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55 Waugh Dr" #900
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OCTOBER/NOVEMBER  1996  A Publication  of  Harri s County  Criminal  Lawyers Association 
Honoree  Richard  "Racehorse"  Haynes  and  Featured  Speaker,  Gerry  Spence  of  Jackson, Wyoming 
Photography  by  Russell  Webb 

Licea -1I1UIJ 
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•  Serving all  courts in Harris  County,  with  statewide and national affiliates 
Lie.  #74346 
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609 Houston Ave.  Acrossfrom City Jail
rs  &  Directors 
President. ...... ..... .. ....... ...... Gorlond D.  Mcinnis 
President-Elect.. ... .............. Robert A.  Moen 
Vice·President  ............ ....... Stonley Schneider 
Secretory ...... .. .............. .... Wendell A.  adom, Jr. 
Treasurer ........... .. ............. George M. Secrest,  Jr. 
Immediate Past President ... George J.  Pomham 
Board  Chairman ................ Robert A.  Moen 
Lloyd  W . Oliver 
Joseph  W.  Varela 
Ted  R. Doebbler 
Tanya  l. Elliott 
Donny  Easterling 
Richard  Trevathan 
Joseph  Solhob 
Clyde Williams 
W.  B.  "Bennie"  House,  Jr. 
Winston E. Cochran,  Jr. 
Ron  Hayes 
Ken  Mclean 
James  Stafford 
Robert Morrow 
Bob Tarrant 
Mike Charlton 
Past-Presidentts  1971·1996 
C.  Anthony Friloux  ( 1972-1973) 
Stuart Kinard  (1973-197.4) 
George Luquette  (197.4-1975) 
Morvin O.  Teague  (1975-1976) 
Dick DeGuerin  (1976-1977) 
W. B.  "Bennie"  House,  Jr.  (1977-1978) 
David R. Bires  (1978- 1979) 
Woody  Densen  (1979-1980) 
Will Gray  ( 1980-1981) 
Edward A.  Mollett  (1981-1982) 
Carolyn Garcia  ( 1982-1983) 
Jock  B.  Zimmermann  (1983-1984) 
Clyde Williams  (198.4-1985) 
Robert  Pelton  (1985-1986) 
Candelorio Elizondo  ( 1986-1987) 
Allen C.  Isbell  (1987 -1988) 
David Mitcham  ( 1988-1989) 
Jim  E.  Lavine  ( 1989-1990) 
Rick  Bross  (1990- 1  991) 
Mary  E.  Conn  ( 1991·1992) 
Kent  A.  Schaffer  ( 1992-1993) 
Don Cogdell  ( 1993-199.4) 
Jim  Skehan  ( 199.4-1995) 
George J.  Pomhom  (1995-1996) 
President's Club 
David Cunni"9hom 
Ken!  A.  Schaffer 
Docket Call 
Editor ... ............... ......... .. .. .. ..................... Allen  C. tsbell 
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Travis,  Suite  208,  Houston  77002  or  the  ASSOCiation 
office  at 405  Main St.,  303,  Houston  77002  Tetephone 
(713) 227-2404. 
Court Ru1emaking  and  Statutory  Conflict  in  Texas ... ...... .... ... . 
.... ......... .... .... .. ...................... ... ....................... .. by  Don  Rogers  2 
HCCLA Grievance Committee Resolution .......... .. .... .. ........... 17 
... ... .. ...... ... ...... ... ...... .. .... .... ...... .. _...... ..... .. ... by  David  Mitcham 
ALR  Appea\s ....... .. ............... .. ......... by  Elizabeth  Rutkowski  18 
October 10, 1996 
November 14, 1996 
December 12, 1996 
Wednesday  Appellate  Updates 
Criminal  Courthouse  Bldg.,  301  San  Jacinto,  230th  court 
01.00  MCLE,  12:00 Noon 
HCCLA Board  Meeting,  Thursday noon, 
Scanlan  Bldg.,  405  Main  2nd  floor conference 
October 24,  1996  LUNCHEON  PROGRAM, Thursday  noon, 
Treebeard's at The  Church,  1117 Texas. 
October 17-18,  1996  Experiencing  Internet Travel: 
Why Lawyers  Need  To  Learn  How 
to  Navigate the  Internet. 
South Texas  College  of  Law  & 
the  State  Bar  of Texas  Computer 
Section,  10.50  MCLE 
(713)  646-1757  or (800)  646-1253. 
November 1,  1996  Keys To The Locks At Trial: 
Opening  Up the  Mind,  Heart  and 
Soul of Jurors. 
South Texas  College  of Law- State 
of Texas  Professional  Development  Course. 
November 6-9, 1996  NACDL Fall  Meeting/Seminar 
The  Ultimate in Juror Persuasion 
Hyatt  Regency,  San  Antonio 
Co-Sponsored  by TCDLA 
2021872-8688, ext.  236. 
"Existing rules and principles can give us our 
present location, or bearings, our latitude and 
longitude.  The inn that shelters for the night 
is not the journeys end.  The law, like the 
traveler must be ready for the morrow.  It must 
have a  principle of growth." 
Cardozo, BeJUamin N., The Growth ofthe Law
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), pp. 19·20.
Court Rulemaking and 
Statutory Conflict in  Texas 
Don Rogers 
The  provisions  of Article  4495b,  § 
5.08 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes 
create a physician-patient privilege, make 
medical  records  confidential,  and estab-
lish  procedures  for  obtaining  access  to 
medical records  which appear on the  face 
of the  statutory provisions to be applica-
ble  to  court  proceedings. I The  provi-
sions  of  Sections  611.00 I  through 
611.005 of the  Texas Health and Safety 
Code create a mental health professional-
patient privilege, establish that communi-
cations  between  a  professional  and  pa-
tient and associated records of treatment 
are confidential, and provide among other 
things legal remedies for improper disclo-
sure ofconfidential infonnation.

statutes are hereinafter referred to as the
medical and mental health enactments.
The  Supreme  Court  of Texas  and  the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas hold 
that the  medical and mental health enact-
ments,  among  other  lawfully  enacted 
statutes not repealed or limited in scope 
by the Texas Legislature, do not apply to 
court proceedings insofar as the statutes 
are "deemed repealed" in civil and crimi-
nal  cases  and  criminal  law  matters 
through  court  orders  and  accompanying 
documents  issued  in  coIUlection  with 
court  rulemaking.

The  practices  and 
holdings  of the  Supreme  Court  and  the 
Court of Criminal Appeals deeming  law-
fully enacted statutes repealed in order to 
deny  full  lawful  effect to the  statutes  in 
court  proceedings  and  related  matters 
cause an anomalous situation:  A person 
affected  by  a  lawfully  enacted  statute 
CaIUlot  determine  from  the  face  of the 
statute  whether or to  what  extent  it ap-
plies to court proceedings or related mat-
ters.  The  constitutional  and  statutory 
rulemaking  authority  of  the  Supreme 
Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals 
is  analyzed  in  this  article  to  determine 
whether  the  practices  and  holdings  of 
both Courts denying full  effect to lawfully 
enacted statutes are pursuant to the  lawful 
exercise of any consti tutional or statutory 
authority.4  Analysis  of  each  Court's 
respective  rulemaking  authority  demon-
strates:  (I) that neither Court  is  autho-
rized  by the  Texas  Constitution  to  pro-
mulgate  any  rule  contrary to  any  provi-
sion of a lawfully enacted statute; (2) that 
neither  Court  is  empowered  with  any 
lawful authority to repeal, amend, or limit 
the  application  of any  lawfully  enacted 
statute;  and  (3)  that  the  practices  and 
holdings  of both  Cow1s,  whereby  law-
fully enacted statutes are deemed repealed 
and denied lawful effect in court proceed-
ings  and related matters, are  unconstitu-
tional as they exceed the scope of author-
i ty  granted  by  Article  V,  §  31  of the 
Texas Constitution and violate the  sepa-
ration of powers doctrine of Article II,  § 
1of the Texas Constitution by infringing 
on the powers of the  legislative branch of 
A basic understanding of the respec-
tive  functions and powers of the legisla-
tive and judicial branches of government 
established by the  Texas  Constitution is 
necessary  to  analyze  the  scope  of rule-
making  authority  that  can  be  lawfully 
delegated  by  the  Legislature  to  the  Su-
preme Court  and  Court of Criminal Ap-
peals.  Article III,  §  I of the  Texas Con-
stitution establishes the legislative power 
of the  State  of Texas.  The  legislative 
functions  recognized to be included with 
Article ill, § 1 include the power to make, 
alter, and repeallaw.

The Texas Consti-
tution  grants  the  Legislature  ultimate 
authority  over judicial  administration.

The Legislature has the authority to spec-
ify  the  means  and  procedure  through 
which substantive provisions in the con-
stitution are made effective.

The Legis-
lature is constitutionally entitled to expect 
the  cow1s  to  follow  the  specific  text of 
any lawfully enacted statute.

Article V,  §  1 of the Texas Constitu-
tion establishes the judicial power of the 
State  of Texas.  The  judicial  functions 
included within the grant of power under 
Article V,  § 1 are recognized as:  "(1) the 
power  to  hear  facts,  (2)  the  power  to 
decide  the  issues  of fact  made  by  the 
pleadings, (3) the power to decide ques-
tions  of law  involved,  (4)  the  power to 
enter  a  judgment  on  the  facts  found  in 
accordance with the law as determined by 
the cowt, and (5) the power to execute the 
judgment or sentence. "9  Cow1s  have  a 
duty to determine the validity and consti-
tutionality  of  any  law  enacted  by  the 
Legislature. \0 Cow1s  do  not  have  the 
authority to judicially amend any  statute 
or add words not implicitly contained in a 
statute. I I The  Supreme  Court  and  the 
Court of Criminal Appeals are authorized 
to promulgate rules  for the governance of 
the courts within their respective jurisdic-
tion.  The  Supreme  Court currently has 
rulemaking authority derived from  Article 
V,  §  31  of the  Texas  Constitution  and 
Sections 22.003  and 22.004 of the Gov-
ernment  Code.  The  Court  of Criminal 
Appeals currently has rulemaking author-
ity derived from Article V, § 31 of the
Texas Constitution and Sections 22.108
and 22.109 of the Government Code.
The origin and scope of the rulemaking
authority of the Supreme Court and Court
of Criminal Appeals will be hereinafter
The Supreme Court power to promul-
gate rules of procedure and evidence for
court proceedings in civil actions arises
from the Constitution of 1876.
V, § 25 of the Texas Constitution,
adopted in 1891, is the initial constitu-
tional source of the Supreme Court power
to promulgate the rules of civil procedure
and rules of evidence. \3 In 1939, the
Legislature, pursuant to Article V, § 25,
passed the Rules of Practice Act
enable the Supreme Court to promulgate
what ultimately became the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure. The Legislature at the
time ofenactment ofthe Rules of Practice
Act intended to delegate full rulemaking
power in civil cases to the Supreme
The provisions of Section 2 of
the Act give the Court full rulemaking
power as to matters ofpractice and proce-
dure in civil actions, and expressly pro-
vide that the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court cannot abridge, modify,
or enlarge the substantive rights of a
The Supreme Court promul-
gated what are now the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1940 and the Texas
Rules of Civil Evidence in 1982 through
authority conferred by the provisions of
Article V, § 25 of the Texas Constitution
and the Rules of Practice Act. I
In 1985, the Legislature determined a
need to delegate limited rulemaking au-
thority to the Court of Criminal Appeals
for the promulgation of rules of evidence
and rules of post-trial and appellate pro-
cedure in criminal cases, and passed a
joint resolution
leading to a constitu-
tional amendment whereby Article V, §
25 was repealed and replaced by Article
V, § 31 of the Texas Constitution. Arti-
cle V, § 3Jl9 enables the Legislature to
delegate rulemaking authority to the
Supreme Court and Court of Criminal
Appeals. Article V, § 25 and Article V, §
31 of the Texas Constitution are excep-
tions to the general prohibition against
delegation of legislative functions to the
judiciary WIder the separation of powers
provisions of Article II, § 1 of the Texas
Constitution, and confer a limited grant of
legislative power upon the COurts.20
On May 26, 1985, the Legislature,
anticipating adoption of Article V, § 31,
enacted House Bill No. 13,21 which will
be later discussed, to enable the Court of
Criminal Appeals to exercise limited
rulemaking through promulgation of rules
of evidence and rules of post-trial and
appellate procedure in criminal cases.
House Bill No. 13 was initially codified
as Article 1811 f of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes. In 1987, Sections 1, 2,
and 3 of House Bill No. 13 became Sec-
tion 22.108 of the Govenunent Code/
relating to promulgation and amendment
ofrules of appellate procedure in criminal
cases. In 1987, Sections 5, 6, and 7 of
House Bill No. 13 became Section 22.109
of the Government Code,23 relating to
promulgation and amendment of rules of
evidence in criminal cases. Section 9 of
House Bill No. 13 is presently codified as
Article 1811 f, § 9 of the Revised Civil
Statutes. Other sections of House Bill
No. 13 were repealed in 1987.
In 1985,
the Legislature enacted Title 2 of the
Texas Government Code
to consolidate
statutes relating to the judiciary. The
Rules of Practice Act, as amended, was
incorporated into the Govenunent Code
as Section 22.004.
The Legislature at
that time added Section 22.003 of the
Government Code,27 which also relates to
rulemaking by the Supreme Court. The
sections mentioned regarding the rule-
making authority ofthe Court of Criminal
Appeals were added to the Govenunent
Code in 1987. The Court of Criminal
Appeals promulgated what are presently
the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence
and the crirninallaw aspects of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure through
authority derived from Article V, § 31 of
the Texas Constitution and House Bill
No. 13. The Supreme Court promulgated
the civil law aspects of the present Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure through
authority derived from Article V, § 31 of
the Texas Constitution and the Rules of
Practice Act as incorporated into Texas
Government Code Section 22.004.
The authority of the Supreme
Court or Court of Criminal Appeals, if
any, to repeal, amend, or limit the appli-
cation of a lawfully enacted statute
through promulgation of an inconsistent
rule or otherwise in connection with law-
fully delegated rulemaking authority is at
best questionable. The Supreme Court
and the Court of Criminal Appeals en-
gage in the practice of deeming lawfully
enacted statutes repealed as to court pro-
ceedings and other matters, as discussed
at the outset in connection with the medi-
cal and mental health enacbnents. Sec-
tion 3 of the Rules of Practice Act em-
powers the Supreme Court to file with the
Secretary of State a list of statutes, known
as the List of Repealed Statutes, which in
its opinion are repealed by Section 1 of
the Act. Section 1 of the Rules of Prac-
tice Act is a general repealer of statutes
relating to civil procedure. The Supreme
Court holds that the statutes repealed by
Section 1 of the Rules of Practice Act
includes those enacted by the Legislature
on or before the effective date of the act. 28
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, contin-
ues to add to the List of Repealed Stat-
utes those which in its opinion are
deemed repealed by subsequent amend-
ments to the rules of procedure and rules
of evidence, including statutes lawfully
enacted after September 1, 1941, the
effective date of the Rules of Practice
The Supreme Court's authority for
this practice has been questioned, but
never directly challenged.
The Su-
preme Court, at the time of adoption of
the rules of civil procedure, promulgated
Rule 819/
which provides that a rule of
procedure prevails in the event of conflict
with a statute. Appellate courts utilize
Rule 819 to nullify statutory provisions
conflicting with rules of civil procedure.
Section 22.004(c)33 of the Government
Code now provides in part that "a rule
adopted by the supreme court repeals all
conflicting laws and parts of laws govern-
ing practice and procedure in civil ac-
tions." The Court of Criminal Appeals
designates all of the statutes listed in
Section 9(b) of House Bill No. 13, includ-
ing the medical and mental health enact-
ments, for repeal as they relate to criminal
cases and criminal law matters in its order
adopting the Texas Rules of Criminal
Evidence. 34 The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals does not add to its List of Repealed
Statutes. Nevertheless, any subsequent
enactment of a listed statute may later be
deemed repealed under the present orders
and holdings of the respective COurts.
An anomalous situation results from
the practices, orders, and holdings that
lawfully enacted statutes are deemed
repealed as to court proceedings and
related matters. A person affected by the
operation of a lawfully enacted Texas
statute cannot read the statute and deter-
mine its applicability in situations con-
nected with court proceedings or related
matters. The statute must instead be fully
briefed, including review of court orders
and accompanying documents, to deter-
mine if the statute, or any predecessor,
has been listed as repealed pursuant to a
standardless determination by either
The applicability of the statute
may even then remain unclear. The situa-
tion presented does nothing but create
confusion among all affected, including
the bench, the bar, and law enforcement
officials, as to the meaning and applica-
tion of lawfully enacted statutes. The
ultimate consequences of this situation
include waste of judicial resources, in-
creased probability of erroneous judicial
decisions, and failure of the courts to
carry out the will of the citizens of Texas
as expressed through lawful enactments
by their representatives in the Legisla-
The issue hereafter addressed is
whether the orders and holdings of the
Supreme Court and Court of Criminal
Appeals deeming lawfully enacted stat-
utes repealed, and accordingly inapplica-
ble to court proceedings and other mat-
ters, are made pursuant to any lawful
exercise of power or authority by either
The Supreme Court does not have
authority under the Texas Constitution to
promulgate any rule conflicting with the
provisions of any lawfully enacted stat-
ute. 1be Supreme Court in Few v. Char-
ter Oak Fire Insurance Company1B
holds that the language "not inconsistent
with the laws of the State" contained in
Article V, § 25, the predecessor of Article
V, § 31, causes the provision to be a
limited grant ofconstitutional authority to
promulgate rules not inconsistent with
legislative enactments, meaning that a
court-promulgated rule yields to the ex-
tent of conflict with a lawfully enacted
statute by virtue of the Texas Constitu-
tion. Article V, § 31 replaces Article V,
§ 25 with the same language authorizing
Supreme Cowt rulemaking "not inconsis-
tmt with the laws of the state." Readop-
tion of the language of a replaced consti-
tutional provision is presumed to be with
the purpose not to change the law.
construction of Article V, § 2S by the
Supreme Court as a limited grant of
power to promulgate rules not inconsis-
tent with the law as embodied in legisla-
tive enactments prior to adoption of the
same language in Article V, § 3 1 be-
comes a part of the constitution upon
adoption of Article V, § 31 to the extent
that it cannot be changed even by a stat-
ute expressly seeking to change the mean-
ing of the provision as construed.4O The
Supreme Court accordingly is prohibited
by the provisions of Article V, § 31 from
promulgation of rules of procedure or
evidence inconsistent with lawfully en-
acted statutes. Any rule promulgated by
the Supreme Court conflicting with a
valid statute exceeds the authority granted
by Article V, § 31 and to the extent of
conflict is null and void ab initio.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has
no constitutional authority to promulgate
rules inconsistent with the provisions of
any lawfully enacted statute. Article V, §
31(c) of the Texas Constitution autho-
rizes delegation of rulemaking authority
to the Court of Criminal Appeals by the
Legislature. Article V, § 3 1 (c) allows the
Cowt of Criminal Appeals to promulgate
rules which may be prescribed by law or
the constitution. The constitution is
construed as a whole
to ascertain the
will ofthe people of Texas.42 The courts
cannot write in an exception to the consti-
tution as any change must be written by
the people through amendment. 41 The
constitution is strictly construed where
the language is plain and unambiguous. 44
Article V, § 31 prohibits promulgation of
rules inconsistent with the laws of the
State of Texas by the Supreme Court.
The Court of Criminal Appeals cannot
logically have more power under the
Texas Constitution than the Supreme
Court. Article V, § S empowers the
Court of Criminal Appeals with fmal
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases
subject to exceptions or regulations pro-
vided in the constitution or prescribed by
law. The appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Criminal Appeals is regulated by
the Legislature.
No provision of the
Texas Constitution and no statute autho-
rizes the Court of Criminal Appeals to
promulgate rules inconsistent with the
law of the state. The will of the people
expressed through Article V, § 31 of the
Texas Constitution is that no appellate
court has constitutional authority to pro-
mulgate a rule inconsistent with the law
as embodied in a statute of the State of
Texas. Any rule promulgated by the
Court of Criminal Appeals conflicting
with the provisions of any lawfully en-
acted statute exceeds the authority
granted by Article V, § 31 of the Texas
Constitution and is null and void ab initio
to the extent of the conflict.
The Legislature has no power to
delegate to the Supreme Court or the
Court of Criminal Appeals authority
which cannot be exercised lawfully pursu-
ant to the constitution. There is an im-
plied prohibition against adding to a
condition specified in a constitutional
provision where a power is given because
the constitutional provision is exclusive
as to the circwustances under which the
power may be exercised.
The Legisla-
ture does not have power to enact any law
contrary to the provisions of the constitu-
Neither the Legislature nor the
courts can set aside a clear constitutional
A statute conflicting with
any constitutional provision is void and
The Legislature, there-
fore, cannot delegate the power to pro-
mulgate a rule inconsistent with the law
as embodied in a statute to either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Criminal
Appeals. The Legislature recognizes this
restriction upon its power to delegate
rulemaking authority to the Supreme
Court through the language of Section
22.003 of the Government Code to the
effect that the Supreme Court may pro-
mulgate and enforce all necessary rules
"not inconsistent with the law". The
Legislature, nevertheless, provides in
Section 22.004(c) of the Government
Code that "a rule adopted by the Supreme
Court repeals all conflicting laws and
parts of laws governing practice and
procedure in civil actions." Section
22.004(c) is based upon the premise that
full rulemaking power requires a provi-
sion empowering the Supreme Court to
repeal statutes as to matters of procedure
conflicting with its rules. The premise
begs the question as the Supreme Court
may not lawfully promulgate a rule con-
flicting with a lawfully enacted statute
because of the limited grant of authority
by Article V, § 31 of the Texas Constitu-
tion. The power to repeal a statute is a
power inconsistent with the laws because
exercise of the power annuls a legislative
enactment. The issue thus arises as to
whether the Legislature may lawfully
delegate the power to repeal or amend a
statute to the Supreme Court and the
Court of Criminal Appeals through dele-
gation of rulemaking power pursuant to
either Article V, § 25 or Article V, § 31
of the Texas Constitution.
A repeal of a statute is essentially
defined by an appellate court in Texas to
be the abrogation or annulling of a previ-
ously existing law by subsequent statute
declaring the former law revoked or con-
taining provisions so contrary to the prior
law that the prior law cannot stand. so A
repeal completely abrogates the former
law. An amendment alters the law leav-
ing some part of the original still stand-
ing. An amendment is a partial repeal of
a law to the extent that the meaning of the
law is changed or something is added to
or deleted from the law increasing or
limiting its application. 51 Alteration of
the scope or application of a statute is
technically an amendment. The Supreme
Court and Court of Criminal Appeals by
deeming the medical and mental health
enactments and other listed statutes re-
pealed as to court proceedings or related
matters are actually attempting to amend
the statutes so as to limit their application
to matters outside of court proceedings.
A deemed repeal may be viewed as a
legal fiction employed by a court to pre-
clude application of a lawfully enacted
statute court proceedings or related mat-
ters. The word repeal as used herein
refers to the power to either completely
annul a statute or amend a statute by
limiting its application.
The power to repeal a statute is an
exclusive legislative power under Article
III, § 1 of the Texas Constitution. The
powers to repeal or to amend a statute are
powers of general legislation which may
not ordinarily be delegated by the Legis-
lature in the absence of express constitu-
tional authority. 52 The power to repeal
laws may not be delegated under Article
III, § I or Article II, § I without express
constitutional authority as that is an ex-
clusive legislative function.53 Repeals
are either express or implied. An express
repeal specifically annuls a designated
statute. An implied repeal arises from
passage of a subsequent statute with
terms so contradictory to a prior statute
that the statutes cannot stand together.
The courts do not favor implied repeals
and ordinarily attempt to harmonize con-
flicting statutes. An implied repeal is
fmmd by the courts only where provisions
of statutes are irreconcilable.54 Repeals
may also be general or specific. A gen-
eral repeal or repealer is a clause or provi-
sion in a statute saying that all laws or
parts of laws in conflict with the statute
are repealed. 55 A specific repeal or re-
pealer is a provision in a statute designat-
ing a particular statute or statutes as
repealed. A general repeal or repealer is
effective to repeal prior enactments to
the extent the prior enactments are incon-
sistent with or repugnant to the terms of
the statute containing the provision.56 A
general repealing clause or general re-
pealer does not ordinarily repeal a special
statute even though the special statute
conflicts because the special statute is
treated as an exception to the general
statute regardless of the date of enact-
ment. 57 A general repealing clause or
general repealer is effectively nothing
more than a repeal by implication.5&
The Legislature cannot delegate the
power to repeal statutes in the absence of
express constitutional authorization with-
out violating the separation of powers
doctrine set forth in Article II, § I of the
Texas Constitution. 59 The separation of
powers doctrine of Article II, § 1 is vio-
lated where one branch of government is
delegated or assumes a power attached to
another branch without express constitu-
tional authorization or interferes with
another branch so as to prevent effective
exercise of its constitutional powers.
Courts have no constitutional power to
repeal or amend a statute.
Courts gen-
erally have nothing to do with making or
repealing statutes and violate their own
powers by undertaking to repeal a
Courts may determine the
validity of statutes and may construe
ambiguous statutes, but may not legislate
under the guise of statutory construction
by attempting to rewrite or change a
The Legislature generally
cannot delegate legislative functions to
the COurts.64 A function of govenunent
that the Legislature cannot directly dele-
gate to the courts cannot be indirectly
delegated to the courts.
Article V, § 31 of the Texas Consti-
tution does not expressly provide that the
legislature may delegate the power to
repeal statutes to the judicial branch of
government. No other provision in the
Constitution allows such delega-
bon. Courts may not write in exceptions
to any provision in the constitution
through construction as any change must
be made by the people through constitu-
tional amendment. 66 The provisions of
Article V, § 25 and Article V, § 3 I al-
lowing promulgation of rules not
sistent with the laws as embodied in
  enactments, contain an implied
prohibitIon against delegation of the
power to repeal statutes to the courts.
The power to repeal statutes cannot arise
as an implied power from the constitu-
tional grant of rulemaking authority in
any event as the provisions of Article II
§ I of the Texas Constitution allow trans:
fer of power among government branches
only by express constitutional authoriza-
tion. The limited grant of power to pro-
mulgate rules in a manner not inconsis-
tent with the laws negates implied power
to repeal statutes as such a power is con-
trary to the limited grant and cannot be
lawfully exercised.
The Legislature is
not empowered by either former Article
V, § 25 or Article V, § 31 to delegate the
power to repeal any statute to either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Criminal
Appeals. The Legislature cannot indi-
rectly delegate such power to the courts
where it cannot directly delegate such
power. Repeal of a statute is more prop-
erly a fimction of the Legislature than the
courts because repeal of a statute involves
policy considerations more appro-
pnately made by the Legislature than the
judicial branch of government.
Legislature in the absence of an express
grant of authority in the constitution
violates the separation of powers doctrine
of Article II, § I of the Texas Constitu-
tion by delegating the function of repeal
of any lawfully enacted statute to the
judiciary. The issue thus becomes
whether the Legislature in fact delegates
the power to repeal statutes to the Su-
preme Court or the Court of Criminal
Appeals through respective enabling
The Legislature does not delegate the
power to repeal statutes to the Supreme
Court through the Rules of Practice Act
as originally enacted. The only sections
of the Rules of Practice Act relevant to
the issue of whether the Act confers
power to repeal or limit application of
lawfully enacted statutes upon the Su-
preme Court are Section I and Section
3,(1} which should be considered together
as to practical effect. The magnanimous
language of Section I creates a hybrid
type of general repealer having the basic
effect of an implied repeal as to statutes
enacted on or before the effective date of
the act. 70 Section I is referred to herein
as a hybrid type of general repealer as it
purports to repeal only procedural stat-
utes or parts of statutes while leaving
substantive statutes or parts of statutes
unaffected by the repeal. The result under
this approach is that statutes having both
substantive and procedural aspects are
amended to delete the procedural aspects.
The Legislature does not undertake the
task of determining which statutes are
affected by Section I and instead leaves
the to the Supreme Court through
SectIOn 3. Section 3 authorizes the Su-
preme Court at the time of filing the rules
of procedure authorized by Section 2 to
additionally file with the Secretary of
State a list of statutes which in its judg-
ment are affected by the repeal in Section
I of the Act. The list of statutes con-
strued by the Supreme Court as affected
by the repeal in Section I of the Act
"shall constitute, and have the same
weight and effect, as any other decision of
the Supreme Court." Section 3 empowers
the Supreme Court to file a list of statutes
amounting to an advisory opinion in the
of an actual case or controversy,
and IS, therefore, unconstitutional in
violation of the separation of powers
doctrine of Article II, § 1 of the Texas
Constitution as an infringement upon the
powers ofthe executive branch of govern-
71 S .
. ectIon 3 does not under any
Circumstances authorize the Supreme
Court's practice of adding lawful statutes
enacted after the effective date of the Act
to the List of Repealed Statutes. The
language of Section I gives the Supreme
Court no more power than it already has
to determine whether an implied repeal
results as to any statute enacted on or
before the effective date of the Act. The
of Section I is of practical sig-
only as evidence of the Legisla-
ture s mtent, at the time of the Act, to
confer full rulemaking power upon the
Supreme Court. The language of Section
I relinquishing full rulemaking power to
the Supreme Court is otherwise of no
significance as one legislative
sesSIOn, regardless of intent, cannot bind
a subsequent legislature so as to prevent
amendment or repeal of any statute
prevent a subsequent legislature from
exercising its constitutional powers with
respect to the judiciary. The general
repealer in Section I only affects statutes
enacted on or before the effective date of
the Act. 73 Any statute which specially
addresses a subject matter area encom-
passed by the rules of procedure or evi-
dence may be construed as a special stat-
ute controlling over the rules in the event
of conflict. H
Section 3 of the Rules of Practice Act
as amended in 1985 and incorporated into
Section 22.004(c) of the Texas Govern-
ment Code authorizes the Supreme Court
rep.ea1 statutes by promulgation of
mconslStent rules, and is unconstitutional
an unauthorized delegation of a legisla-
tIve function violating the separation of
powers doctrine of Article II, § 1 of the
Texas Constitution. Section 22.004(c)
cannot, therefore, lawfully empower the
Supreme Court to repeal any statute or
deem any lawfully enacted statute re-
pealed as to court proceedings or related
matters. The power conferred upon the
Supreme Court through Article V, § 25
and Article V, § 31 of the Texas Consti-
tution authorizes the Supreme Court only
to promulgate rules of procedure not
inconsistent with the laws of the state
and does not relieve the Supreme Court of
its duty to give full effect to lawfully
enacted statutes.
The limited rule-
making authority conferred upon the
Supreme Court can be withdrawn or
modified at any time at the discretion of
the Legislature. The practices and hold-
ings of the Supreme Court whereby stat-
utes lawfully enacted after September 1,
1941 are placed on the List of Repealed
Statutes, deemed repealed, and thereafter
denied full lawful effect in court proceed-
ings or related matters: (1) exceed the
authority granted by Article V, § 25 and
Article V, § 31 of the Texas Constitution;
(2) exceed the authority granted by the
Rules of Practice Act as originally en-
  ~ and (3) interfere with the powers of
the legislative and executive branches of
government violating the separation of
powers doctrine of Article II, § 1 of the
Texas Constitution.
The Legislature does not lawfully
delegate the power to repeal statutes to
the Court of Criminal Appeals through
House Bill No. 13, as is demonstrated by
analysis of Section 9 of the Act in relation
to Article V, § 31 of the Texas Constitu-
tion. Article V, § 31(c) authorizes the
Legislature to delegate to the Court of
Criminal Appeals "the power to promul-
gate such other rules as may be pre-
scribed by law or this Constitution, sub-
ject to such limitations and procedures as
may be provided by law." Nowhere in
Article V, § 31 or any other provision is
the Legislature authorized to empower the
Court of Criminal Appeals to repeal
statutes. In 1985, the Legislature enacted
House Bill No. 13
to enable the Court
of Criminal Appeals to promulgate what
has become the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure and the Texas Rules of Crimi-
nal Evidence. House Bill No. 13 empow-
ers the Court of Criminal Appeals to
promulgate rules of evidence and rules of
post-trial and appellate procedure, but not
rules ofcriminal procedure. The Legisla-
ture can place any limitations or excep-
tions on the jurisdiction of the Court of
Criminal Appeals." Section 9
is the
portion of House Bill No. 13 relevant to
the issue of authority of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, if any, to repeal or
limit application of the medical and men-
tal health enactments, and other lawfully
enacted statutes listed therein. The provi-
sions of Section 9(a) allow the Court of
Criminal Appeals to select which from
among the statutes listed in Section 9(b)
it desires to "designate for repeal" in
connection with promulgation of rules of
evidence for criminal cases. There is no
outright repeal of the statutes listed in
Section 9(b). The issue presented is
whether Section 9 of House Bill No. 13
causes a lawful repeal of the statutes
listed in Section 9(b) which are desig-
nated for repeal by the Court of Criminal
Appeals. The meaning of the words
designate for repeal in Section 9(a)
affects the constitutionality of Section 9
of House Bill No. 13 \mder the separation
ofpowers doctrine ofArticle II, § 1 of the
Texas Constitution The authority, if any,
bestowed by House Bill No. 13 upon the
Court of Criminal Appeals to repeal the
civil statutes listed in Section 9(b), or
deem the statutes repealed, initially de-
pends upon the meaning of the words
cresignate for repeal. A construing court
must apply the specific text of a statute
without reference to extrinsic aids and
rules of statutory construction if the lan-
guage of a statute is not ambiguous.
The tenninology deSignate for repeal
seems sufficiently clear so as to be Wlam-
biguous as it appears on its face to mean
that the Court of Criminal Appeals is
empowered to merely designate which of
the statutes listed in Section 9(b) should
be considered for later repeal by the leg-
islature. The statutory language in Sec-
tion 9(a) does not contain an express
repealer or purport to say the statutes
listed in Section 9(b) are repealed upon
action by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The language of Section 9(a)(2), how-
ever, includes wording which renders
Section 9 ambiguous as it says "a list of
statutes repealed Wlder this section."
Analysis of Section 9 of House Bill
No. 13 Wlder the principles of statutory
construction establishes that the Court of
Criminal Appeals is not thereby empow-
ered to repeal any statute. The words
designate for repeal are not defmed in
House Bill No. 13, and \meier the rules for
construction of civil statutes must be
given their ordinary meaning Wlless "con-
nected with and used with reference to a
particular trade or subject matter" or
"used as a word of art," in which case the
words shall have the "meaning given by
experts in the particular trade, subject
matter, or art."80 Words defmed in dic-
tionaries with meanings so well known so
as to be Wlderstood by persons of ordi-
nary intelligence are not considered vague
or indefInite.
Common dictionary defi-
nitions ofthe term repeal clearly indicate
a repeal is a legislative enactment abro-
gating or armulling a prior statute.
term repeal has a distinct legal meaning
as it is similarly defined by an appellate
court in Texas.
The word repeal is
accordingly defined by law requiring
application of "the meaning given by
experts in the particular trade, subject
matter, or art. 1184 The word repeal
whether defmed by conunon usage or by
legal or technical meaning can only be
construed to mean the abrogation or
annulling of a statute by a legislative act
or action in the form of a statute. Desig-
nate for repeal thus construed means
designate for action by the Legislature.
Construction of Section 9 of House Bill
No. 13 as authorizing designation of a
statute for repeal by the Legislature does
not give the Court of Criminal Appeals
authority to repeal, amend, or limit the
application of any statute listed in Section
A construction of Section 9 of House
Bill No. 13 as empowering the Court of
Criminal Appeals to repeal statutes listed
therein, or otherwise limit their applica-
bility to criminal law matters, causes
Section 9 to be an Wlconstitutional dele-
gation of a legislative function violating
Article II, § 1 of the Texas Constitution
insofar as the Court. and not the legisla-
ture, makes the decision as to which of
the statutes listed in Section 9(b) are
repealed. Courts are required to construe
a statute in a manner so as to uphold its
constitutionality.8s The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals carmot be delegated the
power to repeal statutes indirectly when it
cannot be given the power directly by the
The wording of Section 9
does not authorize the Court of Criminal
Appeals to limit the application of any
statute listed in Section 9(b) to preclude
its use in criminal cases or criminal law
matters. The language of Section 9, if
construed to authorize repeal of any stat-
ute by the Court of Criminal Appeals,
requires a repeal of the entire statute.
The medical and mental health enact-
ments are not repealed, and continue to be
amended, indicating that the Legislature
views any designation by the Court of
Criminal Appeals as only advisory. A
construction of Section 9 as authorizing
the Court of Criminal Appeals to suggest
which of the listed statutes should be
repealed by the Legislature upholds its
constitutionality, but does not empower
the Court to limit application of any stat-
ute. The provisions of House Bill No. 13,
regardless of construction, do not confer
lawful authority to repeal statutes on the
Court of Criminal Appeals. The practices
and holdings of the Court of Criminal
Appeals deeming lawfully enacted stat-
utes repealed so as to prevent their lawful
application to court proceedings and
related matters: (1) exceed the authority
granted by Article V, § 31 of the Texas
Constitution; (2) exceed the authority
granted by House Bill No. 13; and (3)
interfere with the powers of the legislative
branch of government violating the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine of Article II, §
I of the Texas Constitution.
The holdings of the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals that the medical and mental
health enactments are deemed repealed as
to criminal cases and criminal law matters
also exceed the scope of authority granted
by House Bill No. 13 as the Act does not
authorize the court to promulgate or
affect rules of criminal procedure. The
medical and mental health enacbnents
contain procedural aspects as they set out
a procedure for obtaining medical records
and other evidence, and are therefore
special statutes.87 The medical and men-
tal health enactments, as special statutes
to the extent ofprescribing procedures for
obtaining evidence, control over the gen-
eral provisions of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure as to how such evi-
dence may be lawfully obtained.
tion of a procedure for obtaining evidence
under the medical and mental health
enacbnents constitutes violation of a
statute, and any evidence obtained
through violation of a statute is inadmis-
sible in criminal proceedings by virtue of
Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Crim-
inal Procedure regardless of its admissi-
bility under the Texas Rules of Criminal
The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals cannot deem the medical and mental
health enactments repealed as to proce-
dure applicable to criminal cases and
crirninallaw matters as such action: (1)
exceeds the scope of authority conferred
by House Bill No. 13 by invading the area
of criminal procedure; (2) exceeds the
authority granted by Article V, § 31 of
the Texas Constitution; and (3) interferes
with the powers of the legislative branch
of government by affecting procedure in
criminal cases, and thereby violates the
separation of powers doctrine of Article
II, § I of the Texas Constitution.
The Supreme Court and Court of
Criminal Appeals lack lawful authority
under Article V, § 31 of the Texas Con-
stitution to promulgate rules of any kind
inconsistent with any lawfully enacted
statute. The Legislature may not through
delegated rulemaking authority empower
either Court to do anything forbidden by
the Texas Constitution. The Texas Con-
stitution does not authorize the Legisla-
ture to delegate to either Court the power
to repeal or limit application of any law-
fully enacted statute, and any statute
which can be construed as delegating
such function to either Court is unconsti-
tutional in violation of Article II, § 1 as
an unauthorized delegation of a legisla-
tive function. The enabling legislation
delegating rulemaking authority to the
Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal
Appeals does not lawfully empower either
Court to repeal or limit any lawfully
enacted statute so as to prevent its appli-
cation to court proceedings or related
matters. Consequently, the practices and
holdings ofboth Courts deeming lawfully
enacted statutes repealed because of
rulemaking orders or activities, and there-
fore inapplicable to court proceedings,
exceed the lawful authority delegated to
each Cowt and are WlCOnstitutional as (1)
exceeding the authority granted respec-
tively by Article V, § 25 and Article V, §
31 and (2) infringing 00 the powers of the
legislative branch of government violat-
ing the separation of powers doctrine of
Article II, § I of the Texas Constitution.
The medical and mental health enact-
ments, among other affected statutes,
must be given full lawful effect in court
proceedings and related matters. The
medical and mental health enactments,
therefore, control to the extent of conflict
ova Rules 509 and 510 of the respective
rules of evidence.
The medical and
mental health enactments also control in
the event of conflict over the Texas Rules
ofCivil Procedure and the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure to the extent that the
statutes are special statutes regarding
procedure relating to the subject matter
areas covered by their provisions.92 The
Supreme Court and Court of Criminal
Appeals, ifnot content with any statutory
provisions, may lawfully reconunend
changes to the Legislature.
changes to the provisions of lawfully
enacted statutes may only be made by the
The Supreme Court and
the Court of Criminal Appeals must give
full effect to all lawfully enacted stat-
No amount of acquiescence can
remedy the violations of the Texas Con-
stitution discussed in this article.
ertheless, the situation presented may
have simple solutions.
The Legislature
enacts the laws of the State of Texas in
the form of statutes. The courts of the
State of Texas are constitutionally re-
quired in all circumstances to give full
lawful effect to all lawfully enacted stat-
1.  Tex.  Rev.  Civ.  Stat.  Ann.  art. 
4495(b), § 5.08 (Vernon SUpp. 
2.  Tex.  Health  and  Safety  Code 
Ann.  §§  611.001  through 
611.005  (Vernon  1992). 
These provisions were fonnerly 
codified as Tex. Rev. Civ.  Stat. 
Ann.  art.  5561h.  See  Tex. 
Health and  Safety Code  Ann., 
Chapter  611  historical  and 
statutory notes (Vernon  1992). 
Section 611.004(a)(9) provides 
that  confidential  infonnation 
may  be  disclosed  "in  a  civil 
action or in  a criminal  case or 
criminal  law  matter  as  other-
wise  allowed  by  law  or  rule." 
This language appears to sub-
ordinate the statutes in Chapter 
611  of the  Health  and  Safety 
Code  to  court  promulgated 
rules.  See:  Tex.  Health  and 
Safety Code Ann.,  §  611.004 
revisor's  note  (Vernon  1992). 
The  tenns "otherwise  allowed 
by law"  may condition the op-
eration ofthe statutes to proce-
dures  set  forth  in  Article 
4495b,  §  5.08.  The  word 
"rule" obviously refers  to Rules 
509  and  510  of  the  Texas 
Rules  of  Civil  Evidence  and 
Texas  Rules  of Criminal  Evi-
dence respectively.  This article 
addresses  the  question  of 
whether the operation of a stat-
ute may lawfully be limited by 
court promulgated rules. 
3.  R.K.  v.  Ramirez,  887  S.W.2d 
836,  840  n.5  (Tex.  1994); 
State v. Comeaux, 818 S.W.2d 
46,  52  n.6  (Tex.  Crim.  App. 
1991);  Blunt  v.  State,  724 
S.W.2d  79,  80-81  n.l  (Tex. 
Crim.  App.  1987).  Both 
Courts  recognize  the  statutes 
are otherwise valid and  opera-
ble.  R.K.,  887 S.W.2d at 840; 
Richardson  v.  State,  865 
S.W.2d  944,  953  n.7  (Tex. 
Crim.  App. 1993). 
4.  The discussion and analysis of 
the scope of court rulemaking 
authority herein applies  to any
statute  which  has at  any  time 
been  listed  or  designated  as 
repealed (X' added to the List of 
Repealed  Statutes by either the 
Supreme Court of Texas or the 
Court of Criminal  Appeals  of 
Texas,  and  has not  been law-
fully  repealed  by  the Legisla-
ture.  The statutes involved are
too nwnerous to analyze for  the 
purpose ofthis article, and may 
be located through reference to 
infra  notes  24,  29,  and  34. 
The medical and mental health 
enactments, and court enabling 
legislation relating to same, are 
utilized  herein  for  purpose  of 
example  as  the  statutes  have 
procedural and evidentiary as-
pects, and are referred to herein 
collectively  as  presently  and 
fonnerly enacted or codified. 
5.  Walker  v.  Baker,  145  Tex. 
121,  196  S.W.2d  324,  328 
6.  Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 
802  S.W.2d  237,  240  (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1990). 
7.  Vinson  v.  Burgess,  773 
S.W.2d 263, 270 (Tex.  1989). 
8.  Pub.  Utility Com'n  ofTexas  v. 
Cofer,  754  S.W.2d  121,  124 
(Tex.  1988);  Boykin  v.  State, 
818  S.W.2d  782,  785  (Tex. 
Crim.  App.  1991);  Ex Parte 
Hayward,  711  S.W.2d  652, 
655-656  (Tex.  Crim.  App. 
9.  Morrow  v.  Corbin,  122  Tex. 
553,  62  S.W.2d  641,  645 
(1933);  Kelley  v.  State,  676 
S.W.2d  104,  107  (Tex.  Crim. 
App.  1984); Jackson  v.  State, 
861  S.W.2d  259,  261  (Tex. 
App. - Dallas  1993, no pet). 
10.  Friedman  v. American Surety 
Co.  of New  York,  137  Tex. 
149,  151  S.W.2d  570,  580 
11.  Lee  v.  City  of Houston,  807 
S.W.2d  290,  294-295  (Tex. 
1991);  Jones  v.  Liberty Mu-
tuailnsurance Company, 745 
S.W.2d 901, 902 (Tex.  1988). 
12.  Tex.  Coost.  art.  V, § 25  interp. 
commentary (Vernon  1955). 
13.  Tex.  Const.  art. V, § 25 (1891, 
repealed  1985) ("The Supreme 
Court  shall  have  power  to 
make  and  establish  rules  of 
procedure  not  inconsistent 
with  the  laws  of the  State  for 
the  government  of said  court 
and  the other  courts  of this 
State to  expedite  the  dispatch 
of business therein".) (empha-
sis added). 
14.  Act  of  May  12,  1939,  46th 
Leg.,  R.S.,  ch.  25,  1939  Tex. 
Gen.  Laws  20 I,  amended by 
Act  of March  5,  1941,  47th 
Leg.,  R.S.,  ch.  53,  1941  Tex. 
Gen.  Laws 66 (codified at Tex. 
Rev.  Civ.  Stat.  Ann.  art. 
173la).  The  amendment  re-
lated  to  interim  rulemaking 
authority of the Supreme Court 
for  rules  prior  to  the effective 
date  of the  act,  September  I, 
1941,  and  appears  as  enacted 
at  Tex.  Rev.  Civ.  Stat.  Ann. 
art.  1731 a,  historical  note 
(Vernon  1962). 
15.  Bar Ass'n ofDallas v.  Hexter 
Tille  &  Abstract  Co.,  175 
S.W.2d  108,  113  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.  - Fort Worth  1943), ajJ'd, 
142 Tex.  506,179 S.W.2d 946 
16.  Tex.  Rev.  Civ.  Stat.  Ann.  art. 
1731a,  §  2  (Vernon  1962); 
Moritz  v. Byerly,  185  S.W.2d 
589,590-591  (Tex. Civ.  App. 
- Austin  1945, writ refd). 
17.  The Supreme Court entered the 
Order  Adopting  Rules  as  to 
what  is  currently  the  Texas 
Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  on 
October  29,  1940,  effective 
September  1,  1941.  Vernon's 
Ann. Rules  Civ.  Proc., Vol.  I,
at p.  XLIII (Vernon  1979).  See 
also  Rules  of Practice  and 
Procedure in  Civil Actions,  3 
Tex. B.J.  517 (1940).  The Su-
preme  Court  entered  its  order 
adopting  the  Texas  Rules  of 
Evidence  on  November  23, 
1982,  effective  September  1, 
1983.  Vernon's  Texas  Rules 
Ann.,  1996  Special  Pamphlet, 
Evidence  and Appellate  Pro-
cedure, at 2.  The Texas  Rules 
of Evidence  became the Texas 
Rules of Civil Evidence by Or-
der  of the  Supreme  Court  en-
tered November  10,  1986,  ef-
fective January  1,  1988.  Id.  at 
18.  Tex.  S.1.  Res.  14,  § 8 and  § 9, 
69th  Leg.,  R.S.,  1985  Tex. 
Gen.  Laws  3355  (adopted  on 
November 5,  1985). 
19.  Tex.  Const.  art.  V.  §  3/ pro-
(a)The  Supreme Court is responsible 
for  the  efficient  administration  of  the 
judicial branch and shall promulgate rules 
of administration  not  inconsistent  with 
the laws ofthe state as may be necessary 
for  the efficient and unifonn administra-
tion ofjustice in  the various courts.  (em-
phasis  added) 
(b) The Supreme Court shall promul-
gate rules of civil procedure for  all courts 
not  inconsistent  with  the  laws  of the 
state as may be necessary for  the efficient 
and  unifonn  administration ofjustice  in 
the various courts.  (emphasis added) 
(c)  The  Legislature  may  delegate  to 
the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal 
Appeals  the  power  to  promulgate  such 
other  rules  as  may  be prescribed by  law 
or this  Constitution, subject to such limi-
tations  and  procedures  as  may  be  pro-
vided by law. 
20.  Bedner v. Federal Underwrit-
ers  Exchange,  133  S.W.2d 
214,  216  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  -
Eastland  1939,  writ  dism'd 
judgm't. cor.). 
21.  Act  of  May  26,  1985,  69th 
Leg., RS., ch.  685,  1985  Tex. 
Gen.  Laws  2472  (amended 
1987) (current version at Tex. 
Rev. Civ. Stat.  Ann.  art.  181lf 
(Vernon Supp. 1996». 
22.  Tex.  Gov't  Code  Ann.  § 
22.1 08  historical note (Vernon 
23.  Tex.  Gov't  Code  Ann.  § 
22.1 09 historical note (Vernon 
24.  Tex. Rev.  Civ.  Stat.  Ann. art. 
1811 f  historical  and  statutory 
notes  (Vernon  Supp.  1996). 
Sections 4 and 9 of House Bill 
No.  13  concern repeal  of stat-
utes.  Section  4  provides  for 
repeal of designated articles of 
the  Code  of Criminal  Proce-
dure  relating  to  appellate pro-
cedure in  criminal cases.  Sec-
tion  4 is  not analyzed  in  depth 
herein  as  it  does  not  relate  to 
the  medical  and  mental  health 
enactments,  and  was  repealed 
in  1987  as  Article  1811f,  §4. 
Analysis  of  Section  4  may, 
nevertheless, be relevant  as  to 
the effect of articles of the code 
not repealed by the Legislature 
which  conflict with  the  provi-
sions  of  the  Texas  Rules  of 
Appellate  Procedure.  The 
Court's  List of Repealed  Stat-
utes  in this  regard  appear in
Vernon's  Texas  Rules  Ann., 
1996  Special  Pamphlet,  Evi-
dence  and  Appellate  Proce-
dure,  at  572-573.  See  infra 
note  86  for  partial  analysis  of 
Section 4. 
25.  Act  of  May  17,  1985,  69th 
Leg., RS., ch.  480,  1985 Tex. 
Gen. Laws  1720. 
26.  Tex.  Gov't Code Ann § 22.004 
historical note (Vernon  1988). 
27.  Tex.  Gov't  Code  Ann.  § 
22.003 historical note (Vernon 
28.  Garrell  v.  Mercantile  Nat. 
Bank,  140  Tex.  394,  168 
S.W.2d 636,638 (1943) ("This 
was  broad enough to evidence 
an  intention that all procedural 
statutes, including those passed 
at the same session of the  Leg-
islature, should become  inoper-
ative on and after September  1, 
1941. "). 
29.  The  List  of Repealed  Statutes 
includes  those  listed  on  the 
initial  list  accompanying  the 
Order Adopting Rules  entered 
October  29,  1940  and subse-
quently listed by various orders 
adopting  amendments  to  the 
rules  of procedure  and  orders 
in connection with adopting or 
amending the rules of evidence. 
The  orders  and  enumerated 
statutes listed as  repealed as to 
civil  actions  through 
rulemaking as to rules ofpro-
cedureappearinVernon's Ann.
Rules Civ. Proc., Vol. 1, pp.
XLill-LXXXllI(Vernon 1979)
and in  the 1996 pocket part
supplement thereto at XIX-
XXXD. Variousordersregard-
ingthe rulesofevidenceappear
inVernon'sTexasRules Ann.,
1996 Special Pamphlet, Evi-
dence and Appellate Proce-
dure, at 2-10, and the List of
ing the rules appears at 181.
Not every order adds to the
30. See, e.g., Tex. Gov't Code
Ann. § 22.004 revisor's note
(Vernon 1988).
3l. Tex.R Civ. P. 819. Rule 819 
istmconstitutional to theextent 
providing rules prevail over 
statutes for the reasons dis-
cussed hereinas itexceedsthe 
limited grant of authority to 
promulgaterulesnot inconsis-
tentwith thelawsofthe State 
tmderTex. Const. arts. V, §25 
and V, §31 and violates Tex. 
Const. art. II, § 1. 
32. See, e.g. , Moore v. Johnson, 
785 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tex. 
App. - Waco 1990, no writ); 
Stubbs v. Thomason, 244 
S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex. Civ. 
App. - Dallas 1951, writ 
33. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §
22.004(c) (Vernon 1988).
repeal statuteswhere conflict-
ing is, as discussed herein,
the express provisionsofTex.
Const. art. V,§31andthesep-
tainedin Tex. Const. art. II, §
1. Seeinfranote71.
34. The Order Adopting Texas
Rules of Criminal Evidence
dated December 18, 1985,ef-
fective September 1, 1986,
appears m Vernon's Texas
Procedure,at 184,and theac-
companying List ofRepealed
Statutes appears at  542-543.
The statutes listed were not
repealed by the Legislature at 
thattime, and several, suchas
Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat. Ann. art.
4495b, § 5.08 (Vernon Supp.
1996),amended as recentlyas
1995,remain on the books as
35. See, e.g., R.K, 887S.W.2dat
36. Delegationoflegislativepower
has been authorized in  limited
instances where it would be 
impossible or impractical for
the legislature to perform the
functions delegated. TheLeg-
islaturein suchinstancesmust
declare apolicy and fix apri-
mary standard governing the
exerciseofthe delegatedpower
cise of the delegated power.
Railroad Com'n ofTexas v.
Lone Star Gas, 844 S.W.2d
679,689-690(Tex. 1992);Ex
Parte GranvieI, 561 S.W.2d
503, 514-515 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978). No standards
have been established by the
Legislaturefor the exerciseof
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §
22.003(b) (Vernon 1988) di-
recting that rules of practice
and procedure for the govern-
mentof the SupremeCourtand
all othercourts ofthe statebe 
37. Cf R.K, 887 S.W.2d at  840 
n.5 and Crocker v. Synpol, 
Inc., 732 S.W.2d 429, 435 
(Tex.App. - Beaumont 1987, 
nowrit)("An uncertaintyarises 
as to whether Sec. 5.08 has 
beenrepealeda  onlylimitedto 
non-judicial disclosurecircwn-
stances. "). Such uncertainty 
causes confusion and wastes 
38. Few v. Charter OakFire In-  
surance Company, 463 
S.W.2d424,425 (Tex. 1971). 
See alsoClearLakeCityWa-  
ter Authority v. Clear Lake 
Utilities Co.,549S.W.2d385, 
389 (Tex. 1977); Kirkpatrick 
v.Hurst,484 S.W.2d587,589 
(Tex. 1972);GovernmentSer-  
vices Ins. Underwriters v. 
Jones, 368 S.W.2d 560, 563 
(Tex. 1963). 
39. City ofWichita Falls v. Wil-  
liams, 119 Tex. 163, 26 
S.W.2d910,914 (1930);Cox 
v.Robison, 105 Tex.426, 150 
S.W. 1149,1151 (1912).
40. Hubbardv. HamiltonCounty, 
113 Tex.547,261 S.W.990, 
991 (1924); Lyle v.State, 80 
Tex. Crim. 606, 193 S.W.680, 
682 (1917). See also Trav-  
eler's Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 
124Tex. 45,76 S.W.2d 1007, 
4l. Vinson, 773 S.W.2d at 265; 
Collingsworth County v. 
Allred, 120 Tex. 473, 40 
S.W.2d13,15(1931); Cooky. 
State, 902 S.W.2d 471, 478 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995); 
Oakley v. State, 830 S.W.2d 
107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 
42.  Collingsworth  County,  40 
S.W.2d at  15. 
Carpenter  v.  Sheppard,  135 
Tex.  413,  145  S.W.2d  562, 
567 (1940). 
44.  Ex  Parte  Hayckn,  152  Tex. 
Crim.  517,  215  S.W.2d  620, 
622 (1948). 
45.  Ex Parte  Spring,  586 S.W.2d 
482.  485-486  (Tex.  Crim. 
App.  1978);  Armes  v.  State, 
573  S.W.2d  7,  8  (Tex.  Crim. 
App.  [Panel Op.]  1978). 
46.  Arnold v.  Leonard,  114  Tex. 
535,  273  S.W.  799,  802 
(1925)  (tilt  is  a  rule  of 
construction  of Constitutions 
that  ordinarily,  where  the  cir-
cwnstances are specified under 
which  any  right  is  to  be 
acquired,  there  is  an  implied 
prohibition against the legisla-
tive  power  to either  add  to or 
withdraw  from  the  circum-
stances  specified. ").  See  also 
Walker,  196  S.W.2d  at  328; 
White  v.  State.  440  S.W.2d 
660,  665  (Tex.  Crim.  App. 
47.  City  of  Fort  Worth  v. 
Howerton,  149 Tex.  614,236 
S.W.2d  615,  618  (1951); 
Dendy  v.  Wilson,  142  Tex. 
460,  179  S.W.2d  269,  273 
(1944);  Ex  Parte  Halstead, 
147  Tex.  Crim.  453,  182 
S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 
48.  State  v.  Hatcher,  115  Tex. 
332,  281  S.W.  192,  195-196 
49.  Dickson  v.  Strickland,  114 
Tex.  176,  265  S.W.  1012, 
1021  (1924);  Jefferson  v. 
State,  751  S.W.2d  502  (Tex. 
Crim.  App.  1988);  Halstead, 
182 S.W.2d at 482. 
50.  Thompson  v.  United Gas Cor-
poration.  190  S.W.2d  504. 
508  (Tex.  Civ. App.  - Austin 
1945,  writ  refd)  ("Simply 
stated, a repew  is  the 'abroga-
tion  of annulling  of a  previ-
ously existing law by a subse-
quent statute, which either de-
clares that the fonner law sha11 
be  revoked  and  abrogated,'  or 
which  contains  provisions  so 
contrary  to  or  irreconcilable 
with  those  of the  earlier  law 
that  only  one  of the  two  can 
stand in force. "). 
51.  Various  definitions  of  repew 
and amendment appear at infra 
note 82. 
52.  Texas  Nat.  Guard  Armory 
Board v.  McCraw,  132  Tex. 
613.  126  S.W.2d  627,  635 
53.  Brown v.  Humble  Oil & Refin-
ing  Co.,  126  Tex.  296,  83 
S.W.2d 935. 941  (1935). 
54.  Acker v.  Texas  Water  Com'n, 
790  S.W.2d  299,  301  (Tex. 
1990);  Standard  v.  Sadler, 
383  S.W.2d  391,  395  (Tex. 
1964);  Garrett  v.  State.  161 
Tex.  Crim.  556,  279  S.W.2d 
366, 368 (1955). 
55.  Garrett v.  State. 279 S.W.2d at 
368;  City  of Beaumont  Inde-
pendent  School  District  v. 
Broadus,  182 S.W.2d406, 410 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  - Amarillo 
1944, writ refd).  Examples of 
generw repewers may be found 
at  Tex.  Rev.  Civ.  Stat.  Ann., 
Final Title  § 2 (Vernon  1967) 
(repealing all  statutes existing 
prior to enactment of the  Texas 
Revised Civil Statutes), and in 
Section  I of the Rules of Prac-
tice  Act.  Tex. Rev.  Civ.  Stat. 
Ann.  art.  1731a.  §  I  (Vernon 
56.  Ex Parte Holmes. 754 S.W.2d 
676.685 n.6 (Tex. Crim.  App. 
1988);  Garrett  v.  Slate,  279 
S.W.2d at 368. 
57.  Jefferson  County  v.  Board of 
County and District Road In-
debtedness.  143  Tex.  99,  182 
S.W.2d 908, 915  (1944). 
58.  City of Port Arthur v.  Jeffer-
son  County Fresh  Water Sup-
ply District No.1. 596 S.W.2d 
553,  556  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  -
Beaumont  1980,  writ  refd 
59.  Tex.  Const.  art. II, §  1 ("[N]o 
person,  or  collection  of per-
sons, being of one of these de-
partments,  shwl  exercise  any 
power properly attached to ei-
ther ofthe others, except in  the 
instances  herein  expressly 
  (emphasis added). 
60.  Armadillo  Bail  Bonds,  802 
S.W.2d at 239; Ex Parte Giles, 
502  S.W.2d  774,  780  (Tex. 
Crim. App.  1973); State ex rei 
Smith  v.  Blackwell.  500 
S.W.2d  97,  lOl  (Tex.  Crim. 
App.  1973).  See  also  In  re 
Thoma,  873  S.W.2d 477, 507 
(Tex.  Rev.  Trib.  1994); 
Meshell  v.  State,  739  S.W.2d 
246,  252  (Tex.  Crim.  App. 
1987)  (holding  the  Speedy 
Trial  Act  unconstitutional) 
("Although one department has 
occasionwly exercised a power 
that  would  otherwise  seem  to 
fit within the power of another 
department,  our  courts  have 
only  approved  those  actions 
when authorized by an express 
provision  of  the  Con-

stitution. H);  Hayward,  711 
S.W.2d at 655. 
61.  Lee,  807  S.W.2d  at  294-295; 
Williams  v.  State, 707 S.W.2d 
40,  44-45  (Tex.  Crim.  App. 
62.  Lasater  v.  Lopez,  110  Tex. 
179,  217  S.W.  373,  376-377 
(1919)  ("COurts  have  nothing 
to do with the making of stat-
utes,  or the  repeal  of statutes. 
They  violate their true powers 
and endanger their own author-
ity whenever they lDldertake the 
legislative role.  Legislation is 
for  legislatures,  not  courts. "). 
See  also  Hayward,  711 
S.W.2d at 656. 
63.  Halstead,  182  S.W.2d at 482. 
64.  Daniel v.  Tyrrell & Garth Inv. 
Co.,  127 Tex.  213,93 S.W.2d 
372,  375  (1936);  Southwest-
ern  Bell  Telephone  Company 
v.  State,  523  S.W.2d  67,  69 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  -- Austin 
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 
526  S.W.2d 526 (Tex.  1975). 
Alternatively stated, the Legis-
lature  carmot  constitutionally 
impose functions  on courts that 
are legislative in nature.  In  re 
Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 780 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  -- Corpus 
Christi  1977), writ refd n.r.e., 
569 S. W.2d 882 (Tex.  1978). 
65.  Key  Western  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
State Board ofInsurance,  163 
Tex.  ll, 350 S.W.2d 839, 847 
66.  Carpenter,  145  SW.2d at 567. 
67.  See  Eichelberger  v. 
Eichelberger,  582  S.W.2d 
395,398-400 (Tex.  1979) (dis-
cussing  implied  and  inherent 
powers of courts). 
68.  Chemical Bank & Trust Com-
pany v.  Falkner,  369  S.W.2d 
427,432 (Tex.  1963);  Watts  v. 
Mann,  187  S.W.2d  917,  924 
(Tex.  Civ.  App. - Austin  1945, 
writ refd). 
69.  See  Tex.  Rev.  Civ.  Stat.  Ann. 
art.  1731a, §§  I  and 3 (Vernon 
70.  Hallum  v. Texas  Liquor Con-
trol Board,  166  S.W.2d  175, 
176-177 (Tex.  Civ. App.  - Dal-
las  1942, writ refd).  See  cases 
cited supra  notes  54,  56,  and 
71.  No provision in the Texas Con-
stitution authorizes the Legisla-
ture  to  empower  the  Supreme 
Court  to  issue  advisory  opin-
ions.  An  advisory opinion de-
cides  an  abstract  question  of 
law  without  binding  any  par-
ties.  Texas  Association  of 
BUSiness v.  Texas Air Control 
Board,  852  S.W.2d  440,  444 
(Tex.  1993).  Courts  may  not 
issue  opuuons  on  abstract 
questions of law in the absence 
of  an  actual  case  or 
controversy.  Section  3  of the 
Rules  of Practice  Act  autho-
rizes  the  court  to  effectively 
issue an advisory opinion as to 
the effect of Section  I  on stat-
utes  enacted  on  or  before  the 
effective date of the act in  the 
absence  of a  case  or  contro-
versy.  See Tex. Rev.  Civ.  Stat. 
Ann.  art.  1731a,  §  3  (Vernon 
1962).  Advisory opinions vio-
late  the  separation  of powers 
doctrine as the function of issu-
ance of advisory  opinions  be-
longs  to  the  executive  branch 
ofgovernment.  Fireman's Ins. 
Co.  ofNewark  v.  Burch,  442 
S.W.2d 331,333 (Tex.  1969); 
Morrow  v.  Corbin,  122  Tex. 
553,62 S.W.2d 641,644-647 
(1933).  The  Legislature may 
not  empower  cowts  to  issue 
advisory  opinions  in  the  ab-
sence  of an  express  constitu-
tional  provision  authorizing 
same.  Slate  v.  Margolis,  439 
S.W.2d  695,  698-699  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.  -Austin  1969,  writ 
refd n.r.e.).  Tex.  Gov't Code 
Ann.  §  22.004(c)  (Vernon 
1988)  is  also unconstitutional 
for  this  reason.  Section  5  of 
the  Rules  of Practice Act and 
Tex.  Gov't  Code  Ann.  §§ 
311.032(c)  and  312.013(a) 
(Vernon  1988) contain  sever-
ability  or  savings  provisions 
which prevent entire acts from 
being voided because of partial 
72.  Central Power & Light v.  Pub. 
Utility  Com'n,  649  S.W.2d 
287,289 (Tex.  1983);  WailS, 
187  S.W.2d at 924; Bryant v. 
Slate, 457 S.W.2d 72, 78 (Tex. 
Civ. App.  - Eastland  1970, writ 
refd n.r.e.). 
73 .  Garrell  v.  Mercantile  Nat. 
Bank,  168  S.W.2d at 638.  See 
cases cited supra note 56. 
74.  Hallum,  166  S.W.2d  at  176-
177.  See  the  following  as  to 
practical effect of special stat-
utes:  Forwood v.  City ofTay-
lor,  147 Tex.  161,214 S.W.2d 
282,  285-286  (1948);  Sam 
Bassell Lumber Co.  v. City of 
Houston,  145  Tex.  492,  198 
S.W.2d  879,  881  (1947); 
Cantu  v.  State,  842  S.W.2d 
667,  685  n.l3  (Tex.  Crim. 
App.  1992),  cert.  denied  125 
L.Ed.2d  73  (1993);  Garza  v. 
State,  687  S.W.2d  325,  330 
(Tex. Crim.  App.  1985).  See 
also Tex.  Gov't Code Ann. §§ 
311.025(a)  and  311.026 
(Vernon  1988). 
75.  Polaris  Investment  Manage-
ment  Corp.  v.  Abascal,  892 
S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex.  1995); 
Public Utility Com'n v.  Cofer, 
745  S.W.2d  121,  124  (Tex. 
1988);  Board  of Insurance 
Com'rs  v.  Guardian  Life Ins. 
Co.,  142  Tex.  630,  180 
S.W.2d 906, 909 (1944); Hay-
ward,  711  S.W.2d at 655-656. 
76.  See supra note 21  for the com-
plete citation to House Bill No. 
77.  Spring,  586  S.W.2d  at  485-
486; Armes,  573 S.W.2d at 8. 
78.  Tex.  Rev.  Civ. Stat.  Ann. art. 
1811f,  §  9  (Vernon  Supp. 
1996).  See  supra  note  21. 
The  Order  of  the  Court  of 
Criminal Appeals of December
18,  1985  filed  with  the  Secre-
tary of State included  all  stat-
utes  listed  under  Section  9(b) 
of House Bill No.  13.  See su-
pra  note  34.  Section  9  does 
not state that all statutes  listed 
in subsection (b) are repealed 
upon  promulgation  of a com-
prehensive  body of  rules  of 
evidence in the trial of criminal 
cases.  Section 4 of House Bill 
No.  13  provides for the repeal 
of certain  articles  of the  Code 
of  Criminal  Procedure.  See 
supra  note  24  and  infra  note 
86 regarding Section 4. 
79.  Boykin,  818  S.W.2d  at  785; 
City ofDallas v.  Cornerstone 
Bank,  N.A., 879  S.W.2d 264, 
270 (Tex. App.  - Dallas  1994, 
80.  Tex.  Gov't  Code  Ann. § 
312.002  (Vernon  1988). 
Chapter  312  of the  Govern-
ment Code applies to construc-
tion of all  civil  statutes by vir-
tue  of the  provisions  of Tex. 
Gov't  Code  Ann.  §  312.001 
(Vernon  1988). 
81.  Floydv. Siate, 575  S.W.2d 21, 
23  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  [Panel 
Op.]  1978). 
82.  The  term  repeal  is  defmed  in
Webster's  Ninth  Collegiate 
Inc.,  Copyright  1991,  as  fol-
lows:  "1.  to rescind or annul 
by  authoritative  act;  esp.:  to 
revoke  or  abrogate  by  legisla-
tive  enacbnent."  See  also 
Black's Law    Sixth 
Edition,  West  Publishing, 
Copyright  1990, which defmes 
the  term repeal as  follows: 
Repeal.  The abrogation or an-
nulling of a previously existing 
law  by  the  enacbnent  of 
subsequent  statute  which  de-
clares that the fonner law shall 
be revoked  and  abrogated 
(which  is  called  "express"  re-
peal), or which contains provi-
sions  so  contrary  to  or 
irreconcilable with those Of the 
earlier law that only one of the 
two statutes can stand in force 
(called  "implied"  repeal).  To 
revoke,  abolish,  annul,  to  re-
scind or abrogate by authority. 
Golconda LeadMines v.  Neill, 
82  Idaho  96,  350  P.2d  221, 
223.  See  also  Abrogation: 
express  repeal.  Amendment 
distinguished  Repeal of a law 
means its complete abrogation 
by  the  enacbnent  of a  subse-
quent  statute,  whereas  the 
amendment of a statute means 
an alteration in the law already 
existing,  leaving some  part of 
the original still standing. 
The  word  repealer,  a  deriva-
tive ofthe word repeal, is like-
wise  defmed  therein  as  "one 
that repeals;  specific:  a legisla-
tive act  that  abrogates  an  ear-
lier  act."  The word  repeal is 
defmed in The Random House 
ofthe English lan-
guage, Random House, Copy-
right  1967, as  follows:  "1.  to 
revoke (l" withdraw formally or 
officially:  to  repeal a  grant. 
2.  to  revoke  or  annul  (a  law, 
tax, duty, etc.) by express leg-
islative enactment."  (empha-
sis added). 
83.  Thompson,  190 S.W.2d at 508. 
84.  A written opinion of a court of 
record is included in the defini-
tion  of  a  law  in  Tex.  Penal 
Code  Ann.  §  1.07(aX30) 
(Vernon  1994).  See Tex.  Gov't 
Code Ann  § 312.002 (Vernon 
85.  Ely v.  State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 
419  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  [panel 
Op.]  1977); Stale v. Gambling 
Device, 859  S.W.2d 519, 526 
(Tex.  App.  - Houston  [1st 
Dist.]  1993,  pet.  refd);  Tex. 
Gov't Code Ann.  § 311.021(1) 
(Vernon  1988). 
86.  Key Western Life Ins.  Co.,  350 
S.W.2d  at  847.  Section  4  of 
House Bill No.  13, like  Section 
9,  lists  articles  of the  Code of 
Criminal Procedure from which 
the Court of Criminal Appeals 
may  select  to  list  as  repealed 
with  the  Secretary  of State  at 
the  time  of filing  the  rules  of 
post-trial  and  appellate proce-
dure.  Section 4, Wllike  Section 
9,  states  that  the  repeal  of the 
articles so listed by the Court is 
effective OIl the  effective date 
of  the  rules.  The Court  is 
given the "option"  as to which 
articles  are repealed.  The 0p-
tion amounts to an  indirect at-
tempt to  delegate  a legislative 

function  as  the  Court,  and  not 
the Legislature, makes the  fmal 
decision as to which articles are 
repealed  under  this  scheme. 
Section  4,  therefore,  IS 
unconstitutional  in  violation of 
Tex.  Const.  art.  n, §  1  as  an 
unauthorized  delegation  of  a 
legislative function,  and cannot 
lawfully empower the Court to 
repeal any statute. 
87.  Tex.  Rev.  Civ.  Stat.  Ann. art. 
4495b, § 5.08 (g) (10) (Vernon 
Supp.  1996) creates an excep-
tion to  the  privileges or confi-
dentiality otherwise allowed as 
to  criminal  court  proceedings 
and prescribes a procedure  for 
obtaining  medical  records  as 
"[I]n any criminal prose-
cution where the patient 
is  a  victim.  witness,  or 
defendant.  Records  are 
not  discoverable  until 
the  court  in which  the 
prosecution  is  pending 
makes  an  m  camera 
detennination  as  to  the 
relevancy of the records 
or  communications  or 
any  portion  thereof. 
Such determination shall 
not constitute a detenni-
nation  as  to  the 
admissibility  of  such 
records  or  communica-
tions  or  any  portion 
The language of 5.08  (g)  (10) 
is  the  same  as  appeared  at  § 
5.08 (g) (8) before amendment 
of  the  statute,  effective  Sep-
tember  1,  1995.  Act  of May 
28,  1995,  74th Leg.,  R.S.,  ch. 
856,  § 4,  1995 Tex.  Tex. Gen. 
Laws  4293  (codified  as  an 
amendment  to  Tex.  Rev.  Civ. 
Stat.  Ann.  art.  4495b,  §  5.08 
(g) (Vernon Supp.  1996». 
88.  The  procedure  for  obtaining 
records  set forth  in  Tex.  Rev. 
Civ.  Stat. Ann. § 5.08 (g) (10) 
(Vernon  Supp.  1996)  consti-
tutes  a  special  statute control-
ling over the  provisions of the 
Texas Code of Criminal  Proce-
dure, and could impact  service 
and  execution  of search  war-
rants  and  grand  jury  subpoe-
nas,  among other things. 
89.  Tex.  Code  Crim.  Proc.  Ann. 
art.  38.23  (Vernon  Supp. 
1996). See Erdman v. State,
861  S.W.2d  890,  893  (Tex. 
Crim.  App.  1993);  Polk v.
State, 738  S.W.2d  274,  276 
(Tex.  Crim. App.  1987). 
90.  The medical and mental health 
enactments  cannot  be  deemed 
repealed as to matters of crimi-
nal  procedure in  any event and 
remain valid statutes under this 
scenario  for  consideration  of 
such matters as reasonable ex-
pectation  of  privacy  among 
others.  Cf Comeaux, 818 
S.W.2d at 51-53; and Thurman
v. State, 861  S.W.2d  96,  99-
100 (Tex.  App. - Houston [lst 
Dist.]  1993, no  pet.)  (holding, 
among  other  things,  that  the 
appellant  did  not  have  a  rea-
sonable expectation of privacy 
because  of the  deemed  repeal 
of  the  medical  and  mental 
health enactments). 
91.  Tex.  R.  Crim.  Evid.  lOl(c); 
Few, 463  S.W.2d at 425.  Tex. 
R.  Crim. Evid.  509 purports to 
abolish  the  physician-patient 
privilege  in criminal  cases. 
This rule conflicts with the pro-
visions of Tex.  Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann.  art.  4495b,  §§  5.08  (a)-
(f) (Vernon Supp.  1996) and is 
null and void by virtue of Tex. 
Const.  art.  V,  §  31.  The
deemed  repeal  of  Article 
4495b,  §  5.08  by either Court 
is  unconstitutional in violation 
of Tex.  Const.  art.  II, §  1. 
92. c.E. Duke's Wrecker Service,
Inc. v. Oakley, 526  S.W.2d 
228,  232  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  -
Houston  [1st Dist.]  1975, writ 
refd  n.r.e.).  See cases  cited 
supra note  74  as  to  effect  of 
special statutes. 
93 . See, e.g. , Red River Nat. Bank
v. Ferguson, 109  Tex.  287, 
206 S.W.  923,927 (1918). 
94. Board of Ins. Com'rs. , 180
S.W.2d at 909; Hayward, 711
S.W.2d  at  656;  Ex Parte
Young, 138  Tex.  Crim.  418, 
136 S.W.2d 863, 864 (1941). 
95 . Public Utility Com'n ofTexas,
754  S.W.2d  at  124;  Boykin,
818 S.W.2d at 785; Hayward,
711  S.W.2d at 655-656. 
96. Kimbrough v. Barnett, 93  Tex. 
301,55 S.W.  120,  123 (1900); 
Ex Parte Heyman, 45  Tex. 
Crim.  532, 78  S.W.  349, 354-
355 (1904). 
97.  lmmediate solutions to the situ-
ation  described herein  may be
found  by  the  Supreme  Court 
and the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals through exercise of their 
lawful  rulemaking  power  to 
accomplish the following:  (1) 
rescission  of all  orders  listing 
or designating lawfully enacted 
statues as  repealed;  (2) cessa-
tion  of the  practice  of listing 
lawfully  enacted  statutes  as 
repealed  in  COIUlection  with 
promulgation or amendment of 
rules;  (3)  amendment  of the 
rules of procedure and evidence 
to  adopt  or  conform  with  the 
provisions  of conflicting  law-
fully enacted statutes; and (4)
amendment of the rules of evi-
dence and procedure to the ex-
tent necessary to clearly require
resolution ofconflict between a
lawfully enacted statute and a
rule in favor of the statute to
insure that all valid statutes are
given full lawful effect by the
courts. Legislative solutions to
the situation described herein
may include: ( I) an amend-
ment of Section 22.004(c) of
the Government Code to con-
form with the requirements of
Article V, § 31 of the Texas
Constitution and eliminate con-
flict with Section 22.003(b) of
the Government Code; and (2)
a requirement that court-pro-
mulgated rules be expressly
approved by the Legislature as
an affumative check against
the possibility of conflict with
lawfully enacted statutes.
Reprinted with Permission of the
Voice for the Defense
and the Texas Criminal Defense
Lawyer's Association
Biographical of Don Rogers
Don Rogers is an attorney with the
law firm ofRichard Haynes &  Associ-
ates, P.e. in Houston. He attended the
University of Houston, where he re-
ceived his B.B.A. (1970), J.D. (1972),
andL.LM. (1993) degrees. He is board
certified in Criminal Law and Civil
Appel/ate Law by the Texas Board of
Legal SpeCialization.
The Author wishes to specially thank
Richard "Racehorse" Haynes ofHous-
ton for his support and encouragement
in the preparation ofthis article.
Nancy J. Bailey Appointed
Houston Mayor Bob Lanier recently
apPointed Nancy J. Bailey as Judge of
Municipal Court No. 10. The appointment
was confirmed at the Houston City
Council meeting on Wednesday, Septem-
ber 4,  1996.  Judge Bailey earned her
Bachelor of Arts Degree from Rice
University and her Doctor of Jurispru-
dence degree from the University of
Houston Law Center. Before assuming her
new position, Judge Bailey served as
Senior Executive Assistant to the Direc-
tor of Public Works and Engineering and,
prIor to that, she served as Senior Council
Aide to former City of Houston Council-
member Jim Greenwood.

. 1-.


On  diskette 
in  Word  Perfect to: 
Allen  Isbell 
202  Travis,  #208 
Houston,  TX  77002 


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On November 16, 1995 in Judge
Keagan's cowtroom, there was a very
oilightening Continuing Legal Education
seminar conducted by the State Bar re-
garding the grievance process. Several
attorneys for a cowtroom full of criminal
defense lawyers in attendance.
One of the issues that emerged
during the seminar was the relationship
between the Grievance Prone Practice
Areas (please see chart below) and the
occupational configuration of the griev-
ance panels which make up the Grievance
Conunittee. There are 180 lawyers in this
district which constitutes the Grievance
Committee, along with a number of non-
attorney citizens who volunteer their time
to sit in judgment of lawyers.
Grievance Prone
Practice Areas
(1993-1994 Discipline
Year: 5/1/93-4/30/94)
This chart represents the per-
centage of grievances filed
with respect to particular ar-
eas of law practice. For ex-
ample, 28% of all grievances
upgraded to complaint status
involved criminal law
representation. As this chart
indicates, if an attorney han-
dled no criminal, personal
injwy, or family law cases, the
attorney's chances of having a .
grievance filed were no greater
than 8% during this period.
Out of the 180 lawyers, it came to
light that a grand total of 14 had experi-
ence in the filed ofcriminal law according
to one of the Conunittee's administrative
lawyers who spoke at the seminar. There-
fore, criminal lawyers constitute approxi-
mately 8% of the Grievance Conunittee
whose case load involves complaints
against criminal lawyers at 28%.
The attitude displayed by the Bar's
personnel varied in regard to these disqui-
eting statistics. The administrative law-
yer appeared resigned to the circumstance
and gave the opinion that the Conunittee
would never be in a situation where there
could be a criminal lawyers on each of the
6 panels. The Chief Investigator offered
the opinion that criminal lawyers on the
panels were unnecessary and that all that
was needed were 6 people with "good
common sense". The Chief Attorney for
the Conunittee, Mr. Rick Perry, stated in
response to a question regarding the
Committee's make up and the perception
that criminal defense lawyers were under
represented, that the Committee was
indeed interested in getting more solo
practitioners and small finn practitioners
who had experience in criminal law to
serve on the Committee but to date very
few had applied.
Presently, it appears from the
information gathered at the seminar that
the Conunittee is primarily derived from
civil practitioners from large firms who
can afford to spend the time necessary to
sit in judgment of their peers who it ap-
pears from the information gathered at
the seminar come from areas civil practi-
tioners do not practice in. And of course,
there are those citizen volunteers willing
to devote their spare time policing our
It was not brought to light what
percentage of the Conunittee was derived
from family law practitioners or from the
plaintiffs personal injury bar but the
impression was that it was consistent with
the representation afforded to the criminal
So the upshot of the seminar's
discussion seemed to be that the areas of
practice that are receiving the brunt of the
Grievance Committee's attention are
being judged by attorneys who do not
practice in these areas and citizen volun-
teers who have never experienced the
problems associated with the practice of
In order to attempt to rectify this
apparent imbalance in the Committee's
occupational configuration and to provide
for meaningful peer review, it should be
resolved that the Harris County Criminal
Lawyers Association form a Committee
to recruit attorneys to participate on the
S tate Bar's Grievance Conunittee and
submit their names to the appropriate Bar
officials and monitor our representation
therein. Further, this HCCLA Grievance
Committee should establish liaisons with
the family law bar and the plaintiffs
persooal injury bar to likewise organize a
response to this apparent imbalance with
the Bar's grievance organization.
ALRlicense suspensions cannot be
ignored by attorneys who represent
clients charged with OWl, intoxication
assaultif apersonwasoperatingamotor
of the offense. Whether the person is
A defendant has 15 days from the
date ofnotice to request a hearing. The
dateof noticeisusuallythesamedateas
the date the person was arrested. The
licensesuspensionwill automaticallytake
effect onthe 40th day from the date of
notice ifno hearing is requested. (See
§524, Texas Transportation Code for
failure ofa breathtestand §724, Texas
Transportation Code for refusal of a
There are defmite benefits to
hearing. The most obvious benefit is
your client from suffering a license
suspension. Ifnohearingis requestedor
if onedefaultsonthedateof thehearing
the license suspension is automatic and
therighttofile an appealonthe license
suspensionis lost.
This article focuses on the statutes
regarding the filing of ALR appeals,
§524.041, Texas Transportation Code;
case law pertaining to appeals ofALR
suspensions; and case law applying to
administrative review. Throughout this
article the Texas Transportation Code
will becitedasTRC.
To file an appeal from a driver's
licensesuspension theAppellantshalldo
1.  File a verified appeal in the
appropriatecountycourt at law
within 30 days of the State
Office of Administrative
Hearings Law Judge's fmdings
and decision. Ifthecountydoes
not have a county court at law
the appeal shall be filed in the
countycourt. Ifthejudgeofthe
county court is not a licensed
attorney,eitherpartymayfile a
In most Texas counties, the
appeal may include application
for anoccupational license.
2.  Serve, by certified mail, court-
certifiedcopiesofthe appealto
both OPS and SOAH at the
State Office of Administrative
300West 15thSt. ,Ste.502
P.O.Box 13025
Texas Department of Public
c/oDirectorofHearings - ALR
P.O. Box 15327
3.  Acquire a copy ofthe agency
record. The record is obtained
through the State Office of
Administrative Hearings in
Austinandthecostis $75.00per
side oftape. SOAH Rule No.
§159.37(f) requires that the
Appellant file a written request
for the record and pay the
appropriatefeewithin 10daysof
filing the appeal. SOAH will
send a copyoftherecordtothe
attorneyandfile acopywiththe
4.  DPS, throughits attorney, isre-
quired to file an ansWC% within
20days, Rule99,Tex. Rulesof
(Either a district attorney or a
county attorney may represent
OPS on appeal. §524.041,
Procedures thereafter depend upon
1. Maximwn 90 day stay of
suspension for those who are
The statue limits eligibility to
driver's license suspension as a
result of an alcohol-related or
during the five years preceding
the date ofthe person's arrest;
and/orto personswhohavenot
been convicted previously of
DWl, for 10yearsprecedingthe
date ofthe person's new arrest.
These limitations include
person's who have been
if a motor vehicle was used;
manslaughterif a motorvehicle
wasused. See§524.042,TRC.
(Filing an appeal on an ALR
suspension will not stay a
suspension based on anything
other than the instant ALR
suspensIOn even if the
suspension resulted from the
2.  Opportunity  to  remand  to  the 
State  Office  of Administrative 
Hearings  to  present  additional 
evidence.  §524.043, TRC. 
3.  Possibility to stay the suspension 
long  enough  to  win  an  acquittal 
on  the  DWl and  rescind  the 
suspension.  §724.048  (c), TRC. 
On  appeal,  the  Texas 
Department of Public Safety is  limited to 
issues oflaw. The person whose license is 
suspended because of an ALR suspension 
is  limited,  on  appeal,  to  prove  that  the 
administrative agency/ administrative law 
judge  prejudiced  the  Appellant's 
substantial rights. (The law  from  January 
1,  1995  to  September  1,  1995  expressly 
stated that appeals would be based on the 
substantial  evidence  rule;  however  the 
TRC,  which  became  effective  on 
September 1,  1995, does not state that the 
review  will  be  based  on  the  substantial 
evidence rule.) 
Possible issues on appeal: 
1.  Whether  the  administrative 
agency  violated  the  person's 
constitutional rights. 
When an appeal process is not
provided by statute, this issue
must be included to provide
standing/or filing an appeal.
2.  Whether  the  administrative 
agency'sladministrative  law 
judge's  decision  was  made  by 
fraud,  bad  faith  or  affected  by 
other error of law. 
3.  Whether  the  agency's 
conclusions  were  reasonably 
supported by the fmdings  and by 
substantial  evidence  in  view  of 
the  reliable  and  probative 
evidence  in  the  record  as  a 
4.  Whether  the  agency's  decision 
came after careful consideration 
of the evidence. 
5.  Whether  the  administrative 
agency's  fmdings  inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions were in 
violation of a statutory provision 
and/or  beyond  the  agency's 
statutory authority. 
6.  Whether  the  judge's  findings 
were  arbitrary  or  capricious  or 
characterized  by  abuse  of 
discretion or clearly unwarranted 
exercise of discretion. 
See:  Gulf  States  Utility  Co.  v. 
Coalition of Cities for  Affordable Utility 
Rates,  883  S.W.  2nd  739  (Tex.App.-
Austin  1994);  Miller  v.  Railroad 
Comm'n, 363  S.W.2d 244, 245-46 (Tex. 
1962);  City  of El  Paso v. Public  Utility 
Commission  of Texas.  EI  Paso  Electric 
Company,  883  S.W.2d  179  (Tex.App.-
Austin  1995);  Texas  Dept.  of Public 
Safety  v.  Raffaelli,  905  S.W.  2d  773 
(Tex.App.-Texarkana  1995) 
The county court at law judge has  the 
authority  to  remand  the  case  to  SOAH, 
affinn  the  suspension  or  rescind  it. 
However,  for  the  Appellant  to  prevail 
under the  Substantial  Evidence  Rule  the 
Appellant has  the burden to  prove there 
was  a  lack  of  substantial  evidence 
presented  to  support  the  agency's 
findings.  To  compound  the  difficulty  of 
an  Appellant's  win  on  appeal,  case  law 
indicates  that  the  agency's  decision  will 
be upheld to resolve any conflict in  favor 
of the agency. 
The first published case (and the only 
published case  as  of this  writing)  on  an 
ALR suspension is Texas Dept.  of Public 
Safety  v.  Raffaelli,  905  S.W.  2d  773 
(Tex.App.-Texarkana  1995).  In
Raffaelli, DPS  appeals  a  district  court 
order that reversed an administrative law 
judge's  fmdings.  Raffaelli is  concerned 
with,  among other  issues,  the  following: 
1  )  whether  the  trial  court  erred  in 
concluding  ".. . that  the  administrative 
law judge's  fmdings  was  erroneous  and 
not  supported  by  substantial  evidence"; 
and  2) whether a technical error made by 
a  SOAH  judge  on  a  SOAH  fonn  is 
reversible error. 
At  the  ALR  hearing  the arresting 
officer testified  and  presented the arrest 
and probable cause affidavit.  The officer 
testified  that  Raffaelli  insisted  upon 
having an  attorney present when he took 
the breath test even though the officer had 
infonned him  he did not have that right. 
The  video  tape  offered  into  evidence 
supported the officer's testimony and the 
officer  concluded  that  Appellant  had 
refused to take the  breath test. 
The  Court found  that any dispute as 
to  whether  or  not  Raffaelli  refused  the 
breath  test  was  to  be decided  by  the 
administrative  law  judge.  Judge  Bleil 
wrote  that  "  .  .. although  substantial 
evidence  is  more  that  a  scintilla,  the 
evidence  in  the  record  may  preponderate 
against the decision of the agency but still 
amount to  substantial evidence."  He cited 
El  Paso,  883  S.W.  2nd  at  185  as  his 
authority and  found  there was  substantial 
evidence  to  affmn  the  administrative 
order  suspending  Raffaelli's  driver's 
Rafaelli challenged the administrative 
law  judge's  failure  to  strike  one  or  the 
other "was/was  not"  on  the  fmdings  and 
decision  sheet.  The  Court  held  that  the 
error was "hypertechnical"  and upheld the 
Raffaelli was  not  the  best  fact 
situation  to  go  to  the  appellate  level. 
However, it does illustrate how difficult it 
is going to be to prevail in  the county civil 
courts at law or at a higher appellate level 
on  an  ALR  review  predicated  on  the 
substantial evidence rule. 
North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v'
Texas  Dept.  of  Public  Health.  839 
S.W.2d  448  (Tex.App.-Austin  1992), 
cites from  City of League  City v. Texas 
Water  Comm'n  777  S.W.2d  802  (Tex.-
App. 1989, no writ) to swrunarize the
standardsofreviewforan appealfounded
on the substantial evidence rule.North
Alamo, id at 452 & 453, offers the
standards governing appeal of an
"1. The fmdings, inferences,
agency are preswned to be 
supported by substantial
evidence, and the burden is on
2. In  applying the substantial
is prohibited from substituting
its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight ofthe
3. Substantial evidence is more
in the record may preponderate
against the decision of the
agency and nonetheless amount
4. Thetrue test is not whether the
agency reached the correct
conclusion, but whether some
reasonable basis exists in  the
5. Theagency's actionwill besus-
tainedifthe evidenceis suchthat
reasonable minds could have
reached the conclusion that the
agency must have reached m
There are nwnerous cases on the
substantial evidence rule. Isuggest that
before you argue your appeal from an
ALR suspension you research some of
yourissues toensurethatyouhaveyour
from privatecounselinterestedinbiddingon
tobeawardedfrom competitivebidssubmittedin
responseto Requests for Proposal(RFPs) soon to
TheUniversityofHouston-ClearLakewill hold theThird
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NACDL wants to expand the representation of women in
criminal defense work. In doing so, your affiliation in your
local Bar Association and Criminal Defense Bar Association is
important. However, you are also important to the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and their expanded
vision towards women in the criminal justice work place.
As Chairperson of the Women's Issues Committee, I am asking
you to contact me personally to discuss your membership in
NACDL and encourage you either to become a member, if
you are not one, or expand your horizons by encouraging
other female criminal defense lawyers that you know practice
criminal defense law on a state or federal level, to join the
ranks of NACDL. Your participation is important, and with
the onset of the Women's Issues Committee during the tenure
of President, Bob Fogelnest, we have an opportunity to expand
our influence on this national organization and its agenda.
Judy Clark is the President-Elect. She is a prominent criminal
defense lawyer. This is an excellent opportunity for women
practicing in criminal defense law to espouse their concerns
and develop an agenda to help in areas of concerns, specifically
unique to the female criminal defense lawyer.
Marcia G. Shein, M.S.
Chairperson, Women's Issues Committee
52 Executive Park South, Suite 5203
Atlanta, GA 30328
(404) 633-3797
·500SO.FT. TO60,000 SO.FT.
Houston, Texas77002
RobertH. Cranshaw,Jr.
Fax: 713-223-4559
Admin I


I&. 2 


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