1. BA Finance Corporation vs.

CA161 SCRA 608

Facts: Augusto Yulo, respondent, secured a loan from the petitioner, BA Finance Corp., as evidenced by
hissignature on a promissory note in behalf of the A & L Industries. About two months prior to the loan,
however,Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned their conjugal
home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.
Petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses on the basis of the promissory note. They
also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt. The trial court issued the writ of attachment thereby enabling the petitioner to
attach the properties of A & L Industries. Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with
counterclaim, alleging that Augusto had already abandoned her and their children five months before
the filing of the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissory note was
executed. She also alleged that her signature was forged in the special power of attorney procured
by Augusto. Petitioner contends that even if the signature was forged or even if the attached properties
were her exclusive property, the same can be made answerable to the obligation because the said
properties form part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo.
Issue: Whether or not the exclusive property of private respondent forms part of the conjugal
partnership of the spouses and be made answerable to the obligation.
Ruling:SC ordered the release of the attachment of the said property. Though it is presumed that the
single proprietorship established during the marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name
of only one of the spouses. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by
the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership .In the case at bar, the
obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the
private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the
time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.
2. Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprise vs Guiang
168 scra 373
FACTS: The present Petition for Review seeks to set aside the decision in CA. which dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioner company against private respondent spouses.
On 2 May 1975, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and petitioner
Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprises, Inc., a corporation engaged in the hotel and resort business with
office and establishment at Olongapo City. Under the agreement, Maris Trading undertook to drill for
water and to provide all equipment necessary to install and complete a water supply facility to service
the Marmont Resort Hotel in Olongapo, for a stipulated fee of P40,000.00. In fulfillment of its contract,
Maris Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a parcel of land situated in
Olongapo City, then occupied by respondent spouses Federico and Aurora Guiang.
Five (5) months later, a second Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and
Aurora Guiang, with Federico Guiang signing as witness.
After some time, the water supply of the Marmont Resort Hotel became inadequate to meet the hotel's
water requirements. Petitioner Marmont secured the services of another contractor (the name of which
was not disclosed), which suggested that in addition to the existing water pump, a submersible pump be
installed to increase the pressure and improve the flow of water to the hotel.
On 13 May 1980, petitioner Marmont filed a Complaint against the Guiang spouses for damages
resulting from their refusal to allow representatives of petitioner and the second contractor firm entry
into the water facility site.
In their Answer, the Guiang spouses (defendants below) denied having had any previous knowledge of
the first Memorandum of Agreement and asserted that the second Memorandum of Agreement was
invalid for not having been executed in accordance with law.
The spouses there assailed the validity of the second Memorandum of Agreement, alleging that the
subject matter thereof involved conjugal property alienated by Aurora Guiang without the marital
consent of her husband, Federico Guiang.
RTC: Denied the Motion to Dismiss
CA: Affirmed decision of RTC and Dismissed the Appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not the second Memorandum of Agreement was invalid in this case?
We consider briefly respondent spouses' argument that the second Memorandum of Agreement was
invalid for having been executed by Aurora Guiang without the marital consent of Federico, contrary to
Articles 165 and 172 of the Civil Code.
In this particular case, however, as noted earlier, the second Memorandum of Agreement, although
ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading, was also signed by her husband
Federico, as one of the witnesses thereto. This circumstance indicates not only that Federico was present
during the execution of the agreement but also that he had, in fact, given his consent to the execution
thereof by his wife Aurora. Otherwise, he should not have appended his signature to the document as
witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the second Memorandum of Agreement as their
effective consent thereto is sufficiently manifested in the document itself.
Even if the debt or obligation were not for the benefit of the community, the absolute community of
property shall be liable if such debt or obligation were contracted during the marriage by both
spouses or by anyone of them with the consent of the other. Consent maybe express or implied.









4. De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz Case Digest
De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz
130 Phil 324

Facts: Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz, defendant, at Bacolod City.
During their coverture they acquire seven parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land
at Silay Cadastre. They are also engaged in varied business ventures.

The defendant started living in Manila, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his
office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at Bacolod
City. Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon the defendant who had never
visited their conjugal abode. She also began to suspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in
Manila to a certain Nenita Hernandez, which she confirmed upon getting several pieces of evidence on
the defendants polo shirt and iron safe.

The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the reason he transferred his living
quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and
extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because at home
he could not concentrate on his work. The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned
his wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them financial
support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office and he
financed the education of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila.

Issue: Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to comply with his obligations.

Ruling: The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is considered view that the
defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of
the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must be real
abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but
also amount to financial and moral desertion.

Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband,
despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the
conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the defendant never ceased to
give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode
and resume his marital duties and rights.

5. METROBANK vs TAN
In 1974, the company co-owned by Tan, acquired a P250k loan from Metrobank. In 1976, the same
company acquired another P150k loan from Metrobank. In 1979, it again got a P600k loan from
Metrobank. These 3 loans were secured by a mortgage executed by spouses See in favor of Metrobank.
See was not part of Tans company not until 1979 but theyve been securing the loans. The loans were
consolidated as a P1 Million loan in 1980 payable at P125k in 8 quarterly payments until fully paid.
Meanwhile, Tan had a separate unsecured loan of P970k owed from Metrobank which it failed to pay.
Metrobank won a collection suit against Tan for said sum of money. Loan was still unpaid.
In 1984, Tan defaulted from paying the P1 M loan. Metrobank foreclosed the property of See located in
Paco, Manila (June 1984). Metrobank was the highest bidder at P1.7M. The Sale was registered same
month/year.
In December 1984, See assailed the foreclosure averring that the P1M loan is no longer covered by the
mortgage for the same was novated when the 3 loans were consolidated. The CA ruled the foreclosure
to be valid but proceeds therefrom should only cover the P1M loan, excess has to be returned.
While pending on appeal before SC, Tan offered to pay P2M: P600k as downpayment and the rest
payable in 2 years w/o interest in order to release the foreclosed mortgaged property. This was denied
by the bank.
Tan and See then petitioned that Metrobank allow them to redeem the property at P1.6M. This was in
1997.
SCs decision (G.R. 118585) finally went out and made final CAs ruling that the foreclosure is valid. This
was interpreted later by the RTC and the CA as giving the right to Tan to repurchase the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tan may redeem the said property?
HELD: No. The decision of the SC in GR 118585 did not give the right to redeem way past the period of
redemption. This was an error in the RTC and the CA.
Tan was clearly in default hence Metrobank had the right to foreclose which it did in 85. Tan had a year
to redeem. Though See was the registered owner, Tan had the right of redemption because they were
the actual mortgagors. But Tan never redeemed the property within the redemption period of 1 year.
The filing of a civil suit did not forestall the period of redemption though said suit drag for more than ten
years until a decision was laid down in 97.
Though Tan made offers and proposals to redeem property, Tan did not make simultaneous payments
(which is required in redemption) which further bolstered the fact that he did not make valid offers of
redemption (considering arguendo).
After the 1 year redemption period, the right has already vested in Metrobank, hence it could provide
for any purchase price i.e. P11M offer to sell property to spouses See.
7. Pelayo vs Perez (459 SCRA 475)
PELAYO VS PEREZ, G.R NO. 141323 JUNE 8,2005
FACTS:
David Pelayo sold two parcels of agricultural land located in Panabo to mrlki perez onJanuary 1988 And
the sale is evidenced by a deed of Absolute Sale and Loreza Pelayo,wife of David and another one whose
signature is illegible witnessed the execution of the deed. MrsPelayo signed only the third space in the
space provided for the witness, Perez asked Loreza tosign on the first and second pages but the latter
refused as a result, Mr Perez instituted anaction for specific performance and Perez countered that the
lots were given to him bydefendant Pelayo in consideration of his services as his attorney-in fact to
make the necessaryrepresentation and negotiation with the illegal occupants-defendants in the
ejectment case.Defendant Pelayo said that the deed was without the consent og Mrs perez and invoked
Art 166of the Civil code to support his argument.
ISSUE:
Did Mrs Pelayo expressed his consent in the deed of Sale executed by Mrs Pelayo?
HELD:
The consent need not be expressed. It can be implied. In the present case, although itappears on the
face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness,circumstances leading to
the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fullyaware of the sale of their
conjugal property and consented to the sal. The petition of Mr. andMrs Pelayo was denied
8. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, (LONG VERSION)
G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005
FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property
was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in
favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing
the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the
spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from
petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including
the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of
respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property
being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned
that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford
sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was
conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real
Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and void
and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the
plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorneys
fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and
attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE
LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
HELD: the petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one
renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal
partnership of gains already established before its effectivityunless vested rights have already been
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late
Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and
income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their
efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership
apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal
partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of
conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the
Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)
authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the
disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the
Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial
court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the
subject property for lack of respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, *T+he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern
for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains
lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the
late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of
his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
NOTES:
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously
asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in
the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the
benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the
proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted
to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party
but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change
his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the
new theory.
8. Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo (SHORT)
Charges and Obligations
CASE ISSUES:
Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late M on the
(453 SCRA 283)
g g y
property as co-owner is valid as to his undivided share.
Whether or not the conjugal partnership (CP) is liable for the
payment of the loan obtained by the late M.
FACTS:
M and D were married on August 1967 without a marriage
settlement.
They purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City during their
marriage, but the Deed of Sale was executed only in favor of M,
without the knowledge and consent of D.
The loan remained outstanding upon maturity so H instituted an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property. A
Certificate of Sale was issued to H as the highest bidder and
consolidated the ownership of the property.
D instituted a case for the nullity of contracts of sale and other
damages in the RTC, which ruled in her favor. So did the CA.
LESSONS:
Article 105: The Chapter on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Dailo (453 SCRA 283)
p jg p
in the Family Code was made applicable to CPG already
established before its effectivity, unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws
Article 124: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void It is not only the share of the nonconsenting
spouse that is void, but the entire encumbrance or
disposition.
The burden of proof that the debt redounded to the benefit of
the family must be proven by the creditor for the CPG to be
liable.

9. Security Bank and Trust Co vs Mar Tierra Corp
GR 143382, November 29, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent
corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C.
Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with
respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.
On September 25, 1981, respondent corporation availed of its credit line and received the sum of
P9,952,000 which it undertook to pay. However, respondent corporation was not able to pay the
balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations in 1984.
Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer
for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents in the Regional
Trial Court .
The RTC rendered its decision on June 20, 1994. It held respondent corporation and individual
respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner . It, however, found that the obligation
contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.
Petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the
husband to accommodate a third party?
HELD: NO In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and
respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity
agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for
respondent corporation was similarly for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge
that burden.
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the
objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The underlying
concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it limits the liability of the
conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
Any personal undertaking by a spouse, such as making himself or herself a surety or a guarantor in
relation to an obligation to another person, cannot be presumed to be the benefit of the family as any
advantage that may arise therefore is merely indirect.

10. Villanueva vs Court of Appeals (427 SCRA 439)
Presumption of Conjugality of Property
FACTS:
A & B were validly married in 1926. In 1945, A cohabited with
C and since then, no longer lived with his legitimate family.
In 1998, B, the wife, sought reconveyance of several
properties, claiming that they were conjugal properties with A.
C, the concubine, contends that Article 148 of the Family Code
applies to those properties.
LESSONS:
The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern
the property relations between A & B even if they married
before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired
during the marriage, the presumption is that they are
conjugal property. The burden of proof is on the party
claiming otherwise.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even
period a subsisting for a long period, does not sever the tie of previous marriage. Otherwise, the law
would be giving
a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and
immoral.
Reliance on Article 148 is misplaced. There must be proof of
actual joint contribution by the live-in partners before the
property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their
contribution. Otherwise, there is no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal sharing.

11. Villanueva vs. IAC
192 SCRA 21
Facts:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. After they died, their
surviving children, Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of
extrajudicial partition.

Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. Modesto was
married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. After the death of Modesto, his two surviving
illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from Jesus Bernas. As a security
they mortgaged to Bernas their fathers property. In the loan agreement executed between the parties,
a relative Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later,
Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas praying that the
property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land. They
ground their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and
his wife Victoria. Victorias willstated that her interests, rights and properties, real and personal as her
share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea
and Teodoro in equal shares.
Modestos will, onthe other hand, bequeathed to his two illegitimate children all his interest in his
conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and
Victoria.
Ruling: Even if it be assumed that the husbands acquisition by succession of the lot in question took
place during his marriage, the lot would nonetheless be his exclusive property because it was acquired
by him during the marriage by lucrative title
Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is
his exclusive and private property. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter
of law.





13. Genato v. Lorenzo
23 SCRA 618

DOCTRINE: The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done must be simultaneous and the
acceptance by a person other than the true done must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set
forth in a public document

FACTS:
The property under dispute in this case is the 530 shares of stocks of Genato Commercal Corporation,
which has P100 par value, of the deceased Simona B. De Genato (Director and secretary-treasurer of the
said company). The petitioners herein, 2 heirs of Simona, are claiming that they own 530 shares of
stocks of Genato Commercal Corporation because of the donation made by Simona to them.
Respondents (other remaining heirs), however, are trying to recover from the petitioners, their co-heirs,
the said stocks so they can include it in the intestate estate which should later be distributed among all
the surviving children of the decedent.

Four or five days after having Florentino Genato elected and designated as Assitant Secretary-Treasurer
of the Corporation, 265 shares were issued in favour of Florentino Genato and another 265 were issued
in favour of Francisco G. Genato. These were not presented as evidence in the course of the trial; they
were merely mentioned by Florentino Genato in the course of his testimony as a witness.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid donation? -- NO

HELD:
There was no valid donation for lack of proper acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two donees was
not present at the delivery, and there is no showing that Francisco Genato had authorized his brother,
Florentino to accept for both of them. The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done must be
simultaneous and the acceptance by a person other than the true done must be authorized by a proper
power of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this case.




14. BPI vs. Posadas
56 Phil 215
Facts:
The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance policy for
$10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. During the following five years the
insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company. The deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze
married the plaintiffappellant Rosario Gelano.
The plaintiff-appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed administrator of the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order, entered by the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid
Rosario Gelano Vda. De Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the sum of P20,150, which was the amount
of the insurance policy on the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date
Rosario Gelano Vda. De Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
administrator of the deceased's estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate,
and then returned the money to said widow. The appellee alleges that it is a fundamental principle that
a life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary upon the death of the person insured.
Issue: Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal partnership.
Ruling: SC holds, (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which
the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-
half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; and (2) that if the premiums were paid
partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion
paraphernal in part and conjugal in part. That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part
of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to
the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was
domiciled in these Islands or outside.
15. JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS
February 16, 1989 (G.R. No. L-55322)
FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first intestate then the
husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during
his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what
apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his
wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void
and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of
their deceased parents.

Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. They
say it is conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the
name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.

ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete is
conjugal property or exclusive property.

HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The
party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must
first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient.
The fact that the properties were registered in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title
and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but
merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under
dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his
marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as
married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioners position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocsons, the registered owner. This is so because the words married to preceding
Alejandra Poblete are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import
from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
19. Wong vs. IAC
200 SCRA 792
Facts:
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. They had been most of the time living
separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage,
Romarico bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed from an
officemate.
Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter
consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within
the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of
Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa.
Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature.
Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an
action for collection of a sum of money. After trial, the court promulgated decisions in favor of the
Wongs. A writ of execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in Angeles all in the name
of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the
decision as well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction. Romarico alleged that he
was "not given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul
appeared solely for Katrina. That he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he
did not authorize her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and
sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties.
Issue: Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusive properties of Romarico.
Ruling: The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are
exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money
he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he
paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on
this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a
property acquired by a person during coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money
utilized in the purchase.

20. Carandang vs Heirs of Quirino de Guzman
NATURE OF THE CASE: This case reached the Supreme Court as an appeal to the decision of the CA
ruling against the spouses Carandang and denying their motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the
RTCs decision that Milagros de Guzman, the decedents wife, is not an indispensable party in the
complaint, hence, her non-inclusion in the case does not warrant a dismissal of the complaint.

FACTS: Spouses Carandang and the decedent Quirino de Guzman were stockholders and corporate
officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS). The Carandangs have equities at 54 % while Quirino
has 46%.

When the capital stock of MBS was increased on November 26, 1983, the Carandangs subscribed
P345,000 from it, P293,250 from the said amount was loaned by Quirino to the Carandangs. In the
subsequent increase in MBS capital stock on March 3, 1989, the Carandangs subscribed again to the
increase in the amount of P93,750. But, P43,125 out of the mentioned amount was again loaned by
Quirino.

When Quirino sent a demand letter to the Carandangs for the payment of the loan, the
Carandangs refused to pay. They contend that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between
Arcadio Carandang and Quirino, whereby Quirino promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the
Arcadio without cost, in consideration for Arcadios technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment,
and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no
indebtedness on the part of the Carandangs.

Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint seeking to recover the P336,375 total amount of the loan together
with damages. The RTC ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered the Carandangs to pay the loan plus
interest, attorneys fees, and costs of suit. The Carandangs appealed the trial courts decision to the CA,
but the CA affirmed the same. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Carandangs were
also denied. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

SPOUSES CARANDANG: Three of the four checks used to pay their stock subscriptions were issued in
the name of Milagros de Guzman, the decedents wife. Thus, Milagros should be considered as an
indispensable party in the complaint. Being such, the failure to join Milagros as a party in the case
should cause the dismissal of the action by reason of a jurisprudence stating that: (i)f a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action."

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action,
considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a party-
plaintiff.

HELD: No. Although the spouses Carandang were correct in invoking the aforementioned doctrine, the
ground set forth entails an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the
outcome of the litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded.
The first query seeks to answer the question of whether Milagros is a real party in interest, while the
latter query is asking if she is an indispensable party. Since the issue of this case calls for the definition of
an indispensable party, invoking the abovementioned doctrine is irrelevant to the case because the
doctrine talks about a real party in interest and not an indispensable party. Although it is important to
take note that an indispensable party is also a real party in interest.

*Definitions:
> Real party in interest the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
> Indispensable party a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
> Necessary party one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete
relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the
claim subject of the action
> Pro-forma parties those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or against another
party as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or procedural rule.
An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The
third case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be
part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules
nevertheless require that she be joined as a party.

Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August
1988. As they did not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains
govern their property relations.

All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.

Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit
transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be
conjugal property.

Assuming that the four checks are credits, they are assumed to be conjugal properties of Quirino and
Milagros. There being no evidence to the contrary, such presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de
Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership property, is certainly a real party in interest.

Now, with regard to the discussion on the effect of non-inclusion of parties in the complaint filed: in
indispensable parties, when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court void,
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. For
necessary parties, the non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in
the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary
party. Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary party would not warrant the
dismissal of the complaint. Lastly, for pro-forma parties, the general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must
be followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to
recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional
defect. The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement
which may be cured by amendment.

Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma parties are also indispensable or necessary parties, the
rules concerning indispensable or necessary parties, as the case may be, should be applied. Thus,
dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an indispensable party.

Under Art. 147 of the Civil Code which was superceded by Art. 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership. Thus, Milagros is a co-owner
of the subject personal property in this case the credit incurred by spouses Carandang. Being co-
owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the
recovery thereof.

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to
Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind
of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-
owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have
been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

Thus, Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for the recovery of the allegedly
loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and
dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto. (The Civ Pro issue was not the
main issue in the case.)

22. Go vs Yamane
489 SCRA 107
Facts:
1) Wife of Yamane is involved in a suit entitled Florence Pucay De Gomez et al. v. Cypress Corporation
for this she hires a certain Atty. Guillermo De Guzman.
2) Atty. De Guzman files for writ of execution on a property of the wife of as payment for attorneys
fees awarded in the aforementioned suit amounting to P10,000 the auction of the property is scheduled
on Aug 11, 1981.
3) On Aug. 8, 1981, the files a third party claim on the property claiming that it is conjugal in nature
and thus not liable for the wifes personal obligations
4) Sheriff however proceeds w/ the auction and the property is sold to spouses Go. One year later the
sale becomes final as no redemption is filed and the deed of certificate of sale is issued to the on Aug
26, 1982.
5) Sept. 4, 1984. files for annulment and cancellation of the auction sale on same grounds as before (3)
6) answer contending res judiccata, no cause of action, lack of lawful remedy, and absence of
irregularity in the sale. on the other hand file a complaint for damages contending fraud and
misrepresentation for selling a P200,000 property to pay P10,000 in attorneys fees.
7) RTC decides in favor of stating had no cause of action since the property was deemed not
conjugal as it was registered in his wifes name.
8) CA reverses RTC decision: presumption of conjugality attaches to property acquired during the
marriage, unless proof that exclusive funds were used in purchase are
adduced. (TCT and deed of absolute sale indicate owner married to Yamane) do not prove this in
instant case thus decision in favor of . Auction and sale annulled.

ISSUES: WON property is conjugal and can pay for the debts of the wife and here sisters
HELD: Yes, property is conjugal but CANNOT pay for debt
- Property as conjugal:
o (X) Unilateral declaration of wife that property is paraphernal - property is determined by law and not
will of one spouse
o (X) deed and title are only under name of one spouse mere registration is not sufficient to establish
its paraphernal nature. Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal property thus
stronger evidence should be given ie purchased with exclusive money
o (X) non-redemption of sale redeeming it would have been estopped him from later impugning its
validity
- lien between sisters and Atty De Guzman cant be charged with conjugal property since it wasnt for
the benefit of the family. Same with indebtedness because her obligation has not been shown to be one
of the charges against conjugal partnership.
o Right are merely inchoate prior to liquidation of conjugal partnership.

Cant answer to personal obligation when there is no evidence that it was for support of the family, or
administration of conjugal partnership was transferred to wife by courts of when wife gives moderate
donations for charity.

23. JOVELLANOS vs. CA
210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164)
Facts:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement over a house and
lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the
petitioners.
Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married private respondent Annette with whom he begot
two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the
behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises.
With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute
sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over
the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was
acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the
conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property, were acquired by
their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement
with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
Issue:
WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES
Held:
The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a contract to sell, as
contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not
transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally,
ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller
until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually
known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the
installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of
which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount hence,
although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8,
1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.
Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale in
his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law, 19 and, under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not
possess or enjoy such rights of ownership.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since.
as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to
his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements
to the petitioners who helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of
the Family Code on property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage,
such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
25. Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with
PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and
Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution.
Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent
spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses
filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the
said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for
the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to
AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted
the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate
from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.
Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his
corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given to
another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of
PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a
business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which
was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of
shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must
be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.
Any loss resulting from the exercise of a profession or family business by any of the spouses shall be
chargeable to the absolute community of property.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband
himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be
used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on
behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.

26. Ching vs Court of Appeals (423 CASE ISSUE:
vs. SCRA 357)
Presumption of Conjugality of Property
FACTS:
A is the Vice-President of PBM Inc., which obtained a loan from
ABC Bank. A executed a continuing guarantee with the bank
binding himself to jointly and severally guarantee the loan.
PBM Inc. defaulted on the loan, and as a consequence the
deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the
100,000 common shares of C Corporation in A's name.
A's wife E filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on the
attachment. She alleged that the stocks were acquired by her
and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds
and therefore cannot be used to pay off her husbands
exclusive liability.
LESSONS:
All properties acquired during marriage are presumed to
vs. SCRA 357)
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proven that the
property is exclusively the husbands or the wifes.
Whoever claims that the property acquired by the spouses
during their marriage is not conjugal partnership property but
is exclusive owned by one of them as his personal property is
burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to
purchase the property. It is necessary to have clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property acquired
during the marriage.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for an obligation,
there must be some showing that some advantage accrued to
the spouses. The benefits must be those directly resulting
from the obligation. They cannot merely be a by-product or
spin-off of the obligation.

27. Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo
Charges and Obligations
CASE ISSUES:
Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late M on the
(453 SCRA 283)
g g y
property as co-owner is valid as to his undivided share.
Whether or not the conjugal partnership (CP) is liable for the
payment of the loan obtained by the late M.
FACTS:
M and D were married on August 1967 without a marriage
settlement.
They purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City during their
marriage, but the Deed of Sale was executed only in favor of M,
without the knowledge and consent of D.
The loan remained outstanding upon maturity so H instituted an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property. A
Certificate of Sale was issued to H as the highest bidder and
consolidated the ownership of the property.
D instituted a case for the nullity of contracts of sale and other
damages in the RTC, w
LESSONS:
Article 105: The Chapter on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains
in the Family Code was made applicable to CPG already
established before its effectivity, unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws
Article 124: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void It is not only the share of the nonconsenting
spouse that is void, but the entire encumbrance or
disposition.
The burden of proof that the debt redounded to the benefit of
the family must be proven by the creditor for the CPG to be
liable.hich ruled in her favor. So did the CA.

29. People v. Lagrimas
29 SCRA 153
Facts:
1) October11, 1962 Judgment finding Froilan Lagrimas guilty of murder becomes final.
2) Writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity in the case was issued and 11 parcels of land in the
name of the accused were scheduled for auction on Jan. 5, 1965
3) December 29, 1964 the wife of Lagrimas files a motion to quash the writs of attachment and
execution on the properties citing that they belong to the spouses conjugal property and thus could not
be held liable for the husbands individual indemnity.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 116

4) LC grants the petition which is later reversed by a second judge of the same court only to be
reaffirmed by a third judge ruling for the wife of the accused on March 5, 1960.
5) LC rules that indemnities may be imposed on the conjugal properties of the accused only after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the liquidation of the assets thereof pursuant to ART 161 of
the NCC.

Issues: WON civil indemnities may be taken from the offenders conjugal properties even before the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the liquidation of its assets.
Held: YES, the Civil Code provides that indemnities may be imposed on the conjugal property of an
offender when the offenders exclusive properties are insufficient to cover the cost his indemnity. In this
the law does not contemplate that the conjugal partnership must be dissolved and its assets liquidated
before the indemnity is to be drawn. It merely requires that the offending spouse repay the liabilities
taken from the conjugal partnership when such partnership is to be dissolved. However it is a condition
in the article that the indemnities collectible from the CPG must not eat in to the funds for the
maintenance of the family and the education of the children as it would lead to injustice.

30. Uy vs. CA
346 SCRA 246
Facts:
- Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffers a stroke on March 25, 1991
- A piece of property was planned on being sold
- Upon knowledge of the planned selling, Teodoro (Ernesto's son) files for petition praying for a court
appointed guardian to administer the property given the present physical and mental incapacity of
Ernesto
- Gilda (Ernesto's wife) files for petition praying for sole powers of administration of conjugal properties
and authorization to sell the same
- Alleging that the her husband's medical treatment's bills needed to be paid, hence the need to sell
- RTC awards petition to Gilda, pursuant to FC Art. 124 and governed by the rules on summary
proceedings of Art. 253
- Teodoro files for Motion of Reconsideration
- While above case was pending, Gilda sells the property to Jose and Glenda Uy
- Teodoro files opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale
- TC approves sale / CA reverses the decision ordering the TC to dismiss the proceedings to approve the
deed of sale

ISSUE: WON Gilda Jardelez may assume sole powers of administration of conjugal property and sell land
since her husband is incapacitated with a stroke to do so.
HELD: NO
- Art 124 contemplates a situation where spouse is absent, separated, or abandoned the other or where
consent is withheld of cannot be obtained. Such rules dont apply
to cases where non-consenting spouse is incapacitated.
- Rule 93 of 1964 Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy in judicial guardianship proceedings. Also,
FC also recognizes that for the wife to assume power of administration it has the same powers and
duties as a guardian under rules of court
o THUS, they must still observe rules of sale of wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule
95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary proceedings

In this case, TC did not comply with procedure in Revised Rules of Court and did not serve notice of
petition to incapacitated spouse and require him to show

31. THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents from the
husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining,
petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The agreement
handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would secure
his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses
were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written
consent.

HELD:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not
give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is
required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate consent.

32. SPS ANTONIO VS CA
GR. No. 125172
June 26, 1998
HELD: Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. The spouses has 3 children.
The Corpuz couple, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a lot located in South Cotabato,
and particularly from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale.
Later, the Corpuz spouses sold one-half portion of their Lot spouses Guiang. The latter have since then
occupied the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon .They are thus adjoining neighbors of the
Corpuzes.
Gilda left for Manila trying to look for work abroad and her departure was with the consent of her
husband. She was not able to go abroad though. She stayed for sometime in Manila.
After his wifes departure for Manila, defendant Judie seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling.
Sometime in 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half
portion including their house, of their homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother
informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not
inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang]
would advise her father
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda defendant Judie pushed through the sale of the remaining
one-half portion. He sold to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as Deed of Transfer
of Rights the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house standing .Transferor Judie Corpuzs
children Junie and Harriet signed the document as witness.
Four (4) days, obviously to cure whatever defect in defendant Judie title over the lot transferred,
defendant Luzviminda Guiang as vendee executed another agreement over the lot , this time with
Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner from whom the Corpuz spouses
originally bought the lot , who signed as vendor . Judie signed as a witness to the sale. The new sale
described the lot differently but it is obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct lot is the very
lot earlier sold to the corpus spouses.
Plaintiff then returned home. She found her children staying with other households. Only Junie was
staying in their house. Gilda gathered her children together and stayed at their house. Her husband was
nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children that their father had a wife already.
For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by defendant
Luzviminda Guiang and her husband before the Barangay authorities for trespassing. The parties thereat
signed a document known as amicable settlement. In full, the settlement provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave
voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any
charge, on or before April 7, 1990
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, Gilda went to the Barangay Captain to
question her signature on the amicable settlement. She was referred however to the Office-In-Charge at
the time, and the latter in turn told her that he could not do anything on the matter.
This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda
Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the settlement. We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really
approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been
made, plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot.
Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable settlement with a motion for the execution of
the amicable settlement, filing the same with the MTC of Koronadal. The proceedings [are] still pending
before the said court, with the filing of the instant suit.
As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang spent for the preparation of the Deed of Transfer of
Rights, as the amount they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having assumed the remaining obligation of
the Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo and expenses particularly the taxes and other expenses towards the
transfer of the title to the spouses Guiangs were incurred for the whole lot.
Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complainant against her husband Judie and
Petitioner-Spouses Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which
involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void.
The trial court rendered a judgment is rendered for Gilda and against the defendants therein, declaring
both the Deed of Transfer of Rights amicable settlement as null void and of no effect; Recognizing as
lawful and valid the ownership and possession of plaintiff Gilda over the remaining one-half portion of
subject lot 9; and ordering plaintiff Gilda to reimburse defendants Luzviminda Guiang the amount
corresponding to the payment made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel Callejo for the unpaid balance of
the account of plaintiff in favor of Manuel Callejo.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the CA. Respondent Court affirmed the decision of
the trial court
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Petition denied; the challenged decision affirmed
1. Whether the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was a void or a voidable contract
2. WON the execution of the amicable settlement can validly rectify the defect in the assailed
Deed of Transfer of Rights
HELD:
1. VOID CONTRACT.
The Guiang spouses allege that absence of Gildas consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under
Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of
ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of
consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondents
consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.
The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly
applied by the the lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership properly shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (NOTES,
#2)
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were
perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged
during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and
coercion.
13
In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the
husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was
entered into without the wifes consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause,
(2) object, and (3) consent,
14
the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
2. NO. Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified
by the contending parties through the amicable settlement they executed.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of the
private respondent. The trial court correctly held:
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil Code] therefore, the Deed to Transfer of Rights
cannot be ratified, even by an amicable settlement. It cannot be denied that the amicable
settlement entered into by plaintiff Gilda spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights. By express provision of law, such a contract is also void:
Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.
(Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of Rights and the amicable settlement are null and
void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified.
NOTES:
1. Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained
the amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise:
12

The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we
compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of
the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null
and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or
encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years . . . during [the] marriage to annul the alienation
or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or
encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.
2. Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is
clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which
the barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement and petitioners filed before the MTC a
motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the
property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent
would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as
the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
33. Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a
petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings
are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed
a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations
of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

34. Carino vs Carino
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage,
SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage
with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a
total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her
marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but
the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage
license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the
previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage
license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article
40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity
of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is
void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to
him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop
even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for
there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they
earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this
includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.

35. Buenaventura vs CA
CASE ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of Article 50 in relation to
Articles 41, 42, and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership
of gains applies to a marriage declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
A and B married. A, the husband, filed for a declaration of
nullity of marriage on he ground that he and B, the wife, were
psychologically incapacitated.
The Trial Court declared the marriage void but awarded B
moral and exemplary damages. The retirement benefits of A
and the shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park were ordered
to be liquidated and partitioned equally among them, based
on the regime of CPG.

36. Gonzales vs Gonzales
BARRETO GONZALES vs. GONZALES
March 7, 1933

Facts:
The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together fromJanuary
1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man &
wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow
Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her childrens support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which
to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her name.

Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured inthat
jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. Onthat same date
he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3children with her.
When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for
thesupport of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Renodivorce as
alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought
anaction at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courtsof
Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to theGuardian ad
litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legalportion from respective
estates had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they alsoprayed that the marriage
existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzalesbe ordered to pay Barreto P500
per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred ineducating the 3 minor sons. The
guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the case.

After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors,
butreduced the attorneys fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against
thedefendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision.

Issue:
Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in
this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the
PhilippineIslands would grant a divorce.

Ruling:
No. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because: The court
said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorcedone in Reno, Nevada
cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on thequestion of divorce. Its clear in
Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that theentire conduct of the
parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted prayingthe ratification of the
Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce & willbe done under conditions
not authorized by our laws. The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines &
the residence acquiredby the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer
jurisdiction upon thecourt of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered
in 1919.

Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to bedone, the
effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel thecourts to approve of
their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by
decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is contrary to public
order & good morals.
37. Agapay vs Palang GR NO 116688 July 28 1997
Agapay vs. Palang
276 SCRA 341

Facts:
Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan.
A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang,
respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales with his brother during the
entire duration of his year-long sojourn, not with his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce
Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and child.
When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda
Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee.
To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a
form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six
parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died. Thereafter,
Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the
riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that
the house and lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of the
petitioner while CA reversed the said decision.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of
petitioner and Miguel Palang.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale but was a
donation and therefore void. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but
one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.

39. JUANIZA V. JOSE
89 SCRA 306

30 March 1979
Ponente:
De Castro, J.
Keywords: paramour, no co-ownership
QuickGuide: The common law wife (paramour) of theowner of the jeepney which got into an accident
cannotbe held liable for the damages arising from the accident.
Facts:
-Herein respondent owned and operated a jeepney which got involved in an accident of collision,
causing death to 7 and physicalinjuries to 5.
-Herein petitioner was held by the lower courtto be jointly and severally liable (with
respondent), as respondents paramour/common-law wife, to the damages arising from the accident.
-Lower court based their decision on
Art. 144,CC:
When a man and woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married,or their
marriage is void from the beginning,the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on ownership.
Issue:
- WON petitioner can be held liable for theobligations arising from the accident to which
respondents property was involved; or
- WON common-law relationship, where oneparty is incapacitated to marry, automaticallyadopts
co-ownership by virtue of the CCRuling:-

NO. Petitioner shall not be held liable for thedamages.
Ratio:
- Art. 144 pertains only to those common-lawrelationships where neither of the partiessuffer
from any legal impediment to marry.
- Herein respondent is legally married toanother woman and is thus incapacitated tomarry herein
petitioner.
- Co-ownership cannot apply to their relationship.
- Herein petitioner is not considered a co-owner of the jeepney
- Moreover, the jeepney was registered only under the name of respondent
40. BELCODERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
October 20, 1993 (227 SCRA 303)
FACTS:
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while living with
a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had been bought by the
husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950 but the final deed, as well
as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during the latter Codes
regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03
August 1988.
The prpoerty was acquired by Alayo then transferred title to the name of the second wife. Alayo Bosing
died and left the property to his paramour turned second wife (first marriage still subsisting). First wife
petitioned.

HELD:
The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana.
Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at
Alayos request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably was
acquired by Alayo it was just transferred to Josefa.
41. Josefina Francisco vs Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February
16, 2005
Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married on
January 15, 1983. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private corporation. In 1984,
the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo
Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house
thereon. The Register of Deeds annotated at the dorsal portion of the said titles an Affidavit of Waiver
executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two
parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was waiving
whatever claims he had over the property.

In 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International,
bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to
pay for the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against
Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sherrif issued a notice of levy on execution
over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she
claimed as her paraphernal property.

Josefina filed a complaint for damages against MIWCC and the sheriff. Before she could commence
presenting her evidence, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of
Paraaque on the ground that when they were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already
married to one Carmelita Carpio. The RTC declared the marriage null and void for being bigamous.
Issue:

Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and can not be held liable
for the Eduardos personal obligations.

Held:

No.The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows
that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner and titles over
the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee after her marriage to Eduardo.

It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At that age, it is doubtful if she had
enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third
Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds were provided by her mother
and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to shield the subject properties from appellant
Master Iron as judgment creditor.

Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision,
pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights.

Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art
148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money,
property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will
not arise. (Josefina Francisco vs Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967,
February 16, 2005)



43. Joaquino vs. Reyes
Facts:
Lourdes Reyes was the widow of Rodolfo Reyes, having been married in 1947 in Manila.
Rodolfo, however, in the course of their marriage, had illicit relations with one Milagros Joaquino, to
whom he allegedly "put into custody" some of the couple's conjugal properties.
Said properties specifically include his earnings and retirement benefits from working as the Vice
Presidet and Comptroller of Warner Barns and two cars; and that the amount herein stated was used to
pay off theloan and monthly mortgage of a house in Paranaque, registered under Joaquino's name.
Lourdes then prayed that the properties be declared conjugal, that Milagrossurrenders the possession
thereof, and that damages be awarded. Milagros, on the other hand, contends that she purchased the
mentioned properties in her exclusive capacity, that she had no knowledge of the Rodolfo's first
marriage, that she had was never a beneficiary of the latter's earnings, and that her living together with
Rodolfo for nineteen (19) years, along with the fact that she had children with him, be considered by the
court in rendering judgment.Lourdes, however, died and was later represented by her children with
Rodolfo.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Lourdes' complaint. Upon appeal to the CA, however, Milagros
reiterated her stand and questioned the findings of the trialcourt. But to no avail, the CA likewise held
that the property had been paid outof the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes, because the funds
used to pay thehouse off was sourced from Rodolfo's earnings as part of the conjugal partnership.
Issue: WON the properties in question were conjugalWON the petitioner's common-law relationship
with Rodolfo validates her claim ofownership
Held: Yes. The property regime applicable is the CPG, having been the default propertyregime during the
time of Lourdes' marriage.
Such properties include the following, as enumerated by Article 153:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property
or from the exclusive property of each spouse. Subject properties fall squarely within the said
categories.
Article 160 then prescribes that all properties of the marriage are presumed tobe conjugal and covered
by the CPG unless rebutted and proven otherwise. Joaquino, having failed to prove that she
was financially capable and that she purchased said properties in her exclusive capacity, could not make
a valid claim of ownership.
As to Joaquino's claim of having the benefit of co-ownership conferred by the common-law relationship
under Article 144 of the Civil Code (in connection with Article 148 of the Family Code), the
Court reiterated that the said provision is inapplicable to common-law relations amounting to adultery
or concubinage. Jurisprudence holds that for Article 144 to apply, the couple must not have any legal
impediment to contract a marriage. And since Rodolfo and Joaquino were incapacitated to marry due to
Rodolfo's marriage with Lourdes, she cannot validly invokethe right conferred. Thus, only the property
acquired by them-through their actu al joint contribution of money, property, or industry-shall be
owned by them incommon and in proportion to their respective contribution.
Milagros likewise failed to prove that she was indeed financially capable of purchasing the house and
lot, that she actually contributed to the payments, and that she was employed anytime after 1961 when
the property was purchased.
The Certification and Affidavits stating that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings
from a jewelry business were also deemed to have no probative valueas they were not cross-examined
by the respondents.
The petition is therefore denied and the decision of the CA is affirmed

44. Tumlos vs. Fernandez
G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000

Facts:
Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and
Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an
apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to
occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed
upon that after a few months, Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants
promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said
defendants. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises, as they are in
need of the property for the construction of a new building.
Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the
Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question
together with Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on
appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in
question as their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that Guillerma administered the property by
collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her
as to the annulment of his marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property in litis.

Ruling:
Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject
property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent
Mario. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is
unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of
the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its
acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question
belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.

45. ABING V. WAEYAN (Coownership)

497 SCRA 202
July 31, 2006

Facts: In 1986, petitioner and respondent cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. Together, they bought a house erected on a lot owned by Dino in Benguet. The tax declaration
was thereafter transferred to respondents name.

In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. Eventually, petitioner
demanded respondent to vacate the annex structure when respondent failed to pay petitioners share
in their properties. Petitioner alleged that he alone paid for the construction of the annex structure.

Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner.

Held: Any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property
relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their
properties in common in equal shares. Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question,
respondent, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.