1. Alvarez v. Guigonia Jr.

On april 1993, HB no. 8817, entitled “ An act
converting Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an independent Component City
to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in
the house of Representative Antonio Abaya as
principal author. The house bill was then duly
referred to the House COmiittee on Local
Government and the House Committee on
Appropriations. On January 1994, said bill was
transmitted to the Senate. Senate Bill 1243, a
counterpart of HB 8817, entitled as An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
independent Component City to be known as
the City of Santiago” was subsequently filed in
the Senate. After approval of subsequent
amendments made thereto, said bill was
approved by the Senate. The enrolled bill
following presidents approval was ratified by the
people. Petitioners then raised among others
that said conversion could not be validated as
the said city does not meet the requirement in
connection with the annual income requirement
following the exclusion of the IRA in the total.
Issue: WON IRA is included in the annual
income of a local government.

2. Pimentel Jr. v. Aguire
Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition
was filed on connection with the enactment of
AO. No. 372, otherwise known as Adoption of
Economy Measure in Government for FY 1998.
The said order required local government units
to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent to
their authorized regular appropriations for non-
personal services and which stipulated that a
portion of their Internal Revenue Allotments will
be withheld pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Department of Budget and
Management, on a quarterly basis using the
attached format. Petitioner contends that the
President in issuing said order was in effect
exercising the power of control over LGUs. He
further contends that the Constitution only grants
the President general supervision over LGUs
consistent with the principle of autonomy.
Petitioner further argues that the directive to
withhold the IRA is in contravention of the LGC
and the Constitution which mandates the
automatic release to each of these units its
share in the national revenue. Respondent,
speaking through the SG, claims that the said
order was issued to alleviate the economic
difficulties brought about by the peso
devaluation and constituted merely an exercise
of the President’s power of supervision over
LGUs. He adds that said order does not violate
fiscal autonomy and that the withholding of a
portion of the IRA was only temporary in nature
pending the assessment and evaluation of DCC
of the emerging fiscal situation.
Issue: WON the president acted beyond the
mandate of the constitution when he enacted
AO 372 providing for the

3. Philippine Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals vs. Commission on
Facts: Petitioner composed of animal
aficionados and animal propagandists was
incorporated as a juridical entity on 1905 by the
Philippine Commision. The objects petitioner
was generally about enforcing laws relating to
animal cruelty and perform all things to alleviate
the suffering of animals and promote their
welfare. Its creation preceded the Corporation
Law and Security and Exchange Commission.
Subsequently CA 148 recalled its power to
retain some of its collected fines and to make
arrest. On December 2003, an audit team from
respondent visited the office of the petitioner to
conduct an audit survey pursuant to its mandate.
Petitioner demurred on the ground that it was a
private entity and not under the jurisdiction of
COA. Respondents on the other hand asserts
that since petitioner is a body politic created by
virtue of a special legislation and endowed with
a governmental purpose the former can thus
audit the financial activities of the respondent.
Despite several correspondences between
petitioner and respondent, the latter was not
able to conduct the audit survey due to the
refusal of the petitioner because the petitioner
maintained that it was a private corporation.
Issue: WON petitioner is a public corporation
thus under the jurisdiction of COA’s auditing
Held: No.

4. Atienza v. Villarosa
Petitioner Atienza and Respondent Villarosa
were Vice-Governor and Governor respectively
of the Occindental Mindoro. Initially petitioner
received a letter from respondent informing him
that purchase orders shall be approved by him
in his capacity as the local chief executive of the
province. A subsequent letter followed ordering
petitioner to submit a list of employees entered
by him and to have them terminated and granted
them to appoint replacements subject to
respondents approval. Petitioner in response
iterated that approval of Purchase Orders is
under his prerogative and that the appointment
of casual/job order employees is exercised
under his appointing authority. Respondent
asserts the validity of his orders.
Issue: WON said orders issued by Governor are

5. Liban v. Gordon
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition to declare
Richard Gordon as Having forfeited His Seat in
the Senate as he was accordingly appointed as
the Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors
during his incumbency as a member of the
Senate. Petitioner asserts that respondent has
ceased to be a member of the Sentate as
provided in the Constitution Art. VI Sec. 13 “ No
Senator … may hold any other office or
employment in the Government … including
GOCC or their subsidiaries … “. Petitioners cited
a case which held that the PNRC is a GOCC.
Respondent replied that PNRC is not a GOCC
thus prohibition stated in the Constitution does
not apply to him.
Issue: WON PNRC is a GOCC thus subsequent
appointment of Gordon as its chairman during
his incumbency in the Senate constitutes a
violation in the constitutional prohibition against
incompatible offices.
Held: No. PNRC is not a GOCC. It is a private
organization performing Public Functions. As
stated in its charter PNRC is a non-profit, donor-
funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization,
whose mission is to bring timely, effective and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the
most vulnerable without consideration of
nationality, race, religion, gender, social status,
or political affiliation.

6. Boy Scout of the Philippines v. NLRC
Facts: Petitioner, in a letter, addressed to the
five private respondents informing them that
they were to be transferred to another branch.
These orders were opposed by the private
respondents and appealed the matter. Despite
assurance of the BSP regarding added benefits,
private respondents were not persuaded to
abandon their opposition to the transfer order.
Their persistent refusal later resulted to their
termination of employment with BSP which In
turn caused them to amend their complaint from
illegal transfer to one including charges of illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice against
petitioner BSP. Initially the labor arbiter
dismissed the complaint but was later reversed
by the NLRC. In the complaint, private
respondents stated that BSP is by mandate of
law a Public Corporation. The court later
required the parties to file a comment on the
question whether or nor BSP is in fact a GOCC.
BSP asserts that it does not receive monetary
subsidy from the government. It further asserts
that it is a purely private organization directed
and controlled by its National Executive Board
the members of which are voluntary scouters
including seven Cabinet Secretaries.
Issue: WON BSP is a GOCC.
Held: Yes. The public function of BSP’s
functions and activities must be conceded, for
they pertain to the educational, civic, and social
development of the youth which constitutes a
very substantial and important part of the nation.
Second, the fact that the appointment of
members of the Board are subject to the
ratification by the Chief Scout, the president
suggest that there is substantial governmental
participation or intervention in the choice of the
majority of members. Considering the character
of its purpose and its functions, the statutory
designation of the BSP as a public corporation
and the substantial participation of the
Government in the selection of members of the
National Executive Board of the BSP, as
presently constituted under its charter, is a
government-controlled corporation within the
meaning of the Constitution.

7. Veterans Federation of the Philippines
v. Reyes
Facts: Respondent as the Secretary of National
Defense, issued the assailed order directing
petitioner for the briefing and for documents on
personnel, ongoing projects and petitioner’s
financial condition. Respondent also informed
petitioner that it would be paying a visit for an
update on VFP’s different affiliates and the
financial statement of the federation. Petitioner
initially denied the order on the ground that the
timeframe set by respondent had been set for
the activity. Later petitioner asserts that it is not
a public nor a governmental entity but a private
organization, and advances this claim to prove
that the order issued by respondent is an invalid
exercise of respondent secretary’s control and
supervision. VFP asserts that it does not
possess the elements which would qualify them
as a public office, particularly the designation of
a portion of sovereign power of the government;
and that the funds are not public it being
sourced out from membership dues and not
from government funds; and that although its
personality emanates from a statutory charter,
VFP retains its essential character as private.
Issue: WON VFP is a GOCC.
Held: yes

8. Feliciano v. Gison
Facts: Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD)
filed a petition to Department of Finance
requesting that a certain water supply equipment
and a vehicle given by the Japanese
Government for the rehabilitation of its typhoon-
damaged water supply system for tax
exemption. Initially the water supply equipment
was granted tax exemption but the vehicle was
not included. Upon filing for reconsideration by
LMWD, respondent as undersecretary of DOF,
denied the request to include the vehicle for tax
exemption. Accordingly, privileges of tax
exemption of GOCCs had already been
withdrawn. After elevating the case to the CTA,
the same denied their request for the same
reason iterated by DOF. LMWD then filed in CA
and requested among others to determine
whether LMWD is a GOCC or not.
Issue: WON LMWD is a GOCC.
Held: YES. LWDs are not private corporations
as they are not created under the Corporation
Code. Nor are they registered with the SEC.
Sec. 14 of the Corp. Code states that all
corporations organized under this code shall file
with the SEC articles of incorporation. LWDs
have no articles of incorporation, nor
incorporators, nor stockholders and members.
PD 198 created LWDs thus their powers to
exercise powers given to a private corporation
emanates from said decree, a special charter
rather than a general law.

9. Chavez v. Public Estate Authority
President Marcos through a presidential decr
ee created PEA, which was
tasked with the development, improvement, a
nd acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of
lands. The then president also transferred to
PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila
Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.

Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the r
eclaimed areas of land and then, years later,
PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the
of the Freedom Islands. These two entered
into a joint venture in the absence of any
public bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by
Senator President Maceda denouncing the
JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An
investigation was conducted and it was
concluded that the lands that PEA was
conveying to
AMARI were lands of the public domain; the
certificates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself
was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an
investigatory committee on the legality of the

Petitioner now comes and contends that the
government stands to lose
billions by the conveyance or sale of the re
claimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for
the full disclosure of the renegotiations
happening between the parties.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed
lands of the public domain to be transferred to
PEA as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to
transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary
to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA
also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain.

10. Limbona v. Mangelin
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona,
was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman
of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House
of Representatives, invited petitioner in his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region
XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members
through the Assembly Secretary that there shall
be no session in November as his presence was
needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the
Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from
his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it
declared that he was still the Speaker of the
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the
case, the SC received a resolution from the
Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's
membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme
Court against some members of the Assembly
on a question which should have been resolved
within the confines of the Assembly," for which
the respondents now submit that the petition had
become "moot and academic" because its

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have
jurisdiction over the autonomous governments
or regions. What is the extent of self-government
given to the autonomous governments of Region

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in
the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable". At the same time,
it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision" over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys
autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987),
Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of
the organic act creating it and accepted
principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted,
under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and
the Department of Local Government). If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in
perhaps the same way that the internal acts,
say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in
the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense
(decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and
control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we
assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an
inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the
petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that
of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations,
one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang
and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the
November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid.
It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of
the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own,
we still invalidate the twin sessions in question,
since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could do so. In the second place, the
invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided
a plausible reason for the intermission sought.
Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be
called, it does not appear that the respondents
called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an
apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the
ground of good faith.