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MARY LOUISE R.

ANDERSON VS ENRIQUE HO
GR No. 172590
January 7, 2013
Facts:
Intending to file with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
Andersons counsel, Atty. Rommel V. Oliva, filed a Motion for Extension of Time of 15 days
from May 20, 2005 or until June 4, 2005 within which to file a petition allegedly due to the
revisions required in the initial draft and on account of heavy pressure of work. This was granted
by the CA. Subsequently, said counsel sought another extension of 15 days or until June 19,
2005, this time claiming that the petition had already been finalized and sent to Anderson in
Hawaii, U.S.A. for her to read as well as sign the certification and verification portion thereof.
However, as of the last day of the extended period on June 4, 2005, the petition has not yet been
sent back, hence, the additional extension being sought. In the interest of justice, the CA once
again granted the said motion for extension. On June 20, 2005, Atty. Oliva was finally able to
file the Petition for Review but the certification against forum shopping attached thereto was
signed by him on Andersons behalf without any accompanying authority to do so.
Issue:
Can the court relax the rule on certification against forum shopping in this case?
Held:
There is no justifiable reason to relax the rule on certification against forum shopping in
this case. The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it imposes has
been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these procedural requirements is the
certificate of non-forum shopping which, time and again, has been declared as basic, necessary
and mandatory for procedural orderliness.
The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a "certification is a peculiar personal representation
on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are
no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action.
Obviously, it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been
retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether she actually filed or
caused the filing of a petition in that case. Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner is
unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA
designating her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification which had been signed by
counsel without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the
dismissal of the petition.













SPOUSES EUGENE L. LIM and CONSTANCIA LIM VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and BPI
G.R. No. 192615
January 30, 2013
Facts:
A closer look into the SPA and the Corporate Secretarys Certificate submitted by BPI
reveals that, at the time the subject complaint was filed on January 26, 1999, Ramos did not have
the express authority to file and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping
attached to BPIs complaint. The SPA, which appointed Ramos and/or Atty. Mateo G.
Delegencia as BPIs attorneys-in-fact, was executed only on July 8, 2008. The Corporate
Secretarys Certificate that named the officers authorized by the BPIs Executive Committee to
grant and extend a SPA to other officers of the bank was executed only on February 21, 2007.
Issue:
Whether or not the Special Power of Attorney and Corporate Secretarys Certificate that
BPI belatedly submitted constituted substantial compliance with the requirements under the rules
on verification and certification.
Held:
BPIs subsequent execution of the SPA constituted a ratification of Ramos unauthorized
representation in the collection case filed against the petitioners. A corporation can act only
through natural persons duly authorized for the purpose or by a specific act of its board of
directors, and can also ratify the unauthorized acts of its corporate officers. The act of ratification
is confirmation of what its agent or delegate has done without or with insufficient authority. At
the time the complaint against the petitioners was filed, Ramos held the position of Assistant
Vice-President for BPI Northern Mindanao and was then the highest official representing the
bank in the Northern Mindanao area. This position and his standing in the BPI hierarchy, place
him in a sufficiently high and authoritative position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of
the allegations in the subject complaint, to justify his authority in filing the complaint and to sign
the verification and certification against forum shopping. Whatever is lacking, from the strictly
corporate point of view, was cured when BPI subsequently (although belatedly) issued the
appropriate SPA.



















RIVULET AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS ANTHONY PARUNGAO ET AL
G.R. No. 197507
January 14, 2013

Facts:
Rivulet was the registered owner of Hacienda Bacan, an agricultural land situated in
Barangay Guintubhan, Isabela, Negros Occidental. Despite the sale in favor of Atty. Jose Miguel
Arroyo (Atty. Arroyo) in a tax delinquency sale held on April 8, 1994, title to Hacienda Bacan
remained in Rivulet's name. In April 2001, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
commenced the administrative process to acquire the subject property under R.A. No. 6657
Thereafter, the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO) of Isabela conducted field investigation and
segregation survey. On December 15, 2010, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRA Administrator and/or all persons acting upon their
orders or in their place and stead from cancelling TCT No. T-105742 in Rivulet's name; issuing a
new certificate of title in the name of the Republic. Incidentally, Rivulet refiled its application
for land use conversion which was denied by the DAR Secretary on the grounds that the subject
land had already been placed under CARP coverage nine (9) years prior to the application for
land use conversion and that it remained economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes. Undersecretary Parugao sought advice from the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) on the possibility of installing farmer beneficiaries in the subject property despite the
TRO, citing that the acts sought to be enjoined had already been performed prior to its issuance
and that the DAR was not among those enjoined.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of respondents in installing farmer-beneficiaries in the subject
landholding constitutes an open defiance and disobedience of the Court for which they should be
cited for indirect contempt.

Held:
No. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to
its authority, justice and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the courts order,
but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered
contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a
person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act
which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no
reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.














SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO VS SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 188056
January 8, 2013
Facts:
Petitioners initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr.,
et al. On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No.
182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat
of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Pursuant to DO No. 182, the
complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to
the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ. Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners
have directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing
to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim
that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws,
and their right to the speedy disposition of cases.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Court.
Held:
The petitioners did not properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Court. Petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by
coming directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without
tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the
dismissal of the recourse. Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the
only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of his or her grievances. As a
rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance. Hence, every litigant who
brings petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever
be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined
and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65.














MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON vs. JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS and COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 185595
January 9, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were
married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998,
petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioners application for
support pendente lite. After hearing, the trial court issued an Order dated March 7, 2005 granting
the motion to reduce support and denying petitioners motion for spousal support, increase of the
childrens monthly support pendente lite and support-in-arrears. Petitioners motion for partial
reconsideration of the March 7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4, 2005.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC orders dated March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 are merely
interlocutory.
Held:
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and
the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy. An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something
more to be done to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered
final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage
of the same action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not
dependent on compliance or non-compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner
suggests.
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears,
as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of
the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners claims as to the
ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal
assets.

















TML GASKET INDUSTRIES, INC vs BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 188768
January 7, 2013

Facts:
TML obtained a loan from the Bank of Southeast Asia, Inc. (BSA), which TML can avail
via a credit facility of P85,000,000.00. As security for the loan, TML executed a real estate
mortgage over commercial and industrial lots located at Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Paraaque City.
For additional security, BSA required TML to execute a promissory note for each availment
from the credit facility. TML defaulted in the payment of its loan leading BPI to extra-judicially
foreclose the mortgaged properties. Because of the imminent foreclosure sale of its mortgaged
properties, TML, on 21 November 2002, filed a "Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Accounting,
Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale, Increased (sic) in Interest Rates, Penalty
Charges Plus, (sic) Damages, with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against BPI and DBS. In an Order dated 20 June
2003, the trial court denied TMLs application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The
appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court and granted the injunctive writ in favor of
TML.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred when it reversed and set aside the twin Orders of
the trial court and lifted the injunctive writ.
Held:
A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual
existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The requisites of a
valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be
entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be
shown. In this case, TML anchors its right to the mortgaged properties on its claim that it cannot
be considered in default of its loan obligation to BPI. Consequently, the mortgaged properties
cannot be foreclosed. TML claims it had been religiously paying its loan; however, BPIs
unilateral increase of the rate of interest to 33% prevented TML from further paying the loan.
Thus, for TML, while an accounting and liquidation of the actual amount of its obligation to BPI
remains undetermined, it cannot be considered in default. Ultimately, TML avers that the
threatened foreclosure and auction sale of its mortgaged properties while its loan with BPI
subsists is a violation of its right. In this case, there was an invasion of the right that is material
and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear
legal right, the issuance of a writ of injunction constitutes grave abuse of discretion.