical and metaphysical Pandora's box.

One can well imagine Russell turning over in his mind this question,

which Frege put to him more than once in their correspondence of

1902-4. For Russell was resisting the view that sentences had truth

values as denotations.

A year after the correspondence ended, Russell published his theory

of descriptions. The theory opened the possibility of maintaining alle-

giance to the Composition Principle (1), yet analyzing the logically

relevant parts of a sentence in a very different way from the way Frege

regarded as natural and appropriate. The theory simultaneously opened

the possibility of assigning a variety of different sorts of denotations to

sentential parts, and a variety of different sorts of denotations, other

than truth values, to the sentences themselves ("states of affairs", "facts",

"propositions" and so forth).

Russell demonstrated that one could do compositional semantics

without taking truth values to be the central feature functionally asso-

ciated with sentences. But it is no accident that, despite the deep

methodological interest of the theory of descriptions, Frege's approach,

106 TYLER BURGE

not Russell's, has been the source of the mainstream development of

semantical theory in logic. No doubt one reason for the pre-eminence of

Frege's approach lies in the artificiality, from a syntactial or grammatical

point of view, of Russell's analysis of sentential constituents. But more

profound reasons are suggested by Frege's first argument for Thesis (b).

Truth (or some modalized notion of truth, like necessary truth or

validity) is the central notion of logical theory. In making truth values

the primary functional values of the Composition Principle (1), Frege

was simply uniting his formal apparatus with the conception that

motivates logical theory.

Russell's theory can, of course, accommodate the representation of

truth values, of truth-evaluations; and it maintains allegiance to a notion

of logical consequence explained in terms of truth. But formally, the

truth values enter through a side door, so to speak. The composition

principle yokes words with sentences, but it is not used primarily to

relate word-denotation to truth value. The primary semantical feature of

sentences is the "fact" they are correlated with. The denotations of

words functionally determine a ''fact'' or "proposition" composed of

attributes and (perhaps) individuals. The primary semantical feature of a

sentence is the ''fact'' that it is correlated with. Thus, from the outset,

Russell's formal theory incorporates into its subject matter entities that

evince a strong admixture of metaphysical motivation. States of affairs,

facts, and the like have a recurring attraction for the metaphysically

minded. But they have not obtained general acceptance among logicians,

and they have yet to, be shown to be indispensable for the foundations

of logic. By contrast, the more abstract notion of truth is firmly

entrenched in nearly all logical theories. Formal logical theories that

place this latter notion at their center, resting little or no weight on

arguably dispensable metaphysical entities semantically correlated with

sentences, have formed the mainline development oflogic in this century.

Frege may be seen as a certain sort of minimalist in this context. He

conceived of the fundamental part of logic - the calculus of truth values

and first and second order logic - as having an aim and subject matter

that was relatively independent of metaphysical controversy. The laws

of logic are fundamentally the laws of truth, not laws about the meta-

physical constitution of facts, propositions, or thoughts (Gedanken). (Cf.

Kl50SIKS 342; and PPW 1221NS 133.) The metaphysics of thoughts is

developed to deal with intensional contexts and with epistemic ques-

tions, which are treated only in a heuristic way in Basic Laws.

FREGE ON TRUTH 107

Frege took the notion of truth as a normative primitive.

3

He did not

leave it unexplicated, and his explications are, as we shall see, highly

controversial and involved in metaphysical commitments. But his basic

procedure is that of a good scientist in the broadest sense of the term.

He created and worked within a theory whose interpretation, for the

fundamental purposes of the science, was largely uncontroversial. Con-

troversial views were isolated and confined - to the science's heuristic

preliminaries and to its frontiers (the philosophical explication of the

notions of truth, sense, and assertion, and the application of the logic to

intensional contexts, respectively). Extensional logic, more or less as

Frege interpreted it, remains fundamental at least in the sense that it is

common ground to all logicians and in the sense that its interpretation

expresses, with a minimum of controversial accessories, that notion of

logical consequence in terms of truth which has traditionally been seen

as the central concept of the discipline.

None of this is to deny that Frege had a controversial metaphysics.

His philosophical views about truth (particularly Theses (c) and (d) and

the "redundancy" conception), his theory of sense, and his theory of

judgment and assertion are widely doubted. Indeed, one might safely

count them mistaken.

Frege's philosophical views are not, as such, a set of unfortunate

superfluities. I think that a metaphysics - or rather a set of controversial

philosophical proposals - in this area can hardly be avoided. There are

philosophical questions about truth, meaning, cognitive value, and judg-

ment that are genuinely difficult and apparently genuine. Frege

responded to - in fact, in some cases introduced - these questions.

And in order to deal with problems about informativeness, about the

commitments of propositional-attitude discourse, about the mechanisms

of word-denotation, and so forth, he postulated certain metaphysical

entities (senses, Gedanken) that are no less controversial than Russell's

facts or propositions. Russell's own theory is in part an attempt to

answer these same questions. So from a certain philosophical standpoint

it may seem that until these issues are thrashed through, Frege's position

holds no advantages over Russell's. His extensional logic owes debts

that must be paid before a balance sheet can be drawn up.

There is surely something to this standpoint. But I think that it

overlooks one of Frege's central insights and ignores the cognitive

advantages of his pragmatic method. Frege's insight is that the norma-

tive notion of truth is the central semantical feature of sentences and the

108 TYLER BURGE

fundamental concept of the science. And his pragmatic method of

isolating controversy carries the subject a long way before philosophical

issues intrude. That has been the method of all successful sciences,

mathematical logic included; and success is perhaps our surest guide to

knowledge. These considerations tend to favor Frege's basic approach

to logic unless the philosophical issues with which he and Russell

grappled were decisively and "scientifically" decided in a way that

undermined Frege's extensional starting point. That possibility seems

remote.

The Church-Godel Argument

Here is perhaps a good place to enter into a digression on the relation

between Frege's argument for Thesis (b) and an argument proposed by

Church and G6del that is clearly inspired by Frege. (Church (1943),

G6del (1964).) The argument has a number of interesting variants, and

it has been put to even more uses. G6del's version is particularly rich in

implications. I shall, however, discuss only what has become a stan

dardized form.

The argument is supposed to show that all true sentences denote

the same thing; an analogous one would show that all false sentences

denote the same thing. The argument first presupposes that sentences

have a semantical feature that bears enough of an analogy to the central

semantical feature of terms to be given the same expression. (This

presupposition is often not made explicit. For convenience we shall,

inaccurately, call it a "premise".) Let us dub this feature "denotation" in

accord with Frege's Thesis (a). Second, the argument assumes the

Composition Principle (1). And third, it assumes that logically equiva

lent expressions have the same denotation. Take any true sentences S

and S'; S is logically equivalent with a sentence of the form '(LX)

(X = 0) = (LX) (X = 0 & S)'. So by the third premise, S and this

sentence have the same denotation. But the latter sentence yields the

sentence '(LX) (X = 0) = (LX) (X = 0 & S')' by substitution of co

denotational terms on the right side of the identity sign. So these two

sentences have the same denotation, by the second premise. But the new

sentence is logically equivalent with S'. So by the third premise, they

have the same denotation. So Sand S' have the same denotation.

Frege accepted not only the conclusion of the argument, but all three

premises. But in arguing for the conclusion, in effect Thesis (b), he did

FREGE ON TRUTH 109

not advance this argument. I do not find it plausible to view Frege as

giving an elliptical or invalid approximation to this argument. The

primary reason for this is the one I have already proposed. Frege

invokes the normative foundations of logic and the normative roots of

the primacy of sentences in logical theory (and in everyday language

use) in arguing for his conclusion. That is, he has a premise about the

point of logic; and he connects the notion of sentence denotation both

with this point and with his primary analytical tool, the Composition

Principle (1). The Church-Godel argument makes no such appeal to the

purpose of logic or semantics.

Another reason why Frege's argument is different can be developed

by looking ahead in our discussion. One source of plausibility for the

third premise of the Church-Godel argument derives from the com-

parison of sentences to terms - in effect, Frege's Thesis (c). Clearly, the

denotations of logically equivalent terms are the same. Insofar as

sentences are terms, or at least designators, they plausibly fall under the

same principle. But many of the considerations that led Frege to accept

Thesis (c) presuppose a prior commitment to a semantical analysis of

sentences in terms of their truth values.

A deeper version of the same sort of point can be made from another

angle. It may seem perfectly reasonable to accept the third premise of

the Church-Godel argument independently of comparison between the

semaI\tics of terms and the semantics of sentences. Suppose that we

avoid relying on the view that sentences, like terms, designate or denote

entities. The notion of the denotation of a sentence was initially intro-

duced as that notion which captured the primary semantical feature of

sentences for logical theory that could be linked up, by the Composition

Principle (1), with the denotations of terms. Should we not expect,

virtually a priori, that logical theory ought to count sentences as being

the same with respect to their primary semantical feature if it counts

them logically equivalent?

The rhetorical question packs a punch. But it still overlooks how

fundamental Frege's starting point is. The sentences that are indicated to

be logically equivalent in the Church-Godel argument are so counted

under a prior conception of logical equivalence, whether informal or

fully articulated. This notion already employs some concept of truth -

truth under all interpretations, necessary truth, or the like. From Frege's

standpoint, this notion of logical consequence (and logical equivalence)

already brings with it a commitment to truth values as the central,

110 TYLER BURGE

logically relevant feature of sentences. So again the third premise of the

Church-Godel argument is less fundamental from Frege's standpoint

than its conclusion. Frege's syntactical analysis - Thesis (c) - his

conception of logical consequence, and the metaphysics of his logical

theory, e.g. Thesis (d), all depend on his commitment to logic's being

primarily concerned with the normative notion of truth.

It would be absurd, of course, to suggest that Frege's conception of

logical consequence in terms of (necessary) truth was somehow arbi-

trary, or merely one of many equally suitable choices. The conception

lies in the mainline tradition of logic that stretches back to its beginning.

Even those conceptions of logic prior to Frege that allowed metaphysi-

cal visions to predominate tended to maintain allegiance to the informal

conception of logical consequence from which his theory sprang. There

have been in this century a few approaches, self-consciously reacting

against the main tradition, that have departed from the standard infor-

mal conception of logical consequence, following a metaphysical, or

more often an epistemological muse. At this point, such approaches

must be regarded as secondary developments.

The preceding discussion is not intended to suggest that the Church-

Godel argument is circular. (The third premise is not equivalent to the

conclusion.) The argument is usually given in a context in which people

already have the ordinary notion of logical consequence, and in which

the notion of a denotation for sentences is open to determination. The

usual way of reading the argument is to give it the flavor of, "If you are

willing to concede that there is a notion of sentence denotation that

meets these restrictions (those of the argument's second and third

premises), I will surprise you with what the denotation of a sentence has

to be." The third premise might be bolstered by the argument I gave

above [second half, p. 109.] By contrast, Frege already knew exactly

how he wanted to use the notion of sentence denotation: it was re-

stricted by the Composition Principle (1) (second premise); but it had to

accord with the primary aim of logic, as it has traditionally been

conceived.

Much of the surprise of the Church-Godel argument derives from

implicitly thinking of sentence denotation primarily in terms of the pre-

theoretical notion of naming, rather than primarily in terms of a specific

conception of its theoretical employment, as Frege did. Once one has

taken the dubious step of seeing sentences as names, or at least as desig-

nating some entities that are functionally dependent on word-denota-

FREGE ON TRUTH

111

tion, it is intuitively surprising to think of them as designating only one

of two entities, and odd to reify truth and falsity. Having come so far, it

is perhaps more intuitive to take sentences as "designating" possible

states of affairs, or something like that. At least many have thought so.

Seen this way, the conclusion of the Church-Godel argument is unap-

pealing. It is doubtful, however, whether anyone, except perhaps for

Church, has endorsed the argument read in this way.4 The natural and

most common response to the argument is to reject.its first "premise":

sentences do not name, refer to, or designate any entity.

As 1 have indicated, it is possible to see the argument as using a less

determinate notion of denotation that gets around this objection. One

can consider the argument without adopting Frege's Theses (c) and (d).

Then the oddity of the conclusion disappears - the better for reflecting

on the logical relationships that the argument reveals.

5

Theses (c) and (d) - Pragmatic Motivations

In my view, the first of Frege's arguments for (b) and both his arguments

for (a) are sound. Although (a) and (b) have often been targets of

criticism, most of the criticism stems from construing (a) and (b) in the

light of Theses (c) and (d). 1 believe that doubts about (c) and (d) are

justified. But as 1 shall try to show in the remainder of this section and in

Section II, such doubts are less interesting than has sometimes been

supposed. The discussion of these theses will serve to introduce back-

ground essential to Frege's treatment oflogical objects.

6

In a letter to Frege in 1903, Russell challenged Thesis (c), the view

that sentences are to be regarded as of the same logical type as singular

terms: "I have read your essay on sense and denotation, but 1 am still in

doubt over your theory of truth values, only because it seems para-

doxical to me. 1 believe that a judgment, or even a thought, is something

so completely peculiar that the theory of proper names has no appli-

cation to it." (Cor. 155-6IBW238.) The gist of Russell's challenge has

been repeated by subsequent generations, and with qualifications to

hedge against the overstatement in Russell's phrase "no application," I

would echo it. But it is easy to be led by the paradoxical ring of (c) and

(d), as 1 think Russell was led, into misunderstanding their import and

place in Frege's system.

Frege repeatedly emphasized intra-logical, pragmatic advantages for

regarding truth values as objects: "How much simpler and sharper every-

112 TYLER BURGE

thing becomes through the introduction of truth values, only thorough

occupation with this book can show. These advantages alone already

put a great weight on the balance in favor of my conception, which

indeed may seem strange at first glance." (BL 7/ GG x.) In fact, The

Basic Laws of Arithmetic mentions only considerations involving

simplification of logical theory as motivations for (c) and (d). These

considerations are also dominant in Frege's post-paradox writing.

I should make it clear here that in calling Frege's reasoning "prag-

matic" or "intra-logical," I am not suggesting that he took the commit-

ments that he based on such reasoning to be less than absolutely serious.

Such commitments were not merely practical conveniences or technical

artifices. Frege saw himself as making objective discoveries. What I wish

to emphasize is the great extent to which Frege tried to develop his

positions from his analysis of logical structure and from observations

regarding functional analogies between different components of that

structure. In his arguments for (a)-(d), considerations that derive from

intuitions not firmly entrenched in the actual practice of logic, "meta-

physical intuitions," play a secondary role in Frege's argumentation.

Whatever conceptions most profoundly clarified and simplified logical

theory, whatever language made mathematical practice more rigorous,

more comprehensive, more fruitful, and less ad hoc, were seen as

providing insight into the most abstract features of the world.

The pragmatic cast of Frege's thought seems to have come naturally.

Only rarely did he remark on his methodology in general terms. The

effusion from Basic Laws, quoted in the previous paragraph but one,

constitutes a relatively unusual example. The following passage from a

thrice rejected manuscript of 1880-1 provides another:

All these [mathematical) concepts have been developed in science [Frege terms mathe-

matics a science) and have proved themselves fruitful. What we can perceive in them

therefore has a far higher claim on our attention thaI'l anything that everyday trains of

thought might offer. For fruitfulness is the touchstone of concepts, and the scientific

workshop is the real field of observation for logic. (PPW 331NS 36-7; cf also KS 124,

369)

Frege's pragmatic considerations rest on analogies that are quite natural

within a formal context. In formulating the propositional calculus, it is

natural to quantify t4e letters that stand for sentences in something like

the way one quantifies into the places held by singular terms in the first-

order functional calculus. The places for sentences, like the places for

FREGE ON TRUTH

113

terms, stand in argument places for functional expressions; they some-

times constitute value expressions resulting from functional application;

and they never stand for functional or predicate expressions. When one

quantifies the letters that stand for sentences, the natural interpretation

of the domain of quantification is to take it as consisting of the two truth

values - as several generations of logic students have been made aware.

(Cf. Cor. 158/BE241; KS 225-6/

Another analogy, which is more debatable, is that between non-

denoting names and truth-valueless sentences in natural language.

(G & B 'S & R' 62/ KS 148; Cor. 152, BW 235). Both maintain a sense

in the absence of denotation. Frege thought that subject-predicate

sentences containing nondenoting terms always lacked truth values.

It is difficult to see to what extent he accepted this view on intuitive

grounds and to what extent he reasoned to it. If one already sees

predicates as denoting functions, then one will see a nondenoting name

as providing no argument for such a function. Functions without

argument yield no value. And if the denotations of sentences are the

values of such functions, and are counted truth values, then sentences

involving only the application of predicates to nondenoting terms (and

application of functors to sentences so obtained) will lack truth value.

This reasoning, of course, assumes the assimilation of predicates to

function signs. And this assimilation is tantamount, as we shall see, to

accepting Thesis (c). So the reasoning cannot be seen as providing much

independent support for Thesis (c).

Very likely, the view that nondenoting terms in subject-predicate

sentences yield truth-value-less sentences was also found acceptable by

Frege on intuitive grounds. The various examples he gives do elicit in

many the intuition that the sentences are neither true nor false. But

there are numerous other cases that are at best indecisive witnesses for

Frege's defense. Since this issue has been discussed at uncommon length

by others, I shall not go into it. I think that Frege's view of the intuitive

relation between nondenoting terms and truth-value-less sentences was

not very critical to his account of truth values. Since he banned non-

denoting terms from his formal theory, he rested little weight on the

point.

An analogy of which Frege makes more is that between nonassertive

occurrences of declarative sentences (suppositions or occurrences

within other sentences) and proper names. (EL 35/GG 7.) Sentences

often occur embedded in other sentences (for example, in the antece-

114 TYLER BURGE

dents of conditionals) in such a way as to contribute to semantical

structure, without being asserted - like terms. Moreover, whole sen-

tences can be put forward merely for consideration without carrying any

assertive force - again like terms.

These analogies between sentences and terms are, of course, not very

gripping. They take on interest when linked to Frege's larger strategy.

One of Frege's most profound contributions was to separate the notions

of predication and assertion. More generally, he distinguished the

notions of logical structure and pragmatically relevant force. The deeper

point of the present analogies is that within a formal theory that

attempts to lay bare semantical structure, one can prescind from the

primary difference between names and sentences (that only the latter

can be used to effect linguistic acts or thoughts, protoypically assertions

and judgments). The difference between names and sentences can be

taken to lie in their point, their use, not in the form of their contribution

to semantical structure. Actually, as we shall see in Section II, Frege's

formal theory did make formal distinctions between sentences and

terms. But the distinctions do not leap to the eye. Although one might

believe (as I do) that form should correspond more closely to use than

Frege's logical theory allows, subsequent formal usage has confirmed

that Frege's analogy constitutes an insight that affords at least a con-

venient alternative in setting up a logical system.

Frege's construal of predicates as functional expressions is perhaps

the most obvious and widely appreciated ground for Theses (c) and (d)

and for his view that truth values are objects. As far back as the

Begriffsschrift in 1879, Frege had interpreted predicates as function

signs (B, Section 9). Once he supplemented this initial conception with

an explicit semantical analysis, which he arrived at by the early 1890's at

latest, he was forced to think of functions as denotations for predicates.

He called such denotations "concepts". (We shall limit considerations to

1st-level concepts.) Objects, obviously, served as arguments for (lst-

level) concepts. But then there must be values for these functions. These

must be the denotations of sentences. Sentences are not themselves

functional expressions, so their denotations are not functions. Moreover,

the values of prototypical functions, the denotations of prototypical

completions of functional expressions (terms), just are objects. (We

shall, for now, regard an object as anything that is denoted by what is,

under logical analysis, a term.) Taking concepts literally to be functions

was tantamount to taking the denotations of sentences to be objects

FREGE ON TRUTH 115

(and the completions of predicates, sentences, to be terms). Since Frege

had independent grounds for regarding the denotations of sentences to

be truth values, this line of thought entailed that truth values were objects.

8

Why did Frege take concepts, denotations of predicates, literally to

be functions? One primary and lasting motivation was, yet again, prag-

matic. Seeing sentences as created by the application of functional

expressions effected a simplification in the understanding of the compo-

sition principles. The simplest construal of the Composition Principle

(1) is to take 'the denotation of sentence s' to be a singular term,

denoting an object. (Cf. Note 8.)

A closely related motive was to provide a simple formal expression

of the formal analogies between predicates and function signs. (BL 6,

34-5IGGX, 6-7/PPW 235/243-4/NS 253-4, 263). Like function

signs, predicates have open places for terms. The primary role of

predicates from the point of view of logic is functional - to take objects

into truth values.

Completeness and Incompleteness

Frege's pragmatic motives are, I think, dominant. But the analogy

between predicates and function signs is sometimes associated by Frege

with remarks that have a darker, more metaphysical hue - remarks

about similarity in their ''unsaturatedness'' or "incompleteness". He says

that the essence of a function is its making a connection between its

arguments and its values, in a specific sort of "need for completion" (BL

33-4/GG 5-6; 'C & 0' G & B 47/KS 171; 'F & C' G & B 24-5/KS

128-9). Moreover, he writes, 'An object is anything that is not a

function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place.

A declarative sentence contains no empty place and on that account its

denotation is to be regarded as an object' ('F & 0' GB, 32/KS 134).

Here Frege may appear to be inferring from a metaphysical thesis

about incompleteness of functions and completeness of objects and

from a thesis about how language must match reality as regards com-

pleteness or incompleteness, to the conclusion that truth values are

objects. Michael Dummett interprets the characterization of objects as

anything that is not a function in this passage (and in an equivalent one

in Basic Laws vol. I Section 2) as an ad hoc attempt to induce the reader

to accept truth values as objects (IFP, 235n). Neither the metaphysical

reading nor Dummett's attribution of desperate improvisation places

Frege in a very attractive light.

116 TYLER BURGE

To begin with the latter interpretation, I do not find Dummett's

charge plausible. Frege's characterization of objects is independent of

Thesis (d) and precedes its adoption. The idea that objects can be

recognized as whatever is never the denotation of an incomplete, func-

tional expression goes back at least to The Foundations of Arithmetic

(Cf. pp. x, 77n, 72 - before Frege's adoption of Thesis (d).) In the latter

passage, FA 72, Frege writes that the point of counting number words

as words for objects (or self-subsistent objects) is "only to preclude the

use of such words as predicates or attributes ... " (Cf. PPW 100, 1051

NS 109.) Given Frege's view that truth values are denotations of

complete sentences, and never denotations of predicates, and given this

characterization, truth values fill the bill as objects.

Frege's characterization of an object as the denotation of any ex-

pression other than a predicate or function sign may seem either to

emasculate the notion of object or (perhaps equivalently) to commit one

to objects too easily. In discussing Frege's arguments for Thesis (a) we

attributed to him a notion of sentence denotation that does not carry

genuine ontological commitment. But now, it may seem, we are allowing

Frege to smuggle ontological commitments into his arguments for

Theses (a) and (b) by granting him an excessively liberal criterion for

ontological commitment to objects. I have argued that the relevant

criterion was not fabricated, as Dummett suggests, simply to make

palateable the view that truth values are objects. But it may seem that

Frege made illegitimate use of a criterion that was first developed in a

context in which the denotation of sentences was not an ontological

issue - resorting to a cheap means for ontological gain.

There is something to this worry. I believe, however, that it cannot be

taken at face value. Frege does argue from his characterization of

objects to Thesis (d) (in the paragraph following the relevant charac-

terization of objects in 'Function and Concept'). But he does not take

the characterization as stipulated or ungrounded. In the first place, there

are substantial analogical considerations that undedy his counting

sentences and terms "complete" and predicates and function signs

''incomplete.'' In the second place, Frege seems to have always regarded

the characterization of objects as resting on an antecedent notion of

completeness that he believed he could apply to sentences (and truth

values) as well as to terms and ordinary objects. It is the notion of

completeness that bears the weight, not the bare claim that objects are

the denotations of every sort of symbol other than function signs. The

FREGE ON TRUTH 117

intuitive notion of completeness underlies and motivates the syntactical,

semantical, and ontological claims.

Then isn't Frege's engrossment in the completeness-incompleteness

distinction simply a metaphysical indulgence? I would not deny that

some of Frege's uses of the distinction involve a kind of fixation that is

difficult to fathom, much less defend. But his deployment of the distinc-

tion to support his view that the denotations of sentences, truth values,

are objects, seems to me less problematic than some other uses he

makes of the distinction.

Let us lay aside Frege's view that no objects are functions and no

functions are objects. I think that this view is extremely doubtful and

that it probably does constitute an instance in which Frege allowed his

sound conceptions of logical function to harden unnecessarily into a

metaphysical doctrine. These matters are, however, intertwined with a

suprisingly large number of serious considerations (for some of them,

see Burge, 1984). I shall avoid the tangle here.

Let us consider only Frege's views that in using (what were under

logical analysis) function signs, one is committed to their denotations,

functions; and that in using (what were under logical analysis) terms,

one is committed to their denotations, objects. As we have noted,

predicates are like function signs in having empty argument places, and

in having a functional role in logical theory. Sentences are like terms in

not manifesting such formal incompleteness and in not having a func-

tional role. In concluding that the denotations of sentences are objects,

Frege may be reasonably seen not as drawing a primitively minded

inference from some pre-Socratic vision of the world as a mixture of the

complete and incomplete - but as simply summing up and embellishing

the analogies, within his logical system, between the roles of sentences

and terms, and their contrasts with predicates and function signs.

The mapping of objects and functions onto truth values - the central

semantical feature of sentences - is the primary formal role of predicate

expressions (or concepts) within formal logical theory. The deep differ-

ences between predicates and ordinary function signs, and between

sentences and terms, were largely shunted off into the theory of

force or use. Frege did not lose sight of the differences. But he

thought that he could draw ontological conclusions from a semantical

theory that abstracted from them. In regarding concepts as functions

and truth values as objects on grounds of the "incompleteness" of

signs for the latter, Frege was basing ontological commitments on

118 TYLER BURGE

the semantical analysis of the logical forms of sentences in whose

truth he believed. Frege's methods, if not his conclusions, seem

unexceptionable.

Clarification of Extensions of Concepts

The assimilation of concepts to functions served one other large pur-

pose in Frege's system. It provided the key to his attempt to clarify the

notions of a concept and of the extension of a concept. As I have tried

to show in some detail elsewhere, Frege was unclear about and dissatis-

fied with these notions from the time he first introduced the latter in

Foundations (Section 68) (1884) up to and through the publication

of Basic Laws. (1903). (Cf. Burge, 1984.) The key to the clarifica-

tion that he attempted, until Russell unsettled him, was the notion of the

course of values of a function. Frege sought to make this notion intuitive

by appeal to the graph of a function (G & B, 'F & C' 251KS 129)

which he seemed to think of both algebraically and geometrically. He

self-consciously did not interpret the graphs as a set of ordered pairs,

for a variety of reasons deriving from his emphasis on the priority of

functions over their courses of values. We shall return to these points in

Section III.

The notion of a concept had had a long but mathematically barren

career in the logical tradition. It was not held in high esteem by

mathematicians in Frege's day. By contrast, the notion of a function was

well established in mathematics. By assimilating the denotations of

predicates to those of function signs - giving them a recognizably

mathematical role - Frege hoped to clarify the notion of a concept and

burnish its reputation. At the same time, he would be effecting a unifi-

cation of the languages of logic and mathematics in accord with his

logicist thesis. This motivation is explicit when Frege first introduces the

assimilation of concepts to functions:

... for what purpose, then, are the signs '=', '> " , <' admitted into the circle of those

that help form a functional expression? It seems that nowadays more and more sup-

porters are being won to the view that arithmetic is further-developed logic ... I too am

of this opinion, and I base upon it the requirement that the symbolic language of

arithmetic must be expanded into logical symbolism (G & B, 'F & c', 30/KS 132.)

The clarification of the notion of a concept was intended to give a firm

foundation to those objects logically associated with concepts (their

FREGE ON TRUTH 119

"extensions") with which in Foundations, driven by grammatical con-

siderations and his logicist goal, Frege wanted to identify the numbers.

The extension of a concept was understood as the course of values or

graph, obtained by providing all objects one by one as arguments for the

concept (function) and taking the resulting truth values as values. The

whole procedure, taken as a completed whole, was what Frege regarded

as a logical object. Since the introduction of such objects crucially

depended on Axiom V, which led to Russell's paradox, Frege's attempt

to clarify the notion of the extension of a concept by assimilating

concepts to functions failed.

The Redundancy Conception of Truth and the Notion of Object

I shall conclude our discussion of Frege's reasons for accepting Theses

(c) and (d) by considering his redundancy view of truth. In 'On Sense

and Denotation' he writes:

One might be tempted to regard the relation of the thought to the True not as that of

sense to denotation but rather as that of subject to predicate. One can, indeed, say: ''The

thought that 5 is a prime number, is true." But if one observes more closely, one notices

that really nothing more is thereby said than in the sentence '5 is a prime number.'

('S & R' G & B 641 KS 150). (Cf. also PPW 128-9, 233-4, 251-2, 255-61 NS

139-140,251-2,271-2,275-6; 'The Thought' Kl. 5141KS 347.)

Frege uses the view to ward off possible doubts about the postulation of

the truth values as objects denoted by all sentences, regardless of subject

matter. If truth were an attribute of a limited range of entities (thoughts),

it would be difficult to motivate the claim that every sentence denotes

one of the truth values and his view that (in a sense to be sharpened in

Section III) all assertive uses of sentences regardless of subject matter

are committed to the object truth.

In 'On Sense and Denotation', two large philosophical ideas emerge

in connection with the redundancy conception. One utilizes truth values

as objects in an account of assertion and judgment. The other bears on

scepticism. We shall consider these themes in turn.

Frege goes on from the passage just cited to argue that the claim or

judgment that a thought is true arises not from the predication of 'is

true' of a thought, since the sentences 'the thought that 5 is prime is true'

and '5 is prime' express the same thought regardless of whether they are

used with or without assertive force. Truth claims or judgments depend

120 TYLER BURGE

on the combination of the form of a declarative sentence with its "usual

force." Frege thinks that such truth claims are indicative of the real

relation between a sentence or thought and its truth value. (G & B

'S & R' 65/ KS 150). Judgments are "advances from thoughts to truth

values." Since truth claims and judgments cannot be represented in

subject-predicate form, the relation of a sentence or thought to its truth

value cannot be regarded as that of subsumption of a thought (sentence)

under a property. Frege proposes that the appropriate relation is that of

a sentence or thought to its denotation. (Cf. also PPW 128-9, 233-4,

251-2/NS 139-40, 252-3, 271-2.)

One need hardly note that considered as an argument for Thesis (d),

this is pretty weak. (It is doubtful that Frege intended it as such.) One

could respond that on Frege's own account, two sentences could have

the same assertive force - both could count as assertions - while one

lacked a truth value and the other had one. So truth values' as objects

cannot be essential to the account of assertive force. Even if this reply is

not decisive, Frege does not show why it is not.

I think Frege was here again thinking analogically. Normally, the

point of using names was to secure a denotation, a bearer, to relate a

mode of presentation to an object. Normally, the point of using sen-

tences, what "matters to us," is to claim truth for a thought. The object,

in the sense of the point or objective, of sentence use was truth. It is

illuminating therefore to see truth as an object. There is more than a

suggestion of this reasoning when Frege writes:

The designation of truth values as objects may here appear as arbitrary fancy or perhaps

a mere play on words, out of which no profound consequences could be drawn. What I

call an object can be more exactly articulated only in connection with concept and

relation .... But so much should already be clear, that in every judgment, no matter how

trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the level of denotations (the objective) has

already been taken. (G & B, 'S & R', 63-41 KS 149)

The parenthetical phrase is the key to the passage.

To many this reasoning may seem indeed to rely on a mere pun on

the word 'object'. I think that there is more to it than that. Both the

relevant objective of sentence use, truth, and objects that are denoted by

terms are for Frege mind-independent. And in some sense they are what

sentences and terms are respectively "about." (In fact, as Frege empha-

sizes in his arguments for (a) and (b), objects are of interest to us

because and only because of the objective of assertion and judgment.)

FREGE ON TRUTH 121

Both points resist simple or quick put-downs. Both mind independence

and being the topic of a discourse are involved in traditional explica-

tions, stemming from Aristotle, of the notion of object.

I am not suggesting that the analogies between the "objects" of terms

and the "object" (objective) of sentence use provide a sound argument

for Frege's assimilation. I believe the contrary. In fact, I believe not only

that the analogies are not compelling, but also that Frege's redundancy

view of truth,which motivates them, is untenable. (Part of the reason for

this untenability lies in the semantical paradoxes; cf. Section III.) Rather,

what I am suggesting is how Frege might have come to see the analogy

as intuitively attractive, given his view that the attribution of truth added

nothing to a thought. We shall further articulate Frege's analogy

between objects and the objective of assertion, in Section III.

Frege puts Thesis (d) and the redundancy view of truth to use as a

weapon against the sceptic about an objective world. Frege writes that

the True and the False "are recognized, if only implicitly, by everybody

who judges something to be true - and so even by the sceptic" (G & B,

'S & R 63/KS 149). (Frege assumes contrary to the legends about

Pyrrho, but probably correctly, that no sceptic suspends all judgments.)

The idea is that every act of judgment aims at truth and presupposes

some discrimination between truth and falsity. Frege explicates the point

by his redundancy thesis: truth values are not a property of thought,

where thoughts constitute one subject matter among many: "What

distinguishes [truth] from all other predicates is that it is always asserted

when anything at all is asserted." (PPW 129/ NS 140.) Since the true is

an object logically associated with the truth predicate and so with

judgment - a logical, mind-independent object - , judgment itself

presupposes an objective world. We shall sharpen Frege's point in

Section III. I think that one could probably dispense with the implausibi-

lities of the redundancy view to provide the sort of premise needed for

joining with (d) in order to defeat the relevant sceptic. If only (d) were

true!

Godel remarked that Frege held the view that all true sentences have

the same denotation "in an almost metaphysical sense" (Godel 1964,

214). It is true that Frege puts the doctrine to use against the sceptic.

There is no question but that he thought of truth as an object. And there

are some unfortunate, but qualified and never repeated remarks in 'On

Sense and Denotation' about parts of the True (G & B, 'S & R' 65/ KS

122 TYLER BURGE

150-1) - remarks that prompted G6del (inappropriately, I think) to

compare Frege's view with Parmenides'. But if the reasons for a view

may be seen as an index of its character, Frege's doctrine cannot

comfortably be called metaphysical. The brunt of his case for (d) rests

on the formal simplifications the view effects within his logical theory

and the clarification it was supposed to yield for the notion of the

extension of a concept. With the discovery of Russell's paradox, the

latter support was undermined, leaving only the former.

It is interesting that in his post-paradox period, Frege cites only

considerations of simplification (for example, the congeniality of the

view with the Composition Principle (1 in favor of Thesis (d). In his

epistolary responses to Russell's doubts he remains doggedly within the

elegant confines of his logical theory - repeatedly employing the

composition principle and pointing out difficulties in Russell's vague but

seminal alternatives. In 1906 at the beginning of the scrap 'What May I

regard as the Result of my Work?', he cites "a concept construed as a

function" and introduces the citation with the remark, "It is almost all

tied up with the Begriffsschrift" (PPW 184/NS 200). In his late writings

he gives up on the notion of the extension of a concept, and in 'The

Thought' (1918) the arguments against scepticism make no use of truth

values.

Once Frege's intra-logical analogies are appreciated, there is, I think,

no need other than momentary expositional convenience to treat sen-

tences as of the same logical type as names. One may maintain in one's

semantical theory a reflection of the large differences in use between

sentences and terms. And one may return to the natural view that terms,

not including sentences, are the basic avenue of ontological commit-

ment.

The primary reason why Frege did not take this more modern view

of the matter in his great, pre-paradox writings is that he wanted to use

the truth values in his account of logical objects. Logical objects were

needed for his logicist project - the project of showing that the mathe-

matics of number is reducible to logic. For mathematics was apparently

committed to objects, the numbers; and to account for these commit-

ments Frege thought he had to generate commitments to appropriate

sorts of objects within logic. The truth values were the basic logical

objects from which all others were to be generated. (Cf. Section III.)

By roughly 1906, however, Frege seems to have given up logicism'.

So the most prominent philosophical motivation for postulating logical

FREGE ON TRUTH 123

objects lapsed. The doctrine that truth values are objects may have

become less important to him in his later years. He does not give up the

view, however. And I suspect that in addition to analogical or pragmatic

considerations, he retained a philosophical motive for holding it. This

motive was his desire to explicate the objectivity and informativeness of

logic - its "descriptive" as well as normative character. (Cf. Note 3 and

Section III.) Although I shall not discuss it here, I think that this motive

is profoundly conceived. But after the failure of Frege's logicist project,

the attempt to utilize the truth values as means to articulate the motive

was deprived of a coherent background theory within which to bring

together a conception of truth with a conception of logical objects. So

Frege is left without a theory within which he could argue for using

Thesis (d) to articulate his thoroughly unKantian view that logic is an

informative science of "being" (K150S1 KS 342).

We have briefly touched on Frege's view about logical objects in our

discussions of his attempt to clarify the notion of the extension of a

concept, his argument against the sceptic, and his conception of the

nature of logic. We shall return to them in Section Ill. But first, I want to

consider an influential body of thought that seems to me to have placed

Frege's views on truth values in the wrong light. This discussion will

enable us to develop further Frege's conception of truth, a conception

that will dominate our concluding reflections on logical objects.

II

In his two books on Frege, Michael Dummett maintains, as against

Theses (c) and (d), that sentences are not names, and truth values are

not objects. As is plain, I do not dispute this conclusion. It is the

reasoning behind Dummett's rejection of these theses, and the urgency

with which he invests that rejection, that constitute, in my opinion, a

serious misrepresentation of FregeY

We have already quoted Dummett's statement that Frege's accept-

ance of Theses (c) and (d) was an almost unmitigated disaster. For,

Dummett writes,

... it obscured the crucial fact that the utterance of a sentence, a complex term ... can

be used to effect a linguistic act, to make an assertion, give a command ... the general

notion of the sense of a word will now have to be taken to consist in the contribution

which that word makes to determining what a complex singular term, in which it may

occur, stands for, rather than what are the truth-conditions of a sentence in which it may

occur. (FPL, 7)

124 TYLER BURGE

If sentences are merely a special case of complex proper names, ... then, after all,

there is nothing unique about sentences: whatever was thought to be special about them

should be ascribed, rather, to proper names - complete expressions - in general. This

was the most disastrous of the effects of the misbegotten doctrine that sentences are a

species of complex name ... : to rob him of the insight that sentences playa unique role,

and that the role of almost every other linguistic expression ... consists in its part in

forming sentences. (FPL, 196; cf. 643-5)

Dummett takes the adoption of Thesis (c) to underlie the relative

inconspicuousness, in Frege's later work, of statements of the context

principles, statements which had been so prominent in The Foundations

of Arithmetic (p. x, and Sections 60, 62, 106). Dummett's idea is that

since Frege's assimilated sentences to complex singular terms, he

"debarred himself from a direct statement of the context principle, since

this would have involved acknowledging a difference in logical role, of

utmost importance, between sentences and proper names of objects

other than truth-values" (IFP, 371). Dummett cites Frege's conclusion to

Section 10 of The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (cf. also Sections 29, 31-2)

as evidence that only a weakened, generalized analog of the context

principle for denotation was still adhered to: The denotations of terms

are fixed when it has been determined for every primitive function

[whether a concept or not] what the value of the function is to be for the

denotations of any terms as argument(s) (IFP, 408ft). In this principle

sentences and predication are given no special prominence over terms

and ordinary functional application. Dummett goes on to question the

coherence of the resulting doctrine.

Now there is much in Dummett's discussion that we cannot take time

to go into. The context principles form an exceedingly complex topic.

Despite my disagreement on some fundamental matters in this area, I

think that Dummett has contributed a great deal to our understanding of

the issues. Here I shall concentrate on disagreements that bear most

directly on truth values.

There is evidence that Frege did not lose sight of the "crucial fact"

that the utterance of a sentence, unlike a term, can be used to make

assertion; that he did not draw the unsound inference Dummett does

that "if sentences are merely a special case of proper names ... then,

after all, there is nothing unique about sentences ... "; and that Frege

was never robbed of the insight "that sentences playa unique role."

In the first place, there are a great number of passages throughout his

career and especially from the 1890's onward, in which Frege asserts

FREGE ON TRUTH 125

that the aim of logic is to understand the laws of truth (PPW 2-3,

128-9, 149, 197-8, 252, 253/NS 2-3, 139-40, 161, 212-13, 272,

273; Kl 505ff/ KS 342ff). He repeatedly characterizes these laws as

normative restrictions on judgment and assertion. Predications of truth

are not really distinguishable from the assertoric form of any declarative

sentence at all (PPW 129, 2331NS 140,251; cf. our discussion, Section

I, of the redundancy theory of truth.) Once he writes that the essence of

logic lies in assertoric, or judgmental, force (PPW 252/NS 272). The

vehicle of judgment is a thOUght and the vehicle of assertion (the

expression of a judgment) is a sentence (PPW 126, 131, 206/NS 157,

142,222-3). Thus the essence and aim of logic is repeatedly associated

with sentences and thoughts (the senses of declarative sentences) and

their logically relevant uses. The denotations of terms are almost never

discussed except in the larger context of this emphasis on the centrality

of truth, judgments, thought, assertion, and sentencehood. And in

Frege's last years, the denotations of terms receive very little attention

at all.

Moreover, there are the passages from the 1890's and later, quoted

in Section I, that occur in Frege's arguments for Theses (a) and (b)

(G & B, 'S & R' 631KS 149; Cor. 152, 158, 163n, 1651BW235, 240,

245n, 165; PPW232/ NS 250-1). These repeatedly and explicitly make

the point that the denotations of terms are of interest to us only because

of our interest in the denotations, in fact the truth values, of sentences.

Indeed, the remarks constitute a fair approximation to the slogan of

Foundations that only in the context of a sentence do words have a

Bedeutung.

Further, the implication of the same passages is that our interest and

confidence in the truth of sentences that contain terms justifies our

interest and confidence in the terms' having the denotations that they

are commonly taken to have. This implication appears to echo and

perhaps even sharpen the motivation for one of the uses to which Frege

put his contextualism in Foundations (Sections 60, 62) - defending

ontological commitment to objects (numbers) in the absence of an

intuitive, imagistic, or causal relation to them. Only the general prin-

ciple underlying this use is suggested in the argument for Theses (a) and

(b). But it is clearly indicated: ontological commitment to the denotation

of terms is justified insofar as we are justified in acknowledging the

truth of sentences that contain them. It is noteworthy that these develop-

ments of Frege's contextualist thinking occur in arguments for Theses

126 TYLER BURGE

(a) and (b), which are in turn embedded in arguments for Theses (c) and

(d) - the very theses that Dummett holds prevented Frege from main-

taining the prominence of sentences in his contextualist principles.

What then are we to say of the considerations Dummett draws from

The Basic Laws of Arithmetic to support his view that Theses (c) and (d)

undermined Frege's commitment to the centrality of sentences in logical

theory? Let us begin with the passage Dummett cites from Section 10 of

Basic Laws that states a weakening of the context principle, one that

gives no special prominence to sentences. What Frege writes is as

follows:

With this we have determined the courses of values so far as is here possible. As soon as

there is a further question of introducing a function that is not completely reducible to

already familiar functions, we can lay down what value it is to have for courses of values

as arguments; and this can then be regarded as much as a determination of the courses

of values as of that function.

A similar passage occurs in Section 29:

A proper name has a denotation if the proper name that results from that name's filling

the argument places of a denoting name of a first-level function with one argument

always has a denotation, and if the name of a first-level function of one argument that

results from the relevant proper name's filling the of a denoting name

of a first-level function with two arguments always has a denotation, and if the same

holds also for the t-argument-places.

These remarks do indeed state a kind of context principle for fixing

term denotation - one that does not give prominence to sentences.

First-level concepts are not singled out from among the first-level

functions. (Part of the reason for this derives from a particular problem

that Frege raises in Section 10 about the interpretation of his Axiom V.

I shall not go into this point here since it would require substantial

stage-setting.)

Although the principles just quoted do not give prominence to

predication over functional application, or to sentences over terms, they

are unquestionably compatible with the view that ultimately it is the use

of a subclass of "terms," the sentences, that counts in justifying interest

in term denotation and confidence in identifying the denotations of

course-of-value terms. Dummett is right to note that Frege does not

explicitly draw this distinction in Basic Laws. He is probably also right

in holding that Frege's not doing so is partly explained by his commit-

FREGE ON TRUTH 127

ment to counting sentences as falling in the same syntacial category as

terms. But it does not follow that Frege had lost sight of the philosophi-

cal motivations underlying the formal system that he repeatedly stated

in other writings during the same period. The circumstance bespeaks a

lack of perspicuousness in the formal system - the price of the various

economies Frege prized. But it does not evince a major philosophical

turn away from the centrality of sentences, ultimately judgment, in

motivating logical theory.

I think that the main reason Frege gives no special prominence to

sentences over terms in Sections 10 and 29 is that to make intelligible

the primacy of concepts (or predication) in fixing term denotation, he

would have had to have entered on an excursus into his philosophy of

language. Such an excursus would have been incongruous in the context

of the book as whole, where philosophical discussion was held to a mini-

mum. The strategy of Basic Laws is ruthlessly to suppress discussion

of philosophical ideas and motivations, except where they are essential

to understanding the formal system and the proofs themselves, or where

they bear directly on mathematical practice (as in the case of the discus-

sions of definition and consistency). Where philosophical ideas intrude,

they are presented tersely and in summary fashion. Except for the

polemical introduction, the book is steadfastly mathematical.

The chief consideration that Dummett relies upon for holding that (c)

and (d) undermined Frege's commitment to the centrality of sentences

in logical theory is that "the whole thrust of [Frege's] logical doctrines"

was "to recognize no difference in the kind of logical powers that

different expressions have save as were explicable by a difference in

logical type" (IFP, 371-2). Since by Thesis (c), sentences and terms are

of the same logical type, it follows that they can have no difference in

logical power. Dummett admits that Frege never states such a principle.

But he holds, "it is implicit in his whole procedure; nothing could

illustrate it more aptly than the fact that, in the logical system of

Grundgesetze, no distinction exists between sentential and individual

variables ... " (IFP, 372).

The evidence of the numerous passages that we cited six paragraphs

back indicates that this principle must be severely qualified. Although

sentences and terms are of the same logical type, according to Frege,

some properties in which they differ are of direct and primary impor-

tance to logic. Sentences can make assertions and express judgments;

terms cannot. The semantical properties of terms are of interest to us

128 TYLER BURGE

only because of our interest in the seman tical properties and use of

sentences and thoughts. There is no reason for thinking that Frege

wanted to deny or suppress these points in his philosophical writings.

As we have seen they are prominent in his post-Foundations work.

In fact, sentences and terms are not everywhere interchangeable even

within the formal system Frege presents in Basic Laws. So in a further

sense, they do not have the same "logical powers" despite the fact that

they are of the same "logical type." Only sentences can follow the

vertical judgment stroke in Frege's syntax; ordinary terms cannot. This

important point requires detailed explication. I shall develop it by

reference to a further consideration that Dummett adduces in favor of

his view.

Dummett notes that whereas in the Begriffsschrift there is a restriction

in the formation rules against placing the horizontal or content stroke

before anything other than an expression with judgeable content -

anything other than a sentence - , in Basic Laws this restriction is

relaxed. In the latter book, the horizontal may occur before any term (or

sentence) yielding "a name of a truth value, of the True if the original

expression named the True and of the False in all other cases" (IFP,

371). Dummett does not explain what he takes the significance of this

fact to be. But it may suggest to the unwary that Frege's system was set

up so as to allow one to "judge" (impossibly) the contents of terms. For

example, both '- 5' and 'IT 5' are grammatical expression in Frege's

logic, where the shorter vertical line in the latter expression represents

negation. (Cf. the end of Basic Laws, Section 6.)

This reasoning would be quite mistaken. (I do not claim that

Dummett employs it.) In fact, Frege's use of the horizontal in Basic

Laws constitutes one of the subtleties of the book that suggest that

Frege was keeping his philosophical motivations in mind. 1 do not see

that the use supports Dummett's view in any way. To begin with,

although the horizontal may apply to ,any name, it is itself a concept

expression: a function from objects to truth values, as Frege explains

(BL, Section 6). Informally, the horizontal means "is the True:" Concept

expressions are predicates and concepts are the denotations of senten-

tial parts (e.g. PPW 119, 1931NS 129, 210). Thus the expression' - 5' is

a sentence, though a false one. It says that 5 is the True. ' IT 5' represents

an assertion that 5 is'not the true.

Now the vertical judgment stroke can be applied only to the hori-

zontal, content stroke. So it is built into Frege's system, however

FREGE ON TRUTH 129

discretely, that only sentences, not ordinary terms, may be asserted.

Only the senses of sentences, thoughts, may be marked as judged. Frege

himself makes the point:

I distinguish the judgment from the thought in this way: by a judgment I understand the

acknowledgement of the truth of a thought. The presentation in the concept script

(begriffsschriftliche Darstellung) of a judgment by use of the sign" f- ", I call a statement

(Satz) of the concept script, or briefly a statement .... Of the two signs of which" f-" is

composed, only the judgment stroke contains the act of assertion (BL, Section 5).

Judgments acknowledge the truth of a thought, and thoughts are said,

over and over again throughout the period and afterward, to be charac-

teristically expressed by declarative sentences: 'The proper means of

expression of a thought is a sentence' (1897) (PPW 126, 131/NS, 137,

142-3). (Cf. also PPW 129, 138, 167, 174, 197-8,206,216, 243/NS

140,150,182,189,213-14,222-3,234,262; KI'The Tho't' 5111KS

345; G & B'S & R' 64/ KS 150 etc.)IO

The result of attaching the judgment stroke to a sentential expression,

begun by the horizontal, asserts something, but it is not a term: "The

judgment stroke cannot be used to construct a functional expression; for

it does not serve, in conjunction with other signs, to designate an object:

, I- 2 + 3 = 5' does not designate anything; it asserts something."

(G & B, 'F & C, 34/KS 137) The vertical, judgment stroke is not a

function sign, but is the sign of an act - judgment or assertion - , an act

that applies only to thoughts or sentences. (This is why one cannot

substitute a singular term denoting truth for the sentence beginning with

the horizontal in the expression' I- 2 + 3 = 5' (which would yield the

ungrammatical 'I the True').) It is here that the distinction between

sentences and terms finds its representation within Basic Laws. I I

The change regarding the grammar of the horizontal that Frege

makes between Begriffsschrift and Basic Laws is partly motivated by the

grammatical assimilation of sentences to terms. But this motivation is

less important than one might think. For in one sense the grammatical

assimilation of sentences to terms was already present in Begriffsschrift.

Insofar as this is so, the view that adoption of the position effected a

major change in Frege's later philosophy of language is rendered further

implausible. In Begriffsschrift Section 3, Frege writes:

A language is imaginable in which the sentence 'Archimedes perished at the capture of

Syracuse' would be expressed in the following way: 'the violent death of Archimedes at

the capture of Syracuse is a fact'. Here one can, if one wishes, distinguish subject and

130

TYLER BURGE

predicate; but the subject contains the whole content, and the only purpose of the

predicate is to present this as a judgment. Such a language would have only a single

predicate for all judgments, namely 'is a fact' .... Such a language is our Begriffsschrift,

and the sign' I- ' is its common predicate for all judgments.

Here Frege is primarily intending to make the point that the subject-

predicate distinction of natural language has no comparable importance

in his logical theory. But the passage also indicates a more radical point

of view that the "content" of the first sentence can be completely

captured by the subject, a term, in the second. The sign 'f--' is seen in

Begriffsschrift as a predicate that adds nothing to the content of the term

to which it applies. This viewpoint contains more than the germ of

Frege's later commitments to the grammatical assimilation of sentences

to terms and to the redundancy conception of truth.

The changes from this position in Begriffsschrift to his later stance in

Basic Laws are fairly easy to separate out. In the first place, Frege more

clearly distinguished in the sign 'f--' an element corresponding to

jUdgmental force and an element corresponding to the expression 'is a

fact' or 'is a truth'. (The running together of force with semantical

attribution occurs elsewhere in the Begriffsschrift. Cf. for example the

semantics given in Section 5.) Thus, the vertical judgment stroke repre-

sents judgmental force, and the horizontal alone comes to represent a

semantical predicate, such as 'is a fact' or 'is true'. Presumably this

distinction is accompanied by the rejection in 'Function and Concept' of

the Begriffsschrift view that the sign' f-- ' is a predicate (G & B, 'F & C'

34/KS 137 - quoted above). On the other hand, the horizontal, taken

alone, is a predicate whose meaning is similar to that of 'is a fact'.

Distinguishing force from predication in the sign 'f--' probably

made it easier for Frege to relax the Begriffsschrift restriction against

following the sign' f-- ' with anything but a judgeable content. What was

asserted need not be just what followed the horizontal, it could be the

predication of the horizontal onto what followed it. As I have noted

earlier, Frege had already in Begriffsschrift come to view predicates as

function signs (Section 9). Given that he was also already treating the

grammar and "content" of sentences as equivalent to that of terms that

nominalize those sentences, it may have seemed a small step to allow

the horizontal to be functionally applicable to all terms, simple and

complex, clausal and nonclausal. The vertical judgment stroke could still

only apply to sentences, the expression of somethingjudgeable.

FREGE ON TRUTH 131

What seems to be the large step in this development, in addition to

the distinction between force and predication, is the semantical clarifi-

cation that Frege achieved. The semantical standpoint developed in

Theses (c)-(d) in effect answered the question of what the arguments

and values of the horizontal should be. The redundancy conception of

truth is the natural offspring of this semantical development and the

viewpoint expressed in Begriffsschrift Section 3. The universal predicate

'is a fact' gives way to the universal predicate 'is the true'. But in neither

case does the predicate add to the "content" (sense) of what followsP

The predicate does not change the sense (or denotation) of the results of

ordinary predication.

Thus the grammatical change in the restrictions on the horizontal

between the Begriffsschrift and Basic Laws is not really a change from

allowing only sentences to occur to allowing terms to occur. It is from

allowing only the occurrence of terms that nominalize sentences to

allowing all terms. Thesis (c) played a role in motivating this change. But

the developments associated with the changed use of ' 1-' that seem

most significant are different. The significant developments are Frege's

drawing the semantical consequences of viewing predication as func-

tional application (not the mere viewing of predication as functional

application, which is already present in Begriffsschrift), and the clear

distinction between judgmental force and predication. This latter devel-

opment, and the prominence Frege gave to truth and judgment in

motivating logical theory, undermine any claim that the grammatical

assimilation of sentences to terms deprived him of his insight into the

basic role of sentences in logical theory.

III

The claim that truth values are objects inevitably suggested to Frege the

question 'Which objects?' A parallel question had arisen in The Foun

dations of Arithmetic, once it had been concluded that numbers were

objects. Frege was sensitive to the initial possibility that the answer to

the latter question might be no other than 'why, the numbers - 0, 1, 2

.. .' Similarly, the truth values might tum out to be specifiable only as

truth and falsity. But Frege's belief in logicism drove him to seek a

different answer in the case of numbers. Similar forces were at work in

his views on truth values.

132 TYLER BURGE

In The Basic Laws of Arithmetic the truth values are identified with

particular logical objects, particular extensions of concepts. The reason-

ing behind this identification is the subject of this final section. Our

discussion of this subject must be more conjectural than that of Theses

(a)-(d) because Frege wrote very little directly about it. Nevertheless,

by piecing together different strands of his views, it is possible, I think,

to weave a pattern that has some interest, and even a kind of blemished

beauty.

One reason why Frege's reasoning is interesting is that it sheds light

on his conception of logical objects. Another is that it is critical to

assessing what sort of realism Frege maintained with regard to such

objects, and with regard to numbers. Each of these issues is quite

difficult and complicated. I shall begin with some very rudimentary

background for the realism issue.

A common and straightforward story about Frege's realism goes as

follows:

Frege believed that the numbers were genuine, existing abstract objects. He thought,

however, that number theory was reducible to logic. He proceeded to try to show this by

constructing a logic containing a version of set theory. He gave definitions, within the

logic, of the primitive expressions of number theory, and tried to derive the axioms and

theorems of number theory within his logic. Since he had a realist attitude toward the

ontologies of the languages of both number theory and logic, and since he regarded

numbers as particular objects, he thought that there was but one way to construct the

definitions of numerical expressions within his version of set theory. As it turned out

Frege's set theory is inconsistent; and for any viable set theory there are an infinite

number of ways of defining arithmetic within it. So even if his set theory had been

consistent and even granting that set theory is logic, Frege's logicism and his realism

about the numbers are, if not incompatible, at least deeply at odds.

There is much that is right about this familiar recitation. But it seems

to me misleading in some fundamental ways. The first derives from

Frege's attitude toward all language other than his own concept script. It

is well known that Frege thought that natural language was defective for

the purpose of expressing thOUght. But he also thought the same of

mathematics itself. Within mathematics, the problem was partly just that

the language had not been given logical form. But vagueness was also a

problem. Frege repeatedly notes that the content or sense of the term

'number' is not adequately or sharply grasped by even the most com-

petent mathematicians. Other fundamental, long-standing arithmetical

terms are afflicted by vague usage. In the first section of The

Foundations of Arithmetic, he writes:

FREGE ON TRUTH 133

The concepts of function, continuity, limit and infinity have been shown to stand in need

of sharper determination. Negative and irrational numbers, which had long since been

admitted into science, have had to undergo closer scrutiny of their credentials. In all

directions these same ideals can be seen at work - rigor of proof, precise delimitation of

extent of validity, and as a means to this, sharp grasp of concepts.

13

In the introduction to the book, referring indirectly to the concept of

number, Frege writes, 'Often it is only after immense intellectual effort,

which can continue over centuries, that a concept is successfully recog-

nized in its purity, stripped of foreign coverings that hid it from the eye

of the intellect' (p. vii). (Cf. KS 122.) Clothing, covering, veiling are

standard Fregean metaphors for the interferences of language in

thought. This theme runs throughout the book. Indeed, the book may be

fruitfully read as an attempt to remedy the inadequacies of language

(primarily mathematical language) for ideally rational conceptualization

and thought. If one substitutes 'perception' for 'language', one has the

schema for the traditional rationalist program for freeing the intellect

from non-rational factors.

Any number of senses and denotations were compatible with the

conventional significance of vague terms. It is clear that Frege thought

that conventional mathematical usage left mathematical terms vague.

That is, what a conventionally competent speaker masters does not fix a

definite sense or denotation. Frege thought that his logicist program was

required to uncover the senses and denotations of number words. So

strictly speaking, defining arithmetical terminology is not a matter of

capturirig linguistic meaning as we commoly understand it, but of

uncovering supplementations of such meaning so that the terminology

can be seen to have a definite sense and denotation. Sense lay beyond or

beneath conventional significance. (These points are discussed and

substantiated in some detail in Burge, 1984.)

It would be a mistake to infer from this point that Frege held that

defining numerical terminology involved stipulating meanings for it.

The definitions had to respect mathematical practice. Moreover, I think

it plausible that Frege thought that only one set of definitions (his)

respected all relevant philosophical considerations. Frege's point is that

by merely understanding the linguistic meaning of ordinary mathemati-

cal language, by being a competent participant in the conventions

governing it, one did not thereby attain a completely adequate grasp of

numerical concepts; one did not thereby secure completely definite

denotations for number words.

134 TYLER BURGE

Thus if Frege did think that there was a single, correct set of logicist

definitions, it was not because the ordinary conventional meaning of

mathematical language and standard mathematical practice allowed only

one such set. Since mathematical usage was vague, it admitted of

many sharpenings. Rather the unique propriety of a set of logicist

definitions would have to depend partly on philosophical considera-

tions, considerations attendent on the logicist program.

Thus Frege's realism about the ontology of ordinary mathematics is

more subtle and qualified than the familiar narrative spun above

suggests. His realist attitude toward the language of mathematics is tied

to and supplemented by the assumption that his logical theory gives a

proper account of the objects and Junctions in the mathematical world.

Even with respect to his logical language, his realism is not com-

pletely unqualified. Not every logical constituent of the language corre-

sponds to an item in reality. For example, the function sign negation

does not in general correspond to a thought component. (PPW 149-50,

185, 1981NS 161-2, 201, 214; Cf., however, G & B "N" 131-21KS

374-5).

Nevertheless, Frege thought of his logic as a tool for discovering the

nature of the mind-independent world, at least that portion of the world

with which mathematics was concerned: " ... The mathematician cannot

create something at will, any more than a geographer can; he too can

only discover what is there and name it" (FA 107-8). The theme runs

through Foundations, his correspondence with Hilbert, and his attack

on the formalists; it emerges in the introduction to Basic Laws, and it

recurs in his late writings. Functions, thoughts, and (at least until the

despair over Russell's paradox) courses of values are among the charter

members of the mind-independent world. Although this traditional

"realist" interpretation has been questioned now and again, I think it

fundamentally secure and will not argue for it in general terms here.

14

A second way in which the familiar account of Frege's realism that I

recited above is misleading concerns the references to set theory. I will

not go into this complicated and somewhat obscure matter here. (I have

discussed it in Burge, 1984.) I will just say bluntly that it is a

mistake to think of Frege's theories of courses of values and extensions

of concepts primarily in terms of what we now know as set theory. This

is not because Frege's theory turned out inconsistent. It is because- he

consciously and repeatedly argued against the basic intuitions that

underlie the iterative conception of sets, and because the fundamental

FREGE ON TRUTH 135

intuitions underlying his own theory have only scattered echoes in

mainstream set theory and even in the various nonstandard versions.

The question of whether and in what sense Frege's logicism and his

realism about numbers are affected by the multiplicity of models of

arithmetic within set-theory is clearly bound up with these matters.

This is a question that I shall not attempt to settle here.

If Frege's extensions of concepts were thought of set-theoretically,

the axiom of foundation would be everywhere violated. This is a prime

reason for feeling queasy about the set-theoretic explication. This reason

is a corollary of a more fundamental one - the primacy for Frege of

concepts over classes, or courses of values. It is better to think of

extensions of concepts visually in terms of a geometrically represented

graph, or yet better as the total (abstract) event of matching each of the

arguments with their truth values, one by one. Needless to say, these

heuristics give one only a vague start at the notion. (As logical objects,

extensions of concepts were not supposed to be dependent for their

conception on intuition or vision.) Frege never achieved a dear con-

ception of extensions of concepts that accorded with his philosophical

and mathematical preconceptions. It is arguable that no one else has

either. So we must be willing sometimes to grope along in the dim

afterglow of Russell's devastating paradox if we are to follow the course

of his reasoning.

The common thrust of the two main caveats that we have entered in

the familiar story about Frege's realism is that we need to be sensitive to

the role of his philosophical considerations, beyond what we now think

of as standard mathematical (arithmetical and set-theoretic) practice, in

assessing the character and plausibility of Frege's realism about mathe-

matical and logical objects.

How do truth values figure in all of this? They are fundamental in

Frege's notion of the extensions of concepts, a subset of which consti-

tutes the primary logical objects. Since concepts are functions from

arguments to truth values, and extensions of concepts are courses of

such values, the truth values chart the courses. Since the numbers are

certain extensions of concepts and since truth values thus figure essen-

tially in the ontology of the numbers, consideration of them is insepar-

able from consideration of Frege's realism about numbers.

But there is a more specific reason for ontological interest in truth

values. Frege identifies not only the numbers but the truth values

themselves with courses of values, extensions of concepts. Frege indi-

136 TYLER BURGE

cates that his identification of the truth values with the specific courses

of values he chooses in Section 10 of Basic Laws is arbitrary relative to

the axioms of his logical theory. Any other choice would have been

equally consistent with those axioms. Getting straight what Frege means

in this passage, which we shall scrutinize shortly, is critical for under

standing his whole philosophical standpoint.

On its face, the passage in Section 10 of Basic Laws suggests that

Frege's theory of truth had a large stipulative component. It also

suggests that Frege's ontology of the numbers contains a massive dose

of arbitrariness, and that he was aware of this. If these suggestions are

correct, then the traditional view of Frege's realism and of the intentions

governing his logicist project must suffer substantial qualification. For

different choices as to how to identify the truth values with extensions of

concepts would yield different accounts of which objects the numbers

are.

1S

I believe that these initially plausible suggestions are mistaken.

Although I shall stop short of a general discussion of how Frege

regarded his definitions of the numbers, I shall argue that his identifica

tions of the truth values were, and were known to be, not in the least

arbitrary, but supported by reasons. To understand these reasons, we

must consider the philosophical context in which Frege conceived his

logicist program. The reasons are not narrowly mathematical. Their

failure to appear in Basic Laws accords with the predominantly mathe

matical emphasis of the book.

In Section 10 of Basic Laws Frege correctly argues, first, that

whether or not one or both truth values are courses of values and,

second, which courses of values they are, granted that they are courses

of values, is left completely undecided by the axioms of his logical

system (in particular by Axiom V). He concludes:

Thus without contradicting our setting 'tq,(e) = t'P(E)' equal [in denotation] to '(x)

(q,(x) = 'II (x,' it is always possible to stipulate th,!t an arbitrary course of values is to

be the True and an arbitrary different one, the False. Accordingly, let us lay down that t

(-e) is to be the True and that t(e = - (x) (x =' x is to be the False.

't4>(e) = l'(e)' is read 'the course of values of the concept 4> is

identical with the course of values of the concept lJI'; 't( -e), is read 'the

course of values of the concept is the True'; 't(e = - (x) (x = x))' is

read 'the course of values of the concept being identical with the truth

value of not all objects' being self-identical'. This passage certainly

appears to support the view that Frege's choice is a matter of stipulation.

FREGE ON TRUTH 137

And, of course, it is in two ways. The choice involves "stipulation"

relative to the commitments of natural language. As Frege often notes,

ordinary uses of 'true' and 'false' do not explicitly commit themselves to

truth values as objects at all. The commitment is promoted by logical

theory. Thus relative to natural language use, the identification of any

object as one of the truth values is arbitrary. Frege's choice also involves

stipulation relative to considerations of consistency with Axiom V, and

the other axioms of his system. Within a context in which mathematical

consistency is all that matters, the choice is arbitrary. But let us broaden

the context.

On numerous occasions outside of Basic Laws Frege holds that

consistency does not suffice for truth. Frege repeatedly defends this

view in opposition to early expressions of the model-theoretic viewpoint

toward mathematics. Frege's best known defenses of the view occur in

his correspondence with Hilbert (1895-1900) and in 'On the Foun-

dations of Geometry, I' (1903) (e.g. Cor 48/BW 75; FG, 25-37/KS

264-72). But the view is already quite explicit in 'On Formal Theories

of Arithmetic' (1885) (KS, 110). And it clearly guides the criticism of

formalism in the closing pages of Foundations (pp. 104-119).

These latter passages are particularly relevant to our theme.

16

Frege

notes that the denotation of 'the square root of -1' was not fixed by

mathematical usage prior to the advent in mathematics of complex

numbers (pp. 106-7, 11 On). He then ridicules the view that one can

simply introduce a denotation for the term by mere stipulation or

definition (pp. 107-8). One reason Frege gives is that even granted that

the purported definition is consistent, one is not thereby guaranteed that

there exists an object that satisfies the concepts used in the definition

(pp. 108ff.): in effect, consistency does not entail truth. A second reason

is that even if one succeeds in attaching the term to an object and even

if one stipulates meanings for the usual mathematical function signs

in application to this object that are compatible with those mathematical

principles that had been established prior to the introduction of com-

plex numbers, there might be philosophical considerations that militate

against the definition.

Let us elaborate the second reason in more detail since it bears

directly on the treatment of truth values in Basic Laws. Frege notes that

simultaneously with the introduction of new numbers, the meanings of

functional words like 'sum' and 'product' are extended. Suppose we

choose some object as the denotation of 'the square root of -1', say, the

Moon. So the moon multiplied by itself is -1: This explication seems to

138 TYLER BURGE

be permitted because the [denotation] of such a product does not at all

arise from the erstwhile denotation [Bedeutung] of multiplication, and

therefore in extending this erstwhile denotation it [the denotation of the

product] can be arbitrarily determined' (p. 110).17

Frege goes on to consider multiplication and addition as applied to

imaginary numbers, and in so doing capriciously takes the time interval

of one second, instead of the Moon, as the denotation of 'the square

root of -1'. He summarizes by saying, 'one is tempted to conclude: Thus

it is quite immaterial whether i denotes a second or a millimeter or

anything else, provided only that our laws of addition and multiplication

hold good; that alone is what matters; the rest need not trouble us' (p.

111).

Frege does not accept this position. One point he makes against it,

less interesting for our proposes, is that a contradiction may lurk

between the definitions and the rest of mathematical theory. There is no

evidence that Frege thought that the relevant definitions in fact lead to

contradiction. Frege's other objection is philosophical. By letting the

interval of a second be the denotation of 'the square root of -1',

we are bringing something quite foreign, time, into arithmetic. The second stands in

absolutely no intrinsic relation to the real numbers. Propositions proved with the aid of

complex numbers would be a posteriori judgments, or at least synthetic, unless we could

find some other proof for them, or some other [denotation) for i. We must at any rate

first make the attempt to show that all propositions of arithmetic are analytic (p. 112).

For two sections Frege develops the theme of not importing anything

foreign into arithmetic. And he ends the book by recapitulating it: by

explicitly defining the numbers as extensions of concepts, one can avoid

importing physical objects or geometrical intuitions into arithmetic (p.

119).

These sections of Foundations provide an initial clue to understand-

ing Frege's remarks about truth values in Section 10 of Basic Laws. Like

complex numbers, truth values are seen by Frege as introduced (recog-

nized) for theoretical reasons. Their introduction also extends previous

mathematical and natural-language usage. And a variety of ontological

choices are compatible with that usage. In showing that Axiom V does

not fix the denotation of the course of value notation (or of the expres-

sions 'the True', 'the False'), Frege is indicating, as he does in his attack

on Hilbert and the formalists, that the (partially interpreted) axioms of a

theory do not by themselves fix the objects of the theory (or the senses

FREGE ON TRUTH 139

of its terms). One must have an understanding of the senses and denota

tions of the terms used in the axioms that is not reducible to mere

commitment to the truth of the axioms taken as linguistic objects. (Cf.

Note 2 and the accompanying text in Section I.) In stating that the

stipulations as to the identity of the truth values are arbitrary relative to

previous usage and previously stated axioms, however, Frege is not

stating that his stipulations are arbitrary, absolutely speaking.

What we need now is to understand the reasons for the particular

identifications Frege proposes in Section 10 of Basic Laws. I shall

approach his position by a process of elimination. The Foundations

passages already make it clear why the truth values could not be

identified with physical, mental, or geometrical objects. The domain of

logic is universal, whereas these objects are the topics of special

sciences, and thus their natures are explicated in synthetic propositions

(Cf. Foundations, Section 3.) Moreover, physical and mental objects

exist contingently and are known by a posteriori methods. Logic encom

passes the necessary and is fundamentally a priori.

Similar considerations seem to rule out identifying truth values with

any course of values associated with a function or concept denoted by a

term that is a primitive of, or is definable with primitives of, one of the

special sciences. Thus the extension of the concept is a cat (is an image,

is a line) is inappropriate.

Truth values could not be identified with senses because of the

arguments of Thesis (b) that we considered in Section I. A corollary of

these arguments is that such identification would be inappropriate

because senses are denoted primarily in oblique contexts, whereas a

truth value is denoted in the expression of any thought. Since, by Thesis

(d) truth values are objects, and since Frege thought no function (or

concept) is an object, truth values could not be identified with functions.

These considerations leave Frege either with identifying truth values

with the course of values of some logical function or with not identifyinK

them with any courses of values, taking them rather as primitive,

"independent" logical objects.

We have been ruling out possible identifications by appeal to what is

foreign to logic. In order to proceed further, we need to recall what

Frege saw as essential to logic. Logic essentially concerns itself with the

laws of truth. As we have seen, Frege sharpened this claim by stating

that the laws of truth yielded those norms governing ideal assertions or

judgments (PPW 2521NS 272; Kl 507-SIKS 343). Truth was the

140 TYLER BURGE

"objective" of judgment; the most general laws governing this objective

formed the subject matter of logic. Thus the true is in a sense the most

basic logical object. We shall return to this point and sharpen it.

The conception of truth as the aim of logic informed Frege's view

that logic had an internal ordering. Logic is founded on the proposi-

tional calculus, or the calculus of truth values. Frege repeatedly empha-

sizes that one of his seminal contributions is to begin in logic with the

sentence and to derive an analysis of sentential parts and their various

semantical functions only in the context of a semantical analysis that

already features logical relations among sentences: the functional calculi

are built upon the calculus of truth values. We have cited various

passages to this effect in his arguments for the view that truth values are

the denotations of sentences (Theses (a) and (b. Frege also makes the

point in his earliest and latest writings (PPW 17, 253/NS 18-19,273).

The sense of an ordering within logic is perhaps most clearly enunciated

in a footnote Frege wrote in 1910 to Jourdain's chapter on Frege in a

history of mathematical logic:

To found the 'calculus of judgments' on the 'calculus of concepts' ... is to reverse the

correct order of things; for classes are something derived, and can only be obtained from

concepts (in my sense). But concepts are something primitive that cannot be dispensed

with in logic .... And the calculation with concepts is itself founded on the calculation

with truth-values (which is better than saying 'calculus of judgments') (Cor 192n!NS

287n).

The truth values are on the ground floor of logic - in the ontology of

the propositional calculus. They are a "subject matter" for all parts of

logic. In a sense to be explicated, truth is even more basic than falsity.

The laws of logic were for Frege "nothing other than an unfolding of the

content of the word 'true'" (PPW 3/NS 3; cf. Kl 507/KS 343).!Now

courses of values were supposed by Frege to be logical companions of

functions, and functions were denoted in all parts of logic. Prior to

discovery of the paradox, each function was thought to be accompanied

by its associated course of values. Logical objects such as courses of

values could be canonically specified only through denoting the

associated functions. Frege repeatedly emphasizes that (denoting) a

course of values is derivative from (denoting) a function. A function

sign denoted a function, but its use determined an associated course of

values. Frege seems to have regarded sentences containing function

signs as ontologically committed to their associated courses of values.

FREGE ON TRUTH 141

(See G & B 27, 49-50/ KS 130, 173; the point is also suggested in BL

4/001,7 and PPW123/NS 134.)

Since Frege saw logic as having a fixed order, his taking truth values

as part of the ontology of the propositional calculus meant that his

specification within logic of these objects could not depend on concepts

whose specification was conceptually derivative.

These considerations suggest an argument for taking truth, or the

True, to be specifiable in terms of a concept that is primitive within the

propositional calculus, assuming that truth is a course of values. Since all

logic is concerned with truth and is in fact the unfolding of the laws of

truth, and since truth is an object, truth must be ia the ontology of all

parts of logic - in particular the most fundamental part, the proposi-

tional calculus. For a course of values to be in the ontology of the

propositional calculus it is necessary and sufficient that it be specifiable

in terms of functions denoted in the propositional calculus. So assuming

that truth is a course of values, it must be specifiable in terms of

functions within the propositional calculus. The only such functions are

concepts.

One might worry about the argument, both as a reconstruction of

Frege and as a substantive proposal, by concentrating on the second

premise. Let us assume with Frege that to be specifiable at all, a course

of values must be specifiable in terms of its associated functions. But

why iS'it necessary, in order to be in the ontology of the propositional

calculus for a course of values to be specifiable in terms of functions

denoted by expressions in the propositional calculus? And is denoting

certain functions really sufficient for being onto logically committed to

their associated courses of values?

Of course, with the hindsight that we have gained from the semantical

and set-theoretic paradoxes, both questions can be pressed. And I

would not wish to defend a Fregean answer to either. It is arguable that

sometimes the ontological commitments of a language (say, those

involved in giving a semantical theory for it) are specifiable only in a

stronger metalanguage. And since Frege's Axiom V is inconsistent, it is

sometimes the case that commitment to a given function is not sufficient

for commitment to an associated extension (a course of values). This

problem makes it plausible to deny that in using function expressions

one has dual commitments, to a function and a course of values, even in

cases where there is an associated course of values. One can make one's

commitments separately. But these problems are bound up with larger

142 TYLER BURGE

problems concerning Frege's conceptions of truth and courses of values

- particularly with the inconsistency of his system. They do not under-

mine the argument we gave as an interpretation of Frege.

How would Frege answer the two questions about the second

premise? To the first, I think that he would reply that a language that

lacked the concepts (or could not denote the concepts) needed to

specify its ontology would be logically deficient. Such a language could

certainly not serve to express the fundamental part of logic. A logical

language that could not specify its own ontology would be dependent on

some other language to specify its primary subject matter, truth. Thus it

could not be the fundamental language for expressing the laws of truth.

But Frege regarded logic as an ideal language of thought; the fundamen-

tal part of that language should be complete for its own

purposes.

This point should be seen in the light of Frege's redundancy concep-

tion of truth. Frege believed that semantical discourse about a language

could add nothing to what could already be said in the language itself. It

is obvious that he did not anticipate the sorts of considerations that lead

us to be cautious about claims that a language must be able to specify its

own ontology.

The second question about the second premise of our argument is

less interesting insofar as it bears on the interpretation of Frege. The

truth values are in fact in the ontology of his propositional calculus and

they are in fact specifiable in terms of functions (concepts) that are

denoted in the propositional calculus. Since the truth values are courses

of values in his view, and since he thought courses of values could be

specified only in terms of their associated functions, it is hard to see any

ground for denying that he thought that being so specifiable was suffi-

cient for being in the ontology of the language. (For a discussion of texts

that suggest that Frege thought that language always carried dual

commitments to concepts and their associated extensions, see Burge,

1984, Sections III-IV.)

I have argued that Frege conceived truth as the subject matter of the

most basic part of logic, and that truth had to be specifiable by means

of the primitive predicates in the propositional calculus. Frege's con-

ception of an ordering within logic motivates a corollary restriction.

Truth should not be the extension of a concept (or course of values

of a function) whose specification is in any way conceptually deriva-

tive. Truth must be specifiable in terms of a concept whose own specifi-

FREGE ON TRUTH 143

cation need not presuppose other types of concepts. This consideration

would seem to rule out identifying truth any course of values of a

second-level function (including second-level concepts). For the second-

level functions are introduced in logic only after, and only in terms

of, first-level functions. The consideration also seems to rule out iden-

tifying truth with any course of values of a function, of any level,

whose canonical explication presupposes specification of

functions.

The effect of these exclusions is substantial. Two large categories of

logical objects are barred as candidates for being identified with the

truth values. First, the courses of values that are not extensions of

concepts are excluded. There is only one purely logical, primitive first-

level function sign that is not a concept sign, or predicate, in Frege's

logic. This is the description operator, and its explication presupposes

specification of the course-of-values operator, which is second-level (at

least!). Of course, the course of values associated with the course-of

-values function sign 'f' is excluded. For the function it denotes is (at

least) second level. A second category of logical objects that is excluded

consists of the extensions of concepts with which the numbers are

identified. For these are extensions of second-level concepts. In fact, the

definition of 'equinumerous', which is essential to specification of the

numbers, depends on second-order quantification - i.e. third level

concepts.

So, if the truth values are to be identified with courses of values at all,

and if Frege's philosophy of logic is to be respected, it appears that they

must be identified with the extensions of logical concepts that are first-

level. Such concepts ought to be denoted in the propositional calculus.

What underlies the path of exclusion that we have so far followed,

and indeed what guides us to our destination, is Frege's conception of

truth. The argument we have just given is rather speculative, considered

as an interpretation of Frege's own reasoning. The considerations that

follow are much less so.

Frege identifies truth (the True) with fe-e). '-', the horizontal,

denotes the concept that maps truth onto truth and everything else onto

falsity. Thus the horizontal denotes the concept under which only truth

falls. Truth is the extension, or course of values, of this concept. Falsity

is the extension of the concept under which only falsity falls.

Now this identification can seem to be a piece of artifice if one thinks

of courses of values purely in set-theoretic terms. From this persp'ective

144 TYLER BURGE

truth (falsity) is identified with its own unit class. (Cf. Dummett, IFP,

404.) What could be more typical of a mere technical convenience? But

the set-theoretic gloss misrepresents Frege's view.

Frege's identification should be seen as the result of drawing out the

implications of the two ideas that we have discussed so far, and supple-

menting them with his redundancy conception of truth. The first idea

was that the truth values are logical objects. Their specification should

not "import anything foreign into logic". Further, as logical objects, their

specification must be derivative from the specification (or denotation) of

logical concepts. The second idea is that logic is an ordered unfolding of

the laws of truth, where truth is the aim of sentence use within logic.

Truth must somehow be the objective and subject matter (object) of all

parts of logic, including the most primitive part. In fact, it must some-

how be implicated in the aim of every sentence of logic. As we have

seen in earlier sections, Frege interprets the logically relevant aim of

sentence use in terms of our "striving after truth". This aim is revealed in

assertion and judgment. So truth must somehow be implicated in the

assertive use of every sentence of logic. Putting the two ideas together,

we seek a concept in terms of which we can specify truth as a logical

object, a concept that is present in the assertive use of every sentence of

logic.

It might appear that we have an approximation to the idea that truth

must be implicated in the assertive use of every sentence of logic, in

Frege's doctrine that every sentence of logic denotes truth or falsity. As

we have seen, in Section I, there was a connection in Frege's mind

between the point of sentence use and the denotation of sentences. But

truth is the aim of logic; falsity, strange to say, is not. This aim is

revealed in assertion, not simply in the grammatical form of sentences.

The concept in terms of which truth is specified is present in every

assertive use of a sentence, whereas the counterpart concept for falsity is

not. Thus the specification of truth is philosophically primary. The

specification of falsity will present itself as natural once we have under-

stood Frege's specification of truth.

The only concept that fits the requirement of being present in the

assertive use of every sentence of Frege's logic is his concept of truth,

the concept denoted by the horizontal. In unpublished writing contem-

poraneous with Basic Laws, Frege is quite explicit about the point. He

held that what distinguishes 'true' from all other predicates, and what fits

it to indicating the a'im of logic, is that "it is asserted when anything at all

FREGE ON TRUTH 145

is asserted" (PPW 129/NS 140). In accord with his redundancy concep-

tion, Frege held that 'it is true that _', when filled by a declarative

sentence, expresses the same sense as '_' when filled by the same

sentence. But this neutrality of sense in predications of 'true' is collateral

with the predicate's omnipresence in assertions and judgments. As we

have seen in Section II, this idea of the omnipresence of the truth

predicate traces all the way back to the Begriffsschrift (B, 3).

The horizontal expresses the notion of truth in Frege's system. It

means 'is the True' or 'is the truth' or 'is truth'.18 It is present in the

formulation of every assertion. It may accompany any declarative

sentence without adding to its sense. The concept denoted by the

horizontal is the only one within Frege's logic that meets the condition

set by his redundancy conception of truth. Frege alludes to this condi-

tion without fanfare in Section 5 of Basic Laws, where he notes the

equivalence:

/:l. = (-/:l.)

where '/:l.' varies over truth values. The import of the condition comes

clear if one sees sentences as substituting for '/:l.', reads '=' (as in such

cases one may in Frege's system) as the material biconditional, and

reads the horizontal as the truth predicate. The equivalence is the analog

within Frege's system of Tarki's truth schema.

Given his redundancy conception, Frege regarded the two sides of

the equivalence as having the same sense when a sentence is substituted

for'S. (Cf. G & B 63-4/KS 149-150.) This suggests that the concept

of truth may in a sense be implicated in the ontology of every (declara-

tive eternal) sentence, whether the sentence is asserted or not, and

regardless of whether a truth predicate explicitly occurs in the sentence.

This conclusion needs the assumption that a sentence is committed to

the existence of the extension of a concept C if C is a denotation deter-

mined by (a component of) the sense that the sentence expresses. Since

every sentence has the same sense as a sentence in which the concept of

truth is denoted, every sentence would by this reasoning be committed

to the existence of the extension of this concept - the truth value truth.

Although I think that there is some reason to believe that Frege

considered and accepted the relevant assumption, he did not explicitly

assert it. (Cf. G & B 27, 49-50/KS 130, 173; BL 4/GGJ 7; PPW 123/

NS 134; the numerous passages where he speaks of the senses of

sentences as being decomposable into component senses; and Burge,

146 TYLER BURGE

1984.) I shall not defend the attribution of the assumption, however,

since I regard it as somewhat speculative.

What is indisputable and important is that Frege forces the truth

concept to be explicitly denoted by a truth predicate (the horizontal)

when a sentence is assertively used in his logic. Thus it is through

assertion that the aim and ultimate subject matter of logic are revealed.

The truth concept also expresses Frege's conception of the order

within logic. It is the concept in terms of which all others are explicated

and understood. In this regard, it is prior to any other concept canoni-

cally denoted in the propositional calculus.

In specifying truth as the extension of his truth predicate, Frege is

"deriving" a logical object from a logical concept. Obviously, it is

intuitively natural to derive the object truth from the concept of truth

(assuming that one wants such an object and that such an object must be

derived from a concept). Frege is in effect nominalizing the truth pre-

dicate by generalizing on his truth schema (in the light of his construal

of the schema in terms of Theses (b) and (d.19 But Frege's specification

of the object truth is not merely intuitively natural, granted his assump-

tion that it is a logical object and must be derived from a concept. It also

expresses his conception of the point, subject matter and order of logic,

and flows from his redundancy conception of truth. It is the only

identification that is consonant with his philosophical views.

The evidence we have been considering suggests reconsideration of a

pair of long-standing criticisms of Frege's view of truth values as objects.

One is that once truth becomes one object among others, it is difficult to

explain what it is about it that makes us want to strive after it, assert it,

acknowledge it, and so forth. (Cf. Furth, BL, pp. lii-liii. The point is

also made by Dummett in various places in FPL.) What is so terrific

about the relevant object? Frege seems to be inviting us to join a kind of

secular religion without explaining the attributes of its god that merit

our worship.

We may begin to appreciate the weakness of this criticism by

recalling Frege's contextualist arguments for Theses (a) and (b). Denota-

tion of objects with terms is of interest only because of our interest in

semantical features of sentences. Interest in sentences derives from

interest in norms governing their use in making assertions and express-

ing judgments. So the practice of using sentences to denote truth values

derived its interest from the role of assertion and judgment in our lives.

From Frege's point of view, the idea that we must explain this role in

FREGE ON TRUTH 147

terms of the features that certain objects, the truth values, have, would

be to put the horse behind the cart.

Frege underlines this point by specifying the object truth as what

every assertive use of a sentence (and every judgment of a thought) is

committed to. We know what the object truth is and what it is like only

through reflecting on the fact that assertion and judgment aim at it. To

be sure, Frege thinks that the laws of truth, which are laws of "being"

(Sein, Kl 507-SIKS 342-3), generate norms for assertion and judg-

ment. (Cf. Note 3.) This is because Frege assumes it as obvious that we

ought to judge in accordance with logical laws, and because he con-

strues these laws as governing an objective world of objects. But it is not

part of his view that we should be able to explain the interest for us of

the object truth, or the way that we think about it, independently from

consideration of the point of assertion and judgment - to "strive after

truth".

Frege thinks truth and judgmental force are primitive ideas. And he

does not try to explicate or philosophize about the value of "striving

after truth." But it is foreign to his system, and thus not a pseudo-

question concocted by it, to ask what it is about the object truth that

engenders our interest in it. The activity of jUdging and the practice of

assertion are primary.

The second longstanding criticism of Frege is closely related to the

first. Dummett states it in his thought provoking article 'Truth':

... it is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements; and Frege's

theory of truth and falsity as the references of sentences leaves this feature of the

concept of truth quite out of account. Frege indeed tried to bring it in afterwards in his

theory of assertion - but too late; for the sense of the sentence is not given in advance

of our going in for the activity of asserting, since, otherwise there could be people who

expressed the same thoughts but went instead for denying them. (TOE, pp. 2-3)

It is certainly true that Frege said less about the roles of jUdging and

asserting in our lives than one might want in a post-Wittgensteinean

climate. But it is not true that Frege leaves our aim at making true

statements "quite out of account" in his exposition of the concept truth.

It is this aim, he says in 'On Sense and Denotation', that motivates our

asking for the denotations of terms and sentences. Late in life he writes:

" ... 'true' only makes an abortive attempt to indicate the essence of

logic, since what logic is really concerned with does not at all lie in the

word 'true' [since by the redundancy view, it contributes nothing new to

148 TYLER BURGE

the sense of whole sentences in which it occurs as predicate] but in the

assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered" (PPW252/ NS 272).

The last main clause of the passage cited from Dummett's criticism is

difficult to interpret. But it does not seem relevant to Frege's view. Frege

nowhere, to my knowledge, writes or implicates that the sense of a

sentence is given "in advance" of our going in for the activity of

assertion. Denotation is motivated and justified by Frege in terms of our

"striving after truth." Sense is postulated as the way denotations are

presented to us in thought. Thoughts, the senses of sentences, are truth

conditions; and we are interested in truth conditions because we are

interested in arriving at truth. So our attaching senses and denotations to

sentences and sentential parts is motivated by their roles in judgment

and assertion. Frege's thesis that sentences denote objects is proposed in

the context of these motivations, not in contradiction to them.

We should now consider the possibility of taking truth and falsity as

"new" logical objects, not identical with any course of values. Frege

would not have introduced a new name for truth, an individual constant,

into his system since doing so would have created an inelegant logical

connection between his specification of truth and his truth predicate.

Moreover, such a move would controvert his view that logical objects

are derivative from logical concepts, a view bound up with his con-

textualist defense of the existence of abstract objects. But suppose that

one identified truth with \f(-e) (where the slash is the description

operator - cf. Section 11 Basic Laws) - the unique object that falls

under the concept - (is the true).

I think that Frege would answer this suggestion by asking rhetorically

what purpose a distinction between truth and the extension of the

concept is the true would serve. He would take \f(-e) to be fe-e).

(Compare the way Frege argues against postulating negative thoughts

(PPW 149-50,185, 198/NS 161-2,201,214).) Prior to the discovery

of the paradox, there were no evident logical advantages to the distinc-

tion. This point is implicated in Note 17 in Section 10 of Basic Laws.

It is arguable that Frege accepted the intuitive or metaphysical point

that a physical, mental, or geometrical object is distinct from any course

of values - on the ground that they are obviously distinct categories of

objects. (The argument would have to develop out of the central

sections of Foundations.) But such a point is evidently not applicable to

the relation between truth and courses of values. Truth is a necessary,

logical object, unlike physical, mental, and geometrical objects; and

FREGE ON TRUTH 149

since it is introducted on predominantly pragmatic grounds, against the

grain of prior intuition, there is no force in the claim that we make an

intuitive distinction between the object truth and courses of values.

From Frege's pre-paradox point of view, I see no purpose to the

distinction and so, for him, no point in drawing it.

I believe that the urge to draw such a distinction derives from

thinking that has already been informed by the set-theoretic and seman-

tical paradoxes. One wants to insist on a difference in "level" between

basic individuals and higher-order objects. Of course, merely taking

truth to be an individual will not suffice to deal with the semantical

paradoxes. Frege's redundancy theory of truth and his truth predicate

('is the True') are not capable of representing common uses of the

notion of truth, much less to explicating and representing the derivative,

indexical, and schematic aspects of the notion, aspects revealed by the

paradoxes. (Cf. Burge, 1979.) If there is not some pervasive provision

for levels of just the sort that Frege ignored, there can be no adequate

theory. The notion of truth cannot be adequately represented in terms

of a truth predicate that lacks any sort of stratification.

These remarks are, however, anachronistic. They presuppose knowl-

edge that Frege lacked when he wrote Basic Laws. Given his redun-

dancy conception of truth, his notion of course-of-values, his view of

truth as an object, and his logicist ambitions, the identification of truth

values that he proposed in Basic Laws Section 10 must have seemed

uniquely appropriate.

Truth is the basic logical object in Frege's system. It is the object on

which the purely logical, first level functions (including concepts) are

initially construed as operating (BL, Section 31). The logical objects

with which the numbers are identified are derivative from second and

third level concepts that operate on the first level functions. So the

numbers are less fundamental than the truth values (though all are, of

course, seen by Frege as necessarily existent). The reason truth is basic

is that it is the object (objective) of assertion and judgment. It is through

these activities that the point and the ontology of logic are revealed.

As we have noted, the truth values formed, at one time, the basis for

an argument against scepticism. They also formed the basis for Frege's

answer to Kant's dictum that there could be no knowledge of objects

without intuitions. Frege held that commitment to mind-independent

objects was inseparable from the very act of judging something to be

150 TYLER BURGE

true. The idea is surely the quintessential distillation of the ambitions of

rationalist epistemology.

Even apart from these ambitions, the profundity and breadth of

Frege's conception must be seen as admirable. What enables Frege's

views on truth value to be of enduring importance is that they are so

largely grounded in fruitful and highly articulated insights into the

anatomy and function of logic, mathematics, language, and thought. I

think it unlikely that we have fully harvested Frege's insights.

University of California,

Los Angeles

NOTES

I Abbreviations of titles listed in the bibliography, together with page numbers, will be

included in the text. Where German editions and translations of Frege's works differ in

pagination, both occurrences will by cited, separated by a slash. Responsibility for the

translations of all quotations from Frege is mine, although frequently the translations are

similar to and benefit from already published translations.

2 The fact that Frege's notion of term-denotation cannot be entirely separated from the

"name-bearer" relation has been appropriately emphasized by Michael Dummett in

FPL, Chapter 12; and in IFP, Chapter 7. For some views that proceed on the assump-

tion of the primacy of sentences (or their truth-values) and on the view that the notion

of the denotation of a term has no content other than that which is derivative from an

analysis of how the term functionally determines truth-value, see Quine (1960, Chapters

1-2; 1969, Chapters 1-2); Wallace, (1977); Davidson, (1977); Putnam (1981, Chap-

ters 1-2). Several of these authors explicitly invoke Frege's inspiration. I find the views

not only uncongenial to Frege (though unquestionably inspired by part of his doctrine),

but unpersuasive. But I shall not be able to go into these points here.

3 In calling Frege's notion of truth "normative", I am glossing over a very interesting set

of views that he held regarding the normative and descriptive aspects of logic. From the

beginning to the end of his career, Frege regarded logic as being descriptive of the laws

of logical objects, in particular those of truth. (PPW 31NS 3; K1507-81KS 342-3.) In

fact, Frege seems to have believed that in a sense logic was fundamentally "descriptive,"

fundamentally a science of "being." Normative restrictions on assertion and judgment

derived from "the way things are" regarding the laws of truth. (Kl 5081KS 342.) To

many this view of logic will seem quaint at best. I think that stripped of the particular

metaphysics with which Frege endowed it, and supplemented by Quinean and other

considerations, it can be made very powerful. In emphasizing that truth is a normative

notion, I am not ignoring the "descriptive" elements in his view. I am simply highlighting

a feature of Frege's methodology. Frege attempts to arrive at the laws of truth not by

invoking metaphysical assumptions but by concentrating on our practices of assertion,

judgment, and deductive inference and by developing his science of logic through

reflecting on the "oughts" of good intellectual practice.

FREGE ON TRUTH 151

4 Even he enters qualifications, (1956), p. 25 Note 66.

5 Prior to the argument's formulation, as early as 1903, Russell rejected the first

premise. He insisted that the relevant semantical notions for sentences are quite

different from those for terms. It is a bit open to question how seriously this rejection is

to be taken. Russell refused to call the relation between a sentence and a fact or pro-

position the relation of "naming" or "denoting." But he treats propositions or facts as

complexes made up entirely of entities that have traditionally been thought of as

referred to by words - properties, relations, individuals and the like. And he regards

these complexes as playing a central role in his semantical theory of sentences. Thus at

times Russell's point seems to come to little more than that sentences are not ordinarily

speaking names, a point with which Frege might well agree. Actually, of course, the issue

in Russell is quite complex. (Cf. e.g. the first lecture in 'Logical Atomism'.)

Russell remains at odds with the Church-Go del argument even in its less titillating

form - even after sentence denotation is construed as the yet-to-be-determined seman-

tical feature that is connected to the denotation of terms by means of the Composition

Principle (1). As I mentioned earlier, Russell may be interpreted as rejecting the third

premise of the argument. He accepted more or less the traditional conception of logical

equivalence and judged logical consequence in terms of the traditional modalized notion

of truth (e.g. PM Section A*I). But he took the primary semantical correlates of

sentences to be what he called "propositions" and sometimes "facts." If one interprets

Russell as accepting the first "premise" of the Church-Godel argument by granting it the

liberal conception of sentence-denotation that involves no commitment to Thesis (c) (so

sentence denotation is merely the central semantical feature of sentences in one's formal

semantics), then one must see Russell as rejecting the argument's third premise. For

then facts or "propositions" are sentence denotations; and logically equivalent facts

could, on Russell's view, differ.

What allows this position to remain compatible with the principle that exchange of

co-denotational expressions preserves truth value is, of course, the theory of descrip-

tions. This theory by itself blocks the Church-Godel argument by depriving one's

language (artifically, I think) of the definite description operator, or any comparable

device for forming complex singular terms that have denotations.

A discussion of the Church-Godel argument that is Russellian in its metaphysical

cast occurs in Barwise and Perry (1981). Unfortunately, the paper contains much that is

misleading. Frege's arguments are dismissed in two paragraphs. One paragraph charac-

terizes Frege's rhetorical question 'What else besides truth value is compatible with the

composition principle?' as a metaphysical oversight. This dismissal would perhaps

be fair if it did not ignore Frege's normative motivations and methodology. Frege's

argument from our primary interest in sentences, glossed in one sentence, is countered

by an irrelevant appeal to embedded sentences (irrelevant because the reason sentences

are interesting is that they are the vehicles of assertion and judgment). The

Church-Godel argument is discussed only on the unquestioned (but widely rejected)

assumption that sentences as wholes "designate" some entity. And it is resisted as if it

had been presented on this unquestioned assumption, and widely accepted, as a

"proof' from "virtually apriori" first principles. The incompatibility of Russell's system

with the argument's conclusion has been widely recognized. No one has tried to utilize

the argument to refute Russell, least of all Church and Godel, who were, of course,

thoroughly familiar with Russell's system. The role of the argument in the history of

152 TYLER BURGE

semantics is more subtle than treating it as a proof from purportedly obvious first

principles could suggest.

6 The relation between Theses (c) and (d) is a complicated and subtle matter. Ontologi-

cally, of course, logical objects, such as truth values, and functions on these objects are

prior for Frege to singular terms and function signs. They exist before the signs existed,

and would have existed regardless of whether the signs did. On the other hand, Frege

held, on several occasions, that one could not engage in reasonably sophisticated

thought except by means of language. The analysis of thought relied heavily on analysis

of linguistic structure. But even in the analysis of thought, the analysis of language was

not prior in any simple sense. For thinking could and did correct the deficiencies of

language. In the light of all this, there is no simple answer to the question of whether

Frege reasoned from Thesis (c) to Thesis (d) or vice-versa. Part of why he concluded

that numbers are objects and numerals are terms was that he was able to give explicit

definitions which amounted to a criterion of identity for the numbers. On the other

hand, much of his reasoning to this conclusion was based on observations regarding the

structure of mathematical language. Similarly, his reasoning about Theses (c) and (d) is a

mixture of considerations regarding the role of objects in logic and the anatomy of the

language of logic (properly construed). I shall therefore treat Theses (c) and (d) more or

less together, without trying to sort out the various relations of relative priority that

obtain between them.

7 There are variants of the analogy between terms and sentences as regards their sense

and denotation that Frege mentions, but which I shall skim over. For example, he cites

his theory of indirect discourse as tending to confirm the introduction of truth values.

(BL 7/ GGX). The idea seems to be that, in indirect discourse, just as terms shift from

denoting their customary denotations to denoting their customary senses, so sentences

shift from denoting their truth values to denoting the thoughts they customarily express.

On Frege's conception, there need be no shift in grammatical category between the

occurrence of a sentence standing alone, and its occurrance in indirect discourse, which

is clearly a singular term position.

S One might be tempted to think that Thesis (a), or at any rate (b), already commits

Frege to taking truth values to be objects. For by our stipulation, an object is anything

that is denoted by a term. But the phrase 'the denotation of Sentence 5' (d. Thesis (b is

a term. So by Thesis (b), truth values are objects. This line of reasoning misses the fact

that the phrase 'the denotation of a sentence' need not be a term under logical analysis.

Similarly, for the phrase that begins Principle (1). 'Denotation' as applied to sentences in

the initial construal of Thesis (b) is guided by' the compositional method, loosely

expressed in Principle (1). As far as Frege's arguments for (a) and (b) are concerned,

there need be no entity that could be called under logical analysis "the denotation" of

the sentence. Of course, once Frege has committed himself to Theses (c) and (d), he can

consider Theses (a) and (b) to have proper construals, under logical analysis, that

commit him to taking truth values to be objects.

9 I do think that Dummett neglects to convey the. richness and inter-related nature of

the theoretical considerations supporting Frege's theses. His remark about Thesis (c)

that it is a "ludicrous deviation" from the forms of natural language and a "gratuitous

blunder" (FPL, 184) is, at best, immoderate. Incidentally, in FPL, Dummett spends two

thirds of his chapter 'Truth Value and Reference' on Frege's view that a sentence with a

non-denoting name thereby lacks a truth value. As I mentioned in Section I, I think that

Frege rested little weight on this view in defending Thesis (d). I think Frege regarded his

view as a consequence of the rest of his doctrine. Since the consequence accorded with

his intuitions, it had some value for him in confirming the doctrine.

FREGE ON TRUTH 153

10 It is true that Frege writes in Basic Laws Section 2, 'The sense of a name of a truth

value I call a thought'. This might seem to be intended to include all terms (not just

sentences and their nominalizations), as long as the term denotes a truth value. I think

that there is no independent evidence that this was Frege's intention. The remark is

illustrated only by sentences. As we have just seen, three sections later, Frege says that

thoughts are what are judged. And his system allows the act of assertion or judgment to

apply only to sentences or what they express. Thus I think that the remark in Section 2

is a slip encouraged, to be sure, by the formal assimilation of sentences to terms.

11 Furth errs in calling (rather than the vertical alone) the judgment stroke, a

distinction critical to the points we have been making. But he gives an excellent account

of the role of the notion of assertion in Basic Laws (Cf. BL, pp. xlviii-lii).

12 With one exception. When in Basic Laws the horizontal applies to expressions like '5'

or 'the course of values such that ... ', which are not sentences, the sense of the result of

the application is different from the sense of the argument expression. The former is a

thought; the latter is not. There is no analog in Begriffsschrift since the horizontal only

applied to judgeable contents.

13 The words 'determination' (for 'Bestimmung') and 'grasp' (for 'zu fassen') in this

translation replace two occurrences of the word 'definition' in J. L. Austin's otherwise

good translation of this passage from FA. Austin's choices may obscure the fact that

Frege thought not only that we needed a reduction of arithmetical terminology to other

terms, but that we needed a better grasp of the notions that such terminology expressed.

14 For a discussion that rebuts recent attacks on this interpretation, and with which I am

in broad agreement, see Michael Dumrnett, IFP.

15 This interpretation has been urged in an article, containing many interesting secon-

dary points, by Paul Benacerraf (1981). Benacerraf cites not only Section lOaf Basic

Laws but some passages in Foundations. I have discussed these latter in Burge, 1984. I

believe that I have shown them not to support the view. Here I shall concentrate on

Basic Laws Section 10.

16 I am indebted to Mary Dant for bringing home to me the kinship of these sections of

Foundations to the writings on Hilbert.

17 The bracketed substitution of 'denotation' (,Bedeutung') for 'sense ('Sinn') is specif-

ically suggested by Frege, in the light of his subsequent sense-denotation distinction, in a

letter to Husser! of May 24,1891.

18 Almost needless to say, Frege's representation of the truth predicate is not intended

exactly to reproduce ordinary language. In particular, '-t(-c)' turns out true but has no

analog in ordinary uses of 'is true'. Cf. also Note 12.

1" Frege's method of specifying or "defining" truth (in the extensional, mathematical

sense) is a primitive ancestor of Tarski's set-theoretic methods of attaining the same

objective. (Frege differs from Tarski in having no ambition to explicate, or provide a

vindication for, the concept of truth.) Both authors may be seen as summing up or

generalizing from their respective versions of the truth schema. Frege's identification of

falsity as the extension of the concept is the false is the natural counterpart of his specifi-

cation of truth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barwise, Jon and J. Perry: 'Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations' Mid

west Studies 6, 1981.

Benacerraf, Paul: 'Frege: the Last Logicist' Midwest Studies 6, 1981.

154

TYLER BURGE

Burge, Tyler: 'Semantical Paradox' The Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), 169-198.

Burge, Tyler: 'Frege on Extensions of Concepts, From 1884 to 1903', Philosophical

Review 93 (1984), 3-34.

Church, Alonzo: 'Carnap's Introduction to Semantics' Philosophical Review 52 (1943),

298-305.

Church, Alonzo: lntroduction to Mathematical Logic (1956) (Princeton University

Press, Princeton, 1956).

Davidson, Donald: 'Reality without Reference' Dialectica 31 (1977),246-258.

Dummett, Michael: Frege: Philosophy of Language (FPL) (Duckworth, London, 1973).

Dummett, Michael: Truth and Other Enigmas (TOE) (Harvard University Press, Cam-

bridge, Mass.; 1978).

Dummett, Michael: The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy (IFP), (Harvard University

Press: Cambridge, Mass.; 1981).

Frege, Gottlob: Begriffsschrift und Andere Aufsiitze (B) Angelelli (ed.) (Georg OIms,

Hildesheim, 1964).

Frege, GottIob: Foundations of Arithmetic (FA), Austin trans. (Northwestern University

Press, Evanston, 1968). (The volume contains both the German and the English.

Pagination is the same as in the original.)

Frege, Gottlob: Kleine Schriften (KS), AngeIelli (ed.) (Georg OIms, Hildesheim, 1967).

Frege, Gottlob: Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (G & B)

Geach and Black (eds.), (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1966) 2nd edition. Obvious

abbreviations of relevant articles are also used in the text.)

Frege, Gottlob: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GG), (Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1962).

Frege, GottIob: The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (BL), Furth trans. and ed. (University of

California Press, Berkeley, 1967).

Frege, Gottlob: On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic

(FG), Kluge ed. (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971).

Frege, GottIob: Nachgelassene Schriften (NS) Hermes, Kambartel, Kaulbach (eds.)

(Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1969).

Frege, Gottlob: Posthumous Writings (PPW), Long and White trans., (University of

Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979).

Frege, GottIob: Briefwechsel (BW), Gabriel, Hermes, Kambartel, Thiel, Veraart eds.,

(Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1976).

Frege, Gottlob: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence (Cor), McGuinness

and Kaal (eds.) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980).

G6del, Kurt: 'Russell's Mathematical Logic' in Philosophy of Mathematics, Benacerraf

and Putnam (eds.) (prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; 1964).

Klemke, E. D. (ed.): Essays on Frege (Kl) (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1968).

Putnam, Hilary: Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge,

England; 1981).

Quine, W. V.: Word and Object (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.; 1960).

Quine, W. V.: Ontological Relativity (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969).

Russell, Bertrand and A. N. Whitehead: Principia Mathematica (PM) (Cambridge

University Press, New York, vol. 1,1910).

Wallace, John: 'Only in the Context of a Sentence Do Words Have Meaning' Midwest

Studies 2, 1977.

LEILA HAAPARANTA

FREGE ON EXISTENCE*

1. INTRODUCTION

In his philosophy of language Gottlob Frege strives to present the basic

structure of language which is supposed to correspond to the structure

of what is referred to. He makes a distinction between proper names,

which refer to objects, and function-names, which refer to functions.

Function-names include concept-words and relation-words, which stand

for concepts and relations, respectively. Frege also assumes that, besides

a reference (Bedeutung), each name has a sense (Sinn), through which

the name is directed to its reference.

l

In his monumental work on Frege's philosophy of language Michael

Dummett lists ten theses of Frege's concerning sense and reference

(Dummett, 1981, pp. 152-203). One central principle is missing,

however, and it has likewise been ignored by most of the other Frege

scholars. This is the thesis that the word 'is' is ambiguous in a certain

way. Ignacio Angelelli comes close to attending to it when he makes

some remarks on identity and predication, and Matthias Schirn puts

special emphasis on the role of the thesis in Frege's work? but the great

majority of Frege scholars have completely overlooked the ambiguity

doctrine. Frege and Russell proposed this thesis and made it one of the

basic ingredients of modern logic. Likewise, in the Tractatus Ludwig

Wittgenstein emphasized the ambiguity of the verb 'to be' and stressed

the importance of constructing a language which prevents confusions

between different meanings of 'is'. Wittgenstein remarked that Frege's

and Russell's conceptual notation was purported to be such a language

although it did not succeed in excluding all mistakes (TLP, 3.323-

3.325). Some philosophers and linguists, including Jaakko Hintikka,

Charles Kahn, and Benson Mates, have recently discussed the ambiguity

doctrine and raised criticism against it.

3

The roots of the ambiguity thesis do not reach farther than the

beginning of the nineteenth century. Charles Kahn (1973a, 1973b,

1985) has argued that in the nineteenth century there was curious

interaction between the views of linguists and philosophers concerning

155

L. Haaparanta and J; Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 155-174.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

156 LEILA HAAPARANTA

the verb 'to be', particularly concerning the notions of existence and

copula. Linguists and philologists misunderstood the ancient use of the

Greek verb einai and based their account of the verb on a mistaken

philosophical exegesis of ancient theories of being, while philosophers

relied on the work of linguists and philologists, when developing their

theories of being. In 1801 Gottfried Hermann, a German philologist,

proposed a rule which attached different accents to different meanings

of einai, thereby in effect attributing the ambiguity between existence

and copula to ancient Greek (Hermann, 1801, pp. 84-85).

Among the early opponents of the ambiguity thesis as applied to

Greek philosophy, G. E. L. Owen (1960) hinted that Aristotle's view of

being had been misinterpreted. Michael Frede (1967), for his part,

questioned the possibility of reading any sharp distinction between

existence and copula out of Plato's texts (Frede, 1967, p. 37). R. M.

Dancy (1975, 1983) has explicitly argued against efforts to apply the

ambiguity thesis to the verb einai, especially to Aristotle's verb einai,

and Jaakko Hintikka (1983, 1985) has discussed Aristotle's doctrine of

being in detail and maintained that the ambiguity thesis is completely

anachronistic when applied to Aristotle. Benson Mates (1979) has

criticized the view that Plato made a semantical distinction between the

'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication.

According to Aristotle, the realm of beings falls into different cate-

gories. Being itself is not a genus, and no single category exhausts all

beings (Met. B 3, 998b22-27, An. Post. II 7, 92b14; cf. Owen, 1965, p.

77). Aristotle assumes that to be is always to be either a substance of a

certain sort, or a qUality of a certain sort, or a quantity of a certain sort,

etc. (An. Post. I 22, 83bI3-17). However, this does not mean that

Aristotle takes 'to be' to have a completely different meaning for

different kinds of subjects. Instead, he argues:

There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', but all that 'is' is related to

one point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to be by a mere ambiguity.

(Met. r 2, lO03a33-36.)

Aristotle makes a distinction between homonymy and multiplicity of

uses. In the beginning of the Categories he states that things are

homonymous if they have only a common name but completely differ-

ent definitions. This is not what he assumes all existing things to be, but

he argues that the different uses of 'being' in the different categories

have the same focal meaning. This amounts to saying that the different

FREGE ON EXISTENCE 157

applications of 'being' are not homonymous for Aristotle but 'is' has, on

his view, only a multiplicity ofuses.

4

The distinction between different Aristotelian categories is, however,

quite different from the Frege-Russell distinction between different

meanings of 'is'. Fregean logic distinguishes between the following

meanings of 'is':

(1) the 'is' of identity (e.g., Phosphorus is Hesperus; a = b),

(2) the 'is' of predication, i.e., the copula (e.g., Plato is a man;

(3) the 'is' of existence,

and

(i) expressed by means of the existential quantifier and the

symbol for identity (e.g., God is; (3x) (g = x,

or

(ii) expressed by means of the existential quantifier and the

symbol for predication (e.g., There are human beings/

There is at least one human being; (3x)H(x,

(4) the 'is' of class-inclusion (e.g., A horse is a four-legged

animal; (x) (P(x):::> Q(x).

Frt(ge's conceptual notation expresses these meanings as follows:

(1) I-- (A =B)

(2) I-- <P(A)

(3) (i) a)

(ii)

(4)

X(a)

These formulas <?f Frege's language are judgements (Urteile), since they

are provided with the symbol' f-', which consists of the content stroke

(Inhaltsstrich) '-' and the judgement stroke (Urteilsstrich) 'I'. The

vertical stroke which connects the two horizontal ones Frege calls the

conditional stroke (Bedingungsstrich) (BS, 5). Negation is expressed in

his symbolism by a small vertical stroke which is attached under the

content stroke (ibid., 7). In the Begriffsschrift Frege uses three parallel

strokes as a sign for identity, but in the Grundgesetze he adopts the

158 LEILA HAAP ARANT A

usual sign for identity with two strokes (GGA I, 'Vorwort', p. IX).

Generality is expressed by a concavity containing a German letter plus

the same German letter holding the place of the argument (BS, 11).

Frege does not pay attention to (3) (i) in his formalism, even if he

discusses it in detail in his informal articles, such as in 'Dialog mit Piinjer

tiber Existenz' (NS, pp. 60-75). Nor has he any separate symbol for

existence, but he expresses it by means of the symbol for generality and

two negation signs.

Kahn, Hintikka, and others have mainly been worried about earlier

writers' efforts to derive the Fregean ambiguity thesis from Aristotle's

words. Since, for Aristotle, being is not a genus and to be is thus always

to be something or other, it cannot be claimed that he believed in any

pure ambiguity between existence and predication. Whether Aristotle

hinted at any of the Fregean ambiguities or not, it is at least obvious that

he gave these suggestions a minor position in his thought. This is shown

by the fact that he did not recognize any need for writing down these

different meanings of 'is' in any specific language. He was satisfied with

our natural language which does not provide us with any such

distinctions as that between identity, predication, existence, and class-

inclusion. Accordingly, even if Aristotle believed in such forms of being

as his categories, which he also found in natural language, he did not

believe in those forms of being which are shown by Frege's distinction.

Unlike Frege, Aristotle did not think that there are such relevant forms

of being as identity, predication, existence, and class-inclusion.

Frege's doctrine concerning the words 'to be' and 'is' can be gathered

from various sources, mainly from the article 'Dialog mit Piinjer tiber

Existenz', written before 1884 and published posthumously, from Die

Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), and from the article 'Uber Begriff

und Gegenstand' (1892). In these works Frege deals with the difference

between predication and existence, on the one hand, and the difference

between predication and identity, on the other. The distinction between

predication and class-inclusion is discussed by Frege as early as in the

Begriffsschrift (1879), where he also introduces the rest of the distinc-

tions but does not comment on them in detail. Frege's thesis not only

bears upon the different uses of the words 'to be' and 'is', but it also

concerns the different concepts that those words stand for. Frege argues

that our natural language is deficient, since it offers us one single word

for these various purposes. What we are in need of, then, is a language

which correctly reflects the distinctions between the different concepts

FREGE ON EXISTENCE 159

of being. Frege regards it as a philosopher's task to show where natural

language leads us to see things in the wrong perspective (NS, pp. 74-75

and p. 289). As Frege himself states in the BegriffsschriJt, his conceptual

notation is meant to be a language of pure thought, which is free from

ambiguities.

It is true that Frege's principal aim was to realize his logicist program.

To carry out the program, Frege had to define arithmetical concepts by

means of logical concepts and to prove that arithmetical truths are

derivable from the axioms of logic by means of logical deduction. Frege

developed the logical implements for the derivations in the Begriffs

schriJt, and by doing so he became the foremost pioneer of modern

logic. However, it was not Frege's sole purpose to present the rules of

logical inference. Indeed, his conceptual notation was purported to be a

Leibnizian lingua characterica, from which all ambiguities were elimin-

ated and which was thus meant to be the correct semantic representa-

tion of natural language.

s

Frege's paradigm of first-order language was

thus essentially semantically determined. However, he did not himself

present it semantically, for, as Jean van Heijenoort (1967) and Jaakko

Hintikka (1979a, 1981b, 1981c) have argued, he believed in the ineffa-

bility of semantics. This means that he did not take it to be possible for

us to step outside the limits of language in order to consider the

relations between language and the world, because, in his view, all talk

already presupposes these semantical relations. Frege explained the

different uses of the word 'is' simply by describing his notation for a

first-order language, which was for him the only correct linguistic

representation of our concepts.

It is true many twentieth-century logicians have adopted the idea of

language as a calculus which can be freely reinterpreted in a fixed

domain of individuals.

6

Some logicians have even completely rejected

the claim that a Fregean first-order language - suitably supplemented,

for instance, by adding to it some higher-order logic, as Frege does - is

a universal medium of communication in the Fregean sense; meaning

both the sense that the interpretation of its names and predicates do not

vary in a fixed domain of individuals and the sense that it speaks about

one fixed domain. None the less, logicians have accepted the Fregean

quantification theory, where the ambiguity doctrine is firmly codified.

The simple reason why they have accepted this doctrine merely by

accepting the quantification theory is that the meanings of the logical

constants of the quantification theory, including those that stand for

160 LEILA HAAP ARAN

various kinds of being, remain unchanged, even though the classes of

individuals the quantifiers range over may change. Thus adding new

elements to the basic Fregean quantification theory or relativizing the

ranges of his quantifiers does not remove a logician's commitment to the

ambiguity of 'is'.

I have here claimed that Frege has several concepts of being, without

carefully attending to Frege's own terminology, according to which

concepts are references of concept-words. We can try to avoid the

distinction between senses and references by saying that, in Frege's

logic, the word 'is' not only has a number of uses but it has various

meanings. In this paper, I shall not deal with the possibility of applying

the distinction between senses and references to such an auxiliary verb

as 'to be'.7

This paper focuses on Frege's doctrine of existence. One of the

innovations of Frege's logical theory was to construe existence as a

second-order concept, i.e., as a property of concepts.

8

This paper is,

however, an attempt to elucidate some lesser known aspects of Frege's

view of existence. I shall argue that Frege regards existence both as a

proper second-order concept and as an empty first-order concept and

that the distinction between the two references of 'exists' is motivated by

his metaphysical and epistemological tenets. In constructing these

tenets, we must be satisfied with Frege's brief remarks and hints. Thus,

Frege not only assumes that the word 'is' is ambiguous but he also

considers the verb 'to exist' and hence also the 'is' of existence an

equivocal word. Frege's concept of Wirklichkeit, which likewise turns

out to be a kind of concept of existence, will not be discussed in this

paper.

9

I have spoken of Frege's logical language as a first-order language.

Admittedly, Frege did deal with higher-order quantifiers. However, for

reasons which Will not be discussed here the higher-order component of

Frege's lingua characterica may be considered inessential, and it is in

any case largely irrelevant for the purpose of this paper.IO

2. THE EQUIVOCITY OF 'EXISTS'

The concept of existence is discussed by Frege in detail in his 'Dialog

mit Piinjer iiber Existenz', which has been published in Frege's Nachge-

lassene Schriften. The paper was written before 1884, the year Frege

completed his Grundlagen. In the Grundlagen Frege presents his doc-

trine of existence in a mature form. The argumentation put forward in

FREGE ON EXISTENCE

161

'Dialog mit Piinjer iiber Existenz' supplements the Grundlagen and is

very instructive if we are interested in the different aspects of Frege's

concept of existence. I have discussed the dialogue in my paper 'On

Frege's Concept of Being', where I tried to shed some light on how

Kant's views on existence influenced Frege's ideas. In what follows, I

shall present the main points that Frege makes in the dialogue and give

my suggestions concerning the implicit motivation of his view.

In 'Dialog mit Piinjer iiber Existenz' Frege supports the claim that such

sentences as 'Leo Sachse is' and 'Leo Sachse exists' are self-evident

(selbstverstandich), while Piinjer suggests that the word 'is' carries the

same meaning as 'is something that can be experienced' (ist erfahrbar).

For Piinjer, the set of objects of experience (Gegenstande der Erfahrung)

is a subset of the set of objects of ideas (Gegenstande der Vorstellungen).

Frege argues that Piinjer's account results in contradiction: If 'A is not'

means the same as 'A is not an object of experience', then the statement

'There is something that is not an object of experience' means the same

as 'There is an object of experience which is not an object of experience'

(NS, pp. 71-72). In an afterword to the dialogue Frege continues his

argumentation and states that if the sentence 'A is' were not self-

evident, its negation could be true in some circumstances. He concludes

that if the sentence 'There are entities which do not have the property of

being' means the same as 'Something that has being falls under the

concept of not-being (der Begriff des Nichtseienden)', it is a contradic-

tory sentence, and if the sentence 'There are B's' is equivalent in

meaning to the sentence 'Something that has being is B', the concept of

being is self-evident.

Frege seems to be driven to denying the meaningfulness of sentences

like 'A is' or 'A exists' because of his conceptions of language and the

world. He cannot say that the sentence 'Something that has being is not'

means that something for which it is possible to exist does not exist in

the actual world, since he is committed to the view that there is only one

world and that his conceptual notation is a universal language which

speaks about that world. He does not even divide his universe into various

sorts. That is indicated by his principle of completeness (Grundsatz der

VoNstandigkeit), according to which any function must be defined for all

objects (GGA II, 56-65).11 Due to his one-world view, he concludes

that the concept of being is not a determination of an object, i.e., it does

not help us to distinguish between any two objects (NS, p. 73).

We may put the same point as follows: Because of Frege's one-world

162

LEILA HAAP ARANT A

view, there can be quantifiers of one kind only, namely, quantifiers

ranging over all actually existing objects. For this reason, Frege cannot

escape the threatening inconsistency by assuming that we have two

different ranges of quantifiers in sentences like 'Something that has

being is not', which otherwise might have seemed a plausible way out for

someone who distinguished from each other the different meanings of

'is'.12

After having rejected the idea that existence is a real property of an

object, Frege makes an effort to convert existential statements into the

form of particular statements (NS, p. 70).'3 For instance, he turns the

sentence 'There are men' into the sentence 'Some living beings are

rational'. If the concept that occurs in a given sentence cannot be

defined by means of two concepts, Frege resorts to the concept of being

identical with itself (sich selbst gleich sein), which he takes to be the

most general concept of the hierarchy of concepts. He identifies this

concept with the concept of being. Hence, he can turn the sentence

'There are men' also into the sentence 'Something that has being is a

man', or 'Something that is identical with itself is a man' (NS, p. 71).

Consequently, Frege holds the view that we are forced to regard being

(in the sense of existence) as a concept which is superordinate to every

concept. What Frege shows here is that, according to his doctrine of

being, existence can be used as a first-order concept if one i's willing to

pay the price of its becoming an empty concept.

14

The concept of being

that we are here interested in is such that we predicate it of every object

of which we predicate anything. By saying that a is X, we say that a is

and that a is X Here the copula is purported to posit the object a in the

sense that it is the part of the predication which makes the predication

carry with itself the claim for existence. Copula is for Frege a concept

which applies to entities in this one world of ours as well as any other

concept, even if more generally.

The idea that existence is included in every predication apparently

brings Frege quite close to Aristotle. Frege seems to repeat Aristotle's

view that the expression 'existent man' says nothing more than 'man',

i.e., 'existent' is an empty and hence redundant word in any context

whatever (Met. r 2, 1003b27-30,I 3, 1054a16-18). What is even

more, as far as we consider Frege's concept of being as a first-

order concept, Frege does not believe in the analogy of 'is' in the sense

in which Aristotle does. For Frege, being is a 'genus'; it is an empty

concept, which has an infinitely wide extension and no comprehension.

FREGE ON EXISTENCE 163

If we limited our consideration of Frege's concept of existence to what

we have found out up to now, we could conclude that Frege's concept of

being is a univocal concept.

Why does Frege regard being as a univocal concept in this limited

sense? The reason is, again, that Frege does not divide his universe into

various sorts. Unlike that of Aristotle's, Frege's realm of beings does not

fall into different categories.

In his article 'Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in E. Schroders

Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik' Frege suggests that the

sentences 'A is' and 'A exists' could be rendered as the metalinguistic

sentence 'the name "A" has a reference' (KS, p. 208). But if Frege is

consistent in his view that we cannot step outside the limits of language,

he must consider such statements as illegitimate talk about the expres-

sions of our language.

15

Frege requires that in the language of science all proper names have

to be taken to be nonempty (NS, p. 135). He also assumes that if we talk

about an object we already presuppose the existence of that object

('Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', KS, p. 147). None the less, Frege admits

that we speak meaningfully about entities which do not exist. On Frege's

view, a sentence lacks only a truth-value - but not a sense - if it

contains a name which has no reference ('Uber Sinn und Bedeutung,

KS, p. 148).

Since Frege regards being as a characteristic of every concept, it

might be suggested that if we attach any concept-word to an empty

proper name, the concept brings it about that the name has a reference,

after all. That this is not the case becomes obvious if we consider

Frege's concept of concept. According to Frege, a concept-word - and

likewise a concept to which it refers - is ungesiittigt. It has a 'gap', which

can be filled with a complete expression, i.e., with a proper name (GGA

I, pp. 5-8). If we fill the gap of the concept-word with a proper

we also aim at filling the gap of the corresponding concept. If we

succeed in filling the gap of the concept, it is also true that the proper

name has a reference. If the gap of the concept is not filled, we do not

attach existence to anything, since we do not succeed in predicating

anything. If we succeed in predicating something, we succeed in predi-

cating existence at the same time. This is so because, for Frege, to be an

object implies existence. For if a is an object, then the proper name 'a'

has a reference, which amounts to saying that a exists. Consequently,

Frege's idea that we presuppose the existence of the objects we talk

164 LEILA HAAP ARANT A

about concerns only the nature of our speech acts and the pragmatical

aspects of our language, and it has nothing to do with the semantical

relation between the sentences of our language and the objects and the

functions of the world. Frege simply wants to remark that, when we say

something about an object, we do not add that the object exists.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein argues that we arrive at nonsense if we

treat such concepts as those of object, function, number, and concept as

ordinary concepts. According to Wittgenstein, in a consistent and

perspicuous language, that something is an object, a function, etc. could

only be shown but could not be said (fLP, 4.126). David Bell (1979)

claims that Frege supported this view as far as functions are concerned,

for, on his view, that something is a function is shown by the incom-

pleteness of the sign which is used to refer to it, but it is not possible to

say that something is a function ('Uber Begriff und Gegenstand' , KS, p.

170). Bell assumes that Frege never extended this doctrine to include

the expression '() is an object' (Bell, 1979, p. 47). Frege's treatment of

existence is, however, a kind of extension, since, on his view, we do not

say that something is an object because, in using the name, we already

presuppose that there is an object to which the name refers.

There is one important and manifest reservation that Frege makes in

his argumentation in 'Dialog mit Piinjer tiber Existenz'. He concludes

there that if the sentence 'There are B's' is equivalent in meaning to the

sentence 'Something that has being is B', then the concept of being is

self-evident. His formulation suggests an alternative way of handling the

problem, in which the mentioned equiValence is denied and which thus

hints at the equivocity of 'being'. But if the expressions 'x has being' and

'there is an x' differ in meaning, Frege's argumentation for the view that

'A is' is self-evident collapses.

At the end of 'Dialog mit Piinjer tiber Existenz' Frege introduces the

doctrine that existence is a property of a concept (NS, p. 75). Frege is

inclined to maintain that existence used as a first-order concept is an

empty concept, but he insists on preserving the meaningfulness of

existence used as a second-order concept. That conviction is conspicu-

ous in his criticism of the idea that every concept is abstracted from a

number of objects. He remarks that if all concepts were elicited from

existing objects, existential statements would lose all content; once we

had a concept, we could infer that there is an object which exemplifies

the concept (GLA, 49).16

FREGE ON EXISTENCE

3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF FREGE'S

EQUIVOCITY VIEW

165

The above discussion shows that Frege assumes that 'exists' and the 'is'

of existence have two readings. They may refer either to an empty

first-order concept or to a meaningful second-order concept. In the

former case the existential statement becomes meaningful if it is trans-

formed into a metalinguistic statement which expresses that a given

proper name has a reference. In the latter case the statement tells us that

a concept is instantiated, i.e., that there is an object which has a given

property. First-order existence is formalized by means of the existential

quantifier and the symbol for identity, while second-order existence is

expressed by means of the existential quantifier and the symbol for

predication. In order to find out the philosophical motivation for Frege's

view of existeace, let us first consider the distinction between identity

and predication.

Frege discusses the problem of interpreting the concept of identity

already in the Begrijfsschrift, where he states that in an identity state-

ment a name seems to represent itself. He adds, however, that an

identity statement does not concern names only but it expresses that two

signs have the same content (Inhalt), which is determined in two

different ways by the two signs (BS, 8). He reformulates that idea in

'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' by saying that an identity statement

expresses that two names have the same reference but different senses.

The sense of a name is the way in which the reference of the name is

presented (KS, pp. 143-144).

Frege thinks that the symbols which occur on the different sides of

the identity symbol can be replaced by each other in any context

whatsoever, and he also assumes that two objects are identical if and

only if they fall under the same o:mceptsP As we saw in the preceding

section, Frege also considers identity to be a relation of an object to

itself. These renderings of the concept of identity are subject to

Wittgenstein's criticism, according to which to say of two objects that

they are identical, is nonsense, and to say of one object that it is

identical with itself, is to say nothing at all (TLP, 5.5303). The details of

Frege's doctrine of identity and the possible changes in his view will not

be discussed in this paper.IS It is, however, worth mentioning that Frege

does not regard it as possible to define the identity of objects by the

sameness of their properties or by any other means, since any definition

166 LEILA HAAP ARANT A

is itself an identity ('Rezension von: E. G. Husserl, Philosophie der

Arithmetik 1', KS, p. 184).

In his article 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand' Frege emphasizes that, in

order to keep objects and concepts apart, we must make a sharp

distinction between identity and predication (KS, p. 168). The principle

according to which objects must be clearly distinguished from concepts

also manifests itself in that, unlike traditional grammatical analysis,

Fregean analysis of sentences distinguishes the relation between two

concepts of the same order from predication, which, for its part,

concerns the relation between an individual and a concept or a relation

between two concepts of two different orders (NS, p. 207 and p. 210).

In the Grundlagen the distinctioJ) between objects and concepts occurs

in the list of Frege's basic principles (GLA, p. X). He also stresses the

distinction in the Grundgesetze (GGA I, p, X and p. XIV), in 'Uber die

Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene' (KS, p. 233), and in

'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie II' (KS, p. 270).

Why does Frege stress the distinction between objects and concepts?

Frege rejects the grammatical analysis of sentences and substitutes

objects and concepts (and other functions) for subjects and predicates,

and thereby he changes the structure of universal and particular

sentences. As far as singular sentences are concerned, he does not

accept the identification of individuals with their essential properties.

For Frege, the sentence 'Plato is a man' contains the 'is' of predication,

which must be sharply distinguished from the 'is' of identity ('Logik in

der Mathematik' (1914), NS, pp. 230-231).19 This means that Frege

does not regard it as possible for us to have knowledge of what an

object is in itself by means of our concepts. For him, all properties are

on a par, whether they are called essential or accidental in traditional

philosophical literature.

Surprisingly enough, Frege's much debated distinction between Sinn

and Bedeutung witnesses the same epistemological view. Disregarding

Frege's views on the sense and the reference of a sentence, which Frege

also labels a proper name, we can present Frege's doctrine of the sense

and the reference of a proper name as follows: The sense which a

proper name expresses and which is a way of presenting the object to

which that proper name refers belongs to the object. Moreover, we

should have complete knowledge of the object, only if we knew all its

senses, which is not possible for us ('Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', KS,

pp. 144-147). Accordingly, Fregean senses of an object seem to be

FREGE ON EXISTENCE

167

complexes of the concepts under which the object falls. This interpreta-

tion of Frege's concept of Sinn is supported by his examples, according

to which 'the Evening Star' and 'the Morning Star' are senses of Venus

and 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' arid 'the pupil of Plato' are

senses of Aristotle. Frege also argues that a proper name is related to an

object via a sense and only via a sense and each proper name must

express at least one sense (NS, p. 135). Hence, according to Frege, it is

not possible to talk meaningfully of an object without thinking of the

object as falling under some concept. Frege's remarks (;oncerning senses

and references thus give us more support for the hypothesis that Frege

believes in the universality of language. They may even hint at the view

that there are no properties which belong to objects before there is a

conceptual system which attaches senses to objects.

Frege's theory of sense and reference shows that Frege not only takes

it to be impossible to find out any essential properties of objects, which

would be identical with objects themselves, but he also considers the

forming of complete concepts of objects as being beyond the abilities of

a finite human being. Frege echoes Leibniz's thOUght that a human being

is only able to form partial concepts of individuals, while God sees in

the concept of an individual all that can be predicated of that individual

(Leibniz, 'Discourse on Metaphysics', sec. 8 and sec. 9). For Frege, an

object is neither identical with any essential property nor with any

combination of the concepts under we can know the object to fall.

By stressing the distinction between objects and properties, or concepts,

Frege in effect draws the limits of human knowledge.

What has been said above shows why Frege calls special attention to

the distinction between identity and predication. Frege's conceptual

notation, which is meant to be a universal language, allows us to speak

about objects only through different configurations formed by concept-

words and other function-names. We cannot step outside these con-

figurations in order to consider the relations between our language and

objects themselves. An identity statement can only tell us that two

names have the same Bedeutung but, according to Frege, we cannot say

what this Bedeutung is. If Frege were consistent, we could not even

accept a metalinguistic sentence which tells something about the relation

between names and references. An identity statement tries to say some-

thing that cannot be said, while predication is precisely the way in which

our reason is capable of handling objects.

Even if Frege subscribed to the principle that one and only one

168 LEILA HAAP ARANT A

linguistic symbol or distinction should correspond to each reference or

distinction of the universe, he did not eliminate the identity symbol from

his language. Wittgenstein was more consistent in this respect, for he

regarded an identity statement only as a rule, which concerns the

substitutivity of names in different contexts. He assumed that we can

give up the identity symbol, when we have realized the idea of universal

language so that there are no more two different names for anyone

single object in our language. According to Wittgenstein, the identity

symbol is not an essential part of the conceptual notation (fLP, 5.53).

Frege considered the role of the identity symbol from a completely

different perspective. As he mentioned already in the Begriffsschrift, he

did not regard the identity statement only as a rule which concerns

names. At the same time, he insisted on the principle that his language

speaks about something and that each distinction and each symbol in

language must correspond to a unique sense, a unique reference and

a unique distinction in the universe. Hence, we must try to find out

what the counterpart in the world is in the case of identity statements.

What Frege found in the world was a distinction between senses and

references, which follows from the distinction between objects in

themselves and objects as we know them. Frege wanted to make a

distinction between objects as metaphysical entities and objects as we

know them, and he also wanted that this distinction is visible in his

universal language. For this reason, he distinguished the 'is' of identity

from the 'is' of predication in his conceptual notation and hence

incorporated the identity symbol in his language. Frege did not notice

that he ought to have excluded identity statements from his language

precisely because they aim - at saying something about objects as

metaphysical entities, that is, in the way in which we cannot speak about

objects in language, according to Frege.

In the previous section I argued that Frege's view of language and the

world influenced his doctrine of existence. The discussion above con

cerning identity and predication serves to clarify the details of Frege's

view that the word 'exists' is equivocal. It is not only the case that Frege

regards 'exists' and the 'is' of existence as equivocal in the sense that

there are two concepts of existence apart from all linguistic contexts but

that each context determines to which concept the words refer in each

case. What is more, Fregean analysis has the additional consequence

that 'exists' and the "is' of existence preserve their equivocity in some

contexts. That is what happens if we attach them to proper names. I

FREGE ON EXISTENCE 169

shall clarify this point in what follows on the basis of what I argued

above concerning identity and predication. That also yields an answer to

the question concerning the philosophical background of Frege's view of

existence.

If Frege's Sinne are complexes of properties of objects, the sentence

'a exists' expresses the thought that there is an object which is P, Q, R,

etc. Since the sentence 'There is a P' means, for Frege, the same as the

sentence The concept P is instantiated', likewise, the sentence 'a exists'

means that a certain bundle of concepts is instantiated. Here existence

turns out to be something that is asserted of a bundle of properties.

Frege nowhere explicitly draws this conclusion from his premisses, but

his suggestions are, however, evident. In 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung'

Frege undertakes to show that identity statements can be meaningful

even if they seem to be either vacuously true or self-contradictory. The

solution he offers is that one may associate a different sense with 'a' and

with 'b' even if 'a = b' is true. If Frege supports this kind of analysis, he

must also admit that 'a exists' makes sense. That is because one can, of

course, attach a sense to 'a' without knowing that a exists, as easily as

one can attach a sense to 'a' and 'b' without knowing that 'a= b' is true.

Existence is not included in the Sinn expressed by a proper name. If we

take the individual properties expressed by the proper name apart and

form a judgment of each, the sentences which express the judgments

may either be true or lack a truth-value. For Frege, forming a concept or

a bundle of concepts is independent of the instantiation of that concept

or bundle of concepts.

Like the distinction between identity and predication, the thesis of

the equivocity of 'exists' and the 'is' of existence is motivated by

epistemological considerations concerning the limits of human knowl-

edge. My suggestion for construing Frege's doctrine of existence in the

case of sentences like 'a exists' or 'a is' is hence the following: If we say

that a exists and if someone asks us what it is that exists, we are not able

to answer the question in any other way than by mentioning some of the

concepts under which that objects falls. We can say that the sentence 'a

exists' means that there is an object which has the properties P, Q, R,

etc. Existence turns out to be a second-order concept, which means

instantiation of a bundle of properties. But since we cannot say what the

object a is as abstracted from our concepts, our answer to the question

concerning what a is in itself comes down to saying that a is a, which is

an empty statement. On Frege's view, we can say that an object is what it

170 LEILA HAAP ARANT A

is, that it is identical with itself, which is an empty statement, but we

cannot say what it is, i.e., what it is identical with. Therefore, in the

sentences 'a exists' and 'a is' words 'exists' and 'is' can be read either as

expressions of a meaningful second-order concept or as expressions of

an empty first-order concept. If we interpret the words as referring to

the first-order concept, the corresponding sentence can be transformed

into the sentence 'The name "a" has a reference', but that is, of course,

of no help for us in finding out what the reference is.

Thus, Frege's distinction between the two concepts of existence

ensues from his endeavour to distinguish objects in themselves from

objects considered through the descriptions that we can attach to them.

As I concluded above, Frege wants to make a distinction between

objects as metaphysical units and objects as we know them, and he also

wants that this distinction is visible in his universal language. But again,

if Frege were to be consistent, he should eliminate the existence

expressed by the existential quantifier and the symbol for identity from

his language, for it tries to say something that, on Frege's view, cannot

be said in language.

Academy of Finland

NOTES

* I am very grateful to Professor Jaakko Hintikka for valuable suggestions and

comments.

My thanks are due to the Philosophical Society of Finland, which has given me the

permission to use extracts from my monograph Frege's Doctrine of Being (Acta

Philosophica Fennica 39, 1985) in this article.

1 See 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', KS, pp. 144-147, GGA I, p. X and 26, and 'Uber

die Grundlagen der Geometrie I-Ill', KS, p. 285.

2 See AngeleIli (1967), pp. 253-254, and Schirn I (1976), pp. 20-21.

3 See Hintikka (1979b, 1981a). See also Kahn (1973a, 1973b) and Mates (1979).

4 See Hintikka (1973,1983,1985) and Knuuttila (1985).

5 See, e.g., 'Uber den Zweck der Begriffsschrift', BS, 1964, p. 98, 'Uber die Begriffs-

schrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene', KS, p. 227, and 'Anmerkungen Freges zu:

Philip E. B. Jourdain, 'The development of the theories of mathematical logic and the

principles of mathematics', KS, p. 341.

6 See van Heijenoort (1967), Goldfarb (1979), and Hintikka (1979a, 1981b, 1981c).

7 For further discussion of this problem, see Haaparanta (1985a), pp. 56-58.

B See, e.g., GLA, 53.

9 For Frege's concept of Wirklichkeit, see Haaparanta (1985a).

FREGE ON EXISTENCE 171

10 Note that Frege tried to treat higher-order entities by correlating with each of them a

Werthverlauf, which is always a first-order entity, for instance, a value of first-order

quantifiers. See, e.g., GGA I, 3 and 10.

II See van Heijenoort (this volume).

12 This was suggested to me by laakko Hintikka.

13 Frege makes the same suggestion in 'Aufzeichnungen fiir Ludwig Darmstaedter', NS,

pp.274-275.

14 This is also pointed out by R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz (Thiel, 1975, p. 126).

15 However, Frege anticipates the distinction between object-language and metalan-

guage in the article 'Logische Allgemeinheit', where he makes the distinction between

Hilfssprache and Darlegungssprache. See NS, p. 280. Cf. also Haaparanta (1985a), p. 35.

16 I do not want to argue that if existence is considered as a second-order concept, it is

no more a problematic concept. The expression 'There is a - ' is far from clarified by

the expression 'The concept - is instantiated'. Cf. Williams (1981), pp. 59-60.

17 See BS, 8, GLA, 65, and 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', KS, p. 150. See also GGA

I, 20, and NS, p. 131.

18 See Schirn (1976), Band II. See also Haaparanta (1985a).

19 Cf., e.g., Aristotle, Met. Z 6. M. J. Woods (1975) argues for the interpretation that,

according to Aristotle, the sentence 'Socrates is a man' means that Socrates is identical

with a man. See also Hintikka (1985). For further discussion, see Haaparanta (1985a),

pp.94-96.

REFERENCES

Frege, G.: 1879, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete FormeZsprache des

reinen Denkens. Verlag von L. Nebert, Halle a. S.; repr. in G. Frege (1964), pp.

1-88. (Referred to as BS.)

Frege, G.: 1883, 'Uber den Zweck der Begriffsschrift', in Sitzungsberichte der lenaischen

Gesellschaft flir Medizin und Naturwissenschaft fUr das lahr 1882, Verlag von G.

Fischer, lena, pp. 1-10; repr. in Frege (1964), pp. 97-106.

Frege, G.: 1884, Die GrundZagen der Arithmetik: eine Zogisch mathematische Untersu-

chung tiber den Begrijf der ZahZ, Verlag von W. Koebner, Breslau; repro and trans!'

by l. L. Austin in The Foundations of Arithmetic! Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik,

Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968. (Referred to as GLA.)

Frege, G.: 1891, Funktion und Begriff, Vortrag, gehalten in der Sitzung vom 9. Januar

1891 der lenaischen Gesellschaft fiir Medizin und Naturwissenschaft, H. Pohle,

Jena; repr, in KS, pp. 125-142.

Frege, G.: 1892, 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', Zeitschrift fUr Philosophie und philoso-

phische Kritik 100, 25-50; repr, in KS, pp. 143-162.

Frege, G.: 1892, 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand', Vierteljahrschrift flir wissenschaftliche

Philosophie 16,192-205; repr. in KS, pp. 167-178.

Frege, G.: 1893, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begrijfsschriftlich abgeleitet, 1. Band,

Verlag von H. Pohle, lena. (Referred to as GGA I.)

Frege, G.: 1894, 'Rezension von: E. G. Husser!, Philosophie der Arithmetik 1', Zeit-

172 LEILA HAAP ARANT A

schrift [iir Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 103, 313-332; repr, in KS, pp.

179-192.

Frege, G.: 1895, Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in E. Schroders Vorlesungen

iiber die Algebra der Logik', Archiv [iir systematische Philosophie 1,433-456; repro

inKS,pp.193-21O.

Frege, G.: 1896, 'Uber die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene', in

Berichte uber die Verhandlungen der koniglich siichsischen Gesellschaft der Wissen-

schaften zu Leipzig, Mathematisch-Physische Klasse, 48. Band, pp. 361-378; repr.

in KS, pp. 220-233.

Frege, G.: 1903, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, II. Band,

Verlag von H. Pohle, Jena. (Referred to as GGA II.)

Frege, G.: 1903, 'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie II', Jahresberichte der Deutschen

Mathematiker- Vereinigung, 12. Band, pp. 368-375; repr. in KS, pp. 267-272.

Frege, G.: 1906, 'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie I-III', in Jahresberichte der

Deutschen Mathematiker- Vereinigung, 15. Band, pp. 293-309, 377-403, 423-430;

repr. in KS, pp. 281-323.

Frege, G.: 1912, 'Anmerkungen zu: Philip E. B. Jourdain, The development of the

theories of mathematical logic and the principles of mathematics', The Quarterly

Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics 43,237-269; repr, in KS, pp. 334-341.

Frege, G.: 1952, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. by P.

Geach and M. Black, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Frege, G.: 1964, Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsiitze, ed. by I. Angelelli, Georg Olms,

Hildesheim.

Frege, G.: 1964, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Exposition of the System, trans!. and ed.

by M. Furth, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.

Frege, G.: 1967, Kleine Schriften, ed. by I. Angelelli, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,

Darmstadt, and Georg Olms, Hildesheim. (Referred to as KS.)

Frege, G.: 1969, Nachgelassene Schriften, ed. by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F.

Kaulbach, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg. (Referred to as NS.)

Frege, G.: 1972, Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, trans!' and ed. by T. W.

Bynum, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Frege, G.: 1979, Posthumous Writings, trans!. by P. Long and R White, Basil Blackwell,

Oxford.

Angelelli, I.: 1967, Studies On Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy, D. Reidel,

Dordrecht.

Aristotle: 1928, Analytica Posteriora, in The Works of Aristotle, Vol. I, ed. by W. D.

Ross, Oxford University Press, London.

Aristotle: 1928, Metaphysica, in The Works of Aristotle, Vol. VIII, ed. by W. D. Ross,

The Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Bell, D.: 1979, Frege's Theory of Judgement, The Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Dancy, R: 1975, Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.

Dancy, R: 1983, 'Aristotle and Existence', Synthese 54,409-442.

Dummett, M.: 1981, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London.

(First published in 1973.)

Frede, M.: 1967, Priidikation und Existenzaussage, Hypomnemata 18, Vandenhoeck &

Ruprecht, Gottingen.

FREGE ON EXISTENCE 173

Goldfarb, W. D.: 1979, 'Logic in the Twenties: the Nature of the Quantifier', The

Journal of Symbolic Logic 44, 351-368.

Haaparanta, L.: 1985a, Frege's Doctrine of Being, Acta Philosophica Fennica 39.

Haaparanta, L.: 1985b, 'On Frege's Concept of Being', in Knuuttila and Hintikka

(1985).

van Heijenoort, J.: 1967, 'Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language', Synthese 17,

324-330.

van Heijenoort, J.: 1985, 'Frege and Vagueness', in this volume.

Hermann, G.: 1801, De emendanda ratione graecae grammaticae, Gerhard Fleischer,

Leipzig.

Hintikka, J.: 1973, 'Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity', in J. Hintikka, Time and

Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality, The Clarendon Press, Oxford,

pp.1-26.

Hintikka, J.: 1979a, 'Frege's Hidden Semantics', Revue Internationale de Philosophie

33,716-722.

Hintikka, J.: 1979b, '''Is''.. Semantical Games, and Semantical Ralativity', Journal of

Philosophical Logic 8, 433-468.

Hintikka, J.: 1981a, 'Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument',

Dialectica 35,127-146.

Hintikka, J.: 1981b, 'Semantics: A Revolt Against Frege', in G. Fl0istad (ed.), Contem-

porary Philosophy, Vol. 1, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, pp. 57-82.

Hintikka, J.: 1981c, 'Wittgenstein's Semantical Kantianism', in E. Morscher and R

Stranzinger (eds.), Ethics, Proceedings of the Fifth International Wittgenstein Sym-

posium, HOlder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, pp. 375-390.

Hintikka, J.: 1983, 'Semantical Games, the Alleged Ambiguity of "Is", and Aristotelian

Categories', Synthese 54, 443-468.

Hintikka, J.: 1985, 'The Varieties of Being in Aristotle', in Knuuttila and Hintikka

(1985).

Kahn, {:.: 1973a, 'On the Theory of the Verb "To Be"', in M. K. Munitz (ed.), Logic and

Ontology, New York University Press, New York, pp. 1-20.

Kahn, c.: 1973b, The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.

Kahn, C.: 1985, 'Retrospect on the Verb 'to be' and the Concept of Being', in Knuuttila

and Hintikka (1985).

Knuuttila, S.: 1985, 'Being qua Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus', in

Knuuttila and Hintikka (1985).

Knuuttila, S. and Hintikka, J. (eds.): 1985, The Logic of Being: Historical and Critical

Studies, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.

Leibniz, G. W.: 1969, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2nd ed., ed. by L. E. Loemker,

D. Reidel, Dordrecht.

Mates, B.: 1979, 'Identity and Predication in Plato', Phronesis 24, 211-229.

Owen, G. E. L.: 1965, 'Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology', in R Bambrough (ed.), New

Essays on Plato and Aristotle, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp. 69-95.

Schirn, M. (ed.): 1976, Studien zu FregelStudies on Frege I-III, Frommann-Holzboog,

Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt.

Stuhlmann-Laeisz, R: 1975, 'Freges Auseinandersetzung mit der Auffassung von

'Existenz' als ein Priidikat der ersten Stufe und Kants Argumentation gegen den

ontologischen Gottesbeweis', in C. Thiel (ed.), Frege und die moderne Grundlagen-

forschung, Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan, pp. 119-133.

174 LEILA HAAP ARANT A

Williams, C. J. F.: 1981, What is Existence?, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Wittgenstein, L.: 1961, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, The German text of Ludwig

Wittgenstein's Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung with a new Translation by D. F.

Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. (Referred to as

TLP.)

Woods, M. J.: 1975, 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle', Proceedings of the Aristotel-

ian Society 75,167-180.

PART III

LOGICAL THEORY

MICHAEL D. RESNIK

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTIALITY

A logically perfect language (Begriffsschrift) should satisfy the conditions, that every

expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name out of signs already

introduced shall in fact designate an object, and that no new sign shall be introduced as

a proper name without being secured a reference. The logic books contain warnings

against logical mistakes arising from the ambiguity of expressions. I regard as no less

pertinent a warning against apparent proper names having no reference. The history of

mathematics supplies errors which have arisen in this way. ([7), p. 41; trns., [10], p. 70)

Here again we likewise see that the laws of logic presuppose concepts with sharp

boundaries, and therefore also complete definitions for names of functions ... In Vol. 1

we expressed this as follows: every function-name must have a reference. ([4), p. 78;

trans., [10), p. 170)

After reaching the end in this way, one may reread the Exposition of the Begriffsschrift

as a connected whole, keeping in mind that the stipulations that are not made use of

later, and hence seem superfluous, serve to carry out the basic principle that every

correctly-formed name is to denote something, a principle that is essential for full rigor.

([3), p. 12; trans., [9), p. 9)

No methodological principle was more important to Frege than the one

at stake in these passages: in a properly constructed scientific language

every name (including function-names as well as object-names) must

have a reference. In his eyes the repeated failures of his fellow mathe-

maticians to be certain of satisfying this tenet was one of their most

grievous errors. Thus it was entirely in keeping with this that he proved

that every name in his own system has a reference. The foundations for

the proof appear in Sections 28-30 of the Grundgesetze (13]) with the

proof itself taking place in Section 31. Evidently, Frege thought that he

need only show that his primitive names were referential since the

referentiality of names composed from them would follow by an easy

induction.! Accordingly, the proof focused almost exclusively on the

"basis" case.

Frege's proof anticipates contemporary proofs that a given valuation

for a language assigns a unique value to each sentence of the language.

Since many authors regard those proofs 'as too obvious to state, it might

be hard to imagine any difficulty with Frege's proof. There is agreement

among Frege scholars that serious problems exist with his proof but that

177

L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 177-195.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

178

MICHAEL D. RESNIK

is as far as the agreement goes. Some have claimed that there is no way

to assign references uniquely to all sentences of Frege's language,

because doing so would establish the consistency of his system.

2

Others

have claimed that the proof is circular; while most recently it has been

claimed that the proof is perfectly valid but rests upon a contradictory

assumption ([11], pp. 157-158). I scarcely exaggerate in saying that

each person interested in the proof has thought that it involves one big

mistake, and the dispute concerns the location of that mistake. I will give

here still another account of the proof and show that the proof rests

upon not one, but several, big mistakes whose significance has not been

previously appreciated.

Some of the problems with Frege's proof involve simple oversights;

others result from deficiencies in the semantical formalism Frege used;

still others are due to conflating substitutional and referential inter-

pretations of logical operators. Finally, one is due to Frege's use of the

semantical version of Axiom V as a premise. As it turns out, semantical

formalisms adequate for Frege's proof were not available until several

generations later. They also took forms which would not have been

acceptable to Frege.

These formal considerations bear upon the interpretation of Frege's

philosophy. Several scholars have wondered whether Frege's proof and

the sections of the Grundgesetze related to it reflect the signs of much

broader semantical and ontological doctrines - such as a contextual

theory of abstract entities. ([2], pp. 139-141; [16].) Certainly, those

sections demand interpretation in the light of Frege's wider doctrines.

But, as will emerge below, the nature of Frege's mistakes and his

inability to give a fully satisfactory proof attenuate conclusions about

his wider doctrines drawn from the proof itself or its attendant seman-

tical formalism. For Frege's proof may have reflected no ontological or

semantical doctrines at all; it may simply have been the best solution he

found for the mathematical problem of proving the referentiality of his

system.

I am not fully prepared to take such a conservative stand. I, too,

suspect that deep issues may have been at stake in the proof. For, as we

will see, there is a simpler and logically more satisfactory version of

\"loth Frege's semantics and his proof which it is hard to believe that he

could have simply overlooked. In my opinion, Frege rejected this alter-

native because he thought that it would not properly represent classes as

dependent upon concepts.

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTIALITY 179

METATHEORY IN THE GRUNDGESETZE

1. Formation rules

The first step towards proving that all well-formed names are referential

is to delineate the class of well-formed names. Frege does this with

formation rules which are totally foreign to contemporary logicians.

Instead of constructing "(x) (y) (x = y)" by first forming "x = y" and

applying the quantifiers "(x)" and "(y)" to it, Frege starts with the first

level function name "; = and an object name A. He then forms

the first level function name "A = ;" which he combines with the

second level function name "(y)o(y)" to yield "(y) (A = y)". Deleting

the "A" from this, he obtains the function name "(y) (; = y)", which

is, in turn, combined with "(x)o(x)" to yield "(x) (y) (x = y)". Frege

calls the method by which two names are combined to yield a new one

the first way of forming names. The method which forms a new name by

deleting a well-formed part of a name he calls the second way. The

closest Frege comes to an inductive definition of the class of well-

formed names is to follow his presentation of the two ways of forming

names with the statement "all correctly-formed names are formed in this

manner".3 There is no problem in giving such an inductive definition,

however ([14J, pp. 76-78).

Although Frege never discusses alternative formation rules, it seems

clear that the rules he does give are chosen to reflect the way in which

objects and functions of the various levels may be combined. Forming

"(x) (y) (x = y)" from "(x)" and "(y) (x = y)" by juxtaposition would

belie the incomplete nature of quantification qua second level function.

Frege often warned against misrepresenting the unsaturated nature of

functions by using names or variables for them which did not, them-

selves, exhibit unsaturatedness.

4

He would hardly have violated these

strictures for metamathematical convenience. This passage makes it

quite plain:

For the same reason many of Peano's designations in which a function-letter occurs

without an argument are to be rejected. They contradict the very essence of a function,

... Such designations, which belie the real situation, may indeed seem at first sight

convenient, but in the end they always lead into a morass .... But the designations that

promise best to survive are those which adapt themselves most readily to diverse

requirements and can be applied over the most extensive domain, and this because they

fit the subject-matter best. We shall not be able to discover such designations if we are

merely concerned to cope with the case in hand and do not pursue our reflections

180 MICHAEL D. RESNIK

further, but only if we attain the deepest possible insight into the nature of the subject-

matter ([6], p. 156).

2. Semantical rules

Just as Frege's ontological views preclude the use of concatenation-style

formation rules, they also exclude the Tarski approach to semantics.

According to Frege, the denotation of a compound name is yielded by

application of the functions denoted by some of its components to the

arguments denoted by its other components. The universal quantifier

symbol, for instance, denotes a second level function, and Frege's

explanation

["(x)F(x)"] is to denote the True if for every argument the value of the function is

the True, and otherwise is to denote the False" ([3], p. 12, trans. [9], p. 42).

tells us which function this is. A Tarski-style rule, such as (x)Sx is true if

Sx is true for every assignment of values to x; and is false otherwise,

(where a domain, interpretation and assignment to the free variables in

S is presumed fixed), can be taken as defining a function denoted by the

universal quantifier symbol. But, and this is the important point, it can

also be taken as merely giving conditions for a universal quantification

to be true. Furthermore, the Tarski approach extends to sentences

containing free variables in a way that a Fregean approach should not.

For Frege did not regard open sentences as names and reduced their

content to that of their universal closures ([3], Sections 17 and 32).

Thus the denotation of the universal quantification, "(x) (x = x)", which

is a name, cannot be construed as a function of the denotation of the

"x = x"; for the latter has a denotation only in the derivative sense of

being stipulated to be coreferential with the former. As we shall see,

Frege's non-Tarskian approach precludes the use of a simple inductive

proof to show that if his simple names denote then so do all names

which are correctly formed from them; although that very proof wouid

seem altogether obvious to us today. (Frege's semantical conditions are

like Tarski's in being recursive. Yet Frege's entire conception is unlike

Tarski's in not relativizing interpretations to domains or to assignments

to nonlogical symbols. The idea that a sentence could be true for one

interpretation and false for an other, while familiar to Frege, was totally

inimical to him. For him logic deals with one domain of each logical

type - the universal domain of that type.)5

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTIALITY 181

Frege explains the truth-function and quantifier symbols by directly

specifying the functions which they denote. However, the explanation of

the abstraction symbol does not follow suit. Instead, it is based on the

stipulation "that the combination of signs 'iF(x) = yG(y)' has the same

denotation as '(x) (F(x) = G(x))'" ([3], p. 16; trans. [9], p. 45). This does

not assign denotations to abstracts; it only interprets identities between

them, and leaves open questions concerning identities between abstracts

and other terms. This odd feature of Frege's method, which has puzzled

and provoked most Frege scholars, is responsible for several of the

difficulties with his proof.

It is quite possible that Frege's unusual semantical stipulation was

largely responsible for his undertaking his proof in the first place. For in

Section 10 he attempts to deal with referential indeterminancies engen-

dered by the stipUlation and he refers to this in Section 31. It is also

possible that he regarded his stipUlation and the proof as justifying the

introduction of classes. One can hardly fail to believe that some deep

motive grounded his procedure, since Frege almost certainly considered

the alternative of interpreting the abstraction operator by stipulating

that it designates a second level function which maps each first level

function onto its course-of-values. In fact his words,

If I say generally that

"iF( x)" denotes the course-of-values of the function F( ;),

this requires a supplementation ... ([3], p. 15, trans., [9], p. 44),

virtually amount to such a stipulation. (Be that as it may, only the first

explanation figures in either Frege's semantical discussions or his proof.)

I will postpone further speculation on Frege's motives until later in this

paper.

3. The Criteria of Referentiality

Frege Qpens Section 32 of the Grundgesetze with these words:

In this way it is shown that our eight primitive names have denotation, and thereby that

the same holds good for all names correctly compounded out of these. However, not

only a denotation, but also a sense, appertains to all names correctly formed from our

signs. Every such name of a truth-value expresses a sense, a thought. Namely, by our

stipulations it is determined under what conditions the name denotes the True. The

sense of this name - the thought - is the thought that these conditions are fulfilled ([3],

p. 50-51; trans. [9], pp. 89-90).

182 MICHAEL D. RESNIK

(This passage is the source of the famous truth-condition theory of

meaning attributed to Frege by Wittgenstein and others.) As the passage

shows, Frege thought that his proof of referentiality not only established

that each well-formed name has a unique reference but also determined

the identity of each name's reference. (This is not to say that their

references were effectively determined or that the proof was construc-

tive.) It is quite clear that Frege thought that the proof showed not only

that "(x) (y) (x = y)", for example, denotes a truth-value but also that it

denotes the True just in case every object x is identical with every object

y. Had Frege not believed this he would have hardly claimed that his

referential stipulations also sufficed to determine truth conditions for

the sentences of his system.

The proof thus had two tasks: 1) to establish that each name has a

(unique) reference and 2) to fix the identity of that reference. Unfortu-

nately, Frege's semantical formalism was not equal to the second task.

6

Frege needed a semantical formalism which specifies the reference of

each compound name in terms of the reference of its component names.

Only in this way can the reference of each compound name be deter-

mined inductively from the reference of simple names. Now one might

say, "What could be easier? '(x) 0 (x)' refers to the universal quantifier

function; '- .;' refers to the horizontal function; so '(x) (- x)' refers to

the True in case every object is the True, and refers to the False other-

wise." Yes, there is no problem here; but consider instead the case of

"(y) (x) (x = y)". This can be formed from the universal quantifier

functor and the first level function-name "(x) (x = ';)". Hence we

should be able to derive its reference from those of these components.

But then we must already have determined a reference for "(x)

(x = .;)". However, "(x) (x = .;)" must be formed using the "second

way", that is, by forming the name "(x) (x = A)", where A is an object

name, and then dropping the occurence of A. But there is no analogous

method for obtaining the reference of the name "(x) (x) (x = .;)". We

cannot start with the object (x) (x = A) and "knock out" the object A in

analogy to Frege's second way of forming names. For the same object

can be the value of many functions for many different arguments; and,

thus, there is no inverse operation to map a pair of objects into a unique

function. Instead the reference for "(x) (x = .;)" must be obtained by

applying the universal quantifier function to the identity relation. This

would either require universal quantifiers which can apply to two place

functions, ones which can apply to three place ones, etc, or it would

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTlALITY 183

require an operation which applies to functions of any number n of

places and carries them to functions of n-l places in accordance with

the behavior of the universal quantifier. The latter alternative would

violate Frege's theory of types and the former would require having

infinitely many primitives. The abstraction operator poses similar prob-

lems. (To the modern logician the quickest solution would be to add

functional abstraction to Frege's metalanguage. Yet Frege could not

accept this; for him functional abstracts do not designate functions, they

designate objects!)

In Grundgesetze, Section 29, Frege "solved" this problem by intro-

ducing criteria of referentiality which give conditions for a name to be

referential but which fail to determine what the name's reference is. We

read, for example, that "a name of a first-level function of one argument

has a denotation (denotes something, succeeds in denoting) if the proper

name that results from this function-name by its argument places being

filled by a proper name always has a denotation if the name substituted

denotes something" ([3], p. 46; trans. [9], p. 84). As far as these criteria

go, "has a denotation" and "denotes something" can be one place

predicates which ascribe to a name no more connection to objects,

functions, and truth-values than does the predicate "is a quantifier".

This hints that all there is to an expression having a reference is that

it always yields a referential expression when properly combined with

referential expressions. This in turn is akin to the view that an expres-

sion is referential so long as its occurence in a sentence does not

disqualify the sentence itself from having a truth-value. So, perhaps, a

contextual theory of reference is implicit in the Grundgesetze. Despite

the suggestiveness of both these criteria and the very title of Section 29

("When does a name denote something?") and the clear need to account

for Frege's procedure, we should resist attributing a contextual view of

reference to Section 29 of the Grundgesetze. Such an interpretation is

virtually scotched by the opening lines of section 30, where we read:

The foregoing provisions are not to be regarded as definitions of the phrases "have a

denotation" or "denotes something", because their application always presupposes that

we have already recognized some names as denoting. They can serve only in the

extension step by step of the sphere of such names. From them it follows that every

name formed out of denoting names does denote something ([3], p. 46; trans. [9], p. 85).

First, as the passage clearly states, the criteria do not give the entire

account of reference; they neither define what it is for an expression to

184 MICHAEL D. RESNIK

refer nor do they suffice for establishing the referentiality of each

expression of Frege's system. They are to be used to show that names

formed from names already known to denote also denote. Plainly, on

pain of an infinite regress, the referentiality of some names must be

established by other means. The remainder of Section 30 discusses the

two ways in which new names may be formed from the names already at

hand. Section 31 then opens with the remark that given what has been

said before, one need only show that the simple names of the system

denote in order to show all the names of the system do, and then turns

to the proof that the simple names do denote. Thus it is clear that the

primary purpose - and probably the sole purpose - of the criteria of

Section 29 is to enable Frege to carry out his proof. To clinch the case,

remember that simple names, with the notable exception of the abstrac-

tion function name, are directly assigned references.

One might object that all this is compatible with a quasicontextual

theory of reference. According to such a theory (some) simple names

are referential because they refer to specific functions or objects, while

other simple names and all compound ones are referential only in the

sense of meeting the criteria of Section 29. But the idea that there might

be such a distinction between names of the same syntactic category

seems utterly unFregean. This is, perhaps, too strong; there is a passage

in which Frege discusses, though in the most tentative terms, an idea

similar to the contextual account. The text occurs in the appendix to the

second volume of the Grundgesetze as part of his reaction to the Russell

Paradox ([4], pp. 225-256; trans. [9], pp. 129-130). Frege says that if

we are unwilling to recognize classes as "proper objects", that is, "as

admissible arguments for every first level function" then we must regard

class names as syncategorematic and without denotation. He continues,

'They would in this case have to be regarded as parts to signs that had

denotations only as wholes." Now this sentence supports my contention

that Frege would mark no distinction between the ways in which names

of the same syntactic category can refer; names that do not refer

standardly are not really names at all. (Frege proceeds to reject the

syncategorematic approach, because it excludes classes and thereby

numbers, from the range of object quantifiers).

There is a curious footnote to the sentence last quoted that I find

difficult to reconcile with my interpretation. The footnote refers the

reader to Vol. 1, Section 29, where the criteria of referentiality are

given. Since the footnote is appended to the sentence stating that class

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTIALITY 185

names refer only in the sense of occurring in wholes which have

denotation, it seems to imply that the criteria of referentiality in Section

29 do not give sufficient conditions for genuine reference. In a sense,

this does support my view, since it says that contextual reference is not

reference at all. It also demolishes my view that Frege thought that the

criteria of referentiality afforded a means for proving that certain names

have reference in the full sense. There is a way out. The sentence prior

to the one footnoted says that a proper object must be admissible as an

argument for every first-level function. But a corollary of this is that a

proper name refers to an object if and only if substituting it into the

argument place of any first level function name which refers to a

function yields a name which denotes the value of that function for the

object as argument. This, of course, resembles the criterion of referen-

tiality of proper names. Thus it is quite possible that the otherwise

puzzling footnote was intended for the sentence prior to the one to

which it was in fact affixed. If we" accept this explanation then there are

no problems with my reading of the text in question. We can safely

conclude that the criteria of Section 29 were intended neither as a

contextual nor as a quasicontextual theory of reference.

It is worth recalling at this point that there are other explanations for

the form taken by the criteria of Section 29, which have nothing to do

with contextual views of reference. The first is that Frege may have

known no other way to carry out the inductive part of his proof. The

second is that he may have realized that approaches of the sort we

considered above would conflict with his fundamental principles. I

accept the first explanation. As noted earlier, Frege was apparently

unaware of the failure of his proof to determine the identity of the

reference of each name. Furthermore, another problem with Frege's

proof - his use of what I will call the substitutional-referential approach

to quantification and abstraction - indicates that he may have been

unaware of the subtle differences between a name being referential in

the sense of his criteria and referring to some particular entity. Finally,

the semantical formalisms (the predicate functor logics and algebraic

semantics) which measure up to a Fregean proof of referentiality have

only been recently developed.

Do the criteria of referentiality succeed in at least establishing that

every name is referential given that the simple names are? Yes, but they

establish too much. For they state, in essence, that a name of a given

type is referential provided it yields a referential name whenever

186 MICHAEL D. RESNIK

properly combined with other referential names.

7

By appealing to them

one can introduce names into Frege's system which the criteria will

mark as referential but which fail to refer according to Frege's more

familar canons of referentiality. For instance, let us suppose that all the

names in the system refer in the usual sense of designating an entity of

the type appropriate to their syntactic category. Now let us introduce a

new first-level function name, "S", with the stipulation that "S(E)"

refers to the reference of E if E has one. Here E may be any proper

name, including one which has not yet been introduced. Then the

criteria of Section 29 will deem" S" as a referential function name,

because whenever it is combined with a referential proper name the

resulting compound name has a denotation, namely, that of the proper

name. But plainly "s (';)" does not denote a totally defined function.

Consequently, our introduction of it violates Frege's principle of com-

pleteness ([4], sects. 56-65). Yet once again I cannot believe that

Frege was aware of this consequence of his criteria or the difficulties

it raises for his proof.

4. The Proofin Section 31

In this section Frege tries to prove that his simple names have refer-

ences, assuming that once this basis case is established the referentiality

of his compound names will follow automatically from the criteria of

Section 29. He takes the referentiality of the truth-functors to be imme-

diate and pauses briefly over the quantifiers. Here he uses the substitu-

tional-referential approach. He shows that "(X)0(X)" is referential by

showing that "(x)F(x)" is, for every referential function name, F(';). In

other words, he shows that every referential substitution for "0" yields a

referential compound instead of showing "(x) 0 (x)" denotes a function

which has a value for every first level function as argument. He does

that in tum by noting that "F(A)" denotes the True for every referen-

tial object name A or it denotes something else (again, rather than by

arguing that the function denoted by "F(';)" has a value for each

argument). As we have already seen, this form of reasoning would lead

Frege to other consequences which would be totally unacceptable to

him. The major concern in Section 31, however, is with the abstraction

operator.

Due to its unusual semantical stipulation, Frege approaches the

abstraction sign differently. He argues that he can restrict himself to

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTIALITY 187

occurences of abstracts within identity contexts, and notes that by using

the criteria of referentiality he need only show that if F is referential

then so is the function name "iF(x) = ';". To do so he need only show

that "iF(x) = A" is referential for each referential object name A. But in

Section 10 he had identified the truth-values with two value-ranges.

Therefore, he restricts himself to those A which are referential abstracts

of the form "yG(y)". Thus everything reduces to showing that

"iF(x) = yG(y)" is referential. And by the semantical stipulation for

abstracts this is if "(x) (F(x) = G(x" is. Of course, it is referential,

given that F and G are.

There are several problems with this argument. First, Frege has failed

to provide for all the contexts in which an abstract may occur. One of

these contexts is "(g) (g(';)", and the proof becomes circular with

respect to it. The context is a referential first level function name.

Hence, following the model of the rest of Frege's proof, the way to show

that an abstract A is a referential abstract is to show that "(g) (g(A)" is

referential (in addition to showing that A = .; is). However that is

shown by showing that F(A) is referential for every referential first-level

function name F(';), and "(g) (g(';)" is one of these; so we have gone in

a circle.

s

(Note that we do not have this problem with showing that "(g)

(g( ';)" is referential; for we can restrict ourselves to function names

already known to be referential and use the semantical condition for the

universal quantifier.)

Bartlett, who was the first to see that Frege's proof was faulty,9

observed that it is circular in another sense. He noted that the proof

shows only that if F(';) is referential then so is "iF(x)", and that in

admitting the abstraction operator we can form first-level function

names in which the abstraction operator itself occurs. Thus to apply the

italicized principle non-circularly we must order the abstracts appropri-

ately, and the presence of impredicative abstracts is incompatible with

the ordering required. Parsons follows Bartlett in making a similar

criticism.

1O

Of course, as I have just remarked, even the proof of the

italicized principle fails.

On the other hand, Martin sees no problem at all with the features of

the proof considered so far, and thinks that its only flaw is that it rests

upon a contradictory assumption - the semantical embodiment of

Axiom V. I find his assessment dubious. The Bartlett-Parsons criticism

points out that Frege tried to run an inductive proof while confusing the

basis and inductive cases. An inductive proof should furnish a scheme

188 MICHAEL D. RESNIK

for establishing the theorem's assertion with respect to any finite initial

sequence of its instances, and that is exactly what Frege's proof fails to

do. Martin apparently thinks that there is another procedure, which is at

least implicit in Frege's proof, and that it can handle with ease the

impredicative abstracts, such as "y(j) (x/(x) = y)".

Here is how the Martin method works. We can prove that

(1) yif) (Xf(x) = y)

is referential by first applying the method of Section 31 (the basis case)

to reduce the referentiality of (1) to that of

(2) yif) (x/(x) = y) = xF(x),

where F( s) is a referential function-name. The referentiality of (2) then

reduces to that of

(3) (z) [if) (x/(x) = z) = F(z)].

Then we apply the inductive step, taking the universal quantifier to be

referential, and reduce the referentiality of (3) to that of

(4) if) (x/(x) = B) = F(B),

where B is any referential object-name. Since F(s) and B are referential

and the identity symbol is already known to be referential, the referen-

tiality of (4) reduces to that of

(5) if) (x/(x) = B),

and since the universal quantifier symbols are already known to be

referential we can reduce this case to

(6) xG(x) = B,

where G( s) is referential function-name. Then returning to the method

of the basis case we replace B by an abstract formed from a referential

function-name, say, xF(x), and reduce the question of the referentiality

of (6) to that of

(7) (x) (G(x) = F(x,

which is referential since F and G are. Undoubtedly, this method can be

applied to any wellformed abstract of Frege's system.

Thus if we assume 1) the criteria of referentiality, 2) the semantical

version of Axiom Y, and 3) the referentiality of the truth-function and

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTIALITY 189

quantifier symbols, then we can argue validly that each wellformed

name is referential. For in a finite number of steps Martin's procedure

will reduce the question of the referentiality of any name to that of a

name composed of the quantifier and truth-function symbols. Thus it

could be argued that Frege had another "proof' of referentiality in

mind; to wit, one which first establishes that all names constructed from

the truth-functions and quantifiers are referential and then uses this to

show that the abstraction operator is referential.

Is this what Frege had in mind? I think not. For this account fails to

respect Frege's division of his proof into a basis case (all simple names

are referential) and an inductive case (if N is a name correctly formed

from referential names then N is referential too). Martin's method

"proves" that the abstraction functor (a simple function name) is refer-

ential by using the results of the inductive case. In addition, Frege's

remark that the abstraction operator greatly complicates matters sug-

gests that he did not think that a separate proof of referentiality for the

truth-function and quantifier symbols could be carried over intact once

the abstraction symbol was added.

I must confess some uneasiness with this criticism, since it is possible

that Frege attempted to give an induction within the basis case, and

confused this with an argument like Martin's. Whether this was Frege's

procedure or not, it is not generally sound. Consider a language con-

taining a supply of predicates and the description operator. Suppose

that no vacuous descriptions are constructable in this language. Then

suppose that we add a new predicate F, which is referential considered

in itself and together with the other predicates of the language. It is still

entirely possible that the definite description, ''the F", will fail to refer.

Then what should we the blame for the failure of reference? Surely, the

problem lies with the whole system of names and is not a fault of the

predicates or of the description operator taken singly. The proof

considered above suffers from the analogous mistake of assuming that if

the truth-function and quantifier symbols are referential then they auto-

matically remain so in the presence of the abstraction symbol. This

assumption, in tum, can be traced to the criteria of referentiality, whose

other faults we have already noted.

CONSISTENCY AND REFERENTIALITY

A common opinion is that no sound proof of referentiiility is possible

190 MICHAEL D. RESNIK

for Frege's system because it would amount to a proof of its consistency.

Here is how Sluga has recently put it:

Since he treats sentences as names of truth-values, the proof that every name has exactly

one reference amounts to a proof that no sentence refers to both the True and the False.

If Frege's argument were successful it would in effect give us a consistency proof for the

system of the Grundgesetze ([15), p. 167).11

But without some qualification that is clearly mistaken. The set of

sentences of a formal language and the set of its theorems are not

necessarily identical. It is quite easy to give examples of interpreted

formal languages with sentences having unique truth-values and incon-

sistent sets of theorems. Thus referentiality does not imply consistency.

Furthermore, it is also easy to construct consistent formal languages

which have nonreferring terms, and are thus not referential.

The independence of referentiality from consistency can be demon-

strated for the symbolism of the Grundgesetze too. By using a standard

interpretation (or Frege's) for the quantifier and truth-function symbols

and by assigning each abstract the True as its denotation, one can secure

referentiality while falsifying Frege's Axiom V. This together with

Russell's contradiction establishes referentiality and inconsistency. On

the other hand, by using a partial valuation for Frege's language we can

verify a subset of his axioms. Then by taking these as the full set we

obtain a consistent but not fully referential system (this is analogous to

Quine's mixing of virtual and real classes).

But we cannot give a sound interpretation of Frege's system in which

abstracts denote value-ranges construed as objects that satisfy Axiom V.

The Russell paradox shows that there are no such objects. This means

that no sound repair of Frege's original proof is possible (perhaps, this is

all that Sluga and others have meant). Despite this there is no reason to

think that we cannot interpret abstracts as denoting objects like value-

ranges, so long as we lay down sufficiently weak axioms governing them.

There is also an indirect connection between consistency proofs and

Frege's particular proof. That proof could be seen as an attempt to use

Axiom V, or its semantical correlate, to eliminate abstracts in favour of

formulas of second order logic. If all occurrences of abstracts were

eliminable in favor of second order logic, we would have a consistency

proof of Frege's system relative to second order logic. Thus Martin is

right; there would be no way to eliminate abstracts entirely from Frege's

system even if the referentiality proof were correct. I find little reason to

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTIALlTY 191

believe that Frege had the elimination of abstracts in mind when he gave

his proof. When Russell proposed the no-class theory to Frege, he used

a definition quite similar to Axiom V. But Frege was only concerned

with Russell's failure to represent functions as incomplete, and, though

he did compare Russell's abstracts with his, he did not show much

interest or enthusiasm for the no-class idea itself ([51, pp. 160-161).

We have just seen that referentiality and consistency are independent.

Does referentiality bear on other major methodological issues? At the

beginning of this paper I emphasized that there was a strong connection

for Frege between referentiality and good methodology. Some of the

passages I cited were portions of Frege's criticisms of the faulty defini-

tions, such as contextual definitions, implicit definitions, conditional

definitions or creative definitions, which many of his contemporaries

used. It is thus ironic that a proof of referentiality for the primitives of a

system in no way insures against improper definitions. Frege seems to

have seen this too, and laid down rules of definition which can be shown

to satisfy Lesniewski's criteria of eliminability and noncreativity.12

Whether or not the primitives of a system are referential, definitions in it

which satisfy these criteria will be formally satisfactory in the sense of

giving rise to a conservative extension of the system. If the primitives are

referential besides, then such definitions will guarantee that the defined

expressions are too.

However, there is no methodological impropriety in presenting,

developing and studying uninterpreted formal systems. Hence Frege's

requirement of referentiality is not a requirement for rigorous work with

formal systems - at least not as such work is done today. Furthermore,

even if rigor did demand that formal systems be interpreted, referen-

tiality need not be a requirement of rigor. For some rigorously inter-

preted systems might contain nondenoting terms. Referentiality is not an

uncontroversial requirement of rigor, despite the emphatic protests by

Frege with which I opened this paper.

Granted, Frege believed that a formal system of logic cannot be

applied unless it is fully referential; thus he portrayed formalism as a

grievous methodological error. Many formalists criticized by Frege did

employ faulty definitions and committed other methodological sins;

however, formalism itself can be given rigorous foundations. (Indeed,

Frege saw how to do it. (Cf. [13], pp. 54-62. Formalism is at worst a

philosophical error and not a methodological one. Frege would like us

to think that referentiality is a requirement of rigor; and it is, given his

192 MICHAEL D. RESNIK

views on logic and inference. But we must recognize that those have

never been uncontroversial views. From the point of view of rigorous

mathematical practice, both of today and of Frege's time, referentiality

proofs are merely embellishments.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that Frege's proof contains a number of mistakes and

confusions, that it would not prove what he wanted even if it were

correct, and, finally, that the demands of rigor do not even require it.

Yet we still have no explanation for Frege's giving the proof in the first

place. As I noted earlier, several possibilities come to mind. Frege did

interpret his language referentially, and, thus, the proof was entirely

appropriate for a rigorous presentation of his language. Perhaps that

was the sole motive for Frege's proof. Another possibility, suggested by

the criteria of referentiality, is that Frege used the proof to buttress a

contextual theory of reference. I argued against that interpretation

earlier. Possibly Frege felt that both the demands of rigor and the

peculiarity of his semantics for abstraction necessitated giving the proof.

This explanation seems the most plausible to me.

But this just raises another question. Why did Frege use the strange

semantical stipulation for abstraction? Was it in order to guarantee that

Axiom V would be true by virtue of the meanings of its terms? Suppose

that he had introduced value-ranges in his metalanguage (as he in fact

did), with the stipulation that he would use the words "the function

has the same value-range as the function as having the same

denotation as the phrase "the functions and have identical

values for identical arguments" (Cf. [3], section 3). But then suppose that

he went on (as he did not), to stipulate that the abstraction operator is a

second-level function which maps first-level functions onto their value-

ranges. His proof would have been greatly simplified and Axiom V,

being a formalization of his meaning condition, would remain true in

virtue of the meaning of its terms.

However, there is a serious flaw in Frege's metalanguage, and it

would persist even if Frege made the changes just mentioned. Frege

introduced the term ''value-range'' by means of a contextual stipulation.

It is dangerously similar to definitions which he strongly castigatedY

Value-ranges themselves are not necessarily at hand prior to Frege's

stipulation nor are they introduced by an explicit existential postulate.

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTIALITY 193

Frege could have avoided this situation by insisting instead that value-

ranges exist and that it must be recognized as a fundamental logical law

that there is a one to one association between them and first-level

functions.

Then why didn't he do that? One is again tempted to see Frege as

resisting the recognition of value-ranges in their own right, to see them

as epiphenomenal, or along the lines of Russell's no-class theory or the

results of a contextual view. But, as emerges in his discussion of the

Russell paradox, Frege clearly thought of value-ranges as full-fledged

objects and would reject any resolution of the paradoxes which treated

them as less than SUCh.

I4

The explanation for Frege's treatment of

value-ranges seems to me to be connected with his insistence that the

concept of class is a derivative concept of logic and that classes must be

conceived of as extensions of concepts - the more fundamental logical

entities.

Is

If we introduced value ranges, and classes, by means of an

axiom that read,

With each function there is associated in a one to one fashion an

object, its value-range,

we would fail to emphasize the "derivative" status of classes. Indeed,

Frege might have supposed that since his readers might identify value-

ranges with one of their own pet entities, e.g., with classes in Schroeder's

sense, the logical self-evidence of the axiom introducing them would not

be assured. I think that this explanation is as good an interpretation of

the very puzzling treatment of value-ranges in the Grundgesetze as we

currently have.

My account of Frege's attempt to prove his system referential por-

trays him as confused and groping. I will neither moderate nor apologize

for it. But Frege's greatness demands that it be put into perspective.

Prior to Frege no one had clearly grasped the notion of a formal system,

no one had even formulated the distinction between a system and its

interpretation;nor had anyone tried to state or prove theorems relating

them. Frege was the first to do all of these. Moreover, in assessing

Frege's failure we must recall that no satisfactory general semantical

theories for formal languages existed until Tarski's. If, in trying to rank

Frege against other great figures of early mathematical logic, we

compare his attempt with Hilbert's early effort (1904) to prove the

consistency of arithmetic, the result is an embarrassment to Hilbertp6

The University of North Carolina

Chapel Hill

194 MICHAEL D. RESNIK

NOTES

1 The criteria of referentiality given in Section 29 state, roughly, that a name is

referential in case it yields referential names whenever combined properly with other

referential names. The opening paragraph of Section 31 contains the sentence: "By what

has been said, it is necessary to this end only to demonstrate of our primitive names that

they denote something".

2 This view, which has been advanced by Bartlett and Sluga, is related to Frege's own

remark to Russell (in the letter of 22.6.1902) that his "explanations to Sect. 31 do not

suffice". But note that this remark is made with reference to the specific semantical

stipulations for abstracts which he used in Section 31. See Note 9 below. It does not

preclude proofs based upon seman tical stipulations other than those used by Frege. See

[1], p. 75; [15J, p. 167.

3 [3], p. 48; trans., [9], p. 86.

4 For two examples see: [8], pp. 663-665; trans., [10], pp. 113-115; [4], p. 148, Note

2; trans., [10], p. 180.

5 See the Frege-Hilbert and Frege-Peano exchanges.

6 Martin was, to my knowledge, the first to remark on this problem with Frege's proof

([11], p. 163).

7 In fact Frege fails to lay down criteria which cover each way of combining names in

his system.

S This is not the circle discussed by Bartlett or by Parsons, but it has been noted by

Thiel ([17], p. 82).

9 In the letter to Russell giving his first reactions to the contradiction Frege wrote:

my Law Y (Sect. 20, p. 36) is false, and ... my explanations in Sect. 31 do not

suffice to secure a meaning for my combinations of signs in all cases ([5], p. 132).

It is thus clear that Frege realized that something was wrong with his proof, but given

that he connected the problem to Axiom Y, it is most likely that he saw his proof was

based upon an incorrect semantical stipulation for abstraction and was unaware of the

other problems with the proof.

10 See [1], pp. 72-75; [12], p. 190.

II See also [I],p. 75.

12 Lesniewski's notion of creative definitions is not the same as Frege's. To Frege a

creative definitiol'l amounts to mislabeling, as a definition, an existence postulate or

theorem. Frege discusses "creative definitions" in [4], Sect. 143; his principles of

definition are given in [3], Section. 33.

13 This did not escape Frege's notice. In [4], pp. 148-149 Frege argues that since he

introduces value-ranges by means of an axiom rather than a definition his procedure is

not open to the criticisms he had directed at his colleagues. My claim, however, is that

his metalanguage uses such a definition.

14 The question of why Frege introduced value-ranges in his metalanguage by means of

a' contextual stipulation is related to, but distinct from, the question of why he was

willing to settle by stipulation the question of whether, say, Julius Caesar is a value-

range.

FREGE'S PROOF OF REFERENTIALITY

195

15 This is especially clear in [5], pp. 191-192. See [13], pp. 206-207 for further

discussion.

16 I would like to thank Catherine Elign, Susan Hale, Philip Kitcher and Andrew Rein

for their help with this paper.

REFERENCES

[1] Bartlett, J.: 1961, Funktion und Gegenstand, Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-

Universitiit, M. Weiss, Munich.

[2] Dummett, M.: 1981, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, Harvard University

Press, Cambridge.

[3] Frege, G.: 1893, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol. I, H. Pohle, Jena.

[4] Frege, G.: 1903, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol. II, H. Pohle, Jena.

[5] Frege, G.: 1980, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, edited by H.

Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel and A. Veraat, abridged from the German by B.

McGuinness and translated by H. Kaal, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

[6] Frege, G.: 1979, Posthumous Writings, edited by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F.

Kaulbach, translated by P. Long and R. White, University of Chicago Press,

Chicago.

[7] Frege, G.: 1892, 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', ZeitschriJt fUr Philosophie und

philosophische Kritik 100, 25-50.

[8] Frege, G.: 1904, 'Was ist eine FunktionT, in Festschrift fUr Ludwig Boltzmann

gewidmet zum sechzigsten Geburtstage, 20. Februar 1904, A. Barth, Leipzig.

[9] Furth, M.: 1964, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System, a partial

translation of [3] , University of California Press, Los Angeles.

[10] Geach, P. and Black, M.: 1952, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of

Gottlob Frege, Blackwell, Oxford.

[11] Martin, E.: 1982, 'Referentiality in Frege's Grundgesetze', History and Philosophy

of Logic 3, 151-164.

[12] Parsons, c.: 1965, 'Frege's Theory of Number', in Philosophy in America, edited

by M. Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

[13] Resnik, M.: 1980, Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics, Cornell University

Press, Ithaca.

[14] Resnik, M.: 1963, Frege's Methodology, Dissertation, Harvard University.

[15] Sluga, H.: 1980, Frege, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

[16] Snapper, J.: 1974, 'Contextual Definition: What Frege Might Have Meant but

Probably Didn't', NoUsS, 259-272.

[17] Thiel, c.: 1965, Sinn und Bedeutung in der Logik Gottlob Freges, Verlag Anton

Hain, Meisenheim am Glan.

NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM:

A LOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION

Logicism by the end of the 19th century was a philosophical doctrine

whose time had come, and it is Gottlob Frege to whom we owe its

arrival. "Often," Frege once wrote, "it is only after immense intellectual

effort, which may have continued over centuries, that humanity at last

succeeds in achieving knowledge of a concept in its pure form, in

stripping off the irrelevant accretions which veil it from the eyes of the

mind" ([Fd] , p. xix). Prior to Frege, logicism was just such a concept

whose pure form was obscured by irrelevant accretions; and in his life's

work it was Frege who first presented this concept to humanity in its

pure form and developed it as a doctrine of the first rank.

That form, unfortunately, has become obscured once again. For

today, as we approach the end of the 20th century, logicism, as a

philosophical doctrine, is said to be dead, and even worse, to be

impossible. Frege's logicism, or the specific presentation he gave of it in

[Gg], fell to Russell's paradox, and, we are told, it cannot be resurrected.

Russell's own subsequent form of logicism presented in [PM], moreover,

in effect gives up the doctrine; for in overcoming his paradox Russell

was unable to reduce classical mathematics to logic without making at

least two assumptions which are not logically true; namely, his assump

tion of the axiom of reducibility and his assumption of an axiom of

infinity regarding the existence of infinitely many concrete or non

abstract individuals.

Contrary to popular opinion, however, logicism is not dead beyond

redemption; that is, if logicism is dead, then it can be easily resurrected.

This is not to say that as philosophical doctrines go logicism is true, but

only that it can be logically reconstructed and defended or advocated in

essentially the same philosophical context in which it was originally

formulated. This is true especially of Frege's form of logicism, as we

shall see, and in fact, by turning to his correspondence with Russell and

his discussion of Russell's paradox, we are able to fonnulate not only

one but two alternative reconstructions of his form of logicism, both of

which are consistent (relative to weak Zermelo set theory).

In regard to Russell's form of logicism, on the other hand, our

197

L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 197-252.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

198 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

resurrection will not apply directly to the form he adopted in [PM] but

rather to the form he was implicity advocating in his correspondence

with Frege shortly after the completion of [POM]. In this regard, though

we shall have occasion to refer to certain features of his later form of

logicism, especially in our concluding section where a counterpart to the

axiom of reducibility comes into the picture, it is Russell's early form of

logicism which we shall reconstruct and be concerned with here.

Though Frege's and Russell's early form of logicism are not the same,

incidentally, they are closely related; and one of our goals will be to

reconstruct or resurrect these forms with their similarity in mind. In

particular, it is our contention that both are to be reconstructed as

second order predicate logics in which nominalized predicates are

allowed to occur as abstract singular terms. Their important differences,

as we shall see, will then consist in the sort of object each takes

nominalized predicates to denote and in whether the theory of predica

tion upon which the laws of logic are to be based is to be extensional or

intensional.

1. LOGICISM AND THE PREDICA TIVE NATURE OF CONCEPTS

The doctrine of logicism can be succinctly stated in the following two

fold claim: (1) that all of the concepts of classical mathematics are

explicitly definable in terms of purely logical concepts; and (2) that all of

the theorems of classical mathematics can be derived from the laws of

logic through purely logical deductions (cf. [Camap]). This is not a

doctrine about the reducibility of mathematics to set theory, it should be

noted, but about the reducibility of classical mathematics to the con

cepts and laws of logic. In other words, it is not a doctrine about the

reducibility of mathematics to a theory of membership (in a class or set)

but about the reducibility of mathematics to a theory of predication, and

in particular to a theory about the concepts which predicates stand for

in their role as predicates. For this reason both Frege and Russell

maintain that the logistic framework within which classical mathematics

is to be represented must consist at least of a second order predicate

logic where quantification is not only with respect to the role of singular

terms but to that of predicates as well. Indeed, it was Frege himself who

first formulated and developed standard second order predicate logic,

and he did so precisely as a framework within which classical mathe

matics was to be reduced to logic.

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 199

The distinction between predicates and singulars terms, it must be

emphasized, is fundamental to both Frege's and Russell's forms of

logicism; and to fail to attend to this distinction is to fail to understand

the nature of predication in either framework. In particular, the attempt

to characterize predication in terms of a first order theory of exemplifi

cation (or a first order theory of membership without an axiom of

extensionality) is a nonstarter as far as either form of logicism is

concerned. Predicates are not singular terms or what Frege called

"proper names" in his extended sense, and the role of concepts in

predication is not that of objects or individuals to which other objects or

individuals stand in a relation of exemplification.

Now this does not mean that predicates cannot be nominalized and

transformed into singular terms the way that 'human', 'triangular', 'wise',

etc. can be transformed into 'humanity', 'triangularity', 'wisdom', etc.; or

to use Frege's example, the way 'horse' can be transformed into 'the

concept horse'. Rather, the point is that any account of nominalized

predicates as abstract singular terms presupposes an account of their

role as predicates; and in particular any relational predicate such as

'exemplifies' or 'falls under', as in 'Socrates exemplifies humanity' and

'Bucephalus falls under the concept horse', is to be viewed as derived

from an account of predication in which predicates do not have such

nominalized forms. Indeed, the priority of the role of a predicate as a

predicate over the corresponding role of its nominalization as an

abstract singular term is in fact one of the ways we are to understand

Frege's famous context principle (cf. [Fd], p. xxii). For it is only in the

context of a sentence that a predicate can occur as a predicate, and it is

only throught a correlation with such occurrences that we are to under

stand the role of a nominalized predicate as an abstract singular term.

This sort of correlation is fundalnental not only to Frege's logicism but

also to the reconstruction we shall propose.

What distinguishes a predicate from its nominalization, according to

Frege, is that a predicate has an unsaturated nature which is essential to

its role in predication. That is, whereas a nominalized predicate is a

complete, saturated expression in its own right, the predicate itself is in

need of supplementation, and it is this unsaturatedness or need of

supplemenatation which is the basis of its predicative nature. Moreover,

because this unsaturatedness is essential to its role in predication, the

concept which a predicate stands for (bedeutet) is said by Frege to have

a corresponding unsaturated nature as well. Indeed, it is precisely the

200 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

corresponding unsaturatedness of a concept which Frege identifies as

its predicative nature (cf. [G & Bj, p. 47, [PW], p. 177).

Now just as the predicative nature of a predicate excludes its being a

singular term, so too, according to Frege, the predicative or unsaturated

nature of a concept excludes it from being the dena tatum (Bedeutung)

of a singular term; and therefore what a nominalized predicate denotes,

according to Frege, is not the concept which the predicate otherwise

stands for in its role as a predicate. Instead, according to Frege, the

concept "must first be converted into an object, or, speaking more

precisely, represented by an object" ([G & Bj, p. 46), and it will be this

object, or concept-correlate as Frege also calls it, which is the real

denotatum of the nominalized predicate. Thus in particular, what 'the

concept horse' denotes, according to Frege, is not a concept but an

object, that is, a concept-correlate.

This is not the conclusion Russell comes to in [POMj and thereafter,

it should be noted; and in fact, as already indicated, Russell's different

view in this regard is one of the principal differences between his and

Frege's form of logicism. Russell did hold something rather similar to

Frege's view in an unpublished manuscript of 1898, it might be noted;

but in [pOM], it is clear, he explicitly rejects the earlier view. Thus

(keeping in mind that terms and predicates for Russell are individuals

and concepts, respectively, and not expressions) in 1898 he wrote that

"the peculiarity of predicates is that they are meanings," and "although it

is impossible to speak of meanings without making them subjects ... ,

yet meanings as such are the antithesis of subjects, are destitute of being,

and incapable of plurality. When I say 'Socrates is human,' human as

used in this judgment does not have being, and is not a logical subject. I

am, in a word, not asserting a relation between two subjects. As soon as

I make human a term, ... I have added something, namely being, one-

ness, and diversity of being from other terms which human as predicate

did not not possess" ([AMRj, book I, p. 10).

Russell briefly restates this view in [pOMj, observing that "it might be

thought that a distinction ought to be made between a concept as such

and a concept as used as a term" (p. 45); but he quickly rejects it,

claiming that "inextricable difficulties will envelop us if we allow such a

view" (ibid.). The difficulties in question, it turns out, are those con-

nected with such claims as that the concept horse is not a concept,

which Russell thinks is false and leads to a contradiction. His conclusion

is that "terms which are concepts differ from those which are not, not in

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 201

respect of self-subsistence, but in virtue of the fact that, in certain true

or false propositions, they occur in a manner which is different in an

indefinable way from the manner in which subjects or terms of relations

occur" (ibid., p. 46). In other words, concepts, including relations, are

individuals (since 'term' for Russell is synonymous with 'individual' - cf.

[POM], p. 43), and they are denoted as such by nominalized predicates

occurring as abstract singular terms. Yet, predicate expressions are not

singular terms and the concepts which predicate expressions stand for in

their role as predicates do not occur in propositions the way that

individuals denoted by singular terms do. That is, even though concepts,

according to Russell, do not have an unsaturated nature, nevertheless

they do have a predicative nature in virtue of which they can occur in

propositions in "a manner which is different in an indefinable way" from

that in which individuals denoted by singular terms occur.

Now the "indefinable way" in which a concept can occur in a

proposition as a concept and not as a term, according to Russell, is also

a feature of what he calls a propositional function; and in fact in [pOM]

a propositional function can occur in a proposition only in this "indefin-

able way". That is, unlike concepts, propositional functions in [POM]

are not individuals. To be sure, to each concept there corresponds a

unique propositional function in the propositional values of which the

concept occurs as a concept; but upon discovering his paradox, Russell

was led in [POMI to doubt that every propositional function is either

itself a concept or that it has a concept corresponding to it. Of course,

"apart from the contradiction in question," Russell observes, "this point

might appear to be merely verbal: 'being an x such that fjJx,' it might be

said, may always be taken as a predicate [concept]. But in view of our

contradiction," Russell continues, "all remarks on this subject must be

viewed with caution" (ibid., p. 88). In particular, the contradiction is

avoided for Russell in [POM) "by the recognition that the functional

part of a propositional function is not an independent entity" (ibid.); and

in fact it was precisely for this reason that Russell was led in his

commentary on Frege (in Appendix A of [POM]) to claim that "the

word Begrijf is used by Frege to mean nearly the same thing as

propositional function" (p. 507).

In his later form of logicism in [PM], Russell was able to avoid his

paradox while also claiming that propositional functions are single

entities after all; i.e., that propositional functions are individuals, albeit

of a higher order/type than concrete individuals, a fact which is often

202 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

missed or ignored by philosophers and logicians alike since, contrary to

his earlier practice, Russell chose to use 'individual' in [PM] only to refer

to concrete individuals. There is no point in distinguishing concepts

from propositional functions in such a framework, needless to say, and

in fact we shall not assume any such distinction even in our resurrection

of the form of logicism which is implicit in Russell's correspondence

with Frege shortly after [POM] was written. That is, having noted the

difference between concepts and propositional functions which Russell

thought he was committed to in [POM] as a result of his paradox, we

shall nevertheless assume that concepts, including relations, are none

other than propositional functions, since that in fact was what Russell

originally thought and returned to in his later form of logicism. We

return in this way to the original context of Russell's paradox as it

applies to Russell's early form of logicism no less so than as it applies to

Frege's form of logicism. In that regard, in other words, we may assume

that the only important difference between Frege's and Russell's early

form of logicism which need concern us at this point is that whereas

according to Frege nominalized predicates denote concept-correlates,

i.e., objects somehow correlated with concepts, for Russell nominalized

predicates denote the same concepts or propositional functions which

the predicates in question otherwise stand for in their role as predicates.

What is common to both forms of logicism, on the other hand, is that

the concepts assumed in each form have a predicative nature, and that it

is this predicative nature which is the basis of the laws of logic.

2. PREDICATION VS. FUNCTIONALITY

Standard second order predicate logic with identity, we have already

noted, was first formulated by Frege as a framework in which to carry

out the reduction of classical mathematics to logic. The reduction is not

forthcoming, to be sure, without a logistic treatment of nominalized

predicates or some such equivalent device, but still it is a framework in

which the laws of logic have their basic form prior to any assumption

about how nominalized predicates are to be interpreted. In this regard it

is a system of the laws of logic which are common to both Frege's and

Russell's early form of logicism; and for that reason we shall tum to its

formulation first.

Accordingly, let us use 'x', 'y', and 'z', with or without numerical

subscripts, to refer (in the metalanguage) to individual variables, and

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 203

similarly let us use 'pn" 'Gn' and 'Rn' to refer to n-place predicate

variables. (JVe shall usually delete the superscript when the context

makes clear the number of subject or argument positions that go with a

predicate variable or constant; and we shall only use 'Rn' when n > 1.)

As primitive logical constants, let us take -> (the material conditional

sign), - (the negation sign), = (the identity sign), and 'if (the universal

quantifier sign). As usual, we understand the juxtaposition of signs to

represent their concatenation. We shall also use parentheses and

brackets as auxiliary signs.

Ignoring the introduction of predicate and individual constants for

the special applications of logic, the basic or atomic formulas are all of

the expressions of the forms x = y and pn(XI> ... , x

n

), where n is a

natural number. Well-formed formulas, or wjfs, are then defined as the

members of the smallest set K containing the atomic formulas and such

that - <jJ, (<jJ -> 'IjJ), ('if x)<jJ, ('if P)<jJ are in K whenever <jJ, 'IjJ are in K and x

and P are an individual and an n-place predicate variable, respectively,

for all natural numbers n. For convenience, we shall use '<jJ' and ''IjJ' to

refer (in the metalanguage) to wffs (with and without predicate and

individual constants as well). We assume the usual notions of bondage

and freedom of variables, of one variable or constant being free for

another in a given wff, and of the proper substitution of a wff for an n

place predicate variable (relative to n individual variables occurring free

in that wff as subject-position indicators).

No function symbols other than predicate variables (and constants)

have been introduced into our present logical syntax, it should be noted;

and in this regard, it might be said, our formalism is more in line with

Russell's form of logicism than with Frege's. For whereas Frege

explained predication in terms of the mathematical notion of function-

ality (cf. [G & B], p. 47), Russell explained mathematical functionality in

terms of predication, i.e., in terms of the predicative nature of proposi-

tional functions. That is, according to Russell, "the sort of function

which is fundamental in logic is the propositional function; and the

functions customary in mathematics are defined by means of this" (EA],

p. 261). Thus "if f(x) is not a propositional function, its value for a given

value of x ... is the term y satisfying, for the given value of x, some

relational proposition; this relational proposition is involved in the

definition of f(x), and some such propositional function is required in

the definition of any function which is not propositional" ([POM], p.

508).

204 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

All functions other than propositional functions, in other words, can

be identified with many-one relations (cf. [POM], p. 83); and this, from

either a philosophical or a logical point of view, is not an unimportant

observation. Stated in this way, however, the observation in no way runs

counter to Frege's form of logicism. For just as Frege analyzed all truth-

functions in terms of those for negation and the material conditional,

so too he could have analyzed all functions in terms of those which he

calls concepts and relations, i.e., in terms of functions from objects

to truth-values. (Frege never spoke of relations as concepts; i.e.,

concepts were always unary functions from objects to truth-values for

Frege. For convenience, however, we shall speak here of relations as

relational concepts; and whether a concept is unary or relational, we

shall in either case refer to the saturated object corresponding to that

concept as a concept-correlate.)

There is something in Russell's way of making the above observation,

incidentally, which should not be overlooked; namely, that functionality

presupposes predication in that it depends essentially on the unity of a

proposition. Curiously, though Frege himself did not explain function-

ality in terms of predication, nevertheless precisely this sort of con-

sideration, whether applied to the unity of a sentence or to the thought

(Gedanke) expressed by that sentence, seems to be fundamental to his

notion of unsaturatedness, which of course is the basis of his notion of

functionality. Thus in regard to the unsaturated nature of a predicate as

the predicative component of a sentence, Frege argued that "this

unsaturatedness ... is necessary, since otherwise the parts [of the

sentence) do not hold together" ([PW), p. 177); and, similarly, "not

all the parts of a thought can be complete; at least one must be

'unsaturated', or predicative; otherwise they would not hold together"

([G & B), p. 54). In other words, though Frege explained predication in

terms of his mathematical notion of functionality, ultimately his only

argument for the unsaturatedness of functions is his argument for the

unsaturatedness of the functions involved in predication, whether that

predication be syntactical or otherwise. In this regard our present for-

malism neither distorts nor runs counter to Frege's form of logicism;

and indeed, if anything, it rather emphasizes what is really fundamental

in Frege's view of logicism.

3. EXISTENTIAL POSITS AND THE LAWS OF LOGIC

The laws of logic, according to Frege, must be universal, but only in the

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 205

sense that they must be applicable to any objects whatsoever. Frege

does not mean to deny, in other words, that there are any existential

posits among the laws of logic. To be sure, none of Frege's axioms in his

Begriffsschrift are other than universal in form, but this does not mean

that no existential posits are provable on the basis of these axioms. In

particular, the (impredicative) comprehension principle,

(CP) (3P) (Vx) . .. (Vxn) [F(x), . .. ,x

n

) ... j,

where is a wff (pure or applied) in which P does not occur free and

XI' .. , xn are pairwise distinct individual variables occurring free in ,

is easily seen to be provable on the basis of Frege's basic law (lIb).

Besides being provable, however, (CP) can be taken as an axiom

schema and Frege's basic law (lIb) derived instead. That is, together

with the remaining axioms and rules of standard second order predicate

logic with identity, Frege's basic law (lIb), which we can formulate as

follows,

(UI2) (VP)'IjJ -> 'IjJ[/F(xI"" ,x

n

)],

is provable on the basis of (CP) (cf. [Henkin]). Now although there is

something to be said in favor of having the basic laws of logic all be

universal in form, there is also something to be said for putting one's

existential posits up front. In addition, there is something appropriate

about avoiding the notion of proper substitution in stating the basic laws

of logic, especially such a complex notion as the substitution of a wff for

a predicate variable (relative to certain individual variables free in that

wff as subject-position indicators).

Such an observation applies on the first order level as well, inciden-

tally, especially if we are to adhere to Frege's view that "correctly-formed

names must always denote something" ([Gg], vol. 1, 28); for of

course that view amounts to the assumption that logic is not free of

existential presuppositions regarding singular terms. That is, where a is a

singular term in which X does not occur (free), the fact that a denotes

something (as a value of the bound individual variables), i.e., (3x) (a =

x), is provable on the basis of Frege's basic law (IIa):

(UI

I

) ('V x)'IjJ -> 'IjJ( a/ x).

But, conversely, given the remaining axioms and rules, (UI

I

) is also

provable on the basis of (:Ix) (a = x) (cf. [K & MD.

A substitution free axiom set for standard second order predicate

logic with identity can be described, accordingly, as follows. As axioms

206 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

(or basic laws of logic) we need take only all wffs (pure or applied)

which are either tautologous or of one of the following forms:

(AI) (Vu) [ -+ 1/J]

-+ [(Vu) -+ (Vu)1/J],

(A2) -+ (Vu),

(A3) (3x) (a = x),

(LL) (a= b) -+ ( - 1/J),

(CP) (3P) (V Xl) ... (V xn)

[F(XI , ... , xn) - j,

where u is an individual or a pre-

dicate variable,

where u is an individual or pre-

dicate variable not occurring free

in '

where a is a singular term in

which x does not occur free,

where a, b are singular terms and

1/J comes from by replacing

one or more free occurrences of

b by free occurrences of a,

where Fn does not occur free in

, and Xl' ... , Xn are among the

distinct individual variables oc-

curing free in .

As inference rules we need take only modus ponens and universal

generalization:

(MP) if f- and f- ( -+ 1/J), then f- ;

(UG) if f- , and u is an individual or a predicate variable, then f-

(Vu).

Unlike Frege, incidentally, Russell does not take (Ul

l

) and (UI

z

) as basic

laws, but instead he takes their contrapositives, i.e., their corresponding

form as existential generalizations (cf. [PM], *9.1):

(EG

1

) 1/J(a/x) -+ (3x)1/J,

(EG2) 1/J[/F(XI"'" xn)] -+ (3P)1/J.

Of course, Russell does not distinguish these two laws and expresses

(EG

2

) in the form of (EG

I

); but that is because his "individual" variables

are really metalinguistic variables subject to systematic ambiguity. The

substitution of wffs for predicate variables which is involved in (EG

2

) is

only implicit in Russell, moreover, and (EG

2

) is really effected through

his use of the cap-notation, (Xj, ... , xn)' for the representation of

propositional functions. Such a use of the cap-notation, needless to say,

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 207

amounts to applying a syntactical operation for the generation of com-

plex predicates. An alternative notation which we shall adopt here is

Alonzo Church's A-operator for functional abstraction. That is, instead

of Russell's notation ... , xn) we shall use [AXI ... for the

expression of a complex predicate. Russell's "primitive proposition"

(EG

2

) can then be restated as follows:

1Jl([A..Xi .. P) (3P)1Jl.

According to Russell, incidentally, "the above primitive proposition

gives the only method of proving 'existence-theorems'" ([PM], p. 131).

That is, "in order to prove such theorems, it is necessary (and sufficient)

to find some instance in which an object possesses the property in

question. If we were to assume 'existence-axioms', i.e., axioms stating

(:lz) . fjJz for some particular fjJ, these axioms would give other methods

of proving existence. Instances of such axioms are the multiplicative

axiom (*88) and the axiom of infinity .... But we have not assumed any

such axioms in the present work" (ibid.).

This is somewhat misleading, needless to say, since it suggests that in

logic "existence-theorems" are only conditional theorems, and this we

know from our discussion of (CP) is false. Thus, in particular, where

ai' ... , an are singular terms which are free, respectively, for Xl' ... , Xn

in fjJ, the basic law regarding complex predicates corresponding to

Russell's of his cap-notation is the principle of A-conversion:

(A-Conv)

Generalized, this principle can be stated as follows:

(V/A-Conv) (Vx

l

) ... (VXn)([AXI ... XnfjJ] (Xl" .. , Xn) .... fjJ);

and of course from this, (CP) follows by (EG

2

).

It is historically noteworthy, incidentally, that the first explicit use of

(CP) as a basic law of logic occurs in [Tarski] where it is credited to

Lesniewski (cf. [Henkin], p. 203). Lesniewski apparently, referred to

special cases of (CP), each of which is really an instance of (V / A-Conv),

as "pseudo-definitions", which of course is quite appropriate since (CP)

is the logical basis of all explicit definitions of predicate constants. That

is, it is on the basis of (CP) that any such definition can be shown to be

noncreative and that the predicate constant so defined is eliminable in

principle. It is in terms of these "pseudo-definitions", in other words,

that the reduction of classical mathematics to logic is to be effected.

208 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

4. WERTVERLAuFE AS CONCEPT-CORRELATES

No reduction of mathematics is forthcoming, however, without a logistic

treatment of nominalized predicates, or some such equivalent syntactic

device such as Frege's notation for value-ranges (Wertverliiufe). Value-

ranges, it should be noted, are not sets or classes in the sense of being

composed of their members; rather, they are the saturated logical

objects which Frege also informally called concept-correlates. That is,

value ranges are for Frege the denotata of norninalized predicates - or

at least that is what we claim in our reconstruction and shall attempt to

show in what follows. If we are right in this claim, then we may in effect

identify Frege's implicit logic of nominalized predicates, that is, the logic

which is implicit in his informal remarks, with his explicit logic of value-

ranges. Indeed, this way of viewing Frege's theory of value-ranges, we

claim, will not only provide the essential rationale for his basic Law V

regarding value-ranges but it will also explain why his theory of value-

ranges is not really a second-order set theory.

In justifying our basic claim that value-ranges are concept-correlates,

accordingly, let us turn first to 'On Concept and Object', where Frege

explicitly states that an expression of the form 'the concept F' denotes

not a concept but an object which is somehow correlated with that

concept. In particular, in response to Benno Kerry's objection that

concepts are objects, and, moreover, objects other than their extensions,

Frege explains that "in my way of speaking expressions like 'the concept

F' designate not concepts but objects" ([G & Bj, p. 48). That is, "if he

[Kerry] thinks that I have identified concept and extension of concept,

he is mistaken; I merely expressed my view that in the expression 'the

number that applies to the concept F is the extension of the concept

like-numbered to the concept F' the words 'extension of the concept'

could be replaced by 'concept'. Notice carefully that here the word

'concept' is combined with the definite article" (ibid.). In other words,

according to Frege, 'the extension of the concept like-numbered to the

concept F' denotes the same object as that which is denoted by 'the

concept like-numbered to the concept F'. In a footnote of his original

draft of this passage, Frege writes that "the question whether one should

simply put 'the concept' for 'the extension of the concept' is in my view

one of expediency" ([PW], p. 106). Of course, by the extension of a

concept Frege means none other than a value-range (ct. [Gg], vol 1, 3).

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 209

The above explanatory remark is about as explicit as Frege gets in

identifying concept-correlates with value-ranges. More indirect, but also

more important, evidence for this identification can be found in the

connection Frege implicitly makes between second level concepts and

concept-correlates on the one hand and that which he explicitly makes

between second level concepts and value-ranges on the other. A second

level concept, we should explain, is essentially what a variable binding

operator on wffs to wffs (such as a quantifier) stands for, or, equiva-

lently, it is a concept corresponding to an open wff whi<:h may be used

in a third order comprehension principle to specify such a variable

binding operator, such as the wff (Vx) [F(x) -+ G(x)j which specifies the

second level relational concept of the subordination of one first level

concept to another (cf. [NBC-I]). A first level concept, i.e., one which a

predicate stands for, is said by Frege to fall within a second level

concept in a way analogous to (but still not the same as) the way that an

object is said to fall under a first level concept.

Now the connection between second level concepts and concept-

correlates which is implicit in "On Concept and Object" is the thesis that

corresponding to each second level concept there is a special first level

concept such that a first level concept, say, G, falls within that second

level concept if, and only if, the object correlated with G, i.e., the

concept G, falls under the corresponding special first level concept; or in

symbols (in the monadic case), where subject-position occurrences of a

predicate variable are nominalized occurrences of that variable:

(VQx) (3F) (VG) [(Qx)G(x) ++ F(G)j.

Thus, for example, corresponding to the second level concept of

(objectual) existence, i.e., the second level concept that first order

existential quantifier phrases stand for, there is the special first level

concept of being realized; and the correspondence, according to Frege,

is so tight that even the same thought is expressed by 'there is a square

root of 4' and 'the concept square root of 4 is realized' (cf. [G & Bj, p.

49f). A concept-correlate is realized, in other words, if, and only if,

there exists an object which falls under the concept in question.

Needless to say, but if value-ranges really are concept-correlates,

then Frege's thesis connecting second level concepts with concept-

correlates should connect second level concepts with value-ranges; and

indeed Frege explicitly states this to be the case in [Ggj, vol. 1, 25. That

210 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

is, according to Frege, "second level functions can be represented in a

certain manner by first level functions, whereby the functions that

appear as arguments of the former are represented by their value-

ranges" (op. cit.); or in symbols (in the case of unary concepts):

(VQx) (3F) (VG) [(Qx)G(x) - F(tG(E].

The singular term tG(E) is of course Frege's notation for the extension

(value-range) of the concept G; and the above thesis, it should be noted,

amounts in effect to a restatement of Frege's context principle regarding

such expressions. That is, just as it is only in the context of a sentence

(or of a wff in general) that a predicate can occur as a predicate, it is

only through a correlation with such occurrences of a predicate that we

are to understand the role of the name for a value-range; and of course

it is precisely the same thesis, and therefore the same restatement of his

context principle, which Frege implicitly gives for nominalized predi-

cates, i.e., for abstract singular terms of the form 'the concept G'. We

may read 'tG(E)', in other words, either as 'the concept G' or as 'the

extension of the concept G', which, as already noted, is exactly what

Frege said in the footnote referred to above ([PW] , p. 106).

For convenience, we shall hereafter refer to the above thesis (in

either form) as Frege's double correlation thesis. This is because Frege

assumes as part of his thesis both a one-to-one correlation between

second level concepts and certain special first level concepts on the one

hand, and a one-to-one correlation between first level concepts and

certain special objects called concept-correlates or value-ranges on the

other. Our two alternative reconstructions or resurrections of Frege's

logicism, as we shall see, will turn precisely on a minor modification of

one or the other of the correlations involved in this thesis.

5. FREGE'S DOUBLE CORRELATION THESIS AND HIS BASIC

LAWV

There is at least one other place in Frege's wntmgs which clearly

indicates that value-ranges are concept-correlates, and which, given

Frege's extensional view of concepts (as functions from objects to truth-

values) provides the essential rationale for his Basic Law V. Both the

identification and the rationale, it should be noted, are again based on

Frege's double correlation thesis, only now applied to second level

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 211

relational concepts, and in particular to the second level relation of

mutual subordination.

Indeed, Frege's Basic Law V, viz.,

tF(E) = tG(E) ++ (Vx) [F(x) ++ G(x)j,

should be viewed precisely as a special instance of his double correla-

tion thesis. For what is indicated on the right hand side of this law is

none other than the second level relation of material equivalence or

mutual subordination of two first level concepts; and on Frege's exten-

sional view of concepts (as functions from objects to truth-values) such

an equivalence amounts in effect to their "identity". That is, Frege's

Basic Law V amounts to correlating the first level relation of identity

with his second level relation of mutual subordination. Such a correla-

tion is needed, Frege observes, since "to construe mutual subordination

simply as equality is forbidden by the basic difference between first and

second level relations. Concepts cannot stand in a first level relation.

That wouldn't be false, it would be nonsense. Only in the case of objects

can there by any question of equality (identity). And so the said transfor

mation [from mutual subordination to identity] can only occur by

concepts being correlated with the same object. It is all, so to speak,

moved down a level" ([PW], p. 182, italics added). Of course, if concept-

correlates are identical when the concepts in question are mutually

subordinate, then concept-correlates are none other than the extensions

of the correlated concepts; i.e., then concept-correlates are value-ranges.

The identification of value-ranges as concept-correlates also explains,

it should be noted, why Frege's theory of value-ranges is really not a

second order set theory. For as a concept-correlate, Frege observes, a

value-range "simply has its being in the concept, not in the objects which

belong to it" (ibid., p. 183). That is, unlike sets whose existence or being

is constituted by their members, concept-correlates, and therefore

value-ranges, are "logical objects" whose sole determination is given by

Frege's double correlation thesis, which, as already noted, is really a

restatement of his context principle applied specifically to nominalized

predicates. It is this thesis, in other words, which explains how "by

means of our logical faculties we lay hold upon the extension of a

concept, by starting out from the concept" (ibid., p. 181); for as also

already noted, a value-range, and therefore a concept-correlate, is none

other than the extension of a concept. In this regard, accordingly, the

confusion sometimes made of Frege's theory of value-ranges with a

212 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

second order set theory might best be obviated by directly describing

his theory of value-ranges as a theory of concept-correlates; that is, by

describing his logicism as a second order predicate logic with nominal-

ized predicates.

6. RUSSELL AND FREGE ON NOMINALIZED PREDICATES

Unlike Frege for whom the extension of a concept "has its being in the

concept, not in the objects which belong to it," Russell originally took

the extension of a concept to be a class, or rather he took it to be what

he called a class as many as opposed to a class as one; and a class as

many, according to Russell, is essentially many, i.e., it is essentially

composed of its members (cf. [POM), chap. VI). Being many, however, a

class as many is not a single object, according to Russell, and therefore

it could not occur in a proposition as a term, which in effect defeated

the whole point of Russell's original form of logicism.

Of course, prior to the discovery of his paradox, Russell assumed that

a class as one always existed corresponding to a class as many (cf.

[pOM), p. 104); and as so determined, a class as one was also composed

of its members. But since a class as one is an individual, according to

Russell, then it, unlike its corresponding class as many, can occur in a

proposition as a term; and therefore the fact that a class as many, that is,

the extension of a concept, was not a single object was without any real

effect in Russell's original form of logicism.

With the discovery of his paradox, however, Russell gave up the

assumption that a class as one always existed corresponding to a class as

many. That is, Russell came to believe that it was this assumption which

was "the source of the contradiction" (ibid.). In particular, in regard to

his paradox of the class of classes that are not members of themselves,

Russell found that he could only conclude that "the classes which as

ones are not members of themselves as many do not form a class - or

rather, that they do not form a class as one, for the argument cannot

show that they do not form a class as many" (ibid., p. 102). Having given

up this assumption, however, Russell in effect was forced to give up his

original form of logicism.

Shortly after completing [POM) , Russell gave up not only the

assumption that a class as one always existed corresponding to a class as

many but he gave up assuming that there are any classes at all - i.e.,

classes in the sense of objects that are essentially composed of their

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 213

members. Thus, in his May 24, 1903 letter to Frege we find Russell

writing that "I believe I have discovered that classes are entirely super-

fluous. Your designation e(E) can be used for itself, and x n e(E)

for (x)" ([PMq, p. 158). (Frege's notation 'x n ecp(E)' in effect

amounts to 'x E ecp(e),' as Russell observed in [POMI, p. 512.) The

important suggestion here, it should be noted, is that propositional func-

tions are individuals after all, and therefore they can occur in proposi-

tions as terms instead of the classes as ones Russell originally assumed

to correspond to their extensions. That is, instead of assuming that

there are any classes, whether as "ones" or as "manys", Russell is now

proposing what later he called his "no classes" theory; i.e., the theory

that propositional functions are single entities (individuals) after all, and

that all talk of classes is to be reduced to talk of propositional functions.

Frege's response to Russell's letter is of course predictable. "I cannot

regard your attempt to make classes entirely dispensable as successful,

the reason being that you use function letters in isolation" ([PMq, p.

160). In other words, according to Frege, "to use a function sign in

isolation is to contradict the nature of a function, which consists in its

unsaturatedness" (ibid.). Russell's reply in turn is of course also predict-

able by now, for he writes that "it is not dear to rile that it is never

permissible to use to function letter in isolation" (ibid., 166). That is,

Russell simply refuses to accept the unsaturated nature of concepts.

Despite the stalemate on this point, however, the exchange is instruc-

tive for our present purposes. For to do what Russell suggests, Frege

(ibid., p. 161) observes that "we would first have to transform all [unary]

function names in such a way that there was only one argument place

and that was on the right-hand side. Thus, we would have to transform,

e.g., 'x

2

= l' into '(e

2

= l)x', and 'x(x - 1) (x + 1) = 0' into '[(e - 1)

(e + 1) = Olx', so that we could write

(e

2

= 1)x::? [e(e-l) (e+ 1) = O]x

and for this, according to your [Russell's] definition,

(e

2

= 1) c [e(e- 1) (e+ 1) = OJ.''

Now what should be especially noted here is that Frege uses the sipritus

asper or rough breathing operator to generate a complex predicate as

opposed to his use of the spiritus lenis or smooth breathing operator to

generate a complex singular term (for a value-range). Stated in terms of

our own notation, and using the A-operator to generate complex predi-

214 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

cates, Frege's point is that in transforming a wff into a complex

predicate, [AX(X)], we must keep in mind that [A.x(x)] really has a pair

of parentheses (and commas as well in the case of a relational predicate)

accompanying it. Thus whereas

(Vy) ([AX(X)] (y) [AX1jJ(X)] (y

is a well-formed formula in which two A-abstracts occur as complex

predicates, the expression

R([AX(X)], [AX1jJ(X)]),

where R is a 2-place predicate constant, cannot be well-formed or

meaningful as far as Frege is concerned, since as a complex predicate a

A-abstract "would be defined only in connection with an argument sign

following it, and it would nevertheless be used without one; it would be

defined as a function sign and used as a proper name, which will not do"

(ibid.,p.161t).

In his reply on this point, Russell is undaunted, insisting, as already

noted, that an expression for a propositional function can at least in

some cases be used as a singular term. This will not do as it stands, of

course, but we can reconstruct Russell's position here by distinguishing

between two transformations of a wff (x) where Frege has acknowl-

edged only one. That is, we can first transform (x) into the complex

predicate [AX(X)] () which does have an accompanying argument or

subject position (indicated by the last pair of parentheses); and then we

can transform this complex predicate into the singular term [A.x(x)]

which does not have an accompanying argument or subject position. A

confusion might arise here if we allow ourselves to speak of [AX(X)] as

both a predicate and a singular term; but so long as we understand that

when used as a predicate it must be accompanied by a pair of paren-

theses (and commas in the case of a relational predicate), no confusion

should arise if these parentheses (and commas) are informally dropped

for abbreviatory purposes.

Frege, incidentally, is not unaware of this second transformation of a

predicate into a singular term; for in applying Russell's suggested nota-

tion in just this way, he notes that "we would have 'i( e

2

= 1) = i[( e - 1)

(e + 1) = 0]" which does not differ essentially from my 'f(e

2

= 1) =

e[e e - 1) (e + 1) = 0]'" (ibid., p. 162). But in that case, Frege observes,

Russell's suggested notation for nominalized predicates "would lead to

the same difficulties as my value-range notation" (ibid., p. 161). That is,

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 215

other than assuming that nominalized complex predicates denote con-

cepts or propositional functions as single entities, Russell's suggested

use of such singular terms in 1903 was no less immune from his

paradox than was Frege's use of the same singular terms to denote

value-ranges.

7. RUSSELL'S PARADOX REVISITED

In turning to Russell's paradox and its resolution in our reconstruction

of Frege's and Russell's early form of logicism, i.e., the form of logicism

Russell was implicitly advocating in his correspondence with Frege, let

us first give a more explicit formulation of both the logical grammar and

the logical principles involved in the above exchange. As indicated,

instead of using both the spiritus asper or rough breathing operator for

the generation of complex predicates from wffs and the spiritus lenis or

smooth breathing operator for the generation of complex singular terms

from wffs, we shall follow the reconstructed Russellian strategy sug-

gested above and use only the A-operator for both purposes. Also, for

convenience of expression we shall informally drop parentheses and

commas when referring to predicates. It should be noted in this regard,

however, that using one operator and adopting an informal convention

of dropping parentheses and commas when referring to predicate

expressions in no way prejudges the case in favor of Russell's view that

concepts have a saturated or individual nature. Aside from simplicity

and economy of notation, in other words, the convention allows us to

formulate a logical grammar which is common to both forms of logic-

ism. (We will later introduce an intensional operator for Russell's form

of logicism as well, but this will not affect the grammar which is

common to both forms of logicism.)

In describing our logical grammar we shall for convenience of exposi-

tion identify the diffferent types of meaningful expressions by associat-

ing them with different natural numbers, where 0 is understood to

represent the type of all singular terms, 1 the type of all wffs or proposi-

tional forms, and n + 1, for n > 1, the type of all n-place predicate

expressions. Individual variables, accordingly, are of type 0, proposi-

tional variables are of type 1, and n-place predicate variables are of type

n + 1. We continue to ignore the introduction of special individual and

predicate constants, and, for nEro, we recursively define the meaning

ful expressions of type n, in symbols, MEn> as follows:

216

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

every individual variable (or constant) is in MEa, and every

n-place predicate variable (or constant) is in both MEn+ I and

MEo;

if a, b E ME

o

, then (a= b) E MEl;

if :n E MEn+I' and aI' ... , an E ME

o

, then :n(a

l

, ... , an) E

MEl;

if E MEl, and Xl' ... , xn are pairwise distinct individual

variables, then [AXI ... E ME

n

+

l

;

if E MEl, then - E MEl;

if and ljJ and in MEl> then ..... ljJ) E MEl;

if E MEl' and a is an individual or a predicate variable,

then ('V E MEl;

if E MEl, then E MEo; and

if n > 1, then MEn MEo.

Singular terms, which we shall also refer to simply as terms, are now

understood to be all the members of MEo; and for n > 0, we under-

stand the members of ME

n

+

1

to be n-place predicate expressions. We

are in general to think of each n-place predicate expression as having n

argument or subject positions associated with it, and, as in clause (3)

above, these are all understood to occur within parentheses and to be

separated from one another by commas. Wffs or propositional forms

are of course all the members of MEl. Note that whereas by clause (9)

every predicate expression is a term, not every wff is a term. We differ

in this regard from what Frege would allow; but our difference is

negligible since by clause (4), where n = 0, is a wff if is a wff,

and by clause (8) is a term. In other words, besides O-place

predicate variables (and constants), wffs are terms only when prefixed

by the A-operator. We shall in general read as 'that f when it

occurs in a wff as a term, i.e., when it occurs in one of the arguments or

subject positions of a predicate expression.

It is clear of course that predicate expression occurring in the argu-

ment or subject positions of other predicates, or of themselves as well,

are intended to represent the nominalized predicates that occur in natu-

rallanguage. For this reason, we shall refer to such occurrences of a

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 217

predicate as nominalized occurrences of that predicate, acknowledging

thereby that it has been transformed into an abstract singular term. Note

that adding such suffixes as '-ity', '-ness', or '-hood' to nominalized

occurrences of predicates would be completely superfluous here since

such occurrences are already formally identified as subject position

occurrences. The same observation applies, needless to say, to the use of

such related phrases as 'the concept P or 'being an P. Such phrases and

suffixes are important in transformational grammar. no doubt, since

they serve to mark derived nominal expressions in the surface grammar

of English; and in that regard we shall ourselves use such expressions

when translating or verbally stating certain theses in English. Neverthe-

less, it is sheer sophistry to insist that such surface grammatical features

of English either must or should occur in our "deep structure" logical

forms, as though a logical error were being committed otherwise.

As logical principles regarding this grammar and with respect to

which Russell's paradox is to be derived, we assume exactly the same

axioms and inference rules of standard second order predicate logic

with identity already described in 3, but understood now to apply to

wffs containing nominalized predicates as well. We assume in this

regard (but avoid going into the details here) the obvious definitions of

bondage and freedom of terms and predicate expressions in wffs and

A-abstracts, and also when one such expression can be properly substi-

tuted for another of the same type. In general we shall use a *-label in

referring to axioms and other theses so as to remind ourselves that we

are now dealing with wffs which may contain nominalized predicates as

singular terms. Thus, e.g., Axiom (A3), which is now referred to as

(A3*), has not only

(3y) (Fn-= y)

but also

(3y) ([AXI ... x

n

] = y)

as an instance. Similarly, Leibniz' Law, (LL), which is now referred to as

(LL *), has not only

but also

pn = Gn -. (V'YI) ... (V'Yn) [F(YI' ... ,Yn) ... G(YI'' Yn)]

[AXl .. xn] = [AXI .. xntp] -. (V'Yl) ... (V'Yn) ([AXl

xn] (Yt> ... ,Yn) - [Axl .. xntp] (YI' ... ,Yn

218

NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

as an instance. Together with (A-Conv*), moreover, this last instance of

(LL *) has the following generalized form of Frege's basic law (Vb) as an

instance:

[AXj . .. = [AXj ... Xn1fJ] -+ (V'Xj) . .. (V'xn) ++ 1fJ).

Note incidentally that the comprehension principle (CP), now referred

to as (CP*), does not have the following standard formulation of Rus-

sell's paradox as an instance:

(3F) (VG) [F(G) ++ - G(G)].

This is because concepts are posited by (CP*) only by means of condi-

tions that apply to all individuals or object, whether those individuals be

abstract or concrete. It is for exactly the same reason, moreover, that

one cannot define in this context a predicate, say, 'Impredicable', as fol-

lows:

(V' G) [Impredicable( G) ++ - G( G)].

For, as already indicated, an explicit definition of a predicate constant

must be based upon the comprehension principle (CP*) in the sense of

being one of its existential instantiations, and the above fails in this

regard for the same reason that the preceding wff is not an instance of

(CP*).

Russell does give another version of his paradox, however, in terms

of ''what seems like a complex relation, namely the combination of non-

predicability with identity" ([POMj, p. 97); and this version is an

instance of (CP*):

(3F) (V'x) (F(x) ++ (3G) [x= G& - G(x)]).

A contradiction is derivable from this instance of (CP*), it should be

noted, only because

(UIf) -+

is derivable from (A3*) and (LL*). (By (LL*),

F= x -+ -+

and therefore by (UG), (A1 *), (A2*) and tautologous transformations,

(3x) (F= x) -+ -+

(UIf) then follows, . accordingly, by (A3*) and modus ponens.) Indeed,

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 219

by weakening either (A3*) or (LL*) in certain obvious ways it can be

shown that the resulting second order logic of nominalized predicates is

consistent, not inconsistent. The weakened version of (LL *) is appro-

priate, it should be noted, only when identity is defined (or replaced) by

indiscernibility. (Cf. [NBC-4], 4.6 for a consistency proof when (LL *) is

weakened to its version for indiscernibility; and also 4.1 0 for a

consistency proof when (A3*) is weakened instead.) We do not con-

template rejecting or modifying (LL *) here, however, and although

(A3*) will be weakened in our second alternative reconstruction of

Frege's logicism, we shall retain it in our first and more fundamental

reconstruction, since, together with (LL *), it implies that part of Frege's

double correlation thesis, namely that every concept has a unique

saturated concept-correlate, which will remain intact in our first recon-

struction of Frege's logicism. Of course, since this correlation for

Russell is really an identity, then (A3*) cannot be weakened in any

reconstruction of Russell's early form of logicism.

Now in his correspondence with Frege, it should be noted, Russell

does suggest weakening one other principle, namely, the comprehension

principle (CP*). Thus, in his December 12, 1904 letter to Frege, we find

Russell writing that "I believe the contradiction does not arise from the

nature of a class, but from the fact that certain expressions of the form

() . F(x, x, )

... do not represent [propositional] functions of x. That is, we have

f- ::(:3F):: -'(3!):.(x):fx= (). F(x,x,).

This is easy to prove ill the case of

x = (). :::> - x .

,

For this proposition denies fj(f)} for any f" ([PMq, p. 167). Re-

stated in our own present notation, Russell's particular example

amounts to

(VG) [x = [AyG(y)] -> - G(x)],

and given the identity

G= [AyG(y)]

as a law of the logic of norninalized predicates, Russell's particular

instance of (CP*) which he wants to reject is

220 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

(3F) (VX) (F(x) - (VG) [X= G .... - G(X)]),

which in the present context is also easily seen to lead to a contradic-

tion. The editors of [PMC] erroneously claim there is no contradiction

here (cp. p. 168), incidentally, and their explanation suggests that they

are ignoring Russell's original proposal that f= But even without

this particular identity, it is clear that a contradiction is derivable on the

basis of (LL*), or what amounts to Frege's basic law (Vb), and the

following instance of (CP*) which is clearly intended by Russell in the

letter in question:

(3F) (V x) (F(x) - (VG) [x = [AyG(y)] .... - G(x)]).

Now it is clear of course that Russell is not proposing that we are to

reject all instances of (CP*) in his letter to Frege, but only those of a

certain form. What is not clear, on the other hand, is the precise

delimitation of the excluded forms in question; that is, it is not clear

what restricted form (CP*) is to have according to Russell. What we

shall suggest in our reconstruction of this early form of Russell's

logicism is that (CP*) is to be restricted in accordance with the theory of

simple types Russell described in Appendix B of [pOM), though applied

now to propositional functions as. individuals rather than to classes as

many as the extensions of propositional functions. Such a theory, in

other words, seems to be what Russell had in mind in his correspond-

ence with Frege shortly after the completion of [POM).

Before turning to the specifics of Russell's proposal, however, let us

note that independently of its contradictory instances (CP*) is a conse-

quence of a still simpler form of comprehension principle, namely,

(Cpn (3P) ([AXI ... = F),

where P does not occur free in For by (LL *) and (V / A-Conv*),

[AX

I

= F .... (Vx

l

) (Vxn) [F(x

l

, , x

n

) -

from which (CP*) follows by (UG), (Al*), tautologous transformations

and (Cpn. A restricted form of (Cpn, needless to say, will imply only a

restricted form of (CP*); and for this reason we shall apply our recon-

struction of Russell's proposal to (Cpn instead.

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM

8. FREGE'S REJECTION OF SCHRODER'S HIERARCHY

OF INDIVIDUALS

221

Four months prior to his completion of [POM] in Dec. 1902, Russell

wrote Frege suggesting that ''the contradiction could be resolved with

the help of the assumption that ranges of values are not objects of the

ordinary kind; i.e., that needs to be completed (except in special

circumstances) either by an object or by a range of values of objects or

by a range of values of ranges of values, etc. ''This theory," Russell

observed, "is analogous to your theory about functions of the first,

second, etc. levels. In x ("\ u it would be necessary that u was the range

of values of objects of the same degree as x: x ("\ x would therefore be

nonsense. This view would also be useful in the theory of relations"

([PMC] , p. 144). This suggestion was subsequently described as the

simple theory of types which appears in Appendix B of [POM].

In his reply to Russell and the suggestion "that we are to conceive of

ranges of values and hence also of classes as a special kind of objects

whose names cannot appear in all argument places of the first kind"

(ibid., p. 145), Frege noted that "a class would not then be an object in

the full sense of the word, but - so to speak - an improper object for

which the law of excluded middle did not hold because there would be

predicates that could be neither truly affirmed nor truly denied of it.

Numbers would then be improper objects" (ibid., italics added). In his

discussion of Russell's paradox in the appendix to Volume 2 of [Ggj,

Frege reiterated this objection, nothing that if "classes were proper

objects, the law of excluded middle would have to hold for them"

([G & Bj, p. 235).

Now it is noteworthy that in 1895 Frege had already considered and

rejected the restriction on the laws of logic which would be necessary

for the kind of hierarchy of classes (and later of propositional functions

as individuals) Russell was suggesting as a way of avoiding his paradox.

The circumstances of this rejection had nothing to do with Russell's

paradox, needless to say, since Frege was at that time unaware of the

paradox; but rather they had to do with E. Schroder's conceptual

difficulties with the empty set as an extension consisting of nothing, on

the one hand, and with his notion of a singleton as an extension which

was identical with its only member, on the other (cf. [G & Bj, pp.

86-106). Be that as it may, Schroder, as Alonzo Church has observed,

anticipated the theory of types when he took ''the universal class 1

222 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

which appears in his algebra, not as an absolute universal class, but as

composed of all the elements of a certain domain fixed in advance"

([Church), p. 150). Once such a universal class or "manifold" was given,

moreover, a second may be obtained (to which the algebra is to be

applied in turn) "by taking the subsets of the first to be the individuals of

the second" (ibid.); and by continuing in this way a "hierarchy of reine

Mannigfaltigkeiten may be extended to infinity" (ibid.). The crucial

restriction Schroder imposed on this hierarchy was that no subset of the

domain of "individuals" considered at any stage of the hierarchy was to

be among the individuals of that stage, and that consequently the laws of

logic, as the laws of his algebra, were to be restricted in any given

application only to the individuals of the stage in question.

It was precisely this sort of restriction of the "field for our logical

activities" ([G & B), p. 92), in other words, which Frege criticized and

rejected in his 1895 review of Schroder's book. For ''whereas elsewhere

logic may claim to have laws of unrestricted validity, we are here

required to begin by delimiting a manifold with careful tests, and it is

only then that we can move around inside it" (ibid.).

Russell was on the mark, it should be noted, when he observed that

such a restriction on the laws of logic was already imposed by Frege on

his functions or concepts of first, second, etc. levels. But then for

Russell, it must be remembered, these functions or concepts do not have

an unsaturated nature; and as far as Russell is concerned if the laws of

logic can be restricted when applied to concepts of different levels, then

they can also be restricted when applied to the extensions of these

concepts as well. Indeed, once classes as the extensions of concepts are

eliminated from logic altogether, then as far as Russell is concerned the

restrictions in question are essentially the restrictions already imposed

by Frege on the concepts of different levels.

Now the crucial point ill Russell's view of Frege's hierarchy, it must

be emphasized, is that concepts do not have an unsaturated nature; i.e.,

that despite their predicative nature (as functions from individuals to

propositions), concepts for Russell are abstract individuals. This is

essential to Russell's interpretation, in other words, since if concepts

really do have an unsaturated nature as Frege claims, then they cannot

be construed as objects or abstract (higher order) individuals; and as a

theory of different types of individuals, the theory of types, whether

simple or ramified, would then not be applicable to Frege's concepts of

different levels. Indeed, it is precisely because concepts, and functions in

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 223

general, have an unsaturated nature according to Frege that Church

rejects "the claim sometimes made on behalf of Frege that his Stufen ...

constitute an anticipation of the simple theory of types" ([Churchl, p.

151). And in his rejection of classes as "improper objects" Frege himself

points out that "there is nothing 'unsaturated' or predicative about

classes that would characterize them as functions, concepts, or rela-

tions" ([G & BI, p. 235). Numbers in particular are objects, according to

Frege, not concepts or "improper objects" as they would have to be on

Russell's proposal.

9. FREGE'S DOUBLE CORRELATION THESIS AND THE THEORY

OF SIMPLE LOGICAL TYPES

There is a way, it turns out, of reconstructing Russell's proposal while

still agreeing with Frege that if nominalized predicates denote objects as

individuals "in the full sense," then the laws of logic, and the law of

excluded middle in particular, must not be restricted when applied to

such objects. We shall do so, moreover, by applying the notion of a

simple logical type not to a description of Frege's Stufen or levels of

concepts as "improper objects" the way Russell suggests but rather as a

description of the conditions determined by Frege's double correlation

thesis for positing first level concepts and their corresponding concept-

correlate:;.

Now the point of our reconstruction is that if second level concepts

can be correlated with certain first level concepts, then third level

concepts can be similarly correlated with second level concepts, and

therefore, by the product of these correlations, third level concepts can

in effect also be correlated with first level concepts. Similarly, fourth

level concepts can be correlated with third level concepts and therefore

with first level concepts as well. In general, in other words, all concepts

of whatever level can in effect be correlated with first level concepts,

and these in turn can be correlated with certain (saturated) objects

called concept-correlates. Thus instead of speaking of a higher level

concept Q falling within a concept M of one level higher we shall

instead generalize Frege's double correlation thesis and speak of the

concept-correlate of the first level concept corresponding to Q falling

under the first level concept corresponding to M. Doing so, however,

requires that the conditions for specifying the first level concepts and

concept-correlates in question must be stratified in a way corresponding

224 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

to the stratification of the higher level concepts to which these first level

concepts and their concept-correlates correspond. The comprehension

principle (CPt), in other words, must be restricted in a way that corre-

sponds to the stratification of the unsaturated concepts of Frege's

hierarchy.

We shall actually need a more stringent form of stratification than

Frege allows, it turns out for reasons shown below, and specifically one

which assumes that there are no unequal higher level relations (or at

least none that are involved in Frege's double correlation thesis); that is,

we shall be required to assume, on pain otherwise of generating

Russell's paradox after all, that higher level relations are only homo-

geneously stratified. This in fact will be the only modification of Frege's

original form of logicism which we shall assume in our first reconstruc-

tion of Frege's logic.

Returning to the logical grammar of 7, accordingly, we shall say that

a formula or A-abstract of that grammar is homogeneously stratified if,

and only if, there is an assignment t of natural numbers to the set of

terms occurring in (including itself if is a A-abstract) such that (1)

for all terms a and b, if (a = b) occurs in then tea) = t(b); (2) for all n

1, all n-place predicate expressions n and all terms ai' ... , an> if

n(a

l

, ... , an) is a wff occurring in then (i) tea;) = teak)' for 1 j, k

n, and (ii) ten) = teal) + 1; and (3) for all mEw, all individual

variables x, ... , X

m

, and all wffs tfJ, if [AXI ... xmtfJ] occurs in then (iii)

t(x;) = t(x

k

), for 1 j, k m, and (iv) t([AXI ... XmtfJ]) = t(Xl) + 1. If

clauses (i) and (iii) are dropped and clauses (ii) and (iv) are replaced by

the weaker requirement that ten) = 1 + max [t(a

l

), ... , t(a

n

)] and t([AXI

... xmtfJ]) = 1 + max [t(x

l

), ... , t(x

m

)], then we shall say that is hetero

geneously stratified, or simply stratified; and if clause (1) as well as

clauses (i) and (iii) are dropped and clauses (ii) and (iv) are replaced by

the still weaker requirement that max [t(a

l

), ... , t(a

n

)] < ten) and

max[t(xI)' ... , t(Xm)] < t([AXI ... XmtfJ]), then we shall say they is

cumulatively stratified.

We include the idea of cumulative stratification here because it is a

natural generalization of the idea of a stratified hierarchy of concepts.

Involved in a such a generalization, in other words, is L1.e suggestion that

we should restrict (CPt) as little as possible in our representation of

Frege's double correlation thesis; that is, that we should replace (CPt)

by the cumulatively stratified comprehension principle, (CSCPt), which

is exactly like (CPI) except for the added constraint that the A-abstract

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 225

in question must be cumulatively stratified. Unfortunately, however, this

is too much of a generalization in our present context, since the

A-abstract [AX (3 G) (x = G & - G(x)] involved in Russell's paradox is

easily seen to be cumulatively stratified. That is, (CSCpn is an insuffi-

cient restriction of (Cpn since it still leads to Russell's paradox.

Now although [Ax(3G) (x = G & - G(x] is cumulatively stratified,

it is not heterogeneously stratified, and therefore it will not fulfill the

conditions for the (heterogeneously) stratified comprehej1sion principle;

(SCPI), which is exactly like (CPt) except for the constraint that the

A-abstract in question must be (heterogeneously) stratified. This princi-

ple, it should be observed, is in accordance both with the simple theory

of types briefly described in Appendix B of [POM] and with Frege's

hierarchy of unsaturated concepts. That is, although unsaturated

concepts cannot be cumulatively stratified, higher level relational con-

cepts can be inhomogeneously stratified. Such higher level relations are

referred to by Frege as unequal leveled relations. Thus, for example, the

second level relation of an object to a concept under which that object

falls is said by Frege to be an uneq1lal second level relation because it

has as arguments both a saturated object and an unsaturated first level

concept ([Gg], vol 1, 22). Needless to say, but (SCPt) posits a first level

relation corresponding to tJ:>Js second level unequal relation of sub-

sumption; that is,

(3R

2

) ([Axy(3G) (x= G& G(y] = R)

is an instance of (SCpn; and in that regard (SCPt) is easily seen to be in

full accordance with Frege's double correlation thesis.

Unfortunately, however, precisely because predication stands for a

relation according to (SCPt), then being impredicable with respect to

this relation is also specifiable in terms of (SCPt). That is, since

[Axy(3G) (x = G & G(y] is heterogeneously stratified, then so is

[AZ- [Axy(3G) (x = G & G(y)] (z, z)]; and therefore despite its com-

plexity of expression in terms of A-abstracts Russell's paradox of the

concept which is predicable of itself if, and only if, it is not predicable of

itself is derivable on the basis of (SCPt) after all.! It follows, accordingly,

that if Frege's double correlation thesis is to apply to all higher level

unsaturated relations, then we must assume that no such relations are

inhomogeneously stratified, i.e., that there are no unequal higher level

relations. In particular, we must not assume that there can be such an

unequal second level relation as the sUbsumption of an object under a

226 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

concept; for it is fundamental to Russell's paradox that predication

cannot stand for a relation between an object and a concept-correlate.

10. THE THEORY OF HOMOGENEOUS SIMPLE TYPES AS A

SECOND ORDER LOGIC

If unsaturated higher level concepts, including relations, are not to be

inhomogeneously stratified, then the appropriate restriction of (CPt),

needless to say, is the homogeneously stratified comprehension principle,

(HSCP!), which is exactly like (CPt) except for the added constraint that

the A-abstract in question must be homogeneously stratified. Indeed, in

the second order logic of nominalized predicates in question, which

hereafter we shall refer to as AHST*, the only A-abstracts recognized as

well-formed are those which are homogeneously stratified. This does

not mean, it should be noted, that every wff of AHST* must be homo-

geneously stratified, but only that the A-abstracts occurring in such wffs

are. That is, in general, where n is a natural number, a meaningful

expression of type n (as defined in 7) is a meaningful expression of

type n in AHST* if, and only if, every A-abstract occurring in that

expression is homogeneously stratified.

It follows, accordingly, that if F is a I-place predicate variable (or

constant), then F(F) and - F(F) are both wffs of AHST*; and similarly if

[Ax] is homogeneously stratified, then both [AX] ([AX]) and its nega-

tion are well-formed formulas of AHST*. In other words, the laws of

logic, and the principle of excluded middle in particular, apply in AHST*

to concept-correlates as the denotata of nominalized predicates no less

so than they apply to objects or individuals in general; and in that

regard, therefore, concept-correlates may be said to be objects or

individuals "in the full sense" as far as AHST* is concerned.

The basic laws of logic according to AHST*, it should be emphasized,

are exactly those of standard second order predicate logic with identity

already described in 3, but extended now to include homogeneously

stratified A-abstracts and nominalized predicates. In other words, by an

axiom of AHST* we understand any wff of AHST* which is either

tautologous or of one of the following forms:

(AI*)

(A2*)

(Vu) [ --+ 'IJI] --+ [(Vu)

--+ (V u) 'IJI] ,

--+ (Vu),

where u is an individual or

predicate variable,

where u is an individual or

predicate variable not occur-

ring free in '

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 227

(A3*) (3x)(a= x),

(LL*) (a= b) -+ ... 'I/J],

(A-Conv*) [Ax

1

(a

1

, , an)

.... .. , ajx

n

),

where a is a singular term of

,1.HST* in which x does not

occur free,

where a, b are singular terms

of AHST* and 'I/J comes from

by replacing one or more

free occurrences of b by free

occurrences of a,

where a

1

, , an are singular

terms of AHST* and each a

i

is

free for Xi in

(IdA) [Ax

1

x

n

P(x

1

, . .. , xn)] = P, where P is an n-place predi-

(HSCPA) (3P) ([Ax1 ... = P),

cate variable or constant,

where Fn does not occur free

in and [Ax1 ... is

homogeneously stratified.

Modus ponens and universal generalization (of an individual or pre-

dicate variable) are still the only inference rules, and theoremhood and

derivability from premises are defined in the usual way.2

Now it is important to note that if is a A-free wff containing no

nominalized occurrences of predicates, then [Ax1 ... is homo-

geneously stratified, and therefore by (HSCPA), the comprehension

principle (CP) of standard second order predicate logic with identity is

easily seen to be provable in AHST*. In other words, any A-free wff

containing no nominalized occurrences of predicates which is a theorem

of standard second order predicate logic with identity is a theorem of

AHST* as well. In this regard, AHST* goes beyond the laws of standard

second order predicate logic only in its recognition of homogeneously

stratified A-abstracts as complex predicates and in its logistic treatment

of nominalized predicates, whether simple or complex, as singular

terms. Both of these features are incorporated in the comprehension

principle (HSCPI), which, as already indicated, is in full accordance

with Frege's double correlation thesis, so long as we assume that

unsaturated higher level concepts are only homogeneously stratified.

In regard to the question of the consistency of AHST*, let us note first

that the full AHST* system can be shown to be consistent relative to

monadic AHST* (i.e., AHST* restricted to monadic predicates only) in

228 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

essentially the same way that the simple theory of types can be shown to

be consistent relative to the simple monadic theory of types. That is, it

can be shown that if monadic AHST* is consistent, then the full AHST*

system is also consistent (cf. [NBC-4], 4.8). Secondly, by interpreting

monadic predication as membership, monadic AHST* can be readily

shown to be consistent relative to R. Jensen's system NFU ("New

Foundations with Urelements"); and therefore if NFU is consistent, then

so is the full AHST* system. In [Jensen], however, Jensen has shown that

NFU is consistent relative to weak Zermelo set theory;3 and therefore,

by putting these results together, we can make the following consistency

claim regarding the full AHST* system (cf. [NBC-4], 4.9).

THEOREM: If weak Zermelo set theory is consistent, then so is AHST*.

11. FREGE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EXTENSIONALITY

We observed in 7 that (LL*) and (A-Conv*) together yield the follow-

ing generalized form of Frege's basic law (Vb):

[AX

I

.. = [AXI ... xntP] -+ ('Vx

I

) .. ('Vxn) ++ tP)

It was this law, it will be remembered, which together with (A3*) and

the unrestricted comprehension principle (CPt) led to Russell's paradox.

Given the restriction of (CPt) to (HSCPt), however, Russell's paradox is

no longer derivable (if weak Zermelo set theory is consistent), and we

are still able to maintain Frege's basic law (Vb) as a law of logic.

Of course, this is only one direction of Frege's Basic Law V. The

other direction, i.e., Frege's basic law (Va), is the following principle of

extensionality:

(Ext*) ('Vx

I

) ('Vxn) ++ tP) -+ [Ax

I

.. = [AX

I

xn tP]

This principle, needless to say, is not provable in AHST*, and in that

regard, it might be claimed, it is not a "law of logic". For Frege,

however, it is a law of logic because concepts and relations are

(unsaturated) functions from objects to truth-values. That is, according

to Frege, ''what two concept-words mean [bedeuten] is the same if and

only if the extensions of the corresponding concepts coincide" ([PW], p.

122). In making this claim, Frege is aware that he has made "an impor-

tant concession to the extensionalist logicians. They are right," he

claims, ''when they show by their preference for the extension, as against

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 229

the intension, of a concept that they regard the meaning [Bedeutung]

and not the sense of words as the essential thing for logic. The inten-

sionalist logicians are only too happy not to go beyond the sense; for

what they call the intension, if it is not an idea, is nothing other than the

sense. They forget that logic is not concerned with how thoughts,

regardless of truth-value, follow from thoughts, that the step from

thought to truth-value - more generally, the step from sense to meaning

has to be taken in. They forget that the laws of logic are first and

foremost laws in the realm of meanings [Bedeutungen] and only relate

indirectly to sense" (ibid.). In other words, as far as the laws of logic are

concerned, "concepts differ only so far as their extensions are different"

(ibid., p. 118); and "therefore just as proper names can replace one

another salva veritate, so too can concept-words, if their extension is the

same" (ibid.).

Regardless of his commitment to the principle of extensionality as a

law of logic, however, it must not be overlooked here that Frege still

maintains "that the concept is logically prior to its extension" ([G & B],

p. 106), and that he regards "as futile the attempt to take the extension

of a concept as class, and make it rest, not on the concept, but on single

things" (ibid.). In other words, despite his commitment to the principle

of extensionality, Frege's second order logic of value-ranges as concept-

correlates is not a second order set theory in the sense in which sets are

essentially constituted or composed of their members. That this is so is

especially brought out by the reconstruction and identification of

Frege's form of logicism with the system AHST* + (Ext*) as a second

order logic of nominalized predicates.

12. NFU-."SETS" AS CONCEPT-CORRELATES

Our first reconstruction of Frege's form of logicism, accordingly, is its

reconstruction as the system AHST* + (Ext*). The question whether this

system is consistent, and, if consistent, whether it suffices for the reduc-

tion of classical mathematics is answered, it turns out, by its relation to

Jensen's modification of Quine's well-known "set" theory NF; i.e., by its

relation to NFU. In particular, the concept-correlates of monadic

AHST* + (Ext*), it turns out, are none other than the "sets" of NFU;

and therefore classical mathematics is reducible to AHST* + (Ext*) at

least to the same extent that it is reducible to NFU. Moreover, by

representing concepts by their extensions, monadic AHST* + (Ext*) can

230 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

be easily seen to be equiconsistent with NFU; and therefore since

monadic AHST* + (Ext*) is already equiconsistent with the full AHST*

+ (Ext*) system, then AHST* + (Ext*) is equiconsistent with NFU.

In other words, by defining membership as follows,

XE y=df(3F) [y=F&F(x)],

Jensen's "set" theory NFU can be shown to be contained within

monadic AHST* + (Ext*); and, similarly, by interpreting monadic

predication as membership in NFU, monadic AHST* + (Ext*) can be

translated into NFU so that the translation of a theorem of monadic

AHST* + (Ext*) is a theorem of NFU (cf. [NBC-4], 4.9).4 But monadic

AHST* + (Ext*), for reasons already indicated, is equiconsistent with

the full AHST* + (Ext*) system (cf. [NBC-4], 4.8); and therefore we are

able to establish the following result.

THEOREM: AHST* + (Ext*) is consistent if, and only if, Jensen's "set"

theory NFU is consistent; and therefore AHST* + (Ext*) is consistent if

weak Zermelo set theory is consistent.

This theorem is perhaps not surprising, it might be said, since both

AHST* + (Ext*) and NFU are constructed as type-free counterparts of

the theory of simple types (with an axiom of extensionality for each type

greater than 0). This is somewhat misleading, however, since AHST* +

(Ext*) is really a reconstruction of standard second order predicate

logic with nominalized predicates and not, strictly speaking, a recon-

struction of the theory of simple types as a theory of "improper objects".

The guiding principle of our reconstruction is indeed in accordance with

a homogeneously stratified hierarchy of unsaturated concepts since that

principle is none other than a generalized form of Frege's double

correlation thesis (minus unequal leveled relations); but that is not quite

the same as its being a reconstruction of the theory of simple types (with

axioms of extensionality for each type greater than 0) as a theory of

"improper objects". This is especially so, moreover, insofar as the latter

is intended as a model of all of the finite "stages" at which classes are

generated from concrete individuals (as objects of type 0) in accord-

ance with the power set axiom of set theory. For as a theory of classes

which are essentially constituted or composed of their members, the

number of classes of any given type in the theory of simple types will be

less than the number of classes of the next succeeding type; and this,

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 231

needless to say, runs directly counter to Frege's double correlation

thesis. Thus, in particular, if second level concepts are to be correlated

with certain first level concepts and first level concepts are to be

correlated in turn with their saturated concept-correlates, then there can

be neither more second level concepts than first level concepts nor

more first level concepts than objects. In this regard, since AHST* +

(Ext*) was constructed in accordance with Frege's double correlation

thesis (minus unequal leveled relations), it is misleading to describe it as

a type-free reconstruction of the theory of simple types.

Now Quine's "set" theory NF, on the other hand, was originally

constructed precisely as a first order counterpart of the theory of simple

types as a theory of classes which are essentially constituted or com-

posed of their members (d. [Quine], 40-42). Its failure to be what it

purports, however, is precisely what makes NF so controversial as a

theory of sets. For as a first order theory NF is committed to construing

all individuals as "sets", since by the axiom of extensionality every

individual in NF either has a member or is identical with the empty

"set". That is, unlike the situation in AHST* + (Ext*), NF cannot

"recognize" the concrete individuals of the theory of simple types

without first transforming them into "sets" (e.g., by identifying them with

their singletons). In this regard, NF fails to capture an important feature

of the theory of simple types as a theory of classes which are composed

of their me.mbers, since, as such, classes are ultimately founded on

concrete individuals or urelements which are not themselves classes.

NFU, needless to say, was designed to overcome precisely this failure of

NF.

In both NF and NFU, however, there is a universal "set", a fact which

runs counter to the way classes are generated by "stages" which never

end in the theory of simple types, thoagh not of course counter to the

Fregean view that the universal concept of self-identity should have an

extension as its concept-correlate. Furthermore, in both NF and NFU

every "set" has an absolute complement, which also runs counter to the

strictly relative complements a class has at each "stage" in the theory of

simple types, but not counter to the absolute complements which

concept-correlates have as the extensions of unsaturated concepts. There

is a symmetry between the small and the large in both NF and NFU, in

other words, which runs counter to the limitation of size doctrine which

is incorporated in the theory of simple types as a theory of classes that

are essentially constituted or composed of their members. The same

232 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

symmetry obtains, of course, between the extensions of concepts in

2HST* + (Ext*), since as concept-correlates these extensions have their

being in the concepts whose extensions they are, and not in the objects

which are their members. That is, there can be no asymmetry between

the small and the large among the extensions of concepts in 2HST* +

(Ext*), since by the laws of logic regarding concepts the extensions of

concepts must satisfy the conditions of a Boolean algebra; and this is so,

moreover, precisely because "the extension of a concept simply has its

being in the concept, not in the objects which belong to it" ([PW), p.

183). In this regard, it makes more sense to identify NFU-"sets" with the

concept-correlates of monadic 2HST* + (Ext*) than to attempt to

construe them as sets which are essentially constituted or composed of

their members.

Now there is a result of Ernst Specker's which shows that NF is

equiconsistent with the theory of simple types as a theory of classes if

we add to the latter the assumption that all of the classes of anyone type

can be correlated one-to-one with the classes of the next succeeding

type and that all of the classes of urelements can be correlated one-to-

one with these urelements, an assumption which Specker calls "com-

plete typical ambiguity" (cf. [TA], p. 118). Such an assumption, needless

to say, runs directly counter to the idea of classes as composed of their

members, and therefore it fails to explain in what sense NF is to be

viewed as a theory of sets. It does not run counter to the idea of

NF-"sets" as concept-correlates, on the other hand, and indeed, given

the assumption that every object is a concept-correlate it conforms

perfectly to our generalized form of Frege's double correlation thesis for

unsaturated (unary) concepts. This assumption, formalized as (\Ix)

(3pl)(X = F), was in fact briefly considered by Frege himself in a

footnote to [Gg) , vol. 1, 1O; and, indeed, it is easily seen that NF is

contained in mST* + (Ext*) + (\Ix) (3P) (x = P) in precisely the same

way that NFU is contained is 2HST* + (Ext*). In this regard, we

maintain, it is more appropriate to identify NF-"sets" with the concept-

correlates of monadic AHST* + (Ext*) + (\Ix) (3P) (x = F) as a recon-

struction of Frege's form of logicism than to construe either NF or

2HST* + (Ext*) + (\fX)(3Pl)(X = F), as type-free reconstructions of

the theory of simple types, even when Specker's axiom of "complete

typical ambiguity" is added to the latter. A similar observation applies,

needless to say, to the identification of NFU-"sets" with the concept-

correlates of monadic HST* + (Ext*). In other words, despite the

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 233

original motivation or purpose for its construction, NFU makes more

sense as a partial description of the concept-correlates of AHST* +

(Ext*) as a reconstruction of Frege's form of logicism than it does as a

reconstruction of the theory of simple types as a theory of classes which

are composed of their members.

The appropriate definition of the natural numbers in NFU, inciden-

tally, is precisely the well-known Frege-Russell definition and not either

von Neumann's or Zermelo's purely set-theoretic definitions. Given the

Frege-Russell definition of the natural numbers, moreover, we can go

on to construct all of the integers, rational numbers and real numbers

using only the resources already available in NFU, and therefore in

AHST* + (Ext*) as well. In other words, except for the assumption of an

axiom of infinity the reduction of classical mathematics to logic, and

especially of arithmetic to logic, as originally conceived by Frege is fully

realized in our reconstruction of Frege's form of logicism as AHST* +

(Ext*).

Finally, in regard to the only "existence-axioms" described as such by

Russell, viz., the axioms of choice and infinity, we should take note of

Specker's result in [AC] that the axiom of choice is disprovable in NF;

and therefore, since the axiom of choice is provable for finite sets, the

existence of an infinite "set" is provable in NF. But since NF is

contained in AHST* + (Ext*) + ('Ix) (3P) (x = F), then Specker's

results apply here as well. That is, in AHST* + (Ext*) + ('Ix) (3F) (x =

F), the axiom of choice is disprovable and the axiom of infinity is

provable. Of course, this does not mean (as it did in Russell's later form

of logicism) that there are infinitely many concrete individuals, but only

that the total number of objects, whether abstract or concrete, is infinite.

However, by another argument of Specker's regarding NF, we can prove

in AHST* + (Ext*) + ('Ix) (3F) (x = F), that there are infinitely many

natural numbers in the sense in which these are defined in the Frege-

Russell manner (cf. [Quine], p. 299); and that, needless to say, is exactly

what Frege thought held in his form of logicism. Specker's proofs do not

apply to NFU, however, and indeed Jensen (op. cit.) has shown that the

axiom of infinity is not provable in NFU. The same observation applies,

needless to say, to AHST* + (Ext*).

13. RUSSELL AND THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGIDITY

The only fundamental difference between Frege's and Russell's early

form of logicism so far emphasized is that for Russell concepts are their

234 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

own concept-correlates. That is, Russell refuses to accept the unsaturated

nature of concepts, and he assumes accordingly that nominalized pre-

dicates denote the same concepts which these predicates otherwise

stand for in their role as predicates. The prdicative nature of a concept

for Russell, in other words, does not consist in its being an unsaturated

function from objects to truth-values, but rather only in its being a

function whose values are propositions. That is, concepts for Russell are

none other than propositional functions, and propositional functions are

themselves individuals.

As functions whose values are propositions rather than truth-values,

however, propositional functions are intensional and not extensional

entities; and this in fact is another fundamental difference between

Frege's and Russell's early form of logicism. For when applied to

AHST*, this difference is reflected in the acceptance of (Ext*) by Frege

as a law of logic as opposed to its rejection as such by Russell. That is,

besides assuming that concepts have an individual nature, Russell also

assumes that in general they are only intensionally individuated.

What exactly Russell means by the intensionality of a proposition,

and thereby of a propositional function as well, he never says. Neverthe-

less, in our reconstruction of his early form of logicism, we shall assume

that propositions can be represented by (or rather correlated with)

functions from possible words to truth-values. This is not what a

proposition really is according to Russell, needless to say, especially

since possible worlds would themselves be constructed in Russell's early

framework in terms of propositions about merely possible as well as

actual individuals;5 but it does serve as an intuitive guide regarding the

intensional individuation of propositional functions. Thus, instead of

Frege's principle of extensionality, (Ext*), being a law of logic, Russell

(or so we shall assume) would have as a law of logic the corresponding

principle of intensionality.

(DExt*) o (V'Xj) ... (V'xn) (rp ... 'I/J) - [.hj ... xnrp] = [AXj ... Xn'I/J].

This means that we shall need to take 0 as a new primitive logical

constant of our logical grammar, and that we shall need to add the

following clause in the definition of a meariingful expression given in 7:

(10) ifrp E MEl' then 0 rp E MEl'

We shall retain all of the axioms and inference rules of AHST*, needless

to say, except that now these axioms and rules are understood to apply

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 235

to wffs containing occurrences of 0 as well. In addition, we shall also

assume the axiom schemas of the S5 modal propositional logic and the

rule of modal generalization; i.e., the rule that if is provable, then so is

O. For convenience, we shall refer to the resulting system as OAHST*.

Our initial proposal, accordingly, is that Russell's early form of logicism

is to be reconstructed as OAHST* + (OExt*).6

Unfortunately, however, OAHST* + (OExt*) does not suffice for

Russell's view of classes as analyzable in terms of concepts. In particu-

lar, assuming that classes are to be represented in terms of concepts (as

individuals), we shall need an account of how this representation is to be

given; and assuming the adequacy of that account we shall need to

establish the following thesis as one of its consequences:

(itF)(3G)(Cls(G) & (Yx) [F(x) +> G(x)]).

Now without going into the details here, we shall only say that Russell's

own later contextual analysis in [PM] of 'CIs', or of expressions for

particular classes as "incomplete symbols", will not suffice in our

present context, since as reconstructed here, Russell's contextual analy-

sis would have the inappropriate consequence that all concepts are

"classes"; i.e., that concepts are extensionally, not intensionally, indi-

viduated after all. Instead of Russell's analysis, however, we can begin

with the notion of a rigid (n-ary) propositional function as a concept

which has the same extension in every possible world. A class, on this

analysis, will then simply be a rigid concept. Indeed, if concepts are

themselves individuals, as Russell claimed, there would be little or no

point in distinguishing a rigid concept from the class which is the

extension of that concept, at least not if classes are really "superfluous"

in Russell's form of logicism? Accordingly, where definitions' of predi-

cate constants are given in terms of homogeneously stratified A-

abstracts, we define the notion of rigidityn as follows:

Rigid

n

=df [Ax(3P) (x = P & (ity!) ... (itYn) [OF(Yl' ... , Yn)

V 0 - F(y), ... ,Yn)])]'

Thus, an n-ary relation-in-extension, on this analysis, is simply a rigid

n

relation (in intension), and a class is simply a rigid

l

concept:

Cls=df [Ax(3Fl) (x= F & Rigidl(F].

Now the fundamental new assumption which we need as a "law of logic"

in Russell's intensional form of logicism is not just the above thesis that

236 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

every concept is extensionally equivalent to a rigid concept (i.e., that the

extension of a concept exists), but rather the following more general

principle of rigidity:

(PR) (V p)(3Gn)(Rigid

n

(G) & (Vx/) . .. (Vxn)[F(x/, . .. ,x

n

)

- G( xl> . . . , x

n

)]).

Our proposal, accordingly, is that Russell's early form of logicism is to

be reconstructed as the system DAHST* + (DExt*) + (PR).

It is clear, of course, that by interpreting D as double negation,

DAHST* + (DExt*) + (PR) collapses to just AHST* + (Ext*). That is,

on our reconstruction, Russell's (early) intensional form of logicism is

equiconsistent with Frege's extensional form; and therefore by the

equiconsistency of the latter with Jensen's "set" theory NFU, we have

the following result (cf. [NBC-4], 6.3).

THEOREM: DAHST* + (DExt*) + (PR) is equiconsistent with both

AHST* + (Ext*) and Jensen's "set" theory NFU.

Classical mathematics, it is clear, is reducible to our reconstruction of

Russell's intensional form of logicism no less so than it is to our recon-

struction of Frege's extensional form. The identification of NFU-"sets"

with Frege's value-ranges as concept-correlates is perhaps more plau-

sible than their identification with rigid concepts; but then their identi-

fication with concepts to begin with should also more readily obviate

their confusion with sets as essentially constituted or'composed of their

inembers.

14. FREGE'S CONTEMPLATION OF THE ABELARDIAN VIEW

In reconstructing Frege's logicism, it should be emphasized, we have

made only one relatively minor change in his overall view. We have

assumed, in particular, that all higher level unsaturated concepts are

only homogeneously stratified; that is, that there are no unequal higher

level relations. Only on the basis of this assumption, in other words, can

we maintain that (CPt) is to be restricted to (HSCPt) in accordance with

Frege's double correlation thesis.

There is an alternative to this assumption, however, which allows us

to retain both (CPt) and to avoid Russell's paradox. This alternative, is

implicit in Frege's discussion of Russell's paradox and is contained in his

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 237

suggestion that we might "suppose there are cases where an unexcep-

tional concept has no class answering to it as its extension" ([G & B], p.

235). In other words, instead of maintaining for each singular term the

dubious existential presupposition that that singular term actually

denotes (a value of the bound individual variables), we are to allow on

this suggestion that some singular terms, and in particular some nomi-

nalized predicates, are denotationless.

Given the standard second order predicate logic with nominalized

predicates described in 7 - that is, the logistic context in which

Russell's paradox was originally formulated - the proposal in question,

accordingly, amounts to replacing the dubious axiom (A3*), which

explicitly expresses all such existential presuppositions, by the following

weaker, but also unexceptionable, law of logic:

(A3**) (\Ix) (:Jy) (x= y).

A little more is actually needed on this proposal, however, since without

(A3*) the identity wff (a = a), also an unexceptionable law of logic, is

no longer derivable. In replacing (A3*) by (A3**), in other words, we

shall also need to add (a = a) as an axiom, where a is any singular term.

Similarly, in dropping all existential presuppositions regarding singular

terms, we shall need to replace (A-Conv*) by the presupposition free

form of A-conversion:

(:J/A-Conv*) [AX

I

X

n

] (a

l

, ... ,an) ++ (3x

l

) . .. (:JXn)

(a

l

= Xl & ... & an = Xn & ),

where no Xi is free in any a

j

, for all i, j such that 1 i, j n.

Now with the replacement of (A3*) by (A3**) and (a = a), and of

(A-Conv*) by (:J/A-Conv*), the principle of universal instantiation (VIi)

regarding singular terms is no longer provable, it turns out, except in the

following qualified form:

(:J/VIi) (:Jy) (a= y) -+ [(\lx) -- (a/x)],

where a is any singular term which is free for X in and in which y has

no free occurrences. With this qualification, however, what follows from

Russell's paradox as described in 7 is not a contradiction but only that

the complex predicate [AX(:JG) (x = G & - G(x] is denotationless in

its occurrences as a singular term: i.e., instead of a contradiction,

- (3y) ([AxC:lG) (x== G& - G(x) = y)

238 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

is provable. In other words, even though (CP!) posits the existence of an

unsaturated concept corresponding to [Ax(3G) (x = G & - G(x] as a

predicate, nevertheless by Russell's argument it is provable that there

can be no saturated object corresponding to [A.x(3G) (x = G & - G(x]

as a singular term; or in Frege's words here is a case ''where an

unexceptional concept has no class answering to it as its exten-

sion"(ibid.).

Unfortunately, however, mathematics, and arithmetic in particular, is

not reducible to the system resulting from the above changes; for unlike

the situation in AHST* where (A3*) remains in force, but where only

A-abstracts which are homogeneously stratified are recognized as well-

formed (and where (CPt), accordingly, is replaced by (HSCPl, we can

no longer prove that there are any objects denoted by nominalized

predicates, or, equivalently, that there are any concept-correlates at all.

(The logical grammar of the system in question, it should be empha-

sized, is just the full unrestricted grammar described in 7, and the

axioms are (Al*), (A2*), (A3**), (a = a), (LL*), (Idi), (3/A-Conv*) and

(CPi).)

That there might be no concept-correlates at all, incidentally, was not

a possibility Frege refused to consider in his discussion of Russell's

paradox. For in commenting on the proposal in question, Frege seemed

to interpret this alternative as one in which we can only "regard class

names as sham proper names, which would thus not really have any

reference" (ibid. p. 236). We agree, it should be noted, that for Frege

this apparently meant that "class" names "would have to be regarded as

part of signs that had reference only as wholes" (ibid.), as, for example,

names of natural numbers might occur as parts of quantifier expres-

sions, but in our present framework this can also be formulated as the

Abelardian thesis that no concept is a thing (cf. [NBC-4], 4.1):

('VF') - (3x)(F'=x).

In other words, instead of maintaining only that some nominalized

predicates must be denotationless, Frege generalized this alternative

into the Abelardian view that all nominalized occurrences of predicates

are denotationless. Abelard, incidentally, apparently believed that the

same universal can be shared by different individuals, but he refused to

grant that what individuals have in common is a ''thing''; that is, he

denied that universals are individuals. In this regard, he might be said to

have anticipated Frege's view of concepts as unsaturated functions. Be

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 239

that as it may, nevertheless it was Frege's view throughout most of his

career that nominalized predicates, and abstract singular terms in

general, denoted objects even though these objects could not themselves

be unsaturated concepts. For Abelard, on the other hand, at least on our

interpretation of his view here, nominalized predicates were singular

terms which simply failed to refer to any individual at all. Such a view,

needless to say, is obviously "safe" from Russell's paradox, and indeed

the result of adding the Abelardian thesis to the system in question can

be shown to be consistent (cf. [NBC-4], 4.10).

Though consistent, however, such a view does not lead to a recon-

struction of Frege's form of logicism; and in fact, it leads directly away

from it, a direction which Frege was not disinclined to take in 1924/5 at

the end of his long and brilliant career in defense of logicism. Thus, in

speaking of "the formation of a proper name after the pattern of 'the

extension of the concept a'" ([PW), p. 269), Frege not only noted that

"because of the definite article, this expression appears to designate an

object" (ibid.), but he went on to suggest that "there is no object for

which this phrase could be a linguistically appropriate designation"

(ibid.). Weare misled by language here, he suggests, and "from this has

arisen the paradoxes of set theory which have dealt the death blow to

set theory itself' (ibid.).

These final thoughts of a great logician are unfortunate, however, for

the paradoxes, and Russell's paradox in particular, do not affect set

theory as a theory of classes which are composed of their members, but

rather affect only a theory of classes as the extensions of concepts; and

whereas set theory has continued to flourish throughout the 20th

century, it is the theory of classes as the extensions of concepts, and

thereby logicism itself, which has fallen into disrepute. Such disrepute is

not deserved, however, since logicism, and Frege's form of logicism in

particular, can be easily reconstructed in such a way as to avoid the

paradoxes. In this regard, we have not only the reconstruction of Frege's

logicism already given, but the following alternative reconstruction as

well.

15. A SECOND RECONSTRUCTION OF FREGE'S LOGICISM

The proof that some nominalized predicates must be denotationless in

the system presently under consideration, it should be noted, does not

show that all must be denotationless; i.e., the Abelardian thesis is not

240 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

provable in our modified second order logic with nominalized predi-

cates as described above in 14. We may assume, in other words, that

some concepts do have concept-correlates after all.

Such an assumption, needless to say, can be given in a number of

different ways, such as those corresponding to the existence conditions

for sets in different set theories. The latter, however, will result only in a

second order theory of sets in the sense in which sets are essentially

constituted or composed of their members; and dropping the axiom of

extensionality so as to avoid calling such objects sets is really pointless,

since their existence conditions are in accordance with the limitation of

size doctrine, which in tum is based on the notion of sets as composed

of their members. Such an assumption, in other words, will not result in

a coherent form of logicism since as objects which are essentially consti-

tuted or composed of their members sets are mathematical and not

logical objects. The relevant assumption, in this regard, must be based

on Frege's double correlation thesis and the way it pertains to the

positing of concept-correlates as logical objects and not on conditions

that pertain to the existence of sets as composed of their members.

Now in returning to Frege's double correlation thesis in our present

framework where A-abstracts need not be homogeneously stratified, we

should note that there is a difference in applying the thesis in the

positing of first level concepts from applying it in the positing of con-

cept-correlates. In partiCUlar, since the full unrestricted comprehension

principle, (CPr), is to remain as an axiom schema, we in effect retain the

unrestricted form of Frege's double correlation thesis as it applies to the

positing of first level concepts; i.e., the form in which it posits first level

concepts corresponding to unequal leveled or inhomogeneous higher

level relations no less so than to homogeneous or equal leveled

relations. Thus, corresponding to Frege's unequal second level relation

of subsumption or predication, there is a first level relation posited by

(CPt); that is,

(3R2) ([Axy(3G) (x= G& G(y] = R)

is provable in the system in question. Of course, by Russell's argument,

this same predicate when nominalized simply fails to denote (a value of

the bound individual variables). In other words, as applied to concept-

correlates, Frege's double correlation thesis must be restricted; and in

particular it is not to apply in general to inhomogeneous higher level

relations. The assumption we shall make here is that it is to apply at

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 241

least to all higher level unsaturated concepts which are homogeneously

stratified; that is, to all of the concepts which have concept-correlates in

AHST*.

In order to formulate our assumption as an axiom schema, we shall

say that a meaningful expression (as defined in terms of the logical

grammar of 7) is bound to individuals if, and only if, for all natural

numbers n, all n-place predicate variables P, and all , if (V P) is a wff

occurring in then for some individual variable x and some wff 1/J, is

the wff [(3x) (P = x) -> 1/J]. In other words, to be bound to individuals,

every predicate quantifier occurring in must refer only to those

concepts posited by (CPr) which have corresponding concept-correlates.

Our assumption may now be stated as the following axiom schema:

(3/HSCPr) (3y) (a

1

= y) & ... & (3y) (a

k

= y)

-> (3y) ([AXI ... x

n

] = y),

where [AXI ... x

n

] is homogeneously stratified, is bound to individ-

uals, y is an individual variable not occuring in ' and aI' ... , ak are all

ofthe variables or non-logical constants occurring free in [AXI ... xn]'

The axiom schemas of our present system, accordingly, are (Al*) ,

(A2*), (A3**), (a = a), where a is any singular term, (LL*), (Idr),

(3/A-Conv*), (CPr) and now (3/HSCPI) as well.

8

(Modus ponens and

universal generalization are its only inference rules.) Because of its

relation to our earlier system, we shall refer to this system hereafter as

HSTi

We must again emphasize that unlike the situation in AHST*, A-

abstracts are not required to be homogeneously stratified in HSTi. That

is, the meaningful expressions of HSTi are just those described in the

logical grammar of 7. Also, unlike AHST*, the system HSTi is free of

existential presuppositions regarding singular terms, including of course

nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms. It follows, accord-

ingly, that HSTi is not a conservative extension of AHST*, since

whereas, by (A3*), (V P) (3x) (F = x) is provable in AHST*, this same

wff is actually disprovable in HST!. Nevertheless, since every wff of

AHST* is provably equivalent, again by (A3*), to a wff which is bound

to individuals, HSTi may be said to contain AHST* in the sense of the

following lemma (which is easily seen to hold).

LEMMA: If is a wff of AHST* which is bound to individuals, y is an

individual variable not occurring in , and aI' ... , ak are all the

242 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

variables or non-logical constants occurring free in rp, then IAHST* rp only

ifI

Hsn

(3y) (a

l

= y) & ... & (3y) (a

k

= y) -> rp.

Restricting ourselves to pure wffs, i.e., wffs in which no predicate or

individual constants occur, if follows by the above lemma that every

sentence (or wff with no free variables) of AHST* which is bound to

individuals and provable in AHST* is therefore provable in HST;.,* as

well. In addition, by (3IHSCPI), every object which is a concept-

correlate in AHST* is also a concept-correlate in HSTf, and therefore,

for the same reason, every object which is a concept-correlate in AHST*

+ (Ext*) is also a concept-correlate in HST! + (Ext*). In other words,

since Jensen's "set" theory NFU is contained in AHST* + (Ext*), then in

the sense of the above lemma NFU is also contained in HST! + (Ext*);

and in that regard classical mathematics, and arithmetic in particular, is

reducible to HST! + (Ext*) at least to the same extent that it is reduci-

ble to NFV. (Actually, HST! + (Ext*) is an improvement over AHST* +

(Ext*), and therefore over NFU as well, for the same reason that

Quine's "set" theory ML is an improvement over NF; in particular, in

both HST! + (Ext*) and ML, mathematical induction is provable in an

unrestricted form (cf. [Quine], 42).) Our proposal that HST! + (Ext*)

be taken as an alternative, and perhaps a preferred, reconstruction of

Frege's form of logicism is in that case quite in order.

Finally, it should be noted that just as Hao Wang was able to prove

the consistency of Quine's set theory ML relative to NF, we are able to

prove the consistency of HST! + (Ext*) relative to AHST* + (Ext*), and

therefore relative to NFU as well (cf. [NBC-4], 6.4).

THEOREM: If AHST* + (Ext*) is consistent, then so is HST! + (Ext*).

16. AN INTENSIONALIZED FORM OF FREGE'S LOGICISM

By the intensional counterpart of HST! we shall understand the system

HST!o which is developed from HST! in the same way that DAHST*

was developed from AHST*. That is, the axiom schemas of HST!o are

just those of HST!, extended now to apply to wffs containing D as well,

plus those of the SS modal propositional logic. The inference rules are

of course the same as those for DAHST*, viz., modus ponens, universal

generalization and modal generalization.

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 243

Now it is perhaps noteworthy that insofar as (DExt*) is to be

assumed as well, then we need not take 0 as a primitive logical constant

since it can in that case be contextually defined as follows:

=df = [A(\fX) (x= x)].

That is, since the biconditional,

.... = [A (\fx)(x = x)]

is provable in HSTio + (DExt*), then we need not take 0 as a primitive

logical constant of this system since it can be introduced by means of

the above contextual definition. (Some, but not all, of the modal axioms

will then become redundant.) This definition is not available in DAHST*

+ (DExt*), our reconstruction of Russell's early from of logicism, since

it cannot be used in that context to explain occurrences of 0 in wffs

which are not homogeneously stratified. That is, the above definiens, as

a wff of AHST*, would restrict the application of 0 to wffs which are

homogeneously stratified, since only these wffs can occur within the A-

abstracts of AHST*. But since there are wffs of AHST*, including tau-

tologous wffs, which are not homogeneously stratified, defining 0 as

above would in that case fail to validate the rule of modal generalization

when applied to those axioms of AHST* which are not homogeneously

stratified. It is only in HSTi, in other words, where A-abstracts are not

required to be homogeneously stratified that the above definition of 0

will suffice.

In addition to the principle of intensionality, (DExt*), we shall also

need to assume the principle of rigidity, (PR), if we are to represent

classes in this alternative the way they are represented in DAHST* +

(!;JExt*), + (fR\.our reconstruction of Russell'searlvJorm_ofJolicisltL.

Of course, with the addition of (PR) we can bring about the same

reduction of classical mathematics to logic as is already achieved in

HSTi + (Ext*), which contains all NFU-"sets" as concept-correlates.

Moreover, we can prove the relative consistency of HSTio + (DExt*) +

(fR) in essentially the same way as we proved the relative consistency of

HSTi + (Ext*).

THEOREM: If DAHST* + (DExt*) + (PR) is consistent, then so is

HSTio + (DExt*) + (PR).

244 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

Despite its relative consistency, however, HSTl'o + (Ext*) + (PR)

cannot be construed as a reconstruction of Russell's early form of

logicism. For as an abstract singular term a nominalized predicate,

according to Russell, denotes the same concept as an individual which

the predicate in question otherwise stands for in its role as a predicate;

and therefore whatever is the value of a bound predicate variable,

according to early Russell, is also a value of the bound individual

variables. That is, in Russell's early form of logicism no predicate can

stand for a concept in its role as a predicate and yet fail to denote an

individual when transformed into an abstract singular term. But since

there are predicate expressions satisfying just these conditions in HSTAo,

and therefore in HSTAo + (DExt*) + (PR) as well, then neither HSTl'o

nor any of its extensions can be the basis of a reconstruction of Russell's

early form of logicism. In other words, unlike Frege's form of logicism,

we have no way in Russell's framework by which to explain why some

concepts have individuals as concept-correlates while others do not,

since on Russell's account concepts are their own concept-correlates.

We might adopt a mixed strategy here, however, whereby concepts

are unsaturated functions in Frege's sense but still have propositions as

values in Russell's sense. Concepts are then not individuals after all, and

there is nothing odd or contradictory in the idea of some concepts

having a concept-correlate while others do not. Of course, if in addition

concept-correlates are none other than the extensions which these

concepts have in different possible worlds, then the resulting framework

may be described more as an intensionalized form of Frege's logicism

than as a counterpart to Russell's. In this regard, we would not adopt

(DExt*) but (Ext*) instead, since even intensional concepts which are

materially equivalent will have the same extension, and therefore con-

cepts which are materially equivalent in a given possible world will have

the same concept-correlate in that world. In such a framework, needless

to say, the principle of rigidity, (PR), would be completely superfluous.

There is a problem here with HSTAo as the basis for such an

intensionalized form of Frege's logicism, however, since by (LL *),

(VP) ('iGn) (F= G -> DF= G)

is provable in HSTl'o, and therefore all concepts, even when intensional-

ized, will always have the same extension. We can of course modify

(LL *) so that it remains valid only for extensional contexts, that is, only

for wffs in which D does not occur; for in that case concepts having the

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 245

same extension in one possible world need not necessarily have the

same extension in every possible world. That is, in that case,

(3P) (3Gn) (F= G& <> F G)

will be consistent and not inconsistent (cf. [NBC-4], 6.5). Thus, if

is the system resulting from HSTTo by weakening (LL *) in this

way, but also by adding the commutative law,

(V - 0 (V

as an axiom schema (since concepts themselves remain the "same" from

world to world), then we can identify this intensionalized form of

Frege's logicism with + (Ext*). The extensional system HST! +

(Ext*) described earlier, needless to say, is a subsystem of +

(Ext*), and by interpreting 0 as double negation the two systems

collapse into one, thereby showing the consistency of + (Ext*)

relative to HST! + (Ext*).

17. RUSSELL'S LOGICISM AS CONCEPTUAL PLATONISM

The mixed strategy described above favors Frege's form of logicism

over Russell's, it should be noted, since unsaturated concepts, even

when intensionalized, were assigned their extensions as their concept-

correlates in the different possible worlds. There is another mixed

strategy, however, which is more in line with Russell's form of logicism

than with Frege's, and in fact which may be taken as a counterpart even

to Russell's later form oflogicism in (PM].

On this mixed strategy, the predicative nature of a concept consists in

its having both an intensional and an unsaturated nature, though the

latter is understood in even a more radical sense than Frege would have

allowed. In particular, on this account all predicable concepts are

cognitive capacities to identify (in a classificatory sense), characterize or

relate objects in various ways, and the purely dispositional or non-

occurrent nature of such a capacity is none other than its unsaturated

nature. That is, on this account, concepts are intersubjectively realizable

cognitive abilities which may be exercised by the same person at

different times as well as by different persons at the same time; and in

that regard concepts are neither ideas nor mental images in the sense of

particular mental occurrences. The exercise (or saturation) of a concept

on this account does indeed result in a mental event; i.e., a mental act,

246 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

and, if overtly expressed, a speech act as well; but the concept is not

itself the mental or speech act as an event but rather what accounts for

that act's predicable nature. Second level concepts are really referential

concepts on this account, incidentally, and it is their joint exercise or

mutual saturation with predicable concepts (in a kind of mental chem

istry) which is the basis of our particular thoughts and acts of communi

cation (cf. [NBC-4], chap. 2, and [NBC-3], 11-15).

Predicable concepts, on this version of conceptualism, are not

independently real properties or relations, it must be emphasized; and,

unlike referential concepts, their primary role in thought and communi

cation is not referential but predicative. Yet, by a curious development

of the interplay between language and thought, predicable concepts as

cognitive capacities can be transformed into secondary or derived

abilities which enable us to apply predicable concepts in a denotative

manner corresponding to the use of nominalized predicates in natural

language. It is by means of such a secondary or derived application,

moreover, that we purport to refer to independently real platonic forms

as the denotata of nominalized predicates. Thus, for example, not only

do we predicate of a shape that it is triangular, and of a person that he is

wise by applying a predicate concept in each case, but, in addition,

we also purport to denote the properties of triangularity and wisdom,

respectively, by applying these same concepts denotatively.

Purporting to denote and actually denoting are of course not the

same, and in fact, despite all our purportings, there may be no inde

pendently real properties or relations at all which are actually denoted

by any nominalized predicates; or at least that is a view which is

compatible with our present account of concepts as unsaturated cogni

tive capacities. Adopting the Abelardian thesis here, however, will not

result in a counterpart to Russell's form of logicism. In other words, we

shall consider here only the alternative platonic view according to which

most, even if not all, of the predicable concepts which we can form and

articulate actually do denote an independently real property or relation

when applied denotatively. That some predicable concepts which we

can form and articulate must fail to denote such a property or relation

will, on such a view; be an interesting but hardly problematic fact. What

would be problematic, of course, is the different platonic view that

concepts are themselves the independently real properties and relations

they purport to denote when applied denotatively while admitting that

only some of them are individuals while others are not.

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 247

Now it might objected that if concepts are cognitive capacities, then

none of them can be impredicatively formed in the Russellian sense in

which they can be specified only be means of a wff which contains a

quantifier ranging over all concepts. In other words, as based on the

capacities of the human intellect, the laws of compositionality regarding

concept-formation in the sense intended here exclude the possibility of

validating the full impredicative comprehension principle (CPt). In this

regard, only a conceptualism which is "constructive" in a sense corre-

sponding to the theory of ramified types will be permitted.

While such a constructive conceptualism can be formalized as a logic

of nominalized predicates without resorting to Russell's treatment of

concepts as "improper objects" for which the law of excluded middle is

to be restricted, we shall, for reasons of space, forego such a presenta-

tion here; for our concern is with the validation, not the invalidation, of

(CPt). In this regard, it should be noted, there is a form of concep-

tualism, which we shall call holistic conceptualism, which agrees that the

initial, and perhaps most important, stages in concept-formation are

"constructive" in the above sense, but which nevertheless maintains that

there is also a stage of concept-formation (usually occuring only in post-

adolescence) at which so-called impredicative concept-formation

becomes possible. Such a stage is realized, moreover, only through our

capacity for language, and in particular through our capacity to use

language for the expression of "constructible" concepts. Impredicative

concept-formation, in other words, is a mediated process, and language

and the linguistic ability to use predicate expressions is the means used

to master and direct such a process. Holistic conceptUalism, in this

regard, presupposes constructive conceptualism as an antecedent stage

of conceptual development, and in particular as a stage which is subse-

quently reconstructed through a certain reiterable pattern of reflective

abstraction which proceeds through the ramified hierarchy of predicable

concepts and which is finally completed or closed only by an idealized

transition to a limit at which impredicative concept-formation becomes

possible (cf. [NBC-4], chap. 2).

According to holistic conceptualism, in other words, the impredica-

tive comprehension principle (CP) of standard second order predicate

logic is valid as a description of the laws of compositionality for

concept-formation, as long as the predicate quantifiers occurring therein

are taken as ranging over all predicable concepts, including those that

are only impredicatively specifiable. A holistic conceptualism which also

248 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

adopts the platonic assumption described above regarding the denota

tive application of predicable concepts will in that case also validate

(CP1) as well. In other words, HSTio can serve as the basis for a

formulation of Conceptual Platonism as described above. Moreover, if

thoughts are assumed to be at least in principle always overtly express

ible in language, and 0 is interpreted as ranging over all possible

contexts of use of language, that is, in the sense of pragmatics, then the

principle of intensionality, (DExt*), as a principle regarding the condi

tions under which predicable concepts are understood to denote the

same property or relation when applied denotatively, would seem also

to be valid in Conceptual Platonism.

HST!o + (DExt*) does not itself suffice for the reduction of classical

mathematics to logic, however; and in particular the axiom of infinity is

not provable in HSTio + (DExt*) just as it is not provable in either

HST! + (Ext*) or HST]j + (Ext*). That there are infinitely many

properties and relations as platonic forms is no doubt plausible, if we

are assuming that there are platonic forms as individuals to begin with;

but it is not in any case a consequence of Conceptual Platonism in the

sense in which the latter assumes only that predicable concepts denote

properties or relations when applied denotatively. In this regard,

Conceptual Platonism is very much like Russell's later form of logicism

in [PM], since an axiom of infinity is required in that framework as well.

In [PM], however, the axiom of infinity requires that there be infinitely

many concrete individuals, and that assumption is less plausible than

one regarding properties and relations as abstract individuals. In

particular, an axiom of infinity in the form:

(Inf*) (VE"') (T/Gk)(F 'f G), where n 'f k,

is especially natural, since it only assumes that different properties or

relations are denoted by predicable concepts of different degrees

(adicity).

The situation is more problematic for an account of classes as the

extensions of concepts in HST!o + (DExt*), however, though such an

account is forthcoming if we also assume the principle of rigidity, (PR).

But (PR), unfortunately, cannot be validated in Conceptual Platonism,

since as a principle about concepts as cognitive capacities it amounts to

an unwarranted (and in fact contraindicated) reducibility axiom to the

effect that every predicable concept is materially equivalent to one

having the same extension (or rigid property or relation when applied

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM 249

denotatively) in every possible context of use. (PR), in other words, can

be validated only by the full platonic view which identifies concepts as

being themselves the independently existing properties and relations

they otherwise purport to respresent, which is to say that (PR) can be

validated only in Russell's early form of logicism reconstructed as

DAHST* + (DExt*) + (PR).

Russell's own reducibility axiom in his theory of ramified types is also

said to be unwarranted (and contraindicated) in his later form of

logicism, incidentally. If it is, then this can only be- so because the

concepts or propositional functions assumed in the theory of ramified

types are not indepedently real properties and relations, as Russell in

fact described them to be, but are rather really concepts as cognitive

capacities in the sense intended here. In that case, however, they cannot

also be the logical objects in terms of which classical mathematics is to

be explained, since in fact they are not objects at all. Russell's later

form of logicisim, in other words, is better understood as a form of

Conceptual Platonism, though apparently one based only on construc-

tive rather than holistic conceptualism as well.

The upshot is that although HSTto + (DExt*) + (Inf*) , but not

HSTto + (DExt*) + (Inf*) + (PR) , can be taken as a counterpart to

Russell's later form of logicism, nevertheless neither HSTto + (DExt*)

+ (Inf*) nor Russell's theory of ramified types suffices as an adequate

framework for logicism. This still leaves our reconstruction of Russell's

early form of logicism intact, however, and it in no way affects either of

our reconstructions of Frege's form of logicism. In other words, as

philosophical doctrines go, logicism, whether in Frege's or Russell's

early form, is alive and well.

Indiana University

NOTES

I I am indebted to Edmund Gettier for bringing this fact about (SCpn to my attention.

2 The rewrite law

[AXI ... = [AYI ... .. , Yn1xn)],

where no Yi occurs in is derivable in AHST* on the basis of the principle of exten-

sionality, (Ext*), i.e., Frege's basic law (Va), or its intensional counterpart, (OExt*),

described in 11 and 13 below. If neither of these principles are assumed, then the

rewrite law must be taken as an additional axiom schema of AHST*.

250 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

3 Weak Zermelo set theory is the restriction of Zermelo set theory to those instances of

the Aussonderungsaxiom in which all quantifiers in the comprehension clause are

limited or restricted; that is, in which all quantifiers have the form (''Ix E y) or (3x E

y).

4 Strictly speaking the translation proceeds through an intermediate system NFU'

which is obtained from NFU by adding A as an individual constant together with the

axiom - (3x) (x E 1\) and the modification of NF's comprehension principle for NFU

to the following:

(CP-NF')(3y)((y= A V (3x)(x E y)] & (lfx) [x E y .... IPI)

where IP is a stratified wff of NFU' in which y does not occur free. Similarly, instead of

AHST* + (Ext*) we translate the A-free wffs of its A-free counterpart HST* + (Ext*) into

the first order wffs of NFU'. (AHST* + (Ext*) is a conservative extension of HST* +

(Ext*) since every wffs of AHST* is provable equivalent in AHST* + (Ext*) to a A-free

wff.) The important clause in the translation, besides that translating monadic predica-

tion into membership, is the clause for predicate quantifiers:

trslfFI)IP) = (ifF) [F=A V (3X)(XE p) - trs(IP)].

where '-' (bar) is a one-to-one mapping of predicate and individual variables onto the

individual variables.

5 Cf. [NBC-2] for a description of Russell's early framework as a form of possibilism.

6 Note that by (LL*),

(a= b) - D (a= b)

is provable in DAHST* + (DExt*), and therefore so are

(3x)D(a==x)

and

(3F)D([Ax

I

... xn] = F),

where x does not occur free in a, and Fn does not occur free in [Axl ... x

n

], and [Axl

... xn] is homogeneously stratified. From these principles, the following commutative

laws follow:

(lfx)D91 .... D(lfx)91

(lfP)D91 .... D(lfP)91.

As applied to concrete individuals, the first of these commutative laws makes sense only

in Russell's early possibilist framework (cf. [NBC-2]).

7 This approach towards the representation of classes and relations-in-extension was

first given by Montague in [FP], p. 132. It also occurs in [Gallin], p. 77, where the

principle of extensional comprehension is the type-theoretical counterpart of the prin-

ciple of rigidity described below.

8 As indicated for AHST*, the rewrite law,

[Axl ... x

n

91] = [AYI .. Yn91(Y/xl , , Yn!xn)],

where no Yi occurs in 91, is provable in this system on the basis of either (Ext*) or

(DExt*). If neither of thege principles are to be assumed, however, then the rewrite law

must be added as an axiom schema.

FREGE, RUSSELL AND LOGICISM

251

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Frege, Gottlob:

[Fd] The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans, by J. L. Austin, Harper & Bros.,

N.Y. 1960.

[G & B] Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, eds. P.

[Gg]

(PW]

Geach and M. Black, Blackwell, Oxford, 1952.

Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vols 1 and 2, Hildesheim, 1962.

Posthumous Writings, eds. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach; trans.

by P. Long and R. White, Blackwell, Oxford 1979.

[PMC] Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, eds. G. Gabriel, H.

Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel, A. Veraart; trans. by H. Kaal, University

of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980.

Russell, Bertrand

[AMR) An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning, unpublished ms. of 1898, in the

Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario,

Canada.

[POM] The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed., W. W. Norton & Co., N. Y., 1937.

(PM] Principia Mathematica, co-author, A. N. Whitehead, Cambridge Univer-

sity Press, 1913.

(EA] Essays in Analysis, ed.D. Lackey, Braziller, N. Y., 1973.

Carnap, Rudolf

[Carnap] 'The Logicist Foundations of Mathematics', Erkenntnis 2 (1931); trans. by

E. Putnam and G. J. Massey and reprinted in Philosophy of Mathematics,

eds. H. Putnam and P. Bennacerraf, Prentice Hall, 1964.

Church, Alonzo

[Church] 'Schroder's Anticipation of the Simple Theory of Types', The Journal of

Unified Science (Erkenntnis). 9 (1939): 149-152.

Cocchiarella, Nino

[NBC-I] 'A Second Order Logic of Variable-Binding Operators', Reports on

Mathematical Logic 5 (1975): 3-18.

[NBC-2] 'Meinong Reconstructed Versus Early Russell Reconstructed', Journal of

Philosophical Logic 11 (1982): 183-214.

[NBC-3] 'Philosophical Perspectives on Quantification in Tense and Mopal Logic',

in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. 2, eds, D. Gabbay and F.

Guenthner, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984, pp. 309-353.

[NBC-4] Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Univer-

sals, forthcoming as vol. 2 of Indices, Bibliopolis Press, Naples, 1986.

Gallin, Daniel

[Gallin] Intensional and Higher-Order Modal Logic, No. Holland, Amsterdam,

1975.

Heqkin, Leon

[Henkin] 'Banishing the Rule of Substitution for Functional Variables', The Journal

of Symbolic Logic, vol. IS (1953): 201-208.

Jensen, Ronald

[Jensen] 'On the Consistency of a Slight(?) Modification of Quine's New Founda-

tions', Synthese 19 (1968): 250-263.

252 NINO B. COCCHIARELLA

Kalish, Donald and Montague, Richard

[K & M] 'On Tarski's Formalization of Predicate Logic with Identity,' Arch. for

Math., Logik und Grundl. 7 (1965): 61-79.

Montague, Richard

[FP] Formal Philosophy, ed. R. H. Thomason, Yale University Press, New

Haven, 1974.

Quine, Willard Van Orman

[Quine] Set Theory and its Logic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1963.

Specker, Ernst

[TAJ Typical Ambiguity', in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science,

eds. E. Nagel et al., Stanford University Press, 1962: 116-124.

[AC] The Axiom of Choice in Quine's New Foundations for Mathematical

Logic', "Froc. of the Nat. Acad. of Sciences 39 (1953): 972-975.

Tarski, Alfred

[TarskiJ 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff in Formalisierten Sprachen', Studia Philosophica 1

(1936): 261-405.

ROBERT B. BRANDOM

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS:

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Today we find ourselves at the outset of a golden age in the interpreta-

tion of Frege's philosophical writings. Judged by the number of articles,

books, and seminars addressing his thought, interest in Frege is at an

all-time high. More importantly, as Frege has come out of the shadow of

Russell and Wittgenstein into the fun light of critical attention, the

degree of sophistication of discussion has achieved a quantum improve-

ment. Many factors conspired to bring about this result, but two events

may be singled out as having madt;: contributions both to the

resurgence of interest in and to our greater understanding of Frege's

work.

First is the publication, more than sixty years after his death, of that

part of his Nachgelassene Schriften which survived the vicissitudes of

the intervening years. These papers appeared in German in 1969 and in

English in 1979.

1

Some of the contents are rough in form, though not

without value. We are offered, for example, tables of contents and

partial drafts of a textbook on logic and its philosophy which Frege

made starts on at various crucial periods of his life. Even draft frag-

ments of this sort permit important inferences from the order of

presentation and different emphases given various topics to conclusions

about the explanatory priorities Frege associated with his central

technical concepts. But not all of the selections represent rough cuts or

abandoned projects. Included are some fully polished articles, dealing

with Frege's most central technical concepts - fine examples of his

concise, sometimes lapidary mathematician's prose - which he had tried

unsuccessfully to publish. In a number of cases, these additional texts

permit the resolution of exegetical disputes occasioned by what can now

be seen to be accidental lacunae and merely apparent emphases in the

canonical published corpus.

The other landmark event is the publication in 1973 of Dummett's

monumental and long-awaited full-length treatment of Frege's philoso-

phy of language.

2

It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of

253

L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 253-295.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

254 ROBERT B. BRAND OM

this classic work. Anyone interested in the interpretation of Frege must

give it the same close attention owed to the primary texts. Its clarity of

thought, patient rehearsal of considerations, and exercise of the best

critical judgement in final appraisal will not be soon equalled. This essay

will not offer a systematic account of Dummett's views, since the most

important of these are so intimately tied up with the development of

powerful novel approaches to contemporary philosophy of language as

to defy brief characterization, even by their author. The original volume

has now been supplemented with another containing many valuable

amplifications and clarifications.

3

The result is a 1300 page corpus

which, Dummett's complaints

4

to the contrary notwithstanding, by now

deserves to be considered as setting out the canonical reading of Frege.

It is so considered by the authors discussed below, and forms the

background against which their own accounts are set out.

Two examples will serve to indicate the sort of interpretive advance

signalled by these events. First, it was widely believed in the 1950's and

1960's that Frege did not intend the distinction between sense and

reference to apply to functional expressions such as predicates, but only

to complete expressions such as terms and sentences.

s

Although the

famous essay on sense and reference does not discuss such an applica-

tion of that distinction, the Nachlass makes clear that this is only

because that discussion was reserved for a further article which is quite

explicit in its endorsement of that application, but which was repeatedly

rejected for publication until Frege abandoned the attempt. Several

other passages reprinted in [19] decisively refute the interpretation

which would restrict the distinction to complete expressions. A some-

what less important mistake may also be mentioned as indicative, which

was done in as much by Dummett's arguments as by the unearthing of

further evidence. In 'On Sense and Reference' Frege says "One might

also say that judgements are distinctions of pans within truth-values,"

and that "the reference of the word is part of the reference of the

sentence."6 These remarks have sparked the attribution of a variety of

bizarre ontological views to Frege, centering on the notion of the True

as representing the whole world, sometimes conceived as a Tractarian

world of facts, sometimes as comp'osed of objects (and what about the

False?). The remarks stem from a hasty assimilation, soon explicitly

rejected, of the relation between the argument of a function and the

value it determines to the relation of part and whole. For although the

function 'capital of .. .' takes the value Stockholm when Sweden is taken

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 255

as argument, Sweden is not part of Stockholm. Dummett's discussion of

this issue has permanently disposed of the temptation to take these

remarks seriously as interpretive constraints. We shall see below, how-

ever, that there remain genuine controversies which are not so easily

disposed of (concerning the senses and referents of functional expres-

sions) which may be regarded as successors to these two mistaken lines

of thought.

Dummett has shown that Frege should be treated as a modern

thinker in the sense that one can think about contemporary philosophi-

cal issues of considerable significance by thinking about his concepts

and their explanatory deployment, and that one cannot think about

those concepts and their principles of deployment without thinking

about such contemporary issues. In what follows those concepts are

approached from three different directions. First, an attempt to interpret

and develop Frege's technical scheme in light of contemporary discus-

sions of the issues he was addressing is considered. Then attention is

turned to an argument to the effect that ignoring the historical context in

which Frege developed his theories, treating him we might say merely as

a contemporary, leads to substantive misinterpretation of those theories.

,Finally, following one strand of the account of the path by which Frege

developed and defended some of his central concepts, leads to a novel

diagnosis of the status of those concepts.

SECTION I

One important recent offering is David Bell's book Frege's Theory of

Judgment.

7

This is a clear and well-written work. The issues it raises and

the form in which they are addressed merit the attention of anyone

interested in the significance for current inquiry of Frege's strategic

deployment of a battery of technical concepts to explain various aspects

of linguistic practice. Its title is worthy of some consideration. It is a

measure of the degree of sophistication of contemporary Frege commen-

tary that a controversy exists even over how one should describe the

topic which his philosophical work addresses. Of course no one disputes

his concern with the foundations of mathematical reasoning and knowl-

edge, expressed above all in his three books, the Begriffsschrift, the

Grundlagen der Arithmetik, and the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik But

the more general conceptual framework he found it necessary to

256 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

elaborate in order to express clearly and precisely his claims about the

nature of mathematics and its objects cannot easily be characterized

without prejudging substantial issues of interpretation. It may seem

obvious that Frege was pursuing a project in the philosophy of lan-

guage.

8

But such a description is misleading in the context of Frege's

own insistence on the priority of thoughts (though not of thinkings) to

their linguistic expression. For he was interested in natural languages

only insofar as they permitted rough formulation of objective and

language-independent thoughts, and he crafted artificial languages only

as more adequate means for their expression. It would be inappropriate

to build into the description of the subject-matter at the outset a post-

Wittgensteinian conviction of the wrong-headedness of such an

approach, by assimilating his concerns to contemporary investigations

under the rubric "philosophy of language". One of the major theses of

Sluga'S book, discussed below, is that such Whiggish presuppositions of

continuity of concern have consistently led Frege's readers to overlook

important strands of his thought. Dummett has also suggested "theory of

meaning" as a general characterization, but this seems to apply better to

his own enterprise than to Frege's. For 'meaning' is correlative to

'understanding', and Frege's concern lay at least equally with reference,

which is not in general grasped when one understands a claim, as with

the sense which must be grasped in that case.

In his discussion of the book,9 Dummett objects that Bell has

misdescribed his topic, in that Frege's treatment of the act of asserting is

the topic of only one chapter, while the rest of the book talks about the

notions of sense and reference. This seems unfair, for the heading

"theory of judgement" ought to entitle Bell to offer an account of the

contents which are judged as well as of the acts which are the judgings of

those contents. It has the advantage of placing Frege's concerns in

appropriate historical and philosophical context. Bell's denomination of

Frege's topic as judgement displays his recognition of the importance

Frege, in company with Kant and Wittgenstein, placed on inverting the

traditional order of explanation which took concepts as primary and

sought to account for judgments in terms of them. At least until 1891,

Frege clearly regarded the claim that concepts can only be understood

as the products of analysis of judgements as one of his most central

insights. Although Bell does not say so, it is equally clear in the

Begriffsschrift that Frege completes the inversion of the classical priority

of concepts to judgements and judgements to syllogisms by taking the

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 257

contents of sentences (judgement in the sense of what is judged rather

than the judging of it) to be defined in terms of the inferences they are

involved in.1O Concepts are to be abstracted from such judgements by

considering invariance of inferential role (which pertain only to judg-

ments) under various substitutions for discriminable (possibly non-

judgemental) components of the judgement. Both in the introduction to

BGS and in his essay on "Boole's logical Calculus and the BGS",ll the

virtue of the purely formal perspicuous language of inference in non-

formal contexts is described as its permitting for the first time the

scientific formation and expression of concepts. Although it is for this

reason that Frege called his first work a "concept script", he later came

to believe this phrase misleading precisely because it obscured his

doctrine of the primacy of judgements. On the other hand, it would be

equally misleading to describe Frege simply as a theorist of inference, in

spite of the explanatory priority he accorded to it. For his primary

theoretical focus always lay on the sentential and thence sub-sentential

contents attributable to different expressions in virtue of the roles they

played in inference, as revealed by their behavior under substitution. So

"judgement", which is (a translation of) an expression Frege himself

used pretheoretically to describe the object of his theorizing, seems a

good choice to delimit his subject matter.

Like any other choice, however, it does prejudge some controversial

issues of interpretation, for instance that concerning the persistence in

Frege's thought of the so-called "context principle". It is often unclear

exactly what this principle means, but the canonical statement of it is the

Grundlagen claim that "only in the context of a sentence does a word

have any significance". (I use 'significance' here for Frege's 'Bedeutung'

because in 1884 he had not yet distinguished Sinn from Bedeutung, and

the undifferentiated term should be marked.) It is often claimed,12 even

by those such as Dummett who take the putative change in view to be a

serious mistake, that when Frege achieved his mature views in 1891

with the formulation of that crucial distinction he discarded the context

principle. If that is so, then Bell's choice of "theory of judgement" to

describe the topic of the mature semantic views he discusses would be

misleading or simply incorrect. As we shall see below, Sluga argues that

Frege never relinguishes the context principle. Bell does not argue this,

however, nor does he even claim it. He is simply silent on this issue, as

on others concerning detailed questions about the attribution of various

views to Frege based on textual evidence.

258 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

Bell's enterprise lies in a different direction entirely. He is concerned

to look closely at the explanatory roles played by Frege's various

concepts and at the ways in which Frege takes them to be related, in

order to refine and reconstruct a broadly Fregean account of the nature

of judgement. In keeping with this aim, he is not engaged in the exegesis

of Fregean texts, and freely discards from his reconstruction a number

of doctrines which Frege clearly held, in favor of incompatible princi-

ples (for instance, in Bell's reconstruction functional expressions are

assigned senses but not referents). His project is to salvage from Frege's

account those insights which can be put together to form a workable

theory of judgement. The result is broadly Fregean in endorsing the

following "major strands" of Frege's theory:13

I. There is the methodological principle that 'we can distinguish parts

in the thought corresponding to the parts of a sentence, so that the

structure of the sentence serves as a model of the structure of the

thought'.

II. A thought is (a) objective, (b) the sense of an indicative sentence ....

III. A thought must have at least one 'unsaturated' or functional element,

otherwise its elements would fail to coalesce and would remain merely

disparate atoms.

IV. In a thought the complete elements refer (if at all) to objects.

The nature of this enterprise makes it hard to evaluate its success. There

are many issues one would think to be central to any attempt to offer a

theory of judgement which Bell nevertheless does not address. For

instance, although he argues that it would be wrong to require an

account of judgement to restrict itself to the form of an account of the

propositional attitude constructions used to attribute judgements to

others, he does not justify the books failure to present any such account

as a proper part of such a theory. Again, althought it has been suggested

above that Bell was not obliged to restrict his attention to the notion of

assertoric force (the analysis of the act of judging), one would certainly

like a fuller and more satisfactory account of that notion than the

cursory sketch we are offered.

14

The book does its work in a sort of

methodological no-man's land between textual exegesis and theory

construction owing allegiance only to the phenomena it seeks to

theorize about.

This is not to say that the analysis is not enlightening, however. Bell is

at his best when dissecting the explanatory role assigned by Frege to his

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 259

technical concepts. When he succeeds we learn both about Frege and

about the phenomena. Consider for instance the notion of Bedeutung.

Bell tells us that:

15

... Frege had not one, but two notions of reference. These notions hang together so well

in the case of singular terms that they are hard to distinguish in this context. In the case

of predicates, however, they are not only distinguishable, they are different to reconcile.

One notion is this: the reference 01 an expression is that extra-linguistic entity with

which the expression has been correlated or which it picks out. The other notion of

reference is that it is a property which an expression must possess if that expression is to

be truth-valuable (to coin a phrase). By truth-valuable I mean such that it either

possesses a truth-value, or is capable of being used (and not just mentioned) in a

sentence which possesses a truth-value.

Bell claims that although in the case of singular terms one notion can

play both of these roles, since for them to be truth-valuable just is to be

correlated with an object, in the case of sentence and functions the two

notions diverge. All that Frege ever offers in the way of evidence for the

application of the notion of reference to expressions in these categories

is considerations showing them to be truth-valuable. Since he does not

distinguish the two different notions of reference which he has in play,

he feels entitled to conclude that they possess reference in the first sense

as well. But this is a non sequitur, or at any rate a transition which must

be justified, and not simply assumed on the basis of the conflation of the

two different senses of Bedeutung. Thus Bell rejects the notion of truth-

values as objects, and of functions as the references of functional

expressions, as excess conceptual baggage mistakenly mixed in with the

second notion of reference, which is the only one doing any explanatory

work for these categories.

This analysis is clear-headed and valuable but can be faulted on two

grounds, each of which amounts to a request for further analysis. First,

as Dummett points out,16 the characterization of the second notion of

reference does not seem right. For as Bell has described it, reference is a

property which an expression either has or lacks, depending upon

whether sentences containing it can have or always lack truth values.

But Frege's notion is that in addition to having or lacking reference,

expressions which have reference can have different references, accord-

ingly as they make different contributions to the truth-values of sentences

containing them. The test is always substitutional - two expressions

which have reference have different references iff in some context the

substitution of one for the other changes a true sentence into one

260 ROBERT B. BRAND OM

which is not true. Others who have noticed the distinction Bell is after

have put things better. For instance, Tugendhat

17

(who seems to have

introduced this line of thought) calls this non-relational sense of refer-

ence "truth-value potential" and in effect identifies the truth-value

potential of a sub-sentential expression with the equivalence class of

expressions intersubstitutable salva veritate.

The sharpening of Bell's distinction (which makes it similar to that

between 'referent' and 'reference' which Dummett uses throughout [8])

does not affect his criticism of the inference from possession of refer-

ence in this non-relational sense to possession of reference in the

relational sense, of course. But it does affect a further use he wants to

make of the distinction, to argue that it is incorrect to think of predicate

expressions as having a reference at all, even in the non-relational sense.

For here Bell argues that Frege incorrectly takes as a necessary and

sufficient condition for the truth-valuability (in Bell's sense) of predi-

cates that they have sharp boundaries. He accordingly takes it that the

assignment of reference to predicates is motivated only by this require-

ment, and so that showing the untenability of such a requirement is

sufficient to show the inappropriateness of assiging reference to pre-

dicate expression at all. This line of argument is undercut by seeing that

there is more to the second notion of reference than truth-valuability.

Since the denial of the cogency of the application of the notion of

reference to predicates (or function expressions generally) is one of the

main innovations of Bell's analysis, his failure adequately to characterize

that part of Frege's notion of reference which remains when one takes

away correlation with an extra-linguistic object has serious conse-

quences for the subsequent course of his argument.

Dummett, however, rejects not only Bell's characterization of the

second notion of reference, but also the claim that there are two notions

of reference. He claims that the relational and the nonrelational senses

represent "two ingredients of one notion". The second "tells us what

Frege wanted the notion of reference for, and the oher tells us how he

thought that it applied to the various categories of expression".18 It may

be granted that the explanatory work Frege wanted the notion of

reference for is its truth-value potential or contribution to the truth-

conditions of sentences, and that he thought that the intersubstitutability

equivalence class of equipollent expressions was determined by the

correlation of all and only its members with the same extra-linguistic

entity. But it would still remain to be asked, for instance, whether the

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS

261

identity of the correlated object and the nature of the correlation can be

inferred from the semantic equivalence class of expressions they deter-

mine, as Frege's arguments concerning the reference of sentences and

functional expressions would seem to require. Such a question is in no

way made less urgent or easier to answer by rephrasing it in terms of

two ingredients of one notion rather than in terms of the relations of two

notions. In the final section of this paper it will be argued that this

difficulty is one instance of a quite general definitional failure of Frege's

part, one which in another context he tried unsuccessfully to resolve in a

purely technical way.

Putting the issue in these terms raises the second source of dissatis-

faction with Bell's argument. For the sort of question just raised seems

no less important or difficult for the paradigmatic case of singular terms

than for the parts of speech Bell finds problematic. The basic substitu-

tional/inferential methodology which yields the sense of

reference as an equivalence class of expressions vastly underdetermines

the correlated objects and mode of correlation invoked by the relational

sense even for proper names. Tugendhat, having formulated the non-

relational notion of reference, takes it to be the notion of reference,

discarding correlation with an object as a realistic confusion best

extruded from Frege's thought. Sluga follows Tugendhat in this regard.

The reason in each case is that all that Frege's analysis of the use of

expressions seems to require is the sorting of expressions according to

the non-relational sense of substitutional role. The semantic analysis he

developed is a method for the perspicuous codification of inferences.

Truth is what is preserved by good inferences, and sub sentential expres-

sions can be grouped into co-reference classes accordingly as inter-

substitution within the classes preserves such good-iriference potentials.

Such an approach can give rise to specification of the conditions under

which two expressions have the same reference, but how can it warrant

a claim that the shared reference is to be identified with some object

(among all those which in one way or another could be taken to deter-

mine the same coreference classes) specified otherwise than as the

reference of an expression? The answer seems to be that Frege's

arguments for this identification are straightforwardly substitutional

ones, in particular that for any singular term t we can always substitute

(saving the inferential potentials) the. term the object referred to by

the singular term 't'. The expressions which license intersubstitution

of expressions are identity locutions (as Frege had argued in the

262 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

Grundlagen), and so we are correct to say that the object referred to by

the singular term 'Julius Caesar' is Julius Caesar. Whether this fact has

the significance Frege thought it had is another matter. I

9

One of the most important discoveries of the early 1970's, both from

the point of view of the interpretation of Frege and of the philosophy of

language generally (for once, made independently of Dummett) con-

cerns the need to distinguish two different explanatory roles which are

conflated in Frege's technical concepts of sense. Kripke and Putnam

independently argued 20 that the cognitive notion of the sense of an

expression, what one who has mastered the use of that expression may

thereby be taken to understand, and the semantic notion of the sense of

that expression, what determines the reference of the expression, cannot

in general be taken to coincide. In particular, in the case of proper

names no knowledge or practical capacity which can plausibly be

attributed to an ordinary competent user of the name will suffice to

determine the object of which it is a proper name. A similar point can

be made about the use of natural kind sortals. Since Frege had required

that his notion of the sense of an expression play both the cognitive and

the semantic role, and since for an essential range of expressions no

single notion can do so, it is apparent that his concept must be refined

by dividing it into two distinct sense-concepts, whose interrelations it

then becomes urgent to investigate.

A further distinction within the semantic notion of sense has been

urged by a number of writers, on the basis of the consideration of the

behavior of indexical or token-reflextive expression.

21

In Kaplan's

idiom, we must distinguish for such expressions between their character,

which is associated with the expression type, and the content associated

with each contextually situated token(ing) of that type. The distinction in

question is evident in the following dialogue:

A: I am anxious to get started.

B: No, it is possible that you are eager, but I am the anxious one.

We are concerned with the semantic notion of the sense of an expres-

sion, that is, with the way in which its reference is determined. In one

sense both tokens of "I" have their reference determined in the same

way, for in each case it is the speaker responsible for the tokening who

is referred to. These expressions share a character. But in another sense

A's token of "I" and B's token of "you" have their reference determined

in the different ways (e.g. for the purpose of tracking the referent through

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS

263

the other possible worlds which must be considered to evaluate the

model qualifications in B's remark). The referents of these tokenings will

coincide in every possible world relevant to the evaluation of these

utterances, in virtue of the identity of their contents. The characters of

these expressions, together with the context in which they are uttered,

determine a content which in tum determine a referent in every possible

world. It is this latter task with which the semantic notion of sense is

charged for nonindexical expressions. Such expressions may accordingly

be thought of as those whose character determines a content without

needing to be supplemented by a context. The point is that as we ask

about what would be true in other worlds of the individual picked out

by B's indexical utterance there is a double relativity to possible worlds,

accordingly as those worlds can be relevant to the two different stages in

the determination of a referent. First, since B's remark could have been

addressed to someone other than A, we must consult the world-context

in order to determine what content is fixed by the character of the

exression when uttered in that context. The individual concept so

determined as a content can then be tracked through various possible

worlds and assigned referents in each, so that model claims can be

evaluated.

Without referring to either of these antecedents, Bell distinguishes

two notions of expression sense in a way which partakes of some of the

features of each of the other distinctions. He calls his two notions "input

sense" and "output sense", and introduces them by reference to two

Fregean principles:

22

PSI: The sense of a sentence is determined by the senses of its com-

ponent parts,

and

PRI: The truth-value of a sentence is determined by its sense. (And, of

course, how things stand.)

His claim is that although the ''two principles depend for their plausi-

bility and usefulness on there being a sense of 'sense' which remains

constant throughout", in fact they demand different ones. Input sense is

that notion of which principle PS I holds, and output sense is that notion

of sense of which PRI holds. Input sense is that which is preserved by

correct translations and that for which synonymy claims assert identities

of sense. Sub-sentential expressions have input senses (''meanings''), and

264 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

these combine to determine the input senses of sentences containing

them. Output senses are defined as what is common to claims such as

''Today I ate plum pudding," and "Yesterday you ate plum pudding".

The input senses of sentences together with a context of utterance

determine such output senses. The output senses of sentences are what

can meaningfully be described as true or false, as per principle PR2.

As described so far, Bell's distinction amounts to the claim that the

cognitive/semantic and character/content partitions of the notion of

sense ought to be seen as coinciding. For the compositionality of sense

is a postulate required for the explanation of the possibility of under-

standing complex expressions, so that it must be input senses which are

in the first instance grasped cognitively. Semantic senses, determining

truth values of sentences, are in turn identified with output senses. But

since the latter are determined by the former together with a context of

utterance and the distinction is enforced by attention to indexical

expressions, the character/content distinction is likewise subsumed by

the difference between input and output senses.

Such an identification is clearly subject to a number of objections, as

consideration of the quite different motives and functions of the con-

flated distinctions indicates. But these difficulties may not be insur-

mountable. Perhaps a useful view could be elaborated based on the

assimilation of the sense in which the referent of a proper name token is

determined not by what its utterer understands by it, but only by this

together with a causal, historical, and social context in which the token

is embedded, on the one hand, and the sense in which the reference-

determining sense of a token of "yesterday" is given not just by what one

can understand as the meaning associated with the expression type, but

only this together with a concrete context of use. But Bell does not

attempt to develop such an account. In part this is because he has

nothing whatever to say about what "contexts" are, or how these

together with input senses determine output senses. And it is just here

that all the detailed work is involved in making out either half of such

an assimilation, and hence in justifying their conflation. But Bell is

precluded from addressing such a task by other, less defensible features

of his view.

For Bell denies that sub-sentential expressions have output senses at

all, claiming that "output sense is essentially sentential",23 No argument

or even motivation for this position is presented. It is suggested that for

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 265

sentences the distinction between input senses and output senses corre-

sponds to that between sentences and the statements they can be used to

make, and that it is better to think of the former not as possessing truth-

values which change, by contrast to statements whose truth-values do

not, but rather to think of the former as not the kind of thing which can

have truth values at all. But no reason is given for not extending this

distinction to sub-sentential expressions. The distinction hetween the

two varieties of sense is introduced, as indicated above, in terms of two

Fregean principles. PR2, the 'sense determines reference' principle, is

quoted at this portion of the argument as restricted to sentences and

truth values. But of course the principle Frege uses is not so restricted.

Indeed, when Bell first introduces it some sixty pages earlier it is in

unrestricted form. He has just been discussing the principle he calls

PRI, that the reference of complex expressions is determined by the

references of their components (which Bell discards because as we have

seen he does not attribute reference of any kind to functions). He says:24

Elsewhere in his writings, however, he seems to invoke a quite different principle which

we can call PR2. It is this: (a) the reference of any expression is determined by its sense,

(b) the sense of a complex expression is determined by the senses of its component

parts.

Two features of this definition deserve comment. First, part (b) of

principle PR2 as here stated is what he later calls PS I and is concerned

precisely to distinguish from PR2. Second, part (a) of this original state-

ment differs from the later version in not being restricted to sentences.

Neither of these substantial changes in the significance of his expression

"PR2" is announced, acknowledged, or motivated in the intervening

text. Such carelessness in specifying a central interpretive principle

which one has taken the trouble to name for clarity of reference is bad

enough under any circumstances. It is unforgivable when essential

features of one's own claims and their justifications depend precisely on

the matters obscured by the sloppiness. As things stand, the reader is

left with no idea why in using the two principles PR2 and PSI (=

PR2(b) in earlier statement) to distinguish two notions of sense one

should employ the later version of PR2 rather than PR2( a) from the

earlier version, which is the principle Frege endorsed. Apart from the

invocation of PR2, output senses are specified as what is common to the

two "plum-pudding" sentences quoted above. As our sketch of the

266 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

character/content distinction show, it is not at all obvious why this

characterization should not extend to what is common to 'today' and

'yesterday', on the one hand, and'!' and 'you' on the other.

Bell does, however, employ the restriction of output senses to

sentences to argue for a further point. For he claims that the "context

principle" of the Grundlagen may be understood in terms of the fact

that terms only have input senses, which together with the input senses

of other expressions determine sentential input senses, which in context

determine a truth-value. Since the reference of terms matters only in

determining truth-values, it is "only in the context of a sentence that a

term have a reference". Clearly nothing can be made of this line of

thought in the absence of a rationale for its basic premises.

These difficulties with the distinction between input senses and out-

put senses also make it difficult to evaluate another novel interpretive

suggestion which Bell offers. He concludes his discussion of the senses

of proper names with the claim

25

"The sense of a proper name, then, is

that it purports to refer to a determinate object of a given sort with

which it has been conventionally correlated." The sense of a proper

name is here taken as "that which one understands when one is able to

use it correctly".26 As indicated above in the discussion of the relation of

the cognitive notion of sense to Bell's notions, this must be the input

sense, for sub sentential expressions aren't supposed to have output

senses. It is accordingly obscure what the connection is supposed to be

between the senses Bell is offering a theory of here and the determina-

tion of referents for the proper names they are senses of. What then are

the criteria of adequacy for an account of what a name user must be

taken to understand? Bell examines the conditions under which we

would want to deny that someone had mastered the use of a name, and

concludes that in addition to using it as a singular term one must at least

know some sortal under which the referent is taken to fall in order to be

judged a competent user. This is useful as a necessary condition, but

much less plausible as a sufficient condition to be taken to be using an

expression as a proper name. For a sufficient condition would seem to

require that one be appropriately connected to a community of users of

the name, perhaps an historically extended one, whose joint use does

determine a referent, though no individual's use need do so. It is not

obvious that merely believing that some conventional correlation has

been established with an object of the right sort is sufficient to be

appropriately connected with the community of users of that name. In

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 267

any case, to argue for such a principle would require looking at how

input senses and various specific sorts of context can together determine

output senses and eventually referents for the names in question, and

this Bell does not undertake.

Bell wants his notion of proper name sense in order to develop an

appropriate account of the senses of functional expressions. This latter

task is made especially urgent by the confrontation between his denial

that the referents of functions have any explanatory value, on the one

hand, with the undeniable importance in Frege's scheme of functions

and concepts understood as functions, on the other. Bell's reconstruc

tion reconciles these ideas by interpreting concepts and functions as the

senses rather than the references of functional expressions. A concept,

accordingly, is to be understood as a function which can take as

arguments proper name senses of the sort he has described, and yield

thoughts, the senses of sentences. While this identification of concepts

must be seen as a revision rather than an interpretation of Frege's

thought, it might seem that, setting that identification aside, at least the

account of the senses of functional expressions as functions from the

senses of argument expressions to the senses of value expressions ought

to be uncontroversial. It is not, and it is instructive to see why not.

As Bell has pointed out in his discussion of senses generally, the

concept of sense is required to play two distinguishable roles. First, the

sense of a component of a complex expression must contribute to the

determination of the sense of that complex. But also, the sense of the

component must determine a reference for that component. This gives

us two different ways to think about the senses of functional expressions

such as predicates. On the one hand they must combine with the senses

of terms to yield the senses of sentences. On the other hand they must

be the way in which a function from objects to truth values is deter

mined or given. It is not obvious that these two jobs can be done by one

notion. In particular, Dummett has argued

27

that "once the proper name

has specified the way in which the object is given, then it has made its

contribution to the sense of the sentence; if it had not, then it would be

impossible to see how its sense could both contribute to the sense of the

sentence and consist in the way in which the object is given." That is,

maintaining the coincidence of the two roles of sense in the case of

proper names (presumably where our grasp is firmest) commits us not

only to their divergence for functional expressions, but also to which

half we give up, namely the identification of their senses with sense

268 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

functions. Geach has objected to this doctrine of Dummett's,28 and it is

instructive to examine Dummett's response.

29

It is not disputed that once a sense has been assigned to a predicate, a

function from the senses of proper names to thoughts is determined. For

according to Dummett the predicate sense is the way in which a

function from objects to truth values is given. Hence, when that function

is supplemented by an object, it determines a way in which a truth-value

is given, that is, a thought. But since a term sense will determine such a

supplementing object (according to the second role of senses mentioned

above), the predicate sense will induce indirectly a function from term

senses to sentences senses. As Dummett says, "the question is whether

the sense of the predicate just is that function."

To argue that it is not, Dummett appeals to a further thesis of Frege's

about senses, namely that the senses of component expressions are parts

of the senses of the complex expressions in which they occur. We have

seen that it is a mistake to think of functions or their arguments as parts

of the values they generate, as Frege's retraction of his careless claim

that objects are parts of truth values shows. But since Frege did hold

that predicate senses are parts of thoughts, we would be committing

precisely this howler if we identified those senses with functions taking

term senses into thoughts. This is an ingenious counter-argument, but it

cannot be considered decisive. For while it would be a howler to treat

functions and their arguments generally as parts of the values they

determine (as in the combination of Sweden and the function the capital

of ... to yield Stockholm), this consideration does not show that

particular functions and kinds of function cannot have values which

contain the functions or their arguments as parts. Stockholm is part of

the value of the function the country of which . . . is the capital. And

mathematical examples of function-values which contain functions as

parts in the set-theoretic sense are easy to come by. (One thinks of the

story of the oracle who offered to answer a single question, and upon

being asked "What is the ordered pair whose first element is the best

question I could ask you, and whose second element is its answer?"

replied (falsely, I suppose): "the ordered pair whose first element is your

question and whose second element is this answer.")

Insulated from this dispute about sense functions by his distinction

between input senses and output senses, Bell backs up his commitment

to treating the senses of functional expressions as functions by citing a

number of passages, both published and from the posthumous works, in

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 269

which Frege unequivocally describes such senses as "unsaturated",

"incomplete", and "in need of supplementation", going so far in fact as

to say that "The words 'unsaturated' and 'predicative' seem more suited

to the sense than to the reference".3o To motivate his identification of

concepts with sense functions, Bell argues as follows.

31

The only reason

Frege had for believing in concepts as predicate referents was the need

to deal with a situation in which predicates have a sense and so

determine a thought, but lack a reference, and so determine a thought

which has no truth-value. The only case where this can happen which

does not reduce to the failure of a term to have a reference is where the

predicate is not defined for the sort of argument to which it is applied.

But this sort of case can be much more plausibly excluded by considera-

tions concerning predicate senses. For such cross-categorial predications

(such as "Julius Casesar is the sum of two prime numbers") ought

properly to be seen as not s\:lcceeding in expressing thoughts at all. Bell's

solution accordingly is to see predicates as having sortal restrictions

associated with their argument places, which together with the 'sortal

physiognomy' he has already assigned to proper name senses yields the

result he desires. One of the benefits which might be derived from such

a radical reconstruction should be made manifest by the discussion to

be given below to the difficulties ensuing from Frege's insistence that

functions be defined for all arguments whatsoever. However, as before,

the evaluation of this thesis about senses must await some resolution of

the general questions Bell has left open concerning his distinction

between input and output senses.

SECTION II

Hans Sluga's new book on Frege in the "Arguments of the Philoso-

phers" series

32

represents an approach complementary to Bell's in

almost every regard. It's central aim is to reread Frege's work in the light

of that of his precursors and contemporaries, rather than by reference to

his successors in the analytic tradition, as has been traditional. Although

Frege's unprecedented innovations in symbolic logic have made it

natural to think of him exclusively in the role of the founder of a

tradition - as a man without a past - Sluga argues that we ignore at our

peril his intellectual climate and .the influences which conditioned

various aspects of his technical concepts and of the explanatory tasks he

set for them. Sluga's task is not purely historical, however. For he is also

270 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

concerned to set out and justify novel readings of some of Frege's purely

philosophical doctrines, readings which are suggested and motivated by

the historical recontextualization he recommends. The result is a stimu

lating new picture of Frege's thought which will be of interest even to

those who are not in the end persuaded in detail by it. Furthermore,

since the narrative strategy employed is to trace the development of

Frege's ideas chronologically (starting, as it were, before he was born)

and surveying all of his important writings seriatim, this book is excel

lently constructed to serve as an introduction to these ideas (as Bell's or

Dummett's books, for instance, could not) as well as to challenge

specialists.

The book's historical orientation, then, is not adopted only for its

own sake, but also in order to guard against blinding ourselves to inter

pretively significant features of Frege's work by the importation of

anachronistic prejudices. Accordingly, it is primarily in terms of the

philosophical illumination they provide for our appreciation of Frege's

concepts and claims that we must evaluate the success of Sluga's various

invocations of historical influence. The claimed influences may be

considered under four headings. First, a view is presented about who

Frege took to be his philosophical opponents. Next, Leibniz is identified

as a precursor. Third, claims are made about the influence of two

logicians of the generation preceding Frege's, Lotze and Trendelenburg.

Finally and most significantly, it is claimed that overlooking the intellec

tual debt which Frege owes to Kant has most seriously distorted our

understanding. We will consider these claims in this order.

In his first chapter, Sluga is concerned to refute the claim that "In a

history of philosophy Frege would have to be classified as a member of

the realist revolt against Hegelian idealism, a revolt which occurred

some three decades earlier in Germany than in Britain."33 In this aim he

succeeds unequivocally. Hegelianism had ceased to be dominant or even

popular in German philosophical circles some years before Frege was

born. The view against which Frege was reacting is the scientific natural

ism which Sluga claims was held by the physiologists turned philoso

phers Vogt, Moleschott, Buchner, and Czolbe, popularized during

Frege's lifetime by Haeckel, and shared with some reservations by

Gruppe. Ontologically this view is a reductive materialism, and epistem

ologically it is an empiricist psychologism. Sensations are viewed as

material processes of the brain. Concepts, and hence the thoughts

constructed from them are taken to be reflections of such sensations.

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 271

Logic is seen as the study of the laws of thought, that is, as an empirical

investigation seeking to establish the natural laws governing the associa-

tion of concepts in judgment and of judgments in inference. It is this

psychologism which Frege so vigorously opposed, and on those rela-

tively few occasions when he describes his opponents as 'idealists' it is

clearly this school which he has in mind.

This is a point of no small moment, especially in the context of an

evaluation of Frege's role as progenitor of the analytic tradition. For his

over-arching objection to the naturalists is their failure appropriately to

distinguish between the normative and ideal order of correct inference

and justification on the one hand, and the descriptive and actual order

of causation and empirical processes on the other. Their concommitant

confusion of features of cognitive acts with features of the contents of

those acts is merely the expression of this original sin. And in his

insistence on the centrality of this basic distinction Frege is at one with

Kant and the post-Kantian idealists, and at odds with the primarily

physicalist and empiricist tradition in Anglo-American philosophy

which he fathered, and in the context of which it has been natural for us

to read him.

34

Throughout his book Sluga talks about Leibniz' influence on Frege,

but when he specifies the details of this influence his claims turn out to

be quite weak. Like Leibniz (and Kant), "Frege is interested in the study

of logic and the foundations of mathematics because they allow one to

ask in a p'recise form what can be known through reason alone."35 Aside

from this general rationalist commitment to the possibility of a priori

formal knowledge, the only Leibnizian doctrine which is attributed to

Frege is the endorsement of the project of the universal characteristic.

Frege explicitly describes the motivation for his Begrijfsschrift in this

way. That at this level of generality Frege owes a debt to Leibniz is

hardly a novel or surprising claim, however. Sluga also discusses the

influence of Trendelenburg, but in the end the claims seem to come to

little more than that he was the conduit through which Frege became

familiar with Leibniz' ideas.

It is otherwise with the connection discerned between Frege and the

logician Lotze. The suggestion of influence here has specifically been

denied as "a remarkable piece of misapplied history".36 Yet in this case

Sluga shows sufficiently striking similiarities to make the hypothesis of

influence persuasive. It is known that Frege read Lotze. Indeed it has

been argued that the theory of judgement in opposition to which he

272 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

presents his innovation in the Begriffsschrift just is Lotze's formulation.

37

The essay immediately preceding 'The Thought' in the journal in which

it was originally published, which Sluga takes to have been intended by

the editors as an introduction to Frege's essay, mentions Frege in the

context of an exposition of Lotze which highlights several Fregean

doctrines.

38

From Sluga's account of Lotze's views (as presented in the

Logik of 1874 and an earlier work of 1843) one can extract eight points

of similarity with Frege.

First, Lotze inveighs against psychologism and indeed is the figure

Frege's contemporaries would probably have identified as leading the

battle against the dominant naturalism of the day and in favor of a more

Kantian position. Next, Lotze was a logicist about mathematics,

although there is no hint in his works that he took the detailed working

out of such a reduction to logic as part of what would required to justify

this view. Third, Lotze insists, against empiricistic sensationalism, upon

the distinction between the objects of our knowledge and our recogni-

tion of such objects, in much the same terms that Frege did. Fourth,

Lotze emphasized and developed the Kantian strategy of explaining

concepts as functions (though of course he does not have the notion of

functions as unsaturated which Frege derived from his own substitu-

tional method of assigning contents to sub-sentential expressions). Fifth,

Lotze attacks the empiricists with a distinction between the causal

conditions of the acquisition of concepts and the capacity to use such

concepts in correct reasoning which mastery of the concepts consists in

(see note 34 above). Next, Lotze offers a theory of identity statements

according to which the two terms share a content, but differ in form.

This is the Begriffsschrift view, and the language survives into the

opening paragraphs of 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.' Seventh, Lotze

endorses the Kantian principle of the priority in the order of explana-

tion of judgements to concepts which Frege endorses in the Grundlagen.

Lotze does not succeed in being entirely consistent on this point, since

he also is committed to atomistic principles which are not obviously

compatible with the view on the priority of judgements. Although Sluga

does not say so, those who take Frege not to have discarded the context

principle in the post-1890 writings must find a similar tension in some

of the procedures of the Grundgesetze. Finally, Lotze is committed to

the objectivity of sentential contents, and treats them as neither mental

nor physical just as Frege does. Lotze, however, specifically denies that

this objectivity is grounded in the correlation of sentences with objects

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 273

such as Frege's thoughts appear to be, taking a more Kantian position.

Sluga, as we shall see below, argues that despite apparent statements to

the contrary we should understand this to be Frege's view as well.

This is a suggestive set of similarities to find in a prominent near-

contemporary logician with whose work Frege was familiar. Recogniz-

ing them as important need not commit one to minimizing the signifi-

cant, perhaps dominant, differences in outlook which remain between

Lotze's revived Kantianism and Frege's philosophical e1aboration of his

semantic methodology (although Sluga does on occasion succumb to the

temptation to treat Frege's agreement with Lotze on one point as

evidence that he probably agreed with him on others). Only according

to the crudest notion of what philosophical originality consists in is

there any incompatibility between finding enlightenment in the demon-

stration that these general principles were in the air and so came

complete with a history and a tradition, on the one hand, and the

appreciation of the genius shown in the use such adopted and adapted

raw materials were put to in service of quite a different explanatory

project on the other.

Sluga's most important and sustained argument, however, concerns

the influence of Kant on Frege. He claims that Frege should not be

thought of as a dogmatic realist about physical objects nor as a Platonist

about abstract objects, as he almost universally has been thought of. He

should be seen rather as a Kantian whose realistic remarks are to be

interpreted as expressing that merely empirical realism which is one

feature of transcendental idealism. This is certainly a radical reinterpre-

tation. What evidence can be adduced for it? Sluga's considerations may

be assembled as five distinct arguments.

First it is pointed 'out that Frege joined a philosophical society whose

manifesto is explicitly idealist and Kantian, and that he published in

their journal. By itself, this shows little, for Frege had so much trouble

getting his work into print and finding others willing to discuss it that we

cannot be sure how much he would have put up with to secure such

opportunities. The rationale Sluga suggests

39

is that ''what tied him to

the idealists was primarily his opposition to the various forms of

naturalism". Specifically, Frege and the idealists (a) were anti-psycho-

logistic, (b) endorsed an objectivist epistemology (taking the contents of

judgements to be independent of their entertainment by thinkers), and

(c) endorsed a rationalistic a priorism about mathematics. These points

are well taken, but the views involved are all consistent with Platonism

274 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

and realism generally as well as with transcendental idealism. Indeed

Sluga admits that "one can read much of Frege and not raise the

question of transcendentalism". So we must look elsewhere for a

warrant for such an attribution.

The second argument concerns Frege's attitude towards the truths of

geometry.40 It is remarked to begin with that in his Habilitationsschrift

Frege held a Kantian view on this topic, saying that geometry rests "on

axioms that derive their validity from the nature of our capacity for

intuition (Anschauungsvermogen)". Furthermore, throughout his career

Frege describes geometrical knowledge as synthetic a priori, and on this

basis rejects non-Euclidean geometry as false. From this fact Sluga

concludes: "Frege held a Kantian view of space and hence a transcen-

dentally sUbjective view of the objects that occupy it." The only

elucidation offered of this crucial 'hence' is the later statement that

"Frege's view must be close to Kant's: Empirical objects are in space

and time, but space and time are a priori forms of sensibility. That

seems to imply that for Frege empirical objects can only be empirically

real, but must be transcendentally ideal." That Kant believed the two

views to be linked in this way falls far short of showing that Frege did

so. Certainly such an argument cannot be taken to undermine an inter-

pretation which takes Frege's realistic remarks about physical objects at

face value, and admits that his views are inconsistent to the extent that

be never confronted these latter with his views about geometry with an

eye to reconciling them. On the other hand some interpretive cost is

clearly associated with attributing such an inconsistency to Frege.

The next two arguments must be judged less satisfactory.41 First,

Sluga argues that in the context of Kantian transcendentalism (as just

discussed) Platonic realism looks like dogmatic metaphysics. So Frege

should have been expected to argue that views (a) through (c) above, on

which he argees with the idealists, cannot in fact be warranted tran-

scendentally. But Frege nowhere argues this. The trouble with this

argument is that there is no evidence that Frege did not, as most of his

contemporaries did, read Kant's transcendentalism as a form of psy-

chologism. If he had done so, he would have dismissed it and so not felt

the force of the demand in question. Sluga next argues that every claim

of Frege's that can be taken as evidence of Frege's realism can be

matched by a passage in Lotze, who had a Kantian idealistic theory of

validity. This argument seems to do no more than restate the point that

(a) through (c) are consistent with either position. For it is a criterion of

adequacy of anyone's transcendentally idealistic position that it have

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 275

room for all of the claims the realist wants to make, suitably reinter-

preted. Further, Frege does insist that thoughts are independent, not just

of this thinker or that, but of the very existence or even possibility of

thinkers at all. This seems to contradict Lotze's account of objectivity as

rule-governed intersubjectivity.

Sluga'S final argument is weightier and involves more interpretive

work, both in construction and evaluation. The basic claim is that "there

are strewn through Frege's writings statements that appear irreconcil-

able with Platonic realism. In particular the central role of the Fregean

belief in the primacy of judgements over concepts would seem to be

explicable only in the context of a Kantian point of view."42 Arguing in

this way obviously commits Sluga to showing that Frege does not

discard the context principle when he arrives at the distinction between

sense and reference. We will see below that he contributes significant

new considerations to that debate in furtherance of this aim. But the

incompatibility of realism with the recognition of the primacy of judge-

ments must also be shown. The latter view is 'Kantian', but it does not

obviously entail transcendental idealism, which is the view in question.

Sluga takes the principle of the primacy of judgements to serve the

purpose for Kant

43

of refuting any atomistic attempt to construct

concepts and judgements out of simple components, and in particular to

resist the empiricist sensationalist atomism of Hume. Such a view is

indeed incompatible with the reism of Kotarbinski (to which Tarski's

recursive semantics owes so much), which sees the world as an arrange-

ment of objects out of which concepts and judgements must be con-

structed set-theoretically.44 But the Kantian principle need not be taken

to be incompatible with Platonic realism about abstract entities such as

thoughts which are the contents of judgements. Given that the context

principle does not show that Frege was a transcendental idealist about

thoughts, it seems also open to him to hold some form of realism about

other objects, provided thoughts retain an appropriate priinacy (as,

given the very special status of truth in the late works, even those who

see the context principle as discarded are committed to granting) even if

he has not discarded that principle. So if the case for the persistence of

the context principle can be made out, it should be taken as showing

Frege was a Kantian in the sense of holding the context principle,

not in the sense of being a transcendental idealist.

Still, this point is worth establishing for its own sake. Sluga correctly

sees the Begriffsschrift as the confluence of three lines of thought: (1)

that judgements, as involved in inference, are the original bearers of

276 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

semantic significance, so that it is only by analyzing such judgements

according to the procedure of "nothing invariance under substitution"

that such significance can be attributed to sub-sentential expressions

('the primacy of judgements'), (2) the Leibnizian idea of a perfect

language, and (3) the idea of reducing mathematics of logic. Assuming

the context principle was thus "anchored deeply in Frege's thought, it is

implausible to conclude with Dummett that in his later years Frege

simply let it slip from his mind."45 Sluga advances five arguments for the

persistence of the principle, and along the way addresses two commit-

ments of Frege which have been taken to be incompatible with such

persistence.

First, Sluga offers an important consideration which has not pre-

viously been put forward in the extensive literature discussing this

question. The first of the 1891-2 essays which Frege wrote is a seldom

read review of L. Lange's The Historical Development of the Concept of

Motion and its Foreseeable End Result called 'The Principle of Inertia'.

In it Frege argues at some length that the concepts of a theory are not

given prior to and independent of that theory. Rather those concepts

can be arrived at only by analyzing the contents which the judgements

constituing the theory are given by the inferences concerning them

which that theory endorses. This is a significant new piece of evidence

supporting Sluga'S view. The only question which might be raised about

it is that since this semi-popular piece does not deploy the full-blown

apparatus of sense and reference it may be wondered whether the views

there expressed were confronted by Frege with that apparatus, or

whether the essay might not be seen as merely the latest of his early

works. But to take such a line would be to concede a lot, and future

claims that the context principle was discarded will have to confront this

argument of Sluga's in detail.

Next Sluga offers a novel reading of the essay on the distinction

between sense and reference which denies that, as has often been

claimed, that distinction as there presented applies primarily to singular

terms and their relations to the objects which are their referents, and

hence commits Frege to an assimilation of sentences to terms which is

incompatible with the context principle. The strategy here is, in effect, to

deny that 'Bedeutung' as Frege uses it ever has the relational sense

which indicates correlation with an object. Relying on the Tugendhat

essay mentioned above in connection with Bell, Sluga understands

'Bedeutung' as a nonrelational semantic potential defined paradigmati-

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 277

cally for sentences, in virtue of their role in inference. The introduction

of this notion in the context of the consideration of identities involving

singular terms is seen as a rhetorical device of presentational signifi-

cance only. In the final theory subsentential expressions are taken to

inherit indirect inferential significances in virtue of their substitutional

behavior in sentences, which alone are directly inferentially and hence

semantically significant. Thus 'Bedeutung' is paradigmatically a senten-

tial notion.

To this analysis is conjoined an account of 'Sinn' as a cognitive

notion, as what matters for knowledge. But again, the units of knowledge

are judgements, and sub sentential expressions can become relevant only

insofar as they can be put together to form sentences which can express

judgements. So sense also should be seen as primarily a sentential

notion, which applies to sub sentential expressions only in a derivative

way. This line of thOUght concerning senses is then combined with that

concerning reference in a subtle and sensitive account of the puzzling

relations between the Lotzean rendering of identity locutions offered in

the Begriffsschrift and its successor in 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung'.

The previous discussion of Bell's interpretation suggests that these

readings leave something to be desired. Sluga does not acknowledge the

existence of any passage or considerations indicating that Frege does

have a relational notion of reference in play. Yet such passages and

considerations do exist, and merely elaborating the nonrelational ver-

sion of Frege's concept, as Sluga does, does not obviate the necessity of

investigating the relations between the two notions and the possibilities

for reconciling them. Similarly, Sluga pushes his discussion of the notion

of sense no farther than the discrimination of the cognitive role played

by that concept. He has nothing to say about the semantic notion of

sense, or accordingly about how senses are to be understood as deter-

mining references, even nonrelational references. On these points

Sluga's analytic net does not have as fine a mesh as Bell's. As a result,

his ingenious interpretation of sense and reference will require further

filling-in before its eventual promise can be assessed.

The overall interpretation which results from all of these arguments,

however, is challenging and powerful. The primary objections . to the

persistence of the context principle are that Frege nowhere explicitly

endorses that principle after the 1884 Grundlagen formulation, and that

the principle is incompatible with two central doctrines of the 1891-92

essays, namely the semantic assimilation of sentences to terms and the

278 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

account of concepts as functions from objects to truth-values. Sluga

claims that his readings of the "Inertia" essay and of USB meet these

objections. He does not say in detail how the doctrine about functions is

to be reconciled with the context principle, but does argue that the

"Inertia" essay justifies us in attributing Bedeutung to any expression

which makes an appropriate contribution to the possession of truth

values by sentences containing it. Thus function-expressions may be

assigned (nonrelational) reference on this account. Using intersubsti-

tution equivalence classes to move from Tugendhat's nonrelational

sentential semantic significances to those of sub-sentential expressions

does indeed justify such an attribution. But in the "Inertia" essay, Frege

seems to be using "concept" in the ordinary sense rather than his

technical one, that is, to refer to the senses of predicate expressions

rather than their references. This being the case, it is not clear how the

envisaged reconciliation of the context principle with the view of

concepts as functions from objects to truth values is to be achieved.

Besides the evidence of the essay on inertia, Sluga offers two further

reasons to deny that the later Frege is silent on the topic of the context

principle. First, he mentions in several places the posthumously

published 'Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter' (of 1919) as showing that

Frege continued to endorse the principle. He does not say what pas-

sages he has in mind, but he presumably intends the following:

46

"What

is distinctive about my conception of logic is that I begin by giving pride

of place to the content of the word 'true', and then immediately go on to

introduce a thought as that to which the question 'Is it true?' is in

principle applicable. So I do not begin with concepts and put them

together to form a thought or judgement; I come by the parts of a

thought by analyzing the thought." Such a passage does show that

sentences play a special explanatory role for the late Frege, but that

much is not in question. At most such claims would show that a version

of the context principle held for senses, confirming Sluga's claim that the

cognitive origins of the concept of sense require that priority be given to

sentences. No version of the context principle for referential signifi-

cances follows from these claims. Unfortunately, Sluga never says what

exactly he takes the context principle to be, whether a doctrine about

senses, references, or both. Frege's original formulation, of course,

preceded his making this distinction. So perhaps the best conclusion is

that Sluga takes the principle to persist as applying to senses, that is that

it is only in the context of a thought that a term or other sub-sentential

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 279

expression expresses a sense. This seems to be something Frege indeed

did not surrender. Such a reading has the additional advantage that the

doctrine that concepts are functions from the references of singular

terms to truth-values is not incompatible with it.

The final argument fares less well. It is claimed that Frege's late

treatment of real numbers shows that his practice is still in accord with

the context principle.

47

Here the point seems to be that the real numbers

are given contextual definitions. Such an argument would be relevant to

a context principle applying to reference rather than senses, since Frege

does not pretend to specify the senses of numerical expressions in his

formal definitions. But the definition of real numbers he offers is of just

the same form as the Grundgesetze definition of natural numbers. If this

style of definition does exhibit commitment to a form of the context

principle, that case should be argued for the more central and important

case of natural numbers. It is not clear how such an argument would go.

SECTION III

One of the themes around which Sluga usefully arranges his presenta-

tion of Frege's development is that of the pursuit of the definition of

purely logical objects. The reason offered for the somewhat misleading

order, of presentation pursued in DSB, which seems to give pride of

place to singular terms rather than sentences, is that the road from the

Grundlagen account of numbers to that of the Grundgesetze needed to

pass through a more thorough understanding of identity claims. Sluga is

quite clear that for Frege, beginning with the Grundlagen, the only

concept we have of an object is as that which determines the semantic

significance of a singular term. For an expression to play the semantic

role of a singular term is for it to make a certain contribution to the

inferential potential of sentences containing it, a contribution which is

constituted by the appropriate (truth preserving) substitutions which can

be made for that expression. The substitution inference potential of a

singular term is in tum codified in the endorsed identity claims involving

that term. That what we mean by 'object' is according to Frege

exhausted by our conception of that the recognition of which is

expressed in identity claims in virtue of their licensing of intersubstitu-

tion is one genuinely transcendental element in his thought about which

Dummett, Sluga, and Bell agree.

280 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

In the Grundlagen Frege argued that according to this criterion,

number-words are singular terms, so that if statements about them are

ever objectively true or false they must be so in virtue of properties of

the objects which are identified and individuated in assertions of

numerical identities. The logicist thesis that the truths of mathematics

are derivable from the truths of logic by logical means alone accordingly

entails that numbers are purely logical objects, in the sense that the

identities which express the recognition and individuation of these

objects are themselves logical truths. Sluga's ingenious suggestion is that

Frege's concern in DSB with the nature of synthetic or potentially

knowledge-extending identities specifying ordinary objects should be

understood as a stage in the working out of his mature account of

analytic (logically true) identities required for the adequate specification

of the logical objects treated in the Grundgesetze. The specific interpre-

tive use to which Sluga puts this general insight is hard to warrant,

however.

For he claims that the difference between these two sorts of identities

resides in the fact that the identities by which logical objects are

identified and individuated express coincidence not just of reference,

but also of sense.

48

It is not clear what reasons there are to accept this

reading, nor what interpretive advantages would accrue from doing so.

For Frege explicitly affirms on a number of occasions that the two

expressions '2

2

' and '2 + 2' express different senses. And he seems

committed to this view by structural principles of his approach, in

particular by the compositionality principle as it applies to senses.

Different function-expressions appear in these two complex designa-

tions, and the senses of components are parts of the senses of com-

plexes containing them. Nor does the fact that such identities are to be

logically true entail that they express identities of sense rather than

merely of reference. Identity of sense would of course be sufficient for

identity of reference. But we are often told that logic need be concerned

only with truth and reference, and Frege's view seems to be that it can

be logically true that two different senses determine the same reference.

This mistake aside, Sluga's tracing of the development of Frege's

attempts to define abstract objects of the sort instantiated by logical

objects is a valuable contribution, and raises issues of the first impor-

tance for our understanding of the constraints on interpretations of

Frege's technical concepts. The story begins with the second definition

of number which Frege tries out in the Grundlagen. It states that two

concepts have the same number associated with them iff the objects

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 281

those concepts are true of can be correlated one-to-one.

49

He rejects

such a definition as inadequate to specify numbers as objects, on the

grounds that it will not determine whether, for example, Julius Caesar or

England are identical to any number. Such a definition settles the truth-

values of identities (and hence the appropriateness of substitutions) only

for terms which are the values for some argument expression of the

function-expression "the number of the concept ... ". This procedure

would be legitimate only if we had independently defined the concept

(function from terms to truth values) number signified by this function-

expression. But it is not possible simultaneously to specify that function

and the objects for which it yields the value True. If objects had been

specified by this definition, then there would be a fact of the matter as to

whether Julius Caesar was one of them. But the definition does not

settle this issue either way. On the basis of this objection, Frege moti-

vates his third and final definition of numbers, considered below.

Sluga traces through the later works Frege's efforts to clarify the

specification of numbers in such a way that it will not be subject to this

objection, culminating in the Grundgesetze account of courses of values.

Given the centrality to Frege's project of producing an adequate defini-

tion of number this progress is of interest for its own sake. But the task

of responding to the objection to the second GL definition of number is

made especially urgent for interpreters of Frege by a consideration

which Sluga does not mention. For the specifications of the abstract

objects in terms of which Frege's semantic analysis proceeds (e.g. sense,

reference, thought, truth-value) are of the same objectionable form as

the second GL definition of number. Nothing we are ever told about the

senses of singular terms or sentences, for instance, settles the question

of whether Julius Caesar can be such a sense. Though this may seem like

a question of no interest, some interesting questions do take this form.

For in interpreting the notion of sense one is concerned both With

subdividing the explanatory functional role played by the concept (as

exhibited in the discussion of Bell) and with the possibility of identifying

senses with things otherwise described - for example, the uses of

expressions, sets of possible worlds, mental representations. Frege him

self addresses such issues when he denies that the senses of sentences

are to be identified with ideas in people's minds. How is the identity he

wishes to deny given a sense?

All that is given is a criterion determining when the senses associated

with two expressions are the same (namely if they are intersubstitutable

without change of cognitive value - Erkenntniswerte). If something is

282 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

not specified as the sense associated with an expression (compare:

number associated with a concept) its identity or nonidentity with

anything which has been so given is entirely undetermined. Frege's

procedure for introducing his technical concepts such as sense is

invariably to attempt to specify simultaneously a realm of abstract

semantic interpretants and a function which assigns a member of this

realm to each expression.

We are, for instance, to associate truth-values with sentences. But we

are told only that the truth-value associated with p is the same as the

truth-value associated with q just in case for no occurrence of p (either

as a free-standing sentence or as a component in a more complex

sentence) can a good inference be turned into a bad one by substituting

q for that occurrence of p (reading the principle that good inferences

never take true premises into conclusions that are not true as defining

truth-values in terms of the goodness of inferences). Even conjoining

such a specification with the stipulation that the truth-value associated

with the sentence '2 + 2 = 4' is to be called 'the True' does not settle the

question of whether Julius Caesar is that truth-value. He had better not

be, for if the logicist program of GG is to be successful, truth-values

must be definable as purely logical objects. The current question is how

the identity which is denied here is given a sense so that something

could count as justifying that denial. The functions which associate the

various kinds of semantic significances with expressions are always of

the form: f(x) = fey) iff R(x, y), where x and y range over expressions,

and R is some relation defined in terms of the inferential potentials of

those expressions. These are exactly the kind of definition Frege found

wanting in GL.

Seeing how Frege believes he can overcome the objectionable in-

determinateness of concepts such as that determined by the second GL

definition of number is thus a matter of considerable importance for the

appraisal of his success in specifying his own technical concepts, as well

as for the narrower project of introducing numbers as logical objects.

The third and final definition of number which Frege offers in GL is:

"the Number which belongs to the concept F is the extension of the

concept 'equal (Gleichzahlig) to the concept F' "50 The number three is

thus identified with the extension of the concept, for example, "can be

correlated one-to-one with the dimensions of Newtonian space". This

definition does not have the form Frege had objected to. However, it

essentially involves a new concept, 'extension', which has not previously

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 283

appeared in GL, nor indeed anywhere else in Frege's writings. In a

footnote to the definition, Frege says simply "I assume that it is known

what the extension of a concept is." Sluga points out that this defini-

tionally unsatisfactory situation is not remedied in the remainder of the

book. The result is scarcely up to the standards of definition to which

Frege held others and himself. The project of GL could not be counted

a success until and unless it could be supplemented with an account of

the extensions of concepts.

Six years later, in 'Funktion und Begriff', Frege offers such an

account. The general notion of a function is explicated, and concepts are

defined as functions from objects to truth-values. The extension of a

concept is defined as the 'course of values' (Wertheverlauf) of that

function. This is the first appearance of the concept of a course of

values. Since extensions are reduced to them, the residual definitional

burden bequeathed by GL is put off onto this new concept. What Frege

tells us here is just that the course of values associated with function F is

the same as the course of values associated with function G just in case

for every argument the value assigned to that argument by F is the same

as the value assigned to it by G. The trouble with such a stipulation, as

Sluga says, is that it has exactly the objectionably indeterminate form of

the second GL definition of number which it is invoked to correct.

Frege wants to associate with each function a new kind of object, a

course of values. This domain of objects and the function which assigns

one to each function are introduced simultaneously. The result is that it

has not been determined whether Julius Caesar is the course of values

of any function. A given course of values has only been individuated

with respect to other objects specified as the courses of values asso-

ciated with various functions. In sum, the courses of values in terms of

which the extensions of concepts are defined suffer from exactly the

defect of definition which extensions of concepts were introduced to

rectify or avoid.

In the Grundgesetze when courses of values are introduced this

difficulty is explicitly acknowledged and described in the same terms

used to raise the original objection in GL (though without reference to

the earlier work). Frege introduces the same principle for determining

when the courses of values of two functions are identical, and then

points out that such a principle cannot be taken to determine any

objects until criteria of identity and individuation have been supplied

with respect to objects which are not given as courses of values. He

284 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

proposes to supplement his definition so as to satisfy this demand. His

proposal is that for each object not given as a course of values it be

stipulated to be identical to an arbitrary course of values, subject only to

the condition that distinct objects be identified with distinct courses of

values.

Frege expresses the function which assigns to each function an object

which is its course of values by means of an abstraction operator

binding a Greek variable. The course of value of a function F is written

as ' 0 (F 0). Axiom V of the Grundgesetze tells us that:

(a) 'O(FO)='a(Ga)iff('Vx) [Fx(=) Gxl.

Frege recognizes that this principle alone does not suffice to determine

the identity of objects which are courses of values. To show this he

points out that if X is a function which yields distinct values if and only

if it is applied to distinct arguments (what we may call an "individuation

preserving" function), then:

(a') X('O(FO=X('a(Ga iff ('Vx) [Fx(=) Gxl

without it's having been settled for instance whether

(a") X('O(FO = 'a(Ga)

for any F and G (including the case in which F = G). The by now

familiar point is that (a) only determines the truth-values of homo

geneous identities, those both terms of which are of the form 'O(FO).

And (a') only determines the truth-values of identities which are

homogeneous in that both terms have the form X('O(Fo. But (a") asks

about heterogeneous identities, whose terms are of different forms.

Another identity which is heterogenous and whose truth-value is ac-

cordingly not settled by principle (a) is Julius Caesar = 'O(Fo).

To fix up this indeterminateness, which would result from taking

Axiom Valone as the definition of courses of values, Frege proposes to

supplement it by stipulating the truth-values of the heterogenous iden-

tities. Actually, he is required to specify the inferential behavior of

course of value expressions in all contexts in which they can appear. In

Frege's terminology such contexts are functions, so this requirement is

equivalent to the demand that it be determined for every single-argu-

ment function-expression what value is designated by the substitution of

any course of values expression in its argument place. Doing so will then

determine all of the properties of the objects designated by expression

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS

285

of the form for those properties just are concepts, that is,

functions whose values are truth-values. Among those properties are

individuative properties, the facts corresponding to identity contexts

involving course of values expressions. Thus the Grundlagen require-

ment that to introduce a new set of objects one must settle all identities

involving them is in the Grundgesetze motivated by the omnicontextual

condition. (It is worth noticing, as Sluga points out, that there is an

endorsement of a strong context principle in Frege's claim that what it is

to have introduced expressions of the form as the names of

definite objects is for the truth-values of all sentential contexts in which

those expressions can be substituted to have been settled.) In fact, in the

spare environment of GG it turns out that it is not only necessary to

settle the truth-values of all identities involving course of value expres-

sions in order to satisfy the omnicontextual requirement, but sufficient

as well.

Indeed, in the system of the Grundgesetze at the time courses of

values are introduced the only objects already defined are the two truth-

values, and so the only heterogenous identities Frege explicitly

addresses are those involving a course of values and a truth-value. But

he must justify the general procedure of stipulating truth-values for

heterogenous identities, and not just his application of it. For if he does

not, then the GG definition of number will still be open to the objection

to the second GL account of number (that it has not been settled

whether Julius Casesar is one) which drove him to define the extensions

of concepts and hence courses of values to begin with. Indeed, the

concept "logical object" will not have been defined if it has not been

settled whether Julius Caesar is one. Further, as we have seen, Frege's

own definitions of his technical terms in general suffice only to deter-

mine the truth-values of homogeneous identities, for example, identities

of two truth-values, or two senses, or two references, but not the

heterogeneous identities which would be required to make the claim

that Julius Caesar = the Bedeutung of the expression 'Julius Caesar', or

that a certain linguistic role is the sense of some expression.

In particular, Frege's substitutional-inferential methodology deter-

mines only the nonrelational sense of 'Bedeutung', according to which

expressions are sorted into substitutional equivalence classes as having

the same Bedeutung. For Frege to add to this determination of homo-

geneous identities (both of whose terms are of the form "the Bedeutung

of the expression t") the relational sense of reference in which these

286 FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS

Bedeutungen are identified with objects suitably related to all and only

the members of the nonrelational substitutional equivalence class of

expressions is precisely to stipulate the truth-values of the heterogene

ous identities. The question of whether such a procedure can be justified

on Frege's own terms is thus exactly the question of whether the two

notions of Bedeutung can be made into "two aspects of one notion" as

Dummett claims and Frege is committed to, or whether they are simply

conflated without warrant, as Bell claims. Following Sluga's develop-

ment of Frege's attempted definition of terms which refer to logical

objects thus leads to the argument which must justify the identification

of the things playing the two explanatory roles which Bell has shown

must be distinguished under the heading "Bedeutung".

In Section 10 of GG Frege offers his justification of the procedure of

stipulating the heterogeneous identities, in an argument which Currie

has called ''brilliantly imaginative".SJ The argument is a difficult one, and

we shall have to examine it with some care. What is to be shown is that

it is legitimate to stipulate (a) above, determining the homogeneous

identities involving courses of values, together with the following stipu-

lation for heterogenous identities:

(b) 'T(LT) = tl and 'a(Ma) = 0.,

where t} 0. and (3x) (Lx Mx). L and M are to be arbitrary

functions, and t} and 0. are terms which are not of the form 'a(Pa). For

the purposes of the GG argument, the terms in question are "the True"

and "the False". In the context of Sluga's point that Frege's defense of

his own view against his objection to the second attempted definition of

number in GL must be traced through the account of extension to the

account of courses of values, it will be worth keeping in mind that for

this purpose the argument must apply equally to the case in which t} is

"Julius Caesar" and 0. is "England". To emphasize this requirement, the

exposition of Frege's argument which follows will use those values for t}

and 0. rather than the truth-values which Frege employed. In any case

the poinI is that distinct objects which are not given as courses of values

are stipulated to be identical to the courses of values a like number of

arbitrary distinct functions. The task is to show that such a stipulation is

legitimate.

The strategy of the argument is to construct a domain of objects of

which (a) and (b) can be proven to hold. To start, suppose it has been

stipulated that:

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 287

(c) -lJ(FlJ)= -y(Gy)iff('1x) [Fx(=) Gxl,

that is, we stipulate the homogeneous identities for terms of the form

- lJ(FlJ), where the function which associates objects so denominated

with functions F is unknown except that principle (c) holds. As was

pointed out above by means of (a') and (a"), the fact that both (a) and

(c) hold does not in any way settle the heterogenous identities one of

whose terms is a course of values and the other of which is of the form

-lJ(FlJ). The next step is to use the arbitrary distinct functions Land M

of (b) to construct an individuation preserving function X as above. The

function Xis defined by five clauses:

(1) X(Julius Caesar) = -lJ(LlJ)

(2) X( - lJ(LlJ = Julius Caesar

(3) X(England) = - y(My)

(4) X( - y(My) = England

(5) For all other y, X(y) = y.

The function X is constant except when it is applied to either the two

objects which are not specified as the result of applying - -abstraction

to some function (Julius Caesar and England, or the True and the False)

or to the result of applying - -abstraction to the arbitrarily chosen

functions L and M. In these special cases, the function X simply

permutes the distinguished values.

X is constructed to be individuation preserving, so that a correlation

is preserved between distinctness of its arguments and distinctness of its

values. It follows then that:

(d) X( - lJ(FlJ = X( - y( Gy iff (V x) [Fx (=) Gxl.

In these terms we could now define the course of values notation (which

has not previously appeared in this argument) by agreeing to let:

(e) 'a(Fa) =df X( -lJ(FlJ for all functions F.

Given the definition (e) and the truth of (d), principle (a) for courses of

values follows immediately. The truth of (d), as we have seen, follows

from (c), together with Clauses (1)-(5) defining the function X But

Clauses (2) and (4) of that definition, together with (e), entail principle

(b) concerning courses of values (with the substitution of Julius Caesar

for t1 and England for Thus given only the homogeneous identities in

(c) we have constructed courses of values in such a way that their

homogeneous identities in (a) can be shown to hold and in such a way

288 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

that heterogeneous identities can be proven for two of them, since

'a(La) = Julius Caesar (= X( - 1J(L1J) and 'DeMo) = England

(= X( - y(My). The legitimacy of stipulating heterogeneous identities

in the context of a principle determining homogeneous ones has been

shown by reducing the questionable stipulation to the composition of

two obviously acceptable forms of stipulation: the specification of the

values which the function X is to take for various arguments (in

particular in Clauses (2) and (4, and the introduction of the expression

"'a(Fa)" (previously without a use) as a notational abbreviation of

"X( -1J(F1J".

This imaginative argument is Frege's ultimate response defending his

account of number and of logical objects generally against the objec-

tions he had raised but not answered in the Grundlagen. Seen in that

context, the argument is fallacious. The problem concerns the extremal

Clause (5) of the definition of the individuation preserving function X If

that clause is expanded to make explicit what is contained in the condi-

tion ''for all other y" it becomes:

(5') (lty) [(y Julius Caesar & y - 'fj(L'fj) & Y England

& y - y (My = > X(y) = yJ.

It may then be asked whether it is appropriate at this point in the

argument to make use of a condition such as y - y(My). If the term

substituted for 'y' is also represented as the product of applying

- -abstraction to some function, then clause (c) will settle the truth-

value of the resulting identity. For it settles just such homogeneous

identities. But what of the case in which the identity is heterogeneous?

All that has been fixed concerning - -abstraction is principle (c), which

says nothing about such identities. Indeed, the whole strategy of the

argument depends upon starting from a specification of purely homo-

geneous identities with one sorf of abstractor (-) and using the

function X to construct an abstractor (') for which the heterogenous

identities are specified. Nothing which has been said, or, given the

strategy just indicated, could be said, settles a truth-value for hetero-

geneous identities such as

(t) Julius Caesar = - y(My)

and

(g) England = - 'fj(L'fj).

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 289

For all that principle (c) concerning - -abstraction and the distinctness

of the functions L and M settle, (f) could be true and (g) false. Given the

truth of (f), substituting in Clause (4) would yield that x(Julius Caesar)

= England, and so by clause (1) that England = - rJ(L-fJ), that is, that

(g) is true. So the definition of X presupposes valuations for hetero-

geneous identities which it is in no way entitled to.

Matters are just as bad if we consider some other object, say the

direction of the Earth's axis (also discussed in GL). It has nowhere been

determined whether it is identical to - rJ(LrJ) and so falls under Clause

(2), or identical to - y(My) and so falls under Clause (4), or to neither

and hence falls under Clause (5). The definition of X, in terms of which

it is to be shown acceptable to stipUlate heterogeneous identities for

- -abstraction, is well-formed only if the heterogeneous identities

involving - -abstraction have already been settled. They have not been

settled. Further, to add to the argument the assumption that truth-values

for such heterogeneous identities involving expressions of the form

- o(Fo) have been settled is to assume exactly what the argument as a

whole is supposed to show, namely that such matters are open for

stipulation in the first place (so long as suitable care is taken to match

distinct objects with the result of abstracting distinct functions). If more

is supposed about - -abstraction than principle (c) fixing homogeneous

identities, the question will be begged. And without some supposition

about heterogeneous identities the argument does not go through.

The intent of the offending extremal clause is to deal with all objects

which can be represented by expressions of the form - o(Fo), where F

L and F M. Distinct objects not so representable are each to be

dealt with by a pair of clauses, letting the function X permute them with

the result of abstracting from corresponding arbitrarily chosen distinct

functions. There is nothing in general wrong with such a definitional

strategy. It may not be used in the context of this argument, however.

The distinction between the cases which are to be dealt with by paired

specific stipulations and those which remain to be dealt with by the

extremal stipulation cannot be made precise without begging the ques-

tion. For that distinction corresponds to the distinction between hetero-

geneous identities and homogeneous ones, in the sense of stipulations for

objects not representable by expressions of the form - o(Fo) and those

which are so representable. This distinction is not one which a principle

like (c) specifying the purely homogeneous identities permits us to

make, and we are entitled to presuppose no more than such a principle.

290 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

Put otherwise, the form of definition essentially requires that there be a

pair of specific clauses dealing with every object whose individuation

with respect to the results of applying - -abstraction to functions has

not been settled by principle (c). But this class of objects cannot be

described or specified in the terms permitted for the definition if it is to

play its appointed role in the larger argument.

The only way in which this situation might be remedied would be if

there were some property available which could be independently

appealed to in order to distinguish the two kinds of cases. Thus if to (C)

were added:

(c') (\fy)[P(y)(=) (3F)(y= -o(Fo]

then the extremal clause in the definition of X could be amended to

(5") -y(My(=)X(y)=y]

In the context of (c'), (5") will have the desired effect of applying only

to objects which can be designated by expressions of the form - o(Fo),

where F L and F M. More important, (c') would ensure that the

identities in (5") are homogeneous with respect to - -abstraction, and

hence have had their truth-values settled by (c). It was the failure to

ensure the homogeneity that was responsible for the inadequacy of the

original definition of X

The trouble with this way out is that no such independently specifi-

able property is available. Already in the Grundlagen Frege had pointed

out that the account of when the numbers associated with two concepts

were identical (settling identities homogeneous with respect to the form:

the number of the concept F) could be defended against his objection if

the concept " .. is a number" were available. For then the truth-values

of the heterogeneous identities (such as those involving Julius Caesar)

could be settled by specifying that for any t, if t is not a number, then it

is not identical to the number of any concept. But the problem the

desired definition was to solve was precisely that of specifying the

concept " ... is a number", as the current task is to specify the concept

" ... is a course of values". It would be circular to use for the property P

" ... is an x such that there is an F such that x = - o(Fo)" For that

would precisely presuppose that the heterogeneous identities have some-

how already been settled, rather than independently settling them. Nor

could some property such as " ... is not in the causal order" be used, for

there are other logical objects (such as the True and the False) whose

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 291

individuation with respect to objects specified by - -abstraction has not

been determined. Nor in any case would such a property be available to

a logicist.

Frege's argument does not work, then, and it cannot be made to

work. If the Grundgesetze is meant to offer an account of number which

will meet the demands set by the Grundlagen, then it is a failure by

Frege's own standards. Further this failure is not a matter of the incon-

sistency of the later system. Although Axiom V is the CUlprit in both

cases, it is different features of that principle which are found objection-

able in the two cases. The current complaint is that settling the truth-

values of the homogeneous identities alone, as that principle does, is

definitionally too weak to meet the requirements imposed by the

discussion of GL. Those demand the justification of the stipulative

extension of the definition to heterogeneous identities. That it leads to

inconsistency, on the other hand, shows that that Axiom is inferentially

too strong. Putting aside the question of inconsistency which makes the

claim counterfactual, even if the account of courses of values in GG

were technically adequate, it would not be philosophically adequate as a

specification of its objects and concepts. For it has not settled whether

Julius Caesar is the number three, nor shown that stipulating an answer

in the case of logical objects such as the truth-values is a legitimate

procedure. Nor can this be shown with the materials at hand.

I take it that this definitional inadequacy has not been remarked upon

for two connected reasons. In the purely technical context of the

Grundgesetze the stipulation of the two heterogeneous identities con-

cerning the truth-values and arbitrary distinct courses of values is in fact

perfectly acceptable. Further, provided that it is stipulated that neither

of the truth-values is identical to the result of applying - -abstraction to

any function, Frege's argument shows that his procedure is in order. It is

only in the larger philosophical context provided by Sluga's historical

tracing of the stages in Frege's development of an answer to his own

objections to the second attempted definition of number in GL, from

the invocation of the extension of a concept in the third and final GL

definition, via the reduction of concepts to a special kind of function

and of extensions to courses of values in 'Funktion und Begriff, to the

{inal attempt to define courses of values adequately in the early sections

of the Grundgesetze that it can be seen that satisfying the purely techni-

cal constraints will not suffice to render the definition of courses of

values (and hence of logical objects generally) adequate by the philoso-

phical standards Frege has insisted upon.

292 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

But the result is significant not only for the appraisal of the success in

its own terms of Frege's account of the logical objects which were his

explicit subject matter in GG. For as we have seen, the technical

philosophical concepts Frege developed to use in that discussion, such

as reference, and sense, and truth-value, are all given the same form of

definition as courses of values are, which individuates them only homo-

geneously. Thus " ... we cannot say what the sense of an expression is.

The closest we may approach to this is to say that the sense of a given

expression E1 is the same as the sense of another expression, E

2

."52 It

follows that so far as interpretation (rather than further development) of

Frege's concept of sense is concerned, one can only subdivide the

explanatory roles played by his concept, but cannot identify anything as

playing those roles. Thus it is legitimate and valuable to distinguish the

cognitive role from the semantic role played by senses, or sense as

content from sense as character, or input and output senses as Bell does.

But to entertain hypotheses about whether thoughts are mental pictures

(as Frege did by denying this) or sets of possible worlds, or denizens of

some extra-causal realm is to consider claims which have been given no

sense by Frege's purely homogeneous specification of the entities in

question. Truth values are similarly immune from heterogeneous iden-

tification, from identification in any other form than as the truth-value

associated with some expression.

Probably most important is the case of singular term reference. Here

Frege tried explicitly to supplement the purely homogeneous sorting

into semantic equivalence classes of the reference associated with various

expressions (the nonrelational sense of 'Bedeutung') with the stipulation

of heterogeneous identities involving the references of expressions and

ordinary objects. In accord with his inferential/substitutional method-

ology, these stipulations are grounded in the intersubstitutability for all

terms t of the term itself and the expression 'the Bedeutung of t'. Bell

has shown how much of Frege's conceptual scheme depends upon the

assumption that such heterogeneous identities are determined (and

hence a relational sense of reference applies) for other parts of speech,

given only the determination of the homogeneous identities (settling a

non-relational sense of reference) which is all that is available for expres-

sions of these other categories. Pursuing further a line of thought Sluga

initiated has shown that this assumption is indeed unwarranted, and that

even Frege's attempted stipulation of coincidence of relational and

nonrelational senses of 'reference' in the case of singular terms has not

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 293

been justified by Frege's own standards. Thus extending Sluga's argu-

ment permits better understanding of the philosophical status of Frege's

technical concepts in general, and in particular of the two sides of the

concept of reference which Bell, following Dummett, has so usefully

distinguished.

University of Pittsburgh

I See [19].

2 [8].

3 Dummetl's [10].

4 [10], pp. xii-xvi.

NOTES

5 The most influential proponents of the view were Grossmann in [16), and Marshall, in

in [24] and [25).

6 p. 65 in [14].

7 [3). Bell is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield.

8 As in the title of Dummett's book, [8).

9 [10), pp. 476-95.

10 In Section 3 of BGS, reprinted in [14], Frege says that the begriffliche Inhalt of two

judgements is the same just in case "all inferences which can be drawn from the first

judgement when combined with certain other ones can always also be drawn from the

second when combined with the same other judgements."

11 [19], pp. 9-46.

12 For instance by Resnik in [28] and [29], and Angelelli in [1].

13 [3], pp. 139-40.

14 I have my say in [4].

IS [3], p. 42.

16 [10], pp. 47S-9.

17 in [32].

18 [10], p. 479.

19 I have argued that a purely intralinguistic anaphoric account of such facts can be

offered by construing 'refers' and its cognates as complex pronoun-forming operators, in

[5].

20 Kripke in [23], and Putnam in [27].

21 Most prominently, Perry in [26], and Kaplan in [20] and [21].

22 [3], p. 112.

23 [3], p. 115.

24 [3], p. 5l.

25 [3], p. 64.

26 [3], p. 65.

27 First in [S], pp. 293-4, then at greater length as chapter 13 of [10]. Citations here

from p. 251 of the latter.

294 ROBERT B. BRANDOM

28 in [15].

29 [10],pp.251-2.

30 [19], p. 119. Bell's other citations are in [3], p. 72.

31 [3], pp. 74-8.

32 See [31]. Sluga is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley.

33 Dummett in [7], p. 225, quoted by Sluga in [31], p. 8.

34 In Dummett's defense it should be said that in the final chapter of [8] the main

historical significance of Frege's work is taken to be precisely his anti-empiricist and

anti-psychologist shifting of concern from the acquisition of concepts to what such

mastery consists in - from how the cognitive trick is performed [e.g., by material beings

of our sort] to what counts are performing it. The injudicious invocation of a dominant

Hegelianism as the psychologistic culprit is explicitly made subsidiary to this central

point.

35 [31], p. 59.

36. Dummett, in [9].

37 Bierich in [2].

38 [31], pp. 53, 192.

39 [31], pp. 59-60.

40 [31], pp. 44-5, and 106.

41 [31], p. 60.

42 [31], p. 60. pp. 43)[31], p. 91.

44 cf. [31], p. 181.

45 [31], p. 95.

46 [19], p. 253.

47 [31], p. 134 and Note 21 to chapter 4.

48 e.g. in [31],p. 156.

49 Sections 62,63 of [12].

50 Section 68 of [12]. Equality of concepts in the sense invoked here has been defined

as obtaining iff the objects of which the concepts are true can be put into one-to-one

correspondance.

51 in [6], p. 69.

52 Bell in [3], p. 55 [emphasis in original]. He-goes on to point out an analogy with the

Fregean concept of concept reference: "concept words refer, but we cannot stipulate

what it is they refer to". But in this case the reasons are purely substitutional, since

expressions like "the concept horse" will never be intersubstitutable with predicative

function-expressions. This shows that all heterogeneous identities involving function-

expressions on one side and singular terms on the other must be false.

REFERENCES

[I] Angelelli, I.: 1967, Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy, Reidel,

Dordrecht.

[2] Bierich, M.: 1951, Freges Lehre von dem Sinn und der Bedeutung der Urteile und

Russells Kritik an dieser Lehre, Dissertation, Hamburg.

[3] Bell, D.: 1979, Frege's Theory of Judgement, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[4] Brandom, R: 1983, 'Asserting', NoUs 1, 637-650.

[5] Brandom, R: 1984, 'Reference Explained Away', Journal of Philosophy 84,

769-792.

FREGE'S TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 295

[6] Currie, G.: 1982, Frege: An Introduction to His Philosophy, Barnes and Noble,

Totowa, New Jersey.

[7] Durnmett, M.: 'Frege, Gottlob', in [11], Vol. 4, p. 225.

[8] Dummett, M.: 1973, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harper and Row, New York.

[9] Durnmett, M.: 1976, 'Frege as Realist', Inquiry 19, 476-485.

[10] Dummett, M.: 1981, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, Harvard University

Press, Cambridge.

[11] Edwards, P. (ed.): 1967, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Macmillan Company &

The Free Press, New York/Collier - Macmillian Ltd., London.

[12] Frege, G.: 1967, Grundlagen der Arithmetik, transl. by J. L. Austin, Northwestern

University Press, Evanston, Illinois.

[13] Frege, G.: 1967, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, transl. by M. Furth, University of

California Press, Berkeley, California.

[14] Geach, P. and Black, M. (eds.): 1970, Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege,

Blackwell, Oxford.

[15] Geach, P.: 1975, 'Review of Dummett's Frege: Philosophy of of Language', Mind

85,436-449.

[16] Grossmann, R.: 1961, 'Frege's Ontology', Philosophical Review 70, 23-40.

[17] Gunderson, K. (ed.): 1976, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in

the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7, University of Minnesota Press.

[18] Harman, G. and Davidson, D. (eds.): 1972, Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel,

Dordrecht.

[19] Hermes, H., Kambartel, F., and Kaulbach, F. (eds.): 1981, Gottlob Frege: Post

humous Writings, transl, by P. Lond and R. White, University of Chicago Press,

Chicago.

[20] Kaplan, D.: 'The Logic of Demonstratives', in [33].

[21] Kaplan, D.: Demonstratives, 1980 John Locke Lectures, Oxford University Press,

Oxford, forthcoming.

[22] Klemke, E.: 1968, Essays on Frege, University of Illinois Press, Urbana.

[23] Kripke, S.: 1972, 'Naming and Necessity', in [18).

[24] Marshall, W.: 1953, 'Frege's Theory of Functions and Objects', Philosophical

Review 62, 347-390.

[25] Marshall, W.: 1968, 'Sense and Reference: A Reply', in [22].

[26] Perry, J.: 1977, 'Frege on Demonstratives', Philosophical Review 86, 474-497.

[27] Putnam, H.: 1972, 'The Meaning of Meaning', in [18].

[28] Resnik, M.: 1967, 'The Context Principle in Frege's Philosophy', Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 27,356-365.

[29] Resnik, M.: 1967, 'Frege's Context Principle Revisited', included in [30] pp.

35-49.

[30] Schirn, M. (ed.): 1967, Studien zu Frege, Vol. III, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart

and Bad Cannstatt.

(31) Sluga, H.: 1980, Gottlob Frege, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

[32] Tugendhat, E.: 1970, 'The Meaning of "Bedeutung" in Frege', Analysis 30,

177-189.

[33) Uehling, T., Wettstein, H., and French, P. (eds.): 1978, Contemporary Perspectives

on Philosophy of Language, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, University of

Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

PARTlY

PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

PHILIP KITCHER

FREGE, DEDEKIND, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF

MATHEMA TICS*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the 1880s, two men who had both been trained as rpathematicians

wrote short books defending the idea that arithmetic has an intimate

relation with logic. Neither work was exactly a commercial or intellectual

success. Frege's Grundlagen (Frege 1884) went virtually unnoticed, and

Frege recorded his disappointment and frustration in the introduction

to his Grundgesetze (Frege, 1893, p. xi; Furth, 1967, p. 8). Dedekind's

monograph, Was Sind und was Sollen die Zahlen? (Dedekind, 1888),

fared only a little better. Before Dedekind published it, he had been

encouraged by the interest of other mathematicians in his project. In

1878, for example, Heinrich Weber urged him not to postpone his

planned study on the number concept (Dugac, 1976, p. 273). However,

when the book appeared, it made comparatively little stir: certainly,

Dedekind's discussion of the natural numbers aroused nothing like the

interest excited by his study of the real numbers (Dedekind, 1872).

Although many of Dedekind's contemporaries viewed him as an impor

tant mathematician, they did not rank Was Sind und was Sollen die

Zahlen ? among his major achievements.

1

Today, Frege's Grundlagen is widely appreciated as a philosophical

masterpiece. In retrospect, the mathematicians who ignored it appear as

men who failed to recognize a pioneering work. Yet, in the intervening

century, Frege's study of the foundations of arithmetic has been applied

in a number of different philosophical enterprises. In the early decades

of the century, for example, Frege's defense of logicism was used to

support a program with quite different motivations from his own?

Faced with the problem of accounting for the status of arithmetic, a

traditional bastion of rationalist epistemology, the logical positivists and

their empiricist successors, sought comfort in Frege's claim that arith

metic is disguised logic. More recently, philosophers of mathematics

have approached Frege's work not as an arsenal that can be raided in

the defense of empiricism but as a treasure trove of philosophical

insights about mathematics. Despite the fact that Frege's own solutions

299

L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, 299-343.

1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

300 PHILIP KITCHER

to the problems he posed are not widely accepted, his conception of the

central questions of the philosophy of mathematics is frequently viewed

as definitive. If the history of philosophy in general is a series of

footnotes to Plato, then the history of the philosophy of mathematics in

the last thirty years appears as a series of footnotes to Frege.

Because our current understanding of what the philosophy of mathe-

matics ought to be is so dominated by Frege's view of the field, it is

important to discuss the way in which Frege's enterprise was born. My

aim will be to show how Frege's own philosophical preconceptions led

him to identify, and to bequeath to his successors, a misguided picture

of the central problems of the philosophy of mathematics. To achieve

this, I shall use Dedekind as a foil. Nearly a century after it was

published, Dedekind's monograph on the concept of natural number

persists in its state of benign neglect. Dedekind appears to us as a lesser

Frege, a man who groped toward some Fregean insights but who only

saw dimly what Frege saw clearly. I shall attempt to show that

Dedekind's work does not deserve to be ignored, that it responds to a

different set of philosophical problems than those identified by Frege,

and that a bedekindian view of mathematics might provoke new and

profitable philosophical inquiries.

2. THE ROUTE TO LOGICISM: FREGE

Frege's logicism was the product of his philosophical reflections on the

state of late nineteenth century mathematics, reflections that were by no

means the innocent philosophical thoughts of a philosophically untu-

tored mathematician. In his earliest writings we can already discern a

philosophical view, inherited from Kant. Frege's inaugural dissertation,

presented in 1873, is devoted to the problem of giving a geometrical

representation of imaginary points and figures. The young mathemati-

cian who regaros this problem as an important question for his research

is already concerned with the general project of showing that new

developments within mathematics are compatible with the epistemo-

logical ideals of the discipline. The first sentence provides a clear view

of Frege's intentions:

When one considers that the whole of geometry ultimately rests upon axioms, which

receive their validity from the nature of our faculty of intuition, then the question of the

sense of imaginary figures appears to be well-justified, since we often attribute to such

figures properties which tontradict our intuition. (Frege/ Angelelli, 1967, p. 1)3

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 301

These are not the words of a philosophical naif. The linking of

geometrical axioms to our faculty of intuition reveals the influence of

Kant, and it is the background of Kantian epistemology that gives

significance to Frege's mathematical enterprise.

Yet, as every reader of Frege knows, he was to break explicitly with

Kant over the status of arithmetic. Grundlagen is devoted to defending a

non-Kantian account of arithmetic, and it contains a respectful critique

of Kant's own sketchy ideas about the subject. The divergence from

Kant's specific proposal for arithmetic was already clear by 1874. In the

opening section of the dissertation he presented on his arrival at Jena,

Frege writes.

It is thus clear that for so comprehensive and abstract a concept as that of the concept of

quantity there can be no intuition. Because of this there is a significant difference

between geometry and arithmetic in the way in which their fundamental propositions

are grounded. Because the object of arithmetic is not intuitable (keine Anschaulichkeit

hat), the fundamental propositions of the subject cannot stem from intuition. (Fregel

Angelelli, 1967, p. 50)4

Significantly, while rejecting one part of Kantian epistemology, Frege

makes explicit his commitment to other parts. Within Kant's epistemo-

logy for mathematics we can distinguish two main doctrines. Many

prominent sections of the Critique reflect a particular type of apriorism

about mathematics, the idea that mathematics is a corpus of a priori

knowledge. Kant is committed to what I shall call an apriorist program.

He believes that it is possible to give an epistemological reconstruction

of mathematics which will make it clear that the truths asserted by

mathematicians can be (and perhaps are) known a priori. This general

idea is articulated in the second main doctrine, a specific proposal about

the way in which the apriorist program will go. On Kant's view, all

mathematical truths can be known by means of inferences from funda-

mental propositions which are themselves knowable a priori through

pure intuition. Frege rejects this specific proposal, while honoring the

more general commitment. Moreover, his dissent about the details is

oply partial: throughout his career, Frege continues to espouse Kant's

explanation of the a priori knowability of geometry.

Let me make this interpretative claim more precise by defining the

notion of an apriorist program. I shall assume that a necessary condition

for a person to know that p is for that person's belief that p to have been

produced in an appropriate way. This very general assumption about

302 PHILIP KITCHER

what knowledge is has not only been ably defended in the recent

epistemological literature; it is also an assumption that both Kant and

Frege would have accepted.

s

With respect to any item of knowledge,

there must be a tree-like structure which represents the causal process

through which the belief in question was produced. The ultimate causal

nodes in this structure are basic beliefs, beliefs which can be arrived at

without inference from other beliefs (Kornblith, 1980). To reconstruct a

body of knowledge is to reveal the causal networks underlying the

statements that are known, showing what items of knowledge are basic,

and what chains of inference lead from these pieces of basic knowledge

to the rest of the corpus. To reconstruct a body of a priori knowledge

one must demonstrate how that knowledge results from statements that

are knowable a priori without inference from other statements by means

of chains of inference along which apriority is transmitted. Someone

who believes that mathematics is a body of a priori knowledge is

committed to the possibility of a reconstruction of this kind. Such a

person must hold that there is a feasible apriorist program for mathe-

matics, a program which is to be carried out by completing the following

tasks: (a) identifying a set of basic a priori statements (statements that

can be known a priori without inference from other statements); (b)

explaining the nature of the processes through which a priori knowledge

of the basic a priori statements can be gained; (c) identifying a set of

apriority-preserving rules of inference, rules which license inferential

transitions that always yield a priori knowledge of the conclusion given a

priori knowledge of the premises; (d) showing that all accepted mathe-

matical statements can be obtained from basic a priori statements

through a sequence of inferences each of which is licensed by an

apriority-preserving rule of inference.

Kant's influential contributions to the philosophy of mathematics

consist in his general account of what a priori knowledge is and his

suggestions about how such knowledge can be obtained. As I have

indicated elsewhere, (Kitcher, 1980a), the Kantian idea of a priori

knowledge as knowledge which is independent of experience can be

developed in a coherent way. Given this development, we are able to

define the notions of a basic a priori statement and of an apriority-

preserving rule of inference, thus making clear the concept of an

apriorist program and identifying the claims to which someone wllO

believes in the apriority of mathematical knowledge is committed. But

Kant not only offered this very general characterization of a priori

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 303

knowledge. He also proposed that there are two ultimate sources of a

priori knowledge; conceptual analysis and pure intuition. Kant's own

philosophy of mathematics proceeds from the identification of what an

apriorist program is to the task of explaining the nature of the processes

- processes of pure intuition - through which he takes basic a priori

mathematical knowledge to be obtained.(Thus Kant focusses on task (b)

above.) Kant does not try to specify the statements which are basic a

priori statements or the rules of inference that preserve apriority. His

attitude seems to be that that is the business of the mathematician,

perhaps that mathematical proofs are in order as they are.

The similarities and differences between Kant and Frege can now be

described more precisely. Like Kant, Frege is committed to apriorism

and his work reflects acceptance of the Kantian idea of an apriorist

program. Moreover, Frege endorses Kant's conception of the possible

sources of a priori knowledge. The most obvious disagreement concerns

the way in which areas of mathematics are taken to be related to basic

sources of a priori knowledge. Frege contends, of course, that Kant was

wrong to hold that arithmetical knowledge is based' ultimately on pure

intuition. Instead, Frege believed that our knowledge of arithmetic is to

be traced to the source of our knowledge of logical truths. This shift in

the specifics of the apriorist program causes Frege to emphasize differ-

ent parts of the enterprise. Thinking that our source of a priori knowl-

edge of logic can do more than Kant had given it credit for, Frege sees

the importance of identifying the basic a priori statements - basic laws

of logic - on which arithmetical knowledge depends, of specifying the

apriority-preserving rules of inference, and of showing that the state-

ments and rules so identified suffice for the reconstruction of arithmetic.

Thus tasks (a), (c), and (d) receive a great deal of attention from Frege,

while task (b) is ignored. From Frege's perspective, the basic epistemo-

logical issue, the question of explaining the ultimate sources of a priori

knowledge, had already been settled. But for Frege (unlike Kant)

mathematics itself needs reform. The subject will not stand forth as an a

priori science until the ordinary proofs of mathematicians are improved.

Frege's inaugural dissertation addresses one of the obvious problems

that arise for Kant's favored apriorist program. Late nineteenth century

geometry had advanced beyond the discipline whose epistemological

foundations Kant had considered. Frege's project is to show how geo-

metrical ideas that initially appear beyond the scope of pure geometrical

intuition can be accommodated within the Kantian program. But

304 PHILIP KITCHER

Frege's early reflections on arithmetic must have raised for him a more

serious difficulty. Having arrived at the judgment that it is impossible to

trace arithmetical knowledge to propositions known through pure

intuition, Frege set for himself a new apriorist program, one that would

require a revision of the usual ways of presenting proofs within arith-

metic. Arithmetic must be constructed from the fundamental laws of

logic. So Begriffsschrift was born. Having undertaken to provide arith-

metic ''with the most secure foundation," Frege formulated the problem

as follows:

.. , I first had to ascertain how far one could proceed in arithmetic by means of

inferences alone, with the sole support of those laws of thOUght that transcend all

particulars. My initial step was to attempt to reduce the concept of ordering in a

sequence to that of logical consequence, so as to proceed from there to the concept of

number. To prevent anything intuitive (Anschauliches) from penetrating here unnoticed,

I had to bend every effort to keep the chain of inferences free of gaps. In attempting to

comply with this requirement in the strictest possible way I found the inadequacy of

language to be an obstacle; no matter how unwieldy the expressions I was ready to

accept, I was less and less able, as the relations became more and more complex, to

attain the precision that my purpose required. This deficiency led me to the idea of the

present ideography. (Frege/van Heijenoort, 1967, pp. 5-6)

Formalization entered the philosophy of mathematics in the service of

Frege's epistemological ideals.

When we reconstruct Frege's route to logicism, one question stands

out. Why did he believe that the logical principles he identified were a

priori and the rules of inference he set forth apriority-preserving? I shall

have more to say about this in what follows, but, for the moment, let me

use my comparison of Frege with Kant to offer a quick explanation of

why Frege is so silent about fundamental epistemological issues. At the

one place in his published writings where Frege confronts the question

of ''why and with what right" we acknowledge a law of logic to be true,

Frege announces that, as a logician, the issue is none of his business

(Frege, 1893, p. xvii; Furth, 1967, p. 15). I suggest that Frege saw his

own work as the counterpoise to Kant's. Kant had characterized the

notion of a priori knowledge, thereby making clear the idea of an

apriorist program. Kant had also identified the sources of a priori

knowledge, one that would generate knowledge of analytic truths and

one that would yield knowledge of synthetic truths. Kant's philosophy of

mathematics was incomplete in its failure to show in detail how the

whole of mathematics could be traced to these sources. Where it was in

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 305

error was in its assignment of arithmetic to the wrong source, to pure

intuition instead of to the source of a priori knowledge of analytic

truths. Frege's enterprise is directed at remedying the incompleteness

and correcting the error, but, in this enterprise, certain basic features of

the Kantian framework are taken for granted.

6

Frege's work is intermediate between the projects of general epis-

temologists (like Kant) and those of practicing mathematicians (like

Frege's contemporaries who saw no point in what he was doing). There

is a pervasive philosophical myth, to which Frege himself contributed, to

the effect that his probing of the foundations of arithmetic is an out-

growth of the nineteenth century tradition of making analysis rigorous.1

A careful look at the history of research in the foundations of nineteenth

century analysis explodes this myth. The work of the great mathemati-

cians - men like Cauchy, Weierstrass, and Dedekind - who struggled

with the foundations of analysis was motivated by a quite different set of

interests from those which provoked Frege's metamorphosis from

mathematician to philosopher.

Consider the case of Cauchy. Cauchy was not moved to offer new

definitions of 'limit', 'continuity', 'convergence', and 'derivative' because

he yearned to show that analysis was genuinely a body of a priori

knowledge. His aims were far more pragmatic. Certain important

research problems of nineteenth century analysis could not be resolved

using the techniques that Cauchy and his contemporaries had inherited.

The mix of algebra and geometry constructed by Euler, d'Alembert and

Lagrange does not make it possible to determine whether the sum of an

infinite series of continuous functions is always continuous. A decision

on this issue was needed if the merits of various methods for solving

partial differential equations were to be clearly understood. Cauchy's

new analysis was born from a desire to tackle the urgent problems of

mathematical research, and Cauchy was quite happy to rely on the

older ideas of the eighteenth centJry when he thought he could get away

with it. When we read Cauchy (or Abel, or Dirichlet) through Fregean

spectacles, their texts are extremely puzzling. There are constant lapses

from the ideal of giving full algebraic derivations, periodic invocations

of geometrical evidence, and references to eighteenth century notions

(like that of infinitesimal) which we might have thought Cauchy and his

contemporaries were in the business of eliminating. Removing the

Fregean spectacles improves our vision. Cauchy et al. developed mathe-

matical concepts and methods for the purpose of resolving technical

306 PHILIP KITCHER

questions, and they used those concepts and methods where they found

them useful (or even indispensable). They had no general interest in

showing the apriority of analysis, or in eschewing old-fashioned tech-

niques that might more readily be applied in some contexts.

Ironically, Cauchy'S own reform of analysis showed for the first time

how certain old-fashioned techniques, specifically the method of infini

tesimals, might lead to false conclusions. Of course, from the seven-

teenth century on, mathematicians had been aware that they did not

fully understand why infinitesimalist reasoning works. But no critic -

not even Berkeley - suggested that some conclusions generated by such

reasoning were false. Although Cauchy's work was rightly admired for

its ability to yield recognizably correct answers to certain traditional

questions, his employment of some traditionally sanctioned shortcuts

generated anomalies. The late nineteenth century rigorization of analysis

- whose full flowering is the work of Weierstrass and Dedekind -

was a response to mathematical difficulties which Cauchy'S work had

unearthed. Because some of Cauchy'S techniques gave demonstrably

false results and because Weierstrass needed reliable methods to tackle

recherche questions in elliptic function theory , Weierstrass was forced

to develop the austere style of analysis which has dominated the subject

ever since. Similarly, Dedekind's work on continuity was motivated by

the desire to establish the existence of limits in cases where Cauchy had

had to appeal to geometric analogies, analogies which were, by 1850,

recognizably faulty. The program of rigorization of nineteenth century

analysis was kept in motion by the mathematical difficulties left over by

the latest achievement.

8

Frege arrived on the scene at a time when the search for rigor had

temporarily come to a halt and when mathematicians were eager to put

to work the tools that they had acquired from Weierstrass. (Frege was to

appreciate that this was the attitude of his mathematical contemporaries

- see [Frege, 1893, p. xii; Furth, 1967, pp. 9-10; also Frege/Long et

al., 1979, pp. 165-66]- although he continued to attack it with wither-

ing scorn.) His campaign for attention to the foundations of arithmetic

fell on deaf ears, precisely because it was felt that the available concepts

and methods of mathematics were adequate to the important research

problems and that little would come of foundational ventures in an area

which had yielded no anomalies. If Frege's contemporaries did indeed

say of his work "Metaphysica sunt, non leguntur." then they were only

remaining true to the motivations of Cauchy and Weierstrass.

9

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 307

Frege's enterprise thus falls between the very general project of the

epistemologist, whose interest in mathematics is one of integrating the

subject within a global account of human knowledge, and the activity of

mathematicians, whose concern with foundational issues is fueled by

their recognition of current inability to solve interesting technical ques

tions. If successful, an enterprise like Frege's could point in either (or

both) of two directions: it could show the mathematicians that certain

types of inquiry need to be reformulated as well as reveal to philoso

phers that certain epistemological goals mayor may not be attainable.

But an enterprise that borrows so heavily from general epistemology is

vulnerable to the possibility that, if some of the epistemology that is

taken over is misguided then the project will lack the epistemological

significance that is attributed to it. As I shall suggest below, despite the

rich heritage of Frege's work in logic, his philosophy of mathematics is

flawed in precisely this way.

3. THE ROUTE TO LOGICISM: DEDEKIND

Like Frege, Dedekind was led to investigate the foundations of arith

metic for philosophical reasons; however, his motivation was interest

ingly different from Frege's. The reconstruction of arithmetic offered in

Was Sind und was Sollen die Zahlen? grew out of Dedekind's earlier

work on continuity and irrational numbers. As we shall see, all of

Dedekind's foundational work is pervaded by a particular conception of

mathematics, which differs from Frege's not only in its characterizations

but in the questions that it seeks to resolve.

Yet it is easy to assimilate Dedekind to the Fregean program, to see

him as a pygmy working beside a giant. When we read Dedekind after

reading Frege, we find cryptic phrases that remind us of Frege's goals.

Consider Dedekind's account of how he was led to his investigation of

continuity. He reports his early experience of trying to teach differential

calculus:

In discussing the notion of the approach of a variable magnitUde to a fixed limiting

value, and especially in proving the theorem that every magnitude which grows

continually, but not beyond all limits, must certainly approach a limiting value, I had

recourse to geometric evidences. Even now such recourse to geometric intuition in a

first presentation of the calculus, I regard as extremely useful from the didactic

standpoint, and indeed indispensable, if one does not wish to lose too much time. But

that this form of introduction into the differential calculus can make no claim to being

scientific, no one will deny. (Dedekind/Beman, 1901, p. 1)

308 PHILIP KITCHER

Here we might discern the Fregean project of carrying out an apriorist

program that would correct the Kantian mistake of tracing our knowl-

edge of arithmetic and analysis to pure intuition. However, I think that

Dedekind has something different in mind. Although geometrical dia-

grams may sometimes help us to see that results about the continuity of

functions or the convergence of sequences are true (indeed they may be

the best means of convincing the beginner that these results are true)

they have two deficiencies. First, the transition between the algebraic

notion of continuity and the geometrical notion of continuity is not as

simple as analysts like Cauchy had believed; the uncritical use of that

transition (and others like it) can generate mistakes. Second, even if the

transition were to produce correct results, it would be a detour. We

venture into geometry because we lack any algebraic way of formulating

that continuity of the real numbers which is so easily represented

geometrically, and because, as a result of this lack, we are unable to

establish on a purely algebraic basis theorems about the existence of

limits. 10

Why should we adopt this construal of Dedekind's intent rather than

that which assimilates him to the Fregean enterprise? My answer is

drawn from the structure of the argument advanced in Dedekind's

memoir on continuity. Dedekind sets himself the task of providing an

algebraic characterization of the continuity of the real numbers, and

showing that this characterization suffices for the derivation of standard

theorems about the existence of limits. Far from proposing that the

principle of continuity which he introduces is evident a priori, Dedekind

recommends it by explaining how it can be used to demonstrate results

about limits which had baffled his predecessors. As I interpret him,

there is a body of prior mathematical work which stands in need of

algebraic systematization - systematization which is intended not to

provide us with a priori knowledge but to improve our mathematical

understanding and our ability to solve mathematical problems - and his

proposal to define continuity should earn our acceptance because of its

ability to answer to that need. (For reasons to be given below, I suggest

that this style of argumentation is an important pattern through which

mathematical knowledge develops, and that our understanding of mathe-

matical knowledge will be advanced by taking such patterns seriously.)

Nevertheless, even though Dedekind's work on continuity is free

from commitment to the kind of apriorist views which motivate Frege, it

does contain philosophical views about mathematics, ideas which, as we

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 309

shall see, motivate his subsequent studies of arithematic. Quite early in

his memoir, Dedekind adopts what appears to be a primitive construc-

tivist approach to what mathematics is about: the human mind "creates"

the numbers, and thereby fashions "an exceedingly useful instrument"

for itself. This constructivist attitude erupts ih the substantive mathe-

matics. As Russell pointed out, Dedekind does not identify the real

numbers with sets of rationals. Rather, he "creates" real numbers to

correspond to certain partitions of the rationals (Dedekind cuts),

thereby provoking Russell's gibe that he has obtained "all the advan-

tages of theft over honest toil." However, this taunt is unfair to

Dedekind's intentions. Dedekind does not interpret mathematics as

describing some pre-existent realm of abstract objects (sets) among

which the real numbers are to be found. Rather, he suggests that the

numbers are products of acts of construction. His project is to charac-

terize the way in which the real numbers are constructed, by giving a

new d