Petitioners: Arturo de Castro, John Peralta, PHILCONSA, Estilito Mendoza, Amador Tolentino and

Roland B. Inting
Respondent: JBC
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Type of Case: Consolidated Case
I. Facts:
a. Legal Problem Former Chief Justice Puno, when incumbent, was legally bound to resign on
May 17, 2010 because he reached the age of 70. JBC encountered legal impediments due to
upcoming May Presidential elections. On January 18, 2010, JBC passed a resolution stating that
the filling the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17 upon the retirement of the said
incumbent. In the resolution, it was implied by said agency that it could decide upon the
question whether or not the president could appoint during the election ban period. JBC opened
application on January 20, 2010. As a result, a series of legal ruckus ensued.
b. Cases Filed:
1. Arturo de Castro and John Peralta They filed special civil actions for certiorari and
mandamus with a prayer that JBC ought to submit at least three nominees for Chief Justice
to the President.
2. Jaime Soriano He filed a petition asking for prohibition of the JBC from performing its
function in searching for and nominating a new Chief Justice.
3. PHILCONSA - It wants JBC to submit the same mentioned lists in Arturo de Castro, et. als
civil actions but with a justification that the prohibition only covers appointment in judicial
department.
4. Estilito Mendoza He is seeking a ruling for the applicability of Sec. 15, Art. 7 of the
Constitution.
5. Amador Tolentino and Roland B. Inting They wanted to restrain and enjoin the JBC from
submitting the list during the period provided by Sec. 15, Art. 7 of the constitution.
In favor 3
Against 3
Undecided 1
c. Cases Cited
1. In re appointments of Hon. Valuenzuela and Hon. Villanueva as Judges of RTC Branch 62
Bago City and RTC Branch 24 Cabanatuan City respectively - Court held that Sec. 15, Art. 7
prohibited the President from appointing members of the judiciary during the fixed period
therein.
d. Opinions
1
st
Petitions De Castro viewed that national interest demanded and called for the JBC to perform
its functions in searching and nominating for Chief Justice. He contended that JBC gravely abused its
discretion by deferring to submit the list of nominees to the president.
2
nd
Petition - Soriano on the other hand contended that JBC gravely abused its discretion because of
resolving unanimously to open the search and nomination for Chief Justice. It was raised that the
Supreme Court has the authority to appoint Chief Justice and that the President has the authority to
appoint the Members (excluding the Chief Justice) of the Supreme Court.
3
rd
Petition PHILCONSA observed that the kaleidoscope of interpretations of Sec. 15, Art. 7 in
relation to Sec. 4(1), 8(5), and 9 of Art. 8 of the Constitution ignited a debate which divided the
members of the bench and the members of the bar and the public as a whole. The proper resolution
of these transcendental issues they viewed is by JBC submitting the recommended lists of
appointees to the president to fill every vacancy. PHILCONSA also raised and encouraged the
abandonment of doctrines in the Valenzuela case.
4
th
Petition - It only begged the question whether or not Sec. 15, Art. 7 applied.
5
th
Petitions - There was a controversy concerning JBCs initiation of receiving applications for the
position of Chief Justice. They enjoined a petition of prohibition because they claim it is a form of
midnight appointment.
e. Applicable Laws
1. Sec. 15, Art. 7. Two Months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein would
endanger public safety.
2. Sec. 4(1), Art. 8. The Supreme Court shall be composed of Chief Justice and 14 Assoc.
Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or 7 members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
3. Sec. 8(5), Art. 8. The Council (JBC) shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it.
4. Sec. 9, Art. 8. The member of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointment needed no confirmation
II. Issues
a. Whether or not JBC has the power and authority to resolve the constitutional
question of when should the president appoint.
b. Whether or not the President has the power to appoint during the election ban.
c. Whether or not the power to appoint Chief Justices is vested in the Court en banc.
d. Whether or not Sec. 15, Art. 7 is applied only to positions in the Executive
Department.
e. Whether or not assuming but not conceding Sec. 15, Art. 7 is applicable still exempts
the position of Chief Justice due to the matter of national interest.
f. Whether or not the JBC has the authority to make the list of nominees on the notion
that it will be submitted to the next president in view of prohibition against
appointments from March 11 to June 30, 2010.
g. Whether or not prohibitions in Sec. 15, Art.7 applies to the positions in the Judiciary
mentioned in Sec. 9, Art. 8.
h. Whether or not the president could make the appointment after the Retirement of
Chief Justice Puno.
i. Whether or not JBC has the discretion to withhold the list to the President.
j. Whether or not JBC has the authority to submit the list without committing the
abuse of discretion.
k. Whether or not any act performed by JBC is invalid because of its illegal
composition.
III. Decision of the Court:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and
the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit;
and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
and, accordingly,
directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno byMay 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or
before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary
and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this
decision.
SO ORDERED.


IV. Ruling:
The prohibition does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to
other appointments in the Judiciary. In the principle of Stare Decisis, there were 4 grounds to over-rule
the ruling: 1) Workability, 2) Reliability, 3) Innovations in the law, and 4) Change of facts. The doctrine
established by Valenzuela case was to be over-ruled because it is not reliable, it is not in tune with the
innovations in the law and there is a change of facts. It was obvious that there were changes of facts. In
basic hermeneutics, there is a principle called functional equivalence wherein if there is conflict
between an earlier and a latter chapter or verse, the latter prevails. Similarly, in laws, if there is conflict
between an earlier and a latter provision, the latter applies since it expresses the intent of the legislator.
The court must harmonize the provisions of the law so in this case, the basic hermeneutic doctrine of
functional equivalence was applied. In addition, the court viewed that because Valenzuela is rested
upon false premises, its doctrine that any member of the Judiciary was included in the prohibition could
not be accepted. It was not a reliable doctrine. Also, the Valenzuela case was not based on the
legislative intent of the framers of the constitution. In the records of the Constitutional Commission, it
was said that it is the mandate of the president to fill vacancy of the Court. Thus, for all these reasons,
the court decided to reverse Valenzuela.



Petitioner: PGBI, Represented by Sec. Gen. George Duldulao
Respondent: Comelec
Type of Case: Single Case
Ponente: Brion, J.
I. Facts
a. Legal Problems - Resolution 2847 was passed providing for disqualification of any
party-list who failed to obtain at least 2 per centum of the votes casts in the two
preceding elections in the constituency it was registered. PGBI was disqualified. PGBI
failed to obtain 2 per centum of votes and that it did not participate in the preceding
elections in the constituency it was registered.
b. Cases filed
1. PGBI filed Opposition to Resolution 2847 and MR, asserting in the pleading that the
resolution denied its rights mentioned in the Sec. 4. of Party List System Act and
that the MINERO ruling did not apply since they were not afforded the luxury to be
heard and that Banat ruling relaxed the Minero Ruling and that PGBI was not
afforded the equal protection clause. They also contended that the resolution was a
miscarriage of justice in view of Sec. 6 (8) of RA 7941.
2. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of merit. COMELEC argued that PGBI
misunderstood Sec. 4, it did not earn 2 per centum and participate during 2004
elections, and that PGBI was given opportunity to be heard.
II. Applicable Cases:
a. MINERO vs. COMELEC In this case, the Court disqualified MINERO because of failing to
get 2 per centum of votes cast and that it failed to participate during 2004 elections. It
necessarily failed to get 2 per centum of votes cast during two preceding elections.
b. Banat vs. COMELEC It only relaxed MINERO ruling.

III. Applicable Laws
a. Sec. 4 , Party List System Act It allows any party, organization and coalition already
registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required
to file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.

b. Sec. 6(8), Party List Systems Act - (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.


IV. Issues:
a. Whether or not there is basis for delisting PGBI.
b. Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
V. Decision of the Court
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL
COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is
concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBIs motion for
reconsideration in SPP No. 09- 004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list
group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.
VI. Ruling
The court viewed that MINERO ruling was a flawed application of Sec. 6(8) of Party List
systems act. MINERO ruling was not tolerated because of its characterization of non-
participation as a failure to garner 2 per centum of votes cast. The court saw the confusion
among the interpreters of the law in the MINERO ruling. The preposition or is a
disjunctive, it distinguishes in the absence of one the other. Also, in the development of the
laws, the ruling in BANAT vs. COMELEC regards the 2 per centum requirement in order to
acquire a seat in Congress for Party list groups as unconstitutional. It must then be
understood that 2 per centum requirement is no pre-requisite in winning the election.
Because of the developments in the law and the unreliability it presents, it cannot be
applied. In light of the situation of PGBI, there was a gap present in the law concerning not
winning the previous election and not participating the next one.




Petitioner: Tung Chung Hui
Respondent: Rufus Rodriguez and Board of Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation
Type of Case: Single Case
Ponente: Panganiban, J.

I. Facts
a. Legal Problem Tung Chung Hui is a Taiwanese Citizen. He acquired visa from
Philippine Embassy in Singapore. He went to the Philippines and was carrying in his
hand a tampered passport. He was arrested by PNP upon arrival in the Philippines
and was detained. He was turned over to the BID after finding him guilty of having a
tampered passport caught in his possession.
b. Cases Filed
1. Petitioner filed a petition of Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention
was illegal before the RTC of Manila.
2. Respondents filed a Motion of Reconsideration.
3. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal.
4. Petitioner filed an opposition claiming that the filing of the notice went beyond
the 48 hour reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases as
prescribed in pre- 1997 rules of Court.
5. An Order was instituted, favoring the respondents.
6. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, asserting that the Order dated January
29, 1998 was the one being referred to by the Notice of Appeal not the petition
he filed. It was denied.
7. A request for TRO was made and it was granted by the Court.
c. Applicable Cases:
1. Saulo v. Cruz
2. Garcia v. Echiverri
3. Elephante v. Madayag
d. Applicable Laws:
1. Sec. 18, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court Repealed Sec. 18, Rule 41, Revised
Rules of Court
2. Sec. 18, Rule 41, Pre-1997 Rules of Court - Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how
taken. - An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the
clerk of court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight (48)
hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it
appeals therefrom.
3. Sec. 3, Rule 41, Pre- 1997 Rules of Court - The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from.Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.

II. Issues:
a. Whether or not reglementary period is fifteen days under the new law.
b. Whether or not Sec. 1, Rule 41 is discretional.
III. Decisions of the Court:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court is hereby immediately LIFTED.No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
IV. Ruling
Applicable Cases were deemed not applicable because the provisions they seek to apply
or interpret were repealed. Meaning, to apply the doctrines established in these cases
would only harm the institution of justice because the provisions were amended.