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Persons and Family Relations | DLSU | Atty.

Legarda 1
I. Introduction (Tolentino)
Concept of Law
1. General Sense (derecho) the science of moral rules, founded on the
rational nature of man, which governs his free activity, for the realization of
individual and social ends, of a nature both demandable and reciprocal.
mass of obligatory rules established for the purpose of governing the
relations of persons in society
2. Specific Sense (ley) juridical proposition or an aggregate of juridical
propositions promulgated and published by the competent organs of state
in accordance with the constitution.
Ruggiero Norm of human conduct in social life, established by a sovereign
organization and imposed for the compulsory observance of all.
Sanchez Roman rule of conduct, just, obligatory, promulgated by
legitimate authority, and of common observance and benefit.

Morato a just precept promulgated by the competent authority for the
common good of a people or nation, which constitutes an obligatory rule of
conduct for all its members.
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General divisions of Law
Divine Law God himself is the legislator who has promulgated the law
Human Law promulgated by man to regulate human relations
Public Law
International Law which governs the relations between states and
nations that is between human beings in their collective concept.
Constitutional law governs the relationship between human beings
as citizens of a state and the governing power.
Administrative law governs the relationship between the officials
and employees of the government.
Criminal law guarantees the coercive power of the law so that it
will be obeyed.
Religious law regulates practice of religion.
Private Law
Civil law regulates the relations of individuals with other
individuals for purely private ends.
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Mercantile law regulates the special relations produced by
commercial transactions.
Procedural law provides for the means by which private rights
may be enforced.
Kinds of Specific Law:
1. Permissive
2. Prohibitory
3. Mandatory
Code collection of laws of the same kind; a body of legal provisions referring to a
particular branch of law.
History of Civil Code of the Philippines
[1940] Manuel Quezon created a code committee to formulate Civil Code of the
Philippines.
[1942] Japanese military occupation in the philippines retained the committee;
they begun its work for the codification but the records were destroyed in 1945.
[1947] Manuel Roxas, through EO 48, created a new code commission in view of
the need for immediate revision of all existing substantive laws and of codifying
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them in conformity with customs, traditions and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino
people.
[1949] On oct. 22, 1947, first draft was finished. This was revised and the final
draft was completed on Dec. 15, 1947 subsequently submitted to Congress in
1948 and approved on June 18, 1949 as R.A. No. 386.

CIVIL LAW branch of the law which has for its double purposes the organization of
the family and the regulation of property.
- mass precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among the members of the family,
and those which exist among members of a society for the protection
of private interest.
Sources of Civil Law:
1. New Civil Code
2. Some statutes [copyright law, patent law, law of waters and various
labor laws and other social legislation]
Note: Derived from Spanish and US laws.

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Taada vs. Tuvera

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for5
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. [Section 1 CA 638]
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The clear object of the above quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is mandated by law. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

It appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies
thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these
unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

Acaac v. Azcuna, Jr.

Ramonito Acaac founded Peoples Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PETAL), a NGO
engaged with the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis
Occidental. Sometime in 1995 and 2001, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous materials on
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Capayas Island, which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries. In
May 2002, Mayor Azcuna issued Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for
a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of PD No. 1096 (National Building
Code) but the notices went unheeded.

In July, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002
which classified Capayas Island as timberland and property belonging to the public domain and prohibited,
among others, the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if
authorized by the local government. Azcuna approved the subject ordinance. It was then submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental which conducted a joint hearing on the matter.

Petitioners filed an injunction action in the RTC assailing the validity of the subject ordinance on the
following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code
of 1991); and (c) it was not approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The RTC declared the ordinance void for failure to comply with publication and posting requirements. The
Court of Appeals reversed and held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance
with Section 56 of the LGC.

Section 56 of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. xxx
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(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power
conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in
the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of
such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

Petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of
time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of
the SP. It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the said
ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the Sangguniang Bayan; hence, it should be deemed
approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) of the LGC.


Kasilag v. Rodriguez
The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of mortgage.
Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements of land acquired as
homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The parties stipulated that
Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 years, and in such case, mortgage would not have
any effect.
Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands P, acting in good faith
took possession of the land. To wit, the P has no knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an
element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.
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The Civil Code does not expressly define what is meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that "Every
person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manne of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated
shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides, further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are
deemed possessors in bad faith."
The petitioner is not a lawyer and therefore not conversant with the laws. When he accepted the mortgage
of the improvements, it is based on his well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition on the
alienation of land. Thus is possessing, and consenting the receipt of its fruits, he has no knowledge that this
is already in the nature of a contract of antichresis, which as a lien, was prohibited by section 116.
Therefore, petitioner's ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the
basis of his good faith.

Simon v. Chan
[July 11, 1997] Eduardo Simon was charged by Elvin Chan of violating BP 22 (bouncing check). Three
years later 3 Aug 2000, Chan commenced a civil action in the MTC for the collection of the principal
amount of 336,000php. Chan argued that BP 22 falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code in fraud, for such
offense to be civilly tried independently.

On 23 October 2000, the MCTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent Motion to Dismiss with application
to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages. On 31 July 2001, the RTC of Pasay City upheld
MCTCs dismissal of Chans initiated Civil Case. Chan appealed to the CA by petition for review with the
following issue; Whetheror not the RTC erred in the dismissal of his case on the ground of litis pendetia.
The CA overturned the decision of the RTC with following legal basis; Though the CA recognized that civil
case cannot anymore initiated following the filling of a criminal case, the following case falls under
the exception under Rule 111 sec. 2. The case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
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The SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically, The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil
Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is
it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule,no vested right may attach to,
or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of
their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except
that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of
evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such
retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution

Furthermore, for litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes
nil.

Francisco v. Court of Appeals

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Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage filed
a suit for damages and for annulment of general power of attorney authorizing Conchita Evangelista
(Eusebios daughter in his first marriage) to administer the house and lot together with the apartments
allegedly acquired by petitioner and Eusebio during their conjugal partnership. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of private respondents due to petitioners failure to establish proof that said properties
were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to
the petitioner. As such, the CA ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the
capacity to administer them.

Indeed, Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family Code of the
Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. The aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the
New Civil Code which was expressly repealed by Article 254
[7]
(not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in
her petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case without
impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256
[8]
in relation to Article 105 (second paragraph) of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in
force. Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive their repeal. We
shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the provisions of the New
Civil Code.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy
was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for
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the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this
presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the
property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one
of the spouse.



Pesca v. Pesca
Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo Pesca, a seaman, got married March 1975
after a whirlwind courtship. Their union begot 4 children. However, in1988, petitioner noticed that her
husband was emotionally immature and irresponsible. Respondent became violent. On March 1994,
respondent assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed a complaint and respondent was convicted by the MTC of
Caloocan for slight physical injuries and sentenced to 11 days of imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the
RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. On November 1995,
RTC decided in favour of the petitioner. CA reversed the decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner
had failed to establish that (1) respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be in
cognitive of the basic marital covenant as provided in Article 68 of the Family Code (2) that incapacity is
grave, (3) preceded the marriage and (4) is incurable (5) that such incapacity is psychological (6) that the
root cause has been identified medically/clinically (7) that it has been proven by an expert (8) that such
incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA (promulgated on January 1995), as well as
the guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina (February 1997) should have no retroactive
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application. Petitioner further argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should at least only
warrant a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.