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Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority

Contract No. OP3928068

Metro Transit !ecurity
"inal #eport
$ece%&er 23' 2008
Submitted by
Sid Heal
()ecuti*e O*er*ie+
This is the final report of an assessment of the LA Metros security function. It
identifies several concerns and describes the nature, context and circumstances in hich
they occur, as ell as recommended remedies. These include the folloin!"
The security function is bifurcated beteen the Los An!eles Sheriffs #epartment and
the LA Metro Security. $riction occurs because there is no clear delineation of the
roles and responsibilities for the to a!encies to or% to!ether and some assi!nments
performed by the LA Metro Security may re&uire police action but LA Metro Security
!uards are ithout peace officer poers.
'ffectual mana!ement of any function or a!ency re&uires reliable and timely
information. The report describes the current (push) system for distributin!
information and recommends au!mentin! existin! procedures ith a (pull) system to
!ain a better perspective and broader scope of the factors and influences in play. In
particular, it recommends the establishment of an extranet focused specifically on
security issues to ensure that all efforts are focused on critical ob*ectives and to avoid
duplication of effort and interference.
The fare evasion issue is critical for both the security and the financial ellbein! of
the LA Metro. It is ell established that the li%elihood of a person avoidin! payin! a
fare is directly related to the li%elihood of their bein! as%ed for proof of purchase.
+ecommendations are provided for ho this information is captured, compared and
,raffiti abatement is an oft cited source of irritation for transit conveyances and
facilities. +ecommendations are provided for ho !raffiti incidents are measured and
,eneral coordination of the LA Metro transit security function is a dynamic and
hi!hly complex responsibility. Moreover, as a result of the ,lobal -ar on Terrorism,
protection of this system has ta%en on increasin! importance. In order to enhance
cooperation, collaboration and provide the necessary direction and !uidance, re!ular
meetin!s are recommended for both those at the mana!ement and executive level as
ell as the operators.
The survey revealed some issues that ill need to be *ointly addressed by the LAS#
and the LA Metro Security to alleviate tension and facilitate collaboration. These
include identifyin! an efficient ay of capturin!, storin!, retrievin!, distributin! and
reportin! data used by both the LAS# and the LA Metro. identifyin! (points of
contact) for &uic% clarification and/or supplementation. institutin! security measures
to protect sensitive information ithout hinderin! authori0ed persons from accessin!
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it. authorin! a comprehensive, ritten strate!y to provide the essential focus to ensure
best practices and effective mana!ement for both the LAS# and the LA Metro
!tu,y O&-ecti*e an, Metho,ology
1n September 2, 3442, I a!reed to conduct an assessment on operations security
covera!e strate!ies for Metros rail stations, vehicles, and related facilities based upon
LA Metro vandalism reports, operatin! seep needs, monthly reports and overall security
concerns. In particular, I as as%ed to provide a list of essential data to assess and
appropriately utili0e la enforcement resources in support of security operations, a list of
necessary tools to effectively and efficiently inte!rate and mana!e la enforcement
resources in a comprehensive security effort, and ma%e recommendations as to ho to
best exploit the %noled!e, s%ills and abilities of Los An!eles Sheriffs deputies assi!ned
to policin! the LA Metro.
The pro*ect as divided into three efforts. The first focused on rail operations and
included !uided tours, meetin!s ith sub*ect matter experts, and familiari0ation ith
security related issues. To supplement the formal intervies and meetin!s, I also
travelled each of the rail lines at all times of day and ni!ht, ee%days, ee%ends and
holidays, as ell as intervieed deputies, services assistants, security !uards and fello
passen!ers. To !ain a ider perspective, I also travelled to and conducted similar fact6
findin! and familiari0ation on both the transit systems in St. Louis, Missouri and San
#ie!o, 7alifornia. The second effort as focused on bus operations in the same manner
as those involvin! trains. The final effort as focused on !atherin!, examinin!,
reviein! and comparin! the various data compiled by both LAS# and LA Metro.
.i/urcate, !ecurity "unction
It has lon! been established that efficiency and control are enhanced by !roupin!
or%ers accordin! to shared characteristics. This so called (division of labor) is a
concept that dates bac% to anti&uity and is in common use in all lar!e modern
or!ani0ations today. ,enerally, or!ani0ations are divided alon! the natural (seams) by
!roupin! accordin! to time, area, purpose, process or clientele. 7onse&uently, the
separation of the LA Metro security function by bus and rail operations 8process9 and
service sectors 8area9 are lo!ical divisions. The responsibility for other security functions
is shared beteen the LAS#s Transit Services :ureau and the LA Metros Security.

Since each or!ani0ation has different resources, capabilities, perspectives and priorities,
friction is inevitable. -ith no exceptions, shared responsibility means that no one is
Scope of -or% from 7ontract 07ontractor shall provide Metro ith operations security covera!e
strate!ies for Metros rail stations, vehicles, and related facilities based upon available Metro vandalism
reports, operatin! seep needs, monthly reports, and overall security concerns. $rom this data 7ontractor
shall provide security covera!e schedules to maximi0e safety of Metro and provide strate!ic paths forard
to ma%in! Metro a safer and more secure operation. The scope of or% shall include a revie of existin!
data, meetin!s ith staff, tour of the lines and select facilities folloed by a report hi!hli!htin! Metros
exposures and schedules to fill them. 1ther duties may be assi!ned based upon outcome of initial efforts.
Some of the more conspicuous are those re!ardin! (&uality of life) issues, especially minor infractions or
LA Metro policy enforcement.
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This is particularly troublesome hen the a!encies have competin! interests. $or
example, universally, members of the Los An!eles Sheriffs #epartments Transit
Services :ureau expressed that their focus of effort is on preventin! crimes, arrestin!
criminals and preventin! acts of terrorism, especially eapons of mass destruction. 1n
the other hand, members of the LA Metro Security emphasi0ed enforcement of policy
violations and (&uality of life) issues, such as suppressin! !raffiti, preventin! vandalism,
disorderly conduct, public drun%enness and other types of unruly conduct. The different
perspectives understandably result in disparate priorities and dis*ointed deployment
strate!ies. -ithout the hi!hest de!ree of cooperation and collaboration, many tas%s
become competin! activities in that the efforts to resolve a problem by one a!ency
exacerbates the efforts of the other in handlin! a different problem or even the same
problem usin! different methods.
The problem appears to stem from to underlyin! problems. The first is that there is
no clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for the to a!encies to or% to!ether.
This results in each or!ani0ation attemptin! to deal ith problems in their on ays and
ithout re!ard for the other. #urin! this survey members of both a!encies ere &uic% to
describe numerous instances in hich one a!ency conducted operations or responded to
an incident but that the other as unaare. This has resulted in duplication of effort,
uncoordinated deployments and lac% of accountability. #isputes as to ho as actually
in char!e, ho should have responded, ho should have been notified, hen notifications
ere actually provided, ad infinitum, usually folloed in the form of email exchan!es
durin! the inevitable in&uiries. 'ven minor incidents become contentious as they
continually repeat themselves. At a minimum, this state of affairs results in confusion but
orse case scenarios are not difficult to ima!ine.
The second problem is that both the LAS# and the LA Metro Security are !iven
assi!nments that may re&uire police action but ith different levels of police poers.
This occurs because members of the LAS# en*oy the ri!hts and privile!es of peace
officer status, to include immunity from civil liability in some cases, hile members of
LA Metro Security are limited to those ri!hts provided to private persons yet both share
responsibility for security functions. -hen confrontations escalate into altercations,
deputies actin! in their capacity as peace officers en*oy substantially more protection
under state statutes than do security !uards.
Accordin!ly, both the LAS# and the
LA Metro vicariously en*oy the same protections. $urthermore, issuin! a citation
re&uires statute authority and so some assi!nments, li%e citin! for violations of fare
evasion and other transit related crimes, are limited to those vested.
The current situation ill not be resolved by mandate because both a!encies are
completely autonomous ith separate chains of command and report to no common
senior. Moreover, each vies the roles and responsibilities they currently perform as
both lo!ical and le!itimate. The friction occurs because many of the individual
assi!nments are shared. 1ne of the most commonly cited examples is in maintainin! a
hi!hly visible uniform presence to deter misconduct. The LA Metro Security posits that
they can do the *ob far cheaper than the more hi!hly paid deputies, but hen
interventions are necessary they are not permitted to rite citations and are limited to the
The 7alifornia 7odes, especially the <enal 7ode, provide numerous civil exemptions for honest mista%es
made by peace officers and citi0ens have a duty not to resist a peace officer. Moreover, suspects ho do
resist, delay or obstruct a peace officer face additional, usually more severe, char!es and penalties. See
Appendix A=Las protectin! peace officers
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authority of a private person for detentions and arrests. #eputies, on the other hand, are
authori0ed by 7alifornia state la to rite citations, lafully detain suspicious persons
and arrest hen necessary. $urthermore, a suspect ho resists, delays or obstructs a
deputy can not only be char!ed ith additional crimes, but their peace officer status
provides protections not afforded to LA Metro Security. Thus, to a!encies providin!
the same service but ith different levels of authority and little or no cooperation send an
implicit messa!e of hierarchy and subordination.
-hile parity is not completely possible, provisions of 7alifornia la can provide
LA Metro Security !uards ith additional authority, includin! an ability to rite citations
and ma%e arrests, by either concludin! a memorandum of understandin! ith the Los
An!eles Sheriffs #epartment
or by an authori0in! ordinance.
In addition, they ould
also be endoed ith some of the statute immunities provided to peace officers.
@evertheless, even after the poer disparity issues are resolved the ma*or source of
friction remains. this bein! the shared responsibility for the same tas%s and assi!nments.
Many transit systems successfully inte!rate both la enforcement officers and
security !uards into the security function and to ere examined in detail durin! this
survey. The distin!uishin! characteristic for the success en*oyed by both the Saint Louis
+e!ional Transit System and the San #ie!o Metropolitan Transit System is that both have
clearly identified roles and responsibilities for both contract la enforcement and
security. 'ach discipline performs ithin the limitations a!reed upon and collaborates to
reinforce rather than compete ith the other. The security function is enhanced in both
efficiency and effectiveness by utili0in! less expensive security for saturation and
enforcement of &uality of life issues
hile la enforcement remains focused on
prevention and detection of more serious crimes, as ell as conductin! investi!ations. It
ould seem sensible that LA Metro emulate this successful strate!y. :ecause of the
situation has become so contentious, it ould also seem *udicious to formali0e the
understandin! in a letter of a!reement si!ned by both a!encies.
1sing 2n/or%ation
$or better or orse, effectual mana!ement decisions rely heavily on the &uality of
information from hich they are derived. In order for information to have value it must
be ob*ective, thorou!h, accurate, timely, relevant and in a usable format. The nature of
the LA Metro security function re&uires that data from both the LA Metro and the LAS#
are necessary for measurin! effectiveness and efficiency, identifyin! trends and
anomalies, estimatin! capabilities and intentions, and forecastin! all manner of factors
that ill influence safe, effective and efficient transit security operations.
The to periodic reports are the Monthly Mana!ement +eport and the -ee%ly
Activity +eport, both !enerated by the LAS# for use by the LA Metro. The Monthly
Mana!ement +eport describes the la enforcement efforts for the reportin! period, to
include the numbers and types of incidents on li!ht rail, heavy rail and buses, as ell as
comparisons ith the previous month by use of ;# bar charts and pie charts. 1ther
See Appendix :, <enal 7ode C2;4.B
See Appendix :, <enal 7ode C2;A.?
Includin! fare evasion. See Appendix :, <enal 7ode CA>4
It should be noted that the be!innin! of such an effort is currently underay ith both LAS#/TS: and
LA Metro Security developin! a (responsibility matrix) of the various critical security assi!nments and
attemptin! to a!ree upon hich a!ency should accept primary responsibility for accomplishin! them.
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factors, such as the response times, crime reports, arrests, and so forth, are provided in
table format.
-hile the information provided is certainly essential, it leaves much to be desired in
providin! any real understandin! of hat is !oin! on, hat is upcomin!, or any method
of identifyin! trends and anomalies over time. $urthermore, the reports present only the
perspective of the LAS#. This is troublesome because the security function is shared
beteen the LAS# and the LA Metro. :y providin! only one perspective mana!ers and
executives from either a!ency are unable to identify areas here collaboration may be
necessary or is even already occurrin!. Moreover, there is a conspicuous lac% of futures
forecastin!, hich could identify events, factors and influences that ill affect everythin!
from deployments to concentrations of effort. 'ven more important, hoever, is a lac% of
comparisons beteen the various factors and influences affectin! problems over time.

The current (snapshot) method of reportin! is inade&uate in ma%in! trends and anomalies
!haring 2n/or%ation
The predominate method of sharin! information beteen the LAS#/TS: and Metro
security employs a (push) strate!y, most commonly in the form of periodic reports and
email. <ush strate!ies have the advanta!e of forcin! information upon a recipient and are
often used hen critical information is re&uired for coordinatin! and re!ulatin! activities
of subordinates. The principal disadvanta!e of push strate!ies, hoever, is that the
propa!ator is solely responsible for hat is sent. +ecipients cannot be held responsible
for hat they do not %no. The periodic reports focused on security
are either in the
form of a (Monthly Mana!ement +eport) or a (-ee%ly Activity +eport.) :oth describe
hat has occurred durin! the reportin! period and are devoid of any future oriented
factors that could affect security. 'ven orse, hether by intent or accident, a number of
events have occurred ithout any coordination or even notification of one or the other
a!encies. This has re&uired speculations, assumptions, suppositions and outri!ht
!uessin!. It is also a continuin! source of friction beteen the a!encies as they each
independently attempt to provide &uality service but ithout conspicuous collaboration.
Successful collaborative efforts re&uire free and continuous exchan!e of information.
1ne of the most successful strate!ies incorporates a (pull) system to offset the
disadvanta!es of the push system previously described. <ull strate!ies utili0e an
(information repository) to allo members to inform themselves. The push system is
still used to ensure that all concerned parties are advised of crucial information but the
information repository enables everyone to enhance their understandin! and broaden their
perspective ith other related information. :ecause the information repository is
available at all times, pull systems also en*oy an advanta!e of enablin! members to
inform themselves ithout the delay of aaitin! a scheduled report. 1ne additional
advanta!e is that the responsibility for bein! informed lies ith all members. As lon! as
the information is available in a timely manner accusations of not bein! notified are
invalid since everyone ith access is e&ually responsible for informin! themselves.
1f note, the current reportin! format for the Monthly Mana!ement +eport can be traced bac% at least five
years but as late as #ecember 3443 some of the data as provided in the form of line !raphs and covered a
calendar year. Moreover, an executive summary as included that identified and explained si!nificant
trends, anomalies and percenta!es.
-hile other periodic reports are used, they are focused on other sub*ects, most notably billin! issues.
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It ould seem to be in the best interests of both the LAS#/TS: and Metro security to
develop, install and maintain a system that ould provide members of both a!encies ith
the most current and comprehensive information possible in a format immediately usable
by both. Many or!ani0ations have developed these systems by usin! an (extranet.) In
the simplest terms, an extranet may be thou!ht of as a ebsite for the exchan!e of
information that is limited to authori0ed parties from more than one a!ency. It differs
from an intranet only in that members of other or!ani0ations are alloed access.
-hile the actual content and display of critical information are best left to those ho
ould actually use it, the folloin! are examples of information that has proved
beneficial durin! this security revie.
Organizational Information=or!ani0ational information is that used to describe the
various a!encies involved in the Metro security function. In particular, this
information should precisely identify and clearly convey the roles and responsibilities
for each a!ency, as ell as provide current tables of or!ani0ation for each a!ency.
Additionally, emer!ency contact information for critical personnel from each a!ency
ould expedite notifications and briefin!s.
In-Service Sheets=provides mana!ers an instant snapshot as to ho is on duty, their
individual assi!nments and here they are or%in!. Additionally, In6Service Sheets
identify those ith special s%ills and e&uipment, their reportin! supervisor and shift
hours. Supervisor to subordinate ratios can also be ascertained as ell as personnel
or%in! overtime.
Assi!nments can be hyperlin%ed to detailed descriptions of
tas%s, responsibilities and (:1L1s,)
to provide a capability for nely assi!ned and
reportin! personnel to (self6brief.)
Comparative Information= hile tables and matrices !enerally provide a !reater
volume and more precise vie of information, comparisons are more difficult. A far
better method for identifyin! trends and anomalies is by the use of comparative
!raphs and charts. The use of !raphs, charts, and dia!rams to &uic%ly estimate the
effectiveness and efficiency of deployment plans, various methods
, special
operations and even specific individuals on reducin! or resolvin! the adverse impacts
of chronic problems li%e fare evasion, !raffiti, disorderly conduct, etc., as ell as an
ability to compare data over time, ould facilitate understandin! by planners and
decision ma%ers for both a!encies.
Future vents=future events provide mana!ement an ability to plan for deployment
ad*ustments and can often be reliably forecast ee%s and even months into the future.
'xamples include holidays, ma*or sportin! events, political rallies, festivals, cultural
!atherin!s, and so forth. 'vents such as these can be expected to have a sur!e of
Supervisor to subordinate ratios ere often cited as areas of concern durin! the security revie.
:1L1 is police *ar!on. It is actually an acronym for (:e 1n Loo% 1ut) and refers to thin!s and people
to hich security personnel should be especially attentive.
1ne of the (sore spots) expressed by LA Metro executives is the number of LAS# deputies assi!ned to
other LAS# units routinely or%in! overtime assi!nments to au!ment staffin! needs. Identifyin!
personnel not normally assi!ned to LA Metro ill provide an immediate assessment of capabilities and
expectations by LA Metro mana!ers.
As *ust one example, the efficacy of various methods for deterrin! fare evasions, such as arrests vs.
arnin!s, visible deterrence vs. undercover operations and random chec%s vs. systematic saturation chec%s,
have all reported varyin! de!rees of success at some point, but none appear to offer a consistently reliable
solution and are routinely alternated ith one another.
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passen!ers in particular locations and an ability to anticipate and plan for them is of
!reat benefit to efficient deployment strate!ies. 7onversely, maintenance, repairs and
up!rades may delay or interrupt services.
"a# $ata=all of the data used for current reports are captured electronically. Storin!
the data here it can be accessed for revie, examination, and comparison by
members of both a!encies provides an ability for all concerned to harvest meanin!
from ra data. This capability is commonly used by academia for vettin!
information by encoura!in! peer revie. Additionally, it encoura!es members of
both or!ani0ations to explore the data for more insi!ht.
%rchival information=an ability to access archival information, such as periodic
reports, !raphs, charts, studies, historical data, and the li%e, enables interested parties
to identify lon!6term trends and compare current operations and events ith previous
ones. $urther, more reliable forecasts and pro*ections can be ascertained by notin!
hat has happened in past instances and estimatin! probabilities and ran!es for future
ones. 1nce information is captured and stored electronically the effort to ma%e
historical data available is exceedin!ly minimal.
&riefing area=this area ould provide authori0ed persons assi!ned to the various
security functions an ability to (self6brief.) In the same manner that representatives
from each a!ency ould be able to pull information for plannin! and decision ma%in!
from a central repository, individuals ould also benefit. The functional e&uivalent
of a la enforcement (briefin! board,)
this area could provide information on
anted persons, suspicious activities, persons of interest, ha0ards, and other
noteorthy events. :y !roupin! the information by time and location, supervisors
and individuals ould be able to au!ment their on %noled!e and conduct (self6
patrol. Additionally, by providin! a search en!ine focused specifically on
this site, follo6on investi!ations ould be possible.
'ournal=many problems are chronic and re&uire persistence and continual
adaptation to ade&uately address. These prolon!ed problems tend to be especially
frustratin! and continual sources of irritation. -hen more than one a!ency is
simultaneously attemptin! to resolve such a problem, or hen coordination is
necessary to avoid conflict, alle!ations of interference, *ustified or not, are difficult to
refute. Moreover, it is difficult to !ain insi!ht on hat has failed or or%ed in the
past. 1ther professions, ran!in! from medicine to the military, use *ournals
dealin! ith such problems. It ould seem beneficial that information captured and
provided in such a manner ould benefit all concerned and encoura!e collaboration
and cooperation hile discoura!in! duplication of efforts and unsuccessful courses of
-hile either the LAS# or LA Metro could develop and install such an extranet, the
routine maintenance for updatin! and appendin! data and comments should be the
responsibility of the (issue oner.) The a!ency 8person9 responsible for fare evasions or
A (briefin! board) ta%es its name from the clipboards or to6hole binder boards la enforcement
a!encies have used for decades to centrally locate information necessary to inform officers or%in!
different shifts, different !eo!raphical locations and different assi!nments.
(#irected patrol,) as opposed to (random patrol) is a term used to describe deployments based upon
crime analysis. +elyin! on an analysis of criminal activity police officers may be assi!ned to specifically
focus on !eo!raphical areas, tar!et !an!s, or even specific individuals.
Sometimes called an (operations lo!) for tactical operations or a (unit diary) for military a!encies.
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!raffiti, for example, ould be responsible for maintainin! the specific pa!e8s9 dealin!
ith that particular area. This method ould !reatly minimi0e the burden for ensurin!
the data is current and accurate since these issue oners are not only the ones ho are
most familiar ith the data but are ultimately also the beneficiaries. This decentrali0ed
approach ill (spread load) the tedious and time6consumin! burden of !atherin! and
inputtin! data and allo the a!ency hostin! the extranet to focus on critical control
issues, such as access, security, reliability, and so forth.
"are (*asion
$are evasions are an understandably critical component of security because they
directly affect the fundin! necessary to recoup expenses. LA Metro uses a (proof of
purchase) method in hich a passen!er is re&uired to sho a valid tic%et hen as%ed by
a fare inspector. Enderstandably, every bus passen!er is inspected upon boardin! but rail
passen!ers are inspected randomly by LAS# Security Assistants. #ependin! on the day
of the ee% and the time of the day, fare evasions have been reported as lo as ?F and as
hi!h as 54F.
$are evasion chec%s, arnin!s and citations are reported to Metro by the
LAS# in each Monthly Mana!ement +eport. These reports cover the previous month
and provide data in both table format and to pie charts. -hile tables provide a !reater
volume and more precise method of presentin! data, they are notably poor for
comparisons. <ie charts are excellent for comparin! values ithin a sample and shoin!
proportions but those provided in the Monthly Mana!ement +eports compare only the
numbers of fare chec%s and citations beteen the various rail lines for the reportin!
period. The value of such comparisons is dubious, and even more so because only the
ra scores are presented re&uirin! planners and decision ma%ers to compute percenta!es
for comparison ith other reportin! periods.
8See $i!ure 59
"igure 3"are (n/orce%ent Pie Charts /ro% Monthly Manage%ent #eport' August 2008
The fare evasion rate is computed by dividin! the number of persons identified
ithout acceptable proof of purchase by the total number of passen!ers boarded and
expressin! the result as a percenta!e. 1ne of the most useful metrics for identifyin!
trends and anomalies ith proof of purchase tic%etin! is the (saturation rate.) The
saturation rate is computed by dividin! the total number of persons as%ed to produce
proof of purchase by the number of passen!ers boarded and expressin! the result as a
LA Metro $are 'vasion Assessment presentation to the Metro :oard, 1ctober 3?, 344B, prepared by
Transportation Mana!ement G #esi!n, Inc.
7ompoundin! the problem is that the Monthly Mana!ement +eports are provided in <#$ format hich
necessitates retypin! the values into a spreadsheet rather than (cuttin! and pastin!) from a table.
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percenta!e. -hile conductin! fact6findin! and familiari0ation ith rail operations at
both the transit systems in St. Louis, M1 and San #ie!o, both reported that the !reatest
factor in reducin! fare evaders as the li%elihood of bein! chec%ed and fined if a
passen!er as unable to produce a valid tic%et. San #ie!o reported that their fare
evasion rate as less than 3F hen about ;4F of the passen!ers ere chec%ed
and St.
Louis reported that they chec% nearly every passen!er on rail and buses resultin! in a less
than 5F fare evasion rate over all.

In determinin! both the fare evasion and saturation rates for the LA Metro, the
number of passen!ers boarded each month as captured and available from the
LA Metro.
The number of persons chec%ed and those arned or cited for violations
as obtained from the Monthly Mana!ement +eports provided by the LAS#. +ather
than duplicate the methodolo!y previously described, a line chart as used to identify all
the factors over one years time. Additionally, a trend line 8line of best fit9 as
incorporated to identify the !eneral course of the data for passen!er boardin!s and the
number of persons chec%ed. 8See $i!ure 39
This method provides a number of advanta!es over the current methods. $or
example, the increase in passen!er boardin!s can be readily discerned ith both the
actual monthly totals alon! ith the !eneral trend. Li%eise, the decrease in the
saturation rate is !raphically displayed alon! ith the actual numbers of passen!ers
chec%ed and the saturation rate expressed as a percenta!e. $urthermore, the comparison
beteen the to variables is conspicuous and far more understandable than tables or pie
charts. Li%eise, the fare evasion rate is also included and expressed as a percenta!e
alon! the bottom of the chart. This format not only provides more information but better
comprehension of the impact of these influences on each other. 1f note, is that the
saturation rate has decreased nearly five6fold in the year examined resultin! in a nearly
four6fold increase of the fare evasion rate. 'ven so, the hi!hest saturation rate is less than
that reported by the Transportation Mana!ement G #esi!n assessment.
<resentation by :ill :ur%e, 7hief, Transit Systems Security #epartment, San #ie!o Metropolitan Transit
System, 1ctober 3D, 3442
Intervie ith Tony +ice, Supervisor, Security G $are 'nforcement St. Louis, Missouri, Metro System,
September 3?, 3442
:ruce Shelburne, LA Metro +ail #ivision Transportation Mana!er
As reported 1ctober 3?, 344B in *% +etro Fare vasion %ssessment, Transportation Mana!ement G
#esi!n, Inc.
Page ,
"igure 233"are e*asion /actors an, in/luences co%pare, o*er ti%e
It ould seem prudent to chan!e the reportin! format from the current tables and pie
charts to one that ill more readily provide planners and decision ma%ers an ability to
&uic%ly compare influences and factors ith one another and over time. Additionally, by
providin! the data and charts in an editable format
factors and influences obscured over
time could also be examined more closely. $or example, simply chan!in! the H6Axis
8ordinate9 hi!hli!hts the saturation rate revealin! the noted decline even more clearly.
8See $i!ure ;9 It ould also seem beneficial to examine comparative data over shorter
periods of time, perhaps &uarterly, to more &uic%ly identify and attenuate adverse
#ata is currently provided in either hard6copy or <#$ format, neither of hich readily lends itself to
further exploration.
Page 1-
"igure 3 4!a%e ,ata as "igure 2 &ut a ,i//erent scale re*eals e*en %ore clearly the ,ecline o/ the saturation rate
an, resulting e//ect on the /are e*asion rate
5ra//iti A&ate%ent
1ne of the most often cited sources of irritation for both bus and rail operations is the
disfi!uration of LA Metro e&uipment ith !raffiti. In some areas of the 7ounty, !raffiti
is a bli!ht that has resulted in the defacin! of nearly every ob*ect capable of bein! ritten
or painted upon and LA Metro buses, trains and e&uipment have not been spared. The
primary responsibility for preventin! and investi!atin! incidents of !raffiti falls upon the
Los An!eles Sheriffs #epartment and they report their efforts each month in the Monthly
Mana!ement +eport. That said, !raffiti, per se, is not sin!led out but rather included in
all types of vandalism.
7onse&uently, it is impossible to compare *ust !raffiti incidents,
albeit !raffiti comprises the vast ma*ority of vandalism reports and so they provide some
predictive value. :oth the number of reports ta%en and the arrests made are provided in
table format and ith to bar !raphs that compare the reportin! period ith the previous
month. Additionally, comparisons are provided beteen buses and the various rail lines.
That said, only data from the previous month is available for comparison ith the
reportin! month. 8See $i!ure >9
All !raffiti is vandalism but not all vandalism is !raffiti. Iandalism, by definition, includes all types of
illful and malicious dama!e or destruction of property.
Page 11
"igure 637an,alis% reporting /ro% Monthly Manage%ent #eport' Octo&er 2008
LA Metro also captures and reports data related to dama!e from !raffiti. 1ne report,
the (Iandalism G ,raffiti +eport,)
trac%s the amount of money spent by Metro on
repairin! dama!e resultin! from !raffiti but because the amount spent is an arbitrary
decision based upon economic concerns rather than the amount of dama!e or the number
of incidents actually incurred it provides no probative value in determinin! effectiveness
of efforts to reduce it. The other report, (+ail $acilities ,raffiti Incidents G 7ost)
simply a spreadsheet that trac%s the number of incidents recorded by LA Metro
maintenance personnel hen removin! and/or repairin! !raffiti dama!e.
@otithstandin! a lac% of formality inherent in more formal reports, the spreadsheet not
only captures the number of !raffiti incidents noted by maintenance personnel each time
they clean a railay carria!e but is reported monthly. $urthermore, the data is available
bac% to January of 3445. These values appear to be a useful measurement for accurately
identifyin! the number of (ta!s)
per month. :ecause a sin!le (ta!!er) is often
responsible for multiple (ta!s,) hoever, it lac%s an ability to be more precise.
<repared by ,eor!e Kennedy, #irector, +ail Iehicle Ac&uisition G Maintenance 1perations
<repared by +andolph ,ordy, #irector, +ail $acilities and 7ustodial Services
Page 12
Thus, the LAS# uses the number of vandalism reports to measure the amount of
!raffiti, hile the LA Metro uses the number of actual (ta!s.) In comparin! the to
measurements, the mean avera!e ta!s recorded in the past year
by LA Metro as
55,45A per month, hile LAS# too% an avera!e of only 5? reports per month for the
same period. @either fi!ure is holly representative, hoever, since a sin!le vandal ill
often ta! a number of items in a sin!le incident and a sin!le report often covers multiple
incidents resultin! from a sin!le vandal. :oth fi!ures have value, hoever, in that the
number of reports used by the LAS# is more closely ali!ned ith the number of
incidents resultin! in dama!e. The fi!ures captured by the LA Metro maintenance cre,
on the other hand, capture the amount of dama!e.
An additional problem ith trac%in! !raffiti is the nature of the transit system, since
the buses and trains that are bein! ta!!ed are in near constant motion. @otithstandin!,
even a %noled!e of hich particular lines 8and hen9 are sufferin! the most provides an
ability to redistribute forces and craft intervention strate!ies specifically focusin! on the
current problem.
The most noteorthy shortcomin! in the reportin! format, hoever, is the inability to
identify trends and anomalies over time. Trends and anomalies are most conspicuous in
line !raphs, not tables. In plottin! the number of vandalism reports ta%en by the LAS#
and chartin! the results in a smoothed line !raph over the past 53 months it appears clear
that the preponderance of incidents occurred on all four rail lines durin! the months of
May and June 3442. $urthermore, a third of all !raffiti reports ta%en for the entire year
on the ,reen Line occurred durin! the sin!le month of May 3442. 8See $i!ure ?9 -hen
trends li%e these can be &uic%ly and intuitively identified efforts to intervene can be more
precise and prompt. 'ven ithout additional analysis, perceptive intervention and
deployment strate!ies can be formulated. The more this type of information is shared the
more li%ely that adverse conse&uences can be attenuated or avoided alto!ether.
A (ta!) is a term used to describe a personal identifier, such as the name of an individual or !an!, a
moni%er or representative icon, ritten, scratched, painted or dran as !raffiti.
@ovember 344B throu!h the end of 1ctober 3442
1f note is that the data captured by the LA Metro maintenance personnel 8number of ta!s9 varied less
than 5F throu!hout the same time period.
Page 13

"igure 835ra//iti reports ta9en &y LA!$ ,eputies o*er the past 2 %onths
5eneral Coor,ination o/ the LA Metro Transit !ecurity "unction
-hile the security for air transportation has been !iven !reat attention, urban
transport systems carry more people. 7onsiderin! the critical impact these systems have
on an economy coupled ith the hi!h numbers of passen!ers and comparatively lesser
than air transport they ma%e ideal tar!ets for terrorists. 'ven before the attac%s
on the Enited States on September 55, 3445, security of domestic transit systems had
ta%en on unprecedented importance and become increasin!ly difficult. Successful attac%s
on transit rail systems in To%yo, Japan in 5DD> and 5DD?. <aris, $rance in 5DD?. Madrid,
Spain in 344>. London, 'n!land in 344?. and the nearly continual bombin!s of buses in
Israel and Sri Lan%a are poi!nant reminders that public transit offers an ideal tar!et for
The fact that most of the attac%s have occurred on the lar!est systems in the
lar!est cities should be a lesson that does not !o unheeded in Los An!eles here nearly a
&uarter of a million ride the trains and more than one million ride the buses each day.
It has been reported as recently as last year that for every LD spent per passen!er for air security only 5
is spent on rail security. $ran% J. 7illuffo and Laura <. Keith, (Transit Security +e&uires 7haotic
Approach, .S% /o$a0, March 5, 344B, A5;
It should also be noted that in 344A the $:I reported that the @e Hor% Transit System had been tar!eted
for an attac% by terrorists
Page 14
The LA Metro is not only lar!e but complex and dynamic and the need to seamlessly
inte!rate those responsibilities hich are clearly la enforcement in nature ith those
that are better left to security ill not be easily resolved. #evelopin! and implementin!
effective strate!ies and best practices, estimatin! the impact of trends and anomalies. and
preparin! and plannin! for forecasted events and influences re&uires continual attention
and cooperation. @o reportin! system, no matter ho efficient or elaborate, can replace
the insi!ht and comprehension !ained by face to face meetin!s. Accordin!ly, re!ular
meetin!s focused on security issues should be considered essential. Most critical are
those at the mana!ement/executive level for all concerned parties on at least a &uarterly
basis. :esides providin! a much needed focus of effort, these meetin!s could do much to
obviate much of the discord resultin! from miscommunications, mischaracteri0ations and
misunderstandin!s beteen the LAS# and the LA Metro Security. Similarly, more
fre&uent meetin!s at the operator level ould provide an open forum for exchan!in!
information on effective tactics, techni&ues and procedures, as ell as be!in to build the
camaraderie necessary for collaboration.
Ne)t !teps
This survey has been a necessary first6step to identify useful metrics to !ain insi!ht
and understandin! in the measurement of effectiveness and efficiency of the La Metro
security function. Additionally, issues ere identified that need to be addressed to ensure
the best possible services. -hile the recommendations contained in this report ill serve
to provide direction they stop short of providin! meanin!ful solutions. The folloin! are
some of the more conspicuous follo6on re&uirements.
Spreadsheets need to be developed to store data and calculate comparisons. This is
especially important because the LA Metro uses Microsoft 'xcel hile the LAS# uses
7orel Muattro <ro. 'ven hen the information is provided electronically the disparate
applications ill only perpetuate the same problems currently bein! experienced.
necessity, a bilateral a!reement must be reached re!ardin! those issues preventin! full
use of the data and a comprehensive understandin! of hat it reveals.
#ata ill only be valuable if it is reliable and timely. 'very piece of data provides a
somehat different aspect on the overall picture and some data ill undoubtedly re&uire
follo6up for clarification or supplementation or even corrections of mista%es. To
facilitate these processes a (point of contact) needs to be identified for the person8s9
responsible for capturin!, storin! and maintainin! the data.
Some of the information that both the LAS# and the LA Metro need to best mana!e
security issues and exploit opportunities ithout duplicatin! effort or accidentally
interfere ith the efforts of the other is hi!hly sensitive and ould compromise security if
it ere revealed to unauthori0ed parties. Accordin!ly, ho and here the information is
stored, ho is authori0ed to vie and edit it, ho it is to be distributed, and other
&uestions remains to be resolved.
The security function cannot be holly provided by either the LAS# or both the LA
Metro Security but rather re&uires a holistic approach encompassin! all available
resources and personnel, includin! passen!ers and employees not specifically assi!ned to
security. Accordin!ly, a ritten, comprehensive strate!y for the LA Metro security
:esides the selection of the softare for storin! and analy0in! the data, specific spreadsheets and/or
databases can be developed to facilitate the input and maintenance of data ithout necessitatin! the more
extensive %noled!e necessary to create them.
Page 15
function ould serve to provide the essential focus to sharpen the efforts of both
a!encies, avoid confliction, establish accountability and enhance cooperation. Such a
strate!y ould necessarily re&uire a *oint effort and include identification of roles and
responsibilities, adoption of *oint policies and procedures, and establish benchmar%s and
measures of effectiveness. 1f all the challen!es that face contemporary mass transit, a
failure of security ill have the most immediate and catastrophic conse&uences. In the
ords of one international expert ith painful experience, 12ou can have the cleanest
trains in the #orl$3 0ou can have the most luminous trains in the #orl$3 an$ 0ou can
have the most comforta4le trains in the #orl$3 an$ 0ou can have the most punctual trains
in the #orl$5 &ut #hen 0ou go in a train an$ $o not feel safe 0ou are not going to use that
Manuel +odri!ue0 Simons, #irector of Security and 7ivil <rotection, +ed @acional de los $errocarriles
'spaNoles, Madrid, as &uoted in (+ail Transit Security in an International 7ontext,) Security Issues and
Impacts 7onference, E7LA, June 5, 344A
Page 1!
APP(N$2: A0La+s protecting peace o//icers
/he follo#ing are e7amples of la#s 8California Penal Co$e sections9 specificall0 protecting
peace officers in the scope of their $uties5
Penal Co,e ;838a. Any peace officer ho has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a public offense may use reasonable force to effect the arrest, to prevent
escape or to overcome resistance. A peace officer ho ma%es or attempts to ma%e an arrest need
not retreat or desist from his efforts by reason of the resistance or threatened resistance of the
person bein! arrested. nor shall such officer be deemed an a!!ressor or lose his ri!ht to self6
defense by the use of reasonable force to effect the arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome
Penal Co,e ;836.8 8a9 A public officer or employee, hen authori0ed by ordinance, may arrest a
person ithout a arrant henever the officer or employee has reasonable cause to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer or
employee that is a violation of a statute or ordinance that the officer or employee has the duty to
8b9 There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise
a!ainst, any public officer or employee actin! pursuant to subdivision 8a9 and ithin the scope of
his or her authority for false arrest or false imprisonment arisin! out of any arrest that is laful or
that the public officer or employee, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe as
laful. @o officer or employee shall be deemed an a!!ressor or lose his or her ri!ht to self6
defense by the use of reasonable force to effect the arrest, prevent escape, or overcome
Penal Co,e ;666.9. 8a9 @otithstandin! any other la, a *udicial officer may issue an ex parte
emer!ency protective order here a peace officer, as defined in Section 2;4.5, 2;4.3, or 2;4.;3,
asserts reasonable !rounds to believe that a person is in immediate and present dan!er of stal%in!
based upon the personOs alle!ation that he or she has been illfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
folloed or harassed by another person ho has made a credible threat ith the intent of placin!
the person ho is the tar!et of the threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of
his or her immediate family, ithin the meanin! of Section A>A.D.
8*9 A peace officer ho acts in !ood faith to enforce an emer!ency protective order is not
civilly or criminally liable.
Penal Co,e ;66<a. 8a9 Any peace officer, as defined in subdivision 8a9 of Section 2;4.5 or
Section 2;4.;5, 2;4.;3, or 2;4.;;, may transport any person, as &uic%ly as is feasible, to the
nearest homeless shelter, or any runaay youth or youth in crisis to the nearest runaay shelter,
if the officer in&uires hether the person desires the transportation, and the person does not
ob*ect to the transportation. Any officer exercisin! due care and precaution shall not be liable
for any dama!es or in*ury incurred durin! transportation.
Penal Co,e ;836a. If a person has %noled!e, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should
have %noled!e, that he is bein! arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such person to
refrain from usin! force or any eapon to resist such arrest.
Page 1(
APP(N$2: .0La+s relating to transit policing
/he follo#ing are e7amples of la#s 8California Penal Co$e sections9 specificall0 relate$ to
transit policing5
Penal Co,e ;830.<. The folloin! persons are not peace officers but may exercise the poers
of arrest of a peace officer as specified in Section 2;A durin! the course and ithin the scope of
their employment, if they successfully complete a course in the exercise of those poers
pursuant to Section 2;3"
8e9 <ersons re!ularly employed as inspectors, supervisors, or security officers for transit
districts, as defined in Section DD35; of the <ublic Etilities 7ode, if the district has concluded a
memorandum of understandin! permittin! the exercise of that authority, ith, as applicable, the
sheriff, the chief of police, or the #epartment of the 7alifornia Hi!hay <atrol ithin hose
*urisdiction the district lies. $or the purposes of this subdivision, the exercise of peace officer
authority may include the authority to remove a vehicle from a railroad ri!ht6of6ay as set forth
in Section 33A?A of the Iehicle 7ode.
Penal Co,e ;836.8. 8a9 A public officer or employee, hen authori0ed by ordinance, may arrest
a person ithout a arrant henever the officer or employee has reasonable cause to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer or
employee that is a violation of a statute or ordinance that the officer or employee has the duty to
8b9 There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise
a!ainst, any public officer or employee actin! pursuant to subdivision 8a9 and ithin the scope of
his or her authority for false arrest or false imprisonment arisin! out of any arrest that is laful or
that the public officer or employee, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe as
laful. @o officer or employee shall be deemed an a!!ressor or lose his or her ri!ht to self6
defense by the use of reasonable force to effect the arrest, prevent escape, or overcome
8c9 In any case in hich a person is arrested pursuant to subdivision 8a9 and the person
arrested does not demand to be ta%en before a ma!istrate, the public officer or employee ma%in!
the arrest shall prepare a ritten notice to appear and release the person on his or her promise to
appear, as prescribed by 7hapter ?7 8commencin! ith Section 2?;.?9. The provisions of that
chapter shall thereafter apply ith reference to any proceedin! based upon the issuance of a
ritten notice to appear pursuant to this authority.
8d9 The !overnin! body of a local a!ency, by ordinance, may authori0e its officers and
employees ho have the duty to enforce a statute or ordinance to arrest persons for violations of
the statute or ordinance as provided in subdivision 8a9.
8e9 $or purposes of this section, PordinanceP includes an order, rule, or re!ulation of any
air pollution control district.
8f9 $or purposes of this section, a Ppublic officer or employeeP includes an officer or
employee of a nonprofit transit corporation holly oned by a local a!ency and formed to carry
out the purposes of the local a!ency.
Penal Co,e ;660. 8a9 Any of the acts described in subdivision 8b9 is an infraction punishable by
a fine not to exceed to hundred fifty dollars 8L3?49 and by community service for a total time
Page 1)
not to exceed >2 hours over a period not to exceed ;4 days, durin! a time other than durin! his or
her hours of school attendance or employment, hen committed on or in any of the folloin!"
859 A facility or vehicle of a public transportation system as defined by Section DD355 of
the <ublic Etilities 7ode.
839 A facility of, or vehicle operated by any entity subsidi0ed by, the #epartment of
8;9 A leased or rented facility or vehicle for hich any of the entities described in
para!raph 859 or 839 incur costs of cleanup, repair, or replacement as a result of any of those acts.
8b9 859 'vasion of the payment of a fare of the system. 839 Misuse of a transfer, pass,
tic%et, or to%en ith the intent to evade the payment of a fare. 8;9 <layin! sound e&uipment on
or in a system facility or vehicle.
8>9 Smo%in!, eatin!, or drin%in! in or on a system facility or vehicle in those areas here
those activities are prohibited by that system.
8?9 'xpectoratin! upon a system facility or vehicle.
8A9 -illfully disturbin! others on or in a system facility or vehicle by en!a!in! in
boisterous or unruly behavior.
8B9 7arryin! an explosive or acid, flammable li&uid, or toxic or ha0ardous material in a
public transit facility or vehicle.
829 Erinatin! or defecatin! in a system facility or vehicle, except in a lavatory. Hoever,
this para!raph shall not apply to a person ho cannot comply ith this para!raph as a result of a
disability, a!e, or a medical condition.
8D9 8A9 -illfully bloc%in! the free movement of another person in a system facility or
vehicle. 8:9 This para!raph 8D9 shall not be interpreted to affect any laful activities permitted
or first amendment ri!hts protected under the las of this state or applicable federal la,
includin!, but not limited to, las related to collective bar!ainin!, labor relations, or labor
8549 S%ateboardin!, roller s%atin!, bicycle ridin!, or roller bladin! in a system facility,
vehicle, or par%in! structure. This para!raph does not apply to an activity that is necessary for
utili0ation of the transit facility by a bicyclist, includin!, but not limited to, an activity that is
necessary for par%in! a bicycle or transportin! a bicycle aboard a transit vehicle, if that activity
is conducted ith the permission of the transit a!ency in a manner that does not interfere ith
the safety of the bicyclist or other patrons of the transit facility.
8559 8A9 Enauthori0ed use of a discount tic%et or failure to present, upon re&uest from a
transit system representative, acceptable proof of eli!ibility to use a discount tic%et, in
accordance ith Section DD5?? of the <ublic Etilities 7ode and posted system identification
policies hen enterin! or exitin! a transit station or vehicle. Acceptable proof of eli!ibility must
be clearly defined in the postin!.
8:9 In the event that an eli!ible discount tic%et user is not in possession of acceptable
proof at the time of re&uest, any citation issued shall be held for a period of B3 hours to allo the
user to produce acceptable proof. If the proof is provided, the citation shall be voided. If the
proof is not produced ithin that time period, the citation shall be processed.
8c9 @otithstandin! subdivision 8a9, the 7ity and 7ounty of San $rancisco and the Los
An!eles 7ounty Metropolitan Transportation Authority may enact and enforce an ordinance
providin! that any of the acts described in subdivision 8b9 on or in a facility or vehicle described
in subdivision 8a9 for hich the 7ity and 7ounty of San $rancisco or the Los An!eles 7ounty
Metropolitan Transportation Authority has *urisdiction shall be sub*ect only to an administrative
Page 1,
penalty imposed and enforced in a civil proceedin!. The ordinance for imposin! and enforcin!
the administrative penalty shall be !overned by 7hapter 2 8commencin! ith Section DD?249 of
<art 55 of #ivision 54 of the <ublic Etilities 7ode and shall not apply to minors.
Page 2-
7harles (Sid) Heal, D4D6B;362;3?,