A.

Seminar Questions

1. What were Britains main strategic, economic and humanitarian interests in Afghanistan and
Egypt during in the 1870s-90s?

Egypt: interests changed over time note the difference between the interests that were conveyed
to the public, and the interests felt at home/ by men on the spot
In the late 1870s, British interest in Egypt was mainly to keep in step with France
(international standing).
o French policy towards Egypt under the belligerent Gambetta was an assertive one due
to bondholders having greater influence in Paris that in London, at a time when Egypt
was slipping towards bankruptcy (1875-6). The French had invested heavily in short-
term floating debt which Ismail had resorted to in the early 1870s.
o Britain felt they could not remain inactive because to allow France to steal a march on
them in Cairo would give her command of the Suez route.
In the early 1880s, Britain was narrowly focused on the economy (economic stake).
o Commercial expansion gave employment to British manufacturers and personnel.
o Export developments was financed largely by external borrowing, in which British
investors were dominant.
o Private investment in Egypt was substantial and substantially British.
By 1882, Britain had a large stake in the financial affairs (financial and service sector) of
Egypt as a result of Dual Control (Anglo-French control over Egyptian finance and economy).
o With more than half of the bonds of the Egyptian Funded Debt to be found in England,
British representative actively took part in the ruthless financial exploitation of the
country.
o This system became imperilled in the beginning of 1882, when the Egyptian Chamber of
Delegates demanded control over the share of the budget not already pledged to
servicing European debts.
o For the Controllers (especially from the British side), the Egyptian intent to curb their
hitherto absolute power in all financial and economic matters marked the start of a
descent to disorder and anarchy.
Humanitarian interests came into the fray to only to justify British intervention and
temporary-turned-permanent occupation of Egypt largely a propaganda campaign.
o Occupation occurred solely to restore order. Britain had no territorial ambitions but was
compelled to act because the flame of anarchy spread too fast for the slow movements
of diplomacy.
o The need to uphold Christianity in the face of militant Islam.
o Empire is a particular emotive subject what is Britain telling herself in this righteous
act of imperialism?
Strategic: there is the material sense, and also the intangible strategic interest that is related to
British prestige and power

Invasion of Afghanistan: 1838-42, 1878-80, 1919
Main reason: Intended to limit Russian encroachment into Central Asia, and quell local tribe
leaders.
Aims were more geopolitical developing Afghanistan as a buffer state to protect the
vulnerable northwest border of India, which was seen to be the centrepiece of the British
expansion project. Protection of India became synonymous with the protection of British
reputation/ standing as a world imperialist power, hence by extension gave the absorption of
Afghanistan a lot of weight.
Balance of Power argument part of the Great Game rivalry with Russia in Central Asia.

2. How accurate is it to describe British imperial expansion as part of a carefully planned and
coherent geopolitical strategy?

British policy was experimental and opportunistic to a degree, rather than guided by
straightforward criteria as to where and when formal or informal modes of expansion were
required.
To explain the apparently random territorial preferences of Victorian expansion, we can
look at the relationship between players exerting influence from the metropole and local agents
acting on their own discretion bridgehead
o Concept of bridgehead the hinge or interface between metropole and a local
periphery, acting as the transmission shaft of imperialism and the recruiting sergeant of
collaborators.
o 3 kinds of bridgeheads: (1) A bridgehead that captured a revenue system, possessed its
own army and mustered a powerful lobby could expand with little regard for wider
metropolitan opinion; (2) A bridgehead that was militarily weak and financially poor
made survival, let alone expansion, dependent on rhetoric in a faraway, remote
assembly; (3) A commercial bridgehead that had no means of exerting any political
influence or exploiting any available form of metropolitan intervention was content to
accommodate itself to local society and occupy a favoured commercial and cultural
niche within in.
o Depends on the relationship with local power structures depends entirely on local
circumstances
British imperialism was also curiously characterised by its eccentric progression through
the available menu, whereby it turned down economically and strategically desirable areas for
less important ones.
o Most powerful hypothesis is that late Victorian annexationism was a defensive response
to new dangers (triggered by the onset of local crisis). Further territorial acquisitions
were required to protect the gains of mid-Victorian expansion against new enemies,
external and internal, and to curb any imperial rival from excluding or subverting British
interests.
British foreign policy was more of a display of instinct to a surprise crisis a quick reaction
taken on the basis on inadequate information amid a mass of conflicting problems.
Foreign policymaking was therefore rarely a result of calm reflection on current problems.
In circumstances of confusion and pressure, instinct or traditional frequently prevailed.

Two vital aspects of external policy the empire and defence were handled by a plethora of
rival departments, each with its own specialist career civil servants. This institutional
arrangement made it difficult for anyone to see the broad picture of the problems of British
power.
Numerous government departments have interests in facets of British external policy as well.
o Since British entry into the EC, every part of Whitehall has developed a foreign policy to
some degree.

Summary:
o Foreign policy is made largely in Whitehall, within parameters set by public opinion
and pressure groups. Many government departments have input in foreign policy,
resulting in inadequate coordination between these departments.
o Divisions between entrenched staffs of the Treasury, the three services and the Foreign
Office have complicated the already acute problems of how to make the best use of
Britains diminishing share of international wealth in the face of multitudinous
challenges.
Conclusion: There was rarely, if ever, a unified concept that can be called British foreign
policy.

Respond to national interests, which is increasingly over British India.

3. Were the invasions of Afghanistan and Egypt a sign of national strength or weakness?

More of a weakness for Egypt:
Showed the blunders within the political decision-making body (i.e. in terms of the channels of
communication in receiving information).
o Men on the spot in this way had a much greater influence in shaping foreign policy
they could make any distortion and get the London office to agree.
o Biasness in information
Was all the pomp a display of British power, or masking their weaknesses?
o By showing their power, hopefully it is to scare off the rest of rivals

4. How did the reasons and motivations behind the invasions of Afghanistan and Egypt differ?

Egypt was primarily economic and financial, while Afghanistan was more geopolitical (for the
protection of India).


5. Which is more important in explaining British intervention events on the periphery or policy
makers in Whitehall?

Policy makers in Whitehall seem to constantly be in a blunder! This is largely due to:
Imperfect information they received of events in the periphery that shaped their policies
(too removed from the scene of action).
Divergences in group (party) and professional experience.

Policy makers largely made decisions by instinct.

6. How important is the European balance of power to explaining British action in Egypt and
Afghanistan?

Balance of power is a principle frequently invoked in the practice of alliance diplomacy in
Europe. However, it is a slippery, ill-defined notion.
British leaders have since the C19th employed it to identify Britain as the actual or potential
balancing agent, shifting its diplomatic weight to ensure no hostile power achieves hegemony in
Europe.



B. Make sure you are broadly comfortable with the following concepts:

Metropole/periphery UK, London, Whitehall, decision makers vs. the rest of the empire
Informal/formal control
o Informal imperialism represented a pragmatic acceptance of limited power. British
failure to intervene more forcefully than they did in any particular setting was more likely
a reflection of doubts about the efficacy of action than confidence in masterly (informal)
inactivity.
o Informal: economic forces, shadow puppetry, physical presence without formal control
over policy
o Formal:
Geopolitical (using geographical variable to understand international political behaviour global
strategy) /Realpolitik (politics or diplomacy based primarily on power and on practical and
material factors and considerations, rather than explicit ideological notions or moral or ethical
premises) strategies powers respond o challenges as and when they arrive, not based on
principles/ ideologies etc. exercise of raw power
Balance of Power powers play off against each other
Official Mind ideas, perceptions and intentions of policy makers. Within that, negotiating
various pressures and ideas.
Eastern Question encompasses the diplomatic and political problems posed by the decay of
the Ottoman Empire.
Great Game strategic rivalry between British Empire and Russian Empire for supremacy in
Central Asia. War by proxy, characterised by espionage, subterfuge. They dont want to spark
out a great war, but any other means to gain an upper hand over the other.

Reasons why Britain occupied Egypt:

1) British invasion was ordered to quell the perceived anarchy of the Orabi Revolt. (in the interest
of liberal government and to save Egypt from itself)

Counter:
The riots (which British saw as a steady descent towards anarchy) were less serious than
has long been supposed. Their aims were also not to establish a revolutionary government
and threaten order, but to secure their arrears of pay (Feb 1879) and introduce a limited
programme of reform (Feb 1881).
The more important demonstration in September 1881, far from establishing a military
dictatorship bent on revolution, installed some familiar conservatives in a constitutional
Chamber of Delegates which was pledged to pursue modest internal reforms and to fulfil
Egypts international obligations, including servicing the national debt.
Moreover, Britains men-on-the-spot portrayed the Egyptian government as unstable so as
to provoke British military intervention. All the official information reaching London during
1882 fitted the requirements of the forward party in the cabinet perfectly.
The perceived anarchy of Egypt due to revolutionary disorder cannot merely be explained
by misunderstanding and ignorance on the part of the official mind when it came to focus on
Egyptian affairs. That would be too simplistic. This was because Europeans faced a
dilemma which could only be resolved by intervention. They wanted a strong stable
government with domestic support, but this meant a greater ability for non-compliance. Yet
a weak, pliant government equated to an inability to implement external orders without
arousing opposition. Hence, it was not anarchy that drew the Europeans to Egypt, but the
European presence that made the formula for maintaining stability increasingly complex
and represented opposition as anarchy.

2) Britain was forced to intervene to protect control over the Suez Canal and to maintain its
shipping route to the Indian Ocean. (Robinson and Gallagher) crisis on the periphery.

Counter:
Though Britain did indeed have major interest in the security of the Suez Canal, evidence
suggests that the Canal was not at risk in 1882. It was only two weeks before the
bombardment of Alexandria that the security of the route became an issue in policy-making
and in the public mind, and it was only after Seymours action that the threat of a retaliatory
strike against the Canal rose.
This shows clearly that the British intent on protecting the Canal was promoted later to
justify a forward policy. It was a device to provide a rationale for action by suggesting that
free trade and international communications were in peril.
This way, British invasion could be presented favourably at home and made palatable to
Cobdenite Liberals and Gladstone.
Cause and effect need to be reversed: it was the bombardment of Alexandria that created a
threat to the Canal, not the threat to the Canal that made bombardment necessary.

3) Bondholder thesis
Britain acted in such a way to protect the interests of British bondholders with investments
in Egypt. Bondholders with a financial stake in Egypt also wielded considerable political
influence.

Counter: Too narrow

4) Labour Partys pursuit of domestic political popularity.
They felt that having a militant foreign policy would gain them political popularity at home to
compete with the Conservative Party. The forward party hoped to use Egypt to show that
Liberals could also act decisively in defence of national interests.

5) French ambitions
French policy towards Egypt was more assertive than Britains in the later 1870s, partly
because bondholders had greater influence in Paris than in London. Britain could not
remain inactive because doing so would allow France to steal a march on them in Cairo and
subsequently give them the upper hand over the Suez route. When French attitude
softened with the replacement of Gambetta with Freycinet, by then the course had been set
and Britain was dragged in the wake of France towards measures that would unseat Urabi
and break up the nationalist movement.

Counter:
We can probably only accept this argument up until the fall of Gambetta in Jan 1882.
French assertiveness was more pronounced in the outset than at the crucial final stages
leading up to British intervention. When Freycinet replaced the more bellicose Gambetta, he
had in fact renounced all French ambitions regarding military intervention in Egypt and
acted accordingly, whereas the British government was incapable of putting back the hands
of the clock.
Britain was therefore responsible for her own actions, and these were more combative and
calculated than Robinson and Gallaghers interpretations indicate.

6) Men on the spot
Could be said that the whole pattern of territorial aggrandisement after 1880 had less to do
with any grand strategy, than with the latent strength of the bridgeheads established
before the era of partition, and the irresistible pressure on governments to support them,
where practicable, against their enemies.


7) Fear within the British cabinet about what this riot represents may start an Egyptian Indian
Mutiny (Darwin)
Ministers involved in the conflict shared the widespread post-Mutiny view that British rule in
India was inherently fragile
India was the prism through which the British surveyed non-European politics. To
compromise with Orabi would mean threatening the prestige on which authority in India was
held to depend.
To have done so after the Alexandria massacre, with its horrible evocations of the Mutiny,
would have been inconceivable.
Of all the Ministers in the Gladstone Cabinet, those most alarmed about the Canal (because
of India) were those least disposed to treat with Orabi (because of India). They were the
most susceptible to alarmist report about a coming anarchy and the least likely to see Arabi
as a national leader fighting fairly for freedom.

Hopkins main thrust: Britains intervention stemmed from a conscious and sustained
defence of her expanding economic interests in Egypt.
Capitalists bringing politicians to act in their interests (men on the spot who provided the home
government with misinformation), instead of the earlier belief that politicians used commerce and
capital to forward their political and strategic aims.

Consequences of Egypt Invasion
Egypt became a veiled protectorate power left nominally in the hands of Khedive but all
decisions were made by British officials, in the interest of British and European investors
1880s Sudan rose up against British and Egyptians under Mahdi (Great One). After a series
of defeats, Britain decided to withdraw from Sudan. General Gordon refuses and is killed. He is
made a martyre to the cause of British power/ status/ reputation.

Consequences to Great Power relations
Great Powers were furious that Britain occupied Egypt
Gladstone was replaced (for not being able to save Gordan who stood at the frontiers of British
Empire) by Salisbury. Salisbury believes that
S tries to appease the Great Powers with an agreement to partition Africa (with Germany, Italy,
Belgium)
o Britain tries to create a corridor of power down the east coast (as an alternative route to
india)
o However, Salisbury cant appease the French and an imperial rivalry is developed.
French allies herself with Russia.
Franco-British imperial rivalry reaches its climax in 1888, when the British invaded Sudan
o How are the myths of empire received in the home country
o Theatre in which these rivalries are played out

Can the case of Egypt explain the scramble for Africa later?
Argument 1: French advance in sub-Saharan Africa was largely a response to Britains decision to
occupy Egypt.
Counter: French plans for moving into West Africa were formulated in 1879, 3 years before the
occupation of Egypt. Thus, Britains intervention could not have prompted their advance into Africa.
In fact, the French congratulated Britain on the action they took in 1882 as it appeared to safeguard
rather than threaten French business and personnel.

Argument 2: Britain, having occupied Egypt to defend routes to India, had to extend her control
over East Africa to complete her strategic purpose.
Counter: East Africas strategic importance was considered not in relation to the Canal but to the
Cape. Moreover, the Foreign Office and sundry business interests regarded East Africa primarily
as a land of economic opportunity. Their emphasis was on the interior as opposed to the coast, on
the potential for white settlement, and on the wealth which might be more readily generated than in
West Africa (where disappointments were more familiar?).


Imperialism of Free Trade by Robinson and Gallagher

5 fundamental contentions:
1) New imperialism of the 1870s marked no significant break with the past, as usually argued, but
showed marked continuity with that which went before a political function of the process of
integrating new regions into the expanding British economy
2) Free trade, rather than formal annexation, helped promote an informal empire which was as
tenacious as any created by troops and treaties
3) The essential dynamic that drew European powers into formal empire arose from African and
Asian events (products of indigenous societies), hence one cannot expect to understand
imperialism without first understanding those societies
4) Imperialism worked out most subtly and best through a matrix of collaborators which developed
in reference to local, indigenous needs and on the basis of traditional local elites
5) The Marxist interpretation of imperialism is simplistic, frequently wrong, and at best useful only
at certain times and in certain places

Orthodox view of C19th British imperialism:
Focused solely on events in formal empires as a test of imperial activity. In this way the C19th
was divided into periods of imperialism and anti-imperialism, according to the extension or
contraction of the formal empire and the degree of belief in the value of British rule overseas.
Mid-Victorian era period of anti-imperialism; late-Victorian era period of imperialism

Central hypothesis of Robinson and Gallagher: fundamental continuity in British expansion
throughout the C19th, by looking at formal AND informal expansion.

Britain was more inclined towards informal imperialism.

Official mind notion of a collective attitude/ se tof ambitions in Whtehall responding to crises

British history in the C19th was a history of an expanding society. British industrialisation caused
an ever-extending and intensifying development of overseas regions outside the boundaries of
formal empire.

Economic expansion in the mid-Victorian age was matched with a corresponding political
expansion. Far from being the age of indifference, the mid-Victorian years were the decisive stage
in British expansion overseas, in that the combination of commercial penetration with political
influence allowed Britain to command economies that could be made to best fit her own. A variety
of techniques adopted to diverse conditions, and beginning at different dates were implemented to
effect this domination.

7
th
October 2013

Power and Collaboration
British imperialism utopian ideal to bring modernity and progress to more backward countries.
But very rarely was this realised. These humanitarian notions were used to justify colonial
presence.
The bigger empire (the more resources you have) the more powerful you are in the balance of
power
Using empires to strengthen their positions in the European balance of power

mid C19th informal
late C19th formal

Responses are defensive reactions to challenges (to British India).

Cain and Hopkins expansion wasn't about official mind/ defensive/ reactive policies to rivals it
was actually the product of dynamic capitalism of British. Main interest was economic and financial
such a large amount of investment was overseas that when crisis erupted, they needed to take
action to ensure the security of these invesstors. Moreover, more often than not there existed a
very close relationship between the investors and the politicians shaping foreign policy.

Darwin challenges both of these views. Concept of bridgeheads that expansion was the result
of the relationship between players exerting influence from the metropole and local agents acting
on their own discretion

Eastern Question an the Congress of Berlin
Egypt part of territory of Ottoman Empire
This preoccupies the Great Powers how to deal with the collapse and remains of the Ottoman
Power. Fear of land grabbing which would lead to European war
Britains policy to protect the Ottoman Empire at all cost. They have supported Ottoman rule
as a way of protecting these strategic territories
1875 Ottomans Balkan territories rebelled against Turkish rule.
At the same time, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia formed a bloc which Britain felt
excluded from. There was a changing balance of power that put Britain at a disadvantage.
Congress of Berlin Disraeli realised he had to bring the Dreikaiserbund back into the Concert
of Europe to settle the Eastern Crisis.
o At the same time, Disraeli makes a separate agreement with the Ottomans to take
Cyprus (to make it a naval base)
o This however, antagonises the Russians (Britain played them out at the congress).
o In Russia, the Congress of Berlin was considered a dismal failure. Finally defeating the
Turks decisively after the many inconclusive Russo-Turkish wars of the past, many
Russians expected something colossal a re-imagining of the Balkan borders in
support of Russian territorial ambitions.
o Instead, Russias victory resulted in a decisive Austro-Hungarian gain on the Balkan
front. This gain was brought about by the rest of the European powers preference for a
powerful Austria-Hungary, an empire that threatened basically no one, to a powerful
Russia, which had been locked in competition with Britain in the Great Game for most of
the century.
o This leads to the problem of Afghanistan

Invasion of Afghanistan and consequences 1878
Afghanistan was crucial in strategic terms door to India.
The rivalry is called the Great Game.
Britain was worried that Afghanistan would become hostile to Britain and friendly to Russians.
Lord Lytton was aggressive toward Afghnaistan he feels that force is needed
o Where is the emphasis of expansion coming from? Periphery (men on the spot) or
metropole?
Full scale invasion of Afghanistan after the murder of Sir Pierre Cavagnari in 1879
o This is informal control with a very big threat behind it
o Also based on cooperation
British strategy to protect India: development of buffer states

The Midlothian Campaign
Invasions of Afghan and Zulu were a national embarrassment. Led to backlash against
Disraelis expansionist and jingoist foreign policies
Gladstone vigorously attacks Disraelis management of Foreign Policy
2 very different competing ideas of empire in theory in 1880s we should see a change in
British policy towards expansion but we dont see this change in the occupation of Egypt

Invasion of Egypt and consequences
Egypt was part of Ottoman Empire, but much of the time tried to exert its own power for
autonomous rule
Khedives tried to modernise Egypt, and to do so they draw in huge amounts of European
investment.
o Now Europeans have a large financial stake in the region
When Egypt became bankrupt in 1870s, Dual control was established (French/ British)

India

1857: British India mutiny
East India Company had a monopoly to run India. After 1857, India became a formal empire. In
doing so, India becomes the centrepiece of Britains imperial project.
Romanticism of the region was increased when Disraeli suggested Queen Victoria be called
Empress of India.
Ties Britains standing as an international power to the status of power.
Route to India Cape of Good Hope vs. Suez Canal

Conclusions
1) Crucial position of India
2) Interplay between European balance of power and global/ imperial expansion
3) Informal vs formal control more inclined towards informal control, but she would establish a
formal empire if absolutely necessary.
4) Role of men on the spot
5) Ritualistic projection of power how do they play a part in defining British imperialism? The
imagery is as important as military