Co–benefits or collateral damage?

The potential impacts on the wellbeing of forest-dependent people under different shades of REDD (Country case studies)

Karin Svadlenak-Gomez

Research report submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc in Biodiversity Conservation and Management for Distance Learning Students of the University of London, Centre for Development, Environment and Policy (CeDEP), School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)

25 September 2009

Word count: 9986

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Table of Contents
Research Report Declaration Form .................................................................................1 Table of Contents............................................................................................................2 List of Figures and Tables ...............................................................................................3 Abstract...........................................................................................................................4 Acknowledgements .........................................................................................................5 1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................6 2 Methodology ............................................................................................................8 2.1 Research questions .....................................................................................8 2.2 Data collection & analysis ............................................................................8 2.2.1 Analytical framework ....................................................................................9 2.2.2 Country cases ............................................................................................10 3 Climate change, deforestation, biodiversity, and human wellbeing .........................12 3.1 Deforestation as a driver of global climate change and biodiversity loss ....12 3.2 The flip side: climate change impacts on forests and associated biodiversity.................................................................................................14 3.3 The human aspect: Impacts on the wellbeing of forest-dependent people .15 3.4 Multiple benefits from REDD ......................................................................15 3.5 Poverty, equity, governance, and REDD ....................................................17 4 Country case studies..............................................................................................20 4.1 Africa .............................................................................................................20 4.1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)..................................................20 4.2 South and Central America ............................................................................25 4.2.1 Bolivia ........................................................................................................25 4.2.2 Guatemala .................................................................................................30 4.3 Southeast Asia...............................................................................................35 4.3.1 Cambodia ..................................................................................................35 5 Discussion..............................................................................................................41 6 Conclusions and Recommendations ......................................................................46 Appendix 1: The evolution of REDD ......................................................................... A.1-1 Appendix 2: Sample Questionnaire .......................................................................... A.2-1 Appendix 3: Notes on Indicators and Country Data Comparison .............................. A.3-1 Appendix 4: Expanded Country Case Studies .......................................................... A.4-1 A.4.1 Africa ................................................................................................... A.4-1 A.4.1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ......................................... A.4-1 A.4.2 South and Central America ................................................................ A.4-17 A.4.2.1 Bolivia ............................................................................................. A.4-17 A.4.2.2 Guatemala ...................................................................................... A.4-27 A.4.3 Southeast Asia region ........................................................................ A.4-38 References.................................................................................................................. R-1 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ B-1

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List of Figures and Tables
Figure 3-1: Global Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions.....................................13 Figure 4-1: DRC Land Cover Map .................................................................................20 Figure 4-2: North-Eastern DRC .....................................................................................20 Figure 4-3: Bolivia Land Cover Map ..............................................................................26 Figure 4-4: Satellite image of Bolivia .............................................................................27 Figure 4-5: Guatemala land cover map .........................................................................31 Figure 4-6: Satellite image of fires from biomass burning in Guatemala ........................32 Figure 4-7: Cambodia Land Cover Map.........................................................................36 Figure 4-8: Satellite image of South East Asia...............................................................37 Figure 5-1: Comparison of two key governance indicators ............................................41 Figure A.4-1: DRC Land Cover Map......................................................................... A.4-2 Figure A.4-2: North-Eastern DRC............................................................................. A.4-2 Figure A.4-3: DRC logging concessions and protected areas................................... A.4-4 Figure A.4-4: The Eastern Afromontane Hotspot...................................................... A.4-4 Figure A.4-5: Bolivia land cover map...................................................................... A.4-18 Figure A.4-6: Satellite image of Bolivia ................................................................... A.4-19 Figure A.4-7: The Tropical Andes Hotspot.............................................................. A.4-19 Figure A.4-9: Guatemala land cover map ............................................................... A.4-28 Figure A.4-10: Satellite image of fires from biomass burning in Guatemala............ A.4-29 Figure A.4-11: Political map of the MBR in Guatemala........................................... A.4-37 Figure A.4-12: Land use in the Guatemalan Maya Biosphere Reserve................... A.4-37 Figure A.4-13: Cambodia land cover map .............................................................. A.4-39 Figure A.4-14: Satellite image of South East Asia (2001) ....................................... A.4-40 Figure A.4-15: Protected areas and protected forests ............................................ A.4-41 Figure A.4-16: Forested and sparsely populated provinces in Cambodia ............... A.4-42 Figure A.4-17: Forest classification, administration and concessions ..................... A.4-44 Figure A.4-18: The Oddar Meanchey Carbon Forestry Project Area ...................... A.4-49 Figure A.4-19: The Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area ..................................... A.4-50 Table 2-1: Analytical framework ....................................................................................10 Table 4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC) .....................................................................21 Table 4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia) ..................................................................25 Table 4-3: Key data and indicators (Guatemala) ...........................................................30 Table 4-4: Key data and indicators (Cambodia).............................................................35 Table A.3-1: Country data comparison ..................................................................... A.3-5 Table A.4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC)............................................................. A.4-1 Table A.4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia) ........................................................ A.4-17 Table A.4-3: Environmental threat changes as a result of the project ..................... A.4-25 Table A.4-4: Key data and indicators (Guatemala) ................................................. A.4-27 Table A.4-5: Key data and indicators (Cambodia) .................................................. A.4-38

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Abstract
Tropical deforestation and forest degradation are important drivers of both climate change and loss of biodiversity, while forests and the ecological services they provide are also being affected by climate change. The new mechanism “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD)”, which is being considered as one component of a successor arrangement to the Kyoto Protocol, offers a promising new avenue for financing forest conservation. Under REDD, developing countries would be paid by developed countries for avoided deforestation and degradation. REDD could offer benefits for climate change mitigation, biodiversity, and poverty reduction in developing countries. This research report presents an analysis of governance issues related to pro-poor REDD implementation. Section 2 presents the methodology used. Section 3 discusses relevant background in a global context based on a literature review of the links between climate change, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and poverty, and relevant governance issues. Section 4 presents four country-specific case analyses (Democratic Republic of Congo, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cambodia) of the impact different governance contexts, and in particular forest governance, is likely to have on REDD co-benefits for forestdependent people. Findings from the analysis are used to discuss, in section 5, the implications of national governance indicators for forest-dependent people. To achieve pro-poor REDD outcomes, governance institutions need reform and strengthening in the countries analyzed. It is also argued that where political will is lacking or pressures from powerful groups are too strong, chances are slim that marginalized communities will experience real improvements in wellbeing.

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Acknowledgements

My thanks go, first and foremost, to my research report supervisor at the University of London, Graham Woodgate, for his kind guidance and very valuable feedback on several drafts. I am also indebted to David Wilkie of the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) in New York, for helping me filter out concrete research ideas from my initial brainstorm, and for putting me in touch with WCS field staff. I thank WCS staff members Tom Evans, Roan Balas McNab, Lilian Painter, and Richard Tshombe, and Amanda Bradley of Pact (Cambodia), for sharing their views and providing me with relevant material. Last but not least, I am grateful to Luis Gomez-Echeverri, my husband, for unwavering support and useful inputs.

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"What we are doing to the forests of the world is but a mirror reflection of what we are doing to ourselves and to one another." – Mahatma Gandhi

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Introduction

The global environment today is faced with the dual crises of climate change and drastic biodiversity decline, driven primarily by anthropogenic forces. Some estimates warn that between 20 and 30% of all plant and animal species will probably be threatened with extinction if global average temperatures exceed 1.5 to 2.5° over 1980-1999 levels C (IPCC, 2007b). Tropical deforestation and forest degradation are important drivers of both climate change and loss of biodiversity. In turn, forests and the ecological services they provide are also being affected by climate change. There has long been a large gap between funding needed and funds available for effective biodiversity conservation in tropical forests, and innovative approaches to generate additional funding are increasingly being explored (Emerton et al., 2006; Olander et al., 2009; Richards & Jenkins, 2007; White & Hatcher, 2009). Because forest services have been undervalued, users and owners often do not have sufficient motivation to leave forests standing1. The emergence of carbon markets (both the voluntary market and the new mechanism called Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), which is being considered as one component of a successor arrangement to the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) after 2012, appear to offer a promising new avenue for financing forest conservation (Angelsen, 2008). Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries can obtain carbon credits only for afforestation/reforestation activities. In the EU Emissions Trading Scheme forest carbon is also marginalized (Richards & Jenkins, 2007). 2 Under REDD, developing countries would be paid by developed countries for the ‘service’ of avoided deforestation and degradation (Ebeling & Yasué, 2008).

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This is not the only underlying cause, but it is a significant one. The evolution of REDD is briefly outlined in Appendix 1.

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While the principal aim of REDD schemes is to maintain carbon stocks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such a mechanism could offer benefits for biodiversity and other ecosystem services, and for poverty reduction in developing countries (Peskett et al., 2008).

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2

Methodology

Due to the broad scope of this topic, this report concentrates on the impacts of REDD on the wellbeing and rights of forest-dependent people. Peskett et al. (2008) have looked at general policy options for designing pro-poor REDD initiatives. They argue that more research is needed, inter alia, on poverty implications of demonstration REDD activities and of REDD systems in different national contexts. This research report is an attempt to contribute to these areas.

2.1

Research questions

This research report investigates the following questions: 1. What is the likely consequence of REDD for the rights and livelihoods of poor forest-dependent people in different country contexts? 1.1 1.2 2. What processes are jeopardizing local livelihoods and rights? Who wins and who loses in different governance and land tenure contexts?

What policies exist or would have to be put into place to ensure equitable benefitsharing within countries and avoid harmful REDD impacts on forest-dependent people?

2.2

Data collection & analysis

Data collection was primarily accomplished through a thorough literature review including follow-up with some of the authors. Secondarily, interviews or written answers to questionnaires with country-based informants provided additional insights. An openended questionnaire/interview guide was devised for this purpose and is attached as Appendix 2

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The data collected were primarily qualitative in nature, except for existing statistics and indicators. Information on countries was compiled and synthesized into brief case studies (see Section 4). Although generalization from the case studies is not possible, as the main challenges involved are national governance issues, it is likely that the general analysis and conclusions could be applicable in similar contexts elsewhere.

2.2.1

Analytical framework

The analytical framework for REDD implications for the poor used by Peskett et al. (2008) provided a starting point. It is based on three poverty dimensions (income and growth; equity; and voice and choice) and four spatial scales: individual, community, national, and international. For this research, some representative indicators for the above poverty dimensions (relating to human wellbeing and governance issues) were selected (see Table 2-1) and statistics collected for each case country. These primarily national level data, and, where they exist, studies of relevant project experiences, were reviewed and used to analyse REDD/wellbeing implications and to infer the likelihood of benefits reaching the individual/community level3. Selected indicators, as well as forest,- and biodiversity data, are further explained and presented in summary form (see Table A.3-1) in Appendix 3.

Although Peskett et al. rightly distinguish between individual and community levels, for purposes of this report, due to data limitations, these are here lumped together as one category.

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Table 2-1: Analytical framework
Dimensions of wellbeing Livelihoods/income Related governance issues • • •
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National development status Income distribution Poverty Reduction Strategies

Equity (intra-country/intracommunity)

Voice & Choice (participation)

• Benefit-sharing mechanisms (Who owns forest carbon?) • Land tenure/resource access (Who may use forest resources?) • Status of indigenous/ forestdependent people • Transparency in governance • Participatory forest management • Institutional capacity

Indicators (national level) • National Human Development Index (HDI) National Millennium Development Goal (MDG) reports • Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) or similar strategy documents prepared • Timber & non-timber forest product (NTFP) use • National income-distribution (GINI) • Forest ownership/tenure • Forest laws • ILO 169, UNDRIP, national legislation • Corruption perception index (CPI) • Voice & accountability index • Government effectiveness index • Extent of communitymanagement • FSC certification • Community participation in national REDD process development

2.2.2

Country cases

The topic was illustrated through four country cases: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cambodia. These were selected on the basis of location (aiming for a broad geographical spread) and existence of forests of high conservation importance, such as the Global 200 priority areas (NGS & WWF, n.d.). Countries were classified into one of four potential categories based on forest cover and recent deforestation rates following Da Fonseca et al. (2007): 1. Low Forest Cover/High Deforestation (LFHD), 2. Low Forest Cover/Low Deforestation (LFLD), 3. High Forest Cover/High Deforestation (HFHD), and 4. High Forest Cover/Low Deforestation (HFLD). The cut-off point for HF/LF is 50% forest-cover, and for HD/LD a 0.22% annual deforestation rate. Under some REDD scenarios, HD countries would have greater
Governance issues are crosscutting and do not usually apply to only one of the dimensions of wellbeing. The separation here is merely for convenience.
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potential for earning REDD credits than LD countries, since REDD would only pay for avoiding additional deforestation. This report does not provide a complete analysis of this issue. Rather, it is assumed that the countries analyzed will be able to receive substantial earnings from REDD that could be distributed to stakeholders at national and local levels. The specific focus of analysis is the likelihood of REDD benefits reaching the forest-dependent poor, which is essentially a governance matter. The F/D classification was adopted merely for illustrative purposes, as it provides a rough idea of a country’s forest situation. The classification for each country is shown in data tables in Section 4 of the report.

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3

Climate change, deforestation, biodiversity, and human wellbeing

3.1

Deforestation as a driver of global climate change and biodiversity loss

Climate change due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is now widely considered a very urgent threat to the global environment and continued human wellbeing. The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2), the principal anthropogenic greenhouse gas, in the atmosphere had risen from a pre-industrial value of about 280 ppm to 379 ppm in 2005, and the average annual rate of increase in concentration over the decade 1995-2005 (1.9 ppm p.a.) surpassed by far the average since the beginning of atmospheric measurements. The bulk of the increased concentration is attributable to fossil fuel use, while land-use change also contributes about 30%. Within the land-use change category, deforestation and forest degradation is most important, accounting for 17.4% of overall CO2 emissions (IPCC, 2007b). This is more than the share of the transport sector (Stern, 2006), as can be seen in Figure 3-1. In 2005 about 30% of the Earth’s land mass (4 billion hectares) was forested, but global forest area continues to decrease. In the period 2000-2005, about 13 million hectares per year were lost, mainly due to land use change (FAO, 2005). Global average deforestation figures hide large differences among regions and countries. The rates of deforestation in tropical regions were highest. Over the past few decades, the direct causes of deforestation have largely shifted from being driven by land conversion for subsistence farming to large-scale exploitation of forest areas for commercial use, such as oil and mineral extraction, logging, and conversion to plantations (Butler & Laurance, 2008).

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Figure 3-1: Global Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions

a) Global annual emissions (1970 to 2004), b) Share of different anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (CO2eq.) in 2004, c) Emissions share of different sectors (‘forestry’ includes deforestation). Source: IPCC (2007a, p.36)

Many disappearing forests are of high biodiversity value and home to threatened, often unique, species. There is widespread scientific consensus that protected area coverage of important biodiversity areas is insufficient (Schmitt et al., 2009). Furthermore, many protected forests suffer considerably from illegal deforestation and degradation, though at lower rates than unprotected forests (Campbell et al., 2008). Estimates of carbon stored in different types of forest vary. Most global estimates are rough approximations based on biome-average datasets that use representative values of forest carbon per unit area for broad forest categories (Gibbs et al., 2007). Tropical forests probably store more than 320 billion tonnes of carbon globally (Campbell et al., 2008). Whether mature forests are net sinks or emitters has been contentious, but recent research has strengthened the case for the important role old-growth forest plays in carbon sequestration (Lewis et al., 2009). Even the cautious assessment of forests and emissions undertaken for the Eliasch Review confirms that, overall, intact tropical forests are expected to remain net carbon sinks (Betts et al., 2008). Forest cover also produces an indirect climate impact by modifying some physical properties of the land surface, such as its albedo. The feedback mechanisms are complex and dependent on forest-type and land use. For tropical regions, there is broad

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agreement that further deforestation would cause the land surface temperature to warm because of reduced transpiration, and that large scale deforestation may alter atmospheric circulation, thereby further modifying climates (Betts et al., 2008).

3.2

The flip side: climate change impacts on forests and associated biodiversity5

Climate change is expected to increasingly drive biodiversity loss, but the process is complex, as current and projected impacts on biodiversity are subject to the multiple and non-linear feedback loops and lag-times within ecological systems (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 2008). The impacts on forests are as yet uncertain. While some forest areas may become more productive, others may eventually change into different ecosystems altogether (Betts et al., 2008). Rosenzweig et al. (2007) report that physical and biological systems on all continents are already being affected, particularly by regional temperature increases that initiate alterations in hydrological systems, water resources, coastal zones, and oceans. Shifts in species distributions, local abundance, and phenology have by now been documented (e.g., Adams et al., 2009; Battisti et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Dale et al., 2001; Danby & Hik, 2007; Ehrlich & Pringle, 2008; Evans, 2006; Myers et al., 2009; Reid et al., 2004; Seppälä et al., 2009; Van Mantgem et al., 2009; Williams & Liebhold, 2002). While the severity of the impacts and the extent of future biodiversity losses due to climate change and forest degradation or deforestation are difficult to predict (Laurance, 2007; Wright & Muller-Landau, 2006; Dirzo & Raven, 2003), without decisive action, the decline will be unstoppable (Ehrlich & Pringle, 2008).

Several drivers of biodiversity loss tend to reinforce one another (MEA 2005). This report limits the discussion to climate change impacts on forest-based biodiversity.

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3.3

The human aspect: Impacts on the wellbeing of forestdependent people

While human actions are driving biodiversity loss and climate change, reciprocal consequences are also diminishing human wellbeing. Poor people, especially those living in remote rural areas, are expected to be most severely impacted. About 1.6 billion people rely on forest resources for food and cash income (FAO, 2008; UN-DESA, 2009), and over 800 million people live inside tropical forests and woodlands and in mosaiclands, outnumbering people dwelling on purely agricultural lands (Chomitz, 2006). In areas of high forest and very low population densities forest-dependence is Some people derive likely highest (Chomitz, 2006). It is, however, “fruitless to seek simplistic connections between forests and poverty. Empirically, the links are weak. wealth from forests, others from converting forests to agriculture” (Chomitz, 2006, p. 81). Deforestation results in the decline of many species that are essential to forest people’s livelihoods, with negative consequences for subsistence use and local trade. It has been estimated that by the 2080s between 50 and 200 million people (mostly from developing countries) will be displaced by climate-induced changes to crop yields, ecosystem boundaries and species’ ranges (Anderson, 2005). Under the right governance systems, the millions of people who depend on forests for their livelihoods are likely to benefit from climate change mitigation and forest conservation.

3.4

Multiple benefits from REDD

Given the synergies between protecting forests, biodiversity conservation, and mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, governments could simultaneously meet multiple environmental obligations, including those under the UNFCCC, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and other conventions and agreements. In addition, REDD could advance poverty reduction efforts at national and local levels and provide other social benefits.

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There are, however, also risks to biodiversity6 and local communities that could arise from REDD. Concerning poverty reduction, there are two distinct issues: First, there is the question of how much overall funding a particular country is likely to gain from a REDD scheme, and whether this would be sufficient to counteract deforestation pressures. What type of reference level is used is critical 7 (Ebeling & Yasué, 2008). In addition, the opportunity costs of avoided deforestation are highly variable, depending on location (type of land-use, soil, climate, production scale, technology and inputs used, market access and infrastructure quality), and are complicated by factors such as commodity market prices, costs of the factors of production, and the discount rate applied (Grieg-Gran, 2008). It is not surprising, given this complexity, that estimates of opportunity costs per hectare vary widely (see, e.g., analyses by Butler et al. (2009), Venter et al. (2009), Wise et al. (2009)). Second, there is the issue of the distribution of benefits to stakeholders within the country. This report does not address the first issue in detail8, focusing more specifically on the second one. In the absence of pro-poor policies, co-benefits from REDD may not reach the rural poor. There are concerns that rural communities will not be adequately compensated for conservation efforts (Richards & Jenkins, 2007; Luttrell et al., 2007; Ebeling & Yasué, 2008), or that indigenous people living inside forests may be displaced or their rights infringed upon in other ways (Anchorage Declaration, 2009; Butler, 2009; Climatefrontlines.org, 2009; Griffiths, 2007; Palmer, 2009; Roe et al., 2007). One of the major challenges will be to balance equity and efficiency considerations. There are human wellbeing implications for different REDD options chosen for a global instrument, but regardless of the global design, at national level pro-poor policies would

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Risks to biodiversity are not elaborated here. For discussions of these see, e.g., ATBC & GTÖ, 2009; Ebeling & Yasué, 2008; Miles, 2007; Miles & Kapos, 2008; Sasaki & Putz, 2009. 7 E.g. whether to use a static (e.g. historical) or a dynamic (either declining or improving) baseline, determines how many carbon credits a country can receive for avoided deforestation activities, but the details of this are beyond the scope of this report. An excellent summary of this and general challenges for PES can be found in Wunder (2007; 2005) and a useful discussion of possible perverse incentives depending on reference levels used can be found in Miles (2007). 8 Refer, e.g., to da Fonseca et al., 2007; Dutschke et al., 2008; Griscom et al., 2009.

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be needed to avoid harmful impacts and encourage positive effects on the rights and livelihoods of forest-dependent poor communities (Peskett et al. 2008).

3.5 Poverty, equity, governance, and REDD
Poverty can be defined in many ways, but clearly people who cannot meet their basic needs fall within the category of “the poor”. Income alone is not a sufficient indicator for human wellbeing, although it is often used as a convenient proxy. Indicators such as the HDI and those outlined in the MDGs offer better descriptors of the multiple dimensions of human wellbeing. Regarding global equity, there are concerns about justice and power differentials among rich and poor nations, such as the global distribution of obligations of climate change mitigation vs. the right to development in poorer countries. developing countries. Much of the REDD discussion related to equity issues focuses on the distribution of benefits among different This does not automatically address important intra-country justice issues. These are determined by the types of governance and benefit sharing mechanisms that exist or are put in place within countries. Several groups are also lobbying for global pro-poor REDD design standards. Various organizations are developing relevant standards that could be helpful not only at the project level, but also for governments seeking to meet poverty reduction goals. The already existing Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Project Design Standards (Victurine, 2008; CCBA, 2008) and the social and environmental standards for REDD, which are currently being developed by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) (CCBA, n.d.), explicitly address poverty and rights issues. At the time of writing it seems likely that a global REDD instrument will at least include language requiring that the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities are not negatively affected by REDD (UNFCCC, 2009). Concerning indigenous peoples’ rights, there are a number of international instruments that a majority of countries have committed to. These include (Lawlor & Huberman, 2009) the 1989 International Labour Organization’s Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169), which covers special rights

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concerning their customary lands; and the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which was voted for by 143 countries. It requires, inter alia, the free prior informed consent (FPIC) of indigenous people on any activity on their traditional lands. More general human rights instruments also contain relevant provisions, including the right to property in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Governments thus have both moral and legal duties to uphold the rights of forestdependent and indigenous people. Not doing so may not only be inequitable and in contravention of laws, but may also lead to failures of REDD programmes. Land tenure regimes and other property rights are generally an important aspect of forest governance. Vast areas of forest in the tropics are communally held and managed, but historically there has been friction between customary and statutory tenure and the latter is used as the basis for defining property rights, adjudicating claims, and establishing contracts (RRI & ITTO, 2009). REDD could, given political will, lead to or reinforce recognition of traditional forest use rights and to clarification of tenure and recognition of ancestral claims. But tenure is not the only issue. The human, civil and political rights of forest-dependent people are often denied or insecure, especially when competing with the interests of more powerful groups or individuals. Equitable forest governance therefore requires a broader spectrum of rights recognitions, such as systems of representation, and social, cultural, and economic rights for indigenous and other forest-dependent people (Colchester, 2008). (Stockbridge, 2006). Variation in the bargaining power of different organizations is important in determining how rules are defined and which interests they favour (Stockbridge, 2006). For example, despite the increasing trend towards various types of co-management schemes of forests, while these have tended to improve access rights of the rural poor to forest resources, they have not always significantly improved their livelihoods, as forestry agencies’ interests in timber production or environmental conservation may ride roughshod over local people’s interests or favour local elites (Wollenberg et al., 2004). Another problem that applies to forest governance in general and will certainly also affect REDD is that in many tropical countries with large forest resources, governments Good governance also demands rights that are enforceable, and access to an impartial justice system for all citizens

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have only limited control over what is happening in forests (Legge et al., 2008). The implication is that, even when laws and policies exist for conservation and SFM, implementation may be deficient. Furthermore, because deforestation is not exclusively a forest sector issue, coordination is needed among many institutions working in different sectors, and broad-based information sharing and participation are required, from the grassroots to the national government level. In this regard, another potential ‘co-benefit’ that could emerge from the process of getting countries ready for REDD implementation, may be improved governance institutions. It is only through well developed and fully functional institutions at the national, subnational and community levels that co-benefits of REDD for local communities have a chance to deliver what they promise: real benefits for livelihoods and general wellbeing. It also seems important, so as to avoid creating a class of “rent recipients” (Schipulle, 2009, pers.comm.) among the target population, that benefits – if they do reach forestdependent people – are not perceived as charity, but are in fact clearly linked to specific actions, such as SFM, conservation work, or alternative livelihood schemes. In practice it seems that many target countries for REDD are not well prepared to ensure that local people benefit (Cotula & Mayers, 2009). A phased approach to REDD design and implementation is therefore finding increasing support among negotiators. In such an approach, tropical forest countries would first develop a national strategy and implement some pilot projects, then receive donor funding for reform of tenure and forest laws, and finally get large amounts of funding from carbon markets for actual emissions reductions (Block, 2009; Meridian, 2009). Some programmes to help countries plan for and test REDD activities already exist, among them the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) (FCPF, 2009) and the multi-agency UN-REDD Programme (UN-REDD, 2009b).

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4

Country case studies

The cases in this report examine what implications local context and existing relevant policies and governance systems could have for REDD impacts on forest-dependent communities in these countries. Appendix 4. These cases are presented with more detail in

4.1

Africa

4.1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
DRC is among the poorest countries in the world, with the lowest human development and governance scores. At the same time, the Congo Basin still has vast extensions of relatively intact tropical forest. Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table 4-1-and additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3. Figure 4-1 shows the vast extent of still existing tropical forest, while Figure 4-2 is a satellite photograph of the dense rainforest cover surrounding the Congo river and its tributary Aruwimi in north-eastern DRC. .
Figure 4-1: DRC Land Cover Map Figure 4-2: North-Eastern DRC

Source: Vancutsem et al. (2009, p.67)

Source: ESA (2008)

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Table 4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC) HUMAN WELLBEING & GOVERNANCE Population GDP/capita (PPP US$) 62,399,224 714 FOREST Total forest area (1000 ha) Forest as % of total land area (FAO) Deforestation rate (Change in forest area in %) 2000-2005 (FAO) 133,610 58.9%

Life expectancy HDI Report) (2007/2008

45.8

-0.2%

0.411

Trend Original forest area as % of total land area (WRI) Classification following Fonseca et al. (2009) Carbon stock in forest 2005 (million tonnes)

Down

GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank – HDI rank (2007/08) HPI (2007/2008 Report)

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83.0%

39.30%

HFLD

GINI WB Governance Score Voice & Accountability (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) WB Governance Score Government Effectiveness (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) CPI (2008) EPI Overall score ILO 169 signed/ratified UNDRIP supported?

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32,152

-1.48

Forest ownership

public 100%

-1.89 1.7 47.3 N Y

FSC certification

-

Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)

Despite relatively low levels of deforestation so far, there is concern about the increasing number of logging concessions and potential land conversion for commercial agriculture in the country (Kidd & Kenrick, 2009). By 2008, 33.5 million ha of forest lands were under some type of concession for timber or mining (Sunderlin et al., 2008), none of which was following international SFM standards (Lescuyer & Delvingt, 2007), although the government has expressed its intent to move towards SFM (BTC, 2007).

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Forest livelihoods About 70% of the population are forest-dependent for their livelihoods (Counsell, 2006), but only a small percentage of people are indigenous forest-dwellers, collectively referred to as ‘pygmy’. More than two thirds of the country are occupied by the majority Bantu peoples, who also depend on forest-resources, albeit to a different degree, and have overlapping customary rights to forest resources with the pygmies (IP, 2007). It is, however, the pygmies who have the most trouble gaining formal rights to lands and resources, due to systemic discrimination (Lewis et al., 2008). The 2005 Constitution guarantees the protection of fundamental rights to all citizens of DRC, but no special status is given to pygmy groups (ibid.). Governance DRC is in a severe economic and governance crisis, after emerging from a long internal conflict between the central government and various rebel groups that has caused the deaths and displacement of millions of people (WB, 2008a). Despite the decade-long presence of UN Peacekeepers, conflict is still taking lives and causing many human rights abuses in some areas of the country (HRW, 2009; OHCHR, 2009). Governance scores are low and corruption levels are very high. The government prepared its first full PRSP in July 2006, which aims, inter alia, to strengthen public institutions and improve governance (WB, 2008b). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly organized over the past few years, many of which are grouped under the umbrella organization Natural Resources Network (RRN), as have pygmy groups. Forest governance Forestry is governed by the Ministry of Environment (MECNT). A Thematic Group on Forests brings together relevant MECNT Directorates, the Planning Ministry, and representatives from international agencies that support DRC’s forest sector (UN-REDD, 2009a). A decentralization and reorganization programme is in progress.

22

The 2002 Forest Code zoned 40% of the forest for commercial exploitation, 15% for conservation, and the remainder for concessions. Zoning does not reflect traditional land tenure systems, but it imposes a duty on logging companies to provide socioeconomic benefits and allows communities to participate in setting concession limits (Sakata, 2007). 2008). An independent World Bank Investigation Panel states that while a solid legal framework is important, “an almost overwhelming problem in the forest sector in DRC is the lack of institutional capacity to implement and enforce the laws and regulations, especially at the provincial and local levels” (IP, 2007, p.132), and that one can therefore not count on the law to guarantee sustainable development or benefits for local people in the forest sector. REDD Potential DRC is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like Bolivia and Guatemala), which has expressed formal interest in REDD to the UNFCCC. Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (2006) estimated that DRC could earn anywhere between US$179 million and US$1.28 billion per year for avoided deforestation, depending on the carbon price and actual emissions reductions, which would be a significant income boon. The government views REDD as a potential input to the national development agenda (Kasulu et al., 2008), and has formally stated that REDD activities should support local communities’ and indigenous peoples’ social, environmental and economic development (UNFCCC, 2008, p.5). Yet corruption is reportedly systemic, and transparency and accountability at all levels are low. Particularly for pygmies, it is hard to see how they will be able to benefit from REDD income, given their historic social exclusion, except perhaps through targeted projects. Neither may poor Bantu farming communities see many income benefits from REDD, due to unresolved issues around legislating for community land tenure and creating implementing bodies, which makes it difficult for policy makers to assign carbon rights, especially where there are overlapping land claims (Rogers, 2008). Communities have also been given the right to receive forest concessions and manage forests, but by 2008 none had been awarded (Sunderlin et al.,

23

More positively, however, DRC has one of the strongest civil society networks in central Africa (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.), and it will not be that easy for the government to completely “centralize” (i.e. appropriate) REDD credits. NGOs and the government are trying to raise awareness on REDD among the population so that affected people can make informed decisions (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.). Hope also springs from continued international pressure and support for governance reform. DRC will receive assistance from the FCPF (FCPF, 2008b), which will help to create the necessary legal and institutional frameworks to facilitate REDD implementation. It will also receive assistance from the UN-REDD Programme. Many other international and national agencies are involved in strengthening forest governance in DRC. The UNREDD (2009) proposal argues that despite a heritage of distrust between government and civil society, the REDD process in DRC has so far been a cooperative effort and that the prospects for REDD advancing through a government/civil society dialogue are solid.

24

4.2 4.2.1

South and Central America Bolivia

Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, and considered biologically ‘megadiverse’. It has the sixth largest tropical forest area in the world (UDAPE, 2006).
Table 4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia) HUMAN WELLBEING & GOVERNANCE Population GDP/capita (PPP US$) 9,517,537 2,819 64.7

FOREST Total forest area (1000 ha) Forest as % of total land area (FAO) Deforestation rate (Change in forest area in %) 2000-2005 (FAO) 58,740 54.2% -0.5%

Life expectancy HDI Report) (2007/2008

0.695

Trend Original forest area as % of total land area (WRI) Classification following Fonseca et al. (2009) Carbon stock in forest 2005 (million tonnes)

Up

GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank – HDI rank (2007/08) HPI (2007/2008 Report)

7

54.0%

13.6%

HFHD

GINI WB Governance Score Voice & Accountability (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) WB Governance Score Government Effectiveness (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) CPI (2008) EPI Overall score ILO 169 signed/ratified UNDRIP supported?

60

5,877 public 85%, private 10%, other 5%

-0.01

Forest ownership

-0.81 3 64.7 Y Y

FSC certification (June 2009) (1000 ha)

1,819

Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)

25

Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table 4-2, and additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3. Despite relatively low levels of deforestation so far, there is concern about an increasing rate of forest loss, mostly because of the expansion of industrial agriculture, logging, and incursion of colonists from the degraded highlands (Robertson & Wunder, 2005).
Figure 4-3: Bolivia Land Cover Map
Legend
Administration Land Cover Developed Dry Cropland & Pasture Irrigated Cropland Cropland/Grassland Cropland/Woodland Grassl and Shrubl and Shrubl and/Grassland Savanna Deciduous Broadleaf F orest Deciduous Needlel eaf Forest Ev egreen Broadleaf Forest Ev ergreen Needleleaf Forest Mix ed Forest Water Herbaceous Wetland Wooded Wetland Barren Herbaceous Tundra Wooded Tundra Mix ed Tundra

Source: (FAO, 2009a)

Bare Tundra Snow or Ice Partly Developed Unclassified

Figures 4-3 and Figure 4-4 show how agricultural land use is spreading into forest areas. Forest livelihoods Some 1.4 million people live in or near forested areas, including 180,000 indigenous people with a claim on 42% of Bolivia’s forest lands, and 30,000 peasant farmers who use NTFPs. There are about 500 registered small-scale timber producers. Conflicts exist especially with poor colonists from the highlands, and with large-scale forest concessions. (Colchester, 2004)

26

Governance As a medium human development country, Bolivia has some general governance challenges. distribution. The fourth national MDG report and the National Development Plan of 2006 (PND) include broad, integrated social goals, reflecting political will to work against social exclusion and reduce socio-economic inequalities (Loza Tellería, 2006).
9

Corruption is somewhat of an issue, as is the highly skewed income

Indigenous

people on average score lower on human development indicators than non-indigenous people (UDAPE, 2006). Bolivia ratified ILO 169 in 1991 (ILO, 2006), and UNDRIP became national Law 3760 in 2007 (Sunderlin et al., 2008). The election of Bolivia’s first indigenous president allowed the incorporation of indigenous social movements into the national political arena (UDAPE et al., 2006).
Figure 4-4: Satellite image of Bolivia

Forest governance The extent of large-scale illegal logging has decreased substantially since the institution of the independent Forest Superintendence (Colchester, 2004). The PND also includes SFM as a goal (UDAPE, 2006). Bolivia is undergoing a process of forest land reform to recognize or transfer formal rights to local communities and smallholders based on ancestral claims and cultural identity. Land tenure in Bolivia is still skewed towards large-scale landholders, despite earlier land reforms.
9

Source: NASA (2008a)

The majority (66%) of the population above age 15 self-identify as indigenous, among the highest proportions in Latin America, and almost 50% speak indigenous languages (UDAPE et al., 2006).

27

The Forest Law (1996) includes indigenous and campesino interests, including community forestry for commercial purposes (Colchester, 2004; Pacheco et al., 2008). The current reforms are intended to reconcile conservation, livelihoods and rights-based concerns (Pacheco et al., 2008). They are among the most progressive in community and indigenous land tenure and resource access reform, and also regarding safeguards for equal land access for women and men (Taylor, 2006). There are, however, incidences of conflicts over forest tenure, for example where customary use rights clash with awarded timber or other concessions (Asquith et al., 2002), and unintended instances of elite capture have arisen locally (Taylor, 2006). As part of a broader decentralization programme, Bolivia is also moving forest management authority from central to local government (Chomitz, 2006). Municipal governments in Bolivia retain 25% of forest revenues, which could be invested into local pro-poor development (OECD, 2009). Officially 85% of forests are publicly owned, while 10% are privately owned, and the remainder is either community-owned or of undefined tenure status (Chomitz, 2006). Local communities and indigenous groups own relatively large tracts of forest (ibid.). Community forest management is somewhat hampered by cumbersome standards, bureaucracy and high transaction costs for smallholders (Pacheco et al., 2008). Overall, the decentralization of forest land administration has had a positive impact on the conservation of forests (Taylor, 2006). According to Ebeling and Yasué (2008), corruption in the forestry agency has been much reduced due to policy and institutional reform, which has translated into much better forest management. By 2009, 16 forestry operators had achieved FSC certification, including one indigenous communal concession (FSC, 2006; FSC, 2009). REDD Potential Bolivia is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like DRC and Guatemala), which has expressed formal interest in REDD to the UNFCCC. Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (Butler, 2006a) estimated that Bolivia could earn anywhere between US$72 million and US$1.08 billion per year for avoided

28

deforestation, depending on the carbon price and actual emissions reductions. This would make a significant contribution to national earnings. In practice, Bolivia’s supportive legislative framework and pro-poor policies are often hampered by institutional weaknesses, lack of financial resources, and lack of technical capacity (May et al., 2004). Bolivia will receive assistance for REDD preparations from the FCPF, which will help to ameliorate governance challenges. One pilot experience with carbon forestry, the carbon project in Noel Kempff Mercado National Park (see Appendix 3), on the whole, resulted in net positive protection and livelihood effects on participating service-sellers and positive community-wide social effects. Based on Bolivia’s efforts to uphold indigenous rights and to improve forest governance so far, chances are good that REDD in Bolivia will have a positive impact on local forest-dependent communities.

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4.2.2

Guatemala

Guatemala is a medium human development country in Central America, with one of the highest levels of biodiversity and endemism combined in Latin America. statistics can be found in Appendix 3.
Table 4-3: Key data and indicators (Guatemala) HUMAN WELLBEING & GOVERNANCE Population GDP/capita (PPP US$) 13,348,222 4,568 69.7

Some key

statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table 4-3, and additional

FOREST Total forest area (1000 ha) Forest as % of total land area (FAO) Deforestation rate (Change in forest area in %) 2000-2005 (FAO) 3,938 36.3% -1.3%

Life expectancy HDI Report) (2007/2008

0.689

Trend Original forest area as % of total land area (WRI) Classification following Fonseca et al. (2009) Carbon stock in forest 2005 (million tonnes)

Up

GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank – HDI rank (2007/08) HPI (2007/2008 Report)

-11

99.0%

22.5%

LFHD

GINI WB Governance Score Voice & Accountability (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) WB Governance Score Government Effectiveness (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) CPI (2008) EPI Overall score ILO 169 signed/ratified UNDRIP supported?

55

572 public 42.2%, private 52.5%, other 5.3%

-0.26

Forest ownership

-0.49 3.1 76.7 Y Y

FSC certification (June 2009) (1000 ha)

457.6

Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)

30

Within Guatemala, there is great variation in forest loss rates among departments (Ferrate et al., 2009). The highest loss in terms of area was experienced in the remote Petén region, although this is where most protected areas are located. Conversion to farmland, fuelwood consumption, illegal industrial logging, fires, and pests drive Guatemala’s deforestation. (Ferrate et al., 2009). Figure 4-5 maps different types of land cover, and Figure 4-6 shows smoke from forest fires in 2002.

Figure 4-5: Guatemala land cover map

Forest livelihoods Many people’s livelihoods are connected to communal and industrial timber concessions and use of forest products. Fuelwood use is increasing (about 60% of the population depend on it for energy), but there is little control and much more appears to be harvested than is authorized (Ferrate et al., 2009). Governance Guatemala has many governance

challenges. The country was embroiled
Source: FAO (2000)

in a long civil war, during which extreme human rights violations by the State were

committed. (CEH, 2005)

Numerous violent massacres of entire Mayan communities took place.

Peace came in 1996, but the society bears deep scars. Violence and organized crime are widespread. Income distribution remains very unequal. Formally, the government today is committed to indigenous rights, reflected in its ratification of international indigenous-rights related legal instruments and in the new national Constitution. There are now indigenous people’s offices in some public institutions (Ferrate et al., 2009), but budgets are insufficient to address indigenous issues efficiently (MRGI, 2008). Crimes

31

against human rights defenders by illegal armed groups are frequently committed with almost complete impunity (UN, 2008b). Forest governance Forestry and conservation is the legal purview of a number of
Figure 4-6: Satellite image of fires from biomass burning in Guatemala

ministries and agencies, mainly the National Forestry Institute (INAB), the National Council of Protected Areas (CONAP), the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) and the System for Control and Prevention of Forest Fires (SIPECIF). Municipalities are autonomous and responsible for managing natural resources in their

Source: NASA (2008b)

jurisdiction and for undertaking their own land use planning. (Ferrate et al., 2009) Comanagement arrangements with NGOs exist for some of the National Parks (ELI, 2003). A process of forest land reform is ongoing, with a move towards decentralized management of forest resources. Ownership of forests is 42.2% public, 37.8% private and 14.7% communal (Ferrate et al., 2009). SFM is increasing: At the time of writing, there were 10 FSC-certified forestry operations in Guatemala, totaling 457,625 ha (FSC, 2009). Co-management of forests with communities is common. In the Petén region, almost 500,000 ha were put under 13 co-managed community concessions in the 1990s (Junkin, 2007). This constitutes the largest expanse of community-managed forest in the world, and almost 70% of this is FSC-certified (Cronkleton et al., 2008). Chomitz (2006) reports that, despite problematic corruption and lack of organizational capacity, the extraction of valuable hardwoods has made these concessions mostly profitable, and that deforestation inside them appears substantially lower than outside them.

32

Guatemala thus has an appropriate legal framework and policies for SFM, but inadequate national budget allocations for forests and conservation appear to reflect the low political priority given to environmental issues vis-à-vis other areas (EPIQ, 2003). Furthermore, more powerful actors often succeed in getting their interests represented (Larson, 2008), whether at the national level, or at municipal and indigenous authority levels. REDD Potential Guatemala is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like DRC and Bolivia), which has expressed formal interest in REDD. Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (2006a) estimated that Guatemala could earn anywhere between US$21-216 million per year for avoided deforestation, depending on the carbon price and actual emissions reductions. A national agenda for REDD projects with coordination among the various government agencies is under preparation, supported by several NGOs. Guatemala will also receive funding from the FCPF for REDD readiness activities. According to McNab (2009, pers.comm.) the government maintains that carbon rights are held by the state, but there is no specific law governing carbon, and the details for distribution of REDD benefits are still under discussion. Municipalities in Guatemala may retain a substantial portion of forestry revenue (50%, double the figure of Bolivia), which can be utilized for pro-poor development (OECD, 2009). The government has expressed interest in maximizing the potential income of indigenous people from REDD, and potentially, REDD incentives could lead to greater internal support within communities for SFM activities and might lead to new livelihoodenhancing opportunities (McNab, 2009, pers.comm.). Which agencies should receive REDD resources, or what the share for each should be is not yet clear, and it is likely that greater centralization of REDD income will be sought (ibid.). The first REDD demonstration project will launch in the Maya Biosphere Reserve (MBR) in the Petén with support from international NGOs, but is still in the design stage. The

33

groups proposed for participation have legal standing through forest concessions, so it is expected that local groups would be affected positively (McNab, 2009, pers.comm.). Overall, it seems that there is good potential for forest-dependent people to derive benefits from REDD in Guatemala. The Petén region offers an interesting example of the complex relations underlying negotiations in contested areas. Most observers agree that the Petén has become, over the past several years, a territory governed to the benefit of both communities and forests, enabled through collective action and a shift in several rights bundles from the state and individual (industrial) concessions to the communities involved (Monterroso & Barry, 2008).

34

4.3 Southeast Asia 4.3.1 Cambodia

Cambodia is a medium human development country with a very high deforestation rate. It has high numbers of endangered or critically endangered species (Clements & Evans, 2008).
Table 4-4: Key data and indicators (Cambodia) HUMAN WELLBEING & GOVERNANCE Population GDP/capita (PPP US$) 14,446,056 2,727

FOREST Total forest area (1000 ha) Forest as % of total land area (FAO) Deforestation rate (Change in forest area in %) 2000-2005 (FAO) 10,447 59.2%

Life expectancy HDI Report) (2007/2008

58

-2.0%

0.598

Trend Original forest area as % of total land area (WRI) Classification following Fonseca et al. (2009) Carbon stock in forest 2005 (million tonnes)

Up

GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank – HDI rank (2007/08) HPI (2007/2008 Report)

-6

100.0%

38.6%

HFHD

GINI WB Governance Score Voice & Accountability (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) WB Governance Score Government Effectiveness (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) CPI (2008) EPI Overall score ILO 169 signed/ratified UNDRIP supported?

41.7

1,426

-0.94

Forest ownership

public 100%

-0.81 1.8 53.8 N Y

FSC certification

-

Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)

35

Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table 4-4, and additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3. The main drivers of deforestation in Cambodia, are illegal logging, land conversion from agricultural encroachment, fuelwood consumption, lack of SFM capacity, and lack of (financial) incentives to conserve forests, as well as timber demand from other countries (Sokhun et al., 2009).

Figure 4-7: Cambodia Land Cover Map

Leg end
Administration Land Cover Developed Dry Cropland & Pasture Irr igated Cropland Cropland/Grassland Cropland/W oodland Grassland Shrubland Shrubland/Grassland Savanna Deciduous Broadl eaf F or est Deciduous Needl eleaf F orest Ev egreen Br oadleaf Forest Ev er gr een Needleleaf Forest Mix ed F orest W ater Herbaceous W etl and W ooded Wetland Barr en Herbaceous T undra W ooded Tundra Mix ed T undra Bare Tundra Snow or Ice Partly D eveloped Unclassifi ed

Source: FAO (2009b)

Figure 4-7 maps land cover types, and the satellite image in Figure 4-8 shows South East Asia with the rainforests of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the Mekong river passing through Cambodia into southern Vietnam, and the Tonle Sap lake. Forest livelihoods Cambodia has a very large rural population (79%). Particularly upland indigenous

communities are heavily forest-dependent (Colchester, 2004). Overall about 1.4 million

36

people were estimated to be forest-dependent in the year 2000 (Poffenberger, 2006). Fuelwood provides energy for 84% of the population. Governance Cambodia’s recent history was marred by war in the 1970s and the brutal regime of the Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979, followed by years of renewed occupation by Vietnam. A Peace Agreement finally brought new hope in 1991, although it did not mark the end of violence. Cambodia emerged heavily scarred and, despite an elected government, serious deficiencies in governance and justice administration remain. (Sharp, 1997) Cambodia has made substantial

progress in reducing poverty over the past decade, reducing the proportion of poor people by about 1% annually on average. Nevertheless, reducing inequality is a major challenge, though not as large as in some of the other countries presented. The PRSP of 2002 (RGC, 2002) planned for national poverty reduction for the years 2003-2005. In 2003 Cambodia prepared its first

Figure 4-8: Satellite image of South East Asia

Source: NASA (2008c)

national MDG report and elaborated strategies for achieving the targets in a number of policy documents, including the ‘Rectangular Strategy’ (2004) and the National Development 2008) Although Cambodia voted for UNDRIP, according to OHCHR (OHCHR, 2008, p.15), “indigenous people have suffered greatly…” from illegal evictions from their traditional lands. Unlike in other countries, there is no national-level indigenous representative organization, although there are some provincial-level associations, but there is a Plan 2006-2010, which integrated the earlier Socio-Economic Development Plan, the National Poverty Reduction Strategy and the MDGs. (UNDP,

37

thriving umbrella NGO Forum that brings together social and environmental NGOs, mainly for networking and advocacy (Evans, 2009). Forest governance All forest lands are state-owned (FAO, 2005), and the proportion of community-managed forests is low (Chomitz, 2006). The Forestry Administration (FA), a semi-autonomous unit governed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), is responsible for the management of production forests, whereas the Ministry for the Environment (MOE) oversees protection forests (Sunderlin, 2006). Commercial forestry concessions contributed much to deforestation before the moratorium on logging that was introduced in 2002. Concession management now requires mandatory Strategic Forest Management Plans, and Environmental and Social Impact Assessments. Illegal logging has continued despite the logging ban (Sunderlin, 2006). At the time of writing, none of the logging operations in Cambodia are FSCcertified (FSC, 2009). Global Witness reports illegal logging even in protected areas due to lack of political will and institutionalized corruption at the highest levels of government, which tends to enforce the law selectively against community forest users, but not against large operators (GW, 2004a). The government has formally recognized the importance of forest-based livelihoods and the need to maximize the forestry sector’s contribution to poverty reduction, food security, and equitable development in a 2002 Statement on National Forest Sector Policy (van Beukering et al., 2009). The Statement also explicitly mentioned the need to legally recognize and protect the traditional rights of local populations. As of 2008 only about 2% of forest lands were community forests, but the FA intends to increase the area to about 20%, and there is now a National Community Forestry Coordination Committee (Sokhun et al., 2009). Unlike in Bolivia and Guatemala, logging is not allowed in community forests, so the extraction and sale of NTFPs is the only way participants can earn income from these forests (Sunderlin, 2006). Furthermore, most community forestry projects are situated on already deforested or degraded lands, as the original intent was not poverty-reduction

38

per se, but the rehabilitation of such lands and the conservation of what forest remains (ibid.). In addition to conflicts with loggers, the illegal appropriation of land, encroachment by agricultural settlers, and economic land concessions present a problem for ethnic minority forest-dependent communities, whose status in Cambodian society is low, and who are unable to defend their land or forest use rights (ARD, 2004; ARD, 2006; Poffenberger, 2006). There are several ongoing efforts to improve forest governance in Cambodia, such as donor-funded independent monitors of forest law enforcement. Efforts are also being made at inter-sectoral coordination. REDD Potential As an HFHD country, Cambodia is likely to be able to count on sizeable REDD investments to avoid further deforestation. Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (2006a; 2006b) estimated that Cambodia could earn between US$80-875 million from REDD, depending on the carbon price and actual emissions reductions. According to a 2008 Council of Ministers decision, the FA now has the right to negotiate deals and sell REDD credits, but as yet there is no mechanism to disperse funds in such a way that the maximum revenue reaches the local level (Clements & Evans, 2008). Like all countries studied, Cambodia will receive assistance from the FCPF for REDDreadiness. However, in a situation where “[laws] may be made under pressures from donors, but there is no intention to enforce laws inconvenient to the ruling group” (OHCHR, 2008, p.16), it is not very likely that local forest-dependent communities will receive a fair share of benefits from REDD, except where NGOs or donors are directly monitoring performance. There are at least two international NGO-sponsored forest carbon pilot initiatives under preparation or recently launched in Cambodia, which are specifically designed with

39

community benefits in mind. On a national scale, however, the extent of benefits forestdependent people can derive may be limited by lack of political will and generally weak institutions. The demonstration projects will provide lessons to take into account when developing further REDD initiatives, and they do appear to have the potential to build institutional capacities at both national and local levels and demonstrate how such projects can work transparently and bring the expected benefits to local communities.

40

5

Discussion

Most important for making REDD work for forest-dependent people are, in all country cases, the existing governance and institutional capacities as well as political will. It is clear that their starting points are different. All countries have governance challenges, including institutional deficiencies and issues around corruption and law enforcement capacity, but it is a matter of degree. As far as governance and human wellbeing indicators are concerned, Bolivia and Guatemala have been doing much better lately than Cambodia, which in turn does better than DRC. Two key governance indicators, voice & accountability, and the CPI, are shown in Figure 5-1 to illustrate this (countries are ranked from worst to best performance). None of the countries have a stellar performance on either indicator, but DRC and Cambodia are clearly the worst in terms of accountability and have the highest reported corruption.

Figure 5-1: Comparison of two key governance indicators
Voice & Accountability -0.01

CPI 3.4

Scale -2.5 to +2.5

-0.26

3 S c ale 0-10

3.1

-0.94

1.7

1.8

-1.48 DRC Cambodia Guatemala Bolivia

DR Congo

Cambodia

Bolivia

Guatemala

Madagascar

Source: Author, drawing on World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009) and TI (2008)

Going back to the research questions posed in the beginning, it can be said that, while specific impacts are uncertain and some will depend on the way the global mechanism is designed, some general answers are emerging. Q1. What is the likely consequence of REDD for the rights and livelihoods of poor forest-dependent people in different country contexts?

41

1.1

What processes are jeopardizing local livelihoods and rights?

The situation for forest-dependent people differs markedly in the countries examined, but also has some similarities in the underlying causes that affect livelihoods and rights. Appropriation of lands for commercial exploitation, such as mining, logging, or largescale agriculture, has affected many smallholder farmers in the past, especially in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cambodia. This has so far been less of an issue in DRC. In Cambodia upland indigenous communities have been evicted from their lands, either to make room for commercial concessions or because other poor farming groups have moved in. In-migration into indigenous territories to convert forest to farmland has been a problem in all countries, though in DRC many pygmy groups have themselves become semi-sedentary farmers and others have become displaced from their lands. In all countries, if REDD initiatives concentrate mainly on large-scale state-, or private-sectormanaged SFM operations, this could potentially lead to negative impacts on smallholder forest owners or even displace indigenous forest dwellers if areas they inhabit are zoned for conservation without human habitation. Social injustices are making indigenous communities particularly vulnerable to loss of livelihoods. All countries studied have high levels of inequality, with biases against rural people. Forest-dependent indigenous groups invariably find themselves at the bottom of the wellbeing scale, but there are clear differences. Bolivia and Guatemala have recently made strides towards solidifying indigenous rights and have integrated legal protection for indigenous and local communities into their forest laws. In DRC, like elsewhere in Africa, the term ‘indigenous’ itself is controversial, and pygmy people have traditionally been discriminated against. In Cambodia, highland peoples are also marginalized and suffer incursion from lowland agricultural migrants. Nevertheless, all these countries have supported UNDRIP and have at least made statements to the effect that local and indigenous communities should receive the maximum possible benefit from REDD.

42

1.2

Who wins and who loses in different governance and land tenure contexts?

To some extent the answer to this question depends how one defines ‘winners’. In general, carbon credit earnings could flow into central government coffers, from where they could be redistributed; or they could go straight to the communities living in target areas to pay them for environmental services provided. Additionally, new employment or income earning opportunities may arise from REDD-induced SFM operations or conservation projects with development components. governance capacity at all levels. Who is likely to ‘win’ or ‘lose’ with REDD implementation will depend on the general governance and institutional situation, and on the detailed arrangements negotiated between the parties to specific REDD initiatives. The importance of land tenure issues has been discussed. Where forest sector decentralization processes are well under way, such as in Bolivia and Guatemala, the chances of community co-benefits are greater. In these countries, community forestry is relatively prevalent, and this seems to predestine communities for active participation in REDD. On the other hand, not all communities are concessionaires, and not all land claims have been sorted out, and those who cannot legitimize their claims stand to ‘lose’, at least concerning direct carbon income. In Cambodia and DRC, almost all forests are state-owned, and there are much fewer co-management agreements to date. Prospects do exist to increase their share, which may yet make some forest-dependent communities into ‘winners’. Where there are conflicting rights claims, particularly over land or resource use, these need to be clarified. In DRC and Cambodia, indigenous groups have in the past had their traditional land rights ignored. It remains to be seen how this will be handled in the future. All countries studied have issues relating to tenure security, including conflicts among different ‘local’ communities, law enforcement, and balancing the interests of various stakeholders. In practice, in countries with very high corruption levels, such as DRC and Cambodia, there is a danger that only a minor share will end up with the communities it is intended Communities may also see wellbeing improvements from indirect effects, such as improved institutional and

43

for, while the bulk is captured by elites. The proportion of rural poor is very large, and so far there appears to be little voice or representation for them vis-à-vis more powerful actors, except where NGOs and donors are intervening directly. In countries like Bolivia and Guatemala, which have accumulated considerable positive experiences with community forestry, it seems reasonable to expect that communities will not lose out on REDD benefits. In all countries, through project-based initiatives, such as the pilot projects under development or implementation, it may be easier to ensure benefits for local stakeholders; the details depend on the benefit distribution mechanisms negotiated.

Q2.

What policies exist or would have to be put into place to ensure equitable benefit-sharing within countries and avoid harmful REDD impacts on forest-dependent people?

At least in theory, all countries studied have acceptable legal frameworks and stated policies that would pave the way for equitable benefit-sharing. Their Constitutions guarantee indigenous rights and/or equality for all citizens. Forest laws now require forest management plans and social responsibility strategies from concessionaires, and national development plans all talk about decreasing poverty and increasing livelihood opportunities. REDD specific policies will still have to be elaborated. These will have to address the benefit-sharing mechanisms (e.g. the percentage of net income to go to various departments and organizations). In a pro-poor scenario, the maximum possible share should probably go to the local level, as is, for example, already the case for forestryrelated taxes in Guatemala, where municipalities may keep 50%, which they can use for local development. For large scale concessions, social obligations are already being placed on logging companies, but are at the moment selectively enforced in those countries with a poor governance record. Reconciliation of traditional customs concerning forest management and national law is also necessary in some instances.

44

What emerges from the cases studied is that policies and laws are in place or in the process of being updated, but that implementation is still lacking.

45

6 Conclusions and Recommendations
Clearly, co-benefits for biodiversity and the wellbeing of forest-dependent people will not automatically emerge from REDD. If REDD is to live up to its promise of social cobenefits, it will have to be flexible enough to accommodate differences in national situations, and provide sufficiently specific guidance on equity issues to increase the likelihood of benefits reaching forest-dependent communities. Politics and policies play a big role in determining actual outcomes. Including pro-poor policies in national REDD programmes is an important first step. Reforming national and sub-national institutions to be able to implement such policies is vital. Trade-offs among the interests of different groups are inevitable, and in the negotiation process there is a need for awareness and attempts at mitigation of power differences to avoid elite capture of benefits. Oversight by ‘watchdog’ organizations may be needed to ensure fairness, especially where corruption is high. Clearly there should be full participation of local communities (through designated representatives) and FPIC for those groups whose forest areas may be affected, in all stages of the REDD process. For this to happen, capacity has to be developed at all levels, from national government agencies to local community organizations. In some of the countries examined, such processes are well underway (particularly Bolivia and Guatemala), in others they have only started (DRC, Cambodia). A phased approach, as outlined in Section 3.5, would be useful in all countries examined. Rights and governance issues are the crux of the matter, and it will be well worth investing in clarifying and improving these, for REDD to have a chance to live up to its promise. The sub-national pilot REDD type projects that are currently under implementation or in the planning stages will form a pool of experiences on which governments should draw when designing national REDD schemes. Those initiatives reviewed for this research are being designed with a participatory, local community-focus, so they will provide valuable lessons on ways to ensure co-benefits for forest-dependent people. Much thought will have to go into how these early REDD initiatives may eventually be

46

integrated into national programmes and could count under a national accounting standard. The challenges for the case countries and other tropical forest countries are formidable, but not impossible to achieve. However, where political will is lacking or pressures from powerful groups are too strong, chances are slim that marginalized communities will experience real improvements in wellbeing. The inferences presented here are worth following up on through further research based on specific REDD scenarios once there is clarity on global and national REDD policies.

47

Appendix 1: The evolution of REDD
One of the underlying reasons why standing forests have been subject to continued deforestation is because of the ‘public good’ nature of the types of environmental services they provide, beyond marketable products. Public goods are typically undersupplied through market mechanisms, and this has also been true of such forest services as biodiversity or watershed protection. Furthermore, the costs of damages to natural capital such as forests are usually not accounted for in markets, they are considered externalities, and future benefits from, for example, conserving a tract of forest are often discounted so heavily that the immediate consumption income becomes more attractive than conservation (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2008). Thus, because forest services are undervalued, users and owners often do not have sufficient motivation to leave forests standing10. From the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) emerged the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the Forest Principles. However, fiscal and regulatory measures introduced to attempt to promote sustainable forest management (SFM) and reduce deforestation in tropical forests, or project-based approaches have generally not been very successful at reducing deforestation (Richards & Jenkins, 2007; Ebeling & Yasué, 2009). Similarly, global initiatives to stem deforestation and promote SFM, such as Tropical Forest Action Plans, ITTO Objective 2000, or the UN Forum on Forests’ declarations on SFM, have not had a large enough impact (White & Hatcher, 2009). Market-based mechanisms offer the potential to obtain much greater amounts of funding (Miles & Kapos, 2008; Roe et al., 2007) and to directly link conservation action to underlying causes of deforestation and degradation. Recent experiences with payment for ecosystem services (PES), including some early carbon-market related projects, have shown that paying land users for ecosystem services can be effective (FT, 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2005). It has also been demonstrated that even very poor people can participate in and benefit from PES schemes (Pagiola et al., 2005). Already in the late 1970s, the idea of compensating for rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations through global scale afforestation was brought up (Dyson, 1977, cited in Stuart & Moura-Costa, 1998), and since the beginning of the 1990’s a variety of forestrybased carbon offset projects have been initiated. By early 2009, 144 early REDD-type initiatives were trading credits on the voluntary carbon market (Cotula & Mayers, 2009). The UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol makes only limited reference to forestry activities in its Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) initiatives. The only types of forest carbon initiatives currently eligible under this global mechanism are afforestation and reforestation, and to date only 8 forestry projects have been registered under the CDM (UNFCCC, 2009b). In the existing EU Emissions Trading Scheme forest carbon is also marginalized (Richards & Jenkins, 2007). As Stuart and Moura-Costa (1998) point out, the concept of paying for carbon sequestration through forest protection was controversial, because of technical issues on the one hand (e.g. baseline
10

This is not the only underlying cause, but it is a significant one.

A.1-1

establishment, accurate measurement of carbon absorption, monitoring, certification, risk management, etc.) and political concerns on the other (e.g. fears by some that land-use projects are a way for high-income countries to gain control of rainforest resources). Leakage (the possibility of displacement of deforestation elsewhere) and permanence are also two often voiced concerns associated with forestry-based carbon credits. REDD was, however, explicitly proposed as a component of a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol in the Bali Action Plan, agreed at the 2007 Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. More recently, an even broader scope of REDD, known as REDD+, has become part of the global negotiations agenda. In addition to avoided deforestation, this could include conservation, SFM and ‘enhancement of forest carbon stocks’ in developing countries (Kormos, 2009; Olander et al., 2009; Parker et al., 2009; UNFCCC, 2009a). Different proposals for REDD approaches vary in components such as scope (what should be included), reference levels (what should be the baseline and over what time period emission reductions should be calculated, e.g. historic, current or normative emission levels), financial mechanism (what funding streams should be used, e.g. market-based sources or fund-based sources), distribution (equity issues, which countries should receive payments), risk management, and recommended spatial scale (Angelsen, 2008). Financing will probably involve a combination of market-based and fund-based sources in a mix intended to achieve, effectiveness, efficiency and equity criteria. Fund-based sources (from donors) will be needed to cover the considerable upfront costs of developing ‘REDD readiness’ in many countries with weak governance institutions. Some programmes to help such countries plan for and test REDD activities already exist, among them the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) (FCPF, 2009) and the multi-agency UN-REDD Programme (UN-REDD, 2009b). The possibility of co-benefits and meeting complementary aims of other relevant conventions and agreements is mentioned in the Bali Action Plan (Decision 2/CP.13), and several UNFCCC Parties have called for co-benefits to be considered (UN-REDD, 2009).

A.1-2

Appendix 2: Sample Questionnaire
Informant: Country: Date: Time: 1. What types of co-benefits do you think could come from REDD in [country]? • • 2. For biodiversity? For forest-dependent people?

How would benefits be distributed at the national and local level among different forest users? There is a big concern by indigenous rights organizations that indigenous and other forest-dependent people may lose their land or access rights to forests. How do you think indigenous or local community groups that depend on forest resources would be affected? (positively/negatively, etc.) Are there forest management or land tenure related laws that allow local people to sell forest products (including potentially carbon)? What rights do they have, and what laws are these rights specified in? Related to 4., is land tenure of forest lands an issue that may affect how REDD could benefit forest users/owners? If yes, how? Related to 4., are customary tenure and/or traditional rights recognized? Tenure issues aside, what rights do local people have to benefit from REDD under different land zoning regimes, such as forest reserve, protected area, multiple-use forest, etc.)? One of the principal fears of indigenous organizations and proponents of indigenous rights is that once they become valuable through REDD credits, revenue from forests may be centralized and traditional owners marginalized. Do you see this as an issue in [COUNTRY]? Relating to 8., do you know if/how it is being addressed at a national level? Are you aware what public consultation processes are being used during the development of resource access and policy formulation, if any? Are you aware whether indigenous people are being consulted in the national REDD process, and if so, in what way? A.2-1

3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

Do citizens in general have civil suit authority as a recourse if policies are passed that go against the interests of local people, or are there other systems of recourse? In general, not just relating to REDD, do indigenous or forest-dependent people tend to have a voice when it comes to conservation and resource management decisions? Do you know of any early REDD projects in the country, and are there already lessons from those?

13.

14.

A.2-2

Appendix 3: Notes on Indicators and Country Data Comparison
A number of indicators are used to describe, in aggregate, how a country is perceived in terms of good (or bad) governance ability. These and other relevant data, such as population and forest-related statistics are presented for ease of comparison among case countries in Table A.3-1. Notes on Indicators Concerning poverty, it is important to note that there are different definitions of what constitutes “poverty”. In the way used here, “poverty” does not refer merely to incomepoverty; it is rather seen as a multi-dimensional concept. Related to this, the term “human wellbeing” is used, which is complex, context-dependent, and difficult to quantify, and which encompasses a rather broad range of factors – among them a certain level of income – that contribute to a sense of satisfactory lifestyle. For a brief summary on relevant concepts related to poverty and livelihoods see, for example Dorward et al. (2009). To simplify the analysis, three principal dimensions of wellbeing were examined, following Peskett et al. (2008), as outlined in section 2.3. Therefore, rather than looking just at an income-based indicator such as GDP per capita, the report looks at human development statistics compiled by the UNDP, including the Human Development Index (HDI), as well as a measure of pro-poor governance, the ‘GDP/capita – HDI’ calculation. For governance this report draws on select World Bank indicators and the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI). It also looks at countries GINI index, which is a measure of income inequality. The research also reviewed the governance of forests and biodiversity conservation and management, particularly tenure and access rights issues. The legal status and rights of forest-dependent people were examined, through indicators such as . Relating to biodiversity and natural resource governance, various good governance principles have been developed, such as the Ecosystem Approach described by the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Durban principles for protected areas, lessons from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, and others (Swiderska et al. 2008). For environmental governance in general and biodiversity conservation record in particular, the report looks at the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) and a subcomponent of it, the Biodiversity & Habitat indicator. See the following explanations on some of the selected indicators. Environmental Performance Index (EPI) For environmental governance in general and biodiversity conservation record in particular, this report looks at the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) and a

A.3-1

subcomponent of it, the Biodiversity & Habitat indicator. The EPI is calculated by a team at Yale University. Because of information gaps and difficulties in comparing nationally collected data on biodiversity, 2008 EPI biodiversity indicators are based on remotelysensed data, which cannot measure detail-level ecosystem conditions and emphasize habitat protection, rather than biodiversity conservation at genetic or species levels. The indicator score is calculated based on scores for the following: ‘Conservation risk index’, which compares the area of terrestrial biomes in a country that are under protection to that converted to other land uses; ‘effective protected area conservation’, which combines global datasets on protected areas and human influence (footprint) to estimate how much of protected habitat is in fact relatively intact; ‘critical habitat protection’, which catalogs whether countries make serious efforts to protect those species listed as endangered by the Alliance for Zero Extinction, a joint initiative of 52 biodiversity conservation organizations and applies IUCN Red List criteria for AZE site designation; and ‘marine protected areas’, which measure the percentage of a country’s exclusive economic zone in the marine area that it protects. A forestry metric is also included in the EPI, which measures forest management, using the change in ‘growing stock’ calculation of the FAO GFRA 2005 (see (FAO, 2005). (Esty et al., 2008) It is noteworthy that there are correlations between GDP, governance-related drivers of environmental performance (reflected in such indicators as corruption and voice), and the EPI score (Esty et al., 2008). This is not surprising, as “environmental governance not only refers to governmental regulation and law enforcement for conservation but also involves the political, organizational and cultural frameworks through which diverse interests in natural and cultural resources are coordinated and controlled” (Cronkleton et al., 2008), p.1). GDP per capita rank – HDI rank This is calculated by UNDP (2007) as part of the human development statistics. A positive figure indicates that the HDI rank is higher than the GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank, a negative that it is lower. This points to a country's success (or failure) of using income to promote human development. It should be noted that GDP per capita is used in calculating HDI, so that GDP automatically has an impact on HDI rank. GINI Index The GINI index (GINI-coefficient of inequality) is the most commonly used measure of inequality. A coefficient of 0 would reflects complete equality and 1 would indicates complete inequality, where all the income or consumption belongs to only one person with nothing left for all others. There are also other measures of income inequality, but the GINI is often used. (WB, 2009c) Global 200 Ecoregions, hotspots, and other biodiversity indicators There are many different ways to set priorities for biodiversity conservation and define areas of high biodiversity value. The Global 200 Ecoregions is one way A.3-2

developed by the conservation organization WWF-U.S., to categorize outstanding representatives of globally diverse ecosystems. Forest ecosystems are very important for global biodiversity conservation, and forest ecosystems account for 6 of the 12 terrestrial major habitat types (MHT), and of all the 136 terrestrial ecoregions, 86 are forest ecoregions. Parameters used to choose ecoregions included species richness; species endemism; higher taxonomic uniqueness; unusual ecological or evolutionary phenomena (such as migrations); global rarity of MHT; keystone habitats. (WRI, 2007b) See also (Olson et al., 2001) Other ways to define areas of high conservation priority include the ‘hotspot’ approach (see (CI, 2009c; N. Myers, 1988; N. Myers et al., 2000; Prendergast et al., 1993; Olivieri, 1998); (R. Mittermeier et al., 2005); (R. Mittermeier et al., 1999), ‘high biodiversity wilderness areas’ (CI, 2009b; R. Mittermeier et al., 2003; Olivieri, 1998), the ‘last of the wild’ concept developed by the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) (Sanderson et al., 2002), and several others.

Human Development Index (HDI) The UNDP has been preparing annual Human Development Reports since 1990, which include the human development index (HDI) as the principal statistic. This looks at human well-being beyond income, providing a composite measure of three dimensions of human development : living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income). Although it is not a comprehensive measure of human development, lacking such important indicators as gender or income inequality and more difficult to measure indicators like respect for human rights and political freedoms, it provides a broader view of human progress and the complex relationship between income and well-being. See UNDP (2007). Human Poverty Index (HPI) The Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) is calculated by UNDP for developing countries. It focuses on the proportion of people below a threshold level in the same dimensions of human development as the HDI. It looks beyond income deprivation and represents a multi-dimensional alternative to the $1 a day (PPP US$) poverty measure. See UNDP (2007). Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) GDP data in the UNDP Human Development Report are based on US$ PPP. Purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors take into account differences in the relative prices of goods and services and provide a better overall measure of the real value of output produced by an economy compared to other economies. As PPPs are a better measure of the standard of living of people in a

A.3-3

country, they are the basis for the World Bank’s calculations of poverty rates at $1 and $2 a day. See World Bank Quick Reference Tables (WB, 2009). TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) The composite TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks 91 countries in terms of perceived degree of corruption in the public sector, on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). It is not based on empirical data. (WRI, 2008) See also TI (2008). World Bank governance indicators The World Bank governance indicators measure six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, and are composed of several hundred individual variables drawn from 33 separate data sources from 30 different organizations. They are unavoidably prone to measurement errors (and margins of error are included in the statistics), but nevertheless can inform cross-country comparisons. The World Bank index also draws, among many other data sources, on Freedomhouse and Transparency International (TI). (Kaufmann et al., 2009) This report looks only at ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘government effectiveness’.

A.3-4

Table A.3-1: Country data comparison INDICATORS Land area in km2 (World Bank data) SOCIO-ECONOMIC Population Population growth (annual) Pop.density/km2 Rural pop. (%) Life expectancy at birth GDP/capita (PPP US$) HDI (2007/08) DRC 2,344,858 DATA 9,517,537 2% 8.66 35% 64.7 2,819 0.695 (medium); country rank: 117 out of 177; trend: rising 7 13,348,222 2% 122.59 52% 69.7 4,568 0.689 (medium); country rank: 118 out of 177; trend: rising -11 14,446,056 2% 79.80 79% 58.0 2,727 0.598 (medium); country rank 131 out of 177; trend: rising -6 COUNTRY Bolivia Guatemala 1,098,581 108,889

Cambodia 181,035

62,399,224 3% 26.61 67% 45.8 714 0.411 (low); country rank: 168 out of 177; trend: stagnating 7

GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank – HDI rank (2007/08) HPI (2007/08)

39,3% (88 of 13.6% (32 of 108 108 countries) countries) GINI Index 55 59.2 GOVERNANCE INDICATORS WB Governance Score Voice & Accountability (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) WB Governance Score Government Effectiveness (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) CPI (2008) EPI Overall score EPI Overall country rank (of 149 countries) EPI Biodiversity indicator ILO 169 signed/ratified UNDRIP supported?

22.5% (54 of 108 countries) 55.1

38.6% (85 of 108 countries) 43

-1.48

-0.01

-0.26

-0.94

-1.89 1.7 47.3 142 73.2 N Y

-0.81 3 64.7 110 78.4 Y Y

-0.49 3.1 76.7 69 36.4 Y Y

-0.81 1.8 53.8 136 85.4 N Y

A.3-5

FOREST

&

BIODIVERSITY Y - CongoBasin forests wilderness area (CI); Terrestrial WWF Global 200 Priority Areas; 870 51 133,610 58.9% -0.2%

DATA Terrestrial WWF Global 200 Priority Area Y - Indo-Burma hotspot (CI), Mekong WWF priority area

Important biodiversity country/high conservation value forest?

# of native tree species # of red-listed tree species (2004) Total forest area (1000 ha) Forest as % of total land area (FAO) Deforestation rate (Change in forest area in %) 20002005 (FAO) Trend Original forest area as % of total land area (WRI estimate) Classification following da Fonseca et al. (2007) Primary forest (2005) Extent of primary forest 2005 (as % of total forest area) Trend Carbon stock in forest 2005 (million tonnes) CO2 emissions as % of world total CO2 emissions/capita (tCO2) (2004) FSC Certification (as of June 2009) (1000 ha) Forest ownership

Y - Tropical Andes hotspot (CI); Terrestrial WWF Global 200 Priority Areas; "last frontier forests" (Bryson et al 1997) 2700 70 58,740 54.2% -0.5%

700 83 3,938 36.3% -1.3%

862 32 10,447 59.2% -2.0%

down 83.0%

up 54.0%

up 99.0%

up 100.0%

HFLD

HFHD

LFHD

HFHD

no data no data

29,360 50.0%

1,957 49.7%

322 3.1%

down 32,152 0% 0.037 -

down 5,877 0% 0.800 1,819

down 572 0% 1.000 457.6

down 1,426 0% 0.000 -

public 100%

public 85%, private 10%, other 5% (Chomitz, 2006)

public 42.2%, private 52.5%, other 5.3%

public 100%

A.3-6

Data Sources (where not otherwise indicated within table) Population data: World Bank - HNP Stats (WB, 2007) (WB, 2007) Forest data: FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment, Annex 3, Global tables (FAO, 2005), except for Original Forest Area, which is from WRI EarthTrends (WRI, 2007a). Forest ownership data: (FAO, 2005), except for Bolivia, which is from Chomitz (2006) due to lack of data in the GFRA 2005. GDP/capita, HDI, HPI, and GDP/capita rank – HDI rank are from the Human Development Report 2007/2008 (UNDP, 2007) GINI Index: For DRC (GPI, 2008), for all others (CIA, 2009). World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2007: In reality there are 6 indicators, only 2 are extracted here. See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp and Kaufmann et al. (2009). CPI: (TI, 2008) EPI and Biodiversity Indicator (Esty et al., 2008). CO2 emissions as % of world total: (UNDP, 2007) Country data fact sheets, see: http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/ . For DRC, source is UNDP MDG Monitor DRC Profile Sheet (UNDP, 2007) Further explanation of forest data terms Trend for change in forest area = Increase or decrease in deforestation rate compared to previous reporting period (1990-2000) Forest ownership: public, private, mixed Trend for change in extent of primary forest = decrease of primary forest area as percentage of total forest area Carbon stock in forest: Sum total of above-ground, below-ground, deadwood, litter, in soil biomass Growing stock: Volume over bark of all living trees more than X cm in diameter at breast height. Includes the stem from ground level or stump height up to a top diameter of Y cm, and may also include branches to a minimum diameter of W cm. X,Y,W are country-defined. Red-listed tree species includes critically endangered, endangered, and vulnerable species, as per IUCN Red-list and cited in FAO (2005) GFRA.

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Appendix 4: Expanded Country Case Studies
A.4.1 A.4.1.1 Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

DRC is the second largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa with the third largest population (WB, 2008a). It is situated in Central Africa and surrounded by nine other countries. Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table A.4-1-and additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3.
Table A.4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC) HUMAN WELLBEING & GOVERNANCE Population GDP/capita (PPP US$) 62,399,224 714 FOREST Total forest area (1000 ha) Forest as % of total land area (FAO) Deforestation rate (Change in forest area in %) 2000-2005 (FAO) 133,610 58.9%

Life expectancy HDI Report) (2007/2008

45.8

-0.2%

0.411

Trend Original forest area as % of total land area (WRI) Classification following Fonseca et al. (2009) Carbon stock in forest 2005 (million tonnes)

down

GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank – HDI rank (2007/08) HPI (2007/2008 Report)

7

83.0%

39.30%

HFLD

GINI WB Governance Score Voice & Accountability (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) WB Governance Score Government Effectiveness (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) CPI (2008) EPI Overall score ILO 169 signed/ratified UNDRIP supported?

55

32,152

-1.48

Forest ownership

public 100%

-1.89 1.7 47.3 N Y

FSC certification

-

Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)

A.4-1

Forests DRC is estimated to have between 108 and 135 million ha of tropical forest, of which about 126 million ha are tropical closed natural forest (Chomitz, 2006; CBFP, 2006; FAO, 2005). Of these, 105 million ha are considered production forests, and 22 million ha are allocated to conservation (CBFP, 2006). DRC’s average annual deforestation rate between 2000 and 2005 was about 0.2% and showed a downward trend when compared to the previous reporting period (FAO, 2005). Added to that, CBFP (2006) estimate an annual degradation rate of 0.02%. A land cover map (Figure A.4-1), which was produced using the FAO Land Cover Classification System with 18 land cover types, shows the vast extent of tropical forest that currently still exists in DRC. A sea of green is visible in Figure A.4-2, a satellite photograph of the dense rainforest cover surrounding the Congo river and its tributary Aruwimi in the north-eastern area of DRC.
Figure A.4-1: DRC Land Cover Map Figure A.4-2: North-Eastern DRC

Source: Vancutsem et al. (2009, p.67)

Source: ESA (2008)

Deforestation in Africa is predominantly driven by conversion of forest to small-scale permanent agriculture (unlike in Latin America and Asia, where commercial agriculture is a bigger threat) (Martin, 2008). This is also the case in DRC, in addition to fuelwood gathering, especially around densely populated centres. Demographic pressures have led to a reduction in fallow periods in the traditional slash and burn agriculture, traditional practices lead to forest fires (such as lighting fires in savannahs for hunting wildlife), and the situation of property rights (see below) and the political climate are not currently conducive for SFM (Kasulu et al., 2008). There is increased human pressure on forests due to migration induced by political instability and conflict, primarily in the more densely populated areas in dry and mountain forest zones (WB, 2009a). Deforestation is highest in the north-central region, in the north-east, and in the south-west, where agriculture and mining are more intense and the forest is already fragmented (Laporte et al., 2007). Despite relatively low levels of deforestation in central rainforests so far, there is concern about the increasing number of logging concessions and potential land conversion for commercial agriculture in the country. For example, recently DRC signed an agreement with a Chinese company to plant up to 3 million ha with oil palm (Kasulu et al., 2008). A.4-2

Deforestation pressures arising from large-scale exploitation of forests could quickly surpass other drivers, if allowed to continue unmitigated. In the Congo Basin region short term logging concessions predominate, which contribute significantly to the economy, but not necessarily to the benefit of disadvantaged groups (FAO, 2008). The harvesting of timber in natural forests is increasing in DRC, despite a moratorium on logging in 2002 (Kidd & Kenrick, 2009). In 2005 the World Bank financed a legal review of all existing forest contracts after the moratorium and subsequently proposed the cancellation of 91 contracts that were not legally awarded (WB, 2009a). The government took action to cancel the concessions, but not all companies have complied. In addition, those contracts found to be legal were, given social responsibility agreements of the concessionaires, considered eligible for conversion into long term sustainable forest management concessions that carry environmental and social obligations. By 2008 33.5 million ha of forest lands were under some type of concession, either for timber (22.91 million), diamond mining (6.9 million) or other mining (3.7 million), with timber concessions granted to companies from Belgium, China, India, Italy, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Portugal, and Switzerland (Sunderlin et al., 2008). In 2006 were about 146 concessions, with a mean area of 144,000 ha (CBFP, 2006). Theoretically, according to the 2002 Forest Code, communities have also been given the right to receive forest concessions and manage forests, but by 2008 there was no evidence of award of concessions to any community (Sunderlin et al., 2008). Nevertheless, it is estimated that there are about 8,000 small-scale loggers producing about 10 times the current volume of production in the formal sector, primarily for small local markets and domestic consumption (Counsell, 2006). In terms of financial value, tentative estimates suggest the value of informally logged timber to be around US$100 million, compared to US$60 million for industrial timber (J. Lewis et al., 2008). The extent of forest concessions that have been awarded in DRC becomes visually clear when looking at Figure A.4-3.

A.4-3

Figure A.4-3: DRC logging concessions and protected areas

Biodiversity DRC contains several terrestrial WWF Global 200 Priority Areas, i.e. 4 (Northeastern Congo Basin Moist Forests), 5 (Central Congo Basin Moist Forests), and 104 (East African Moorlands) (NGS & WWF, n.d.). The Congo Basin tropical forests are also classified as ‘high biodiversity wilderness areas’, i.e. large expanses of relatively untouched areas that are biologically unique and not yet critically endangered (CI, 2009b) and contain ‘last of the wild’ areas (Sanderson et al., 2002). DRC’s forests are home to such charismatic mammal species as the near-threatened okapi (Okapia johnstoni), the endangered bonobo (Pan paniscus); the vulnerable forest elephant (Loxodonta cyclotis) and the critically endangered mountain gorilla (Gorilla beringei

Source: CBFP (2006, p.251)

beringei) (CI, 2009a). 870 native tree species have been recorded, and 51 tree species are on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (2004) (FAO, 2005). Several of the protected areas in DRC are also UNESCO World Heritage Sites 11 (i.e. Virunga National Park, Kahuzi-Biega National Park, Salonga National Park, Garamba National Park and the Okapi Game Reserve).
Figure A.4-4: The Eastern Afromontane Hotspot

It also has a share of the ‘Eastern Afromontane’ hotspot (see Figure A.44) along its eastern edge, where the Albertine Rift is located, and where the main vegetation type is montane forest, though in lower regions there is also mid-altitude forest, lowland forest, woodland, and savannah (CI, 2007a). The Albertine Rift hosts about 5,800 species (about 14% percent of Source: CI (2007a) mainland Africa’s plant species, of which more than 550 are endemic, including three endemic genera: Afroligusticum,
The World Heritage Site List was created under the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage and currently contains 890 sites that are part of the cultural and natural heritage which the World Heritage Committee considers as having outstanding universal value (2007a).
11

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Micractis, Rhaesteria. It is also very rich in birds (including 40 endemic species), mammals (more than 400, of which 35 are endemic species, including great apes and other primate species), and 30 endemic amphibian species (ibid.)). At the same time, it has one of the highest population densities in Africa, placing a lot of stresses on the biodiversity of the region. DRC is among the top ten rated countries when it comes to biodiversity and habitat conservation indicators calculated for the EPI. Its overall EPI score is only 47.3, but the score for the biodiversity indicator is a high 73,2 (Esty et al., 2008). This is partly because in general large countries with low population densities score well on protected area effectiveness (ibid.), and because such large tracts of forest still remain. It does not mean, however, that there are not serious threats to biodiversity in DRC. Future threats to biodiversity in the entire Congo Basin region are considered high, due to both local and global demands for forest-based and other natural resources, as well as the impacts of climate change (Usongo & Nagahuedi, 2008). For example, at least one study found that bushmeat harvesting already exceeds sustainable levels by 25%, a situation that is likely to worsen as the human population grows and road access and incomes increase (Chomitz, 2006), as bushmeat is not only an important source of protein for forest people, but is also increasingly in demand by urban consumers (D. Wilkie & Carpenter, 1999). In addition, such highly important conservation areas as Virunga National Park, where the last remaining populations of mountain gorilla live, have been plagued by violence. Over the past decade, more than 150 park wardens have died in the conflict with rebel groups (Wells, 2009). Poverty, forest livelihoods, and governance Human development The latest population estimates DRC has around 62.4 million people and a population growth rate of 3% (WB, 2009b), with a population density of 26.6 people/km2. DRC is among the poorest countries in the world. As per the 2007/2008 global UNDP Human Development Report (HDR) (UNDP, 2007), it also features among the countries with lowest human development scores. It ranks in position 168 of 177 countries ranked, with an HDI of 0.41112, a life expectancy at birth of 45.8 years, and a GDP per capita of PPP13 US$714. For comparison, the average HDI is 0.488 for LDCs and 0.493 for SubSaharan Africa. It falls into the low income country category of the World Bank (WB, 2009a). DRC’s ‘GDP per capita rank – HDI rank’ figure calculated by UNDP is 7 (incidentally the same as for Bolivia – see below), indicating that the HDI rank is higher than the GDP per capita rank. The GINI Index for DRC was calculated as 55, indicating very high income inequality 14 (GPI, 2008). Population growth is high, around 3% annually, and 67% of the population is rural.
12

The lowest-ranked country is Sierra Leone, with an HDI of 0.336 and a GDP per capita of PPP US$806 and an average life expectancy of 41.8 years. The average HDI for high-income OECD countries is 0.947 and a life expectancy is 79.4 years. Countries with the three highest HDI scores are Iceland, Norway, and Australia. 13 Purchasing Power Parity – see Appendix 2 for notes on indicators. 14 A lower GINI indicates a more equal distribution of family income. The country with the lowest GINI, i.e. with the most equal income distribution is Sweden (23). The European Union average GINI is estimated at 31, the United Kingdom has a GINI of 34. The USA has a GINI of 45, i.e. a

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DRC currently receives about US$800 million in international aid per year (2004-2005 figures), which, though large, is inadequate for the many development challenges the country faces (Laporte et al., 2007). The government has prepared a first full PRSP in July 2006 through a broadly consultative process (including also grassroots level organizations). This built on the interim PRSP of 2002, prepared shortly after the country had emerged from a prolonged armed conflict (which still continues in some of the eastern provinces) that led to a drastic decline in living standards to levels lower than in the 1960s (WB, 2006). This final version of the PRSP aims, inter alia, to strengthen public institutions and improve governance (WB, 2008b), a formidable challenge in this country. The forest sector and environmental conservation are also issues included in the PRSP, as well as in the Government’s Priority Action Plan. Theoretically, forestry, in addition to the extraction of other natural resources, should contribute to poverty reduction in the country. The MDGs are mentioned in the final PRSP, but their integration into the development strategy is still limited (UNDP, 2007). Forest livelihoods An estimated 70% of the population of DRC are forest-dependent for their livelihoods (Counsell, 2006). For example, 80% of DRC’s energy needs are met by fuelwood, and tens of thousands of people work in fuelwood harvesting and trading (ibid.) An unpublished study in two areas close to the Kabobo forest in south-eastern DRC near Lake Tanganyika found that income from sales of forest products contributes to 32% of disposable income for lake villages and an average of 96% for villages on the road between Kalemie and Fizi (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.). Some forest also contain “sacred sites” and other culturally important areas (ibid.). Only a small percentage of people are de facto, though not de iure, indigenous forestdwellers. When speaking of ‘indigenous’ people in the African context, what is meant is usually people living in forests as hunter-gatherers. The definition of indigenous people in Africa is not clear, as even the term is controversial. The politically dominant view held by African governments is that “in relation to colonial or neo-colonial powers all Africans are indigenous”, but Central African forest people, often nomadic huntergatherers (referred to collectively by non-forest people as ‘Pygmy’, although in reality they have different tribal names for themselves 15 ) are nevertheless seen and selfidentify as culturally distinct from non-forest people and ‘indigenous’ to the forest (Kidd & Kenrick, 2009, p.5). The term ‘first people’ is often applied in a regional or local context when referring to those Africans who inhabited an area before other Africans arrived from elsewhere (Lewis et al., 2008). Overall, there are more than 200 different ethnic groups in DRC, but more than two thirds of the country are occupied by the majority Bantu peoples (which is itself an umbrella term for various farming populations) (IP, 2007).

rather unequal income distribution. The country with the highest GINI is Namibia (70.7).
15

(CIA,

2009)
E.g. the Mbuti and Efe of the Ituri Forest in DRC, estimated at 35-40,000 people (2005)

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The Pygmies constitute a small minority of the overall population of DRC. Estimates for the numbers of ‘pygmies’ vary enormously, ranging from 70,000 to 600,000, with the higher figure provided by the Ligue Nationale des Pygmées du Congo (National Pygmy League of the Congo) (Lewis et al., 2008). Not all Pygmy groups are still huntergatherers, many have become semi-sedentary and even mixed with Bantu farmers, but most retain strong cultural ties to forests (CBFP, 2006; Counsell, 2006). From precolonial days traditional forest dwellers have been dispossessed of the lands they formerly occupied, and land tenure laws did not, until recently, allow the registration of customary rights of indigenous people (Musafiri, 2009). Often they have developed relationships of inter-dependence and even mutual support, but power relations nevertheless tend to favour the Bantu (IP, 2007). It has to be said that Bantu farmers, too, depend on forest-resources, albeit to a lesser extent than pygmy hunter-gatherers. They have overlapping customary rights to the forest with the pygmies based on traditions of hunting, fishing, and harvesting of NTFPs (IP, 2007). It is, however, the pygmies who have the most trouble gaining formal rights to lands and resources, due to discrimination by both government and farmer communities (Lewis et al., 2008). Governance DRC is a country in a severe economic and governance crisis, against the background of a two-decade long internal conflict between the central government and various rebel groups that has caused the deaths and displacement of millions of people (WB, 2008a) and, despite the decade-long presence of UN Peacekeepers16, conflict is still taking the lives of civilians and causing many human rights abuses in some areas of the country (HRW, 2009; OHCHR, 2009). Historically, a driving force of conflict has been unsustainable natural resource exploitation (Laporte et al., 2007). The civil conflict has also had ecological impacts, as affected populations have largely abandoned agriculture and moved into forested areas to subsist on a new type of gathering (CBFP, 2006). The World Bank governance scores for ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘government effectiveness’ are -1.48 and -1.89 respectively, on a scale of -2.5 to +2.5 (Kaufman et al., 2009). This actually represents a deterioration in the score vis-à-vis the 2007 report. The CPI is 1.7, pointing to very high levels of corruption. Concerning the rights of indigenous people, DRC has not ratified ILO 169, and neither has any other African country (ILO, 2006), but it voted for UNDRIP. However, while formal recognition of indigenous people may not be granted, DRC and many other African countries nevertheless tend to follow various directives on indigenous people for purposes of international policies and projects (Kidd & Kenrick, 2009), such as the World Bank’s Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples (WB, 2009), which aims to promote respect for the dignity, human rights, and uniqueness of Indigenous Peoples. DRC also signed (but has not yet ratified) the 2003 version of the African Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, which mandates that the traditional rights (though not specifically indigenous rights) of local communities be respected (Gilbert & Couillard, 2009). The 2005 Constitution theoretically guarantees the protection of fundamental rights to all citizens of DRC, but no special status is given to pygmy groups (Lewis et al., 2008).
The UN Peacekeeping Mission currently includes 18,381 total uniformed personnel, including 16,626 troops, 681 military observers, 1,074 police; 969 international civilian personnel, 2,154 local civilian staff and 606 United Nations Volunteers (MONUC, 2009).
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However, OHCHR reports that “the public space for protests and criticism … has diminished considerably, with the authorities often repressing those critical of their policies” and that there is no independent judiciary (due to lack of capacity, political will and interference by authorities) through which citizens could obtain redress in case of rights violations (2009, p.2). The main perpetrators of violations are the authorities themselves, especially in remote areas, targeting political opponents, journalists, and human rights defenders (OHCHR, 2009). Forest governance Ownership of forests is 100% public (FAO, 2005). This corresponds to the general trend in Africa, where 95% of all forests are public (FAO, 2008). Governments either retain strict control, or grant limited use rights, such as the extraction of NTFPs. Tenure reform tends to meet with opposition from the forestry sector, including authorities, in many countries where an important income for the government is derived from forest resources and where the importance of tenure reform to SFM is poorly understood (FAO, 2006). In general in many African countries, there are tenure issues to be resolved, in that the formal law tends to have precedence over varied customary systems, which makes natural resource access for communities difficult (ITTO et al., 2009). The general property, land and real estate system established in 1973 (post independence) made the State the sole owner of soil and subsoil, but enabled individuals to obtain private rights of enjoyment over land belonging to the private domain of the State without becoming land owners (Musafiri, 2009). Customary authority was no longer valid, as all land became State land, often causing disputes between the State and indigenous communities over land tenure (ibid.) The Forest Code of 2002 (Law #011-2002, prepared with the assistance of the World Bank and to a lesser extent international NGOs) zoned 40% of the forest for commercial exploitation and 15% for conservation, while the remainder is for concessions. Zoning does not reflect forest peoples’ traditional land tenure systems. It does, however, impose a duty on logging companies to provide socio-economic benefits for local populations, which was not the case under the old 1949 forestry law (Sakata, 2007). The new Forest Code is, inter alia, meant to establish mechanisms for community involvement in forest management, but this will only benefit forest-dwellers if they can contribute meaningfully to the development of such mechanisms and are given control over the resources in the forests they inhabit (Musafiri, 2009). Although the new constitution no longer states that all land belongs to the State, the State still has jurisdiction over all lands (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.). Highly forested areas generally tend to have low densities of poor people (Chomitz, 2006). In most of the country, population density is low, but in the eastern highland regions of the DRC, densities are very high and forests have given way to agricultural mosaiclands. There are local areas of over-population, which has prompted large-scale migration towards lower altitudes since the 1970s, resulting in conflicts between the migrants and original inhabitants, whose social habits and agricultural methods are different (CBFP, 2006). Many forest-based indigenous people are politically and economically marginalized vis-à-vis their non-forest neighbours and subject to negative

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stereotyping and denial of rights, especially to the lands they inhabit under complex customary land tenure systems (Kidd & Kenrick, 2009). (Kidd & Kenrick, 2009) report that the Mbuti and Efe in the DRC have managed to maintain their forest-based livelihoods, but have faced threats of land expropriation from logging companies and conservation projects. There are up to 100,000 Batwa, primarily in the DRC, who have been displaced by the destruction of their forests and have become a cheap source of labour for farmers from other ethnic groups. Many logging companies “interpret national laws to mean that since the land is the property of the state and since the state has granted them use rights, they have as much right to exploit the forest as local people, regardless of how long they have been there”, without asking for consent (Lewis et al., 2008, p.6). In 2005 a number of pygmy groups complained formally to the World Bank, which supports commercial forestry programmes in DRC, that it had disregarded its own policies of consultation of indigenous people when designing reforms of the forest sector in DRC (Wolvekamp et al., 2008). This was later confirmed by an independent Inspection Panel, which in 2007 found that the Bank had not carried out the required initial risk assessment and failed to meet its own safeguard policies relating to indigenous people and environmental assessment (IP, 2007). Forestry is governed by the Ministry of Environment (MECNT). Under the chairmanship of the Minister, a Thematic Group on Forests is operational, which brings together relevant MECNT Directorates, the Planning Ministry, and representatives from international agencies that support DRC’s forest sector (UN-REDD, 2009a). There is currently a decentralization and reorganization programme going on, through which the number of provinces will increase, and provinces will be given some degree of autonomy over forestry issues (FCPF, 2008b). The 2002 Forest Code also requires cross-sectoral consultation processes, but inter-ministerial coordination does not function well (UNREDD, 2009a). The Code and its corresponding regulatory framework, which was elaborated with the help of FAO and adopted in stages until 2008 ((UN-REDD, 2009a) foresees the preparation of national and provincial forest management plans and provides for the redistribution of forest revenues, with 40% of taxes going back to the decentralized administrative entities (DAE) of the Provinces where logging is taking place, and 60% to the national Treasury; of the funds going to the DAE, 25% goes to the Province, and 15% to the relevant DAE, for basic infrastructure for the community (Sakata, 2007). There are also provisions for logging companies to provide certain local development benefits, particularly socio-economic infrastructure (ibid.). However, the taxes accruing to the government from the new ‘forest area tax’ are extremely low compared to the potential value of the timber, i.e. only $0.20 per ha, which even under the (unrealistic) best case scenario of 100% tax collection from concessionaires, would result in only a small contribution to the rural development process (Counsell, 2006). In addition, currently the redistribution of tax revenues is not being applied, and seems, according to the government, “very hard to apply” (Kasulu et al., 2008, sec.8.b)) for reasons not explained. In practice, despite the increase in logging fees, some of which should be allocated for local development in the logging areas, only small proportions actually reach village communities, who tend to expect logging companies to make up for the State’s shortcomings in income redistribution (Lescuyer & Delvingt, 2007). As for the direct contracts, the power difference between companies and local communities makes it unlikely that substantial benefits will reach local communities. The A.4-9

experience has been that local elites and timber operators tend to absorb profits. (Counsell, 2006) There are reports of wide-spread frustration in local communities, because companies are paying benefits to local leaders, who in turn do not share them with the wider community (J. Lewis et al., 2008). In principle, forestry inspectors, sworn civil servants and other judicial police officers are authorized to examine criminal forestry activity. Moreover, interestingly, Congolese environmental NGOs and representative community associations have specific prerogatives to act as civil party to request compensation for damages caused to the forest or the environment, if these can be linked directly or indirectly to the interests of the NGO (Sakata, 2007). By 2007, no NGO had yet brought a case to court under the novel law, possibly because of insufficient awareness of the provisions of the Forest Code (ibid.). Regarding forest governance specifically, an independent World Bank Investigation Panel states that while a solid legal framework is important, “an almost overwhelming problem in the forest sector in DRC is the lack of institutional capacity to implement and enforce the laws and regulations, especially at the provincial and local levels” (IP, 2007, p.132), and that one can therefore not count on the law to guarantee sustainable development or benefits for local people in the forest sector. Counsell (2006) reports that the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism, which also responsible for forest administration, is far from functional and unmotivated – at all levels – to perform forest administration functions. It is highly overstaffed, while at the same time lacking basic capacity in forest management planning, mapping and inventorying. DRC has expressed interest in entering into a Voluntary Partnership Agreement under the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement (FLEGT), which promotes licensing schemes for legal timber import into the EU (Wolvekamp et al., 2008; AFLEG, 2003). Similar to FSC certification, this would come with social and environmental sustainability obligations. A prerequisite for this would be a clear and complete legal framework and the existence of a forest zoning plan (Counsell, 2006). There are as yet no certified sustainably managed forests in DRC (in contrast to other countries in the Congo Basin, i.e. Cameroon, Republic of Congo, and Gabon, which already have several FSCcertified forest areas) (FSC, 2009). In 2007 the government issued a formal declaration of intent that in the future, forest management in DRC should become sustainable in environmental, economic and social terms, including adherence to social justice principles, which is also reflected in the new Forest Code (BTC, 2007). So far, no concession has any international SFM certification, only one national “certificate of legality” has been issued to a concessionaire, and no national benchmarks based on international certification systems have been set so far (Lescuyer & Delvingt, 2007). Nevertheless, there are some logging companies that have not only invested in management plans, despite considerable insecurity about the logging concession conversion process, and some have advanced considerably towards FSC certification (Schipulle, 2009, pers.comm.). Some attempts to strengthen governance capacity have already been made, such as the creation of the Commission for the Forests of Central Africa (COMIFAC) 17 in 2000 (COMIFAC, 2009) and the Network of Parliamentarians of Central Africa (REPAC) for the sustainable management of forest ecosystems in 2002 (Johns & Johnson, 2008;
COMIFAC is a body convened by Central African heads of state, with 10 member countries, aiming to harmonize and develop joint strategies for sustainably managing their tropical forest resources (COMIFAC, 2009)
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Kasulu et al., 2008), as well as the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) (CBFP, 2009b). DRC is in the process of preparing a National Forest Plan, which is intended to address the causes of forest degradation and move towards sustainable forest management (Kasulu et al., 2008). The Plan’s components on participatory land use planning, rural forestry with a community focus, and environment are particularly relevant to REDD (UN-REDD, 2009a). All forests in the DRC are under state ownership. By contrast to Latin America forest tenure reform is extremely slow in the Congo Basin (RRI & ITTO, 2009). This is complicated not only by institutional weaknesses, but also by the complexities of different tenure and access rights systems used by Bantu and pygmy communities, often with overlapping claims (Counsell, 2006). Congo’s severe governance and institutional challenges also extend to forest management, and it is ranked poorly on forest governance (Minang, 2009). Logging companies also often constitute the only significant economic activity in remote regions and function as providers of employment and infrastructure (J. Lewis et al., 2008). However, the concessions granted in 2002, prior to the moratorium, were often in areas with conflicting land claims by farming and pygmy communities and in areas of high biodiversity value, which resulted in conflict and condemnation from international NGOs. It was this situation that prompted the moratorium request of the World Bank to undertake a legal review of all concessions. Under the new Forest Code, at least governments are legally obliged to examine pre-existing rights of local communities before awarding concessions, and if such rights exist, must compensate people who would lose access to forest resources. By law local communities are to be involved in setting concession limits, zoning areas reserved for agriculture, and negotiating ‘specifications’ (Article 17 of the Ministerial Decree #036CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/2006 of 5 October 2006) (Kasulu et al., 2008). Furthermore, representatives of different social groups, including indigenous, should be invited to participate in the National Forest Consultative Committee and the Provincial Forest Consultative Councils (ibid.). On the positive side, NGOs have become increasingly organized over the past few years, many of which are grouped under the umbrella organization Réseau Ressources Naturelles (Natural Resources Network – RRN) with a focal point in each of the 10 Provinces. This network has been instrumental in providing popular versions of the Forest Code in four main local languages and French and distributed thousands to officials, the private sector, local communities and other NGOs. Indigenous people, too, are becoming organized, e.g. through the Réseau des Associations Autochtones Pygmées (Network of Indigenous Pygmies - RAPY). Coordination at national level is, however, costly, due to the vast extent of the country and the lack of good infrastructure for travel (e.g., the proportion of paved roads of all roads is only about 3% (WB, 2009b). Resources and technical capacity within the network are also limited. Nevertheless, many groups have begun participatory forest mapping exercises that can eventually contribute to a SFM process (Counsell, 2006). The Minister of Environment has also announced (at a 2008 workshop on sustainable forest use in DRC) the government’s intention to experiment with community forestry and to focus on maintaining the traditional rights of local and indigenous people in all forests (Chatham House, 2008). At the same workshop, a civil society representative complained of low government interest in promoting community forest management, and A.4-11

recommended the development of a concrete model for conservation contracts with communities or NGOs. REDD Potential Because of their vast size, the Congo Basin forests constitute a principal global carbon sink. FAO (2005) estimates a carbon stock in forests amounting to 32,152 million tonnes. If deforestation rates were allowed to continue to grow to rates observed in high deforestation countries, then carbon emissions from DRC would grow significantly (Laporte et al., 2007). Strategies for the reduction of deforestation are therefore needed to avert a major impact on global climate change. DRC ratified the UNFCCC in 1995 and acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. It is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, which in 2005 made a formal proposal to include avoided deforestation under Kyoto’s carbon trading instruments at the 11th Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC and first meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Several national and international workshops on REDD were held, bringing together representatives from Ministries (cutting across sectors) and national and international NGOs, and REDD training workshops are being organized for members of parliament (Kasulu et al., 2008). The government views REDD as a potential input to the national development agenda that would help the country maintain its forests in good health while providing development benefits (Kasulu et al., 2008). DRC has added its name to several joint submission on REDD to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2007; UNFCCC, 2008; UNFCCC, 2009c), including in early 2009 DRC views on technical capacity-building and cooperation needs related to REDD implementation (together with other Congo Basin countries on behalf of COMIFAC. Given that Congo Basin countries have historically low deforestation rates, it is also stated in the submission that a REDD mechanism that uses only a historical emissions baseline would not be in the interest of these countries (UNFCCC, 2009c). Apart from technical needs, the capacity building requirements mentioned also include the creation of an appropriate institutional environment, with national and regional coordination bodies, and plans and implementation mechanisms for civil society participation. As DRC is one of the countries selected by the World Bank for its FCPF, it also prepared a Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN), finalized in March 2008 (FCPF, 2008b; Kasulu et al., 2008). There appear to have been limited attempts at civil society consultation in the preparation of the R-PIN, but as part of the concession reconversion process different interest groups have been widely involved, a process which could be applied also as part of the REDD process (FCPF, 2008b). The FCPF will support DRC to establish the necessary infrastructure and strengthen technical capacity for forest monitoring, and to create the necessary legal and institutional frameworks to facilitate REDD implementation. There is also a forest governance dialogue committee composed of public authorities, the private sector, NGOs and representatives of pygmies, churches and academia, and the Pygmies League is active in discussing REDD and carbon market implications for indigenous people of Africa (Kasulu et al., 2008). Kowero (2009) argues that it is not sufficient to promote SFM, but that complementary measures, such as the intensification of crop and livestock agriculture around forest A.4-12

margins and the improvement of energy efficiency will also have to be taken into account for REDD to work in Africa. Similarly, (Akinnifesi et al., 2009) argue that designing agricultural landscapes in a way that avoids livelihood-environment conflicts is the biggest issue for many Sub-Saharan African countries, and that integrating REDD and agriculture should be part of the strategy. Hoare et al. (2008) make the case that in the poorest countries it will be necessary to invest considerable public funds into establishing institutions and implementing a number of capacity development actions, without which it will not be possible to attract carbon funding through foreign direct investment or the carbon markets. Even if it were possible to attract funding, it would not be possible to achieve the desired results without major institutional reforms in DRC. DRC is one of the countries included in the UNREDD Programme, which aims to develop ‘readiness’ for REDD in select countries. UNREDD has developed an engagement strategy for indigenous people’s and civil society participation to guide national and international activities. DRC is also a participating country in the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and has submitted a ‘Readiness Plan Idea note (R-PIN)’, which aims to build REDD capacity in tropical forest countries and to pilot-test performance-based incentive payment systems (FCPF, 2009). Also, in June 2008, the multi-donor Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) was created with initial funding from the UK and Norway, to cut deforestation in the Congo Basin through forest management capacity development of local communities (Chalmers, 2009). Apart from government aid programmes, various international NGOs, including the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Conservation International (CI), and the Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC) are working with Congo Basin countries and COMIFAC to strengthen REDD capacities (Johns & Johnson, 2008). At the present time, the inter-sectoral coordination process for the management of forest resources appears unwieldy, given the large number of agencies involved (FCPF, 2008b). DRC has recently invited bids for an independent forest governance monitor, in response to a Global Witness report that DRC is not able to control illegal logging (Wells, 2009). Prospects for forest-dependent people Laporte et al. (2007) have estimated that for a 50 percent reduction in carbon emissions, rural households compensation could range anywhere between US$120 million and 400 million per year over a ten year period, depending on the mean carbon price and the level of compensation required. This takes into consideration CO2 emissions from land cover change over the decade 1990-2000, which amounted to an estimated 0.22 Pg per year. Earlier, using a simplified formula, Butler (2006) estimated that DRC could earn a much lower amount, i.e. US$13 - US$68 million or US$3.41 - US$18.37 per capita from REDD, corresponding to about a 2.44% - 17.43% increase in per capita income. Such drastic differences in estimates probably result from differences in methodology as well as uncertainties about future carbon prices. In principle, REDD payments should go largely to the perpetrators of deforestation, to induce them to stop destructive activities. In the case of DRC, it is mainly the forestdependent poor rural communities who are the principal agents of deforestation, and therefore should be the main beneficiaries, along with the NGOs who work with them to A.4-13

design and implement a REDD regime. A debate is ongoing whether benefits should be distributed directly to households or to local organizations or collective structures (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.). Definitional issues about the meaning of ‘indigenous’ notwithstanding, in a 2008 formal submission to UNFCCC, the DRC Government stated that REDD activities should recognize “...the rights and roles of local communities and indigenous peoples, based on national circumstances, [and] … should respect their traditional knowledge and intrinsic relationship with tropical forests while significantly supporting their social, environmental and economic development and also achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention” (UNFCCC, 2008, p.5). Clearly this is a formal recognition that co-benefits for forest-dependent people are essential. Yet there are many obstacles in DRC for the most marginalized people to receive a fair share of benefits. One needs to distinguish, as mentioned above, between pygmies and other people living near forests, all of whom depend to varying degrees on forest access for their livelihoods. Given the history of exclusion from land rights, and the relative discrimination of pygmy groups, it is unlikely that they will be able to benefit from REDD income, except perhaps on a project basis where they are specifically included. If history is an indicator of the future, poor Bantu farming communities, who also use forest resources to a significant degree, are, given the current severe governance challenges of DRC, also not likely to see many of the income benefits from REDD, unless governance institutions are much strengthened in the REDD readiness process. Indeed, many efforts are underway in this direction, including assistance from the FCPF and UNREDD. The UN-REDD (2009) proposal argues that despite a heritage of distrust between Government and civil society, the REDD process in DRC has so far been a cooperative effort and that the prospects for REDD advancing through a Government/civil society dialogue are solid. The government has argued that the relative complexity of carbon markets, compared with markets for more traditional forest products, will make it difficult for the poorest members of society to access those markets, and that performance-based payments would not be a useful incentive for local populations to stop deforesting activities, but that use rights to state-owned trees may be an effective incentive to assure their sustainable management (Kasulu et al., 2008). Much of this may be attributable to weak governance, in particular the government’s capacity to administer the re-distribution of benefits for the benefit of poor forest-dependent people. Civil society representatives, on the other hand, demand that profits from any PES be fairly shared and that civil society be involved in all relevant negotiations (Chatham House, 2008). The Forest Code itself does not include provisions for selling carbon (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.), which is not surprising, given that this is a relatively recent idea. (Laporte et al., 2007) propose that REDD income, regardless of source, should be distributed into three separate national funds: a Governance Fund, a Private Forest Stewardship Fund, and a Public Forest Stewardship Fund. These, in combination, should then be used to target poverty reduction and protect natural resources. An external review of DRC’s R-PIN recommends that a separate plan on REDD for indigenous forest dweller communities be prepared in cooperation with indigenous representatives and organizations (FCPF, 2008b). One possibility suggested by Rogers (2008) is that payments could be made directly to field actors implementing community forestry projects, which would give these projects A.4-14

an opportunity to connect to the international market or other forms of payment if international trading is not envisaged. This would be the option most likely to ensure direct co-benefits from REDD for local communities, but would only benefit those directly involved in community forestry. How benefits could otherwise be distributed is something that needs careful thought. As is also the case for other types of PES, receipt of benefits should be directly linked to performance of a service by the communities concerned, otherwise it may create “rent recipients” (Schipulle, 2009, pers.comm.), with likely adverse social consequences. One issue also mentioned by Rogers is that carbon rights are linked to land rights, and therefore unresolved issues around legislating for community land tenure and creating implementing bodies makes it difficult for policy makers to assign carbon rights, especially where there are overlapping land claims. Project experience There are as yet no REDD demonstration projects in DRC, although there are some community conservation projects, and the first reforestation project on 4,200 ha of degraded land (the Ibi Bateke Carbon Sink Plantation Project) was just approved, with support from the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund (WB, 2009b). Several proposals have been put forward by international organizations, including a carbon CBNRM project in Ituri (by WCS), a Bonobo Conservation Concession Project in Equateur that would have a carbon component (by CI) (CBFP, 2009a). The Global Environment Facility (GEF) recently (July 2009) approved a US$26.6 million regional project for Congo Basin countries (“Enhancing Institutional Capacities on REDD issues for Sustainable Forest Management in the Congo Basin”), which aims to strengthen knowledge on REDD issues at the local, national and regional levels and to mainstream it in policy and regulatory frameworks for SFM. It will also implement SFM pilot projects in biodiversity hotspots (GEF, 2009). Phase one of a National Joint Programme for UN-REDD is being launched in 2009 with a budget of US$1.88 million from the UN-REDD multi-donor trust fund for one year, and the follow-up phase to cover 2-3 years with a budget of US$2.42 million is expected to be ready by the end of the first year (UN-REDD, 2009a). This programme aims to apply a participatory multi-stakeholder approach to prepare a REDD-readiness plan, and to lay the technical foundations for REDD. A central goal of UN-REDD is that the national REDD strategy is designed with poverty-reduction co-benefits in mind. Much assistance to forest management in DRC is coming from multiple donors (the African Development Bank, the European Union, FAO, GEF, UNDP, UNEP, The World Bank, and bilateral donors). One major example is the Congo Basin Forest Fund (for all COMIFAC countries), which also aims to reduce deforestation in the region and is funded with US$200 million from Norway and the U.K./DFID (UN-REDD, 2009a) . Major support to the forest sector is also being provided by the World Bank, primarily through the US$64 million Forest and Environment Sector Project, with a focus on strengthening institutional and civil society capacity to implement, enforce and monitor the new policies in the Forest Code. (UN-REDD, 2009a) All this investment will be useful in helping to get the country on track for REDD implementation, provided governance can really be significantly improved and corruption A.4-15

reduced. It remains to be seen whether these efforts will bear sufficient fruit. The principal concern in DRC does not appear to be the existence of appropriate legal frameworks or policies (though some of these need updating, and, in the case of REDD, need to be designed), but the ability to enforce the laws and policies on the ground. In a vast country with such serious institutional and financial constraints, this is a formidable challenge, even if political will is present. Furthermore, corruption is reportedly systemic in the country, and unless serious measures are taken to combat this and increase transparency and accountability, it is doubtful how much of the potential REDD income will be distributed fairly. More positively, however, according to Potter (2009, pers.comm), DRC has one of the strongest civil society networks in central Africa, and it will not be that easy for the government to completely “centralize” (i.e. appropriate) REDD credits.

A.4-16

A.4.2 A.4.2.1

South and Central America Bolivia

Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, and considered biologically ‘megadiverse’. It has the sixth largest tropical forest area in the world (UDAPE, 2006). Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table A.4-2, and additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3.
Table A.4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia) HUMAN WELLBEING & GOVERNANCE Population GDP/capita (PPP US$) 9,517,537 2,819 64.7

FOREST Total forest area (1000 ha) Forest as % of total land area (FAO) Deforestation rate (Change in forest area in %) 2000-2005 (FAO) 58,740 54.2% -0.5%

Life expectancy HDI Report) (2007/2008

0.695

Trend Original forest area as % of total land area (WRI) Classification following Fonseca et al. (2009) Carbon stock in forest 2005 (million tonnes)

Up

GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank – HDI rank (2007/08) HPI (2007/2008 Report)

7

54.0%

13.6%

HFHD

GINI WB Governance Score Voice & Accountability (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) WB Governance Score Government Effectiveness (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) CPI (2008) EPI Overall score ILO 169 signed/ratified UNDRIP supported?

60

5,877 public 85%, private 10%, other 5%

-0.01

Forest ownership

-0.81 3 64.7 Y Y

FSC certification (June 2009) (1000 ha)

1,819

Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)

A.4-17

Forests Bolivia has around 58.7 million ha of forest, covering 54.2% of the total land area (FAO, 2005)18. Of this about 47.9 million are tropical closed natural forest (Chomitz, 2006). In has the sixth largest tropical forest area in the world (UDAPE, 2006). The majority of forest are found in tropical lowlands and subtropical valleys leading to the highlands (Colchester, 2004). Bolivia’s average annual deforestation rate between 2000 and 2005 was about 0.5% and showed an upward trend when compared to the previous reporting period (FAO, 2005). This results in a classification of Bolivia into the cluster of HFHD countries. Despite relatively low levels of deforestation so far, there is much concern about illegal logging in the country, mostly because of the expansion of industrial agriculture (primarily soy bean), logging, and incursion of colonists from degraded highlands (Robertson & Wunder, 2005). As much as 80-90% of timber entering markets have been estimated to have been logged illegally (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002), despite the fact that Bolivia has the largest proportion of certified forests (28%) in the world (FSC, 2006). The extent of large-scale illegal logging is, however, relatively minor compared to other countries and has decreased substantially since the institution of the independent Forest Superintendence, which was designed to be unlinked from political and lobbying group interests (Colchester, 2004). The National Development Plan of 2006 also includes SFM as a goal (UDAPE, 2006).
Figure A.4-5: Bolivia land cover map
Legend
Administration Land Cover Developed Dry Cropland & Pasture Irrigated Cropland Cropland/Grassland Cropland/Woodland Grassl and Shrubl and Shrubl and/Grassland Savanna Deciduous Broadleaf F orest Deciduous Needlel eaf Forest Ev egreen Broadleaf Forest Ev ergreen Needleleaf Forest Mix ed Forest Water Herbaceous Wetland Wooded Wetland Barren Herbaceous Tundra Wooded Tundra Mix ed Tundra

Source: FAO (2009a)

Bare Tundra Snow or Ice Partly Developed Unclassified

Deforestation is primarily driven by advancement of the agricultural frontier (UDAPE, 2006) and most of illegal logging takes place in areas not authorized for logging, but it
18

Estimates of the extent of forest vary by source and definition of ‘forest cover’ (P. Taylor, 2006).

A.4-18

later ‘legalised’ for marketing through the issuance of fraudulent certificates of origin (Colchester, 2004).
Figure A.4-6: Satellite image of Bolivia

The land cover map in Figure A.4-5 and the 2002 satellite image in Figure A.4-6 show how agricultural land use is spreading into forest areas. Biodiversity Bolivia is a ‘megadiverse’ country and harbours an extraordinary diversity of different animals, plants and ecosystems, including different forest ecosystems, including a share of the Amazon rainforest. It contains several of the WWF Global 200 Priority Areas, including 46 (Central Andean Yungas), 47 (Southwestern Amazonian Moist Forests), 58 (Chiquitano Dry Forests), 109 (Central Andean Dry Puna) (NGS & WWF, n.d.).

Source: NASA (2008a)

It also contains the high biodiversity hotspot ‘Tropical Andes’ (see Figure A.4-7), which is the most biodiverse region in the world, containing about six percent of all plant life in only one percent of the global land surface, and the greatest amphibian diversity on earth (664 species) (CI, 2007b). All forests in Bolivia have had some degree of human influence, but traditional uses have been so low in intensity that they have not Figure A.4-7: The Tropical changed the composition or ecological functions of the Andes Hotspot forest (Pizarro, 2005), so it can reasonably be claimed that Bolivia’s still has 50% primary forests, but the trend is downward (FAO, 2005). It is estimated to have 2700 native tree species, and 70 tree species were listed as threatened in the 2004 IUCN Red List (ibid.). In terms of official protected areas, Bolivia is doing well by international standards. In the 1990s it firmed up its National Protected Area System (SNAP) and instituted a National Protected Area Service (SERNAP), although such initiatives as ecosystem protection and PES have also been met with scepticism from vocal groups who fear they run counter to national development interests (Robertson & Wunder, 2005). By 2006 it had 17.2 million ha of protected areas (15.72% of the country’s land area), up from 16.7 million in 1999 (UDAPE, Source: CI (2007b) 2006). However, except for three parks that are administered by NGOs or academic institutions, protected areas hardly have any administrative protection, and some 60,000 people live inside, and 200,000 in surrounding areas (P. Taylor, 2006). A.4-19

Poverty, forest livelihoods, and governance Human development Bolivia has about 9.5 million people (WB, 2009b) with a population density of 8,7 people/km2 (very low compared to 123 in Guatemala or 77.2 in Cambodia). The majority (66%) of the population above age 15 self-identify as indigenous, among the highest proportions in Latin America, and almost 50% speak indigenous languages (UDAPE et al., 2006). The population is concentrated in the lowlands and western highlands, and in many forest regions population density is low (Robertson & Wunder, 2005). Per the global HDR (UNDP, 2007), Bolivia is a medium human development country and ranked in position 117 of 177 countries, with an HDI of 0.695, an average life expectancy at birth of 64.7 and a GDP per capita of PPP US$2,819. The World Bank classifies it as a lower middle income country (WB, 2009a). The ‘GDP per capita rank – HDI rank’ figure calculated by UNDP is 7, indicating that the HDI rank is somewhat higher than the GDP per capita rank. This is the case despite a highly unequal income distribution, with a GINI Index of 59.2 (CIA, 2009). For comparison, Guatemala’s situation is the opposite, with the GDP per capita rank higher than the HDI rank – see below. The average HDI score for the Latin America and the Caribbean region is much higher at 0.803. The national average figures also hide large disparities within the country. For example, in the department of Santa Cruz about 25.1% of the population is extremely poor, whereas in the department of Potosí, this statistic rises to 66.7%, and at municipal level the spread is even larger, with a good number of municipalities where more than 70% of the population is extremely poor. Overall, 40% or 3.3 million people are classified as extremely poor. Compared to other countries in the region of a similar human development standard, Bolivia lies approximately in the middle. It has a higher incidence of extreme poverty than Guatemala, Peru and Ecuador, but lower than Honduras and Nicaragua. (UDAPE, 2006)

A.4-20

Bolivia has prepared its fourth national MDG report, in which the Interinstitutional MDG Committee (CIMDM 19 ) reports on 22 selected indicators. The National Development Plan of 2006 (PND) includes broad, integrated social goals that go beyond the global MDG targets, reflecting political will to work against social exclusion and reduce socio-economic inequalities and inequities (Loza Tellería, 2006). It is very unlikely that those municipalities with proportions of extremely poor residents above 70% will be able to achieve most of the national MDG targets by 2015, and for indigenous people, who – for historical reasons – on average score lower on Source: UDAPE (2006, p.20) human development indicators than nonindigenous people, the chances are lowest (UDAPE, 2006). The political changes that came about with the election of Bolivia’s first indigenous president and which allowed the incorporation of indigenous social movements into the national political arena has yet to manifest itself in a narrowing of the human development gap between indigenous and non-indigenous segments (ibid.). Figure A.4-8 shows the incidence of extreme poverty by department.
Figure A.4-8: Incidence of extreme poverty by department (2001) in %

To combat extreme poverty, the PND aims to increase income-generating measures related to micro-enterprise development, micro-finance, rural development, and infrastructure development, in addition to pro-poor investment in education and health (UDAPE, 2006). Forest livelihoods Some 1.4 million people live in or near forested areas, including 180,000 indigenous people with a claim on 42% of Bolivia’s forest lands, 30,000 peasant farmers who use NTFPs. There are also some 500 registered small-scale timber producers. Conflicts exist especially with poor colonists from the highlands, who are blamed as principal agents of deforestation and with large-scale forest concessions. (Colchester, 2004) Governance Bolivia has some general governance challenges, but does better on ‘voice and accountability’ and corruption perception than some of the other countries examined (DRC, Cambodia). On a scale of -2.5 to +2.5 it scored -0.01 on ‘voice and accountability’ and -0.81 on ‘government effectiveness’ (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Its 2008 CPI on a scale of 0 to 10 (10 being least corrupt) was 3.

19

Spanish acronym. Acronyms in this and the Guatemala case study are in Spanish when they follow organization names translated into English.

A.4-21

Bolivia ratified ILO 169 in 1991 (ILO, 2006), and UNDRIP became national Law 3760 in 1997 (Sunderlin et al., 2008). The provisions of these instruments are being put into practice (see section on forest governance). Bolivia’s overall environmental governance (EPI) score is a middling 64,7 and its biodiversity score is high at 78,4 (Esty et al., 2008). Forest governance Bolivia is one of several Latin American countries undergoing a process of forest land reform, which mainly aims to recognize or transfer formal rights to local communities and smallholders based on ancestral claims and cultural identity. Land tenure in Bolivia is skewed to favour large-scale landholders, despite earlier land reforms. The current process differs from previous agrarian land reform processes in that it grants rights with the stipulation that forests have to be maintained as forests, showing concern with conservation, beyond timber use. The reforms are intended to reconcile conservation, livelihoods and rights-based concerns. (Pacheco et al., 2008) There is now a medium proportion of community-managed forests, and officially 85% are publicly owned forests, while 10% are privately owned, and the remainder is either community-owned or of undefined tenure status. Local communities and indigenous groups own relatively large tracts of forest in Bolivia. Large-scale exercises of agroecological zoning have been undertaken. (Chomitz, 2006) By 2009, 16 forestry operators had achieved FSC certification, among them 13 forest concessions, two private properties, and one on indigenous communal land (FSC, 2006; FSC, 2009) As part of a broader decentralization programme, Bolivia is also moving forest management authority from central to local government (Chomitz, 2006). Bolivia’s constitution (Article 172) guarantees communities the right to sustainably use forest-based resources on public lands where communities have acquired customary rights, even when they do not have formal land title (Asquith et al., 2002). The inclusion of the interests of indigenous and campesino interests in the new Forest Law of 1996, which also allowed use of forest resources by such groups for commercial purposes, was brought about in part by pressure from collective action of indigenous and campesino organizations (Colchester, 2004; Pacheco et al., 2008). In addition, the 1996 Agrarian Reform Law also provides for legal recognition of indigenous territories and legalisation of land claims by small farmers and communities, although the process is so complex that implementation is quite slow (Colchester, 2004) and hampered by the government’s budgetary constraints (Sunderlin et al., 2008). About 200,000 indigenous people are expected to benefit from the current land titling and rights reform process (‘saneamiento’), which concerns about 24 million hectares of land (Pacheco et al., 2008). As of 2008, 19.5 million ha were designated for use by communities and indigenous people, up from 16.6 million ha in 2002, and 9.04 million ha were already owned by such communities, up from 2.8 million ha in 2002 (Sunderlin et al., 2008). Bolivia’s land reform is among the most progressive in community and indigenous land tenure and resource access reform, and also regarding safeguards for equal land access for women and men (Taylor, 2006).

A.4-22

There are, however, areas of land where conflicts over forest tenure exist, for example where customary use rights clash with awarded timber or other concessions (Asquith et al., 2002). Indigenous people do not have a state agency that looks after their interests, as, for example, exists in Brazil, and consequently indigenous people have a difficult time defending acquired lands (TCOs) where those are accessible to outsiders, despite having received formal recognition of rights (Pacheco et al., 2008). Some tensions also arise between implementing agencies with overlapping responsibilities for different tenure regimes (e.g. agrarian vs. forest) and unintended clientalism networks and instances of elite capture have arisen locally (Taylor, 2006). On the other hand, for traditional communities with a high degree of forest-dependence for their livelihoods, such as Brazil nut harvesting communities in the Amazonian part of Bolivia, the granting of rights has importantly provided them with a more favourable environment in which to conduct their forest-resource based activities (ibid.). According to Ebeling and Yasué (2008), “policy and institutional reform in Bolivia’s forestry sector has led to dramatically reduced corruption in the country’s forestry agency which has contributed to measurably improved forest management practices, exemplified by the country’s leadership role in tropical forest certification”. Still, conflicts persist, especially between indigenous people and other rural families who rely on NTFP extraction, and for whom the 1996 Forest Law has not resolved the situation (Colchester, 2004). Community forest management is not without its challenges either. Forest resource use requires adherence to restrictive and cumbersome forestry standards, which can lead to prohibitively high transaction costs and bureaucratic hurdles for smallholder and community logging (Pacheco et al., 2008). In Bolivia it can cost a community $20,000 in start-up costs to comply with logging regulations and $8,000 per year thereafter, and simpler rules could minimize the burdens on communities (Colchester, 2004; Chomitz, 2006). This in effect discourages small-scale operators from becoming legal. Overall, however, the decentralization of forest land administration has had a positive impact on the conservation of forests, and the tenure reform has opened up new opportunities for hitherto marginalized groups to get legal access to forest resources (Taylor, 2006). REDD Potential Bolivia has ratified the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005. Like DRC, Bolivia is also a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations which submitted a formal proposal on REDD to the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. In 2005 the carbon stock in Bolivia’s forests was estimated at about 5.9 million tonnes (FAO, 2005). CO2 emissions per capita in 2004 were only 0.8 (ibid.). Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (2006) estimated that Bolivian deforestation releases between 67-200 tCO2e per hectare cleared or converted, and that Bolivia’s annual deforestation rate could produce between 18-54 tCO2e annually. Assuming a low carbon price of US$4 per tCO2e the country could earn between US$72-216 million per year, or between $360 million and $1.08 billion at a price of $20 per tonne. This would make a significant contribution to national earnings.

A.4-23

Bolivia is also one of the countries that will receive assistance for REDD preparations from the FCPF and has prepared an R-PIN. Prospects for forest-dependent people One study (Robertson & Wunder, 2005) reviewed a number of PES-type pilot initiatives in Bolivia, including the carbon project in Noel Kempff Mercado National Park (see below) and found that, on the whole, these resulted in net positive protection effects, but also large variation in protection efficiency. Furthermore, the livelihood effects on participating service-sellers were generally positive, as were community-wide social effects such as better organization and training. Project example The Noel Kempff Mercado National Park Climate Action Project20 Bolivia hosts one of the first long-term carbon forestry and avoided deforestation projects in the world, the Noel Kempff Mercado National Park Climate Action Project in the NorthEast, launched in 1997. This park contains very high conservation value forest. Well before the establishment of the CDM, the companies American Electric Power, Pacificorp, and British Petroleum, under a forest-carbon protection agreement, invested in a park expansion of 634,000 ha and several project components to prevent deforestation leakage into other areas. It was estimated that 6 - 8 million tonnes of carbon would be protected over a period of 30 years (S. Brown et al., 2000), but more recent estimates have adjusted this figure downward to 5.8 million tonnes (TNC, 2009). The park expansion was coordinated and the project is implemented by the Bolivian conservation NGO Friends of Nature Foundation (FAN) in collaboration with SERNAP and the support of the international NGO The Nature Conservancy. Of the total project costs of US$9.5 million, 1.6 million was used to buy out forest concessionaires, and US$1.25 million for a long-term funding stream for community development projects (to prevent negative effects of park expansion on the livelihoods of communities bordering the park). Part of the community development money was used to establish the Bajo Paragua Communal Territory of Original Inhabitants (TCO). Some funds (US$0.25 million) were also used to develop government capacity to implement other carbon projects through institutional support to the national climate change office. Three communities, totalling 1500 inhabitants, were directly affected by park expansion through loss of employment in timber concessions and partial loss of access to the forest for subsistence extraction of forest products timber, artisanal heart-of-palm production, and wildlife). Although this project is much touted as a successful pilot that demonstrated the possibility of using income from avoided deforestation to simultaneously achieve global and local benefits (Block, 2009), at least one earlier study found that the benefits to local communities were slow in materializing and may even have been negative for some families (Asquith et al., 2002). There does not appear to have been much real community participation in the design stages of the project in the sense of having a say about whether or not the project should go ahead and what its components should be, although communities were asked what types of community projects they would like to see.
20

Except where otherwise indicated all data on this project are from Robertson & Wunder (2005).

A.4-24

It is also worth noting that none of the payments made were PES in the strict sense of the term, which requires conditionality upon provision of a certain service, as all payments were either compensatory one-off payments (such as to the logging concessions) or indirect community-development costs, which were at any rate not conditional on any action on the part of the communities and did not require monitoring or future protection. Nevertheless, overall the project had the desired effect of storing carbon and reducing threats to the biodiversity of the park, as shown in Table A.4-3.

Table A.4-3: Environmental threat changes as a result of the project

Source: Robertson & Wunder (2005, p.25)

Compensation to private land owners and concessionaires seems to have been adequate, perhaps even exceeding their opportunity costs. The 1996 Forest Law also includes restrictions on the harvesting of rare mahogany (Swietenia spp.) and cedar (Cedrus), which had already begun to affect the economics of logging concessions in the area when the project started, while an increasing share of FSC certification and rising demand stimulated an expansion into sustainably produced other, less valuable, wood species, some of which are also found in the park area. It is not clear whether as a result logging in the park would have declined even without the project, or whether logging would simply have shifted to these other species that could be sustainably harvested. This shows how difficult it can be to determine ‘additionality’ when designing PES schemes. For communities the overall effects also appear positive, though they are harder to evaluate. Several of the micro-enterprise projects initially launched were not financially successful and were discontinued, while other expected benefits, such as from ecotourism, have yet to materialize. There are differences in interpretation among community members, FAN, and the park service, of the types of restrictions they face as a result of the park expansion. Some feel that subsistence hunting and fishing is still allowed, but the degree is not clear.

A.4-25

The project has led to several social benefits, including the establishment of the TCO, where communities will be able to undertake SFM activities, and improved community organization (Robertson & Wunder, 2005). In the context of weak local government communities were provided with resources, and project managers were able to adapt project management to local priorities and create real partnerships (May et al., 2004). Certainly the experience with this project provides some lessons on which future REDD project design can build and shows that where opportunity costs are not too high, compensatory payments can be attractive enough to land owners. The primary concern that Robertson and Wunder (2005) express is the de-linking of benefits from conservation results, an issue that has plagued many integrated conservation and development projects (see also (Wunder, 2005). For sustainability reasons, REDD project designers will have to envision direct payments for carbon sequestration services, combined with monitoring and enforcement, to ensure that this link is clear to those benefiting. Otherwise there is a risk that destructive activities will continue, despite payments for conservation. It has also been argued that the project design was too centralized, that there were too many activities, and that the links between objectives and activities were not clear. Furthermore, unclear communication to the affected communities about access rights to forest resources were an issue. (May et al., 2004) Griffiths (2007) alleges that there was elite capture of benefits (in the sense that the bulk of benefits went to state agencies, local government, and conservation NGOs, instead of to indigenous people and local communities and that the costs of protection fell unduly on traditional forest resource users. Municipal governments in Bolivia retain 25% of forest revenues, which could be invested into local pro-poor development (OECD, 2009). In practice, Bolivia’s supportive legislative framework and pro-poor policies are often hampered by institutional weaknesses, lack of financial resources, and lack of technical capacity (May et al., 2004).

A.4-26

A.4.2.2

Guatemala

Guatemala is a medium human development country in Central America, with one of the highest levels of biodiversity and endemism combined in Latin America. Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table A.4-4, and additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3.
Table A.4-4: Key data and indicators (Guatemala) HUMAN WELLBEING & GOVERNANCE Population GDP/capita (PPP US$) 13,348,222 4,568 69.7

FOREST Total forest area (1000 ha) Forest as % of total land area (FAO) Deforestation rate (Change in forest area in %) 2000-2005 (FAO) 3,938 36.3% -1.3%

Life expectancy HDI Report) (2007/2008

0.689

Trend Original forest area as % of total land area (WRI) Classification following Fonseca et al. (2009) Carbon stock in forest 2005 (million tonnes)

Up

GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank – HDI rank (2007/08) HPI (2007/2008 Report)

-11

99.0%

22.5%

LFHD

GINI WB Governance Score Voice & Accountability (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) WB Governance Score Government Effectiveness (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) CPI (2008) EPI Overall score ILO 169 signed/ratified UNDRIP supported?

55

572 public 42.2%, private 52.5%, other 5.3%

-0.26

Forest ownership

-0.49 3.1 76.7 Y Y

FSC certification (June 2009) (1000 ha)

457.6

Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)

A.4-27

Forests Guatemala has between 2.9 and 4.3 million ha of tropical forest, of which about 2.8 million ha are tropical closed natural forest (Chomitz, 2006). The official FAO figure is 3.9 million ha of forest, or 36.3% of total land area (FAO, 2005). Figure A.4-9 shows different types of forest cover and other land cover in Guatemala21, and Figure A.4-10 is a satellite view of forest fires burning in the country. The deforestation rate is relatively high at 1.3% per year in the period 2000-2005, and the trend is upward compared to the Figure A.4-9: Guatemala land cover map previous reporting period (FAO, 2005). A national study put the annual deforestation rate between the longer period 1991-2001 at 1.43% annually (Ferrate et al., 2009). It is classified as a LFHD country following the da Fonseca et al. (2007) system. Within the country, there is great variation in forest loss rates among departments. The highest losses were experienced in the western, eastern and central departments, where population density is higher. The highest loss in terms of area was experienced in the Petén (annual losses of more than 47,000 ha, corresponding to a rate of 1.81%), while in terms of loss rate, the highest net losses were registered in the department of Chiquimula (about 1,400 ha/year, and a rate of 2.46%). (Ferrate et al., 2009)

Source: FAO (2000)

The government distinguishes structural, direct, and indirect causes of deforestation. Ferrate et al. (2009) list land use change (primarily conversion to agriculture), fuelwood consumption, forest fires, pests and diseases (e.g. damage from pine weevil (Dendroctonus sp)., and illegal industrial logging as direct causes. In the Petén, about 65% of the 10 year change in forest cover between 1991 and 2001 is attributed to advancement of the agricultural frontier, an in particular for oil palm plantations and the planting of corn for biofuels. Illegal logging appears to be major as well. A 2003 study estimated that illegal timber harvest for industrial use constitutes 30% to 50% of the total annual commercial wood volume. As indirect causes the R-PIN (Ferrate et al., 2009) lists high rural unemployment, corruption among authorities responsible for forest law enforcement, institutional weaknesses concerning monitoring and control in contradiction of legal norms, unsustainable agriculture practices (in particular agricultural encroachment for the
21

Unlike for the other case countries, a more complete land cover map was not available for Guatemala.

A.4-28

planting of corn and cattle grazing by farmers), and market failures (including missing incentives for conservation). Public policy failures are also to blame, as until recently they have encouraged farming activities through forestland conversion, but there have been important changes in the previous decade.

Figure A.4-10: Satellite image of fires from biomass burning in Guatemala

Structural causes are listed as population growth, lack of a forest culture (by which is meant a level of awareness about the importance of Source: NASA (2008b) forests), low levels of education in rural areas (especially concerning the sustainable management and conservation of forests), poverty (lack of alternative employment opportunities), land tenure insecurity and unequal distribution of land (Ferrate et al., 2009). Biodiversity Although a small country, Guatemala has one of the highest levels of biodiversity and endemism combined in Latin America, which are highly threatened and therefore feature among the world’s top conservation hotspots (EPIQ, 2003). Guatemala contains the WWF Global 200 Priority Area 63 (Mesoamerican Pine-Oak Forests) (NGS & WWF, n.d.). In addition, the lowland tropical forest areas of the Petén region are known for their high biodiversity as well as important cultural heritage and contain the Mayan Biosphere Reserve (MBR). 700 native tree species are reported by FAO, and 83 species were red-listed in 2004 (FAO, 2005). Its biogeographic location make it a land bridge between the Nearctic and the Neotropical realms, and it has the highest eco-regional diversity in Central America (EPIQ, 2003). Guatemala’s forests can be classified into 34 different types, which fall into broader categories such as tropical humid broadleaf, mangrove, montane coniferous, montane broadleaf, deciduous and semi-deciduous forests (EPIQ, 2003). The majority (59.4%) of forests are located outside protected areas, mostly in the western and central highlands; while 40.6% of forests are located in protected areas, mostly in the northern Department of Petén. The underlying threats to biodiversity and tropical forests are unsustainable natural resource exploitation. Between 1992 and 1998 50% of the country’s pine forests, 29% of mangroves, and on average 15% of forests were lost (EPIQ, 2003). Numerous mining concessions have been awarded, many on indigenous territories, which has led to environmental destruction, in addition to reported abuses of indigenous rights, including forced removal of people, in contravention of national and international laws (MRGI, 2008).

A.4-29

Guatemala scores 76,7 on the overall EPI (significantly better than the other countries this report looked at), but only 36,4 on the EPI biodiversity indicator (Esty et al., 2008). Poverty, forest livelihoods and governance Human development Guatemala is a densely populated country with about 13.3 million people and an annual population growth rate of 2% (WB, 2007). About half of the population lives in rural areas (ibid.). Per the global (UNDP, 2007), Guatemala is a medium human development country and ranks in position 118 of 177 countries (directly after Bolivia) in the global HDR, with an HDI of 0.689, an average life expectancy at birth of 69.7 years (higher than that of Bolivia) and a GDP per capita of PPP US$4,568 (almost twice that of Bolivia). The World Bank therefore classifies it as a lower middle income country (WB, 2009a). The ‘GDP per capita rank – HDI rank’ figure calculated by UNDP is, however, only -11, indicating that the HDI rank is substantially lower than the GDP per capita rank. This also partly explains why the HDI is about the same as that of Bolivia, even though GDP per capita is much higher. The GINI Index is 55.1 , pointing to very high income inequality. On the positive side, the trend in the HDI has been steadily upward over the past several decades (UNDP, 2007). In 2000 more than half of the population lived in poverty, mainly in rural areas, and 16% were extremely poor (WB, 2003). Furthermore, there are serious inequalities between indigenous and non-indigenous groups. Although 43% of the population is indigenous, they only account for less than 25% of income and consumption (ibid.), which is the result of past policies that purposely excluded indigenous people – and women – from development and education opportunities. Guatemala has prepared two MDG reports, the first one in 2005 with the help of UNDP, and the second one in 2006, by the Office of the President. The government intends to achieve its MDG targets through already ongoing policies and programmes (UNDP, 2008). One of the priorities of the latest elected government (2008), is to narrow the gap in MDG achievement for vulnerable groups (ibid.) Although serious challenges remain, the country appears to be on a rocky road towards more inclusive and pro-poor development, as also laid out in the 1996 Peace Accords (WB, 2003). Forest livelihoods There is a relatively large percentage of communal lands in Guatemala, areas that have long been protected by their inhabitants, not only in areas dominated by indigenous groups (though this is where the largest number of communal lands is found), but also in mixed-ethnicity areas and in non-indigenous regions (Ferrate et al., 2009). There are also many communal and industrial timber concessions that harvest timber and other forest products sustainably, and co-management arrangements with NGOs exist for some of the National Parks (ELI, 2003). About 60% of the population depends on fuelwood for energy, and the numbers have increased over the past several years, but there is little control over fuelwood use in the A.4-30

country and much more appears to be harvested than is authorized (Ferrate et al., 2009). Governance Guatemala has many governance challenges. The country was embroiled in a very long civil war, which began in the 1960s as an uprising against the politically conservative militarily dominated government by left-wing groups, fuelled by the lack of respect for human and civil rights for the majority of the population. It lasted for more than three decades and ended in 1996. Human rights violations by the State accounted for 93% of all reported cases during the years 1978 to 1984, when the majority of violations took place. Leaders of human rights movements were systematically eliminated in the name of national security. Much of the violence was directed against indigenous communities, whom the government considered allies of the guerrillas. Numerous massacres of entire Mayan communities took place with unspeakable violence. Mayan’s ceremonial sites, spiritual places and cultural symbols were also destroyed and in some cases large areas were completely razed. (CEH, 2005) Peace came in 1996, but the society bears deep scars, and violence and organized crime are widespread. The country’s per capita homicide rates are among the highest in the world, but very low conviction rates (UN, 2008b). Formally, the government today is committed to indigenous rights, as reflected in its ratification of national and international indigenous-rights related legal instruments. Following signature of the March 1995 Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AIDPI) Accord (MRGI, 2008), the Guatemalan government ratified ILO 169 in 1996 (ILO, 2006), coinciding with the year of signature of the Peace Accord, and voted for UNDRIP at the UN General Assembly. The new national Constitution guarantees respect for indigenous rights, including to social organization, language, and traditional dress. There are now indigenous peoples’ offices in some public institutions, supported by NGOs (Ferrate et al., 2009), including an Office of the Ombudsman for Indigenous People and a Department of Indigenous People at the Ministry of Labour, but these institutions have insufficient budgets to address indigenous issues efficiently (MRGI, 2008). However, defenders of human rights, particularly social, cultural and economic rights, are facing frequent attacks from illegal armed groups with almost complete impunity, and between 2002 and 2007 at least 50 advocates of human rights were murdered, despite government efforts to address the issue (UN, 2008a), and in 2007 some 200 attacks on human rights defenders were recorded (HRD, 2009). In 2008 the government established a Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) under an agreement with the United Nations, to investigate clandestine illegal ‘security groups’, which were to be dismantled after the Peace Accord, but continue to operate. This Commission, staffed with criminal justice experts, is working to bring to justice criminal groups, which have been threatening courts to prevent them from taking action in human rights abuse cases (UN, 2008b). There have been some encouraging results, e.g. in 2008 anticorruption measures resulted in the expulsion of about 1700 people from the police force (ibid.). Guatemala is now rated -0.26 on the World Bank’s ‘voice and accountability’ governance indicator, and -0.49 on ‘government effectiveness’ (better than Bolivia and showing an upward trend on the latter). The CPI is 3.1, indicating relatively high levels of corruption (close to Bolivia, but significantly less than in DRC and Cambodia). A.4-31

Forest governance Forestry and forest conservation is the legal purview of a number of ministries and agencies, mainly the National Forestry Institute (INAB), the National Council of Protected Areas (CONAP), the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) and the System for Control and Prevention of Forest Fires (SIPECIF). Forest Law enforcement is the duty of INAP, CONAP, the Division for Protection of Nature of the National Civil Police (DIPRONA), and municipalities (local government). (Ferrate et al., 2009). INAB is a semi-autonomous body that governs all forestry activities outside protected areas, established by Legislative Decree No. 101-95 (Forestry Law) to commercialize, diversity and conserve forest resources. CONAP was established under Decree 4-89 (Protected Area Law) and is in charge of the Guatemalan System of Protected Areas (SIGAP). It approves the submission of forestry concessions and manages protected areas. (Ferrate et al., 2009) Here, like in Bolivia, there has been a process of forest land reform, with a move towards decentralized management of forest resources. The decentralized INAB has the reputation of being one of the most competent and honest public institutions in Guatemala (Wittmer & Birner, 2003). Decision making on forestry matters is still largely centralized, although elected municipal governments can now participate significantly in local natural resource management (A.M. Larson, 2008). Municipalities are autonomous and are responsible for managing natural resources in their jurisdiction sustainably, undertaking their own land use planning through specialized units (Ferrate et al., 2009). This decentralization to municipalities is significant for indigenous people, because municipal codes require the municipalities to consult with indigenous communities and their recognized authorities on any issues affecting their interest (A.M. Larson, 2008). In cases studied by Larson (2008), local indigenous leaders did not see municipal governments as representative of their interests, and civil society organizations appeared to have different agendas from municipalities, but this varied with site. Some indigenous groups are against logging on principle, and sometimes also because they do not foresee benefits flowing to their communities. Municipalities that have been delegated forest management responsibilities may retain 50% of tax income from forest licenses (A.M. Larson, 2008). INAB has sometimes mistakenly awarded logging permits based on contested land titles, and despite a commitment to SFM is as yet unable to control the substantial illegal logging that is taking place (ibid.). This probably contributes to the wariness of INAB by some indigenous communities. Municipal forest offices (OFM), where they have been set up, have in some cases successfully functioned as a mediator between local communities and INAB, facilitated by their knowledge of local customs (ibid.). In another case documented by Larson (2008), a local indigenous authority flat refused to allow the establishment of an OFM because of an objection to using forest as a commercial resource, and protests have ensued over the issuance of logging licenses to the municipality by INAB . A variety of forest management regimes being implemented in different areas, ranging from state-management to community-based management to NGO management (Wittmer & Birner, 2003). According to official figures, 42.2% of forests are publicly owned, 37.8% are private lands and 14.7% are communal areas (Ferrate et al., 2009).

A.4-32

Guatemala, like Bolivia, is among the most progressive countries in granting equal access to land ownership for men and women. There is considerable co-management of forests under community concessions. In the remote Petén region, almost 500,000 ha were put under 13 co-managed community concessions in the 1990s (Junkin, 2007). This constitutes the largest expanse of community-managed forest in the world, and almost 70% of this is FSC-certified (Cronkleton et al., 2008). At the time of writing, there were also 10 FSC-certified forest areas in Guatemala, totaling 457,625 ha (FSC, 2009). In terms of providing community benefits, one form of governance is not necessarily superior to any other, but rather it is context specific which form works best in a given situation (Wittmer & Birner, 2003). Concerning protected areas, CONAP recently instituted a Department of Indigenous Peoples to address issues of indigenous peoples’ voice regarding conservation and resource management decisions and ensure greater dialogue and participation with the indigenous population (McNab, 2009). Guatemala theoretically has an appropriate institutional framework and policies to protect and manage its forests sustainably, but the institutions are hampered by funding limitations due to inadequate national budget allocations, which appears to reflect the low political priority given to environmental issues vis-à-vis other areas (EPIQ, 2003). REDD Potential Guatemala is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like DRC and Bolivia), which has expressed formal interest in REDD to the UNFCCC. Guatemala has prepared national greenhouse gas inventories for the years 1990 and 2000. In 1990, CO2 emissions were under 7.5 million tonnes, and by 2000 (preliminary data) this had gone up threefold to 21.3 million tonnes (Ferrate et al., 2009), most of it due to land use change. 12 million tonnes of CO2 in carbon stocks and about 0.7 million tonnes in soils were lost between 1990 and 2000 (ibid.). Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (2006a) estimated that Guatemala could earn anywhere between US$21-216 million per year for avoided deforestation, depending on the carbon price and actual emissions reductions. Plans are underway to develop a national agenda for REDD projects with coordination among the various government agencies, supported by several NGOs. Community groups are only marginally involved in the development process (McNab, 2009). The country has submitted, in early 2009, an R-PIN to the FCPF, from which it will receive funding for REDD readiness activities. Prospects for forest-dependent people Potentially, forest-dependent communities could receive support for sustainable management and protection, and REDD incentives could lead to greater internal support within communities for sustainable management activities, which might include protection, sustainable economic alternatives, and education and the intangible benefits created by additional employment opportunities (McNab, 2009). Given the cultural resistance of some Mayan communities to logging (A.M. Larson, 2008), REDD, which would provide payment for conservation activities (as well as, in all likelihood, SFM), would seem in the interest of indigenous people inhabiting tropical forest areas.

A.4-33

Various schemes for distribution of REDD benefits are under consideration. Because some groups have already promised various benefits to local communities, high (and probably unrealistic) expectations have been created (McNab, 2009). According to McNab (2009, pers.comm.) the government maintains that carbon rights are held by the state, but there is no specific law governing carbon, and the details are still under discussion. Some local people who hold forest concession contracts providing them with formal usufruct rights consider that since these provide them with rights to the natural resources above ground, they automatically should have legal standing to derive REDD income. This is an issue that needs to be clarified. In general, municipalities in Guatemala retain a substantial portion of forestry revenue (50%, double the figure of Bolivia), which can theoretically be utilized for pro-poor development (OECD, 2009). There is no reason why REDD-income could not also be re-distributed in this fashion. However, one of the principal fears of indigenous organizations and proponents of indigenous rights is that once they become valuable through REDD credits, revenue from forests may be centralized and traditional owners marginalized. This could possibly be an issue in Guatemala. The indigenous people of Guatemala made a joint submission, signed by 14 indigenous organizations and associations, to the UNFCCC in February 2009, in which they expressed concern that REDD and other climate change mitigation options could negatively affect the rights of indigenous people (UNFCCC, 2009d). They request consideration of collective rights of indigenous peoples, effective consultation to obtain FPIC, conformance to the ILO169 Convention and UNDRIP, coordination with various UN agencies, access to financing and capacity development for mitigation and adaptation activities, and recognition of indigenous strategies relating to adaptation and mitigation. They demand structural reforms at the national level that would assure effective indigenous participation in broader poverty reduction efforts, as well as recognition of indigenous land and other rights. This would also imply a revision of policies concerning mining, other large projects, and protected areas in indigenous territories. The government has expressed interest in maximizing the potential income of indigenous people from REDD, but it is not yet clear among government agencies by what agencies REDD resources should be received and what the share for each should be (McNab, 2009). McNab illustrates the case with the example of the National Parks Authority (CONAP), which administers the countries protected areas, while the Ministry of Environment & Natural Resources (MARN) is responsible for broader environmental issues and leading efforts to adapt to climate change. It is likely that greater centralization of REDD income will be sought. If citizens felt that their rights were being violated, theoretically they would have the possibility of filing a civil suit against the government. In the case of indigenous people’s environmental rights infringements, support can be provided by NGOs such as the Centro de Acción Legal-Ambiental y Social de Guatemala (CALAS – Center for Legal, Environmental and Social Action), but in general such recourses are not easily accessible (McNab, 2009). As is the case elsewhere, more powerful actors often succeed in getting their interests represented (A.M. Larson, 2008). This is the case at national level, but also at municipal and indigenous authority level. Where municipal authorities have elected indigenous A.4-34

officials, these are not necessarily fully representative of or accountable to local indigenous communities, as they may come from more urban, educated strata (ibid.). What Larson suggests is that it matters less which institution (municipal forestry offices, or indigenous authorities) is chosen to manage forests at the local level, but rather how well it is able to perform a participatory process of engagement with local communities – indigenous authorities themselves may also be autocratic or lack transparency. If a fair share of REDD income is to reach local communities, the same issues as for SFM in general will apply. It will require careful analysis of the local context, dialogue space, and an often slow and difficult process of negotiation among parties with different attitudes, interests, and power. The Petén region, which contains the Maya Biosphere Reserve (MBR), offers an interesting example of the complex relations underlying negotiations in contested areas. Project-example: The MBR in the Petén The Petén, which includes a large share of the country’s tropical humid forests (more than 47,800 km2) and functions as a northern limit for tropical vegetation (EPIQ, 2003), is politically and geographically isolated and has experienced much competition by different interests over natural resource use as a result of a history of in-migration by extractivist communities (e.g., to harvest chicle gum (Manilkara spp., ornamental xate (Chamaerdorea elegans, C. oblongata and C. ernesti-augustii) from other departments, starting in the 1920s, and followed in the 1960s by campesino (peasant) communities of ladino (mixed) and indigenous origin for swidden agriculture and some large scale ranching. Later, mining and extraction of petroleum and timber by other groups caused accelerated deforestation in this region. Contests over land by members of different groups with competing interests increased during the decades of the civil strife and the transition period in the 1990s, when the Peace Accords stipulated the distribution of land to former combatants and refugees, often overlapping with protected MBR territory. The MBR was formed in 1990 between Belize, Guatemala and Mexico and is the largest protected area in Central America, extending over 2.1 million ha (Johns & Johnson, 2008). In establishing the reserve, it was important to find a solution that could accommodate the conflicting interests of major groups, including recognition of settlement rights (historic and recent), forest and biodiversity conservation, and industrial logging (Monterroso & Barry, 2008). Community forest concessions were introduced in the Multiple Use Zone (MUZ) to mitigate some of the conflicts and enable better reserve management under certified SFM (Cronkleton et al., 2008; Monterroso & Barry, 2008). Though initially these were foreseen to be scattered smallholding concessions (of maximum 7,000 ha each), through a negotiation process between all concerned parties it was possible to arrive at an arrangement that scaled the size of community concessions up significantly (averaging between 20,000 and 50,000 ha) to meet stated livelihood needs, and that also satisfied the needs of commercial logging operators (Monterroso & Barry, 2008). While previously communities had only usufruct rights for NTFPs, now they were able to extract timber, while part of the concession area has to be reserved for conservation, with NTFP extraction permitted (Monterroso & Barry, 2008).

A.4-35

Despite problematic corruption and lack of community organization capacity, the concessions have been mostly profitable due to the extraction of valuable commercial species, and most have received FSC certification (Chomitz, 2006). The result has been that deforestation in the concessions appears substantially lower than outside them, including in protected areas (Chomitz, 2006; Monterroso & Barry, 2008). There are, however, some conflicts among different existing rights due to contrasting legal provisions, e.g. loss of traditional use rights of NTFPs by some local residents to guarantee exclusion rights for community concessions owners (Monterroso & Barry, 2008). Here, too, though exclusion rights exist, these are insufficiently backed up by the state, and NTFP extraction is not yet officially regulated by law – the latter so far remains governed by informal agreements (ibid.). Despite such issues, most observers agree that the Petén has become, over the past several years, a territory that is governed to the benefit of both communities and forests, which was enabled through collective action and a shift in several rights bundles from the state and individual (industrial) concessions to the communities involved (ibid.). Johns and Johnson (2008) summarize the first REDD demonstration project, currently still in the design stage, in Guatemala’s Maya Biosphere Reserve (MBR) (see Figure A.4-11), which is supported by CI, WCS, and the Guatemalan Government. Figure A.412 shows the various land uses inside the reserve, where agricultural encroachment and illegal logging are becoming a threat to the forests and biodiversity.

A.4-36

Figure A.4-11: Political map of the MBR in Guatemala

Figure A.4-12: Land use in the Guatemalan Maya Biosphere Reserve

Source: WJU (2002)

Most people with “standing” in the MBR are Ladino (of mixed indigenous/Hispanic descent22). Indigenous people tend to be concentrated in the highlands of Guatemala, although in recent years migrations have brought more indigenous people to the lowlands of the Petén. The pilot project will focus on carbon sequestration, gradually expanding in scope. There are plans to pursue reforestation near the Maya Jaguar Corridor and attempt to improve the livelihoods of local communities from carbon finance revenues. In the planning stages, informal consultations with communities of the MBR have occurred under the auspices of some NGOs (McNab, 2009). Whereas at a global level concern has been expressed by indigenous rights advocates that indigenous and other forest-dependent people may lose their land or access rights to forests if exclusionary REDD schemes are implemented, according to McNab (2009) this is not a concern in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, where the groups proposed for participation have legal standing via forest concession contracts with the state. On the contrary, it is expected that local groups will be affected positively. Nevertheless, one of the concerns among local groups with forest concessions in the MUZ of the MBR concerns the share of benefits they will be able to receive when making efforts to conserve forests in their concessions.

The Guatemalan Ministry of Education describes the Ladino group as a heterogeneous population that speaks Spanish as native language and possesses specific cultural traits of Hispanic origin mixed with indigenous cultural elements (MINEDUC, 2009).

22

A.4-37

A.4.3 A.4.3.1

Southeast Asia region Cambodia

Cambodia is a medium human development country with a very high deforestation rate. It has high numbers of endangered or critically endangered species (Clements & Evans, 2008). Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table A.4-5, and additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3.
Table A.4-5: Key data and indicators (Cambodia) HUMAN WELLBEING & GOVERNANCE Population GDP/capita (PPP US$) 14,446,056 2,727

FOREST Total forest area (1000 ha) Forest as % of total land area (FAO) Deforestation rate (Change in forest area in %) 2000-2005 (FAO) 10,447 59.2%

Life expectancy HDI Report) (2007/2008

58

-2.0%

0.598

Trend Original forest area as % of total land area (WRI) Classification following Fonseca et al. (2009) Carbon stock in forest 2005 (million tonnes)

Up

GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank – HDI rank (2007/08) HPI (2007/2008 Report)

-6

100.0%

38.6%

HFHD

GINI WB Governance Score Voice & Accountability (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) WB Governance Score Government Effectiveness (2009) (-2.5 to +2.5) CPI (2008) EPI Overall score ILO 169 signed/ratified UNDRIP supported?

41.7

1,426

-0.94

Forest ownership

public 100%

-0.81 1.8 53.8 N Y

FSC certification

-

Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)

A.4-38

Forests Cambodia is located in Southeast Asia and has a land area of 181.035 km2. Its tropical forests currently extend over about 10.4 million ha (FAO, 2005), of which 5.5 million ha are tropical closed natural forest (Chomitz, 2006). Only 322,000 ha of primary forest (3.1% of total forest area) remain, and the trend of loss is upward (FAO, 2005). The country has experienced serious deforestation over the past decades. Cambodia is among the top five countries in Southeast Asia with the largest annual net loss in forest area in the period 2000-2005, topped only by Indonesia and Myanmar. At present 59.2% of the total land area remain under forest-cover, but the deforestation rate from 2000-2005 was 2%, showing an upward trend vis-à-vis the previous reporting period (FAO, 2005). In 1965, about 73% of the country were still forested (Sokhun et al., 2009). Griscom et al. (2009) estimate that originally 18.1 million ha of forest covered the country (practically all of the land area), and that currently 65.1% of the original forest area remain. They estimate an average annual forest loss rate of 0.89% for the period 1990-2005, which puts Cambodia into the cluster of HFHD countries. Most deforestation occurred in the north-west of the country (notably Bantey Meanchey, Battambong, Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey and Pailin Provinces) (Sokhun et al., 2009). Main drivers of deforestation in Cambodia are illegal logging (in a context of high timber demand from other countries in the region), land conversion, heavy reliance on fuelwood for energy in rural areas (used by 84% of the population), lack of SFM implementation capacity, and lack of (financial) incentives to conserve forests (ibid.). Economic Land Concessions (ELC) have been responsible for a significant degree of landscape changes (Bradley, 2009).
Figure A.4-13: Cambodia land cover map
Leg end
Administration Land Cover Developed Dry Cropland & Pasture Irr igated Cropland Cropland/Grassland Cropland/W oodland Grassland Shrubland Shrubland/Grassland Savanna Deciduous Broadl eaf F or est Deciduous Needl eleaf F orest Ev egreen Br oadleaf Forest Ev er gr een Needleleaf Forest Mix ed F orest W ater Herbaceous W etl and W ooded Wetland Barr en Herbaceous T undra W ooded Tundra Mix ed T undra Bare Tundra Snow or Ice Partly D eveloped

Source: FAO (2009b)

Unclassifi ed

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Figure A.4-13 shows land cover types in Cambodia, while Figure A.4-14 is a satellite view of the entire South East Asia region, showing the rainforests of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and the Mekong river passing through Cambodia into southern Vietnam, as well as the Tonle Sap in Cambodia, the largest freshwater lake in South East Asia.
Figure A.4-14: Satellite image of South East Asia (2001)

Source: NASA (2008c)

Biodiversity in Cambodia Cambodia contains WWF Global 200 Priority Area 54 (Indochina Dry Forests) (NGS & WWF, n.d.). It is located in the very large Indo-Burma biodiversity hotspot (about 2.4 million km2 in extent), which contains the Lower Mekong catchment and is estimated to host some 13500 plant species, of which 7000 are endemic and several endemic threatened mammals, birds, and amphibians (CI, 2007c). FAO (2005) has recorded 862 native tree species and 32 tree species on the Red List. Cambodia scores 53.8 on the overall EPI, and a very high 85.4 on the EPI biodiversity indicator, interestingly the highest in that category among the 6 countries reviewed. This is likely the case because about 30% of the surface area (but including the Tonle Sap lake, which extends over 8% of that area) has been designated as protected areas, including a protected area system and Protection Forests (ARD, 2004). Cambodia established 23 protected areas by Royal Decree in 1993, covering 18% of the land area, and later added three forest conservation areas with the goal of promoting biodiversity

A.4-40

conservation (CI, 2007c). However, given Cambodia’s governance challenges (see below), it is questionable how much of this land area is effectively protected. Figure A4-15 shows protected areas and protected forests (which are distinct categories, see under forest governance below).
Figure A.4-15: Protected areas and protected forests

Much of the country's biodiversity is linked to, and REDD could help in protecting critical habitats for many species. However, the most severe threats relevant to the most threatened species are due to targeted over-exploitation, which REDD projects alone would not address (T. Evans, 2009b). It is characterized by low levels of endemism and moderate species-richness, but high numbers of endangered or critically endangered species (Clements & T. Evans, 2008). Poverty, forest livelihoods and governance Human development

Cambodia has a population of about 14.4 million people, with an annual growth rate of 2% (WB, 2009b), and a density of almost 80 people/km2 (the Source: Sokhun et al. (2009, p.25) second highest density of the five countries examined). About 79% of the population is rural. The majority are subsistence farmers, and particularly upland and indigenous communities are heavily forest-dependent (Colchester, 2004). According to the 2007/2008 HDR (UNDP, 2007), Cambodia is a medium human development country and ranks in position 131 of 177 countries in the global HDR, with an HDI of 0.598 (showing an upward trend), an average life expectancy at birth of only 58 years and a GDP per capita of PPP US$2,727 (close to that of Bolivia). The World Bank classifies it as a low income country (WB, 2009a). The ‘GDP per capita rank – HDI rank’ figure calculated by UNDP is only -6, indicating that the HDI rank is somewhat lower than the GDP per capita rank. For comparison, the average HDI score for East Asia and the Pacific is 0.771, and for South Asia 0.611.

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Cambodia has, however, made substantial progress in reducing poverty over the past decade, with GDP growing rapidly (about 10% annually), reducing the proportion of poor people by about 1% annually on average. In the first HDR of 1990, Cambodia’s HDI score was only 0.501, and the country was then classified as having ‘low human development’ status (RGC, 2002). Nevertheless, in 2004 34.7% of the population were considered poor and the percentage for rural areas was up to 45.6% for more remote areas (UNDP, 2008). The GINI index for Cambodia is 43 (CIA, 2009), and reducing inequality is a challenge. Cambodia prepared a PRSP in 2002 (RGC, 2002) with a national poverty reduction strategy for the years 2003-2005. Subsequently it prepared its first national MDG report in 2003, setting targets for 2005, 2010 and 2015. It subsequently elaborated strategies for achieving the targets in a number of policy documents, including the ‘Rectangular Strategy’ (2004) and the National Development Plan 2006-2010, which integrated the earlier Socio-Economic Development Plan and the National Poverty Reduction Strategy as well as the MDGs. (UNDP, 2008) Forest livelihoods About 1.4 million people were estimated to be forest-dependent in the year 2000, corresponding to 13% of the population at that time (Poffenberger, 2006). Traditional upland indigenous communities have been practicing swidden agriculture with long fallow period sustainable for centuries, but are now threatened by the incursion of lowland migrant farmers, who tend to introduce more destructive forms of slash-and-burn permanent agriculture systems that have led to erosion and forest degradation (Poffenberger, 2006). Figure A.4-16 shows areas that are forested and have low population density. Orange and green outlines indicate Figure A.4-16: Forested and sparsely populated provinces in Cambodia jurisdiction of the MOE and FA respectively. The government has formally recognized the importance of forest-based livelihoods and the need to maximize the forestry sector’s contribution to poverty reduction, food security, and equitable development in a 2002 Statement on National Forest Sector Policy (van Beukering et al., 2009). The Statement also explicitly mentioned the need to legally recognize and protect the traditional rights of local populations.

Source: ARD (2006, p.3)

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Governance Cambodia’s recent history was marred by war in the 1970s and the brutal genocidal regime of the Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979, which aimed to transform the country into an agricultural communist state. This was followed by years of renewed occupation by Vietnam. A Peace Agreement finally brought new hope in 1991, although it did not mark the end of violence in the country. Cambodia emerged heavily scarred and, despite an elected government, serious deficiencies in governance and justice administration remain. (Sharp, 1997) Cambodia scores very low on ‘voice and accountability’ (-0.94) and ‘government effectiveness’ (-0.81), and its CPI rivals that of DRC with a score of 1.8, indicating high levels of corruption. The UN Human Rights Commission (OHCHR) states explicitly that “…officials, and powerful interests around them, are able to appropriate natural and economic resources, as well as the property of others, punish their opponents and suppress their rights, while civil society has limited impact” (OHCHR, 2008, p.6). Similarly, Global Witness also alleges a “pervasive culture of impunity and the perception of official rank as a license to extort” in Cambodia (2004b, p.43). Under the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodians’ property rights and their ability to engage in collective action were severely challenged (Weingart & Kirk, 2008). Even now, the introduction of new laws, decrees and sub-decrees that were introduced in an attempt to re-create a legal framework to secure access to land and natural resources for the people have created new uncertainties among the rural poor and generally advantaged more powerful elites (GW, 2007). The UN Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia is clearly very concerned. “Year after year, the Special Representative’s predecessors and others have addressed the problems of the legal and judicial system in Cambodia and made numerous recommendations, to no avail. The Government has no incentives for reform, as the international community continues to make large financial contributions regardless of widespread violations of human rights” (OHCHR, 2008, p.22). Forest governance In the 20th century, Southeast Asia’s forests were nationalized and vast forest areas were degraded as the timber industry expanded (Poffenberger, 2006). Cambodia was no exception. Even today, forest management is subject to state domination (van Beukering et al., 2009). Officially 100% of forest lands are state-owned (FAO, 2005), and the proportion of community-managed forests is low (Chomitz, 2006). The Forestry Administration (FA), a semi-autonomous unit under the umbrella of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), is responsible for the management of production forests, whereas the Ministry for the Environment (MOE) oversees sites in protection forests (Sunderlin, 2006). The 2002 Forestry Law divides forests into Permanent Forest Reserve (State property under the jurisdiction of the FA), private forests, and protected areas (under the jurisdiction of the MOE, currently 17% of the forest estate) (see Figure A.4-17). Protected forests constitute 8% of the total Permanent Forest Reserve land area, and 19% are former or suspended forest concessions, while 2% are community forests (Sokhun et al., 2009). A.4-43

The forest policies of Cambodia focus primarily on the commercial utilization of forests, primarily for timber, which is typical for the early stages of forest policy development (M. Wilkie, 2009). Nevertheless, a growing number of community forestry projects have been introduced since the early 1990s, and as of 2002 there were about 83,000 ha of forest area under introduced community forestry management 23 (57 initiatives at 228 sites, inhabited by about Source: van Beukering et al. (2009, p.14) 415,000 people), mainly out of concern over forest degradation and deforestation (Sunderlin, 2006). As of 2008 only about 2% of forest lands were considered community forests, but the FA has expressed a commitment to increase this to about 20%, and there is now a National Community Forestry Coordination Committee (Sokhun et al., 2009). Community forests are still state-owned, but the government may enter into agreements with communities for local management for up to 15 years (Sokhun et al., 2009). Increasing the area under community concessions would, if accompanied by authority to exclude outsiders, reduce the extent of illegal logging, in addition to providing the communities with the needed access to forest resources (van Beukering et al., 2009).
Figure A.4-17: Forest classification, administration and concessions

Unlike in, e.g., Bolivia and Guatemala, in Cambodia, according to the 2004 sub-decree on community forestry, logging is not allowed, so that the extraction and sale of NTFPs is the only way participants can earn income from these forests, and even this is only possible five years after approval of a site management plan and entails payment of royalties and premiums on harvested products (except for customary use) (Sunderlin, 2006). This is aggravated by the fact that most (two-thirds) community forestry projects are situated on already deforested or degraded lands, as the original intent was not poverty-reduction per se, but the rehabilitation of such lands and the conservation of what forest remains (ibid.). Commercial forestry concessions contributed much to deforestation before the moratorium on logging that was introduced in 2002, which is to be in place until new forest management plans can be prepared and approved. Concession management now requires mandatory Strategic Forest Management Plans, and Environmental and Social Impact Assessments. However, it has been estimated that as much as 94% of logging in Cambodia is illegal (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002). Throughout the 1990s the extent of logging was massive, and SFM or the impact on local forest-dependent communities did not appear to be a concern, resulting in losses of livelihoods and severely degraded forests (ARD, 2006).

Sunderlin (2006) distinguishes between introduced and traditional community forest management. Traditional community forestry has been practiced in Cambodia for centuries, mostly in remote areas where ethnic minorities are dominant.

23

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Donor-funded independent monitors of forest law enforcement have been deployed due to concerns of inequitable and opaque allocation of timber wealth and inadequate for sustainable forest resource management (Chomitz, 2006). Brown and Luttrell (2004) found a positive impact on corruption levels, but question the sustainability of the independent monitoring institutions if there is no national constituency that values the information provided by the monitors. The international organization Global Witness, which was for a number of years engaged in forest monitoring in Cambodia, reports illegal logging even in protected areas due to institutionalized corruption at the highest levels of government, which tends to enforce the law selectively against community forest users, but not against large operators (Colchester, 2004). Global Witness reported in 2004 that there is a lack of political will on the part of the government to enforce the 2002 Forestry Law, which demands fines and imprisonment of officials who do not take action against forest crime (GW, 2004b). Illegal logging has continued despite a logging ban enacted in 2001, with substantial negative effects on the national treasury through loss of royalties (Sunderlin, 2006). At the time of writing, none of the logging operations in Cambodia are FSC-certified (FSC, 2009). There has, however, been some progress lately. In 2008, 19 timber processing plants were shut down by the government, and reforestation efforts between 2004 and 2008 succeeded in planting some 6 million trees (Hab, 2009). There are several ongoing efforts to improve forest governance in Cambodia and generally in the ASEAN region. Notable ASEAN initiatives include a Work Plan for Strengthening Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (2008-2015), the development of a regional framework for an ASEAN-wide Certification Initiative, the development of ASEAN Criteria and Indicators for sustainable management of tropical forests, a Regional Action Plan on the trade of wild fauna and flora (2005-2010), as well as drafting of a Mekong REDD Initiative (ASEAN, 2008). Efforts are also being made at inter-sectoral coordination. The formal coordination mechanism for multi-stakeholders dialogue on forestry and environmental issues is the Technical Working Group on Forestry & Environment (TWG F & E), with participation from different ministries and agencies24 as well as international donor representatives and the private sector, civil society organizations and NGOs (Sokhun et al., 2009). In terms of benefits for forest-dependent communities, a land law passed in 2001 is designed to provide land title to indigenous and other rural people, but tenure security is yet elusive for most rural people, and conflicts between local forest-dependent people and logging companies are prevalent, with severe impacts on the livelihoods of forestdependent people (Colchester, 2004). In addition to conflicts with loggers, which may be decreasing, there are also conflicts due to the illegal appropriation of land, encroachment by agricultural settlers, and economic land concessions (ARD, 2004; ARD, 2006). In community forestry projects, conflicts have been reported in part because of unclear tenure, lack of land-use planning, limited government resources to support the system, and forest sector priorities that are skewed in favour of rich and powerful interests (Sunderlin, 2006).

including the Forestry Administration, Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Economics and Finance, Ministry of Land Management, Urbanization, Planning and Construction, Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of National Defence.

24

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Political will to control migration from densely populated lowlands to sparsely populated forest areas (located in the east and north and the Cardamom mountains in the southwest) appears to be lacking, and ethnic minority forest-dependent communities, whose status in Cambodian society is low, therefore are unable to defend their land or forest use rights (ARD, 2004). Unlike in many Latin American countries, there is no national-level indigenous representative organization, although there are some provincial-level associations, such as the Highlanders Association in Ratanakiri Province. There is, however, a thriving umbrella NGO Forum that brings together social and environmental NGOs, mainly for networking and advocacy. Some indigenous community groups are members of this Forum, and they advocate for indigenous rights issues. (T. Evans, 2009b). As pointed out by ARD (2006, p.2), “issues related to forest and land conflict are multidimensional, usually complex, and cannot be addressed in isolation from larger issues of governance, natural resource management, national economic development, rural development, land tenure/forest resource access, and poverty alleviation”. Apart from ‘land grabbers’ and concessionaires, many people moving from lowlands into the highlands are themselves poor farmers trying to make a living, even as they come into conflict with the indigenous forest communities who inhabit these areas (ARD, 2006). REDD Potential Cambodia has ratified the UNFCCC and acceded to the Kyoto Protocol. In 2001, the country completed a national greenhouse gas inventory for 1994. At the time, Cambodia was a net carbon sink country. A second inventory for the year 2000 is currently under preparation. Sokhun et al. (2009) expect that the level of emissions will have increase relative to 1994 due to rapid economic growth that has gone along with increased energy consumption and vehicle ownership during the past decade. Carbon emissions due to land-use change were also analyzed separately in 2006, and were estimated at 13.7 TgC from deforestation between 1993 and 2003 (Sokhun et al., 2009). In a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario, Southeast Asia stands to continue to lose forests at dramatic pace over the next 12-15 years (M. Wilkie, 2009) As a HFHD country, Cambodia is likely to be able to count on sizeable REDD investments to avoid further deforestation. Butler (2006b) undertook a rough analysis of the potential value of avoiding deforestation in Cambodia, and came up with a very large range of potential income, from US$80-875 million, depending on how much deforestation can be reduced, what the carbon content of the avoided deforestation areas is, and what the market price for carbon credits is (with the low-end estimate based on a carbon value of US$4 per tCO2e avoided, and the high-end based on an assumed value of US$20 per tCO2e. Estimates for the amount of carbon released per ha of cleared or converted forest land in Cambodia also vary widely, from 91-200 tCO2e per ha. This would yield a significant income boost for the country and could be a net economic benefit vis-à-vis conversion of forest to some other land uses. As a member of ASEAN, Cambodia subscribed to a joint statement on the ASEAN Common Position on REDD (ASEAN, 2008). ASEAN member countries demand that methods for setting reference levels be flexible according to countries’ circumstances, in addition to those based on historical emission levels. They also request that different A.4-46

forestry-based mitigation strategies be included in the instrument, including, as appropriate, reducing deforestation and forest degradation, SFM, conservation, and ‘enhancement of carbon stocks’. Cambodia is one of the countries selected by the FCPF to receive REDD-readiness funds and has therefore prepared an R-PIN. TWG F&E is the body responsible for preparing a national REDD strategy, including policies on the distribution of financial flows from REDD projects (Sokhun et al., 2009). Given the relatively wide range of biomes found in Cambodia, and the possibility to treat Cambodia’s REDD proposal as complementary to those of Lao P.D.R. and Vietnam, there would be a chance to protect a comprehensive set of the upper Mekong forest biomes through REDD (FCPF, 2008a). According to a Council of Ministers decision (26 May 2008), the FA now has the right to negotiate deals and sell REDD credits, but as yet there is no mechanism to disperse funds in such a way that the maximum revenue reaches the local level (Clements & T. Evans, 2008). In Cambodia it is becoming clear that competition of REDD projects with land concession is going to be a big challenge (T. Evans, 2009b). The market price of carbon will be an important determinant of which land use will eventually prevail. Prospects for forest-dependent people There is still much concern over the way national development strategies are taking place. For example Walker (2009) reports that ‘land grabbing’ is taking place at a large scale, where the government sells parcels of land to private companies for agriculture or other uses, and in the process evicts original inhabitants without compensation. This is possible due to collusion between (elite) private interests and public authorities. “Land rights are regularly violated with impunity by influential individuals, companies and government entities. Owners are often compelled to accept paltry sums, despite evidence of legitimate tenure or land titles, or to move to alternative sites” (OHCHR, 2008, p.14). Only seldom can evicted people obtain redress, as mandated by law (ibid.). One example of adverse impact concerns an estimated 100,000 Cambodians who depend on resin tapping from dipterocarp trees for their livelihoods: illegal logging and forest conversion to acacia plantations is reportedly depriving them of access to such trees (Chomitz, 2006). Cambodia has not ratified ILO 169, but it voted for UNDRIP at the UN General Assembly. According to OHCHR (OHCHR, 2008, p.15), “indigenous people have suffered greatly…” from illegal evictions from their traditional lands. In a situation where “[laws] may be made under pressures from donors, but there is no intention to enforce laws inconvenient to the ruling group” (ibid., p.16), it is not very likely that local forestdependent communities will receive a fair share of benefits from REDD. There is a need to address lacking transparency in the award of land concessions, and to clarify property rights (van Beukering et al., 2009). There are some good prospects that those REDD projects designed and overseen by international organizations/NGOs, with a specific focus on community co-benefits, will deliver both livelihood benefits and improved governance mechanisms. Several are in the design stage, and two pilot forest carbon initiatives were recently launched, with A.4-47

involvement of international NGOs (WCS, and CFI/Pact) and are briefly outlined below. These projects will provide lessons to take into account when developing further REDD initiatives, and they do appear to have the potential to build institutional capacities at both national and local levels and demonstrate how such projects can work transparently and bring the expected benefits to local communities.

Pilot REDD projects in Cambodia Project example 1: Carbon Forestry Program in Oddar Meanchey The first REDD pilot project in Cambodia is the Carbon Forestry Program, designed by the NGO Community Forestry International (CFI) and now, with CFI withdrawal from Cambodia, under the leadership of the NGO Pact. It is located in Oddar Meanchey province, which involves several community forestry groups. Oddar Meanchey has experienced significantly higher losses in forest cover over the period 2002-2006 than national average (3% per year vs. 0.5%) (Terra Global Capital, 2009). Population growth rates are also very high due to in-migration, 9.23% between 1998 and 2008, and this has placed much pressure on forests (Sokhun et al., 2009). Figure A.4-18 shows the project area, with community forest areas in red.

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Figure A.4-18: The Oddar Meanchey Carbon Forestry Project Area

Source: Bradley (2009)

This project was recently submitted for registration under the stringent VCS and will also be submitted for verification under the CCBA standard (Bradley, 2009). It is aimed at protecting 60,000 ha of forest while providing benefits to local communities through a ‘bundled’ community forestry (CF) model, where several CF areas are combined for the carbon project to reach a sufficient scale to make implementation worthwhile (ibid.). Because of the high deforestation rate in this region, the area is particularly suitable for REDD. Agreements were signed in June 2009 with 9 (of 12 planned) community forestry groups comprising more than 50 villages by Cambodia's FA, in partnership with CFI, Pact and the US company Terra Global Capital to develop and market carbon credits in the province (Terra Global Capital, 2009). The project may obtain credits for as much as 8.5 million tons of CO2 sequestered over a 30 year period and will have significant cobenefits for communities and biodiversity (ibid.). The FA will be the seller of forest carbon, but CFI will identify buyers and deal with market issues (van Beukering et al., 2009). Importantly, benefits to the local community in the project area are to be maximized, and the FA has formally agreed that 50% of net income will go directly to communities in the project area, while some of the proceeds will also be used to develop new REDD initiatives and to enhance forest quality (Bradley, 2009). This generous amount was negotiated on behalf of the communities by CFI and Terra Global, since communities themselves did not have specific demands (ibid.). The FA, the provincial government, and the local implementation partner (NGO) will also receive a share of benefits. Community benefits were designed to include both assistance in obtaining legal tenure and management rights over local forests, as well as a regular long-term supplementary income stream for communities managing the forest resource from NTFPs and carbon revenues. In working with local partners, CFI made sure that participating villagers were adequately involved in the project development process, ensuring that local people – who had never even heard of climate change – could understand why they would be paid for conserving forests (Bradley, 2009). Similarly, briefings on REDD were necessary at all levels of the provincial administration, which CFI tackled through regular communication and training workshops, resulting in widespread support for the new

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initiative. Strengthening the regional CF Federation, which represents the involved communities, and other community institutions is also a tool employed by the project proponents to ensure a functioning liaison with government authorities and transparency in carbon income management. Bradley (2009) analyzed risks to communities that might arise from REDD project implementation, which include the risk that the level of benefits might not live up to the communities’ expectations, that conflicts or corruption within communities could arise, that land may not be available for agricultural expansion, and that in-migration could put additional pressure on lands in the project zone. Pact has planned for risk-mitigation activities for each of those issues, but recognizes that there are also some risks that are beyond the NGO’s control. Despite the early stage, some key lessons from the design phase have already emerged, as reported by Bradley (2009). Development took more time and was more costly than anticipated, primarily because of a lack of clarity from the start about benefit distribution and difficult negotiations with the various parties involved. Start-up funding needs were beyond what was expected, as no formal feasibility study had been undertaken. The eventual integration of a sub-national project such as this into a national REDD scheme has to be given some thought, which will be an issue for all REDD projects. It was also felt that technical requirements were quite high, and that it may be recommendable to limit these to the extent possible at the start and increase them as capacities are developed through project implementation. Project example 2: Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area (SBCA) Another pilot initiative was launched in 2009 in the Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area (SBCA) in Mundulkiri Province, which was created in 2002 on the site of a suspended logging concessions (a 305,000 ha site and a project core area of 180,000 ha) (Ratanakoma, 2009). Ratanakoma (2009) reports a 0.5% deforestation rate per year for Mundulkiri, which is lower than national average. Mundulkiri only has 125,955 ha of forest cover of a total land area of 1.3 million ha.
Figure A.4-19: The Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area

Source: WCS (Evans, 2009, pers.comm.)

The SBCA was identified as one of the most important areas in the country for wildlife conservation, as it provides habitat (a diverse mosaic of different forest types, including evergreen forest, semi-evergreen forest, mixed deciduous forest, and deciduous dipterocarp forest, and bamboo forest) (WCS, n.d.). Figure A.4-19 shows the SBCA’s location in eastern Cambodia. Its conservation importance is evidenced by the fact that it contains parts of two of WWF’s Global 200

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Ecoregions, two major Important Bird Areas, part of a Priority 1 Tiger Conservation Landscape and several 'Last of the Wild' areas (T. Evans, pers.comm.). It supports more than 60 species on the IUCN Red List, including at least four critically endangered bird species, and provides habitat for 25 different carnivore species, including tiger (Panthera tigris), and seven species of primates, including the world's largest known populations of yellow-cheeked crested gibbon (Nomascus gabriellae) (> 2,500 individuals) and black-shanked douc langur (Pygathrix nigripes) (> 42,000). It also has important populations of Asian elephant (Elephas maximus), wild cattle (e.g. the endangered banteng (Bos javanicus), and many other species . About 20,000 people live in or bordering the SBCA, the majority from Bunong (a MonKhmer ethnic indigenous group) and Stieng ethnic groups, who largely practice swidden agriculture on forest lands and depend heavily on the consumption and sale of forest products, especially resin from mature Dipterocarpus alatus, rattan, bamboo and fish. The forests of the area are threatened primarily by the influx of migrants from other areas, who clear and claim land, reducing the livelihood security of indigenous communities. In the future, the SBCA may also become threatened by land conversion for commercial plantation of crops, such as rubber, which has been occurring in other areas of the country, including through the degazetting of protected areas. Unsustainable hunting and illegal logging and NTFP extraction is also a threat to the area. (WCS, n.d.) Technically, the forests of the area are classified as production forests, not protection forests, which allows logging, commercial exploitation and potentially conversion to other land uses (Clements & T. Evans, 2008). Communities can legally obtain rights to resources and land tenure, either for agricultural plots in the case of Khmer communities, or as communal lands destined for swidden agriculture in the case of indigenous communities. However, to date no indigenous lands have been registered in the area, and WCS is seeking gazetting of the area as protection forest, which would make the designation of land concessions illegal, and clarification of zoning of existing village lands and levels of commercial exploitation permitted in different areas (Clements & T. Evans, 2008). The SBCA is a collaborative project between the Cambodian FA and WCS to develop conservation programmes that integrate the needs of local people and national development goals with conservation goals. The FA formally agreed to collaborate with WCS to implement a demonstration REDD project over an area of 180,000 ha in the site’s core area, the first such project in a conservation area (Evans, 2009, pers.comm.). The project’s aims are to expand and improve law enforcement activities, to register existing communities’ land claims, and to provide incentives for communities to protect forests. It is conservatively estimated that 1.5 million tonnes of CO2 will be sequestered over the 5 year period 2008-2012, based on cutting deforestation in half in the core project area only. Even at a low carbon price on the voluntary market of only US$5 per tCO2e, this could translate into average revenues of more than US$1 million annually (Clements & T. Evans, 2008). The carbon credit revenue will accrue to the State (T. Evans, pers.comm.). WCS is now working with all stakeholders on the details of a financial mechanism to determine how funds will be distributed among activities and projects in the region (Clements & T. Evans, 2008). As the project is in its early stages, lessons cannot yet be reported. It is now in the process of undertaking a baseline analysis and setting up the legal mechanism for A.4-51

carbon ownership and distribution of carbon funds. The project team expects to submit documents for certification under the Voluntary Carbon Standard to confirm validity of credits and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance standards to confirm cobenefits for conservation and livelihoods by the end of 2009 (Evans, 2009, pers.comm.).

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