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November/December 1995 A Publication of Harris County Crim inal Lawyers Association
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Lie.  #74346 
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cers & Directors
President  .George Parnham 
President-Elect  ....Garland  D. Mcinni s 
Vice-President  ......Mark A.  Goldberg 
Treasurer  . Loren A.  Detamore 
Secretary  . ..  ..  . . ..  . ....Judi th  Mart in  Prince 
Immediate Past President  .  . ...... . ..Jim  Skelton 
Chairman  of the  Board  ........Lloyd  W.  Oliver 
Joseph  W  Varela 
Ted  R. Doebbler 
Tanya  L.  Ell ioll 
Danny  Easterling 
Richard Trevathan 
Joseph  Salhab 
Clyde  Williams 
W.B. "Bennie"  House  Jr 
Paul  S.  John  ,. 
John  E. Crow 
Harry A. Loftus,  Jr. 
Jonathan  Munier 
Will  Outlaw 
Moses  M.  Sanchez 
Winston  E. Cochran,  Jr. 
Past-Presidents  1971-1995 
C. Anthony  Friloux  (1972-1973) 
Stuart  Kinard  (1973-1974) 
George  Luquene  (1974-1975) 
Marvin  0  Teague  (1975-1976) 
Dick  DeGuerin  ( 1976-1977) 
W.  B. "Bennie"  House,  Jr.  (1977-1978) 
David  R. Bires  (1978-1979) 
Woody  Densen  ( 1979-1980) 
Will  Gray  (1980-1981  ) 
Edward A.  Mallen  (1981-1982) 
Carolyn  Garcia  (1982- 1983) 
Jack  B.  Zimmermann  (1983-1984) 
Clyde  Williams 
( 1985-1986) 
Robert  Pelton 
Candelario  El izondo 
Allen  C.  Isbell 
(1988- 1989) 
David  Mitcham 
Jim  E.  Lavi ne 
Rick  Brass 
Mary  E.  Conn 
Kent A.  Schaffer 
Dan  Cogdell 
(1994 -1995) 
Jim Skelton 
President' s  Club 
David  Cunningham 
Kent A. Schaffer 
Docket Call
.. . Allen  C. Isbell 
Editor  . 
...Robert  Pelton 
Associate  Editor 
Design & Production  . . 
. . Donna  K. Kleszcz 
112  Page 
Full  Page 
114  Page 
Business card  size  $3750 
Distribution 500  copies per issue  Arti cles  and  other edi-
torial  contributions  should  be  sent  to  the  Editor,  202 
Travis.  Suite  208.  Houston  77002  or  the  Association 
office  at 405  Main  St. 303,  Houston  77002  Telephone 
(713)  227-2404. 
September/October 1995
From  the  President  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Opinions  of the  First &  Fourteenth  Courts  of Appeals  ..... : : : : : : : : : : : :3 
Attacking  an  Information Alleging  D.W.I  ................ . .. ... . .. .  5 
for  Failure  to  Allege  a Culpable Mental  State 
Welcome  to  the Texas  Transportation Code  ..  . . ........ .  7 
They  Call Them T.R.A.P.  for  a Reason  . .. 
. .. ....9 
Hearsay  ........ ... ........ .. _.. 
. ...10 
A Note  on  Mock  Juries in  a Child  Sex  Case  .... 11 
What  is  a Crime Involving "Moral Turpitude"?  .. ........ . .. . ...... .12 
An  X-Citing  New  Vehicle  for Attacking  Indictments  .. ... . . ..... .... .14 
Task  Description Tape  Tampering  Examination  ..................... 16 
"It is  a good canvas  on  which  some strokes only want retouching." 
-Thomas Jeffersoll, July 31, J788 all tile Constitution.
301  San  Jacinto 
J2:00  noon,  177th District  Court  0 1:00  MCLE 
HCCLA Board  Meeting, Thursday  noon, Scanlan Bldg., 
November 9, 1995 
405  Main, 2nd  floor  conference 
December 14, 1995 
Defender Advocacy  Workshop
January  16  -
A Client-Centered Trial  Skills  Program  fo r 
March  26,  1996 
Defenders  and  Assigned  Counsel 
Tuesday  Evenings  6-8  pm, Harris County  Courthouse, 
30 I Fannin.  Ray  Moses,  Workshop  Coordinator 552-9534 . 
"Reasonable doubt is not a mere  possible doubt.  It is  that state of the case which. 
after the entire comparison and consideration of all  the evidence. leaves the minds 
.  of the jurors in  that condi tion that they cannot say  they  feel  an abiding conviction 
to  a moral  certainty.  of the  truth of the  charge." 

-Walker. Edwi" R. , in Stale V.  Lillker et al. 94  N.J.L. 411, 417 (1 920), I Jl A.  35.37. 
~   the  .5l?resident 
t the State Bar Convention in
San Antonio in the summer of
1970, a small group of attorneys
gathered to discuss the state of the crimi-
nal defense bar and its relationship to the
criminal justice system. Concerns rang-
ing from the status of criminal lawyers as
viewed by the public to the quality of
client representation were expressed. Of
paramount importance, however, was the
necessity of the defenders of individual
liberties to unite in an effort to stop the
rapid erosion of fundamental rights guar-
anteed to each of LIS by our constitution-
al heritage. On that date, in San
Antonio, the Harris County Criminal
Lawyers Association was born.
On May 27, 1971, Percy Foreman, a
Charter Member of the new organization,
told the first gathering of members and
()uests that "historic things we have
always accepted as remedies against the
Crown are now being challenged by
administrative edict." He asked that the
lawyers for the defense stand up and be
counted as an effective voice to help stop
the perilous decline.
Today those same noble objectives
remain. However, today the path to
accomplishment is "land-mined" with
attitudes that existed in 1970, but clearly
not to the degree that exists this day. It is
our duty, indeed Our calling, as defense
lawyers to protect against the daily
diminishing of our individual rights and
liberties. For if we don't, who is Left that
As defense lawyers, we are beset by
challenges both from within and without
our system. Some will be forever there _
the very reason for Our existence. Some,
unfortunately, are there as a result of our
own doing. Those can and must be
addressed and rectified for us to be more
effective in the representation of our
clients. For instance, I venture that the
value of our representation and ultimate
input into the criminal justice system can
be enhanced by an initial introspective
critique of our own everyday perfor-
mances at the courthouse.
I'm convinced that members of the
defense bar will always be the permanent
occupants of the lowest rung on the legal
ladder as seen through the eyes of those,
both lay and professional, who have cho-
sen other directions for thei r life's work.
But this is of no bother. We know who
we are and know what we do. The value
of our service can be measured by the
simple "midnight phone call" from the
colleague or friend heretofore untainted
by the criminal law and who now desper-
ately needs our he lp.
We, as defense lawyers, are also chal-
lenged by socially popular but equally
dangerous threats from a well meaning
yet unsuspecting society. Demands for
the diminution of constitutional rights by
over-zealous exponents of the war on
drugs should sound as a battle cry to all of
us as defenders. Various "victim rights
groups" all too often unwittingly cast dis-
persions on our efforts in representing the
accused. And we are battling the "0.].
Simpson syndrome", i.e., the public per-
ception of criminal lawyers as tricksters
and charlatans, which simply reinforces
the street belief that money buys justice.
Civil liberties are exposed to the knife of
the financial budget cutters and political
reactionaries. Even the Great Writ of
Habeas Corpus is under serious attack as a
resu It of the anti-terrorism legislation in
wake of the Oklahoma City bombing.
We can not stand idly by and let citi-
zens' rights be weakened by over-reactive
jurors within our society. We must take a
vigorous stand to keep our constitutional
guarantees in place and answer with an
effective, un ified voice.
Perhaps our Association has drifted
from its original tenets expressed some 25
years ago, but make no mistake, we have
the will and the strength to answer these
It is understood that all of us in the
defense bar do our job every day and each
of us has our own method of practice that
best defends the interests of our individ-
Llal clients. This is well and good. But to
make an overall impact, think how
greater the impact could be if we collec-
tively voiced the needs of our clients and
our concerns for client's rights to the very
system within which we operate. There
can be no substitute for this kind of
expressed will.
The blueprint exists. We have only to
look back to May 27, 1971, when the
words Percy Foreman spoke were heard
by a packed house that included a Justice
of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 70% of
the judges of the criminal district courts
and their families, 100% of the Harris
County Juvenile judiciary, and 100% of
the County Criminal Courts at Law
judges and their families, as well as
numerous criminal defense practitioners.
On that date, Mr. Foreman called for "a
new awareness by both the bench and bar
to immediately reverse what (he) foresaw
as a move away from the Judicial and an
administrative evolution of progress and
the protection of fundamental
Constitutional rights which began with
the Magna Carta... " Today the message is
the same; the demand for it to be
received still exists - the package within
which it's sent just needs to be dusted off
and spruced up a bit.
© Copyright 1995 by Legal Education
Press, Houston, Texas.
State v. Romero, Cause  No.  01-94-
ere  they  took  the  defendant's 
dope,  the  defendant's  truck, 
the  defendant's  cash,  and  the 
defendant.  (Spouse  and  family  dog 
apparently  left  alone.)  Defendant 
enters  into  an  agreed  forfeiture  judg-
ment on  truck and  cash.  Now  claims 
double  jeopardy  for  prosecution  on 
dope  possession. 
There are THREE theories floating 
around  on  this  type  of  double  jeop-
ardy  issue:  (1) It  is  NEVER  double 
jeopardy  to  forfeit  and  then  prose-
cute;  (2)  It  is  ALWAYS  double  jeop-
ardy  to  forfeit  and  then  prosecute; 
and  (3)  It is  SOMETIMES  double 
jeopardy  to  forfeit  and  then  prose-
This Court takes  approach #3,  and 
says  that  when  the  value  of  money 
and  property  seized  outweighs  the 
costs  of prosecution,  then  the  forfei-
ture  is  PUNITIVE,  as  in  punishment, 
which  means  that  the  defendant  has 
been  punished,  which  means  that  a 
subsequent  prosecution  would  be 
double  punishment,  which  is  another 
The  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals 
has  this  issue  before  them  right  now. 
The  Court  will  probably  find  the 
costs  of  prosecution  theory  of deter-
mining  double  jeopardy  unworkable. 
How  do  you  calculate  the  costs  of  a 
drug bust!  Cost of each cop per hour? 
Court  time  included?  Snitch  pay-off 
money  included?  The  specter  of 
legions of accountants  (on both sides, 
of  course)  battling  out  the  bucks,  is 
enough  to  make  the  mind  boggle. 
Buried  in  this  opinion,  but  not decid-
ed,  is  the  question  of  whether  an 
AGREED civil  judgment of forfeiture 
implicitly  waives  the double  jeopardy 
Ex  parte lamail, Cause  No.  01-94-
By  now,  all  but  the  most  die  hard 
OWl  advocates  recognize:  (1)  there 
is  no  6th  Amendment  constitutional 
right  to  counsel  after  arrest,  and 
before  formal  criminal  charges  are 
filed,  when  the cops ask  you:  "Do you 
want  to  take  the  breath  test?";  (2) 
there  is  no 5th Amendment constitu-
tional  right  (i.e.  Miranda)  to  counsel 
when  asked  this  question;  (3) your 
refusal  to  submit  to  a  breath or  blood 
test IS  admissible  against you;  and  (4) 
the  fact  that  you  decided  not  to  sub-
mit  to  a  breath  or  blood  test  because 
you  could  not consult  with  counsel  is 
irrelevant.  Where  do  we  go  from 
This  opinion  reaffirms  the  earlier 
line  of  cases  stating  the  above  law. 
HOWEVER:  the fact  that your client 
is  screaming  that  he  wants  an  attor-
ney  IS  NOT  ADMISSIBLE  and  is 
deemed  HIGHLY  prejudicial.  The 
State  is  entitled  to  introduce  testimo-
ny  that  your  client  refused  to  submit 
to a  blood or breath test,  but just keep 
this separate from  the client's thought 
processes  concerning counsel. 
Ivie v. State, Cause  No.  14-93-1128-
As you  know,  the  use  or exhibition 
of deadly  weapon  screws  up  real  good 
the  defendant's  good  conduct  time 
toward  parole  something.  Can  you 
unintentionally use  or exhibit a dead-
ly  weapon during the commission of a 
reckless  type  offense,  say  Involuntary 
Manslaughter.  This Court says:  YES. 
Use  or  exhibition  of  the  deadly 
Opinions  of  the  First  &
Fourteenth  Courts 
weapon need only be during the
offense, never intentional.
State v. Hart, Cause No. 14-94-393-
This is an interesting situation
where after trial, the defendant's
motion for new trial is granted. The
State exercised its notice of appeal
powers, and got a new trial. Moral of
story: Do not file a BS MNT and
expect to get away with it.
Washington v. State, Cause No. 14-
This was a prosecution for the
unlawful disposal of cocaine in the
presence of a peace officer, i.e., toss-
ing the crack away as THE MAN
approached. What is disturbing
about this case has nothing to do with
the Court of Appeals rulings, but is
buried deep in the facts of the case.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, the Court of Appeals notes
that the positive result from the offi-
cer's field test of the dope was SOME
EVIDENCE to support the convic-
tion. No police officer is competent
to interpret the results of a dope field
test. Only a chemist is. This is the
same as the administering cop in a
breath test case. He can say what he
did, and what the machine printed
out, but only a chemist can interpret
the results. DO NOT LET A NARC
on (1) hearsay grounds (make the test
tube come in and testify); (2) that the
cop was not shown to be a qualified
expert; and (3) that the cop is not
competent to INTERPRET the
resu Its.
With your help, I will get one
reversed on this principle of law
rian w. Wice was recently appointed to a
two-year term as an associate municipal
court judge for the City of Houston .
Wice is a 1979 graduate of the University of
Houston Law Center and a former briefing
attorney to Judge Sam Houston Clinton of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
A member of the College of the State Bar of
Texas, and a frequent faculty member at contin-
uing legal education seminars, Wice devotes his
practice to criminal appeals and post-convic-
tion writ matters in state and federal cOurt.
New Members Welcome! 
Dean M. Blumrosen
Ted R. Doebbler
Mark W. Bennett
Jacquelin Ann Kramer
Joseph J. LaBella
Willie P. Loston
Glenn J. Youngblood
Norman]. Silverman
R. Yvonne Burton
Cassandra Y. Hollemon
Gilbert Corrigan
J. Scott Bell
Sunny Leigh Kapungu
Martin D. Mayne
Graydon Wilson
Charles H. Portz
Stavis Gilbreath
D. Jennings Bryant, Jr.
Ramon J. Villagomez
Arnold S. Cohn
Alain G. Harvey
Michael Nassif
Lloyd Oliver
Lloyd Oliver
Rick Brass
Lloyd Oliver
Lloyd Oliver
Garland Mcinnis
Will Outlaw
Daniel Corrigan
Allen C. Isbell
Lloyd Oliver
Edward Mallett
Richard Haynes
Moe Sanchez
Moe Sanchez
Lloyd Oliver
Moe Sanchez
Lloyd Oliver
Walter Boyd
Lloyd Oliver
Attacking  an  Information  Alleging 
D.W.I.  for  Failure  to  Allege  a 
Culpable  Mental  State 
[Editor's note: Jim  Steele says that
informations alleging D. W. I . 's  under
Texas Penal Code, §49.04  may be
defective until the recent amendment
which clearly dispenses with a culpable
mental state. Jim says he is  indebted to 
Michael Mapes for the legal memoran-
dum accompanying his motion.}
CAUSENO. __________ 
Defendant  in  the  above  entitled  and 
numbered cause,  and files  this Motion 
to  Set  Aside  The  Information,  based 
on the following: 
Defendant  is  charged  with  the 
offense  of Driving While  Intoxicated. 
The  Information  is  defective 
because  it  fails  to  allege  a  culpable 
mental state. 
SIDERED, Defendant prays the Court 
grant  this  motion  and  set  aside  the 
Information  presented  in  this  cause. 
Respectfully submitted, 
[Attorney for  Defendant] 
COMES  NOW,  [Defendant]  in  the 
above  entitled  and  numbered  cause, 
by  and  through his attorney of record, 
[Attorney],  and  files  this  memoran-
dum  of  law  in  support  of his  Motion 
to Set Aside  the  Information. 
Defendant  is  charged  by 
Information  with  the  offense  of 
Driving  While  Intoxicated  under 
Chapter  49.04  of  the  Texas Penal
Code, effective  September  1,  1994. 
Chapter  49.04  defines  the  offense  of 
Driving While  Intoxicated: 
A  person commits an offense  if the 
person  is  intoxicated  while  driving or 
operating  a  motor  vehicle  in  a  public  . 
The statute does  not state  a  culpa-
ble  state. 
Texas Penal Code, §6.02(a),  enti -
tled  Requirement  of  Culpability, 
states  "Except as provided in  Subsection
(b) of this section. A  person  does  not  · 
commit  an  offense  unless  he  inten-
tionally,  knowingly,  recklessly  or with 
criminal  negligence  engages  in  con-
duct  as  the  definition  of  the  offense 
requires"  (emphasIs  added).  Further, 
§6.02  (b)  states:  . 
"If  the  definition  of  an  offense 
does  not  prescribe  a  culpable 
mental  state,  a  culpable  mental 
state  is  nevertheless  required 
unless. the  definition  plainly dis-
penses  with  any  mental  element" 
(emphasis added). 
The  Driving  While  Intoxicated 
statute  does  not  dispense  with  a  cul-
pable  mental  state,  therefore  the 
State  must  allege  that  the  Defendant 
intentionally, knowingly,  or recklessly 
committed  the  alleged  offense. 
In  the  instant  case,  the 
Information  fails  to  state  an  offense 
because  it  fails  to  allege  any  mental 
element  as  required  by  the  Texas
Penal Code , §6.02. 
This  case  involves  ,3 fundamental 
concept  of crimina'!  law.  To  consti-
tute a crime,  the act or actus reas must 
be  accompanied  by a  criminal  mind 
or  mens rea. The  United  States 
Supreme  Court  explained  this  con-
cept  in  Morissette v. United States,
342  U.S.  246,  250-252,  72  S.Ct.  240, 
243-244,96 L.Ed.  288  (1952). 
It is  as  universal  and  persistent  in 
mature systems of law  as  belief ir  'ee-
dom  of  the  human  will  and  a  conse-
quent  ability  and  duty  of the  normal 
individual  to  choose  between  good 
and  evil...  Unqualified  acceptance  of 
this  doctrine  by  English  common  law 
Attacking  An  Information 
in the Eighteenth Century was indi-
cated by Blackstone's sweeping state-
ment that to constitute any crime
there must first be a "vicious will" ...
Our legislature recognized this fun-
damental concept by enacting §6.02
and four separate culpable mental
states in §6.03 Tex. Penal Code Ann
§6.02 & §6.03 .
The Texas Appellate Courts have
long held that §6.02 applies to all
provisions within the Penal Code. For
example, when the former statute
prohibiting criminal trespass, Article
1377(c), c.c.p  1925, as amended in
1971, was incorporated into the
"new" Penal Code in 1973, legislators
neglected to prescribe a culpable
mental state. See Texas Penal Code
Ann §30.05 (Vernon 1989 & Supp.
1994). However, pursuant to
§6.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code,
the Court of Criminal Appeals held
that "criminal responsibility for a
trespass offense must be established
by proof of either intent, knowledge,
or recklessness." Hollotvay v. State,
583 S.W.2d 376 (Tex.Crim.App.
1979), Langston v. State, 855 S.W.2d
718 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993).
The situation at bar is analogous to
the criminal trespass statute, in that
when the Driving While Intoxicated
Statue was incorporated into the new
Penal Code effective September 1,
1994, the legislature neglected to pre-
scribe a culpable mental state. If the
legislature intended the Driving
While Intoxicated statute to be a "per
se" offense, they would have plainly
dispensed with a culpable mental
state as required by §6.02(b).
The Court of Criminal Appeals
addressed this issue when deciding
which element of unauthorized use of
a motor vehicle required culpability.
The Court decided that to hold a per-
son criminally responsible for know-
ingly operating a motor vehicle,"
without knowing it was without the
owners effective consent would make
the statute a "strict liability offense,"
Tex.Penal Code Ann. §32.31, "does
not prescribe one of the culpable
mental states. Since the statue does
not indicate that the intent was to
make this a strict liability offense,
§6.2(b) and (c) require the conduct
be done either intentionally, know-
ingly, or recklessly and one or more of
these culpable mental states must be
alleged in the indictment" Baldwin v.
State 538
The Texas Legislature recognized
its error and rectified it by enacting
Texas Penal Code, Section 49 . 11,
"Proof of Mental State
Unnecessary," which became effec-
tive on September 1, 1995. Section
49.11, reads as follows:
"Notwithstanding Section
6.02(b), proof of a culpable men-
tal state is not required for con-
viction of an offense under this
The Federal Courts have held that
it violates the Due Process provisions
of the Federal and Texas
Constitutions to provide for criminal
responsibility without requiring a cul-
pable mental state. Harper v.
Lindsay, 454 FSupp. 597 (1978).
SIDERED, the Defendant Prays this
Court grant Defendant's Motion To
Set Aside The Information for its fail-
ure to provide an essential element of
the offense of Driving While
Intoxicated, namely, that the
Information fails to allege a culpable
mental state.
Respectfully submitted,
(Attorney for Defendant]
When  were the 
"Good Old Days?" 
hen there is a large turn-
over in the judiciary,
alarms are sounded among
the defense bar regarding the predis-
position of the new judges toward
valuable tenets in criminal law. We
tend to fear that new judges today are
less inclined toward giving an accused
citizen a fail trial and to protect his
rights under the federal and State
constitutions than in previous times.
If one peruses some of the old case
law, however, one disabuses oneself of
any thoughts of "the good old days."
On their worst days, the new judges
cannot be as bad as one our forefa-
thers in the defense bar confronted.
For example, the trial judge in
Chapman v. State, 57 S.W. 965
(Tex.Crim.App. 1900), delivered a
lecture to the petit jurors, in the
absence of the defendant, in which he
severely criticized the law of self-
defense and the doctrine of reason-
able doubt, both of which he held up
to ridicule and contempt. The defen-
dant was tried for murder and self-
defense was an issue!
The trial judge in Waters v. State,
241 S.W. 496 (Tex.Crim.App. 1922),
remarked to the panel of jurors that
the suspended sentence law would be
repealed if juries made it a vehicle to
turn real criminals loose, that it was
intended to apply to young men and
first offenders and those who acciden-
tally got in trouble.
Our predecessors in the defense bar
would laugh at our concerns. Maybe
there were not any "good old days" in
the practice of criminal law.
n September 1, 1995, the
Texas Transportation Code
became effective. The
Transportation Code (TRC) is a com-
pilation of recodified and/or amended
Civil Statutes and new statutes relat-
ing to the motOr vehicle law of Texas.
Much of the TRC you may never
need but, Chapters 521, 522, 524,
601, and 724 will soon become part of
your criminal law practice.
The following information is a
compendium of Chapters 521, 522,
524, 601, and 724 of the Trans-
portation Code. Welcome to the
Transportation Code is intended to
introduce you to some statutes in the
Transportation Code that may affect
your clients and to provide you with
citations for easy access to the new
law. A complete discussion of each
Chapter is beyond the scope " of this
§521 should be titled "Fifty ways to
Lose your License and to Keep on
Driving." It includes, among other
things, suspensions for habitual viola-
tors, §521.295; suspensions for indi-
viduals under 21 years of age; auto-
matic license suspensions; the suspen-
sion compact throughout the United
States and Canada, §521.299; and
occupational licenses.
Occupational license information
is located in Subchapter L, TRC,
§521.241-§521.253. This section
addresses the petition, the order, the
requirements the judge may impose
and the driving time restrictions DPS
that"... an order granting an occupa-
tionallicense is valid until the end of
the period of suspension of the per-
son's regular drivers license." The
four-hour restnctlon has been
removed from the statute and the
only time limitation is that a person
may not drive for more than 12 hours
in any 24-hour period.
Subchapter 0, TRC, §521.341-
§521.347, Automatic Suspensions,
imposes an automatic license suspen-
sion of an adult or person under 21
years of age upon conviction for cer-
tain offenses, including, but not limit-
ed to, OWl; Intoxication Assault, if
the person had alcohol in his or her
system; Criminally Negligent Homi-
cide, if a person was operating a motor
vehicle at the time; and Accident
Involving Injury (leaving the scene or
obstructing traffic at the scene of an
accident involving personal injury or
death, §550.021, TRC).
§521.344, Suspension for Offenses
Related to Use of Alcohol, is impor-
tant to any attorney who pleads a
client guilty to OWL This section
includes information on when the
license suspension begins (from the
date of conviction to 30 days after the
date of conviction as set by the
judge), and the periods of suspension
(90 days to 1 year as set by the judge
for a first offense, or 180 days to 2
years if enhanced under 49.09, Penal
Code). It does not allow DPS to sus-
pend the license of a first offender
who successfully completes an alcohol
education class. Furthermore,
§521.344 obliges DPS to notify a per-
son of his or her right to a suspension
hearing before suspending the per-
son's driving privilege for failure to
complete an alcohol education course
required under 42.12 Code of Crim.
Proc. The statute authorizes DPS to
deny a person a drivers license an
complete the alcohol education class.
Subchapter P, §521.371-§521.377,
Automatic Suspension for Certain
Felony Drug Offenses concerns auto-
matic license suspensions upon final
conviction of an offense under the
Controlled Substance Act; a drug
offense or a felony under Chapter 481
Health and Safety Code, that is not a
drug offense; or an offense under
49.04, 49.07 or 49.08, Penal Code,
which was committed with a con-
trolled substance in the body. A sus-
pension generally under this statute is
for 180 days. DPS may impose anoth-
er 180 day denial period after the per-
son applies for reinstatement.
Furthermore DPS may not reinstate a
license of a person whose license is
under suspension at the time of con-
viction for a second offense under this
chapter. This subchapter includes the
offenses, periods of suspension and/or
denial, and reinstatement require-
Subchapter S, §521.451-§521,460
TRC, Miscellaneous Offenses, is
comprised of a variety offenses, mostly
Class C misdemeanors, that include a
license suspension as part of the pun-
ishment. Among the various offenses
in this subsection is a new one called
Driving While License Invalid,
§521.457, TRC. Driving while
License Invalid is a OWLS for driving
while license suspended under §524,
TRC, failure of a breath test; or §724,
TRC, refusal of a breath test; or 42.12
Code of Crim. Proc., failure to com-
plete an alcohol education course.
The range of punishment is $100-
$500 and/or 72 hours to 6 months in
jail. A OWL! can be enhanced to a
Class A misdemeanor. No additional
suspension period is imposed upon a
final conviction under this statute.
There is an affirmative defense of no
notice if the license is suspended
may impose. §521.248 now states .
additional two years if a person fails to under §524 or §724, TRC.
Texas  Transportation  Code 
Other offenses in this section
include Refusing to Surrender a
Suspended or Revoked License or
Title; Displaying or Having a
Possession a License or Certificate
that is Fictitious, Cancelled,
Suspended or Revoked; Possessing
More Than One License; and Making
a False Statement in an application
for a Texas Driver's License. The sus-
pension period is set by the court from
90 days to 1 year. If the court does not
set the suspension period DPS will
automatically suspend the license for
one year, 521.346, TRC.
This Chapter is dedicated to com-
mercial drivers' licenses and commer-
cial drivers. §522.001-§522.l06 cov-
ers everything from obtaining a com-
mercial license to losing it. See
Subchapter 1 for Driving While
Alcohol, Controlled Substance, or Drug
in System and §523.005 for the Effect
of Conviction on a Commercial License.
Commercial drivers can be charged
under Subchapter G, §521.071, TRC,
Driving while Disqualified Prohibited, if
arrested during the course and scope
of employment.
CHAPTERS  524  AND  724 
Both §524 and §724 involve ALR
license suspensions for failure of a
breath test and refusal of a breath test
respectively. However, §724.001-
§721.035, Subchapter B pertains to
the taking and analysis of breath
and/or blood specimens, which may
affect both refusals and failures.
§ 724.015 lists the officer's obligation
to inform a person orally and in writ-
ing of the consequences of refusal and
failure of a breath test. The periods of
suspension remain the same 60 days
for failure, first offense and 90 days for
refusal, first offense. For persons
under 21 years of age and commercial
drivers arrested during the course and
scope of employment the period of
suspension is one year.
§524, TRC, outlines everything
from the officer's duty to give notice
of suspension to the defendant to the
defendant's right to appeal. There are
a few changes from the law as it exist-
ed before September 1, 1995. For
example, §524.038(d) still allows a
defendant to subpoena the breath test
technical supervisor to the ALR
Hearing and to object to an affidavit
submitted by the breath test technical
supervisor if the technical supervisor
does not appear. However, upon
showing of good cause why the super-
visor cannot show, DPS can not enter
an affidavit from that person into evi-
§524.021 states that the suspension
takes effect of the 40th day after
notice of suspension is received or
presumed to be received §524.031
requires the person to request a hear-
ing no later than the 15th day from
the date notice is received and
§524.032 states that the hearing be
held no earlier than 11 days after the
day the hearing date is requested.
An administrative hearing for
either a suspension under §524 or
§724 is governed by §524.040-
§524.044. See both §524.035 and
§724.042 for the issues at the hearing
pertinent to each type of suspension.
If you have ever wondered where
DPS has its rules, regulations, safety
responsibility requirements, reinstate-
ment procedures, and power to sus-
pend, this is it. Subchapters K and L
will be the most useful to criminal
attorneys. Subchapter K, §601.331-
§601-342, outlines who must file
proof of financial responsibility (an
SR-22). Subchapter L, §601-371,
Operation of a Motor Vehicle in
Violation of Suspension; Offense, is a
OWLS for person whose licenses are
suspended for an accident with no
insurance, a judgment following an
accident with no insurance or for
multiple no insurance tickets.
Additionally, if a person's vehicle reg-
istration is also under suspension and
that person allows his or her vehicle
to be operated on a public highway
during the suspension period it is an
offense. The range of punishment is
the same as for Driving while License
Invalid, §521.457; and it can be
enhanced to a Class A Misdemeanor
with any conviction, probated or
final, that involved an operation of a
motor vehicle after August 31, 1987.
There is an affirmative defense to
prosecution of no notice.
Presently, the Transportation Code
is available in session law at the
County Law Library or in the Gould's
Publication of the Texas Criminal Law
and Motor Vehicle Handbook 1995-
1996 Edition.
[Elizabeth Rutkowski has been a para-
legal in criminal law since 1988. In
February 1995, she wrote and distributed
the ALR Survival Guide . During her
research while writing the Guide, she
learned the process for filing petitions for
occupational licenses and appeals from
ALR suspensions in the Harris County
Civil Courts at Law. In March 1995,
Ms . Rutkowski opened Elizabeth's
Paralegal Service to assist attorneys in fil-
ing occupational license and ALR
appeals. For more information on this
service, please call Ms . Rutkowski at
(713) 630-0852. Charts of license sus-
pensions will accompany the next article.]
Alpha Pagers for 
Less Anywhere 
Communications, Inc. 
For more information, call:
Lorraine Mondragon @ 
How  The  Wording  In  Your  Notice  Of Appeal May Be  ADeadly Error 
e now have the "word", as
unpleasant as it was for two
appellants, that unless you
use the language of art in giving notice
of appeal from a guilty or no contest
plea in a plea-bargained arrangement,
you commit deadly error. In David v.
State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.
1994) and in Lyon v. State 872 S.W.2d
732 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994), the Court
of Criminal Appeals strictly construed
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
(T.R.A.P.), Rule 40(b)(l) which pro-
vides in part:
.... in order to prosecute an appeal
for a nonjurisdictional defect or
error that occurred prior to entry
of the plea the notice shall state
that the trial court granted per-
mission to appeal or shall specify
that those matters were raised by
written motion and ruled on
before trial.
In strictly interpreting the lan-
guage, the Court held that to appeal a
guilty or no contest plea to raise (1) a
non-jurisdictional defect that occurs
before or after the plea, or (2) an error
that occurred before entry of the plea,
there must be a plea bargain, and the
written notice of appeal must state that
the trial court granted permission to
appeal or specify that the accused raised
those matters by written motion and
received an adverse ruling before trial. A
general Notice of Appeal is insuffi-
cient to comply with T.R.A.P., Rule
Will those critics of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, who rail against
the court as the "citadel of technicali-
ty," complain that two citizens were
denied a hearing on appeal because of
a "technicality"?
As Judge McCormick wrote: "Our
caselaw on how a defendant, in an
appeal from a plea-bargained convic-
tion, confers jurisdiction on a Court of
Appeals to address certain issues is not
exactly a model of clarity and concise
legal analysis." Lyon v. State, supra.
However, the court has interpreted
T.R.A.P., Rule 40(b)(l) and you have
notice that you must give proper
Notice of Appeal in a plea-bargained
conviction. To that end, I submit the
following as a model by which you can
draft your own.
(General Style of Case)
By Authority of Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rule 40(b)(l),
the Defendant gives Notice of Appeal
to the Court of Appeals from his con-
viction on (date) for the offense of
(name of offense).
The Defendant agreed to enter a
plea of (guilty or no contes t) in
exchange for a punishment recom-
mendation by the State. The trial
court did not exceed that punishment
recommendation, and sentenced the
Defendant to (state the sentence).
The Defendant presented and the
trial court overruled before trial the
following written motions which
frame the issues on appeal:
(I temize the pre-trial motions which
were overruled by the trial court) : .
A. Legality of the Metro Police to
Arrest a Motorist for D.W.I.
B. Motion to Suppress the Search
of Defendant's Apartment.
C. Motion to Suppress the
Defendant's Oral Confession.
D. (Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc.)
The trial court has granted the
defendant the right to appeal.
Signed this (date)
(Name etc.)
George Parnham, HeClA President; Han. Thad
Heartfield, U.S. District Ct. Beaumont
Tina Rogers, Richard Haynes, Doug Tinker
Photography by Bob Rosenberg.
attendees. Also, Walter seemed
pleased with the number of people he
managed to offend in only two days.
Johnnie Cochran was as surprised
as I, that the three-hour verdict was
"not guilty." It contravened the
accepted wisdom that "quick ver-
dicts" go against the defendant.
Interesting that so many in the media
want to make it a "racist" verdict, yet
none mention that two white jurors
and one Hispanic juror came to the
"not guilty" decision in the same
short time. Listening to the jurors
discuss the basis for their verdict, it
seems to yours truly they had a good
grasp of the evidence presented and
the reasonable doubt that remained.
Aren't we glad that Houston does not
have, nor ever has had, police like
Mark Fuhrmann who plant evidence
or lie under oath.
Who says, "Good things never
happen on Monday"! Don't tell Don
Stricklin or Judge Debbie Mantooth
Stricklin. They eloped on a Monday
Dune 5, 1995] to Lake Tahoe .
Correct your files to reflect that Judge
Stricklin presides over the 180th
District Court.
At our annual meeting, the associ-
ation honored Jim Steele for four
"N.G.'s" and two Motions to Suppress
granted in one week in County Court
No.2. It was good to see a number of
judges at the annual meeting. Among
others, I saw Judge Mike Wilkinson,
Judge Mike Peters, Judge Jim
Anderson, Judge Werner Voight,
and Judge John Beeler.
Outgoing Prez Jim Skelton report-
ed a balance of $8,540.50 in the bank
account after his year of stewardship.
This is the first time in several years,
the association has had this much in
reserve. Our thanks to Jim for an
excellent year.
Recently installed Prez George
Parnham has gone about our business
with enthusiasm. He promises immi-
nent results in our grievance against
the security system, that we are the
only "officers of the court" who must
go through the system.
Our monthly luncheons/seminars
at the Houston Club have featured
outstanding presentations. Judge
Charles Baird from the Court of
Criminal Appeals gave us the latest
updated material on decisions ren-
dered recently, and a list of the issues
currently pending .... Don Osborne,
supervising United States Probation
Officer, and his two Senior Probation
Officers, Becky Pope and Lisa Reed,
gave practical advice on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines .... Good atten-
dance at both luncheons. The speak-
ers have been much better than the
food, in my opinion.
Phyllis Frye scored a victory for a
client in an indecent exposure case.
Took four days; jury still could not
decide for sure! ... .Dennis Smith got
an "N.G." in an "indecency" with a
child case - in Brazoria County! .. ..
Another victory for Husband and
Wife team, Cruz and Lorraine
Bill Clayton Messick has moved
to Alabama! New address: One
Office Park, Suite 210, Mobile,
Alabama 36609 (334/380-0533).
Walter Boyd wrested "control" of
the Galveston seminar one more time
[the history of "who ousted whom" in
the control of that seminar during the
past eight years is fodder for the
Tabloids]. To almost everyone's sur-
prise, it was highly successful in qual-
ity of lectures and the number of
I did hear from Robert J. Fickman
since my last column. He scored a
"Grand Jury Victory" in Montgomery
County and saved an elementary
school counselor from an indictment
for indecency with a child. He and
David Cunningham were not so for-
tunate in a big bank fraud case.
Seems they could not explain ade-
quately where the 14 million dollars
Yours truly had dinner with Dr.
Ned Van Maanen, executive director
of Crime Stoppers, and Bernard
Wishnow, local television personali-
ty, who interviewed him for his show.
Van Maanen expressed surprise when
I told him that our group is very
thankful for his organization, until I
explained that only those who have
been arrested hire lawyers!
With a touch of irony, our own
Mark Allan Goldberg and Jeri Lara
Kuhleman surrendered their freedom
and became "united in holy matrimo-
ny" on July 4, 1995!
Over a hundred attended the
October 26th luncheon to hear Doug
Tinker; nice to have the food catered
by Treebeard's again. They had to add
tables and bring in chairs! Seemed
like old times.
Tom Brashier and Adrian Smith
represented co-defendants in aggra-
vated robbery case; after two days of
trial, State dismisses because com-
plainant says the robber was neither
Prez-elect Garland Mclnnis was
seen basking in a recent victory. It
was satisfactory, not only because he
won, but because of who he got to
cross-examine! Promised I would not
tell who.
he purpose of a mock jury is to
get "feedback" for defense
counsel before the trial begins,
in order to lower the risk of offending
the jury. This information is critical
particularly in child sex offenses.
knowing what questions to include in
your questionnaire.
2. Contact a consultant in
advance to help with processing, sum-
marizing and analyzing the results.
Clients are pleased because consul-
A criminal defense attorney may rec-
ommend that his client enter a plea,
after reviewing the questionnaires.
prosecutors in several cases decided to
drop charges after they reviewed the
Going to trial can be a risky endeavor
due to the potential of the long terms
of imprisonment involved if the
client does not plea bargain.
One way to reduce risk is to hold a
"mock jury" or "focus group". In an
Ohio case, in order to obtain a more
critical view of the jurors' thoughts in
a sex offense trial, and after they have
been presented with the evidence,
the jury was divided into two (2)
groups - one (1) group of men and
women, and one (1) group of women
only. The "women- only" group pro-
vided a more critical view of the case.
Without men in a mock jury or "focus
group", in a sex offense trial, women
are more open to discuss their true
feelings concerning child sex cases.
Although questionnaires are being
increasingly used, some judges will
not permit this approach. This is the
reason it is imperative to use other
methods to evaluate juror response.
I would like to thank Leonard W.
Yelsky and Angelo F. Lonardo, of
Yelsky & Lonardo Co., L.P. A.,
Cleveland, Ohio, for experimenting
in and utilizing this approach, thus
making it possible for its further
1. Ask court personnel what has
worked before. They are often a
resource for helpful information.
Court personnel are interested in suc-
cessfully implementing the court
process. Their prior experience with
specific questions may assist you in
tants work at an hourly rate equal to
or lower than that of lawyers; courts
are pleased because consultants spe-
cialize in this kind of work and avoid
pitfalls which may occur when courts
first implement this approach. A
consultant's presence often influences
the judge to permit the use of the
3. Point out advantages for the
judge. His or her reputation may be
protected and enhanced in sensitive
or high publicity trials. Court time is
used more productively. You may
wish to start with a long question-
naire like in the O. J. Simpson case
and shorten it, if the judge hesitates
using a long questionnaire. While a
comprehensive questionnaire, like
those used in the O. J. Simpson and
Rodney King cases, is preferable, it is
better to have a small supplemental
questionnaire than none at all.
4. Ask the court to have the jurors
answer the questionnaire at the cour-
thouse. Sometimes questionnaires
are mailed to prospective jurors to be
answered before coming to the court-
house. While short questionnaires
mailed to jurors have a higher
response rate than long question-
naires, the return rate is still lower
than if the jurors fill out the question-
naire at the courthouse.
5. Better decisions can be made
about whether to proceed with the
trial. Frequently, civil attorneys settle
after evaluating the questionnaires.
Inese  A.  Neiclers  is  a  jury  consultant 
from  Columbus,  Ohio.  She  has  suc-
cessfully  used  questionnaires  in  death 
penalty,  drug  conspiracy,  police  bru-
tality,  child  sexual  abuse,  while  collar 
product  liability  and  torts.  You  may 
reach  her  at  (61.4)263-6558  or  Box 
14736, Columbus,  Ohio  43214. 
Business  Possible. 
[a.k.a.  Can't Define  It,  Really,  But 
I Know  It When  I See  It!] 
he general rule controlling
impeachment by evidence of
conviction of crime is stated in
T.R.C.E., Rule 609:
For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public
record but only if the crime was a
felony or involved moral turpi,
tude, regardless of punishment,
and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to a party.
What is a "crime of moral turpi,
tude"? It is an offense involving an
element of fraud, larceny, or criminal
intent. Dallas County Bail Bond Bd v.
Mason, 773 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.App.
Dallas 1989); U.S. v. Smith, 420 F.2d
428, 432 (5th Cir. 1970). In Jordan v.
DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct.
703,95 L.Ed 886 (1951), the United
States Supreme Court stated:
Whatever else the phrase, "crime
involving moral turpitude" may
mean in peripheral cases, the
decided cases make it plain that
crimes in which fraud was an
ingredient have always been
regarded as involving moral turpi-
tude.... The phrase "crime
involving moral turpitude" has
without exception been con-
strued to embrace fraudulent con-
Offenses which are crimes of
"moral turpitude."
(1) Theft, forgery, prostitution, see
Robertson v. State, 685 S.W.2d
488,492 (Tex.App. Fort Worth 1985,
no pet.) .l
(2) Aggravated assault on a
woman [a misdemeanor under pre-
197 4 Penal Code], Trippell v. State,
535 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim.App.
(3) An "expansive" view of what
constitutes "moral turpitude" comes
from civil cases, arising from the dis-
barment of lawyers. The Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure define a "serious
crime," requiring disciplinary action,
as "any felony involving moral turpi-
tude." Tex.R.Disciplinm·y P.
1.06(U)(1992). In deciding what
constitutes a "serious crime", that is, a
felony involving moral turpitude, the
civil courts have viewed moral turpi-
tude broadly, see In reo G.M.P., __
S.W.2d __ (Tex.App. Houston
[14th] 1995, n.w.h.):
1) Crimes involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or
deliberate violence.
'If the gravamen of "moral turpitude" is frawi,
I fail to see why prostitution is in this category.
The only "frawiulent" prostitution cases I've fum-
died are "stings" by the police, who "say but do
not. "
2) Anything done knowingly con-
trary to justice, honesty, principle, or
good morals.
3) An act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellow
men or to society in general.
4) Something immoral in itself,
regardless of whether it is punishable
by law. The doing of the act itself,
and not its prohibition by statute,
fixes the moral turpitude.
5) Immoral conduct is that con-
duct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the
Offenses which are not crimes of
"moral turpitude."
(1) Carrying a weapon, Dowdy V.
State, 385 S.W.2d 678
(Tex.Crim.App. 1964); McKinney V.
State, 505 S.W.2d 536
(Tex.Crim.App. 1974) .
(2) Drunkenness, Gibbs v. State,
385 S.W.2d 258 (Tex.Crim.App.
1965); Hoover V. State, 449 S.W.2d 60
(Tex.Crim.App. 1970).
(3) Driving while intoxicated,
Ochoa V. State, 481 S.W.2d 847
(Tex.Crim.App. 1972).
(4) Driving while license suspend-
ed, Stephens v. State, 417 S.W.2d 286
f.n.l (Tex.Crim.App. 1967) .
(5) Gambling, Robertson V. State,
685 S.W.2d 488,492 (Tex.App. Fort
Worth 1985, no pet.).
(6) Fighting, Robertson v. State,
685 S.W.2d 488,492 (Tex.App. Fort
Worth 1985, no pet.).
Query: Is "Issuance of a Bad
Check" a crime of "moral turpi-
You may find conflicting authori-
ties regarding whether the issuance of
a bad check is a crime of moral turpi-
tude. Some opinions suggest that
"passing a worthless check" is a crime
involving "moral turpitude."
McKinney v. State, 505 S.W.2d 536
(Tex.Crim.App. 1974) [the Court of
Criminal Appeals categorized "pass-
ing worthless checks" as a crime of
moral turpitude]; Kizart v. State, 811
S.W.2d 137 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1991,
no pet.) ["assumed" that passing a
worthless check involved moral turpi-
tude]. Other opinions state that
"passing a worthless check" is not a
crime involving "moral turpitude."
See Dallas County Bail Bond Bd v.
Mason, 773 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.App.
Dallas 1989).
This conflict may be explained by
comparing the present Penal Code
definition of the offense with the pre-
1974 Penal Code definition. Penal
Code 32.41 provides:
(a) A person commits an offense
if he issues or passes a check or
similar sight order for the pay-
ment of money knowing that the
issuer does not have sufficient
funds in or on deposit with the
bank or other drawee for the pay-
ment in full of the check or order
as well as all other checks or
orders outstanding at the time of
Since 1974, the only element the
State must prove is knowledge of
insufficient funds to cover the check.
Under the pre-1974 Penal Code,
however, the offense of passing a
worthless check required two ele-
ments: (1) intent to defraud; and (2)
knowledge of insufficient funds in the
bank to cover the check. Former arti-
cle 567b, Sec. 1, defined the offense:
It shall be unlawful for any person
or firm to make, draw, utter or
deliver, or to cause or direct the
making, drawing, uttering or
delivering, with intent to defraud,
any check, draft or order for the
payment of money on any bank,
person, firm or corporation know-
ing that the maker, drawer or
payor does not have sufficient
funds in or on deposit with such
bank, person, firm or corporation
for the payment in full of such
check, draft or order, as well as all
other outstanding checks, drafts
or others upon such funds than
ou tstand ing.
The authority of any recent cases
holding that "issuance of a bad check"
is a crime of moral turpitude is doubt-
ful because they rely upon language
from cases dealing with the pre-1974
Penal Code. The better view is that
"issuance of a bad check" under Penal
Code Section 32.41, is not a crime of
moral turpitude, unless the State can
show that the offense contained the
element of intent to defraud. See
Dallas County Bail Bond Bd v. Mason,
supra. The statute does not require an
intent to defraud, although it does
require knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds. Also, the Texas legislature
added subsection (g) to the statute,
which became effective June 18,
1987. Subsection (g) provides that
"[a]n offense under this section is not
a lesser included offense under section
31.03 [theft of property, ACI] or
31.04 [theft of services, ACI] of this
This view is consistent with U.S .
v. Livingston, 816 F.2d 184, 190 (5th
Cir. 1987), a case arising out of the
Southern District of Texas. In inter-
preting the Federal Rules of Criminal
Evidence, Rule 609(a)(2), the Fifth
Circuit said that a witness could not
be impeached with the offense of
issuance of a bad check unless it could
be shown that the offense involved
the element of intent to defraud.
Query: Is Misprision of a Felony
a crime of "Moral Turpitude"?
To the surprise of many, the
Supreme Court of Texas has held
recently that "misprision of a felony"
is not a crime of moral turpitude, per
se. Attorney James M. Duncan plead-
ed guilty to misprision of felony in
federal court, and he received a 4 year
probated sentence. Texas disciplinary
rules require the State Bar of Texas to
file a compulsory disciplinary suit in
cases involving intentional crimes
and moral turpitude. The Supreme
Court of Texas held that because a
conviction for misprision of a felony
"could conceivably be based upon an
attorney's refusal to divulge privileged
information, we hold that it does not
involve moral turpitude per se."
Duncan v. Board of Disciplinary
Appeals __ S.W.2d __ (Tex.
No. 94-0161, 1995).
The Duncan case illustrates that
one should never assume that an
offense is a crime of moral turpitude,
even if the offense sounds "ominous."
If the essence of moral turpitude's def-
inition is "fraud or larceny," you may
be able to challenge whether some
misdemeanors are properly classified
as involving "moral turpitude."
unknown decision
by the Supreme Court last
November has opened new
possibilities for attacking many
indictments through motions to
quash. The case is United States v.
X·Citement Video, Inc., U.S.
_, 115 S.Ct. 464,130 L.Ed.2d 372
(1994). The case is notorious because
of its topic, child pornography, but it
has great potential for strategic use in
a wide variety of applications unrelat-
ed to that sordid topic.
The case arose from a 1987 federal
investigation of the wholesale distrib·
ution of videotapes featuring an
"actress" named Traci Lords. It had
been reported that Ms. Lords alleged-
ly was less than 18 years old when she
performed sexual acts on film. A
police officer, posing as a retailer,
ordered a number of Traci Lords
videotapes from X-Citement Video,
Inc., a distributor.
The company and its president
were indicted and convicted under 18
U.s.c. §§ 2252(a)(1) and
2252(a)(2), a "child pornography"
statute. On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, that court reversed the con-
victions, holding that the statute vio-
lated the First Amendment due to the
statute's lack of a mens rea with
respect to the age of performers. The
Government's petition for writ of cer-
tiorari was granted.
The Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit. Much of the debate in
the Supreme Court focused on
whether the federal statute die in fact
require proof of knowledge as to a per-
former's age, with the Court ultimate-
ly holding that the intent of Congress
was to make a mens rea applicable to
that element. 115 S.Ct. at 472. The
interpretation of that obscure statute
itself was less significant than the
manner in which the Supreme Court
arrived at its conclusion. A central
part of the Supreme Court's rationale
was the declaration that there is a
presumption that a mens rea, or culpa-
ble mental state, "should apply to
each of the statutory elements which
criminalize otherwise innocent con-
duct." 115 S.Ct. at 469. The
Supreme Court specifically interpret-
ed the applicable statute as requiring
not merely an intentional or knowing
distribution of the material, but also
knowledge that a performer was under
18. X·Citement Video relied in part
on Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240,96 L.Ed. 288
(1952), which had recognized the
common law tradition of requiring
mens rea, but actually X·Citement
Video went beyond Mori.ssette by
explicitly requiring a mens rea as to
each element which contributed to
make conduct "criminal."
Sometimes the best signal of a
decision's potential impact is given by
the dissenters. Justices Scalia and
Thomas, dissenting, chastised the
majority for "convert[ing] the rule of
[statutory] interpretation into a rule
of law." 115 S.Ct. at 473. Although,
in my opinion, the Court bogged
down in an unpersuasive effort to dis-
tinguish child pornography from
child-molesting cases, where the
common law provided that no knowl-
edge of a victim's age was required,
that was more than offset by an
explicit holding that the statute at
issue would have fallen within the
broadest common-law category, for
"offenses against the state, person,
property, or public morals," where
mens rea is required as a general rule.
115 S.Ct. at 469. In other words, the
rule announced in X·Citement Video
applies more often than not. As a
bonus, the opinion further stated that
the severity of the punishment also
favored requiring mens rea as to each
element necessary to "criminalize"
conduct. The punishment deemed
sufficiently "severe" in X·Citement
Video provides a very low compara-
tive standard, and this additional rea-
son would seem to apply to any felony
case in Texas.
It  is important to recognize that
the rule expressed in X·Citement
Video effectively assigns a burden of
proof to the prosecution. The issue is
not one of "mistake of fact," in which
a defendant must go forward with
some evidence. Because the burden
of proving mens rea is on the State,
mens rea also must be pled properly.
The jury charge in turn must follow
the indictment. Thus X·Citement
Video is a double-barrelled weapon for
reversal, facilitating attacks both
before trial and at the charge stage.
Even better, in some cases the State
may be unable to meet its burden of
proof on the particularized mens rea
Few cases so far have interpreted
X·Citement Video, but two from the
Second Circuit are illuminating
because they split over the important
question whether X·Citement Video
only applies when the defendant's
conduct would not constitute a crime,
but for the element for which mens
rea is not pled. United States v.
LaPorta, 46 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 1994)
offered an affirmative answer to that
question, but the opposite view was
taken in United States v. Santerarrw,
45 F.3d 622 (2nd Cir. 1995), which
cited X·Citement Video in holding
that a mens rea requirement applies to
the aggravating factor of the use of a
firearm during a crime involving vio-
lence or drugs - activities that are
not "otherwise innocent," but from
the firearm.
Due to space limitations, I cannot
elaborate on every reason why I think
X·Citement Video extends to Texas
courts as part of Fourteenth
Amendment due process, but the rea-
sons include: (1) the fact that the
Supreme Court drew upon a long
common-law tradition of requiring
the prosecution to prove mens rea; (2)
an analogy to the "void for vagueness"
doctrine, as an established aspect of
due process, where a mens rea often
has been recognized as a factor saving
some statute from unconstitutionali-
ty; and (3)  the views of] ustices Scalia
and Thomas that the majority was
not just interpreting one federal
statute, but rather formulating a rule
of law.
Which Texas statutes are vulnera-
ble to an X·Citement Video motion
to quash 7  The answer depends in part
on the local prosecutor, as indict-
ments may vary from county to coun-
ty, and even from case to case in the
same county, but I think offenses ripe
for consideration fall into several
A. Special victim offenses. Some
Texas offenses make conduct
criminal, or make an "aggravated"
offense out of other criminal con-
duct, by virtue of some special
characteristic of the victim. Age
is one example, but by no means
the only one.
B. Special situs offenses. Closely
related to the special victim
offenses are what I call special
situs offenses, which make con-
duct illegal or "aggravated"
because the conduct occurs at a
special place. For example, an
indictment for Burglary of a
Habitation might read that a
defendant "intentionally and
knowingly entered a habitation
owned by [Complainant's name], ulatory offenses have in the past
without the consent of the been held to be strict liability
owner." An argument could be offenses, yet often a regulatory
made that the indictment must statute makes the distinction
allege that the defendant knew between "innocent" conduct and
the building entered was a habita- "criminal" conduct hinge on one
tion, and not just a building, and or two factors. X·Citement Video
that the opening allegation of suggests that some mens rea ought
"intentionally and knowingly" to apply to those critical factors.
was inadequate because it only
modified the term "entered." It is impossible to predict how many
C. Non-consent offenses. Many potential applications of X·Citement
offenses criminalize conduct by Video exist, but in Harris County there
virtue of the fact that the conduct are plenty of boilerplate indictments
takes place without the consent which are tempting targets.
of some affected person.
D. Regulator)' offenses. Some reg-
•  Education 
•  Employment 
•  Monthly meetings 
(continuing education) 
•  Networking 
Contact:  Sandra Warhol  (713/861-6163) 
All  attorneys  are  invited  to  start  the  holiday  season  by  treating 
themselves,  their  clients  and  friends  to  a  round  of  golf  at  the 
Sweetwater Country Club and  participate  in  a  live  auction with Judge 
Shelly  Hancock as  auctioneer. 
On Monday,  November  13,  the  Mental  Health  Association  is  spon-
soring  its  2nd  annual  Swing  Fore  Mental  Health  Golf 
Tournament which  will  be  held  at Sweetwater Country Club.  It's  a 
Florida  Scramble  with  a  shotgun  start  at  11  :00.  The  charity  tourna-
ment will  raise  funds  for  the  Mental  Health Association  to  prOVide  pro-
grams  and  services  for  persons  suffering  with  mental  illness. 
Hole  sponsorships  are  $1,000  which  includes  a  company  sign, 
plus  4  players.  The  individual  player fee  is  $150.  This  includes golf, 
box  lunch,  goodie  bag  and  hors  d' oeuvres  after  golf. 
To  round  out  the  day,  there  will  be  awards,  prizes  and  a  silent and 
live  auction  with Judge  Hancock.  Bill  Bosse  will  emcee. 
For  more  information  please  call  Dee  Taylor,  523-8963. 
Task  Description  Tape 
Tampering  Examination 
AFTI  (Applied  Forensic  Technologies  IntI.,  Inc.) 
President/C.E.O.  Forensic  Scientists  M.F.S.,  M. F.S.Q.D. 
hen an audio tape becomes
suspected of tampering, it
may be forwarded to a
qualified forensic audio specialist for
authentication. Examples of such
problems are: Credibility questions
relating to the tape recorder operator,
chain-of-custody contradictions, and
differences between the content of
the tape and testimonies of what was
said. Most often, though, a forensic
expert is contracted when the tape is
believed to have been altered or tam-
pered with. Due to the nature of the
allegat ions surrounding tampering
issues, the examiner requires specific
items from the patron. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation, for example,
has a list of required information
1. The original tape.
2. The tape records and related
components used to produce the
3. Written records of any dam-
age or maintenance done to the
recorders, accessories, and other sub-
mitted equipment.
4. A detailed statement from
the person or persons who made the
recording, describing exactly how it
was produced and the conditions that
existed at the time, such as:
a. Power source, such as port-
able generator or dry-cell batteries.
b. Input, such as telephone,
radio frequency transmitter/receiver,
miniature microphone, etc.
c. Environment, such as tele-
phone transmission line, restaurant,
apartment, etc.
d. Background noises, such as
television, radio, unrelated conversa-
tions, computer games, etc.
e. Foreground information, such
as number of individuals involved in
the conversation, general topics of
discussion, closeness to microphone,
f. Magnetic tape, such as grand,
format, when purchased, whether pre-
viously used.
g. Recorder operation, such as
number of times turned on and off in
the record mode, type of keyboard or
remote operations for all known
events, use of voice-activated fea-
tures, etc.
5. A typed transcript of the
entire recording or, if that is not avail-
able, transcriptions of the portions in
The items listed above are exam-
ples of what is required by a forensic
expert as he begins an examination of
questioned audio recordings.
Falsification  of  tapes 
A qualified forensic expert deter-
mines authentication by performing a
number of scientific tests which
detect evidence of tampering or falsi-
fication. Four basic types of tamper-
ing include:
1. Deletion - the elimination of
words or sounds by stopping the tape
and over-recording unwanted areas.
2. Obscuration - the mixing in
of sound of amplitude sufficient to
mask wave form patterns which origi-
nally would show stops and starts in
inappropriate places.
3. Transformation - the rear-
ranging of words to change content or
4. Synthesis - the adding of
words or sound by artificial means or
Eledromechanicallndications  of 
Such  Falsification  (Anomalies) 
Would  Indude: 
1. Gaps - segments in a record-
ing which represent unexplained
changes in content or context. A gap
can contain buzzing, humming, or
2. Transients - short, abrupt
sounds exemplified by clicks, pops,
etc. Transients may indicate tape
3. Fades - gradual loss of volume.
Fades can cause inaudibility and are
considered gaps when the recording
becomes fully inaudible.
4. Equipment Sounds are
inconsistencies of context cause by
the recording equipment itself.
Common equipment sounds include
hums, static, whistles, and varying
5. Extraneous Voices - are back-
ground voices which at times appear
to be near as the primary voices.
These can, at times, even block the
primary voices.
Methods  AFTI  Uses  to  Deted 
Falsifications  and  Authenticate 
Tape  Recordings 
A forensic expert is trained to corre-
late his observations of such anomalies
with machine functions to interpret
events in the following ways:
1. Critical listening: Use human
analytical capabilities to locate anom-
alies. The forensic sc ientist listens
with proper headphones to the original
tape using high quality analytical
equipment . He first performs a prelim-
inary overview of the original tape and
notes events including starts, stops,
speed fluctuations, and other varia-
tions requiring further investigation.
He then examines record events and
categorizes them as environmental or
non-environmental. After examining
abnormal recorded events, the expert
analyzes background sounds. He lis-
tens for abnormal changes, absences,
or presence in environmental sound.
The final phase of critical li stening is
an extensive audit of the foreground
information. He concentrates on voic-
es, conversation and other audible
sounds. Here anomalies include sud-
den changes in a person's voice, abrupt
unexplained topic change, or strong
foreground interruptions indicative of
obscuration. So the initial forensic
process of critical listening provides
foundation and direction for later
intensive tests.
2. Physical Inspection: The
forensic expert next inspects for tam-
pering with a thorough visual inspec-
tion of the tape itself. He inspects the
housing for pry marks, welding, size,
label and date consistent with alleged
recording date. He also measures the
tape and assures the splicing of mag-
netic tape to the leader is consistent
with normal manufacturing process.
Any other splices are notes as possible
alterati on.
3. Magnetic Development:
Direct visual observation of the mag-
netically "developed" tape is conduct-
ed to find track widths, the type of
recorder used, and the presence or
absence of residual speech signals.
4. Spectrum Analysis:
Specialized computer equipment and
programs to produce a visual interpre-
tation of frequency-versus-amplitude-
versus-time displays. This allows the
expert to view the entire spectrum or
to zoom in on an area of particular
interest thereby helping to character-
ize the acoustic quality of anomalies
and identify their source.
5. \Vaveform Analysis: A com-
puter generated display representing
time-versus-a mplitude of recorded
sounds in graphic form. With such
analysis the expert can sometimes
measure signal return time which
reveals how long a recorder record-to-
erase-head distances, determination of
the spacing between gaps in multiple-
gap erase heads, and inspection of the
signature shape and spacing of various
record event signals.
6. Recorder performance: vari-
ous electrical and mechanical mea-
surements of standard and modified
recorders for use in finding possible
origins of buzz sounds, hum, etc.
In order to submit sound recordings
as evidence in court proceedings, an
attorney must prove that the tape is
an authentic representation of the
conversation it is said to record. The
traditional method of establish ing
authenticity involves maintaining a
chain of custody which logs all per-
sons, times and, locati ons concerned
in the creation of the tape. However,
even if this procedure is strictly
observed, there may stil l be a chal-
lenge to the tapes authenticity.
The recording may contain incon-
sistencies suggest ive of tampering. In
such cases, an attorney may consult a
qua lifi ed forensic examiner to inspect
the tape. The examiner wou ld ini-
tially listen critically for signs such as
gaps, transients, fades, equipment
sounds or extraneous voices which
indicate tampering. Then he would
utili ze other methods li ke physical
anomalies. It is relatively easy to
change the content of a recording by
deleting words or sections; by obscur-
ing meaning with over-recorded
sounds; or by transforming context
through rearrangement of selected
phrases or by adding additional words
through synthesis. Nevertheless, falsi-
fications normally leave detectable
magnetic and waveform acoustic sig-
natures which can lead to forensic
individualization of the evidential
recorders and tapes.
AClient-Centered Trial Skills
Program For
Defenders and Assigned Counsel
Tuesday Evenings 6-8 p.m.
JANUARY 16 - MARCH 26, 1996
Harris County Courthouse
AProied of the
Center for Criminal Justice Advocacy
In Cooperation with the
Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association
The  intensive  10  week  learning  experience  is  designed  specifically  for 
providers  of  indigent  defense  representation  under  the  assigned  counsel 
system  utilized  in  Harris County,  Texas.  The Workshop offers skills  train-
ing  in  simulated  criminal  litigation  together  with  how-to-do-it  informa-
tion that will  prepare you  for  the challenges of criminal defense  practice. 
Key Benefits 
Teaching Methodology
•  learn new  techniques and  styles for 
A  well  tested  learning-by-doing 
criminal defense  specialists. 
teaching  method  emphasizing  exten-
•  Meet  others  who  will  become 
sive  participant  pelformance.  The 
resources  for  you  in  the  future. 
format will  be a small-group workshop 
utilizing a  workbook of simulated  liti -
•  Gain  confidence  through  on-the-
gation  problems  together  with  a  cus-
spot  improvement  in  your  court-
tom made  1300 page,  15  chapter how-
room  performance. 
to-do-it  manual,  Criminal Practice
•  Receive  personalized  feedback  in  a 
Sourcebook, a  Texas  lawyer's  Guide, 
supportive  small  group  workshop 
2nd  edition  (1995) .  Workshops  will 
include  presentations and  demonstra-
•  Use  a  tried  and  true  "learning  by  tions  by  the  faculty,  performance  of 
doing"  method.  exercises  by  the  enrollees,  group  dis-
cussions,  and  critiquing.  Active
•  Obtain  your  own  copy  of  the  new 
preparation  and  participation  are
Criminal Practice Sourcebook, 2nd 
Workshop Coordinator, Ray Moses
Telephone (713) 552-9534 FAX (713) 646-1766
How to Register
Complete the application form and 
return  with  your  check  (payable  to 
Harris  County  Criminal  lawyers 
Association)  to: 
HCClA  Workshop  Conference 
PO.  Box  66212 
Houston,  Texas  77266 
Enrollment is  limited.  To  reserve a 
slot,  register by November 15,1995. 
$300 for  members of HCClA 
$350 for  non-members 
Registration  cancellations  must  be 
received  in  writing  and  postmarked 
no  later than December 13,  1995.  For 
cancellation  purposes  only:  the  regis-
tration fee  will  be  refunded  subject to 
a  $30  administrative  charge.  After, 
December 13,  registration fees  are not 
Who Should Attend?
Attorneys  'who  represent  accused 
persons  in  criminal  proceedings  and 
are  willing  to  take  an  active  role  in 
improving their advocacy skills. 
Limited Enrollment
Enrollment is  limited  to 24  partici -
pants  on  a  first-come  first-served 
basis.  Register  now  to  reserve  your 
CLE Credits
This course will  receive  20 hours of 
MClR  credit  upon  approval  of  the 
MClE Committee. 
Is the Program Tax Deductible?
Costs  incurred  for  attending  legal 
seminars  (including  registration  fees, 
travel and meals)  which maintain and 
improve  professional  skills  required 
for  employment  are  tax  deductible. 
See  Treas.  Reg.  1.162-5:  IRS  letter 
Ruling  7746068  (9-1-77);  Coughlin v.
Comm'r, 203  F.2d  307. 
Week One 
Interviewing Clients and 
Witnesses and Client Counseling 
Week Two 
Introducing Tangible  Items  -
Talking and Walking Exhibits 
into Evidence 
Week Three 
Direct Examination 
Week Four 
Cross-Examination and 
Week  Five 
Expert Opinion Testimony 
Week  Six 
Week  Seven 
Jury  Deselection 
Week  Eight 
Opening Statement 
Jury  Argument 
Week  Nine 
Motion  to Suppress Evidence 
Week Ten 
Negotiation and Settlement 
(Plea  Bargaining),  Entry of a 
Plea, and  Ethics 
You  will be furnished with your 
own  copy  of  Moses,  Criminal
Practice Sourcebook - A  Texas
Lawyer's Guide, 2nd  edition,  a 
1300  page,  15  chapter,  post-
bound,  tabbed,  how-to-do-it 
manual  which  is  yours  to  keep  as 
part  of the  registration  cost.  You 
will  also  be  provided  with  a 
detailed  returnable  workbook, 
Assignments in Criminal Trial
Advocacy, which  includes  infor-
mation about each weeks  exercis-
es  including specific  topics,  prob-
lems,  times,  and faculty. 
Course Registration Form
Defender  Advocacy  Workshop 
Ten  Week Trial  Practice  Course 
January  16 - March  26,  1996 - Houston,  Texas 
The  course  will  be  conducted  in  a  courtroom  at  the  Harris  County 
Courthouse  in downtown  Houston.  Your  tuition  includes  the  workshop  regis-
tration  fee,  use  of  the  exercise  workbook  (Assignments  in  Criminal  Trial 
Advocacy), and your own personal copy of the Criminal Practice Sourcebook (2nd 
edition)  containing  1,300  pages  of how-to-do-it criminal  practice  materials. 
Defender Advocacy Workshop 
For  Office  Use  Only 
Tuition  enclosed: 
Rec. ___ 
o $300 for  members of HCCLA 
Bal. ________ 
o  $350 for  non-members 
Ck.  Amt. 
o  Please  send  me  an  application  for  membership  in  the  Harris  County 
Crimina l Lawyers Association 
o I cannot attend  the  workshop  but  would  like  information on  how  to  order 
Moses,  Criminal  Practice  Sourcebook  - A  Texas  Lawyer's  Guide,  2n.d  edi-
tion  (1995)  at $159.00,  tax  included. 
Return  completed  application  with  check  payable  to  the  Harris  County 
Criminal  Lawyers  Association  to: 
Workshop  Conference Office 
P.O.  Box  66212 
Houston, Texas  77266 
To  help  guarantee  a  slot,  register  by  November  15,  1995. 
Office Name  ________________________ 
Address  ___________________________ 
(No p.o. boxes, please)
City  State 
Zip  _  _______ 
Daytime  Phone  (__) _______  Fax  ( __) 
Trial Experience  Current Practice 
Number of criminal  jury  trials:  __  o ASSigned  counsel 
Felony:  __  o Private  counsel 
Misdemeanor:  Indicate  percentage  of  practice 
Number of civil  jury  trials:  _  _  devoted  to  indigent defense:  __% 
Year  started  practice:  __ 
Other trial  training programs  attended  in  last  three years:  ________ 
$10.00 per book 
plus shipping, handling, 
Wc·IH..... 1fl 
.. Traffk Citations" Traffic Warrants 
.. license  Suspensions  .. Occupational  licenses 
MOST TICKETS $65 Per  Violation 
sales tax 
Beryl P.  Crowley 
P.O.  Box  12487, 
Capital Station 
Austin, Texas  78711 




On  diskette 

in  Word  Perfect to: 

Allen  Isbell 

202  Travis,  #208 

Houston,  TX  77002 
,  . 


Legal  Assistant 
in  search  of  employment. 
Jeffrey V.  Strickland 
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'Certified  Bail  Agent  in  Hauston  Since  1936  Past  President 
of Professional  Bail  Agents  of U.S.  of Harris Co.  &  of Texas 
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The HCCLA is a non-
profit, tax exempt,
professional Association
made up oflawyers from
Harris County, Texas, who
are working to promote
excellence and high ideals in
the practiceofCriminal
Any lawyer in good
standing with the State Bar
ofTexas, who is endorsed
by a member of
HCCLA is eligible to join.
The endorsement recom-
mends the applicant as a
person ofprofessional
competency, integrity and
good moral character who is
actively engaged in the
defense ofcriminal cases.
Rd<rrals Ihrough our LaWY<f Rderral S<r-
vi"" and Ihrough our mcmbcnhip direc-
HCCLA publications including DOCKET
CALL. a monthly ncwslClt<f summarizing
significant decisions of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals and Texas Courts ofAp-
pcaIs and topics ofIocaJ int<fest 10 thc
criminal dcf cru.c bar.
Regular Monthly Luncheon gcn<ral
membership meetings featuring speakcrs
on subjCC15 oftopical intcresl.
Provides a responsivc local forum for
lawyers actively engaged in thc practicc
ofcriminal law.
Opposes legislation and local rules which
infringc on individual rights prOl<Cted by
constitutional guarantees.
Promotes a productivc cxchangcofideas
and encourages better communication
with prosecutors and thc judiciary.
Provides continuing legal educalion pro-
grams for improving advocacy skills and
Promotes a just application ofthc Court
appointed lawycr syst<fO for indigent per-
sonscharged with a criminal offense.
Amicus CUriac Bricfs wh<fc ap-
Particip.. :ue and exchange Inronnallon anJ
skiU in our CLE programs
Conlribule to our Brief Bank S<mce.
P<fform agre<d Pro Bono «rvices.
ilring to Ih< Associalion's allencion proper
in the praclic< which meril
response and action.
Sharc in the commarad<ri< at our monlhly
luncheons and annual social  
Takc c.alJs on our Rd<rral S<rvic<:.
Professional Organizations in which your are a member in good
Admess: _____________________________
Haveyouever beendisbarredordisciplined by anybarassociation
orareyouthesubjectofdisciplinaryaction now pendinl>g_______
FIITIl Name:
ForRegularMembershipenclose$125.00annual fee.
DateadmittedtoBar: LawSChool _______________
Date, Degree from Law Schoo,-I_______________________
Newly Licensed(firstyear) Membership$50.00.
(Expected graduation c1ate______
date signature ofapplicant
__ Advisory
__ Honorary EndorsementonreversemustbesignedbyHCCLAMEMBER IN
I. a member in good standing of HCCLA believe this applicant to be a person of professional competency, integrtty and good
moral character. The applicant is actively engaged in the defense ofcriminal cases.
Harris County Criminal
Lawyers Association
signature ofmemtxr
P.O. Box '12773
Houston, Texas 77027
·500 SQ.  FT.  TO 60,000 SQ.  FT. 
• 6,000 SQ.  FT.  FLOORS 
405 Main Street,  Suite 300 
Houston, Texas 77002 
Robert H.  Cranshaw, Jr. 
Phone: 713-223-4550 
Fax:  713-223-4559 

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