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March/April1995 A Publication of Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association
"To  achieve  law 
people  must be 
In Jail Call 222 - BAIL
That's  ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ 4 5
Burns Bail Bonds 
  ? ~ ~ eued ~ 4Utee 1971
•  Free D.W.I.  video with any D.W.I.  bond 
•  Our bilingual staff provides prompt, courteous service with over half a century of 
bonding experience 
•  Terms Available 
•  Open 24 Hours 
•  Conveniently located across from city jail 
•  Serving all courts in Harris County, with statewide and national affiliates 
Carol Burns, John Burns, and Chris Freyer  Lie. #74243 
609 Houston Ave.  Acrossfrom City Jail
Officers  &Directors 
President  .........................Jim Skelton 
President.Elect  . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  .George Pamham 
Vice·President  ................Mark A.  Goldberg 
Treasurer. . . . . . . . . . . . .  . ...Dick Wheelan 
Secretary  ....................Kenneth W.  Smith 
Immediate Past President. . . . . . ..  . .Dan Cogdell 
Chairman of the Board  ...Lloyd W.  Oliver 
Loren A.  Detamore 
Joseph A.  Porto 
Paul St.  John 
Danny  Easterling 
Wayne  Heller 
Clyde Williams 
Judith  Martin  Prince 
WB. Bennie  House,  Jr. 
J. Charles  Whitfield 
John  E.  Crow 
Harry A.  Loftus,  Jr. 
Jonathan  Munier 
Will Outlaw 
Moses M.  Sanchez 
Winston  E.  Cochran,  Jr. 
Past·Presidents  1971-1994 
C. Anthony  Friloux  (1972-1973) 
Stuart Kinard  (1973-1974) 
George Luquette  (1974-1975) 
Marvin O.  Teague  (1975-1976) 
Dick DeGuerin  (1976-1977) 
W.  B.  "Bennie" House,  Jr.  (1977-1978) 
David  R.  Bires  (1978-1979) 
Woody  Densen  (1979-1980) 
Will Gray  (1980-1981) 
Edward A.  Mallett  (1981-1982) 
Carolyn  Garcia  (1982-1983) 
Jack B.  Zimmermann  (1983-1984) 
Clyde  Williams  (1984-1985) 
Robert  Pelton  ( 1985-1986) 
Candelario  Elizondo  ( 1986-1987) 
Allen  C.  Isbell  (1987-1988) 
David Mitcham  (1988-1989) 
Jim E.  Lavine  (1989-1990) 
Rick Brass  (1990-1991) 
Mary E.  Conn  (1991-1992) 
Kent A.  Schaffer  (1992-1993) 
Dan  Cogdell  (1993-1994) 
President's Club 
David  Cunningham 
Kent A.  Schaffer 
Docket Call 
Editor  ..........................Allen  C.  Isbell 
Associate Editor  .................Robert Pelion 
Polson Pen  ....................Louis  F.  Linden 
Design &  Production  ...........Donna  K.  Kleszcz 
Full Page  $300.00 
1/2 Page  $150.00 
1/4 Page  $75.00 
Business card size  $37.50 
Distribution 500 copies per issue. Articles and other edi-
torial  contributions  should  be  sent  to  the  Editor,  202 
Travis,  Suite  208,  Houston  77002  or the  Association 
office at 405 Main  St.,  303, Houston  77002  Telephone 
(713) 227-2404. 
DOCKET CALL  March/April1995 
From the  President  ...........................................2 
Top Ten  Reasons Attorneys Are  Sanctioned .........................4 
First Court of Appeals - Significant Decisions  .................... .4 
New Special Issue in Capital Trials Recreates the  Pre-Furman Problem .....6 
Hearsay ....................................................7 
To Achieve Law  and  Oder, People Must Be Changed  .................8 
Update on Criminal Appeals Recent Opinion  ..................... .11 
"Ex Parte Crisp Revisited"  ................................... .17 
Special  to  the  Docket Call  .................................... .18 
301  San Jacinto 
12:00 noon,  177th District Court 01:00 MCLE 
April 13, 1995 
May 11.1995 
HCCLA Board Meeting, Thursday noon,  Scanlan Bldg., 
405 Main,  2nd floor conference 
April 20. 1995 
May 18, 1995 
HCCLA Luncheon Meeting 
Treebeard's at The Church,  1117 Texas,  2nd fl.  church aud. 
12:00 noon Thursday. 
April 6-8,  1995  Women As Professionals Within the Criminal Justice System 
- Sponsored by  University of Houston- Downtown 
at West Chase Hilton, 
9999 Westheimer,  Houston 77042. 
Call (713)  221-8000 for  information. 
April 27-29. 1995  .Fifth Annual Law &  All That Jazz Seminar 
New Orleans, LA 
Call (504)  387-3261  for information. 
June 11-24, 1995 
July 16-29, 1995 
1995 Trial Practice Institutes 
The National Criminal Defense College, 
c/o Merccr Law  School, 
Macon,  GA  31207 
Phone:  (912) 746-4151  for  information. 
Office For Rent 
Free  Parking,  Climate Control,  Close to  Courts,  Easy Access to  Freeways, 
All Amenities.  Contact Allen  @  520-6333 
May "Hearsay" Workshop 
"[flur Constitution is in actual operation: everything appears to promise that
it will stand: but in this world nothing is certain but death and taxes."
g-rom the  ..®resident 
Penalty Group 1 (Section 481.101): 
Delivery to a Minor(48]. ]22) F-2 
Manufacture I Deliver less  than  1gram. 
(48LlI2) F-4 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
Manufacture I Deliver  1-4 grams. 
(48LlI2) F-2 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
Manufacture I Deliver 4-200 grams. 
(481.112) F-I 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
Manufacture I Deliver 200-400 grams. 
(48lJ 12) 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
Deliver  10-99 or life  a fine  up to $100,000 
Manufacture  I  Deliver  400  grams  or  more. 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
Deliver  15-99 or life  a fine up to $250,000 
Possession less than  l gram.  (481.115) 
Possession  1-4 grams.(481.115) F-3 
Possession 4-200 grams.(48] .115) F-2 
Possession 200-400 grams.(481.115) 
Possession 400 grams or more. 
(481.115)  10-99  or  life  a  fine  up  to 
Penalty Group 2 (Section 481.103): 
Delivery to a Minor.  (481.122) F-2 
Manufacture I Deliver less than  I gram. 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
Manufacture I Deliver 1-4 grams. 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
Manufacture I Deliver 4-200 grams. 
(481.113) F-I 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
Manufacture I Deliver 200-400 grams. 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
10-99 or life and a fine  up  to  $100,000 
Manufacture  I  Deliver  400  grams  or 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
15-99 or life and a fine  up to $250,000 
Possession less than  1 gram.(481.116) 
Possession  1-4 grams.(481.116)F-3 
Possession 4-400 grams.(481.1l6)F-2 
Possession 400 grams or more. 
(481.116)5-99 or life and a fine  up  to $50,000 
Penalty Group 3 (Section 481.1(4): 
Delivery to  a Minor.(481.122)F-2 
Manufacture  I  Deliver  Jess  than  28  grams. 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture  I 
Manufacture I Deliver 28-200.(481.114) 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture 
Manufacture I Deliver 200-400 grams. 
Possession  with  intent  to  Manufacture 
Manufacture  I  Deliver  400  grams  or 
Possession  with intent to 
Manufacture I Deliver  10-99  or life  and  a fine 
up to  $100,000 
Possession less than 28 grams. 
(481.117) M-A 
Possession 28-200 grams.(481.117)F-3 
Possession 200-400 grams.(481.117) 
Possession 400 grams or more. 
(481.117) 5-99 or life and a fine  up  to 
Penalty Group 4 (Section 481.105): 
Delivery to a Minor.(481.122)F-2 
grams.(481.114) F-4 
Possession with intent to Manufacture I Deliver 
Manufacture I Deliver 28-200.(481.114) 
Possession with intent to Manufacture / Deliver 
Manufacture I Deliver 200-400 grams. 
Possession with intent to Manufacture / Deliver 
Manufacture  Deliver  400  grams  or 
Possession with intent to Manufacture / Deliver 
or life and a fine up to $100,000 
Possession less than 28 grams. 
Possession 28-200 grams.(481.118)F-3 
Possession 200-400 grams.(481.118) 
Possession 400 grams or more. 
(481.118)5-99 or life and a fine  up to 
Marijuana Penalties: 
Deliver  114 ounce  or  less  (no  remunera-
Deliver  114  ounce  or  less  (remunera-
Deliver  114 ounce - Sibs.  (481.120)F-4 
Deliver 5-50 Ibs.  (48L.120)F-2 
Deliver 50-2000 Ibs.(481.120)F-I 
Deliver 2000 Ibs or more.(481.120) 
10-99 or life and a fine  up to $100,000 
Possession 2 ounces or less.(481.12l) 
Possession 2-4 ounces.  (481.121)M-A 
Possession 4 ounces - 5 Ibs.  (481.121) 
Possession S-SO Ibs.  (481.121) F-3 
Possession 50-2,000 lbs.  (481.121)F-2 
Possession 2,000 Ibs or more. 
(481.121) S-99 or life  a fine up to 
Paraphernalia Peualties: 
Deliver to someone younger than  18. 
Manufacture / Deliver.  (481.l25)M-A 
Manufacture / Deliver (one prior). 
Possession. (481.12S)M-C 
Possession(one prior). (48 1.125)M-B 
General Penalties 
Deliver to minor, any amount. 
(481.122) F-2 
Deliver/manufacture simulated 
Deliver/offer to deliver dangerous drug 
(A dangerous drug is one not listed in 
schedules or penalty groups  and  is unsafe 
for  self-medication).(483.042)F-4 
Diversion of controlled substance, 
property or plant.(481.131 )F-4 
Falsification of drug test results (use). 
(manufacture or deliver).(481.1 33)M-A 
Distributes as  a registrant Schedule I or 
11.(48l.l 29)F-2 
Distributes as  a registrant Schedule III 
or IV(481.129)F-3 
Distributes as a registrant Schedule V 
Distributes devises for false  labels. 
(48 1.I 29)M-A Delivers false 
prescription Schedule II.(48L129)F-2 
Delivers false  prescription Schedule III, 
IV,  or V(481.129)F-3 
Possess false  prescription Schedule II 
or III.(481.l29)F-4 
Possess false  prescription Schedule IV 
or V (481.129)M-B 
Illegal expenditure/investment. 
Inhalant Offenses: 
Deliver glue/aerosol paint to  minor. 
(a glue or paint permit).(485.033)M-B 
(a sales tax  permit and  no priors). 
Failure to  post sign.{485.034)M-C 
Manufacture / Deliver.(485.032)M-A 
Paraphernalia.  (484.034)M-B 
(with intent to  deliver/manufacture). 
Possession and use  (glue/paint). 
Manufacture dangerous  drug.  (483.043) 
Possession dangerous drug.  (483.041) 
(one prior}.(483.04I) M-A 
Prescription offenses: 
Failure to maintain records.(483.049) 
(with priors).(483.049)M-A 
Failure to retain prescription.(483.046) 
(with priors).  (483.046) M-A 
Forging or altering prescription. 
(with priors).  (483.04S)M-A 
Refilling prescription without 
authorization).  (483.04S)M-B 
(with priors).  (483.045)M-A 
Refusing to permit inspections. 
(with priors). (483.050)M-A 
Unauthorized communication of 
prescription.  (483.048) M-B 
(with priors).  (483.048) M-A 
Using or revealing trade secrets. 
(483.0S1 )M-B 
(with priors).  (483.051) M-A 
Violation of other provisions. 
(with priors).  (483.052)M-A 
Prohibited Substances in Correction 
facility or on Property ofTDCJ (section 
38.11  Penal  Code) F-3 
Unauthorized Disclosure of 
Information.(481.127) F-4 
Unlawful transferlreceipt chemical 
laboratory apparatus.  (481.082) F-3 
Unlawful transfer/receipt chemical 
precursor.  (481.079)F-3 
HOllston  Corporate  Recycling 
(;ouncil's Expo  '9, Wednesday.  AIJril  19 
J.  \V.  Marriol  Ilote!  & 
Conferellce Center 
hi/' illjii/'ll/{f/i(l/I ('(1/1
8.  Creating    eXpecta. 
tlons of resultS. 
9.  Fail1ng  to  prepare adequately. 
10.  Trust account violations. 
Mr.  McCormack's  article  gives  sage 
advice  as  to  how one may  protect one-
self against these  common  complaints. 
It is worth  re-reading. 
Mooney  v.  State,  No.  01-93-312-Cr, 
11/10/94, by  Huston Dunn, J. 
There  was  a  time  when,  alas,  you  could 
present  an  obviously  altered  lottery  ticket 
with  pure  of heart  (and  empty  of  mind), 
and  if you got caught, could argue that the 
circumstances  do  not  rebut  every  reason-
able  hypothesis  of  innocence.  (By  your 
definition,  any  hypothesis  of  innocence 
was  reasonable).  Those  times  are  long 
since gone. 
Everybody  knows  that  in  Geesa  v.  State, 
820  S.W.2d  154  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1991) 
the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  started 
requiring  a jury  instruction  on  reasonable 
doubt. What most people still  do not know 
is that this  decision changed the method of 
measuring  the  sufficiency  of the  evidence 
on  appeal.  The  standard  is  still  the  same: 
could a rational  trier of fact find  every ele-
ment  of  the  offense  from  the  record 
beyond a reasonable doubt. What is differ-
ent is  the method: The State need no longer 
rebut every  reasonable hypothesis of inno-
cence raised by the evidence. The new test: 
Where there is  smoke,  there  is  fire.  People 
are getting burned by this new  standard. 
The  Court  of  Appeals  notes  that  in  all 
forgery  cases,  the MERE presentation  of a 
forged  instrument is  NOT  enough to  show 
intent to  defraud or harm,  the  key  in every 
case. HOWEVER, unlike checks and other 
by Henry L. 
negotiable  instruments,  there  is  never  a 
good reason to alter a lottery ticket. Where 
the  forger  does  a  piss  poor job  of altering 
the  lottery  ticket  itself:  i.e.,  old  numbers 
glued  on  top  of  old  numbers,  obvious 
surgery,  tear  stains  and  funny  looking 
sweat on the ticket,  it can  be presumed by 
the  trier of fact  that  the  defendant KNEW 
the  ticket was  altered. 
No.  01-93-1 096-Cr, 
11110194, by Huston  Dunn, J. 
Defendant was charged  with  auto  theft and 
unauthorized  use  of a  motor  vehicle.  Trial 
court  finds  defendant  guilty  of  auto  theft. 
On appeal, everybody agrees that the State's 
evidence  on  the  defendant's  INTENT  TO 
DEPRIVE  THE  OWNER  of the  auto  was 
WEAK.  This  is,  after  all,  what  separates 
auto  theft  from  unauthorized  use  (aka  Joy 
Riding). Conviction reversed on the basis of 
insufficient evidence. 
BUT,  since Bigby  v.  State.  865  S.W.2d 26 
(Tex.  Crim.  App.  1993)  the  Courts  of 
Appeals  have  the  authority  to  REFORM 
the  judgment  to  lesser  included  offenses 
for  which  the  evidence  was  sufficient. 
(Having given up on reforming  the clients, 
the Courts will  now settle on  reforming the 
Mr.  Flores  walks  away with a judgment of 
conviction  for  authorized  use  of  a  motor 
vehicle.  Case remanded for  a new  punish-
ment hearing only. 
by  Henry  L. Burkholder 
Jackson  v.  State,  No.  14-94-427-Cr, 
12/1/94, by  Brown, 1. 
Defendant  is  charged  with  sexual  assault 
on  a little  child.  State puts on typical First 
Adult  Out  Cry.  In  this  case,  it  was  father 
telling  the jury how  the complainant came 
to  him,  and  told  horrible  things  about  the 
defendant.  You  can  pretty  much  guess 
Defense  attorney  DESTROYS  credibility 
of complainant  by  having  father  ADMIT 
that complainant appeared NERVOUS  and 
SCARED  to  report  this  offense.  The  only 
logical  conclusion:  the  little  you  know 
what is  LYING.  Right? 
WRONG!  Father  was  now  permitted  to 
testify  that  complainant  reported  to  him 
that  the  defendant  THREATENED  TO 
KILL  HER.  This  statement  of  the  com-
plainant,  offered  through  the  testimony  of 
the father, was admissible to EXPLAIN the 
complainant's statement of mind, and rebut 
this inference that she was nervous because 
she was lying. 
MORAL:  Be  careful  on  how  you  cross 
examine  witnesses  to  show  strange  con-
duct  that  is  arguable  consistent with  them 
being  liars.  Since  strange  behavior,  e.g. 
nervousness,  shiftie eyeballing,  seizures in 
the presence of the defendant,  may  also  be 
explained  by the 'State as  evidence of your 
client having  said unfortunate and non  cir-
cumspect  things  to  them  (i.e.  I  AM 
ME.  That sort of stuff.) 
Plan your cross with this  in  mind. 
Fortenberry  v.  State,  No.  14-94-043-Cr, 
12/1194,  by Ellis, J. 
Defendant  puts  knife  to  complainant's 
throat,  requests  money.  Before  value 
exchanges  hands,  cops  arrive.  Defendant 
quoted as  saying "Shit, cop" (slip op.  at 2) 
before stealing away into the night. Caught 
and prosecuted. 
Defendant  raises  novel  Latin  legal  argu-
ment on  appeal:  Crimus  agg-robbus  inter-
ruptus  non  constitutus  a  no-no.  Court  of 
Appeals  correct  observes  that  the  robbery 
statute is  structure  as  to  NOT  REWARD  a 
half assed attempt. The crime of robbery is 
completed  when  unlawful  force  is  used 
during  a  theft  or  attempted  theft. 
Defendant  loses  at  trial  and  on  appeal 
without  ever  knowing  just how  much  the 
complainant had in  her purse. 
Criminal  Law  -
Galleria Area, nine lawyer, gen-
eral practice firm seeks attorney
for chief of growing criminal law
section of one, to handle varied
criminal docket. Good reputa-
tion, Harris County misde-
meanor and felony criminal trial
and private practice experience
required. Former ADA, AUSA,
and portable business a plus.
Salary range dependent on
qualifications. All responses will
be kept confidential. Mail
: resume to P.O. Box 22773,
I Houston, TX 77027
he statutory special issue in
VA.C.C.P., ARTICLE 37.071,
SECTION 2.(e) unconstitutional
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States constitution
because it invites the open-ended discre-
tion condemned by the United States
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408
u.s. 238 (1972). (Trans. 28-32, 111)
In Furman v. Georgia, supra, the United
States Supreme Court struck down capital
punishment because it was being adminis-
tered in an arbitrary and inconsistent man-
ner. Particularly, the Court condemned the
open-ended, unstructured discretion given
to capital sentencing juries. See also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(Opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ); Spaziano v. Florida. 468 U.S. 447,
460,464 (1984).
Responding to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S 302 (1989), the Texas legislature enact-
ed a new capital sentencing scheme. The
legislature eliminated the previous "deliber-
ateness" special issue, and it added a new
special issue in V . A.c.c.P. Article 37.071
Section 2.(e):
Whether, taking into consideration all of
the evidence, including the circumstances
of the offense, the defendant's character
and background, and the personal moral
culpability of the defendant, there is a suf-
ficient mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances to warrant that a sentence of life
imprisonment rather than a death sentence
be imposed.
This open-ended, unstructured capital
sentencing instruction requires what
Furman v. Georgia. supra condemned. See
Pemy v. Lynaugh, supra., [Scalia, J., dis-
senting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White,
J., and Kennedy, J.]; Graham v. Collins_
U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993)
[Thomas, J., concurringl;Graham v.
Collins U.S., 113 S. Ct. 892, (1993)
[Thomas, J., concurring].
The statutory special issue does not
have clear parameters that objectively
guide the jury in imposing the death sen-
tence and that allow a rational appellate
review of the process by which the jury
imposed the death sentence. See Walton v.
Arizona. U.S., 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990), cit-
ing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980). Therefore, the current capital sen-
tencing scheme is infected with the same
constitutional harm addressed in Furman v.
Georgia, supra.
Willie Blackmon was inducted into the Texas
A & M Athletic Hall of Fame in recognition of
his outstanding athletic achievements. He
held or co-held 16 school records in ten events
during his four years at A & M. Mayor
Robert C. Lanier proclaimed Friday, October
21, 1994, as Willie Blackmon Day.
The November elections confounded all
"accepted wisdom" of Judicial politics. Seems
it did not matter whether the C Club endorsed,
or the Houston Bar Association or any other
group endorsed, or the local newspapers.
What mattered was the "R" after one's name!
Cindy Henley got an "N.G." on a DWI. Client
blew a .I68! Thanks to Robert J. Fickman
for this bit of news. Did you know that
Fickman's young son has a Hollywood con-
tract. Dad must be his "p.r. " person and
Jeffrey Gelb is a Master Chess player. Ex-
prez Mary Conn hit a home-run. State
charged client with burglary with intent to
commit rape; jury said it was only a class A
assault! Kenneth Sparks is board certified
now in Personal Injury Law, as well as
Criminal Law.
The old year closed and the new year began
with some good results for our members. In
December, Joseph Rumbaut "saved" one by
a Motion to Suppress. In January, Rumbaut
got an N.O. for the cousin of the man he had
saved earlier. The December Champion had
to be David Cunningham who had three
Motions to Suppress granted in federal court
in that month. Also, Cunningham, Richard
Frankoff and Robert Fickman teamed up
successfully, persuading Judge Norman
Black that the police cannot create their own
"exigent circumstances" to justify a search.
Joe Porto got an "N.G." on a multi-defendant
federal drug conspiracy [only one to win].
In the "How They Do It In Another World
Department," Montgomery County Courts
routinely make quarterly polygraphs a condi-
tion of probation. I,awyer Jimmy Price in
Conroe is poised to attack that as a legitimate
condition of probation. His client may be
revoked because he "missed his polygraph
appointment." Interesting issue: does being
on probation require one to forfeit his Fifth
Amendment rights during his probation
years? What do you do with someone who
"fails" the polygraph? By the way, it is at a
probationer's expense [$65 a polygraph). The
polygraph is unreliable, especially in the
hands of an "expert" who charges only
$65.00. At least, that is what my polygraph
expert tells me. He charges $500 a poly-
R. Todd Bennett has become a "free-world"
lawyer. Offices at 333 Clay Street, Suite
3830, telephone 752-2728.
Wedding Bells: Jules Laird and Denise
Oncken . . . Roxane Martinez and Juan
Martinez ... Other weD-known courthouse
personalities soon to follow!
If you have "missed" Walter Boyd, he says the
Harris County Lawyers have finally driven
him out of town. Someone spotted him in
Beeville, Texas, lurking around the high
school. He claims to be teaching classes.
When you have little else to do, think of the
answers to these questions: If love is blind,
why is lingerie so popular? Why are there
interstate highways in Hawaii? Why isn't
phonetic spelled the way it sounds? Why are
there flotation devices under plane seats
instead of parachutes? Why is it that when
you are driving and looking for an address,
you turn down the volume on the radio?
[Editor's Note: Recently, Carol Vance spoke at a monthly luncheon for the Harris County Criminal Lawyers
Association. He is a senior partner with a major Texasfirm, Bracewell and Patterson, he is chairman ofthe Texas
Department of Criminal Justice Board of Directors, and he was the highly respected District Attorney for Harris
County for many years. The following are excerpts from his speech prepared for the occasion.]
,'In today's climate, more and more
people are asking why don't
we lock these criminals up and
throwaway the key? In view of our fear of
criminal violence, this is not a surprising
reaction. However, there is a second ques-
tion the public should be asking with equal
passion, and that is - what are you doing
with those you have locked up so they
won't victimize us any moreT ....
"Nationally, the housing of prisoners costs
over $20 billion annually. To house one
prisoner one year exceeds $20,000. It
costs $1,000,000 to build a single prison
bed and keep a prisoner 30 years. Texas is
efficient. This only costs us $500,000. To
tum one solitary life around saves a for-
tune, not to mention the future victims that
lie in that habitual inmate's path.
Therefore, anyone interested in law and
order should demand we do everything
possible to graduate law-abiding and
employable people from our probation and
prison ranks." ....
"We are in a crisis. The U.S. incarcerates
far more people per capita than any other
nation. In Texas alone we will have
155,000 prison beds by year end, exceeded
only by Russia and China. What is more
disturbing is that Texas has over 600,000
males in prison, on a parole or on proba-
tion. Because we have 9,000,000 males in
the state, this is one out of every fifteen
now under sentence for a serious crime."
"In trying to change lives, we must take a
close look at the real cause. The cause is a
combination of the home breaking down
and the influences of today's culture. Root
causes are not poverty, drugs, or unem-
ployment. These things, like crime, are the
end result. The lack of fathers, family sup-
port and teenage mothers, combined with
other negative influences including sex and
violence in television, movies, and rock
music, gangs, pornography, drugs, alco-
hoi-THESE CAUSE CRIME ....But no
reasonable person can argue that the lack
of a caring and concerned mother and
father is the one biggest contributor to
crime, poverty, and addiction. For exam-
ple, only 10% of children of a two parent
family lives below the poverty line. This
compares to 38% with single mothers who
are divorced and rises to 66% in homes of
mothers who never married. Median
income of a two parent family in $43,500.
It is $17,000 and $9,2000 for the previous-
ly married and the never married mothers.
The American traditional home is eroding.
For example, Black children had about a
90% chance in having two parents at home
in 1900. This declined to 50% by 1970,
and now only 15% have a mother and
father at home. Thus it is not surprising
that lout of 4 black males will be incar-
cerated by the age of 25 in the United
States. And, this upward trend applies to
all races in the U.S.. Today, 30% of all
births in America are illegitimate, 22% of
all Caucasian children are born to an
unmarried mother. If you don't accept this
negative proof, look on the positive side.
Most Oriental and Jewish homes are intact,
and this results in very few prisoners pro-
portionately. The poor Oriental immigrant
is your future valedictorian."
"... First, let's look at what kind of person
inhabits our prisons. To begin with, most
prisoners are male - roughly 95%. This
male is 30 years old, has a drug or alcohol
addiction (an estimated 80%), has an I.Q.
of 90, dropped out of school before the
10th grade, tests out at a 6th grade level,
and has little work skills or employment
history. Around 40% are functionally illit-
erate. As we look beneath the surface,
there are major personality problems.
Most have no vision for the future. Many
have low self-esteem and difficulty relating
to other people. Most feel the world and
"the system" are against them. they often
cannot deal with anger, harbor grudges
against others in their past, are lonely, are
cynical and don't trust other people. Now
the overburdened criminal justice system is
expected to pull off a miracle by correcting
these almost overwhelming personality
gaps that have their roots from early child-
"The good news is that many of these peo-
ple can and will change if we are smart.
Several principles emerge if we are to be
successful. It is going to take more than
education and vocational training. We
must deal with the whole person. We must
impart a better way of life. It will take
more than our professional community to
get the job done. It will take a communi-
ty effort with dedicated volunteers. And it
will  take  a lot of one on  one effort both  in 
tenus  of role  modeling  and  personal  dis-
cussion  and  confrontation ... In  short,  our 
criminal  justice  system  needs  to  impart  a 
vision  for  life,  self esteem,  ability  to  for-
give,  ability  to  relate to  and respect others, 
a structure  to  one's life,  a realistic  view  of 
oneself,  common  manners,  and respect for 
the  law and  authority." 
"In Texas  we  are  trying  to  do  something .. 
.  Our  approach  is  not  some  do  gooder, 
handout.  feel  sorry  for  them  kind of thing. 
It is  pragmatic  and  practical  with  the  goal 
that  one  learn  to  live  a crime  free  life  and 
be  a productive  citizen.  Some  of our new 
initiatives are: 
1.  New  Concept In  sentencing. 
To  start  with,  the  Texas  legislature, 
after  a  lengthy  study,  overhauled  the 
law as  applies to  property crimes and 
drug  possession cases.  Texas created 
a new 4th degree felony  that keeps the 
defendant  under  the  control  of  the 
sentencing judge and  the  local proba-
tion  department.  .. At the  same time, 
Texas  has  increased  greatly  the  time 
that  violent  offenders  will  have  to 
serve.  For  example,  in  the  future 
offenders  receiving  a  40  year  sen-
t   n ~   will  serve  24  years.  Capital 
offenders  receiving  a  life  sentence 
will  serve 40 years actual time.  Texas 
is undergoing a $2  billion dollar con-
struction  program  just  to  meet  the 
increase in time violent offenders will 
spend in prison. 
2.  Task  Force  on  Recidivism  and 
Individualized Treatment Programs. 
Within  TDCJ,  and  with  the  help  of 
outside  experts,  we  have  an  ongoing 
task  force  to  examine  how  we  can 
best  deliver  our  program  services  to 
each  individual  offender from  proba-
tion  through  parole ... In  a  nutshell, 
all  of  the  program  people  and  the 
warden  get  together  and  determine 
how  long  that  individual  inmate  will 
be  there,  what  he  needs,  and  how  to 
get  the  job  done  through  the 
resources  at hand before that individ-
ual  is  released. 
3.  New  Direction  For  Our  Prison 
School System. 
Last year prison schools, the Windham 
School  System,  gave  out  about  4,000 
high  school  diplomas  and  has  over 
50,000 inmates enrolled in  G.E.D.  pro-
grams.  We  now  are  placing  a  great 
emphasis on literacy as  we  do not want 
any  illiterates  coming  out  of  prison. 
Equally  as  important,  Windham  has 
introduced a 150 hour "Charge" course 
on  various  aspects  of  living.  This 
includes  instructions  on  dealing  with 
anger and other emotional problems." 
"Prisons should not be soft, but prisons 
must not dehumanize.  Like  a comput-
er,  you  get out  what  you  put in.  If the 
product  goes  in  rough,  then  it  needs 
serious  editing.  If  we  leave  a  human 
with  the capacity to  commit crimes  in 
his  same  state,  we  jeopardize  future 
victims.  Yet  often  I  hear  that  prisons 
should  be  like  dungeons  with  no 
schools,  no  programs,  and  nothing 
happening.  If we  want  to  pile  it  on 
future  victims,  let's do nothing." 
"We  should  not  ignore  the  spiritual 
side of the  individual.  Let's  face  it,  if 
someone will believe that the God who 
created  the  universe  loves  them,  cares 
about them,  and will forgive  them, this 
fact  alone  will  change  their  life.  The 
most dramatic  and lasting changes that 
I have  seen among  inmates I personal-
ly  knew  was  a  result  of a  conversion 
experience.  But remember,  these  per-
sons  also  have  to  be equipped to  get  a 
job  and  be  drug  free.  Our  chaplain 
corp plays a critical role in our prisons. 
In  addition  to  recruiting  volunteers, 
chaplains deal with some of the tough-
est  inmate  problems,  including  manic 
depression,  suicide attempts,  deaths  in 
the  family,  and  even  unrest  within  a 
prison.  We  have only one chaplain per 
1,000 inmates and need more.  I cannot 
begin  to  tell  you  the  impact  that  over 
100 separate ministries  have on inmate 
life.  Ministries  like  Bill  Glass,  Mike 
Barber,  and  Chuck  Colson's  Prison 
Fellowship  carefully  train  volunteers 
who  so  unselfishly  give  of  them-
"In  closing,  we  must  take  a  compre-
hensive  and  holistic  approach  and  use 
every  resource  we  can.  Planning, 
training,  and  coordination  is  essential 
too.  Future cost savings are at stake in 
a great way.  For example, if  we  were 
to take one of our new  2,000  State Jail 
facilities  where  a person might serve  a 
year  in jail and  we  reduced  the  recidi-
vism  rate  by  10%,  the  cost savings for 
these  200  people  who  do  not  come 
back for another year is  $3  million.  If 
each of these 200 persons would spend 
20 more years in prison throughout the 
rest of his  or her life,  then  we  save $60 
million  in  future  costs.  If we  could 
keep  this  same  10%  improvement  rate 
for  ten  years,  then  the  future  saving  is 
now  up  to  $600  million.  Of course, 
this  doesn't  even  count  the  unmeasur-
able human cost to  future  victims." 
4.  Massive Volunteer Effort. 
Texas  now  has  10,000  volunteers, 
mostly from  Christian churches, going 
into  our  prisons  on  a  regular  basis  to 
do  not  only  spiritual  things  like  Bible 
studies  but  also  to  conduct  small 
group sessions, one on one mentoring, 
seminars,  marital  weekends  (not  con-
jugal  visits)  to  strengthen  the  family, 
and  a  host  of other  things.  Other  vol-
unteers  come  from  civic  clubs  and 
5.  Drug Treatment Emphasis. 
Texas is building several new facilities 
that will  house inmate for  an  intensive 
nine  month  drug  and  alcohol  abuse 
6.  Extensive Work  Programs in Place. 
Although  the  public  believes  that  all 
that  our inmates do  is  to  sit around in 
air  conditioned  cells  watching  T. v., 
every  able-bodied  inmate  works  or 
goes  to school or both.  Our 60 indus-
tries  sold  $80 million  worth  of goods 
To Achieve Law &Order ••• 
- Continued  from  page  9 
outsideagencieslastyear, notinclud-
ing our agriculture, cattle, and hog
operation. We make virtually every-
thingweusefrombedframes tocom-
modestomattressesto all the guard's
and prisoner's clothing. including
shoes. We sell furniture, stationery.
and a variety ofitems to schools and
governmental agencies. We repair
schoolbuses,domajorprison repairs
and build asmall building. Thus, we
The work helps prepare inmates for
civilian life, including developing
7. CommunityProjects - PublicWorks.
We havejustopened up several work
camps that housed inmates in tents
and temporary buildings to  do park,
beach, and highway cleanup, as well
as somebuildingprojects.
8. PrisonOvercrowdingandOur
in overcrowdedcountyjails,ourcon-
struction department built 11,000
beds in six months at a cost ofabout
$15,000perbed. Wearebuildingour
State Jail beds at under $20,000 per
thevolunteersandourcommunities. From
firsthand knowledge, a group ofus from
confined to single cells at a maximum
prison. This is tough duty but we keep
going back. Anotherexampleis the little
town in Snyder, in sparse West Texas,
where inmates painted the schools and
took on other civic work projects. The
community responded with volunteerpro-
donate an all purposechapel to the prison
complete with classrooms and program
have been asked by the Board ofDirectors to report to our membership the
results ofa meeting I attended concerning the construction ofthe new Harris
CountyCriminal Justice Center. On OctoberOS, 1994, I was invited by Roger
Bridgewater, one ofourmembers and the Houston BarAssociation representative
on the Steeringand PlanningCommitteefor this constructionproject. Rogerinvit-
ed 17 differentpresidentsorchairpersonsfrom various BarAssociations through-
out Harris County and I attended as the chair of the Houston Bar Association
Criminal Law &  Procedure Section. Also attending were Don Primosic from the
county engineering office and a representative from the architectural finn that is
designing the project. They stated previous meetings on this matterhad been held
with the Judges, DistrictAttorney's Office and the Clerk's Office. Thebudgetthat
Harris Countyis dealing withonthis facility is $65 million dollars.
Theyreportedthattheprojectisnowin theschematicdesignphaseandthatafter
alengthydesign,developmentandpennitphasethatconstructionwill beginon the
facility in approximately January, 1996. The construction site is currently being
clearedConstructionon thebuildingis expectedtotake27 monthsandcompletion
is now scheduledforapproximatelysometimeduring thespringof1998.
The building is projected to be 20 stories tall with the lower floors providing
space for administration, pre-trial services, District Attorney intake and District
ferred to this facility. Theirspace will consistoffour (4) floors. The upperfloors
will containallthecourtroomsandeachcourtroomwill beuniforminsize(approx-
imately 1980 squarefeet) with aplanforfour (4) courtroomsperfloor. Security is
ofutmost concern. The designers are providing a secure arrangement for trans-
portation ofprisoners to and from the holding area in the basementto each court-
room withoutany contact with the public through a secured elevator system. The
inputfromdefenseattorneyshas helpedconvincethedesigners to provideaconfer-
isalsotobespaceallowedforan in-custodyconferenceroomforattorneysnearthe
holdover area adjacent to each courtroom. Defense attorneys present expressed a
desireto have an ongoing relationship with thedesigners andasked to beincluded
in any further meetings afterthepreliminary design stages are overand the actual
designdevelopmentbeginsonthefacility. RogerBridgewaterdeservesalotofcred-
itfor defense attorney input so far on the projectand we should all thank him for
inviting all thedefense attorneys to participate. OurAssociation needs to press on
with ourrequests in thefuture so thatourconcerns andideas will be heardonthis
Yours truly,
Bates, No. 1205-92 (Tex. Cr. App. 12114/94)
(Opinion by Meyers, J. Concurring opinion by
Clinton, J.; joined by Maloney, J. Concurring and dis-
senting opinion by McConnick, PJ., Joined By
White and Overstreet, J.J.)
HOLDING: A trial judge may not grant a new
tria) solely for punishment.
Aggravated sexual assault of a child. Appellant filed a MNT
and the trial court granted a new trial as to punishment only.
Following a Defense motion "Regarding Conduct of Trial"
the trial court restored Appellant's case to its original posi-
tion before the initial trial. The state appealed this latter
ruling. The CA reversed and reinstated Appellant's con-
viction at 833 S.W. 2d 643 (Tex. App. Eastland 1992)
1. MNT: Timely Orders
Absent clerical errors, a trial court cannot alter
orders granting a new trial outside the time of its plenary
power. Here, Appellants motion "Regarding Conduct of
Trial" was an order granting a new trial and was entered
more than 75 days after judgment and was void.
MNT: Pnnishment Only
A trial court has three options when a MNT is filed: (1) grant
the motion; (2) deny the motion; and (3) fail to rule, thereby overrul-
ing the motion by operation of law. Rule 31 of the Rules of Appellate
Court of
Procedure  states  granting  a  new  trial  by  a 
trial court." Article 44.29(b) CCP permits a 
new trial for punishment to be granted only 
by  the  courts  of  appeal  or  the  Court  of 
Criminal  Appeal.  A  trial  court  may  not 
grant  a  new  trial  for  punishment  only. 
Here  when  the  trial  court  ordered  a  new 
trial  solely  for  punishment,  the  state  had 
fifteen  days  to  appeal  this  order,  Article 
44.01  (d).  Since the state did not timely file 
its  notice  of appeal,  the  CA  did  not  have 
jurisdiction  to  rule  on  this  motion  and  its 
order setting aside the trial  court's order is 
(Concurring  opinion  by  Clinton, J., joined 
by  Maloney, J.): The trial court intended to 
grant a  new trial  and mistakenly thought it 
could  grant  a  new  trial  as  to  punishment 
only.  Since  the  state  failed  to  timely  give 
notice  of  appeal,  the  order  effectively 
granting  an  unlimited  trial  became  final. 
As  a  matter of law,  this  "restores  the  case 
to its position before the former trial." This 
case  should  not  only  be  remanded  to  the 
custody of the  sheriff to answer the indict-
(Concurring  and  dissenting  opinion  by 
McCormick,  P.  J.,  joined  by  White  and 
Overstreet,  J.J.) Concurs With the disposi-
tion of the first ground of review- holding 
the  order  granting  a  new  trial  on  guilt! 
innocence  and  punishment  was  void 
because the  order was  not made  within  75 
days  of judgment.  Dissents  to  the  second 
ground  of appeal  that  the  state  failed  to 
timely  appeal  the  order for  a  new  trial  for 
punishment  only  because  it  was  not  an 
appealable order under Article  44.0 I  CCP. 
Appellant's  remedy  is  to  raise  his  con-
tentions  in  a  post  conviction  writ.  The 
majority  remands  to  the  trial  court for fur-
ther proceedings consistent  with  this  deci-
sion but no one knows what these proceed-
ings  will  be. 
Pavalacka,  No.  34693  (Tex.  Cr.  App. 
(Opinion  by  Clinton, J.  Dissenting opinion 
by  Campbell,  J., joined by  McCormick,  P. 
J.  and White,  J.) 
HOLDING:  In  this  aggravated  sexual 
assault case (1) it was not permissible to 
introduce  "evidence  of  other  crimes, 
wrongs, or acts" to rebut denials of guilt. 
(2)  An  impeached  complainaut  caunot 
rehabilitate himself with evideuce, solely 
from the complainant, the Accused com-
mitted other offenses against him. 
Aggravated  sexual  assault.  CA affirmed  at 
848  S.W2d 325  (Tex.  App.-Houston  [1st] 
1991),  holding  it  was  not  error  to  admit 
evidence  of another  incident  between  the 
victim  and  Appellant;  that  the  evidence 
was  relevant  apart  from  character  confor-
mity;  that  its  probative  value  was  not  sub-
stantially  outweighed  by  the  danger  of 
unfair  prejudice.  CCA  reversed  the  CA 
and remanded for a harm analysis. 
Sexual Offenses • Children 
Earlier  decisions,  such  as  Boutwell v. 
State. 719  S.  W  2d  164  (Tex.  Cr.  App. 
1986),  holding  extraneous  sex  offenses 
between  parent  and  child  are  admissible 
pre-date  the  Rules  of Criminal  Evidence. 
Montgomery v.  State, 810  S.  W  2d  372 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.  1991) (opinion on rehearing 
on Court's own motion) is a post-rule deci-
sion  and  observes  such  evidence  may  be 
relevant  if the  child-victim's  credibility  is 
impugned.  Vernon v.  State, 841  S.  W.  2d 
407  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1992)  recapitulated 
Montgomery and  again  emphasized  the 
victims  credibility  must  be  impugned 
before  such evidence is  admissible.  Here, 
the  victim  was  impeached  but  Appellant 
argues  the victim cannot logically  rehabil-
itate himself by  testifying to  'other crimes, 
wrongs,  or  acts"  perpetrated  by  the 
Accused against him. 
Appellant's  defensive  theory  was  the 
victim's  testimony  was  fabricated  and  the 
product  of  improper  influence  from  two 
maternal  aunts  who  quizzed  the  victim. 
The  record  does  not  support  this  conclu-
sion  because  the  aunt's  claim  they  did not 
suggest  this  offense  was  not  challenged. 
The  state's  theory  was  this  testimony  was 
admissible to  rebut Appellant's denials and 
to  rehabilitate  the  victim's  prior  inconsis-
tent statement. 
It is  not  permissible  to  introduce  "evi-
dence  of other crime.  wrongs,  or  acts"  to 
rebut Appellant's denials of guilt.  The vic-
tim  claims  oral  sex  was  the  primary 
offense and attempted anal intercourse was 
the extraneous offense has  is  that corrobo-
rative  force  the  extraneous  offense  has  is 
that  Appellant  was  acting  in  conformity 
with his character.  The state has suggested 
no  logical  inference  other than the charac-
ter  conformity  and  this  is  what  Rule  404 
(b) Tex.  R.Crim.Evid.  prohibits. 
The  state's  other  connection  is  the 
extraneous was admissible after the  victim 
was  impeached  with  a  prior  inconsistent 
statement.  An  impeached  complainant 
cannot  rehabilitate  himself  with  evidence 
solely  from  the  complainant  the  Accused 
committed  other  offenses  against  him.  A 
complainant's  testimony  may  be  under-
mined several ways, including:  (lOa prior 
inconsistent statement; (2)  evidence of bad 
character for truthfulness; or (3)  denial  by 
the  Accused.  Rehabilitation  may  take  the 
form  of:  (1)  prior  consistent statements; 
(2)  expert testimony explaining why  child 
complainants  may  seem to  prevaricate; (3) 
evidence  of  good  character  for  truthful-
ness;  or (4)  any evidence logically corrob-
orating  the  complainant's  account  of  the 
offense  such  as  evidence  from  some  other 
source - other  than  the  impeached  com-
plainant  - the  Accused  molested  him. 
CCA  agrees  testimony  of other  molesta-
1 here is an 
obvious difference 
when  the state uses 
an expert and 
when  the 
Defense attempts 
to  use an 
expert.  " 
tions coming from an impeached com-
plainant cannot logically serve to rehabili-
tate that complainant. The issue is credibil-
ity and the mere repetition of allegations
from a source of dubious credibility does
not render that source any more credible.
(Dissenting opinion by Campbell, J.,
joined by McCormick, PJ. and White, J.):
The extraneous offense was admissible
under 404 (b) to prove motive to commit
the charged offense.
COMMENT: Extraneous offenses should
not be admissible to prove "motive," as the
dissent suggests, because the factfinder can
infer motive from the act itself and motive
is not an element of the state's case.
Williams, Nos. 592-93 & 593-93 (Tex.
(Opinion by Campbell, J. Miller, 1. dis-
sented. Dissenting opinion by Clinton, J.,
joined by Baird and Overstreet, 1.1.)
Telephone harassment. CA affirmed at
850 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.App. - Houston
[14th] 1994) holding the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding expert tes-
timony about Appellant's psychological
profile. CCA affirmed the CA.
A clinical psychologist testified about
the psychological profile of a person who
makes harassing sexual telephone calls. He
also did a series of tests on Appellant and
stated appellant's personality was the
opposite of one who would commit this
offense. This testimony was excluded and
the CA concluded it was "character judge-
ment" and did not constitute specialized
knowledge of the type contemplated by
Rule 702.
Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.
Cr. App. 1990) held expert testimony about
the profile of a victim of child sexual abuse
syndrome was admissible under Rule 702.
In Duckett the expert applied his generic
testimony about the common characteris-
tics displayed by child abuse victims to the
facts of the case, by pointing out the victim
made inconsistent statement about the sex-
ual abuse and initially reported the abuse
by complaining of genitalia irritation.
Here, the expert's testimony was not help-
ful to the jury because he did not specifi-
cally apply his psychological profile testi-
mony to actual characteristics possessed
by Appellant. The expert merely stated
Appellant was an "overachiever" and
"extremely moralistic;" he did not specifi-
cally state whether Appellant possessed
any of the typical characteristics of an
offender under the facts of this case.
(Dissenting opinion by Clinton, 1., joined
by Baird and Overstreet, 1.1.): The majori-
ty seems to implicitly reject the CA's hold-
ing that expert testimony whether an
alleged offender meets a psychological
profile for such offenders does not assist
the factfinder and therefore subject to
exclusion under Rule 702. The dissent dis-
agrees with the majority'S conclusion the
expert's testimony was inadequate to show
Appellant did not meet the profile of a per-
son who would commit this offense. The
trial objection was "improper character
evidence." The court's ruling was "I don't
think it's admissible." The state, at trial and
on appeal, did not challenge the empirical
foundation of the expert's testimony and
the CA's only reason for excluding it was
"character evidence."
COMMENT: There is an obvious dif-
ference when the state uses an expert and
when the Defense attempts to use an
expert. The state's experts are always qual-
ified whereas Defense experts seldom pass
the "expert test" There is a glaring dual
Casarez, No. 1114-93 (Tex. Cr. App. 12-
(Opinion by Baird, J. Clinton, 1. joins with
a note. Maloney, J. concurs with the result.
Dissenting opinion by McCormick. P.J.,
Campbell, J. joined in paragraph IlL
Dissenting opinion by White, J. Dissenting
opinion by Meyers, J.,joined by Campbell,
HOLDING: Batson is extended to reli-
gious affiliations.
Aggravated sexual assault. The CA
affirmed at 857 S.w. 2d 779 (Tex. App.-Ft.
Worth 1993), holding the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
Court of
not prohibit using a peremptory challenge
on the basis of religious preference. CCA
reversed the CA.
1. JURY VOIR DIRE: Religious
The state used peremptoriness on two
African Americans. In a Batson hearing,
the state claimed the strikes were based
upon the venire persons religion - their
Pentecostal faith - rather than racial rea-
sons. Appellant argued Batson should be
expanded to include religion.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95
S.Ct. 1712, (1986): holds Equal Protection
Clause prohibits use of peremptory strikes
based solely upon race. Powers v. Ohio,
III S.Ct. 1364 (1991): holds a defendant's
ethnic background is not relevant in Batson
issues. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., III S.Ct. 2077 (1991): extended
Batson's application of the Equal
Protection Clause to civil trials. Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992): held
Batson applied to criminal defendants.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reI. T.B., 114 S.Ct.
1419 (1994): held the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude venire members on the
basis of gender. Here, The CCA ruled reli-
gion may not serve was a proxy for consti-
tutionaIIy prohibited bias and extended
Batson to religious preferences.
(Dissenting opinion by McCormick, PJ.,
Campbell, J. joined in part III): The record
demonstrates the venire members were
struck for reasons other than religion. One
had a brother in TDC and expressed dis-
comfort with the law on sexual assault of
children. The other's brother had been
arrested, incorrectly completed his ques-
tionnaire and appeared to be slow. On the
record the peremptory challenges were
proper. (This is the paragraph J. Campbell
joined). Also dissented to the majority's
holding that the religious - based peremp-
tory challenges are subject to strict scruti-
ny under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Dissenting opinion by White, J.): Would
hold religious beliefs or affiliations for
strikes may co-exist with nonreligious and
nonracial reasons and are permissible.
States the majority failed to reveal all the
facts, namely that one of the jurors in
question was number thirty-three and
would not have served regardless of the
state's peremptory strikes.
(Dissenting opinion by Meyers, J.,joined
by Campbell, J.): Is to persuaded the U.S.
Constitution forbids peremptory chal-
lenges based upon religion because dis-
crimination based upon personal beliefs
has always been appropriate in jury selec-
tion. To hold one may not be excluded for
his religious preference is tantamount to
holding one may not be struck for his
Enos, No. 1262-93 (Tex.Cr.App. 12-14-
(Opinion by Campbell, J.)
HOLDING: There is no express or
implied abrogation to the Gaskin rule
with respect to victim impact statement.
Aggravated robbery. The CA affirmed at
859 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.App.. -Ft.Worth
1993) holding Article 56.03 (g) exempts
victim impact statements from the Gaskin
rule. CCA reversed and remanded to CA.
1. RULE: 614 (a)
Rule 614 (a) Tex.R. Crim.P. codifies
and expands Gaskin V. State, 353 S.W.2d
467 (Tex. Cr. App. 1961) by requiring wit-
ness statements to be produced for cross-
examination. Here, a state witness testified
at punishment and had previously given a
victim impact statement. Appellant's
request to see the statement was denied
after an in camera inspection by the trial
judge. The judge stated there was "nothing
mitigating or exculpatory" in it.
Article 56.03 (g) CCP state a victim
impact statement is subject to discovery
under 39.14 CCP only if the court deter-
mines it contains exculpatory material..
56.03(g) does not abrogate the Gaskin rule
because 56.03 (g) deals only with impact
statements before the victim testifies and
Gaskin deals with witness statements after
the victim testifies. Gaskin, therefore
applies to victim impact statements. The
CCA remanded to the CA to consider the
argument that victim impact statements are
not discoverable under Gaskin.
Marin, No. 1265-93 (Tex.Cr.App. 12-14-
(Opinion by Baird, J. McCormick, PJ. and
White, J. dissent. Clinton, 1. concurs with
the result. Concurring opinion by Meyers,
HOLDING: Article 1.051 requires an
appointed attorney who replaces anoth-
er appointed attorney be given ten days
to prepare for trial.
Conspiracy to deliver cocaine. The CA
affirmed at 862 S. W. 2d 183 (Tex. App. -
Austin 1993) holding an appointed attor-
ney who replaces another appointed attor-
ney is not entitled to ten days to prepare for
trial. CCA reversed the CA.
1. CCP: 1.051
Appellant's appointed counsel was permit-
ted to withdraw and new counsel was
appointed six days before trial. No objec-
tion was made to not having ten days to
prepare for trial. Failure to comply with
Article 1.051 CCP may raised for the first
time on appeal and is not subject to a harm-
less error analysis. This article has consis-
tently focused on actual preparation time
afforded appointed counsel and not the
time of formal appointment. 1.051 was
passed to ensure the indigent Defendant
receives appointed counsel who is pre-
pared for the proceeding. Here, counsel
was appointed six days prior to trial, hence
1.051 was violated.
(Concurring opinion by Meyers, J.): Henry
v. State, 433 S. W.2d 430 1968) and Roney
v. State, 632 S. W. 2D 598 (Tex. Cr. App.
1982) held in instances where two lawyers
are appointed. only one is entitled to ten
day preparation time. Since the job of
judges is to see the will of the legislature is
implemented, Henry and Roney should be
overruled. This opinion points out the con-
cern that "defendants will somehow seize
control dockets" is without basis as the
trial judge can refuse to let appointed coun-
sel withdraw or permit new appointed
counsel only on the condition the Accused
waives the ten day preparation time.
Richardson, No. 105-94 (Tex.Cr.App. 12-
(Opinion by Campell, J. Overstreet, 1. con-
curs in the result. Clinton and Miller, J.J.
HOLDING: Removal of property from
the open bed of a pickup is an unlawful
entry, thus is burglary of a vebicle.
Burglary of a motor vehicle. The CA
affirmed at 868 S.W2d 14 (Tex.App. -
Houston [1st] 1993)
Open Bed of a Pickup
Appellant reached into the open bed of
a pickup and removed fishing gear valued
at $800. He was convicted of burglary of a
motor vehicle. Coleman v. State, 608
S.W.2d 923 (Tex.Cr.App. [Panel Op.]
1980) held one who removes property
from the open bed of a pickup "enters" the
vehicle and thereby commits burglary; that
entry does not have to be in the cab portion
of the truck. Griffin v. State, 815 S.W2d
576 (Tex.Cr.App. ] 991) held removal of
tires and hubcaps is not burglary of a vehi-
cle because there was no entry into the
Banda, No. 69,827 (Tex. Cr. App. 12-]4-
(Opinion by McCormick, P. J. Miller and
Overstreet, 1. J. concurs in the result.
Concurring opinion by Baird, J., joined by
Clinton, J.)
HOLDING: (1)  Appellant's arrest for
public intoxication was valid. (2) A
Texas Ranger, after qualified as an
expert, may testify why another person
was not arrested. (3) Evidence of tat-
toos was admissible at punishment. (4)
The "mitigating" evidence did not
require a Penry instruction.
Capital murder - death. Affirmed.
1.  ARREST: Public Intoxication
Appellant was arrested for public
intoxication in his cousin's back yard. He
claims this was not a public place, that the
arrest was illegal and the subsequent con-
fession should be suppressed. Prior to the
arrest, the arresting officer knew: (1) 
Appellant's sister told the police Appellant
claimed to have killed some people and he
was going to kill some more. (2) The sis-
ter said Appellant was drunk and had blood
all over him. (3) People at the house were
frightened of Appellant and asked the
police to arrest him. (4) When an officer
arrived at the residence someone ran out
the back door and jumped over the fence.
(5) The officer was told the fleeing man
was the Appellant. (6) The officer chased
Appellant but lost him at the next fence.
(7) The officer searched around several
houses and could not find Appellant. (8)
Other officers searched for approximately
one hour and when they returned to the res-
idence, they found Appellant in the back
yard. CCA ruled these facts were suffi-
cient to circumstantially prove Appellant
appeared intoxicated in a public place.
2. EXPERT WITNESS: Texas Ranger
Appellant's defensive theory was that
Johnny Blanda did the murder. The
Defense elicited testimony on cross-exam-
ination of Blanda that he was not arrested
for the crime. The state called a Texas
Ranger who testified there was insufficient
evidence to arrest Blanda. He did not com-
ment on whether Blanda was involved in
the crime, but explained why he was not
3. PUNISHMENT: Evidence of Tattoos
After the murder, Appellant tattooed a
picture of Jesus with horns and "Satan on
his wrist. This testimony was presented at
punishment. During the punishment
phase, evidence may be presented on any
matter deemed relevant to answering the
special issues. Hernandez v. State, 819
S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Cr.App.l991). A capital
Defendant's expression of speech and
belief is relevant to future dangerousness if
the belief is related to the murder.
Evidence of the tattoo was relevant
because further evidence revealed
Appellant told his sister he had sold his
soul to the devil and the devil told him to
kill six people and he had to kill four more.
In considering Penry issues courts must
determine: (1) what mitigating evidence
was presented; (2) whether the punish-
ment issues provided a vehicle to give
effect to this evidence; and if not, (3)
whether the charge provided a vehicle for
the jury to effectively consider mitigating
evidence. Joiner v. State, 825 S.W2d 701,
706 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992). Here, the only
mitigating evidence was youth (Appellant
was twenty-one at the time of the offense),
intoxication and the state's decision not to
prosecute his "more culpable" brother.
The special issues provided an adequate
vehicle to give effect to this evidence.
(Concurring opinion by Baird, J.,joined by
Clinton, J.): Does not consider a yard a
"public place" for purposes of public
intoxication. Fry v. State, 639 S.W2d 463
(Tex.Cr.App. 1982): "In Texas, a peace
officer's authority to make a warrantless
arrest is controlled exclusively by statute.
The Code of Criminal Procedure autho-
rizes very few exceptions to the general
requirement that a peace officer obtain a
warrant before making an arrest."
Article 14.01(b) does not justify the
arrest because it was not an offense com-
mitted in the officer's presence. Pugh v.
State, 117 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.Cr.App.1909)
involved a case where a man wa<; "lying
down in the yard" of a private residence
"apparently sick." He was arrested for
Court of
public intoxication and the Pugh court
held: "A private residence cannot be  a
public place within the terms of our statute,
not at any time, unless it is made public by
being thrown open for access to the pub-
lic... Nor does the mere fact that a few
invited guests attended the gathering of a
friend at the private residence of their
friend constitute that gathering a public
one, or the residence a public place .. , it
may be questioned that the evidence is suf-
ficient even to show that appellant was
drunk; but clearly it excludes the idea that,
if he was drunk, it was a public place."
Articles 14.3 (a)(l) permits the arrest of
persons found in suspicious places under
circumstances which reasonably show the
person is guilty of some felony or breach
of the peace. "Circumstances which rea-
sonably show that such person have been
guilty of some felony ... " is the constitu-
tional equivalent to probable cause to
believe is a particular person has commit-
ted a felony. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d
238, 251 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). Muniz goes
on to state, "few, if any, places are suspi-
cious in and of themselves." It  is only
when additional facts, along with reason-
able inferences from those facts, that a
place may become suspicious. Here, the
officer did not feel he had probable cause
to arrest Appellant. He could not vouch for
the credibility of his information.
Information provided by a police broadcast
or an anonymous phone call is not suffi-
cient, standing alone, to establish probable
cause. See: Adores v. State, 816 S.W.2d
407, 415 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Rajas v.
State, 797 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex.Cr.App.
1990); Glass v. State, 681 S.W.2d 599
(Tex. Cr. App.l 984); Ferguson v. State, 573
S.W.2d 516, 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1978);
Ablon v. State, 537 S.W.2d 267, 269
(Tex.Cr.App. 1975). Here there was a
report from a citizen and a report by a citi-
zen, whose credibility is unknown, is akin
to an anonymous phone call and may not
establish probable cause. Smith v. State,
739 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex.Cr.App.1987)
(citizens reporting a gun at a club was held
The concurring opinion would hold the
arrest to be  unlawful but would further
hold Appellant's confession was sufficient-
ly attenuated from the illegal arrest.
Appellant was given his Miranda warnings
and there is a complete absence of any
improper purpose or flagrant police mis-
conduct. See Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780
Martinez, No. 71,481 (Tex.Cr.App. 12-14-
(Opinion by Campbell, J. Clinton, J. dis-
HOLDING: Appellant was not "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth
Capital murder death. Affirmed.
1.  ARREST: "Seized"
After the murders, Appellant was invit-
ed to the police station. There was no
insinuation he would have been forcibly
removed had he not accepted this "invita-
tion." He was not handcuffed. This sup-
for cause, clearly articulating the grounds,
was made; (3) a peremptory was used on
the challenged juror; (4) all peremptories
were used; (5) request for additional
peremptories; (6) an objectional juror sat
on the case, by pointing out he is being
forced to try  a case with a juror seated he
would have struck if he had not used all his
peremptory challenges. Here, error was
not preserved.
Lewis, No. 71,615 (Tex.Cr.App. 12-14-94)
(Opinion by Overstreet. J. Dissenting
opinion by McCormick, P.J., joined by
Campbell, White and Meyers J.J.)
HOLDING: A Defendant may not be
ordered to pay restitution to any person
other than the victim of his offense.
Post conviction writ. Relief granted.
Applicant entered a plea to an enhanced
burglary charge, was given thirty years,
and ordered to pay restitution. Applicant
contends the restitution order violated due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment
and due course of law under Article I, sec-
tion 19 of the Texas Constitution.
1. RESTITUTION: Third Parties
Applicant was sentenced to thirty years
and was ordered to pay $250 to Donald
Snortland and $10,988.20 to U.SAA. as
restitution. A Defendant may not be
ordered to pay restitution to anyone but the
victim. Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674
(Tex.Cr.App.l994). Here, Snortland was
complainant in another burglary case and
U.S.A.A. was not the complainant in any
of Applicant's cases.
(Dissenting opinion by McCormick, PJ.,
joined by Cambell, White and Meyers J.J.):
Restitution was a part of the plea bargain
agreement and should be enforced.  
ports the conclusion Appellant was not
"seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, hence his confession is
2. JURY VOIR DIRE: Preserving
Error - Challenge Denied
To preserve error when the trial judge
denies a challenge for cause, the Appellant
must show: (1) the voir dire was recorded
and transcribed; (2) a specific challenge
Would  you  hire yourself 
as  an  investment advisor? 
Call  Pau I Wobbe 
I nvestment  Executive 
Paine Webber Inc. 
IIEx Parle Crisp
By Robert J.  Inger
ecently,  I  represented  an 
alleged  habitual  defendant, 
charged with delivery  of hero-
in-less than 28 grams. 
The  two  prior  convictions  were 
for possession of a controlled substance in 
1979 and  in  1984. 
After reviewing the facts  with my 
client,  I  scrutinized  the  pertinent  docu-
ments under the oldest cause number being 
used  for  enhancement.  I  found  no  smok-
ing  gun!  Next,  I  turned  to  the  1984  con-
viction. The  indictment alleged possession 
of cocaine.  Did it fail  to  allege  a culpable 
mental  state?  (See,  Ex Parte Kirby, 626
S.W.2d  533  [Tex.  Crim.  App.  1981].  Was 
that  the  year  cocaine  was  left  out  of  the 
Controlled  Substance Act?  (See,  Ex Parte
Perez, 618  S.W.2d  770  (Tex.  Crim  ..  App. 
1981).  Neither question  was  answered  in 
the  affirmative, and it looked grim. 
Then,  while  perusing the cases in 
my enhancement file,  I stumbled across Ex
Parte Owenby. 749  S.W.2d  880  (Tex. 
Crim.. App.  1988).  Owenby claimed in his 
writ  of habeas  corpus  that  since  he  was 
charged and convicted under a void  statute 
(ART.  4476-15  V.A.C.S.,  the  Controlled 
Substance Act as  amended  by  H.  B. 730), 
he  was  entitled  to  relief.  Owenby's argu-
ment  was  based  on  Ex Parte Crisp, 661
S.W.2d  944  (Tex.  Crim ..  App.  1983).  In 
Crisp, the  Court of Criminal  Appeals  held 
H.  B.  730  to  be  unconstitutional,  in  its 
attempt  to  amend  the  penalty  ranges  for 
drug  related  offenses,  and  incorporating 
"aggravated  offenses"  into  the  Controlled 
Substance  Act.  The  court  in  Crisp also 
held  that  though  the  amendment  was 
unconstitutional  and  invalid,  the  Law  as  it
existed  prior  to  the  amendment  remained 
in full  force  and  effect. 
In  analyzing  Crisp, the  Court  of 
Criminal  Appeals  in  Owenby held  that  if 
the  offense  alleged  was  an  offense  under 
the  "prior  law",  then  the  conviction  was 
not void;  however,  Oivenby was entitled to 
a  new  punishment  hearing  since  the  pun-
ishment options available under the uncon-
stitutional amendment were  different from 
the  "prior law". 
In  Owenby's case,  the  only  difference 
on  punishment  was  that  a  fine  could  be 
assessed  in  addition  to  jail  time  under  H. 
B.  730;  a fine  was  not an  option  under the 
"old law". 
Well,  as  luck  would  have  it,  my 
client was also charged and sentenced, pur-
suant  to  the  unconstitutional  statute  (see 
Owenby, p. 881, fn.  2 for the effective date; 
he  too  would  be  entitled  to  a  new  punish-
ment  hearing.  Therefore,  his  conviction 
date  as  alleged  in  the  enhancement  para-
graph was not final  since a new sentencing 
would  have  to  take  place.  This  would  be 
true,  even  if the  second  sentence  was  no 
different from  the  first. 
A  motion  to  quash  and  set  aside 
the  offending  paragraph  was  all  that  was 
needed  to  obtain  an  equitable  result;  how-
ever,  a  writ  of habeas  corpus  may be  nec-
The, [8], makes this his Motion to 
Quash  and  Set  Aside  Enhancement  of 
Paragraph  No.  2  in  this  Cause  and  would 
show  the Court as  follows: 
That  this  Cause  alleges  a  prior 
conviction  in  Cause  Number  ____ 
for possession of cocaine.  The date of sen-
tencing  is  January  17,  1984.  The  indict-
ment,  judgment,  and  sentence  states  that 
under  the  offense  was  committed  on  July 
5,  1983. 
That  this  Defendant  was  sen-
tenced  pursuant  to  an  unconstitutional 
amendment  to  the  Controlled  Substance 
Act,  specifically  H.  B.  730,  Ex Parte
Owenby, 749  S.  W.  2d  880  (Tex.  Crill. 
App.  1988), and Ex Parte Crisp, 661  S. W. 
2d  944  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1988).  That  Ex
Parte Crisp declared the  1981  amendment 
contained  in  H.  B.  730  to  be  unconstitu-
tional,  (See  Owenby at  881). 
Further,  that  Owenby involved 
possession  of  methamphetamine  with 
intent to  deliver,  and the  date  given for the 
commission  of the  offense  in  Owenby was 
January 1. 1983.  The date alleged for com-
mission  of the  offense  in  the  Defendant's 
Cause  was  July  5,  1983.  Owenby was 
reversed for  a new  hearing  on  punishment 
Therefore,  this  Defendant is  enti-
tled to  a new  punishment hearing in  Cause 
No.  ,  since  the  Defendant's 
conviction  and  sentence  thereon  is  not  yet 
CONSIDERED,  Defendant  prays  that 
enhancement of paragraph  number  two  be 
quashed and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Defendant 
Louis  F.  linden 
r1" dMk here. It', only five in the
;::Jafternoon and its dark here. I
don't remember it being dark at
five in the afternoon at home. I can look
out my twelfth floor window and see in all
the offices across the street. They're all
brightly florescent lit. They look two
dimensional. As far as I can tell the build-
ing on the other side of K Street is only fif-
teen feet deep. It's rather like an ant farm.
I'm sure that my building looks like an ant
farm to them. The bright lights from the
offices accentuate the fact that it's dark
here. Just above the building I can see the
two red lights at the top of the Washington
Monument blinking on and off. All I can
see is the upper fourth of it lit from the
ground like a Cape Canaveral rocket that
never gets to the end of the countdown.
The rest is hidden by the office building as
is the Potomac. It's dark here. I don't
remember it being this dark before the
I was glad to miss the election at home.
Tulia Vulgaris called me Tuesday night
from Your Mom'n Thems' Fried Chicken.
He wasn't happy. He's not a Republican.
I'm not happy. I'm not a Republican. I
even know some Republicans who are not
happy, here and there. Partisan election of
judges is a real bad idea. There were some
bright spots here. Every morning when I
come out of the subway (affectionately
known here as the Electric Sewer) there's a
guy playing tenor sax and it's not Bill
Clinton. I give him my spare change. In
Virginia Ollie North didn't get elected.
Maryland avoided (but just barely) its first
Republican governor since Spiro Agnew.
TheDistrict of Columbia elected former
Mayor Marion Barry for a fourth term as
Mayor. How's that for rehabilitation?
When the overwhelmingly white popula
tion of the Northwestern part of D.C. were
upset about the election of a con victed
crack smoker as Mayor he told them sim-
ply, "Get over it!" Not bad advice for us
Something nasty may be coming your
way. Actually it already arrived. When the
much vaunted Crime Bill was signed by
the President it added three new rules to
the Federal Rules of Evidence. They go
into effect 180 days after the bill was
signed. Rules 413, 414, and 415 concern
evidence of similar crimes in sex cases.
Rule 413 reads in pertinent part:
"(a) In a criminal case in
which the defendant is accused of an
offense of sexual assault, evidence of
the defendant's commission of
another offense or offenses of sexual
assault is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant."
Rule 414 reads the same way except it
applies specifically to child molestation.
Rule 415 makes such evidence admissible
on behalf of a plaintiff in a civil suit. Some
fun, huh kids? Welcome to the wonderful
world of propensity evidence.
Now obviously not many of us are
going to be trying any rape or molestation
cases in federal court soon unless the next
Congress decides to make all street crime
federal (Mr. Dole? Mr. Gingrich?). These
cases are going to appear on military bases,
Indian reservations and the like of which
there are not many in HarrisCounty. But
the implication for those of us who work
mostly in state court is just as obvious
given the close relationship between the
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence and the
Federal Rules. It is instructive for us to
note how these incredibly ill-advised Rules
came about.
These Rules are not the product of the
Rules Enabling Act procedure. In that
process the Judicial Conference makes
rules after public hearings. Congress then
has the opportunity to review the Rules
and. should it see fit, to prevent their pro-
mulgation. That process was completely
ignored in this case. As the Crime Bill was
being wracked and torn in conference last
autumn, horse trading and jawboning were
the order of the day. In the closing minutes
of the process Rep. Susan Mollinari (R.-
N.Y.) offered her vote as the last one, the
vote that would allow them all to go home
as crime fighters. The quid pro quo for the
vote was inclusion of the rules within the
Republican package of amendments from
the floor. The deal was done and the
truthfinding process got the short end of
the stick. The ascendance of politics over
rationality, the very evil the Rules Enabling
Act was designed to prevent, was a fait
You have to admit that these rules have
a certain elegant simplicity about them.
There's none of that messy balancing or
worrying about whether a jury might be
unfairly prejudiced. For that matter there's
no worrying about whether the previous
conviction is valid; there's no conviction
required. There's no worrying about
whether the government has met its burden
of proof because it has no burden. Any evi-
dence of your defendant ever without con-
sent having touched or been touched by
genitals is per se admissible. Now we're all
saved from those nagging doubts about the
reliability of witnesses. The fact that your
client's ex-wife took a bath in the divorce
suit and got only the family photo album,
an aluminum sauce pan and liability for the
phone bill simply don't matter. Now
admittedly the government is supposed to
give you fifteen days notice and that could
of course upset some of us. But your
friendly U.S. Congress wants you to know
they don't want to ruin your evenings so
they added a clause that allows notice,
" such later time as the court may allow
for good cause." I love surprises, don't
To be honest I wouldn't get worked up
over this issue if I had faith in our State
judiciary's ability to make rational, sensi-
ble rules. I did have faith until the day the
voters of Texas elevated a mediocre gener-
al practitioner with virtually no criminal
law experience (or, as far as I can tell trial
experience of any sort), not to mention an
obvious disdain for such outmoded con-
cepts as truth and honesty, to the Court of
Criminal Appeals. (It's rather as if the
ghost of Senator Hruska had returned. You
will remember he was the U.S. Senator
from Nebraska who maintained that it was
important that the mediocre people have
someone to represent them.) I expect that
someone that unfamiliar with the Rules of
Evidence and their underlying conceptual
basis will find Rules 413-415 very appeal-
ing. J mean it's intuitively obvious that if
someone said your client did it once, then
it stands to reason he probably did it again.
Don't you think?
There are some other interesting things
on the coming attractions list. The new
majority has been handing around what
they call the, "Taking Back our Streets
Act." It's part of the "Contract with
America." Among other things it will limit
federal habeas corpus in death penalty
cases, provide a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. authorize
$10,500,000,00 for building (but not
staffing or running) new state prisons, and
mandates that in the trial of any of the 50
or so new federal capital offenses that
juries be instructed to return a recommen-
dation of death when aggravating factors
outweigh mitigating factors so as to make
the process simpler by removing discretion
from the judge and jury (their language,
not mine). If you're interested in more
details write to Congressman Dick Armey
502 O'Neill House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515 and ask for the
House Republican Conference Legislative
Digest for September 27, 1994. Or you
could call him at (202) 226-2302. I'm sure
he would be delighted to hear from fellow
Texans. In the meantime I suggest that you
all start covering each other's back sides.
It's dark here. And it's getting darker.
Like the fella who rode out of the Alamo to
go for help, Lou Linden left Houston ten
days before the election to serve (once
again) as Executive Director of the
National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers. He is also Docket Call's
Washington correspondent. He hopes to
be home in four months.
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