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Ro.:. 315 Houston, El iade W. Alabama TX #107 77006 DOC(ETLALL November/December 1995 A Publication
Ro.:. 315 Houston, El iade W. Alabama TX #107 77006 DOC(ETLALL November/December 1995 A Publication

Ro.:.

315

Houston,

El iade

W.

Alabama

TX

#107

77006

DOC(ETLALL

November/December 1995

A Publication of Harris County Crim inal Lawyers Association

WELCOME TO THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION CODE

1995 A Publication of Harris County Crim inal Lawyers Association WELCOME TO THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION CODE
Burns Bail Bonds 7~~eued~4Ueee 1971 224-0305 • Free D.W.I. video with any D.W.I. bond •

Burns Bail Bonds

7~~eued~4Ueee 1971

224-0305

• Free D.W.I. video with any D.W.I. bond

• Our bilingual staff provides prompt, courteous service with over half a century of bonding experience

• Terms Available

• Open 24 Hours

• Conveniently located across from city jail

• Serving all courts in Harris County, with statewide and national affiliates

Carol Burns, John Bums, and Chris Freyer

609 Houston Ave.

Across from City Jail

Lie. #74346

DOCKET CALL

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1995

HCClA cers & Directors 1995-1996 President .George Parnh am President-Elect Garland D. Mcinnis

HCClA

cers & Directors

1995-1996

President

.George Parnham

President-Elect

Garland D. Mcinnis

Vice-President

Mark A. Goldberg

Treasurer

.Loren A. Detamore

. Immediate Past President . Chairman of the Board Directors:

Secretary

J udi th Mart in Prince Jim Skelton Lloyd W. Oliver

Joseph W Varela Ted R. Doebbler Tanya L. Ell ioll Danny Easterling Ric hard Tre va than Joseph Salhab Clyde Williams W.B . "Bennie" House Jr

Paul S. John John E. Crow Harry A . Loftus, Jr. Jonathan Munier Will Outlaw Moses M. Sanchez Winston E. Cochran, Jr.

,.

 

Past-Presidents

 

1971-1995

C.

Anthony Friloux

(1972-1973)

Stuart Kinard

 

(1973-1974)

George Luquene

(1974-1975)

Marvin 0

Te ague

(1975-1976)

Dick DeGuerin

(1976-1977)

W.

B . " Be nnie" H ouse, Jr.

(1977-1978)

David R. Bires

 

(1978-1979)

Woody Densen

(1979-1980)

Will Gray

(1980-198 1)

Edward A. Mallen

( 1981-1982)

Carolyn Garcia

(1982- 1983)

Jack B. Zimmermann

(1983-1984)

Clyde Williams

(1984-1985)

Robert Pelton

( 1985-1986)

Candelario El

izondo

(1986-1987)

Allen C. Isbell

(1987-1988)

David Mitcham

(1988- 1989)

(1989-1990)

Jim E. La vi ne

(1990-1991)

Rick Brass Mary E. Conn

(1991-1992)

Kent A.

Schaffer

(1992-1993)

Dan Cogdell

(1993-1994)

Jim Skelton

(1994 -1995)

President's Club David Cunningham Kent A . Schaffer

 

Docket

Call

Editor . Associate Editor Design & Production

.

.Allen C. Isbell Robert Pelton .Donna K. Kleszcz

ADVERTISING RATES

Full Page

112

114

Business card size

Page

Page

$300.00

$150.00

$75.00

$3750

Distribution 500 copies per issue Articles and other edi­ torial contributions sho uld be sent to the Editor, 202 Travis . Suite 208. Houston 77002 or the Association office at 405 Main St. 303, Houston 77002 Telephone

(713) 227-2404.

DOCKET CALL

September/October 1995

Contents

'f'

From the

President

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2

Opinions

of the First & Fourteenth Courts

of Appeals

 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:3

Attacking an Information Alleging D.W.I for Failure to Allege a Culpable Mental State

 

.5

Welcome to the Texas Transportation Code

 

.7

They Call Them T.R.A.P. for a Reason

9

Hearsay

10

A

Note on Mock Jurie s in a Child Sex Case

11

What is a Crime Involving "Moral Turpitude"?

.12

An X-Citing New Vehicle for Attacking Indictments

.14

Task Description Tape Tampering Examination

16

LET'S HEAR FROM YOU!

"It is a goo d canvas on which some strokes only want retouching." -Thomas Jeffe

"It is a good canvas on which some strokes only want retouching."

-Thomas Jeffe rsoll, July 31, J788 all tile Constitution.

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

November 9, 1995 December 14, 1995

Janu ar y 16 ­ March 26, 19 96

WEDNESDAY APPELLATE UPDATES

301 San Jacinto

J2 :00 noon, 177th District Cou rt 0 1:00 MC LE

HCCLA Board Meeting, Thursday noon , Scanlan Bldg.,

405 Main, 2nd floor conference

Defender Advocacy Workshop A Client-Centered Trial Skills Program fo r Defenders and Assigned Counsel

Tuesday Eve nin gs 6-8 pm , Harris County Courthouse,

30 I Fannin .

Ray Moses, Work shop Coord in a to r 552-9534 .

I Fannin . Ray Moses, Work shop Coord in a to r 552-9534 . . (

.

(

" Reasonab le doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is that state of the case which. after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence. leaves the minds

of the jurors in that condi tio n that they cann ot say they feel an abiding conviction

to a moral certainty.

of the truth of the charge ."

-Walker. Edwi" R. , in

Sta l e V. Lillker

et al.

94 N.J.L. 411, 4 17 (1 920), I Jl A. 35.37.

~om the .5l?resident

BY GEORGE PARNHAM

THE HARRIS COUNTY CRIMINAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION

ITS BIRTH, ITS MISSION AND ITS CHALLENGE

A t the State Bar Convention in San Antonio in the summer of 1970, a small group of attorneys

gathered to discuss the state of the crimi­ nal defense bar and its relationship to the criminal justice system. Concerns rang­ ing from the status of criminal lawyers as viewed by the public to the quality of client representation were expressed. Of paramount importance, however, was the necessity of the defenders of individual liberties to unite in an effort to stop the rapid erosion of fundamental rights guar­ anteed to each of LIS by our constitution ­ al heritage. On that date, in San Antonio, the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association was born. On May 27, 1971, Percy Foreman, a Charter Member of the new organization, told the first gathering of members and their b ()uests that "historic things we have always accepted as remedies against the Crown are now being challenged by administrative edict." He asked that the lawyers for th e defense stand up and be counted as an effective voice to help stop the perilous declin e.

same

to

accomplishment is "land-mined" with

attitudes that existed in 1970, but clearly not to the degree that exists this day. It is our duty, indeed Our calling, as defense lawyers to protect against the daily diminishing of our individual rights and

For if we don't, who is Left that

will? As defense lawyers, we are beset by challenges both from within and without our system. Some will be forever there _ the very reason for Our existence. Some, unfortunately, are there as a result of our own doing. Those can and must be addressed and rectified for us to be more effective in the representation of our clients. For instance, I venture that the value of our representation and ultimate

objectives

Today

remain.

those

noble

the

However,

today

path

liberties.

input into the criminal justice system can be enhanced by an initial intro spective critique of our own everyday perfor­ mances at the courthou se . I'm convinced that members of the defense bar will always be the permanent occupants of the lowest rung on the legal ladder as seen through the eyes of those, both lay and professional, who have cho­ sen other directions for th ei r life's work. But this is of no bother. We know who we are and know what we do. The value of our service can be measured by the simple "midnight phone call" from the colleague or friend heretofore untainted by the criminal law and who now desper­ ately needs our he lp. We, as defense lawyers, are also chal­ lenged by socially popular but equally dangerous threats from a well meaning yet unsuspecting society. Demands for the diminution of constitutional rights by over-zealous exponents of the war on drugs should sound as a battle cry to all of us as defenders. Various "victim rights groups" all too often unwittingly cast dis­ persions on our efforts in representing the accused. And we are battling the "0.]. Simpson syndrome", i.e., the public per­ ception of criminal lawyers as tricksters and charlatans, which simply reinforces the street belief that mon ey buys justice. Civil liberties are exposed to the knife of the financial budget cutters and political reactionaries. Even the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus is under serious attack as a resu It of the anti-terrorism legislation in wake of the Oklahoma City bombing. We can not stand idly by and let citi­ zens' rights be weakened by over-reactive jurors within our society. We must take a vigorous stand to keep our constitutional guarantees in place and answer with an effective, un ified voice. Perhaps our Association has drifted from its original tenets expressed some 25 years ago, but make no mistake, we have

expressed some 25 years ago, but make no mistake, we have the will and the strength

the will and the strength to answer these challenges. It is understood that all of us in the defense bar do our job every day and each of us has our ow n method of practice that best defends the interests of our individ­ Llal clients. This is well and good. But to make an overall impact, think how greater the impac t could be if we collec­ tively voiced the needs of our clients and our concerns for client's rights to the very system within which we operate. There can be no substitute for this kind of expressed will. The blueprint exists. We have only to look back to May 27, 1971, when the words Percy Foreman spoke were heard by a packed house that included a Justice of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 70% of the judges of the criminal district courts and their families, 100% of the Harris County Juvenile judiciary, and 100% of the County Criminal Courts at Law judges and their families, as well as numerous criminal defense practitioners. On that date, Mr. Foreman called for "a new awareness by both the bench and bar to immediately reverse what (he) foresaw as a move away from the Judicial and an administrative evolution of progress and the protection of fundamental Constitutional rights which began with

the Magna Carta

the same; the demand for it to be received still exists - the package within which it's sent just needs to be dusted off and spruced up a bit.

" Today the message is

© Copyright 1995 by Legal Education Press, Houston, Texas.

OPINIONS OF THE FIRST &FOURTEENTH COURTS OF APPEALS

By HENRY L. BURKHOLDER

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS

State v.

Romero, Cause

No.

01-94­

1219-Cr

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

AND

FOR­

FEITURES.

ONE MORE CASE.

H ere they took the defendant's

dope, the defendant's truck,

the defendant's cash, and the

defendant. (Spouse and family dog apparently left alone.) Defendant enters into an agreed forfeiture judg­ ment on truck and cash. Now claims double jeopardy for prosecution on dope possession. There are THREE theories floating around on this type of double jeop­ ardy issue: (1) It is NEVER double

jeopardy to forfeit and then prose­ cute; (2) It is ALWAYS double jeop­ ardy to forfeit and then prosecute; and (3) It is SOMETIMES double jeopardy to forfeit and then prose­ cute. This Court takes approach #3, and says that when the value of money and property seized outweighs the costs of prosecution, then the forfei­ ture is PUNITIVE, as in punishment, which means that the defendant has been punished, which means that a subsequent prosecution would be double punishment, which is another name for DOUBLE JEOPARDY. The Court of Criminal Appeals

has this issue before them right now. The Court will probably find the costs of prosecution theory of deter­ mining double jeopardy unworkable. How do you calculate the costs of a drug bust! Cost of each cop per hour? Court time included? Snitch pay-off money included? The specter of legions of accountants (on both sides, of course) battling out the bucks, is enough to make the mind boggle. WHAT TO WATCH FOR:

Buried in this opinion, but not decid­ ed, is the question of whether an AGREED civil judgment of forfeiture implicitly waives the double jeopardy issue.

Ex parte lamail, Cause No. 01-94­

1214-Cr

JUICY ISSUES ON THE (NON)RIGHT TO COUNSEL BEFORE DECIDING TO TAKE THE BREATH TEST. By now, all but the most die hard OWl advocates recognize: (1) there is no 6th Amendment constitutional right to counsel after arrest, and before formal criminal charges are filed, when the cops ask you: "Do you want to take the breath test?"; (2) there is no 5th Amendment constitu­ tional right (i.e. Miranda) to counsel when asked this question; (3) your refusal to submit to a breath or blood test IS admissible against you; and (4) the fact that you decided not to sub­

you; and (4) the fact that you decided not to sub­ mit to a breath or

mit to a breath or blood test because you could not consult with counsel is irrelevant. Where do we go from here? This opinion reaffirms the earlier line of cases stating the above law.

HOWEVER:

is screaming that he wants an attor­ ney IS NOT ADMISSIBLE and is deemed HIGHLY prejudicial. The State is entitled to introduce testimo­ ny that your client refused to submit to a blood or breath test, but just keep this separate from the client's thought processes concerning counsel.

the fact that your client

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS

Ivie v. State, Cause No. 14-93-1128­ Cr UNINTENTIONAL USE OR EXHIBITION OF A DEADLY WEAPON IS USE OR EXHIBI­ TION OF THAT DEADLY WEAPON. As you know, the use or exhibition of deadly weapon screws up real good the defendant's good conduct time toward parole something. Can you unintentionally use or exhibit a dead­ ly weapon during the commission of a reckless type offense, say Involuntary Manslaughter. This Court says: YES. Use or exhibition of the deadly

Opinions of the First & Fourteenth Courts

- CONTINUED FROM PAGE 3

weapon need only be during the offense, never intentional.

State v. Hart, Cause No. 14-94-393­ Cr STATE GETS GRANTED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL SET ASIDE. This is an interesting situation where after trial, the defendant's motion for new trial is granted. The State exercised its notice of appeal powers, and got a new trial. Moral of story: Do not file a BS MNT and expect to get away with it.

Washington v. State, Cause No . 14­

93-342-Cr

DO NOT LET FIELD TEST RESULTS INTO EVIDENCE. NO . NO.NO . This was a prosecution for the unlawful disposal of cocaine in the presence of a peace officer, i.e., toss­ ing the crack away as THE MAN approached. What is disturbing about this case has nothing to do with the Court of Appeals rulings, but is buried deep in the facts of the case. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court of Appeals notes that the positive result from the offi­ cer's field test of the dope was SOME EVIDENCE to support the convic­ tion . No police officer is competent to interpret the results of a dope field test. Only a chemist is. This is the

same as the administering cop in a breath test case. He can say what he did, and what the machine printed out, but only a chemist can interpret the results. DO NOT LET A NARC COP SAY THAT HIS LITTLE TEST TUBE TOLD HIM THAT THE ROCK WAS COCAINE. Objection on (1) hearsay grounds (make the test tube come in and testify); (2) that the cop was not shown to be a qualified expert; and (3) that the cop is not competent to INTERPRET the resu Its. With your help, I will get one reversed on this principle of law someday.

BRIAN W. WICE

one reversed on this principle of law someday. BRIAN W. WICE B rian w. Wice was

B rian w. Wice was recently appointed to a two-year term as an associate municipal court judge for the City of Houston .

Wice is a 1979 graduate of the University of Houston Law Center and a former briefing attorney to Judge Sam Houston Clinton of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. A member of the College of the State Bar of Texas, and a frequent faculty member at contin­ uing legal education seminars, Wice devotes his practice to criminal appeals and post-convic­ tion writ matters in state and federal cOurt.

New Members Welcome!

Name

Sponsor

Dean M. Blumrosen Ted R. Doebbler Mark W. Bennett Jacquelin Ann Kramer

 

Lloyd Oliver

Lloyd Oliver

Joseph J. LaBella Willie P. Loston

Rick Brass

Glenn J. Youngblood Norman]. Silverman R. Yvonne Burton Cassandra Y. Hollemon Gilbert Corrigan

J. Scott Bell Sunny Leigh Kapungu

Lloyd Oliver

Lloyd Oliver

Garland Mcinnis

Will Outlaw

Daniel Corrigan Allen C. Isbe ll

Lloyd Oliver

Martin D. Mayne Graydon Wilson Charles H. Portz Stavis Gilbreath

 

Edward Mallett

Richard Haynes

Moe Sanchez

Moe Sanchez

D. Jennings Bryant, Jr. Ramon J. Villagomez

Lloyd Oliver

Moe Sanchez

Arnold S. Cohn Alain G. Harvey Michael Nassif

Lloyd Oliver

Walter Boyd

Lloyd Oliver

Attacking an Information Alleging D. W.I. for Failure to Allege a Culpable Mental State

[Editor's note: Jim Steele says that

informations alleging

Texas Penal Code, §49.04 may be defective until the recent amendment which clearly dispenses with a culpable mental state. Jim says he is indebted to Michael Mapes for the legal memoran­ dum accompanying his motion.}

under

D.

W. I . 's

[STYLE OF CASE]

MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE INFORMATION

COMES

Defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause, and files this Motion to Set Aside The Information, based on the following:

NOW,

I.

Defendant is charged with the offense of Driving While Intoxicated.

II.

The Information is defective because it fails to allege a culpable mental state.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CON­ SIDERED, Defendant prays the Court grant this motion and set aside the Information presented in this cause.

Respectfully submitted,

[Attorney for Defendant]

CAUSE NO.

[STYLE OF CASE]

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE INFORMATION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, [Defendant] in the above entitled and numbered cause, by and through his attorney of record, [Attorney], and files this memoran­ dum of law in support of his Motion to Set Aside the Information.

1.

Defendant is charged by Information with the offense of Driving While Intoxicated under

Chapter 49.04 of the Texas Penal Code, effective September 1, 1994. Chapter 49.04 defines the offense of Driving While Intoxicated:

A person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while driving or operating a motor vehicle in a public . place. The statute does not state a culpa­ ble state.

II.

Texas Penal Code, §6.02(a), enti­

tled

Requirement

of

Culpability,

states "Except as provided in Subsection (b) of this section. A person does not ·

commit an offense unless he inten­ tionally, knowingly, recklessly or with

criminal negligence engages in con­ duct as the definition o f the offense requires" (emphasIs add ed). Further, §6.02 (b) states: . "If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless. the definition plainly dis­ penses with any mental element" (emphasis added).

The Driving While Intoxicated statute does not dispense with a cul­ pable mental state, therefore the State must allege that the Defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly committed the alleged offense. In the instant case, the

Information fails to state an offense because it fails to allege any mental element as required by the Texas

Penal Code , §6.02.

III.

This case involves ,3 fundamental concept of crimina'! law. To consti­ tute a crime, the act or actus reas must be accompanied by a criminal mind or mens rea. The United States Supreme Court explained this con­

cept in Morissette v. United States,

342 U.S. 246, 250-252, 72 S.Ct. 240, 243-244,96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).

It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief ir 'ee­ dom of the human will and a conse­ quent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good

and evil

this doctrine by English common law

Unqualified acceptance of

Attacking An Information

- CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

in the Eighteenth Century was indi­ cated by Blackstone's sweeping state­ ment that to constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious will" Our legislature recognized this fun­ damental concept by enacting §6.02 and four separate culpable mental states in §6.03 Tex. Penal Code Ann

§6.02 & §6.03 .

IV.

The Texas Appellate Courts have long held that §6.02 applies to all provisions within the Penal Code. For example, when the former statute prohibiting criminal trespass, Article 1377(c), c.c.p 1925, as amended in 1971, was incorporated into the "new" Penal Code in 1973, legislators neglected to prescribe a culpable mental state. See Texas Penal Code Ann §30.05 (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1994). However, pursuant to §6.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that "criminal responsibility for a trespass offense must be established by proof of either intent, knowledge, or recklessness." Hollotvay v. State, 583 S.W.2d 376 (Tex.Crim.App.

1979), Langston v. State, 855 S.W.2d

718 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). The situation at bar is analogous to the criminal trespass statute, in that when the Driving While Intoxicated Statue was incorporated into the new Penal Code effective September 1, 1994, the legislature neglected to pre­ scribe a culpable mental state. If the legislature intended the Driving While Intoxicated statute to be a "per se" offense, they would have plainly dispensed with a culpable mental state as required by §6.02(b). The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this issue when deciding which element of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle required culpability. The Court decided that to hold a per­ son criminally responsible for know­

ingly operating a motor vehicle," without knowing it was without the owners effective consent would make the statute a "strict liability offense,"

Tex.Penal Code Ann. §32.31, "does

not prescribe one of the culpable mental states. Since the statue does not indicate that the intent was to make this a strict liability offense, §6.2(b) and (c) require the conduct

be done either intentionally, know­ ingly, or recklessly and one or more of these culpable mental states must be alleged in the indictment" Baldwin v.

states must be alleged in the indictment" Baldwin v. When were the "Good Old Days?" BY

When were the "Good Old Days?"

BY ZENAS ABOGADO

W hen there is a large turn­ over in the judiciary, alarms are sounded among

the defense bar regarding the predis­ 112 position of the new judges toward A valuable tenets in criminal law. We tend to fear that new judges today are less inclined toward giving an accused

State

538

S.W.2d

109,

(Tex.Crim.App.

1976)

(Carrying

Weapon).

V.

The Texas Legislature recognized

its error and rectified it by enacting

Penal Code, Section 49 .11,

"Proof of Mental State Unnecessary," which became effec­ tive on September 1, 1995. Section 49.11, reads as follows:

Texas

"Notwithstanding Section 6.02(b), proof of a culpable men­ tal state is not required for con­

viction of an offense under this chapter."

The Federal Courts have held that it violates the Due Process provisions of the Federal and Texas Constitutions to provide for criminal responsibility without requiring a cul­ pable mental state. Harper v. Lindsay, 454 FSupp. 597 (1978).

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CON­ SIDERED, the Defendant Prays this Court grant Defendant's Motion To Set Aside The Information for its fail­ ure to provide an essential element of the offense of Driving While Intoxicated, namely, that the Information fails to allege a culpable mental state.

Respectfully submitted,

citizen a fail trial and to protect his

rights under the federal and State constitutions than in previous times. If one peruses some of the old case law, however, one disabuses oneself of any thoughts of "the good old days." On their worst days, the new judges cannot be as bad as one our forefa­ thers in the defense bar confronted. For example, the trial judge in

Chapman

v.

State, 57 S.W. 965

(Tex.Crim.App. 1900), delivered a lecture to the petit jurors, in the absence of the defendant, in which he severely criticized the law of self­ defense and the doctrine of reason­ able doubt, both of which he held up to ridicule and contempt. The defen­ dant was tried for murder and self­ defense was an issue! The trial judge in Waters v. State, 241 S.W. 496 (Tex.Crim.App. 1922), remarked to the panel of jurors that the suspended sentence law would be repealed if juries made it a vehicle to turn real criminals loose, that it was intended to apply to young men and first offenders and those who acciden­ tally got in trouble. Our predecessors in the defense bar would laugh at our concerns. Maybe there were not any "good old days" in the practice of criminal law.

(Attorney for Defendant]

in the practice of criminal law. (Attorney for Defendant] 6 D O C K E T
WELCOME TO THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION CODE By ELIZABETH RUTKOWSKI, PARALEGAL that" tionallicense is valid until

WELCOME TO THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION CODE

By ELIZABETH RUTKOWSKI, PARALEGAL

that"

tionallicense is valid until the end of the period of suspension of the per­ son's regular drivers license." The

four-hour restnctlon has been removed from the statute and the only time limitation is that a person may not drive for more than 12 hours in any 24-hour period. Subchapter 0, TRC, §521.341­ §521.347, Automatic Suspensions, imposes an automatic license suspen­ sion of an adult or person under 21 years of age upon conviction for cer­ tain offenses, including, but not limit­ ed to, OWl; Intoxication Assault, if the person had alcohol in his or her system; Criminally Negligent Homi­ cide, if a person was operating a motor vehicle at the time; and Accident Involving Injury (leaving the scene or obstructing traffic at the scene of an accident involving personal injury or death, §550.021, TRC). §521.344, Suspension for Offenses Related to Use of Alcohol, is impor­ tant to any attorney who pleads a client guilty to OWL This section includes information on when the license suspension begins (from the date of conviction to 30 days after the date of conviction as set by the judge), and the periods of suspension

an order granting an occupa­

(90 days to

complete the alcohol education class. Subchapter P, §521.371-§521.377, Automatic Suspension for Certain

Felony Drug Offenses concerns auto­ matic license suspensions upon final conviction of an offense under the Controlled Substance Act; a drug offense or a felony under Chapter 481 Health and Safety Code, that is not a drug offense; or an offense under 49.04, 49.07 or 49.08, Penal Code, which was committed with a con­ trolled substance in the body. A sus­ pension generally under this statute is for 180 days. DPS may impose anoth­ er 180 day denial period after the per­ son applies for reinstatement. Furthermore DPS may not reinstate a license of a person whose license is under suspension at the time of con­ viction for a second offense under this chapter. This subchapter includes the offenses, periods of suspension and/or denial, and reinstatement require­ ments. Subchapter S, §521.451-§521,460 TRC, Miscellaneous Offenses, is comprised of a variety offenses, mostly Class C misdemeanors, that include a license suspension as part of the pun­ ishment. Among the various offenses in this subsection is a new one called Driving While License Invalid, §521.457, TRC. Driving while License Invalid is a OWLS for driving while license suspended under §524, TRC, failure of a breath test; or §724, TRC, refusal of a breath test; or 42.12 Code of Crim. Proc., failure to com­ plete an alcohol education course. The range of punishment is $100­ $500 and/or 72 hours to 6 months in jail. A OWL! can be enhanced to a Class A misdemeanor. No additional suspension period is imposed upon a final conviction under this statute. There is an affirmative defense of no notice if the license is suspended under §524 or §724, TRC.

O n September 1, 1995, the Texas Transportation Code became effective. The

Transportation Code (TRC) is a com­ pilation of recodified and/or amended Civil Statutes and new statutes relat­ ing to the motOr vehicle law of Texas. Much of the TRC you may never need but, Chapters 521, 522, 524, 601, and 724 will soon become part of your criminal law practice. The following information is a compendium of Chapters 521, 522, 524, 601, and 724 of the Trans­ portation Code. Welcome to the Transportation Code is intended to introduce you to some statutes in the Transportation Code that may affect your clients and to provide you with citations for easy access to the new law. A complete discussion of each Chapter is beyond the scope "of this article.

CHAPTER S21

§521 should be titled "Fifty ways to Lose your License and to Keep on Driving." It includes, among other things, suspensions for habitual viola­ tors, §521.295; suspensions for indi­ viduals under 21 years of age; auto­ matic license suspensions; the suspen­ sion compact throughout the United States and Canada, §521.299; and occupational licenses. Occupational license information is located in Subchapter L, TRC, §521.241-§521.253. This section addresses the petition, the order, the requirements the judge may impose and the driving time restrictions DPS

may impose. §521.248 now states . additional two years if a person fails to

for a first offense, or 180 days to 2 years if enhanced under 49.09, Penal Code). It does not allow DPS to sus­ pend the license of a first offender who successfully completes an alcohol education class. Furthermore, §521.344 obliges DPS to notify a per­ son of his or her right to a suspension hearing before suspending the per­ son's driving privilege for failure to complete an alcohol education course required under 42.12 Code of Crim. Proc. The statute authorizes DPS to deny a person a drivers license an

1 year as set by the judge

Texas Transportation Code

- CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7

Other offenses in this section include Refusing to Surrender a Suspended or Revoked License or Title; Displaying or Having a Possession a License or Certificate that is Fictitious, Cancelled, Suspended or Revoked; Possessing More Than One License; and Making a False Statement in an application for a Texas Driver's License. The sus­ pension period is set by the court from 90 days to 1 year. If the court does not set the suspension period DPS will automatically suspend the license for one year, 521.346, TRC.

CHAPTER 522

This Chapter is dedicated to com­ mercial drivers' licenses and commer­ cial drivers. §522.001-§522.l06 cov­ ers everything from obtaining a com­ mercial license to losing it. See Subchapter 1 for Driving While

Alcohol, Controlled Substance, or Drug

in System and §523 .005 for the Effect of Conviction on a Commercial License. Commercial drivers can be charged under Subchapter G, §521.071, TRC,

Driving while Disqualified Prohibited, if

arrested during the course and scope of employment.

CHAPTERS 524 AND 724

Both §524 and §724 involve ALR license suspensions for failure of a breath test and refusal of a breath test respectively. However, §724.001­ §721.035, Subchapter B pertains to the taking and analysis of breath and/or blood specimens, which may affect both refusals and failures. §724.015 lists the officer's obligation to inform a person orally and in writ­ ing of the consequences of refusal and failure of a breath test. The periods of suspension remain the same 60 days for failure, first offense and 90 days for refusal, first offense. For persons under 21 years of age and commercial drivers arrested during the course and scope of employment the period of suspension is one year. §524, TRC , outlines everything

from the officer's duty to give notice

of suspension to the defendant to the defendant's right to appeal. There are a few changes from the law as it exist­ ed before September 1, 1995. For example, §524.038(d) still allows a defendant to subpoena the breath test technical supervisor to the ALR Hearing and to object to an affidavit

submitted by

supervisor if the technical supervisor does not appear. However, upon showing of good cause why the super­ visor cannot show, DPS can not enter an affidavit from that person into evi­ dence. §524.021 states that the suspension takes effect of the 40th day after notice of suspension is received or presumed to be received §524.031 requires the person to request a hear­ ing no later than the 15th day from the date notice is received and §524.032 states that the hearing be held no earlier than 11 days after the day the hearing date is requested. An administrative hearing for either a suspension under §524 or §724 is governed by §524.040­ §524.044. See both §524.035 and §724.042 for the issues at the hearing pertinent to each type of suspension.

CHAPTER 601 THE TEXAS MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT

If you have ever wondered where DPS has its rules, regulations, safety responsibility requirements, reinstate­ ment procedures, and power to sus­ pend, this is it. Subchapters K and L will be the most useful to criminal attorneys. Subchapter K, §601.331­ §601-342, outlines who must file proof of financial responsibility (an SR-22). Subchapter L, §601-371,

Operation of a Motor Vehicle in Violation of Suspension; Offense, is a

OWLS for person whose licenses are suspended for an accident with no insurance, a judgment following an accident with no insurance or for multiple no insurance tickets. Additionally, if a person's vehicle reg­ istration is also under suspension and that person allows his or her vehicle

the brea th test technical

to be operated on a public highway during the suspension period it is an offense. The range of punishment is the same as for Driving while License Invalid, §521.457; and it can be enhanced to a Class A Misdemeanor with any conviction, probated or final, that involved an operation of a motor vehicle after August 31, 1987. There is an affirmative defense to prosecution of no notice. Presently, the Transportation Code is ava ilable in session law at the County Law Library or in the Gould's

Publication of the Texas Criminal Law and Motor Vehicle Handbook 1995­

1996 Edition.

[Elizabeth Rutkowski has been a para­ legal in criminal law since 1988 . In February 1995 , she wrote and distributed the ALR Survival Guide . During her research while writing the Guide, she learned the process for filing petitions for occupational licenses and appeals from ALR suspensions in the Harris County Civil Courts at Law . In March 1995,

Ms . Rutkowski opened Elizabeth's Paralegal Service to assist attorneys in fil­ ing occupational license and ALR appeals. For more information on this

service, please call

Ms . Rutkowski at

(713) 630-0852. Charts of license sus ­ pensions will accompany the next article.]

Alpha Pagers for Less Anywhere

Mobile Communications, Inc.

For more information, call:

Lorraine Mondragon @

800-836-0283

THEY CALL THEM T.R.A.P. FOR A REASON!

or How The Wording In Your Notice Of Appeal May Be ADeadly Error

The Wording In Your Notice Of Appeal May Be ADeadly Error W e now have the

W e now have the "word", as

unpleasant as it was for two

appellants, that unless you

use the language of art in giving notice of appeal from a guilty or no contest plea in a plea-bargained arrangement,

you commit deadly error. In David v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) and in Lyon v. State 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994), the Court of Criminal Appeals strictly construed

Texas

Rules

of Appellate

Procedure

(T.R.A.P.), Rule 40(b)(l) which pro­ vides in part:

in order to prosecute an appeal for a nonjurisdictional defect or error that occurred prior to entry of the plea the notice shall state that the trial court granted per­ mission to appeal or shall specify that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial.

In strictly interpreting the lan­ guage, the Court held that to appeal a guilty or no contest plea to raise (1) a non-jurisdictional defect that occurs before or after the plea, or (2) an error that occurred before entry of the plea,

there must be a plea bargain, and the written notice of appeal must state that the trial court granted permission to appeal or specify that the accused raised

those matters by written motion and

general Notice of Appeal is insuffi­

I.

received an adverse ruling before trial. A

cient to comply with T.R.A.P., Rule

The Defendant agreed to enter a plea of (guilty or no contes t) in exchange for a punishment recom­

II.

40(b)(l).

mendation by the State. The trial

Will those critics of the Court of Criminal Appeals, who rail against the court as the "citadel of technicali­ ty," complain that two citizens were denied a hearing on appeal because of

court did not exceed that punishment recommendation, and sentenced the Defendant to (state the sentence).

a "technicality"? As Judge McCormick wrote: "Our caselaw on how a defendant, in an

The Defendant presented and the trial court overruled before trial the following written motions which

appeal from a plea-bargained convic­

frame the issues on appeal:

 

tion, confers jurisdiction on a Court of Appeals to address certain issues is not

(I temize the pre-trial motions which were overruled by the trial court) : .

exactly a model of clarity and concise

A.

Legality of the Metro Police to

legal analysis." Lyon v. State, supra.

Arrest a Motorist for D.W.I.

 

However, the court has interpreted

B.

Motion to Suppress the Search

T.R.A.P., Rule 40(b)(l) and you have

of Defendant's Apartment.

 

notice that you must give proper

C.

Motion to Suppress the

Notice of Appeal in a plea-bargained

Defendant's Oral Confession.

 

conviction. To that end, I submit the

D.

(Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc.)

 

following as a model by which you can draft your own.

III.

 

The

trial

court

has

granted

the

(General Style of Case)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

of

Appellate Procedure, Rule 40(b)(l), the Defendant gives Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals from his con­ viction on (date) for the offense of

(name of offense).

By

Authority

of Texas

Rules

defendant the right to appeal.

Signed

this

(date)

(Name etc.)

right to appeal. Signed this ( d a t e ) (Name etc.) George Parnham, HeClA

George Parnham, HeClA President; Han. Thad Heartfield, U.S. District Ct. Beaumont

Han. Thad Heartfield, U.S. District C t . Beaumont Tina Rogers, Richard Haynes, Doug Tinker Photography

Tina Rogers, Richard Haynes, Doug Tinker

Photography by Bob Rosenberg.

HEARSAY

BY ALLEN C. ISBELL

HEARSAY BY ALLEN C. ISBELL Johnnie Cochran was as surprised as I, that the three-hour verdict

Johnnie Cochran was as surprised as I, that the three-hour verdict was "not guilty." It contravened the accepted wisdom that "quick ver­ dicts" go against the defendant. Interesting that so many in the media want to make it a "racist" verdict, yet none mention that two white jurors and one Hispanic juror came to the "not guilty" decision in the same short time. Listening to the jurors discuss the basis for their verdict, it seems to yours truly they had a good grasp of the evidence presented and the reasonable doubt that remained. Aren't we glad that Houston does not have, nor ever has had, police like Mark Fuhrmann who plant evidence or lie under oath.

Who says, "Good things never happen on Monday"! Don't tell Don Stricklin or Judge Debbie Mantooth Stricklin. They eloped on a Monday Dune 5, 1995] to Lake Tahoe . Correct your files to reflect that Judge Stricklin presides over the 180th District Court.

At our annual meeting, the associ­ ation honored Jim Steele for four "N .G .'s" and two Motions to Suppress granted in one week in County Court No.2. It was good to see a number of judges at the annual meeting. Among others, I saw Judge Mike Wilkinson, Judge Mike Peters, Judge Jim Anderson, Judge Werner Voight, and Judge John Beeler.

Outgoing Prez Jim Skelton report­ ed a balance of $8,540.50 in the bank account after his year of stewardship. This is the first time in several years, the association has had this much in reserve. Our thanks to Jim for an excellent year.

Recently installed Prez George Parnham has gone about our business with enthusiasm. He promises immi­ nent results in our grievance against the security system, that we are the only "officers of the court" who must go through the system.

Our monthly luncheons/seminars at the Houston Club have featured outstanding presentations. Judge Charles Baird from the Court of Criminal Appeals gave us the latest updated material on decisions ren­

dered recently, and a list of the issues

currently pending

supervising United States Probation Officer, and his two Senior Probation Officers, Becky Pope and Lisa Reed , gave practical advice on the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines

dance at both luncheons. The speak­

ers have been much better than the food, in my opinion.

Don Osborne,

Good atten­

Phyllis Frye scored a victory for a

client in an indecent exposure case. Took four days; jury still could not

.Dennis Smith got

an "N.G." in an "indecency" with a

child case - in Brazoria County! Another victory for Husband and Wife team, Cruz and Lorraine Cervantes.

decide for sure!

Bill Clayton Messick has moved to Alabama! New address: One Office Park, Suite 210, Mobile, Alabama 36609 (334/380-0533).

Walter Boyd wrested "control" of the Galveston seminar one more time [the history of "who ousted whom" in the control of that seminar during the past eight years is fodder for the Tabloids]. To almost everyone's sur­ prise, it was highly successful in qual­ ity of lectures and the number of

attendees. Also, Walter seemed pleased with the number of people he managed to offend in only two days.

I did hear from Robert J. Fickman since my last column. He scored a "Grand Jury Victory" in Montgomery County and saved an elementary school counselor from an indictment for indecency with a child. He and David Cunningham were not so for­ tunate in a big bank fraud case. Seems they could not explain ade­ quately where the 14 million dollars went!

Yours truly had dinner with Dr. Ned Van Maanen , executive director of Crime Stoppers, and Bernard Wishnow, local television personali­ ty, who interviewed him for his show. Van Maanen expressed surprise when I told him that our group is very thankful for his organization, until I explained that only those who have been arrested hire lawyers!

With a touch of irony, our own Mark Allan Goldberg and Jeri Lara Kuhleman surrendered their freedom and became "united in holy matrimo­ ny" on July 4, 1995!

Over a hundred attended the October 26th luncheon to hear Doug Tinker; nice to have the food catered by Treebeard's again . They had to add tables and bring in cha irs! Seemed like old times.

Tom Brashier and Adrian Smith represented co-defendants in aggra­ vated robbery case; after two days of trial, State dismisses because com­ plainant says the robber was neither defendant!

Prez-elect Garland Mclnnis was seen basking in a recent victory. It was satisfactory, not only because he won, but because of who he got to cross-examine! Promised I would not tell who.

A NOTE ON MOCK JURIES IN A CHILD SEX CASE

© BY INESE A. NEIDERS, J.D., PH.D.

T he purpose of a mock jury is to get "feedback" for defense counsel before the trial begins,

in order to lower the risk of offending the jury. This information is critical particularly in child sex offenses. Going to trial can be a risky endeavor due to the potential of the long terms of imprisonment involved if the client does not plea bargain. One way to reduce risk is to hold a "mock jury" or "focus group". In an Ohio case, in order to obtain a more critical view of the jurors' thoughts in a sex offense trial, and after they have been presented with the evidence, the jury was divided into two (2) groups - one (1) group of men and women, and one (1) group of women only. The "women- only" group pro­ vided a more critical view of the case. Without men in a mock jury or "focus group", in a sex offense trial, women are more open to discuss their true feelings concerning child sex cases. Although questionnaires are being increasingly used, some judges will not permit this approach. This is the reason it is imperative to use other methods to evaluate juror response. I would like to thank Leonard W. Yelsky and Angelo F. Lonardo, of Yelsky & Lonardo Co., L.P. A., Cleveland, Ohio, for experimenting in and utilizing this approach, thus making it possible for its further development. 1. Ask court personnel what has worked before. They are often a resource for helpful information. Court personnel are interested in suc­ cessfully implementing the court process. Their prior experience with specific questions may assist you in

knowing what questions to include in your questionnaire.

2. Contact a consultant in

advance to help with processing, sum­ marizing and analyzing the results. Clients are pleased because consul­ tants work at an hourly rate equal to or lower than that of lawyers; courts are pleased because consultants spe­ cialize in this kind of work and avoid pitfalls which may occur when courts first implement this approach. A consultant's presence often influences the judge to permit the use of the questionnaire.

3. Point out advantages for the

judge. His or her reputation may be protected and enhanced in sensitive or high publicity trials. Court time is

used more productively. You may wish to start with a long question­ naire like in the O. J. Simpson case and shorten it, if the judge hesitates using a long questionnaire. While a comprehensive questionnaire, like those used in the O. J. Simpson and Rodney King cases, is preferable, it is better to have a small supplemental questionnaire than none at all. 4. Ask the court to have the jurors answer the questionnaire at the cour­ thouse. Sometimes questionnaires are mailed to prospective jurors to be answered before coming to the court­ house. While short questionnaires mailed to jurors have a higher response rate than long question­ naires, the return rate is still lower

than if the jurors fill out the question­ naire at the courthouse.

5. Better decisions can be made

about whether to proceed with the trial. Frequently, civil attorneys settle after evaluating the questionnaires.

A criminal defense attorney may rec­ ommend that his client enter a plea, after reviewing the questionnaires. prosecutors in several cases decided to drop charges after they reviewed the questionnaires.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Inese A. Neiclers is a jury consultant from Columbus, Ohio. She has suc­ cessfully used questionnaires in death penalty, drug conspiracy, police bru­ tality, child sexual abuse, while collar product liability and torts. You may reach her at (61.4)263-6558 or Box 14736, Columbus, Ohio 43214.

CRIMINAL LAWYER IN BINZ BUILDING HAS OFFICE FOR RENT

Overflow Business Possible.

224-5225

WHAT IS A CRIME INVOLVING "MORAL TURPITUDE"? [a.k.a. Can't Define It, Really, But I Know

WHAT IS A CRIME INVOLVING "MORAL TURPITUDE"? [a.k.a. Can't Define It, Really, But I Know It When I See It!]

BY ALLEN C. ISBELL

T he

rule

impeachment by evidence of

general

controlling

conviction of crime is stated in

T.R.C.E., Rule 609:

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record but only if the crime was a felony or involved moral turpi, tude, regardless of punishment, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party.

What is a "crime of moral turpi, tude"? It is an offense involving an element of fraud, larceny, or criminal

intent . Dallas County Bail Bond Bd v.

Mason, 773 S.W.2d 586 (Tex .App. Dallas 1989); U.S. v. Smith, 420 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1970). In Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703,95 L.Ed 886 (1951), the United States Supreme Court stated:

Whatever else the phrase, "crime involving moral turpitude" may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpi­

tude

The phrase "crime

involving moral turpitude" has without exception been con­

strued to embrace fraudulent con­ duct.

Offenses which are crimes of "moral turpitude."

(1) Theft, forgery, prostitution, see

S.W.2d

488,492 (Tex.App. Fort Worth 1985, no pet.) .l

(2) Aggravated assault on a woman [a misdemeanor under pre­

Robertson

v.

State,

685

197 4 Penal Code], Trippell v.

State,

535 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim.App.

1976).

(3) An "expansive" view of what constitutes "moral turpitude" comes from civil cases, arising from the dis­ barment of lawyers. The Texas Rules of

Disciplinary Procedure define a "serious

crime," requiring disciplinary action, as "any felony involving moral turpi­

tude."

1.06(U)(1992). In deciding what constitutes a "serious crime", that is, a

felony involving moral turpitude, the civil courts have viewed moral turpi­ tude broadly, see In reo G.M.P.,

S.W.2d

Tex.R.Disciplinm·y

P.

(Tex.App.

Houston

[14th] 1995, n.w.h.):

1) Crimes involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or deliberate violence.

'If the gravamen of "moral turpitude" is frawi, I fail to see why prostitution is in this category. The only "frawiulent" prostitution cases I've fum­ died are "stings" by the police, who "say but do

not. "

2) Anything done knowingly con­ trary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals. 3) An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general. 4) Something immoral in itself, regardless of whether it is punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude. 5) Immoral conduct is that con­ duct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

Offenses which are not crimes of "moral turpitude."

(1)

State,

Carrying a weapon, Dowdy V .

678

385

S.W.2d

(Tex.Crim.App.

State,

505

1964); McKinney V.

S.W.2d

536

(Tex.Crim.App. 1974).

(2)

385

Drunkenness, Gibbs v. State,

S.W.2d

258

(Tex.Crim .App.

1965); Hoover V. State, 449 S.W.2d 60

(Tex .Crim.App. 1970). (3) Driving while intoxicated, Ochoa V. State, 481 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972). (4) Driving while license suspend­

ed, Stephens v. State, 417 S.W.2d 286

f.n.l (Tex.Crim.App. 1967).

(5)

Gambling, Robertson V. State,

685 S.W.2d 488,492 (Tex.App. Fort

Worth 1985, no pet.).

(6)

Fighting, Robertson v.

State,

685 S.W.2d 488,492

Worth 1985, no pet.).

(Tex.App. Fort

Query: Is "Issuance of a Bad Check" a crime of "moral turpi­ tude"?

You may find conflicting authori­ ties regarding whether the issuance of a bad check is a crime of moral turpi­ tude. Some opinions suggest that "passing a worthless check" is a crime involving "moral turpitude."

McKinney v. State, 505 S.W.2d 536

(Tex.Crim .App. 1974) [the Court of Criminal Appeals categorized "pass­ ing worthless checks" as a crime of

moral turpitude]; Kizart v. State, 811

S.W.2d 137 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1991, no pet.) ["assumed" that passing a worthless check involved moral turpi­ tude]. Other opinions state that "passing a worthless check" is not a crime involving "moral turpitude."

See

Mason, 773 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.App. Dallas 1989). This conflict may be explained by comparing the present Penal Code

definition of the offense with the pre­

Dallas County

Bail Bond

Bd

v.

1974

Penal

Code

definition.

Penal

Code 32.41 provides:

(a) A person commits an offense

if he issues or passes a check or similar sight order for the pay­ ment of money knowing that the issuer does not have sufficient funds in or on deposit with the bank or other drawee for the pay­ ment in full of the check or order as well as all other checks or orders outstanding at the time of issuance.

Since 1974, the only element the State must prove is knowledge of insufficient funds to cover the check. Under the pre-1974 Penal Code, however, the offense of passing a worthless check required two ele­ ments: (1) intent to defraud; and (2)

knowledge of insufficient funds in the bank to cover the check. Former arti­ cle 567b, Sec. 1, defined the offense:

It shall be unlawful for any person or firm to make, draw, utter or deliver, or to cause or direct the making, drawing, uttering or

delivering, with intent to defraud,

any check, draft or order for the payment of money on any bank, person, firm or corporation know­ ing that the maker, drawer or payor does not have sufficient funds in or on deposit with such bank, person, firm or corporation for the payment in full of such check, draft or order, as well as all other outstanding checks, drafts or others upon such funds than ou tstand ing.

The authority of any recent cases holding that "issuance of a bad check"

is a crime of moral turpitude is doubt­

ful because they rely upon language from cases dealing with the pre-1974 Penal Code. The better view is that "issuance of a bad check" under Penal Code Section 32.41, is not a crime of moral turpitude, unless the State can show that the offense contained the element of intent to defraud. See

Dallas County Bail Bond Bd v. Mason,

supra. The statute does not require an intent to defraud, although it does require knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. Also, the Texas legislature added subsection (g) to the statute, which became effective June 18,

1987. Subsection (g) provides that

"[a]n offense under this section is not

a lesser included offense under section

31.03 [theft of property, ACI] or

31.04 [theft of services, ACI] of this code."

This view

is consistent with U.S .

v. Livingston, 816 F.2d 184, 190 (5th Cir. 1987), a case arising out of the Southern District of Texas. In inter­ preting the Federal Rules of Criminal Evidence, Rule 609(a)(2), the Fifth Circuit said that a witness could not be impeached with the offense of

issuance of a bad check unless it could be shown that the offense involved the element of intent to defraud.

Query: Is Misprision of a Felony a crime of "Moral Turpitude"?

To the surprise of many, the Supreme Court of Texas has held recently that "misprision of a felony" is not a crime of moral turpitude, per se. Attorney James M. Duncan plead­ ed guilty to misprision of felony in federal court, and he received a 4 year probated sentence. Texas disciplinary rules require the State Bar of Texas to file a compulsory disciplinary suit in cases involving intentional crimes and moral turpitude. The Supreme Court of Texas held that because a conviction for misprision of a felony "could conceivably be based upon an attorney's refusal to divulge privileged information, we hold that it does not involve moral turpitude per se."

Duncan

Appeals

No. 94-0161, 1995). The Duncan case illustrates that one should never assume that an offense is a crime of moral turpitude, even if the offense sounds "ominous." If the essence of moral turpitude's def­ inition is "fraud or larceny," you may be able to challenge whether some misdemeanors are properly classified as involving "moral turpitude ."

Disciplinary

(Tex.

v.

Board

of

S.W.2d

as involving "moral turpitude ." Disciplinary (Tex. v. Board of S.W.2d NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1995 DOCKET CALL 13

AN X-CITING NEW VEHICLE FOR ATTACKING INDICTMENTS

WINSTON E. COCHRAN, JR. AnORNEY AT LAw, HOUSTON, TEXAS

A relativel Y unknown decision by the Supreme Court last November has opened new

possibilities for attacking many indictments through motions to quash. The case is United States v.

X·Citement Video, Inc.,

U.S.

_, 115 S.Ct. 464,130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994). The case is notorious because of its topic, child pornography, but it has great potential for strategic use in a wide variety of applications unrelat­ ed to that sordid topic. The case arose from a 1987 federal investigation of the wholesale distrib· ution of videotapes featuring an "actress" named Traci Lords. It had been reported that Ms. Lords alleged­ ly was less than 18 years old when she performed sexual acts on film. A police officer, posing as a retailer, ordered a number of Traci Lords videotapes from X-Citement Video, Inc., a distributor. The company and its president were indicted and convicted under 18 U.s.c. §§ 2252(a)(1) and 2252(a)(2), a "child pornography" statute. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, that court reversed the con­ victions, holding that the statute vio­ lated the First Amendment due to the statute's lack of a mens rea with respect to the age of performers. The Government's petition for writ of cer­ tiorari was granted. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Much of the debate in the Supreme Court focused on whether the federal statute die in fact require proof of knowledge as to a per­

former's age, with the Court ultimate­ ly holding that the intent of Congress was to make a mens rea applicable to that element. 115 S.Ct. at 472. The interpretation of that obscure statute itself was less significant than the manner in which the Supreme Court arrived at its conclusion. A central part of the Supreme Court's rationale was the declaration that there is a presumption that a mens rea, or culpa­ ble mental state, "should apply to each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent con­ duct." 115 S.Ct. at 469. The Supreme Court specifically interpret­ ed the applicable statute as requiring not merely an intentional or knowing distribution of the material, but also knowledge that a performer was under

18.

X·Citement Video relied in part

on Morissette v. United States, 342

U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240,96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), which had recognized the common law tradition of requiring mens rea, but actually X·Citement Video went beyond Mori.ssette by explicitly requiring a mens rea as to each element which contributed to make conduct "criminal." Sometimes the best signal of a decision's potential impact is given by the dissenters. Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissenting, chastised the majority for "convert[ing] the rule of [statutory] interpretation into a rule of law." 115 S.Ct. at 473. Although, in my opinion, the Court bogged down in an unpersuasive effort to dis­ tinguish child pornography from child-molesting cases, where the

common law provided that no knowl­ edge of a victim's age was required, that was more than offset by an explicit holding that the statute at issue would have fallen within the broadest common-law category, for "offenses against the state, person, property, or public morals," where mens rea is required as a general rule. 115 S.Ct. at 469. In other words, the

rule announced in X·Citement Video

applies more often than not. As a bonus, the opinion further stated that the severity of the punishment also favored requiring mens rea as to each element necessary to "criminalize" conduct. The punishment deemed

sufficiently "severe"

Video provides a very low compara­ tive standard, and this additional rea­ son would seem to apply to any felony case in Texas. It is important to recognize that

the rule expressed in X·Citement Video effectively assigns a burden of

proof to the prosecution. The issue is not one of "mistake of fact," in which

a defendant must go forward with some evidence. Because the burden

of proving mens rea is on the State,

mens rea also must be pled properly. The jury charge in turn must follow the indictment. Thus X·Citement Video is a double-barrelled weapon for reversal, facilitating attacks both before trial and at the charge stage. Even better, in some cases the State may be unable to meet its burden of proof on the particularized mens rea

requirement. Few cases so far have interpreted

X·Citement Video, but two from the

Second Circuit are illuminating because they split over the important

question whether X·Citement Video

only applies when the defendant's conduct would not constitute a crime, but for the element for which mens

in

X·Citement

rea

is

not

pled.

United

States

v.

LaPorta, 46 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 1994) offered an affirmative answer to that

question, but the opposite view was

taken in United States v. Santerarrw,

45 F.3d 622 (2nd Cir. 1995), which

cited X·Citement Video in holding

that a mens rea requirement applies to the aggravating factor of the use of a firearm during a crime involving vio­ lence or drugs - activities that are not "otherwise innocent," but from the firearm. Due to space limitations, I cannot elaborate on every reason why I think

X·Citement Video extends to Texas

courts as part of Fourteenth Amendment due process, but the rea­ sons include: (1) the fact that the Supreme Court drew upon a long common-law tradition of requiring the prosecution to prove mens rea; (2) an analogy to the "void for vagueness" doctrine, as an established aspect of due process, where a mens rea often has been recognized as a factor saving some statute from unconstitutionali­ ty; and (3) the views of] ustices Scalia and Thomas that the majority was not just interpreting one federal statute, but rather formulating a rule of law. Which Texas statutes are vulnera­

ble to an X·Citement Video motion

to quash 7 The answer depends in part

on the local prosecutor, as indict­ ments may vary from county to coun­ ty, and even from case to case in the same county, but I think offenses ripe for consideration fall into several groups:

Some

Texas offenses make conduct criminal, or make an "aggravated" offense out of other criminal con­ duct, by virtue of some special characteristic of the victim. Age is one example, but by no means the only one.

Closely

related to the special victim offenses are what I call special situs offenses, which make con­ duct illegal or "aggravated" because the conduct occurs at a special place. For example, an indictment for Burglary of a Habitation might read that a defendant "intentionally and knowingly en tered a habitation

B. Special situs offenses.

A. Special victim offenses.

ulatory offenses have in the past been held to be strict liability offenses, yet often a regulatory statute makes the distinction between "innocent" conduct and

one

tion, and not just a building, and or two factors. X·Citement Video

that the opening allegation of suggests that some mens rea ought

"intentionally and knowingly"

the building entered was a habita ­ "criminal" conduct hinge on

owned by [Complainant's name], without the consent of the owner." An argument could be made that the indictment must allege that the defendant knew

to apply to those critical factors.

was inadequate because it only modified the term "entered." It is impossible to predict how many

Many

offenses criminalize conduct by virtue of the fact that the conduct takes place without the consent of some affected person.

D. Regulator)' offenses.

C. Non-consent offenses.

potential applications of X·Citement Video exist, but in Harris County there are plenty of boilerplate indictments which are tempting targets.

Some reg -

HALS SERVICE

HOUSTON ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SECRETARIES

• Education

• Employment

• Monthly meetings (continuing education)

• Networking

Contact:

Sandra Warhol (713/861-6163)

SWING FORE MENTAL HEALTH GOLF TOURNAMENT

All attorneys are invited to start the holiday season by treating themselves, their clients and friends to a round of golf at the Sweetwater Country Club and participate in a live auction with Judge Shelly Hancock as auctioneer. On Monday, November 13, the Mental Health Association is spon­

soring its 2nd annual Swing

Tournament which will be held at Sweetwater Country Club . It's a

Florida Scramble with a shotgun start at 11 :00. The charity tourna­ ment will raise funds for the Mental Health Association to prOVide pro­ grams and services for persons suffering with mental illness. Hole sponsorships are $1,000 which includes a company sign, plus 4 players. The individual player fee is $150. This includes golf,

Fore

Mental

Health

Golf

box

To round out the day, there will be awards, prizes and a silent and live auction with Judge Hancock. Bill Bosse will emcee.

lunch, goodie

bag and hors d' oeuvres after golf.

For more information please call Dee Taylor, 523-8963.

Task Description Tape Tampering Examination

BY STEVE CAIN

AFTI (Applied Forensic Technologies IntI., Inc.) President/C.E.O. Forensic Scientists M.F.S., M. F.S.Q .D.

W hen an aud io tape becomes suspected of tampering, it may be forwarded to a

qualified forensic aud io specia list for authentication. Examples of such problems are : Credibility questions

relating to the tape recorder operator, chain-of-custody contradictions, and differences between the content of the tape and testimonies of what was said. Most often, though, a forensic expert is contracted when the tape is believed to have been alte red or tam­ pered with. Due to the nature of the

allegat ions

issues, the examiner requires specific items from the patron. The Federal

Bureau of Investigation, for example, has a list of required information including.

surrounding tampering

1. The original tape.

2. The tape records and related

components used to produce the

recording.

3. Written records of any dam­

age or maintenance done to the recorders, accessories, and other sub­ mitted equipment.

4. A detailed statement from

the person or persons who made the recording, describing exactly how it

was produced and the conditions that existed at the time, such as:

a. Power source, such as port­

able generator or dry-cell batteries.

b. Input, such as telephone,

radio frequency transmitter/receiver, miniature microphone, etc.

c.

Environment,

such

as

tele­

phone

transmission

line,

restaurant,

apartment, etc.

d. Background noises, such as

television, radio, unrelated conversa­

tions, computer games, etc.

e. Foreground information, such

as number of individuals involved in the conversation, general topics of discussion, closeness to microphone,

etc.

f. Magnetic tape, such as grand,

format, when purchased, whether pre­

vio usly used.

g. Recorder operation, such as

number of times turned on and off in the record mode, type of keyboard or remote operations for a ll known

events, use of voice-activated fea­ tures, etc.

5. A typed transcript of the

entire recording or, if that is not avail­ able, transcriptions of the portions in

question.

The items listed above are exam­ ples of what is required by a forensic expert as he begins an examination of questioned audio recordings.

TECHNICAL DEFINITIONS

Falsification of tapes

A qualified forensic expert deter­ mines authentication by performing a number of scientific tests which detect evidence of tampering or falsi­ fication. Four basic types of tamper­ ing include:

1. Deletion - the elimination of

words or sounds by stopping the tape and over-recording unwanted areas.

2. Obscuration - the mixing in

of sound of amplitude sufficient to mask wave form patterns which origi­ nally would show stops and starts in

inappropriate places.

rear­

3. Transformation

-

the

ranging of words to change content or

context.

- words or sound by artificial means or impersonation.

4.

Synthesis

the

adding

of

Eledromechanicallndications of Such Falsification (Anomalies) Would Indude:

1. Gaps - segments in a record­

ing which represent unexplained changes in content or context. A gap

can contain bu zz ing, humming, or silence.

abr upt

2.

Transients

-

short,

sounds

exemplified

by

clicks,

pops,

etc.

Transients

may

indicate

tape

splicing.

3. Fades - gradual loss of volume.

Fades can cause inaudibility and are considered gaps when the recording becomes fully inaudible.

4. Equipment Sounds are

inconsistencies of context cause by

the recording equipment itself. Common equipment sounds include hums, static, whistles, and varying pitches.

5. Extraneous Voices - are back­

ground voices which at times appear to be near as the primary voices. These can, at times, even block the

primary voices.

unexplained topic change, or strong foreground interruptions indicative of obscuration. So the initial forensic process of critical listening provides foundation and direction for later intensive tests.

2. Physical Inspection: The

forensic expert next inspects for tam­ pering with a thorough visual inspec­ tion of the tape itself. He inspects the housing for pry marks, welding, size, label and date consistent with alleged recording date . He also measures the tape and assures the splicing of mag­ netic tape to the leader is consistent with normal manufacturing process. Any other splices are notes as possible alteration.

3. Magnetic Development:

EXPERT TASKS Methods AFTI Uses to Deted Falsifications and Authenticate Tape Recordings

A forensic expert is trained to corre­ late his observations of such anomalies with machine functions to interpret events in the following ways:

1. Critical listening : Use human

analytica l capabilities to

alies. The forensic sc ientist listens with proper headphones to the original tape using high quality analytical equipment. He first performs a prelim­ inary overview of the original tape and notes events including starts, stops,

speed fluctu ations, and

tions requiring further investigation. He then examines record events and categorizes them as environmental or non-environmental. After examining abnormal recorded events, the expert analyzes background sounds. He lis­ tens for abnormal changes, absences, or presence in environmental sound. The final phase of critical li stening is an extensive audit of the foreground information. He concentrates on voic­ es, conversation and other audible

sounds. Here anoma lies include sud­ den changes in a person's voice, abrupt

locate anom­

other varia­

Direct visual observation of the mag­ netically "developed" tape is conduct­ ed to find track widths, the type of

recorder used, and the presence or absence of residual speech s ignals.

4. Spectrum Analysis:

Specialized computer equipment and programs to produce a visual interpre­ tation of frequency-versus-amp litude­ versus-time displays. This allows the expert to view the entire spectrum or to zoom in on an area of particular interest thereby helping to character­ ize the acoustic quality of anomalies and identify their source.

5. \Vaveform Analysis: A com­

puter generated display representing time-versus-a mplitude of recorded sounds in graphic form. With such analysis the expert can sometimes measure signal return time which reveals how long a recorder record-to­ erase-head distances, determination of the spacing between gaps in multiple­ gap erase heads, and inspection of the signature shape and spacing of various record event signals.

6. Recorder performance: vari­

ous electrical and mechanical mea­

surements of standard and modified

recorders

origins of buzz sounds, hum, etc.

possible

for

use

in

finding

SUMMARY

In o rder to submit sound rec o rdin gs as evidence in court proceedings, an attorney must prove that the t ape is an authentic representation of the conversation it is said to record. The traditional method of establish ing authenticity involves maintaining a chain of custody which logs all per­ sons, times and, locations concerned in the creation of the tape . H oweve r, even if this procedure is strictly observed, there may still be a cha l­ lenge to the tapes authenticity.

The recording may contain incon­ sistencies suggestive of tampering. In such cases, an attorney may consult a qua lified forensic examiner to inspect the tape. The examiner wou ld ini­ tially listen critically for signs such as gaps, transients, fades, equipment so unds or extraneous voices which indicate tampering. Then he would utili ze other methods li ke physical anomalies. It is relatively easy to change the content of a recording by deleting words or sections; by obscur­ ing meaning with over-recorded sounds; or by transforming context through rearrangement of selected phrases or by adding additional words through synthesis. Nevertheless, falsi­ fications normally leave detectable magnetic and waveform acoustic sig­ natures which can lead to forensic individualization of the evidential recorders and tapes.

DEFENDER ADVOCACY WORKSHOP

A Client-Centered Trial Skills Program For Defenders and Assigned Counsel

Tuesday Evenings 6-8 p.m.

JANUARY 16 - MARCH 26, 1996

Harris County Courthouse

A Proied of the Center for Criminal Justice Advocacy In Cooperation with the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association

The intensive 10 week learning experience is designed specifically for providers of indigent defense representation under the assigned counsel system utilized in Harris County, Texas. The Workshop offers skills train­ ing in simulated criminal litigation together with how-to-do-it informa­ tion that will prepare you for the challenges of criminal defense practice.

Key Benefits

Teaching Methodology

• learn new techniques and styles for A well tested learning-by-doing

criminal defense specialists. teaching method emphasizing exten­

Meet others who will become sive participant pelformance. The resources for you in the future. format will be a small-group workshop utilizing a workbook of simulated liti ­

• Gain confidence

through

in

on-the­

gation problems together with a cus­ tom made 1300 page, 15 chapter how­

to-do-it

Sourcebook, a Texas lawyer's Guide, 2nd edition (1995) . Workshops will include presentations and demonstra­ tions by the faculty, performance of exercises by the enrollees, group dis­ cussions, and critiquing. Active preparation and participation are required.

spot

room performance.

improvement

your court­

manual,

Criminal

Practice

• Receive personalized feedback in a supportive small group workshop atmosphere.

true "learning by

• Use

a tried and

doing" method.

Criminal

edition.

Practice

• Obtain your own copy of the new

2nd

Sourcebook,

Workshop Coordinator, Ray Moses

Telephone (713) 552-9534

FAX (713) 646-1766

How to Register

Complete the application form and return with your check (payable to Harris County Criminal lawyers Association) to:

HCClA Workshop Conference Office PO. Box 66212 Houston, Texas 77266

Enrollment is limited. To reserve a slot, register by November 15,1995.

Tuition:

$300 for members of HCClA $350 for non-members

Registration cancellations must be received in writing and postmarked no later than December 13, 1995. For cancellation purposes only: the regis­ tration fee will be refunded subject to a $30 administrative charge. After, December 13, registration fees are not refundable.

Who Should Attend?

represent accused

persons in criminal proceedings and are willing to take an active role in improving their advocacy skills.

Attorneys 'who

Limited Enrollment

Enrollment is limited to 24 partici ­ pants on a first-come first-served basis. Register now to reserve your spo t.

CLE Credits

This course will receive 20 hours of MClR credit upon approval of the MClE Committee.

Is the Program Tax Deductible?

Costs incurred for attending legal seminars (including registration fees, travel and meals) which maintain and improve professional skills required for employment are tax deductible. See Treas. Reg. 1.162-5: IRS letter Ruling 7746068 (9-1-77); Coughlin v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 307.

18 DOCKET CALL

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1995

GENERAL SCHEDULE

Week One Interviewing Clients and Witnesses and Client Counseling

Week Two Introducing Tangible Items ­ Talking and Walking Exhibits into Evidence

Week Three Direct Examination

Week Four Cross-Examination and Impeachment

Week Five Expert Opinion Testimony

Week Six

Objections

Week Seven

Jury Deselection

Week Eight Opening Statement Jury Argument

Week Nine Motion to Suppress Evidence

Week Ten Negotiation and Settlement (Plea Bargaining), Entry of a Plea, and Ethics

You will be furnished with your own copy of Moses, Criminal

Practice

Sourcebook

-

A Texas

Lawyer's

Guide,

2nd edition, a

1300 page, 15 chapter, post­ bound, tabbed, how-to-do-it manual which is yours to keep as part of the registration cost. You will also be provided with a detailed returnable workbook,

Assignments

in

Criminal

Trial

Advocacy, which includes infor­ mation about each weeks exercis­ es including specific topics, prob­ lems, times, and faculty.

Course Registration Form

Defender Advocacy Workshop Ten Week Trial Practice Course January 16 - March 26, 1996 - Houston, Texas

in a courtroom at the Harris County Your tuition includes the workshop regis­

tration fee, use of the exercise workbook (Assignments in Criminal Trial Advocacy), and your own personal copy of the Criminal Practice Sourcebook (2nd

Co urtho use in downtown Houston.

The

co urse

will

be

conducted

edition) containing 1,300 pages of how-to-do-it criminal practice materials.

APPLICATION

Defender Advocacy Workshop

Tuition enclosed:

o

o

o Please

o

send

me

an

For Office Use Only

No.

Ck.

Amt.

in

the

Harris

$300 for members of HCCLA

$350 for non-members

County

Crimina l Lawyers Association

I cannot attend the workshop but would like information on how to order Moses, Criminal Practice Sourcebook - A Texas Lawyer's Guide, 2n.d edi­ ti on (1995) at $159.00, tax included.

application

for

membership

Return completed application with check pa yab le to the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association to:

Workshop Conference Office P.O. Box 66212 Houston, Texas 77266

To help guarantee a slot, register by November 15, 1995.

Name

Office N ame

 

Address

 

(No p.o. boxes, pleas e)

 

City

State

Zip _

Daytime Phone (

)

-----

Fax (

)

Trial Experience

Current Practice

Number of criminal jury trials:

o ASSigned counsel

Felony:

o Private counsel

Misdemeanor:

Indicate percentage of practice

Number of civil jury trials: _

devoted to indigent defense:

%

 

_

Year started practice:

Other trial training programs attended in last three years:

rTHE TEXAS CENTER FOR1

LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM

A GUIDE TO THE BASICS OF LAW PRACTICE

$10.00 per book plus shipping, handling, sales tax

Contact:

Beryl P. Crowley P.O. Box 12487, Capital Station Austin, Texas 78711

~

1-800-204-2222

~

Capital Station Austin, Texas 78711 ~ 1-800-204-2222 ~ Wc·IH 1fl Traffk Citations" Traffic Warrants license
Wc·IH 1fl Traffk Citations" Traffic Warrants license Suspensions Occupational licenses MOST TICKETS $65 Per
Wc·IH
1fl
Traffk Citations" Traffic Warrants
license Suspensions
Occupational licenses
MOST TICKETS $65 Per Violation

Legal Assistant

in search of employment.

Contact:

Jeffrey V. Strickland

c/o Dept. of the Army, Box A Attn: ATZK-PM-132

Ft. Knox, KY 40121-5000

~~~~~~~ ' !:('~~~~

~ ~ '., ~ ~l> ~ ~;., "i~ SEND YOUR ~ ~ ARTICLES FOR ~
~
~
'.,
~
~l>
~
~;.,
"i~
SEND YOUR
~
~
ARTICLES FOR
~
~,b
~
PUBLICATION ~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
On diskette
~
~
in Word Perfect to:
~
.
~
~
Allen Isbell
~
~
~
~
202 Travis, #208
IZ~ Houston, TX 77002
~
,
.
~
'"~
~,
236-1000
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ G!'~ ~ ' " ~ ~ ~
~
~
~
~
~
~
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G!'~ ~
'
"
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~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ G!'~ ~ ' " ~ ~ ~ Gerald

Gerald P. Monks CBA* Owner

" ~ ~ ~ Gerald P. Monks C B A * O w n e r

Better Risks get better rates (low as S%)

NATIONWIDE 7 DAYS. 24 HOURS

Traffic Tickets. Non Arrest Bonds

Personal Checks or Terms

"We assign collateral to attorney to help in fee collection II

'Certified Bail Agent in Hauston Since 1936 Past President

of Professional Bail Agents of U.S. of Harris Co. & of Texa s

BAlLMAN BAIL BOND COMPANY

2016 Main, Suite 108, Houston, Texas • 713 759·6000

441·1033

Lie. No.7 4108 • in Humble,

Dial B·A.I·L·M.A.N (224-5626)

20 DOCKET CA LL

NOVEMBE~DECEMBER1W5

WHAT IS THE HARRJS COUNTY CRIMINAL LAWYERS ASSOClAnON? WHAT DOES HCCLA DO FOR THE DEFENSE
WHAT IS THE HARRJS COUNTY
CRIMINAL LAWYERS
ASSOClAnON?
WHAT DOES HCCLA DO FOR
THE DEFENSE BAR?
WHAT DOES A MEMBER DO?
Particip
:ue
and exchange Inronnallon anJ
skiU in our CLE programs
Rd<rrals Ihrough our LaWY<f Rderral S<r­
vi"" and Ihrough our mcmbcnhip direc­
Conlribule to our Brief Bank S<mce.
lOry.
The HCCLA is a non­
profit, tax exempt,
professional Association
made up of lawyers from
Harris County, Texas, who
are working to promote
excellence and high ideals in
the practice of Criminal
Law.
P<fform agre<d Pro Bono «rvices.
HCCLA publications including DOCKET
CALL. a monthly ncwslClt<f summarizing
significant decisions of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals and Texas Courts of Ap­
pcaIs and topics of IocaJ int<fest 10 thc
criminal dc fcru.c bar.
ilring to Ih< Associalion's allencion proper
gri~an= in the praclic< which meril
response and action.
Sharc in the commarad<ri< at our monlhly
luncheons and annual social ~venlS,
Regular Monthly Luncheon gcn<ral
membership meetings featuring speakcrs
on subjCC15 of topical intcresl.
Takc c.alJs on our Rd<rral S<rvic<:.
Provides a responsivc local forum for
lawyers actively engaged in thc practicc
of criminal law.
Justice
Any lawyer in good
standing with the State Bar
of Texas, who is endorsed
by a member of
HCCLA is eligible to join.
The endorsement recom­
mends the applicant as a
person of professional
competency, integrity and
good moral character who is
Duty
Opposes legislation and local rules which
infringc on individual rights prOl<Cted by
constitutional guarantees.
Freedom
FeUowship
Promotes a productivc cxchangc of ideas
and encourages better communication
with prosecutors and thc judiciary.
-
Provides continuing legal educalion pro­
grams for improving advocacy skills and
knowledgc.
66
actively engaged in the
defense of criminal cases.
Promotes a just application of thc Court
appointed lawycr syst<fO for indigent per­
sons charged with a criminal offense.
F~es Amicus CUriac Bricfs wh<fc ap­
propriatc.
Appliant:
Professional Organizations in which your are a member in good
~anding:
Admess:
M~
Telephone:
Have you ever been disbarred or disciplined by any bar association
or are you the subject of disciplinary action now pendinl>g
FIITIl Name:
Date admitted to Bar:
Law SChool
Date, Degree from Law Schoo,-I
For Regular Membership enclose $125.00 annual fee.
Sustaining Membership $200.00
President's Club $500.00
Newly Licensed (first year) Membership $50.00.
TYPE MEMBERSHIP
Student
(Expected graduation c1ate
Advisory
date
signature of applicant
Honorary
Regular
Endorsement on reverse must be signed by HCCLA MEMBER IN
GOOD STANDING
ENDORSEMENT
I. a member in good standing of HCCLA believe this applicant to be a person of professional competency, integrtty and good
moral character. The applicant is actively engaged in the defense of criminal cases.
MAIL THIS APPLICATION TO:
Harris County Criminal
Lawyers Association
P.O. Box '12773
Houston, Texas 77027
signature of memtxr
713/'127-2A04

SCANLAN BUILDING

405 MAIN STREET

DOWNTOWN HISTORICAL LANDMARK

BUILDING 405 MAIN STREET DOWNTOWN HISTORICAL LANDMARK • EXISTING SPACE READY FOR OCCUPANCY • TOTALLY RENOVATED

• EXISTING SPACE READY FOR OCCUPANCY • TOTALLY RENOVATED OFFICE BUILDING

• SHORT TERM LEASES (30 DAYS - 5 YEARS)

• ADJACENT TO COUNTY COURT BUILDINGS ·500 SQ. FT. TO 60,000 SQ. FT. • 6,000 SQ. FT. FLOORS

FOR INFORMATION

TO 60,000 SQ. FT. • 6,000 SQ. FT. FLOORS FOR INFORMATION 405 Main Street, Suite 300

405 Main Street, Suite 300 Houston, Texas 77002

Robert H. Cranshaw, Jr.

Phone: 713-223-4550

Fax:

713-223-4559

t N Family Law Center Congress Harris HarriS Harris Counlr. County County Admin a Civil
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Family
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Harris
HarriS
Harris
Counlr.
County
County
Admin a
Civil
Criminal
Building
Court
Court
Preston
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Prairie
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