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by miquelangel Castillo
ONE. At thread with many ends: a glimpse at Tibetan lands across time and space 1.1. Some features of Space and Population before 1960 TWO- Current troublesome situation 2.1. Population transfer: Contrasting some Facts and figures 2-2- the Tibetan claim of Beijing colonialism on use of resources 2.3. The unsolved issue of civil rights in Tibet 2.4. The destruction of Tibetan culture. THREE- Current Chinese point of view. FOUR. Tibet’s acknowledgement of its perilous stand 4.1. Tibetans four-folded counterpoint 4.2. Three accounts on the Tibet issue in non Tibetan sources FIVE. Conclusion. SIX. References and notes
Chinese beyond Geography . Tibetan lands and China.
ONE. At thread with many ends: a glimpse at Tibetan lands across time and space . Interested in complex situations and familiar with the historic developments in Europe I have been puzzled by a political contradiction related to Tibetan situation after I read the Història dels Tibetans by Josep Ll. Alay and a lovely history-timed book from the early 1910’s Un viaje a Lhasa by Alexandra David-Néel. I would like to dive with this paper into the main turning points at the end of the XX century focusing at some issues: worlds in contact, culture and language, changing situations. My two long-standing questions want to be answered: • • Are Tibetan Chinese? How well aware are Han Chinese of the current (and quickly changing) Tibetan situation? With its vast area and long history of expanding settlements, China went through distinct assimilation waves to other rulers and foreign influences engulfing them. In fact, all the evidence indicates that it once did. Chinese speakers were especially vigorous in replacing and linguistically converting other ethnic groups, whom they looked down on as primitive and inferior <1>.
1.1. Some features of Government at 1900 The Government of Tibet was headquartered in Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet. It consisted of a Head of State (the Dalai Dalai Lama), a Cabinet of Ministers (the Kashag), a National Assembly (the Tsongdu), and an elaborate bureaucracy to administer the vast territory of Tibet. The Government of Tibet levied tax, issued its own currency, ran the country's postal system and issued postage stamps, commanded Tibet's small army, and generally conducted all affairs of Government. It was an ancient form of government which had served the needs of Tibet well in the past, but was in need
of reform in order for the country to keep pace with the great political, social and economic changes that were taking place in the world. The Tibetan form of government was a highly de-centralised one, with many districts and principalities of Tibet enjoying a large degree of self-government. This was, to a large extent, inevitable due to the vastness of the territory. 1.2. Some features of Space and Population before 1960 Tibet before 1959: (consisting of the provinces of U-Tsang, Amdo and Kham) Size: 2.47 million square kilometres. Geography: Plateau with an average height of 4,200 metres. Tibet in Chinese documents after 1959 being the present "Tibet Autonomous Region" (T.A.R.), ‘Xizang’ in Chinese sources. Its size: 1,226,400 square kilometres. Religion: Mahayana Buddhism is practised by 99 per cent of TAR Tibetans. Language: Tibetan of the Tibetan-Burmese language family. Population: 96 per cent of the people, without counting the Chinese immigrants, are Tibetans. There are also minorities like Hu, Monbas, Lopas, Sherpas, Naxis, Denpas besides 3,000 Moslem Tibetans and 20,000 Chinese Moslems. 1.3. Negotiations. There have been several rounds of talk with the Chinese government authorities in order to solve the Tibetan issue since the "Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" in 1951. Yet, no results have emerged out of them. After the 1959 uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet, the Dalai Lama fled to India and established his government in exile. Since then, he has called on the international community to help formulate a peaceful solution to free his homeland. The main reason behind the failure of the talks, or the Chinese rejection of the Tibetan proposals, is obviously the lack of common ground between the Chinese and the Tibetan demands. The latest chapter in this soft-voiced dispute were a Beijing whitepaper report in 2001 with the Tibetan side quickly snapping back.
2- Current troublesome situation
I will focus on several key themes: first, the Tibetan claim of Beijing colonialism on use of resources; then contrasting the use of statistics on both sides, specially on the sensitive issue of population transfer; next the unsolved issue of civil rights in Tibet; and last but not least, the destruction of Tibetan culture. 2.1. The Tibetan claim of Beijing colonialism on use of resources In the introduction to the book The poverty of Plenty, Angela Knox, the translator, says:
Historically, China has a long tradition of making vassal states serve imperial aims. Its geopolitical strategy since 1949 with regard to the border regions shows many similarities with previous practice. Where once vassal states provided tribute to the Chinese emperor, they are now expected to provide raw materials and natural resources... The economic and political integration of outlying regions has been and still is crucial.
The promising outlook of natural Resources can be summarised here: (In old Tibet) Chrome iron ore, lithium, copper, coal, asbestos, borax, mica, tantalum, niobium, gold, iron ore, crude oil, lead, zinc,silver, calcium, nickel and salt. The Tibetans have embarked on a road of socialist transformation, cautiously but steadily. Communications facilities also grew rapidly. There was no highway in Tibet before liberation. Completed projects are Qinghai-Tibet highway (1954), the Sichuan-Tibet highway (1954), the Yunnan-Tibet highway (1976) and the QinghaiTibet Railway starting from Xining has already reached Golmud in Qinghai. In the 80’s policies to enable the Tibetan people to recoup their strength and make up for the damage they had suffered during the "cultural revolution" (1966-1976). In late 1992, China announced the opening of Tibet's economy to "foreign investments" with BP, Agip, Enron, Exxon and AES amongst the multinationals involved. In September 1999 Jiang Zemin and Bill Cinton met in an APEC meeting and China shown a clear commitment to pushing faster on the road toward a market economy. The next month Fortune, the American business magazine, Fortune, published a far-stretched report on China’s opening to the world <2>. The agenda behind China's modernisation of Tibet is best expressed by Gabriel Lafitte <3>, University of Melbourne. He writes in his perceptive article called Economic Colonisation:
China is globalising Tibet. Foreign investment, high technology, stock exchange share floats, railways, hydro-dams, gas and electricity grids are all coming to Tibet, in a campaign orchestrated by Beijing…China is in a hurry to integrate its western half, taps its resources and deal with the deep discontent at being left behind by the booming coast. China's great leap westward is to be financed by global capital as well as through China's
latest Five-Year Plan.
Exile Tibetan sources say that the hidden agenda is the real Chinese determination to absorb Tibet into the Chinese economy. For instance, to name two complaints from the many I found, an estimate 40 per cent of the once thick forest cover had been destroyed by 1985 with the wood being shipped to China; and also in Kham and Amdo, the most fertile lands in the valleys have been given to Chinese settlers, driving the Tibetans to more and more barren lands. In reality, this economic open-door policy is designed only to encourage the settlement of Chinese population in Tibet. The Chinese Government is already persuading its massive drifting population to find home in the T.A.R. But Jiang Zemin for once was honest and said during a late visit in 2001 to the United States that the Xizang-Qinghai railway project would go ahead at any cost even though it doesn't make any economic sense. Jiang Zemin cited "political" reasons for the decision <4>.
2.2. Population transfer: Contrasting some Facts and figures 1. Statistics. Statistics on Tibet are often contradictory and difficult to verify as they are released by both the Chinese and exile-Tibetan sides with opposing aims. I always make the difference between Tibet and TAR. Four sources on Kham and Amdo the Chinese data does not refers to Tibetan entities as they work for the whole of the povince. Inhabitants: Six million Tibetans (now in the old Tibet area there are 7.5 million Chinese, and 6.1 million Tibetans. According to Chinese figures, the number of Tibetans is 4.5 million). According to Chinese claims there are 90,000 Chinese in Tibet and 2.1 million Tibetans. According to Tibetan sources in exile, there are 120,000 to 170,000 Chinese in Lhasa and 40,000 Tibetans <5>. The pressures started in the low-Tibet in the late 30’s with the occupation of soil for Han migrants after military occupation in Sichuan province. Better studied is the case of the Qinghai province where M. Peissel refers in his book The Last Barbarians (1995) the political assimilation <6>. The urban areas of the "TAR" are dominated by Chinese settlers and personnel, who form overwhelming majorities in major towns. The Tibetan population, on the other hand, is concentrated mainly in rural areas. The general economic impact of the Chinese settlers on Tibetans
may be appreciated from the ownership ratio of shops or restaurants in Tibetan towns <7> In the early 1980s, the Tibetan Government-in- Exile estimated the Chinese population in the whole of Tibet at 7.5 million. Since 1992, new "foreign investments" provoked a highest rate. The figure today may be well in excess of this <8>, which leads into our next topic: colonisation. 2. Colonisation. The hottest issue is the undergoing colonisation of Tibet. We can show the Tibetan claim looking up http://www.tibet.com/WhitePaper/white6.html from where I selected some pieces: The first public indication of Chinese population transfer to Tibet came in the 50’s. In the "Directive on Central Committee of CPC on the policies for Work in Tibet", issued by Mao Zedong himself. Proposing a five-fold increase in the "TAR" population, he said:
Tibet covers a large area but is thinly populated. Its population should be increased from the present two or three million to five or six million, and then to over ten million. <9>
During the mid 80’s pressure continued. Deng Xiaoping admitted that the Chinese were being encouraged to move to Tibet because, according to him, the local population "needs Han immigrants as the (Autonomous) Region's population of about 2 million was inadequate to develop its resources" <10>. As a result of Chinese population transfer, Tibetans find themselves marginalised in economic, political, educational and social spheres. Chinese settlers are given preference over Tibetans in jobs created by forestry and mineral exploitation in Tibet. 2.3. The unsolved issue of civil rights in Tibet and the destruction of Tibetan culture; The General Assembly of the UN during the full debates on the Tibet issue in 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1965 expressed their concern about the situation <11>. A previous appeal from the Tibetan Government in 1949 was left unattended following advice from India and UK. Lately in the 90’s the EU went back to a process of diplomatic pressure to no avail. Angela Knox pointed out, "Seeing the east-west divide in economic terms alone omits a whole range of important issues … (Tibetan) territories are not fully
integrated socially, culturally or economically with China proper." <12>. Its best examples being the level of development of rural Tibetans and the continuous flow of refugees. To start with, development didn’t reach Tibetans. Besides their country had been ‘liberated’ and in so doing a military presence became a constant feature in the cities. I summarise some Social Data (applicable only to Tibetans): Average life expectancy is 40 years. The average annual income was 80 dollars in 1990. The analogous purchasing power according to UNDP is 598 dollars. Literacy rate is 21.7 per cent and infant mortality 150 in 1,000. (It is 43 in 1,000 in China). People who leave their country (about 130,000) became deprived citizens in most cases. The difficult situation of refugees in closest country, Nepal (up to 25.000), can give us a close idea <13>. 2.4. The destruction of Tibetan culture. As a result of Chinese policies, it has become very difficult to teach or issue official documents in both the Tibetan and Chinese languages. To use inner sources of information gathered in Tibetan websites I offer a couple of criticism passages<14>. Firstly, The PRC's education policy in Tibet over the last three decades can be summed up in the following words of the late Panchen Lama. Speaking at the first meeting of China's Institute of Tibetology in 1988, he said:
The land which managed itself well for 1,300 years, from the seventh century, lost its language after it was liberated. Whether we remained backward or made mistakes, we managed our life on the world's highest plateau by using only Tibetan. We had everything written in our own language, be it Buddhism, crafts, astronomy, astrology, poems, logic. All administrative works were also done in Tibetan. When the Institute of Tibetology was founded, I spoke in the People's Palace and said that the Tibetan studies should be based on the foundation of Tibet's own religion and culture. So far we have underestimated these subjects. It may not be the deliberate goal of the Party to let Tibetan culture die, but I wonder whether the Tibetan language will survive or be eradicated.
Secondly, in a publication of China's Institute of Tibetology (1991), Sangay, a junior lecturer of Qinghai Nationalities University, wrote:
There is one group of people who hold the view that the use of the Tibetan language will work as obstacles on the way to economic development. ...The local authorities have decided that only the Chinese language should be taught and used.
Nothing shows a deeper divide than the fact of denigrating the local culture of Tibetan by Han political instances. In conclusion, Tibetan is not accepted, taught,
used, or promoted by Beijing authorities beyond a minor symbolic usage. 2. Tibetan achievements. To begin with a small effort from the Tibet in exile forces maintained an outstanding landmark of achievements for a land without government: There are more than 700 Tibetan religious and cultural centres established around the world today. Tibet's native religion, Bön, has re-established its headquarters in Himachal Pradesh state, India. The Tibetan Medical Institute in Dharamsala educates students in Tibetan language. The world has been open to Tibetan influences. Technology and the information age have speedep up the team-up nowadays. The Tibetan collections are copied and preserved in the net in a handful of organizations. The Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (LTWA) in Dharamsala, and Tibet House in New Delhi, serve as facilities to educate foreign students in Tibetan history, language and culture. The LTWA is the premier internationally-acknowledged centre for studies in Tibetology. Up to 1992 it has assisted more than 5,000 research students from over 30 countries. The religious one in St. Petersburgh (a destination linked to past sympathies) has achieved a remarkable success.
THREE- China’s current point of view. I wanted to confront the Zhongguo Ren (Chinese people -Han) with the other western minorities, as Tibetan lands are fringe southwestern provinces with the particularity of showing some trends for the future of the “United China” - as the name clearly tells Zhong Guo (the Central Country), or the place where everythings starts -and from where everything is controlled-, for example only one time zone! As the general Chinese overview pervades all my paper, in this chapter I will deal with the last 20 years. Economic Development The 1980s witnessed a great upsurge of the reform started with the election of 1961, opening-up and modernisation drive in Tibet, as in other parts of China. Party Secretary of Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang visited Tibet. After Hu's visit, there was a brief period of liberal measures: handing local administrative power to the Tibetan cadres to let the Tibetans decide their way of life. In 1984 at the Second Work Forum on Tibet, 43 projects were launched with state
investment and aid from nine provinces and municipalities, including promoting tourism with new hotels in Tibet. Similarly in 1994, at the Third Work Forum on Tibet, 62 projects were announced to help in the development of Tibet's economy. Most of them were geared towards improving the backward urban infrastructure in Tibet. The 1990’s headed the way to economic reforms, while political divergence was severely tied up. The openness to the west investment resulted in a yawning gulf between the developed regions on the coast and and the backward western border regions. And criticism appeared inside China as well. The pressing problems were first articulated by Wang Xiaoqiang and Bai Nanfeng in their book, The Poverty of Plenty which offered an intellectual framework for bridging the east-west divide. More than a decade later, China came up with an overall solution. The political side has to device a manifold project. These are some of the reasons for Beijing to hit upon the idea of the Western China Development Programme, which will solve several problems. In June 2001, in the wake of the Fourth Work Forum on Tibet, 117 projects were formally announced and ambitious plans were laid out to "develop" Tibet, a part of the Western China Development Programme. The white paper on Modernising Tibet, issued by the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 8 November 2001 stated that under the democratic reform in 1959 it introduced the new political system of people's democracy and that the Tibetan people have become masters of the country. Communist Party members dominate key government posts and only a few important posts are held by trusted non-party members. As we can read in http://www.radicalparty.org/tibet/diir_08122001.htm :
The creation of the same dynamic economy in the western regions will attract migrant workers in the opposite direction, thus easing the strain of over-population in China's eastern seaboard. The development of the western regions will make it easier for China to exploit the natural resources and enormous energy potential of these regions, like oil and gas, to meet the galloping energy demand of eastern China.
Also, being aware of the diversity of peoples and that sinisization will upset the social stability, a process which is closely linked with the economic growth and prosperity of these regions. The two economists urged the Chinese authorities to look into the problem and come up with suitable solutions. They said,
We have before us a vast array of serious problems which urgently require investigation and policy decisions. Of course, it is not just the lack of development in undeveloped
regions that will prove the decisive factor. However, looking into the future, research into solutions to the problems of backwardness in these regions, be it with a view to China's economic growth or social stability, will be of vital strategic and theoretical importance that is hard to visualise.
President Jiang Zemin launched the Western China Development Programme in a speech he made in Xian on 17 June 1999. The initial emphasis of the campaign was on acceleration of development focusing on the western regions of China the Tibet, Xinjiang Uighur and Ningxia Autonomous Regions, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Shaanxi and Guizhou provinces and Chongqing municipality totalling 56 per cent of China's land area and 23 per cent of the population <15>.
FOUR. Tibet’s acknowledgement of its perilous stand 4.1. Tibetans counterpoint Tibetan sources could honestly claim the truth will prevail in the end. They could show all the unconsistent pattern of Chinese claims. We can summarize their slashback in four points: Point one. The reader of China's White Paper "Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation" will be surprised by the minor attention its authors pay to Tibet's modern history. This is because from 1911 to the completion of the Chinese occupation in 1951, there is no evidence of Chinese authority or influence in Tibet which can support China's claim. And as everyone can read in http://www.tibet.com/WhitePaper/white6.html
It is a matter of undeniable fact that Tibet has never remained a part of China. China can never prove that Tibet is part of China, although they claim this to the world community in order to fully integrate Tibet into the Mainland China. The term "separatists" they brand the Tibetans is only to tell the world that Tibet is one with China thereby misleading them to think that Tibet is part of China.
Point two. Tibet compared favourably with most Asian countries at the turn of the XX century in both sides: social mobility and wealth distribution. Under Chinese eyes, all peasants were serfs and the country an unjust theocratic regime that needed reform. Besides, Tibet's monastic system provided plenty of opportunities for social mobility. And the peasants could ask for the lawful procedures in all situations. Com llegim a http://www.radicalparty.org/tibet/diir_08122001.htm :
Admission to monastic institutions in Tibet was open to all and the large majority of monks, particularly those who rose through its ranks to the highest positions, came from humble backgrounds, often from far-flung villages in Kham and Amdo. This is because the monasteries offered equal opportunities to all to rise to any monastic post through their own scholarship.
Point three. The large gap between China's policies and the true condition in Tibet can be understood when we realise that Chinese rule in Tibet is essentially colonialist in nature. In many cases it was true that economic development did occur, but the native population contributed more to the realisation of profits for the colonial power and its business entrepreneurs than it ever got in return. Their mottoes have always being a clever marketing strategy without much meat to support their empty rethoric: first, it was "liberation," that led into a "socialist paradise." Now is occupation with a clear colonial nature of Chinese rule. The latest slogan is "modernisation." In its white paper, China claims that after 1959 the Tibetan people have become masters of the country. But the plain truth being the reverse one: Tibetans have little or no say in running their own affairs. <16>. And most important, Chinese white paper overlooks their cruel deeds in Tibet. There is neither mention of the Cultural Revolution, nor the massacres commited on the Tibetan people (some accounts put the figure up to 1 million). Point four. Given China's record in Tibet, any assessment on social and economic developments reported in China’s sources cannot be taken at face value. Even official statistics appear to be drawn up to prove a particular political point rather than to present an objective picture of the situation.
4.2. Three accounts on the Tibet issue in non Tibetan sources
First account. Political struggle. The main point of support for their political struggle stems from internet close-knit groups that have been organising under different financial umbrellas. Every western country has its own branch and some communities have been very active in gathering reports and first-hand accounts of attrocities in the fifties. The state pressure has amounted to rhetorical discourses with the UN and lately EU being a bit more pro-active, but nothing has come out from their efforts on
defending Tibetan civil rights. Since the late 80’s the international community starting to have the Dalai Lama as a World leader with a status close to the Pope as a mediatic fixture. If a well-justified common ground between the two parties could be found, at least, in order to push the talk ahead, this could ensure complete success of the talk. Second account. Democratisation, liberalisation and wishful thinking. Since Tianamen, Han Democratic Chinese leaders come to appreciate Tibetan's tireless, courageous and consistent fight for its fundamental rights. Their struggle is not breaking the power of the Communist autocratic regime in China yet. Tibet's efforts will eventually benefit all Chinese people. As an emblematic flag of their position we have Wei Jingshen's letter to Deng Xiaoping in 1992 http://www.tibet.com/China/wei.html . If most young Han Chinese students could show respect for Tibet, and agree that Tibet has freedom of choice, Beijing's current policy would become untenable. When a majority of Han Chinese may express this type of sympathy, it will represent a significant shift in thought among dynamic Han Chinese. Third account. Discrimination in education. Young people, while speaking of their desire for education, admit that their only choice is to attempt to reach the Tibetan communities in India where at least education was freely available irrespective of all the other hardships. The independent right-on work from the liberalised years (late 1980’s) can be shown in these two short accounts on the education field that we took from
The first Australian Human Rights Delegation to China stated in its report:
Though the delegation noted an official determination to raise educational standards for Tibetans, many Tibetan children appear to still go without formal education. Tibetan children in the Lhasa area seemingly have access to a very limited syllabus at both primary and secondary levels. Some testified to never having been at school, or having to leave for economic reasons as early as ten years old.
In a petition, dated 20 February 1986, submitted to the Chinese authorities, Tashi Tsering, an English teacher at Lhasa's Tibet University, stated:
In 1979, 600 students from the Tibet Autonomous Region were pursuing university education in Tibet and China. Of them, only 60 were Tibetans (...) Even today, 70 per cent of Tibetans are illiterate. Out of 28 classes in Lhasa's Middle School No.1, 12 are for
Tibetans. ... Out of 1,451 students, 933 are Tibetans and 518 Chinese. Only 546 Tibetans are learning their language. Of the 111 teachers, only 30 are Tibetans and seven teach Tibetan. In Lhasa's Primary School No. 1, there are 34 classes with the Tibetans and Chinese sharing the same number of classes. 1,000 students are Tibetans and 900 Chinese.
FIVE. Conclusion. My second question still being unanswered: How well aware are Han Chinese of the current (and quickly changing) Tibetan situation? Inland I don’t know. Abroad quite acquainted. But dissidents cannot lead mainstream paths. China enters the XXI century to be back at the central role she always demanded. Politically occupying a pivotal role at UN where she does not interfered in world affairs as long as the world didn’t put any pressure on her internal issues. After Tian An Men’s riots the central government went back to the core policies: openness in the economical sector and tight control on the household sensible minorities issues. As somebody said “never so many people improved so much in a decade in humankind”. Enough said. The last project of the Three Gorges, the successful space race and the Olympic Games to be held in China in 2008 show the right way with no turning points. The six-million strong Tibet may be a minute speck of dust in a diplomatic portfolio but nothing more. This current situation linked to two hot topics in Beijing talks: the liberalization process so that an unavoidable economic expansion can offer a escapeway to wider demands of democratisation across China dynamic quadres, the official doctrine of “five races” to integrate all five ethnic autonomous regions. Making an exception for Tibet would likely stimulate separatist and independence movements by ethnic minorities in the other regions. The yearning of the Chinese people in China for more individual liberty is another proof. If the Chinese could be convinced with the above fact in all way possible, I think there is hope that we can achieve complete independence. After all, the needs of the people can never be left uncared for long. For a short account of a way-out situation: Dalai Lama seeking 1 country, 2 systems 04 November 2003 Yomiuri Shimbun http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/2003/11/4_1.html We may attain a better historical account of conflictive crucial points. China's
alleged legal claim is based on historical relationships primarily of non-Han rulers with Tibetan lamas and, to a lesser extent, of Chinese rulers and Tibetan lamas. The main events relied on by the Chinese Government occurred hundreds of years ago <18> and China also broke the Manchu rulers from their throne. Any contemporary historian can study the sources and now is a better understanding of past events. What I learnt we could see an invasion of a Tibetan state. I can offer three examples: No inference of being in China lands was made in the novel Viaje a Lhasa. After reading the relevant sections in the Atlas Cultural de China no mention was made of Tibet as belonging to China cultural framework. To end, the maps used by the agreement to clarify the borders in 1951 had to use English maps as China didn’t have any topographical sources from the area. <6.44> Are Tibetan Chinese? The only insight I gain from the paper is that I will not consider Tibetan to be Chinese. In this short journey to Tibet I would like to end up quoting last David-Néel words in her book Viaje a Lhasa: ‘sola en mi habitación, antes de dormirme, grité para mis adentros: ¡Lha gyalo! ¡Los dioses han triunfado!
SIX. Reference material. sources: Alay, J. LL., Història dels Tibetans, Lleida, Pages editors, 2000 Peissel, M., Los últimos bárbaros, Barcelona, Península, 1999 (1995 english version) David-Néel, A., Viaje a Lhasa, Barcelona, Península, 1999 (1927 French version) Diamond, Jared Empire of Uniformity, http://www.huaren.org/heritage/id/08269801.html Gernet, Jacques, Le monde chinois, Armando Colin, Paris, 1972 Blunden, C. & Elvin, M. Atlas cultural de China, Ed. Folio, Barcelona 2000
<1> To enter in the fascinating Chinese world the best piece I read was an outstanding article by Jared Diamond Empire of Uniformity Discover Magazine, March, http://www.huaren.org/heritage/id/082698-01.html <2> Fortune, October 11 1999, a special report (pages 50-86). American businessmen were astonished at the thousand of opportunities of the openness. <3> An expert on the Tibetan economy and a Fellow at the Institute of Asian Language and Societies. Text found at www.tibet.net/eng/diir/tibbul/0111/focus3.html <4> (with 1994 data taken from http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/1994/11/11-3_7.html unless quoted other sources. <5> November-Decenber 2001, vol. 5, issue 5 in http://www.tibet.net/eng/diir/tibbul/0111/focus6.html <6> Qinghai was a prison placement for a large number of ideological citizens (over 2 millions in Mao’s purges) and sinisation started with a quick steady redistribution of urban settlements. Lately, a gold rush in the 80’s brought another large contingent of Han migrants that has left the province with a comfortable majority of 55%. Xinin has become a large capital with more than 1 million inhabitants. <7> Some data: 300 out of 12,827 in Lhasa city (excluding Barkhor); in Tsawa Pashö, southern Kham, 15 out of 133 business enterprises; process similar in other Tibetan towns: 748 to 92 in Chamdo, 229 to 3 in Powo Tramo. Source: http://www.tibet.com/WhitePaper/white8.html <8> http://www.tibet.com/WhitePaper/white8.html <9> [Renmin Ribao, 22 November 1952]. In the aftermath of the Chinese invasion of Tibet, Premier Zhou Enlai said: ‘The Chinese are greater in number and more developed in economy and culture but in the regions they inhabit there is not much arable land left and underground resources are not as abundant as in the regions inhabited by fraternal nationalities’. <10> Deng Xiaoping, during his meeting with ex-US President Jimmy Carter, 29 June 1987, reported by Reuters, Beijing, 30 June 1987. Two years earlier in February 1985, the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi announced its Government's intention to ‘change both the ecological imbalance and the population lack" not just in Tibet but also in other "sparsely populated outlying regions … (Chinese) migration should be welcomed by the local population, and should result in a population increase of 60 million over the next 30 years in those regions.’ <11> Some polarised sectors spoke clearly. So the Ambassador of the Philippines who referred to Tibet as an "independent nation", described China's occupation as "the worst type of imperialism, and colonialism past or present" and added: "it is clear that on the eve of the Chinese invasion in 1950, Tibet was not under the rule of any foreign country." <12> In the preface to the influential Xiaoqiang’s and Nanfeng’s book she translated The poverty of Plenty. <13> . Besides there are more Tibetans in Exile: (India 100,000, Bhutan 2,000, Switzerland 2,000, U.S. 1,500 and Canada 600). Status of the Tibetans in Exile: Stateless, though some have taken foreign citizenships. <14> From http://www.tibet.com/WhitePaper/white6.html <15> According to the London Tibet Information Network's publication, China's Great Leap West, http://www.radicalparty.org/tibet/diir_08122001.htm
<16> The election of 1961, as referred to in the white paper, was a farce. Tibetans do not hold any key positions even within the TAR Communist Party. The Secretary of the TAR Communist Party is the most powerful post in the TAR and this post has been held by the Chinese since 1959 (Zhang Guhua, Zeng Yongya, Ren Rong, Yin Fatang, Wu Jinhua, Hu Jintao, Chen Kuiyuan and now Guo Jinlong). There is racial discrimination against the Tibetans. http://www.radicalparty.org/tibet/diir_08122001.htm <17> During the height of Mongol imperial expansion, when the Mongol Emperors extended their political supremacy throughout most of Asia and large parts of Eastern Europe; and when Manchu Emperors ruled China and expanded their influence throughout East and Central Asia, including Tibet, particularly in the 18th century. <18> Peissel’s The last Barbarians.