Here is the first one by Oswald Boelcke (WW I ace)

1. Try to secure the upper hand before attacking. If possible, keep the sun behi
nd you
Speed: the pilot with the faster of two machines has control over the combat. He
has the choice to break off combat and retire. The slower machine can not catch
him. The pilot of a slower machine must stay on the defense. He can not run to
safety. A fast moving aircraft can perform elaborate maneuvers, giving its pilot
many options. A machine flying close to its stall speed can do little beyond wa
llowing in a more or less straight line. Aircraft engines available in 1914 and
1915 provided just enough thrust to keep machines airborne at 150 km/h (93 mph),
and not much more. Level flight was fine, but climbing to a higher altitude too
k several minutes and cut air speed nearly in half. Diving, on the other hand, c
ould add half again to a plane's top speed. By 1916, engine power and speed incr
eased. By the end of the war, aircraft were operating regularly at speeds over 2
00 km/h (124 mph). Speed was critical.
Altitude: From the advantage of flying above his opponent, a pilot had more cont
rol over how and where the fight takes place. He could dive upon his opponent, g
aining a sizable speed advantage for a hit and run attack. Or, if the enemy had
too many advantages- numbers for instance- a pilot could fly away with a good he
ad start. At best, World War I aircraft climbed very slowly compared with later
types. Altitude was a hard earned 'potential energy' store not to be given away
capriciously.
Surprise: getting the first shot before one's opponent is prepared to return fir
e was the 'safest' and preferred method for attack. Most air victories were achi
eved in the first pass. Without all-seeing devices like radar, a pilot could app
roach his foe stealthily, using clouds, haze or even using the enemy aircraft's
own wings or tail to conceal his approach. The glare of the sun, especially, pro
vided an effective hiding spot.
Performance: Knowing the strengths, weakness and capabilities of your own aircra
ft, and that of your foe, was also critical. Who was faster, who could turn tigh
ter, how many were there, etc. He argued against foolish acts of 'heroism.' If h
e could not 'secure advantages,' he would not attack. One of Boelcke's pupils, M
anfred Von Richtofen (better known as the Red Baron), learned this rule very wel
l and later became World War I?'s top scoring ace.
A documented example of Boelcke 'securing advantages' took place on 17 September
1916. Boelcke and his pilots intercepted a flight of bombers and fighters cross
ing the lines. He chose not to attack right away, but had his plane climb higher
above the bombers, keeping themselves between the bombers and the sun. There th
ey circled and waited. When the bomber pilots, observers and fighter escort pilo
ts were preoccupied with the destruction they were causing on the ground, Boelck
e signaled for his pilots to attack. Several enemy aircraft went down and Jasta
2 lost no one.

2. Always continue with an attack you have begun
Rookie pilots would start a fight, but instinct (fear) would convince them to br
eak it off and run. This inevitably presented the rookie's tail to his opponent'
s guns, making the rookie an easy victory for his enemy. Boelcke learned that it
was far better to stay and continue mixing it up waiting for his opponent to ma
ke mistakes or flee than to break and run. To turn tail and run was to surrender
most, if not all, of the advantages a pilot might have had. As an example, when
Manfred von Richthofen met British ace Lance Hawker in November 1916, each pers
isted in trying to get on the other's tail. Both stuck to Boelcke's second dictu
m. When their endless circling had brought them down near the ground behind Germ
an lines, Hawker had to choose between landing and capture or fleeing. He chose
to flee. Richthofen was then able to get behind him and shoot him down.

3. Open fire only at close range, and then only when the opponent is squarely in
your sights
A common rookie's urge was to start blasting away upon sighting his first enemy
machine. Shots taken at ranges of 1000 m (3280 ft) stood little chance of hittin
g their mark. The rattle of machine gun fire would alert the intended target and
gave them time to react.
The machine guns available for aircraft during the First World War were not high
ly accurate at longer ranges. Add to that the difficulty of aiming from a moving
, bouncing gun platform at a fast moving target and it is a marvel that anyone e
ver hit anything. Boelcke preferred to fly to within 100 m (330 ft) or less befo
re firing, to ensure hitting what he aimed at with his opening burst. Once the r
attle of his guns was heard, the advantage of surprise was gone, so it was best
to make that first shot most effective.
Another aspect of making each shot count was the limited supply of ammunition ca
rried in World War I aircraft usually only a few hundred rounds. This could amou
nt to less than 60 seconds of sustained fire. Reloading in the air varied from d
angerous to impossible. Spraying the sky with lead in hopes of hitting something
, eventually, was not an option. Shots had to be chosen carefully. Early in the
war, when a sense of chivalry still held sway, some men allowed their opponents
to depart if they were out of ammunition or had jammed guns. Total War did not a
llow such courtesies to last for long.

4. You should always try to keep your eye on your opponent, and never let yourse
lf be deceived by ruses
The first part, 'keeping your eye on your opponent,' sounds obvious enough, but
it needed to be stated. In the hustle and bustle of an air fight it was easy to
lose sight of your adversary. A restatement of this rule might be: never assume
you know where your opponent is or will be. If a pilot 'lost' his foe, the advan
tage shifted to the foe. A successful pilot did not allow himself to be distract
ed from his opponent. As far as ruses go, it was not an uncommon practice for a
pilot to feign being hit, going into a supposedly uncontrolled spin or dive, in
order to exit a fight that was not going well. This practice traded on the chiva
lry of their opponents. To continue hammering a man who was already going down,
was thought unsportsmanlike. Boelcke recognized that too many enemies were being
allowed to escape and return to fight another day. War for national survival wa
s not sport. He taught against the accepted notion that once a machine began to
spin down, that one could move on. If it were a ruse, the enemy pilot would pull
out at the last moment and either escape or return to attack, perhaps now havin
g gained the advantage of surprise. Boelcke wanted his pupils to follow their op
ponent down, and make sure they were out of the fight or resume the fight if nec
essary.

5. In any type of attack, it is essential to assail your opponent from behind
Firing at a machine flying across one's path required 'leading' the shotaiming ah
ead of a moving target to compensate for its speed. While a few pilots were adep
t at the mental calculations necessary and good aerial marksmen, most were much
less adept. The velocity of a moving gun platform, the speed of bullets plus the
speed and direction of a moving target could be a lot to consider in the heat o
f battle. Furthermore, in deflection firing, the target could cross the stream o
f fire whose bullets were 50 m (165 ft) or more apart. Such crossing gave less e
xposure to the bullets.
Head-on attacks or head-to-tail attacks required little or no calculated deflect
ion in aim. A head-on attack, however, exposed one directly to the enemy's guns.
It was far safer and more effective to have one's target and bullet stream all
traveling in more or less the same direction. This required little or no 'leadin
g,' and exposed the target to a greater concentration of fire.
Because of the prevalence of attacks from the rear, aircraft design adapted to a
llow for rear firing guns in two-seaters and larger bombers.
6. If your opponent dives on you, do not try to get around his attack, but fly t
o meet it
This rule is related to dictum #5 above. The instinctive reaction of many rookie
s was to turn and flee from an approaching attackerespecially a diving one. This
simply presented their tail to the attacker, usually with disastrous results. Bo
elcke taught that a pilot had to conquer that instinct. Turning to face the atta
ck could force the attacker onto the defensive, or at least keep the situation u
nsettled, which was far better than presenting your tail. Even though climbing t
o meet an attack would reduce speed, it was better to try to bring one's own gun
s to bear than to flee, and approaching the enemy still increases the relative v
elocity between the two fighters and thus reduces the time during which the enem
y can fire. Furthermore, if both fighters miss, the diving attacker must now pul
l out of his dive, while the defender is now in position to circle around and co
unter-attack with his own dive.

7. When over the enemy's lines, always remember your own line of retreat
If a pilot chose to flee a superior force, or was coming down with a damaged mac
hine, it was critical to spend what little time he might have going in the right
direction. This rule sounds as though it is stating the obvious, but Boelcke fo
und it necessary to include it. More than a few pilots came down behind enemy li
nes because they got confused and lost their way. In World War I, aerial navigat
ion was done mostly by sight. Taking regular note of landmarks helped a pilot ge
t his bearings quickly, perhaps making the difference between safety and captivi
ty.

8. Tip for Squadrons: In principle, it is better to attack in groups of four or
six. Avoid two aircraft attacking the same opponent
In the first year or so of World War I, air combat was more of a one-on-one affa
ir. The early aces hunted the skies alone. As the war progressed, the sheer numb
er of machines in the sky increased. Several reconnaissance machines traveled to
gether for mutual protection, further protected by escorting fighters. Boelcke r
ecognized that the days of the lone hunter were over. Many young pilots, however
, still came to the front expecting to dash valiantly into battle as an errant k
night, alone, but in reality they would be quickly overwhelmed by multiple enemi
es. Boelcke tirelessly lectured his pupils on the need for teamworksometimes scol
ding them for acting too independently. Attacking in a group allowed the leader
to concentrate his attention exclusively on his target, while his wingmen protec
ted his tail.
Air battles later in the war could involve dozens of aircraft from each side at
the same time. The sky could become a swirling tangle of machines. When your sid
e was at a numerical disadvantage, it was especially important not to double up
on one opponent. The concentrated fire was of dubious value, since you were just
as likely to get in each other's way as to hit the enemy. Doubling up also left
an enemy machine somewhere unbothered and free to tail one of your side's machi
nes. Later in the war, teamwork became the primary key to success and survival.
Adolph Gysbert "Sailor" Malan
"TEN OF MY RULES FOR AIR FIGHTING"
Wait until you see the whites of his eyes. Fire short bursts of 1 to 2 seconds a
nd only when your sights are definitely 'ON'.
Whilst shooting think of nothing else, brace the whole of the body, have both ha
nds on the stick, concentrate on your ring sight.
Always keep a sharp lookout. "Keep your finger out!"
Height gives You the initiative.
Always turn and face the attack.
Make your decisions promptly. It is better to act quickly even though your tacti
cs are not the best.
Never fly straight and level for more than 30 seconds in the combat area.
When diving to attack always leave a proportion of your formation above to act a
s top guard.
INITIATIVE, AGGRESSION, AIR DISCIPLINE, and TEAM WORK are the words that MEAN so
mething in Air Fighting.
Go in quickly - Punch hard - Get out!
George S Patton:
I want you to remember that no bastard ever won a war by dying for his country.
He won it by making the other poor, dumb bastard die for his country.