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PT&T vs.

272 SCRA 596
Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a
reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifcally as a Supernumerary Proect
!or"er, #or a f$ed period due to a certain employee who%s havin& a
maternity leave' (nder the a&reement she si&ned, her employment was to
immediately terminate upon the e$piration o# the a&reed period'
Therea#ter, PT&T a&ain hired Grace as reliever #or the succeedin& periods,
this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave' The
reliever status was then #ormally completed until she was as"ed a&ain to
oin PT&T as a probationary employee coverin& )*+ days' ,n the ob
application #orm, she indicated in the portion o# the civil status therein that
she was sin&le althou&h she had contracted marria&e a #ew months earlier'
Grace has also made the same representation on her two successive
reliever a&reements' The branch supervisor o# PT&T havin& discovered the
discrepancy sent Grace a memorandum re-uirin& her to e$plain the said
discrepancy and she was reminded about the company%s policy o# not
acceptin& married women #or employment' ,n her reply, she stated that
she wasn%t aware o# such policy at that time and all alon& she hadn%t
deliberately hidden her true civil status' .owever, PT&T remained
unconvinced o# this reasonin& pled&e by Grace and thus she was dismissed
#rom the company' Grace contested by initiatin& a complaint #or ille&al
dismissal and with a claim #or non/payment o# cost o# livin& allowances'
!hether or not PT&T is liable a&ainst Grace%s ille&al dismissal due
to certain company policy'
1arria&e as a special contract cannot be restricted by
discriminatory policies o# private individuals or corporations' !here%s a
company policy dis-ualifed #rom wor" any woman wor"er who contracts
marria&e, the Supreme 2ourt invalidated such policy as it not only runs
a#oul the constitutional provision on e-ual protection but also on the
#undamental policy o# the State toward marria&e'
The dan&er o# such policy a&ainst marria&e #ollowed by PT&T is
that it stri"e at the very essence, ideals and purpose o# marria&e as an
inviolable social institution and ultimately o# the #amily as the #oundation o#
the nation' There#ore, PT&T is deemed liable #or Grace%s ille&al dismissal
and the latter shall claim #or dama&es'
Estrada vs. Escritor
A.M. P-02-1651 Auust !" 200#
,n a sworn letter/complaint, 3leandro 4strada, complainant, wrote
to 5ud&e 2aoibes 5r' re-uestin& #or an investi&ation o# rumors that
respondent Soledad 4scritor, court interpreter o# 6as Pi7as, is livin& with a
man not her husband' 5ud&e 2aoibes re#erred the letter to 4scritor, who
stated that there is no truth as to the veracity o# the alle&ation8 and
challen&ed 4strada, to appear in the open and prove his alle&ation in the
proper court8' 5ud&e 2aoibes set a preliminary con#erence and 4scritor
move #or inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearin& her case' ,n the
con#erence, 4strada confrmed that he fled a letter/complaint #or
dis&race#ul and immoral conduct8 under the 0evised 3dministrative 2ode
a&ainst 4scritor #or that his #re-uent visit in the .all o# 5ustice in 6as Pi7as
learned 4scritor is cohabitin& with another man not his husband'
4scritor testifed that when she entered udiciary in )999, she was
already a widow since )99:' She admitted that she%s been livin& with
6uciano ;uilapo 5r' without the beneft o# marria&e #or <+ years and that
they have a son' 4scritor asserted that as a member o# the reli&ious sect
"nown as 5ehovah%s !itnesses, and havin& e$ecuted a =eclaration o#
Pled&in& Faith#ulness8 >which allows members o# the con&re&ation who
have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations?
ointly with ;uilapo a#ter ten years o# livin& to&ether, her conu&al
arran&ement is in con#ormity with her reli&ious belie#s and has the
approval o# the con&re&ation, there#ore not constitutin& dis&race#ul and
immoral conduct'
!hether or not 4scritor is administratively liable #or dis&race#ul and
immoral conduct'
4scritor cannot be penalized' The 2onstitution adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach that &ives room #or accommodation o#
reli&ious e$ercises as re-uired by the Free 4$ercise 2lause, provided that it
does not o@end compellin& state interests' The ASG must then
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so
that the #ree e$ercise clause is not in#rin&ed any more than necessary to
achieve the le&itimate &oal o# the state' ,n this case, with no iota o#
evidence o@ered, the records are bere#t o# even a #eeble attempt to show
that the state adopted the least intrusive means' !ith the Solicitor General
utterly #ailin& to prove this element o# the test, and under these distinct
circumstances, 4scritor cannot be penalized'
The 2onstitution itsel# mandates the 2ourt to ma"e e$emptions in
cases involvin& criminal laws o# &eneral application, and under these
distinct circumstances, such conu&al arran&ement cannot be penalized #or
there is a case #or e$emption #rom the law based on the #undamental ri&ht
to #reedom o# reli&ion' ,n the area o# reli&ious e$ercise as a pre#erred
#reedom, man stands accountable to an authority hi&her than the state'
$oitia vs. Ca%&os-Ru'da
#5 P(i). 252
3rticle )B 4loisa Goitia, plainti@/appellant, and 5ose 2ampos/0ueda,
de#endant, were le&ally married in the city o# 1anila' They established
their residence ))* 2alle San 1arcelino, where they lived to&ether #or
about a month' .owever, the plainti@ returned to the home o# her parents'
The alle&ations o# the complaint were that the de#endant, one
month a#ter they had contracted marria&e, demanded plainti@ to per#orm
unchaste and lascivious acts on his &enital or&ans in which the latter reect
the said demands' !ith these re#usals, the de#endant &ot irritated and
provo"ed to maltreat the plainti@ by word and deed' (nable to induce the
de#endant to desist #rom his repu&nant desires and cease o# maltreatin&
her, plainti@ was obli&ed to leave the conu&al abode and ta"e re#u&e in
the home o# her parents'
The plainti@ appeals #or a complaint a&ainst her husband #or
support outside o# the conu&al domicile' .owever, the de#endant obects
that the #acts alle&ed in the complaint do not state a cause o# action'
!hether or not Goitia can claim #or support outside o# the conu&al
1arria&e is somethin& more than a mere contract' ,t is a new
relation, the ri&hts, duties and obli&ations o# which rest not upon the
a&reement o# the parties but upon the &eneral law which defnes and
prescribes those ri&hts, duties and obli&ations' !hen the obect o# a
marria&e is de#eated by renderin& its continuance intolerable to one o# the
parties and productive o# no possible &ood to the community, relie# in
some way should be obtainable'
The law provides that de#endant, who is obli&ed to support the
wi#e, may #ulfll this obli&ation either by payin& her a f$ed pension or by
maintainin& her in his own home at his option' .owever, the option &iven
by law is not absolute' The law will not permit the de#endant to evade or
terminate his obli&ation to support his wi#e i# the wi#e was #orced to leave
the conu&al abode because o# the lewd desi&ns and physical assaults o#
the de#endant, Ceatriz may claim support #rom the de#endant #or separate
maintenance even outside o# the conu&al home'
*a)o+o vs. CA
$.R. No. ,#59, Marc( 7" 1997
Petitioners 6eoncia and Gaudioso Calo&bo& are the children o#
Casilio Calo&bo& and Genoveva 3rzibal who died intestate in )9*) and
)9D), respectively' They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in )9E*,
predeceasin& their parents' ,n )9D:, private respondents 0amonito and
Generoso Calo&bo& brou&ht an action #or partition and accountin& a&ainst
petitioners, claimin& that they were the le&itimate children o# Gavino by
2atalina (bas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one/third share
o# Gavino in the estate o# their &randparents' ,n their answer, petitioners
denied "nowin& private respondents' They alle&ed that their brother
Gavino died sin&le and without issue in their parentsF residence at Ta&/
ama"an, 3sturias, 2ebu' The 2ourt o# First ,nstance o# 2ebu 2ity rendered
ud&ment #or private respondents, orderin& petitioners to render an
accountin& #rom )9D+ until the fnality o# its ud&ment, to partition the
estate and deliver to private respondents one/third o# the estate o# Casilio
and Genoveva, and to pay attorneyFs #ees and costs' An appeal, the 2ourt
o# 3ppeals aGrmed'
!hether or not the marria&e between Gavino and 2atalina is valid
even in the absence o# marria&e certifcate'
(nder the 0ules o# 2ourt, the presumption is that a man and a
woman conductin& themselves as husband and wi#e are le&ally married'
This presumption may be rebutted only by co&ent proo# to the contrary' ,n
this case, petitionersF claim that the certifcation presented by private
respondents, to the e@ect that the record o# the marria&e had been lost or
destroyed durin& the war, was belied by the production o# the Coo" o#
1arria&es by the assistant municipal treasurer o# 3sturias' Petitioners
ar&ue that this boo" does not contain any entry pertainin& to the alle&ed
marria&e o# private respondentsF parents' This contention has no merit'
3lthou&h a marria&e contract is considered primary evidence o# marria&e,
the #ailure to present it is not proo# that no marria&e too" place' Ather
evidence may be presented to prove marria&e'
.ere, private respondents proved, throu&h testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and 2atalina were married in )9<9B that they had three
children, one o# whom died in in#ancyB that their marria&e subsisted until
)9E* when Gavino diedB and that their children, private respondents
herein, were reco&nized by GavinoFs #amily and by the public as the
le&itimate children o# Gavino' .ence, the marria&e between Gavino and
2atalina is valid'
Eu'-io Sr. vs. .')'/
1,5 SCRA !25
(naware o# the death on <: 3u&ust )9:: o# Hitaliana Har&as, her
#ull blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents fled a petition
#or habeas corpus be#ore the 0T2 o# 1isamis Ariental alle&in& that Hitaliana
was #orcibly ta"en #rom her residence sometime in )9:I and confned by
herein petitioner in his palacial residence in 5asaan, 1isamis Ariental'
=espite her desire to escape, Hitaliana was alle&edly deprived o# her liberty
without any le&al authority' 3t the time the petition was fled, it was
alle&ed that Hitaliana was <* years o# a&e, sin&le, and livin& with petitioner
Tomas 4u&enio' Petitioner re#used to surrender the body o# Hitaliana >who
had died on <: 3u&ust )9::? to the respondent sheri@' 3s her common law
husband, petitioner claimed le&al custody o# her body' Private respondents
>Har&ases? alle&ed that petitioner Tomas 4u&enio, who is not in any way
related to Hitaliana was wron&#ully inter#erin& with their >Har&asesF? duty to
bury her' ,nvo"in& 3rts' E+* and E+: o# the 2ivil 2ode, the Har&ases
contended that, as the ne$t o# "in in the Philippines, they are the le&al
custodians o# the dead body o# their sister Hitaliana' 3n e$chan&e o#
pleadin&s #ollowed' Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under
3rt' <9J o# the 2ivil 2ode, the term spouse used therein not bein&
preceded by any -ualifcationB hence, in the absence o# such -ualifcation,
he is the ri&ht#ul custodian o# HitalianaFs body' HitalianaFs brothers and
sisters contend otherwise'
!hether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse o#
Hitaliana Har&as'
There is a view that under 3rticle EE< o# the 0evised Penal 2ode,
the term KspouseK embraces common law relation #or purposes o#
e$emption #rom criminal liability in cases o# the#t, swindlin& and malicious
mischie# committed or caused mutually by spouses' The Penal 2ode article,
it is said, ma"es no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or le&al tie and another who are husband and
wi#e de #acto' Cut this view cannot even apply to the #acts o# the case at
bar' !e hold that the provisions o# the 2ivil 2ode, unless e$pressly
providin& to the contrary as in 3rticle )JJ, when re#errin& to a KspouseK
contemplate a law#ully wedded spouse' Petitioner vis/L/vis Hitaliana was
not a law#ully wedded spouseB in #act, he was not le&ally capacitated to
marry her in her li#etime'
2ustody o# the dead body o# Hitaliana was correctly awarded to her
survivin& brothers and sisters >the Har&ases?'
Cosca vs. Pa)a0&a0o-
2#7 SCRA 2!9
0amon 2' Sambo and other complainants fled an administrative
complaint to the AGce o# the 2ourt 3dministrator a&ainst 5ud&e 6ucio
Palaypayon and Melia Caroy, respondents, #or the #ollowin& o@enses:
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
<' Falsifcation o# the monthly reports o# cases
E' Cribery in consideration o# an appointment in court
J' Mon/issuance o# receipt #or cash bond received
*' ,nfdelity in the custody o# detained prisoners, and
D' 0e-uirin& payment o# flin& #ees #rom e$empted entities
2omplainants alle&e that respondent ud&e solemnized marria&es
even without the re-uisite o# marria&e license' Thus, several couples were
able to &et married by the simple e$pedient o# payin& the marria&e #ees to
respondent Caroy, despite the absence o# marria&e license' 3s a
conse-uence, their marria&e contracts did not reNect any marria&e license
number' ,n addition, the respondent ud&e did not si&n their marria&e
contracts and did not indicate the date o# solemnization, the reason bein&
that he alle&edly had to wait #or the marria&e license to be submitted by
the parties which was usually several days a#ter the ceremony' ,ndubitably,
the marria&e contracts were not fled with the local civil re&istrar'

!hether or not respondent ud&e is liable o# ille&al solemnization o#
An the char&e re&ardin& ille&al marria&es, the Family 2ode
pertinently provides that the #ormal re-uisite o# marria&e, inter alia, a valid
marria&e license e$cept in the cases provided #or therein'
2omplementarily, it declares that the absence o# any o# the essential or
#ormal re-uisites shall &enerally render the marria&e void ab initio and
that, while an irre&ularity in the #ormal re-uisites shall not a@ect the
validity o# the marria&e, the party or parties responsible #or the irre&ularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable' Thus, respondent
ud&e is liable #or ille&al solemnization o# marria&e'
1ass%'r vs. .')'/
12 SCRA 6!,
Francisco Helez, de#endant, and Ceatriz !assmer, plainti@/
appellant, #ollowin& their mutual love, decided to &et married on
September J, )9*J' Two days be#ore the weddin&, de#endant le#t a note to
Ceatriz statin& therein the postponement o# their weddin& due to
opposition o# de#endant%s mother and that he will be leavin&' Cut on
September E, )9*J, de#endant sent another tele&ram stated that he will be
returnin& very soon #or the weddin&' .owever, de#endant did not appear
nor was he heard #rom a&ain'
Ceatriz sued de#endant #or dama&es and in silence o# the
de#endant, trial court &ranted the petition and ordered the de#endant to
pay Ceatriz actual, moral and e$emplary dama&es' An 5une <), )9**
de#endant fled a petition #or relie# #rom orders, ud&ments and
proceedin&s and motion #or new trial and reconsideration'8 Ceatriz moved
to stri"e it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to
appear #or the sta&e o# possibility o# arrivin& at an amicable settlement'
=e#endant wasn%t able to appear but instead on the #ollowin& day his
counsel fled a motion to de#er #or two wee"s the resolution on de#endant%s
petition #or relie#' ,t was &ranted but a&ain de#endant and his counsel #ailed
to appear' 3nother chance #or amicable settlement was &iven by the court
but this time de#endant%s counsel in#ormed the court that chances o#
settlin& case amicably were nil'
!hether or not the trial court erred in orderin& the de#endant to
pay plainti@ dama&es'
The case at bar is not a mere breach o# promise to marry because
it is not considered an actionable wron&' The mere #act the couple have
already fled a marria&e license and already spent #or invitations, weddin&
apparels, &ives the plainti@ reason to demand #or payment o# dama&es'
The court aGrmed the previous ud&ment and ordered the de#endant to
pay the plainti@ moral dama&es #or the humiliation she su@ered, actual
dama&es #or the e$penses incurred and e$emplary dama&es because the
de#endant acted #raudulently in ma"in& the plainti@ believe that he will
come bac" and the weddin& will push throu&h'
Navarro vs. 2ud' 3o%ato0
A.M. No. MT2-96-10,, 2u)0 19" 1996
1ayor 0odol#o Mavarro fled an administrative case a&ainst
1unicipal 2ircuit Trial 2ourt 5ud&e .ernando =oma&toy' 2omplainant
contended that =oma&toy displayed &ross misconduct as well as
ineGciency in oGce and i&norance o# the law when he solemnized the
weddin&s o# Gaspar Ta&adan and 3rlyn Cor&a, despite the "nowled&e that
the &room is merely separated #rom his frst wi#e, and Floriano =ador
Sumaylo and Gemma del 0osario, which was solemnized at the
respondent%s residence which does not #all within his urisdictional area'
0espondent ud&e see"s e$culpation #rom his act o# havin&
solemnized the marria&e between Gaspar Ta&adan, a married man
separated #rom his wi#e, and 3rlyn Cor&a by statin& that he merely relied
on the 3Gdavit issued by the 1unicipal Trial 5ud&e o# Casey, Samar,
confrmin& the #act that 1r' Ta&adan and his frst wi#e have not seen each
other #or almost seven years' !ith respect to the second char&e, he
maintains that in solemnizin& the marria&e between Sumaylo and =el
0osario, he did not violate 3rticle I, para&raph ) o# the Family 2ode and
that article : thereo# applies to the case in -uestion'
!hether or not the respondent ud&e may be held liable #or
solemnizin& marria&es which did not comply with the re-uisites in the F2'
The 2ourt held that even i# the spouse present has a well/#ounded
belie# that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceedin&
#or the declaration o# presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subse-uent marria&e' ,n this case, Ta&adan was not able to present a
summary proceedin& #or the declaration o# the frst wi#e%s presumptive
death thus, he is still considered married to his frst wi#e'
3 marria&e can only be considered beyond the boundaries o# the
urisdiction o# the ud&e in the #ollowin& instances: >)? at the point o# deathB
><? in remote placesB or >E? upon re-uest o# both parties in writin& in a
sworn statement to this e@ect' Mone o# these were complied with there#ore
there is an irre&ularity'
Ara4's vs. 2ud' 5ccia-o
A.M. No. MT2-02-1#09 A&ri) 11" 2002
Petitioner 1ercedita 1ata char&ed respondent ud&e with Gross
,&norance o# the 6aw, via a sworn 6etter/2omplaint, #or solemnizin& the
marria&e between petitioner and her late &room >0et'? 2ommodore
=ominador C' Arobia without the re-uisite marria&e license, amon& others'
Since the marria&e is a nullity, petitioner%s ri&ht, upon Arobia%s
death, to inherit the vast properties8 le#t by Arobia was not reco&nized'
Petitioner was li"ewise deprived o# receivin& the pensions o# Arobia'
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed a&ainst respondent #or his
ille&al acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and su@erin&s' The case was re#erred by the
AGce o# the 2hie# 5ustice to the AGce o# the 2ourt 3dministrator, which
re-uired the respondent to comment on the complaint'
0espondent averred, amon& others, that be#ore startin& the
ceremony, he e$amined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner
and he discovered that the parties did not possess the re-uisite marria&e
license so he re#used to solemnize the marria&e' .owever, due to the
earnest pleas o# the parties, the inNu$ o# visitors, and the delivery o# the
provisions #or the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marria&e out o#
human compassion' 3#ter the solemnization, respondent reiterated the
need #or the marria&e license and admonished the parties that their #ailure
to &ive it would render the marria&e void' Petitioner and Arobia assured
the respondent that they would &ive the license to him, but they never did'
.e attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner su@ered as due
to her own #ault and ne&li&ence'
!hether or not respondent%s &uilty o# solemnizin& a marria&e
without a marria&e license and outside his territorial urisdiction'
0espondent ud&e should be #aulted #or solemnizin& a marria&e
without the re-uisite marria&e license' ,n People vs. Lara, the Supreme
2ourt held that a marria&e, which preceded the issuance o# the marria&e
license, is void, and that subse-uent issuance o# such license cannot
render or even add an iota o# validity to the marria&e' 4$cept in cases
provided by law, it is the marria&e license that &ives the solemnizin&
oGcer the authority to conduct marria&e' 0espondent ud&e did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marria&e o# the petitioner'
5ud&es, who are appointed to specifc urisdictions, may oGciate in
weddin&s only within said areas and not beyond' !here a ud&e solemnizes
a marria&e outside his courtFs urisdiction, there is a resultant irre&ularity in
the #ormal re-uisite, which while it may not a@ect the validity o# the
marria&e, may subect the oGciatin& oGcial to administrative liability'
.da. 3' C(ua vs. CA
$.R. No. 116,#5 Marc( 5" 199,
0oberto 2hua was the common/law husband o# Florita 3' Halleo
and had two ille&itimate sons with her' An <: 1ay )99<, 0oberto 2hua died
intestate in =avao 2ity' (pon the death o# 0oberto, Halleo fled with the
0e&ional Trial 2ourt o# 2otabato 2ity a petition #or the &uardianship and
administration over the persons and properties o# the two minors' .erein
petitioner fled #or its dismissal, claimin& that she was the sole survivin&
heir o# the decedent bein& his wi#eB and that the decedent was a resident
o# =avao 2ity and not 2otabato 2ity, which means that the said court was
not the proper #orum to settle said matters'
The petitioner #ailed to submit the ori&inal copy o# the marria&e
contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy o# said
marria&e contract, Trans#er 2ertifcate o# Title issued in the name o#
0oberto 6' 2hua married to 3ntonietta Garcia, and a resident o# =avao 2ityB
0esidence 2ertifcates #rom )9:: and )9:9 issued at =avao 2ity indicatin&
that he was married and was born in 2otabato 2ityB ,ncome Ta$ 0eturns #or
)99+ and )99) fled in =avao 2ity where the status o# the decedent was
stated as marriedB passport o# the decedent speci#yin& that he was married
and his residence was =avao 2ity' The trial court ruled that she #ailed to
establish the validity o# marria&e, and even denied her petition' This was
latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in #avor o# herein
!hether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their
rulin& on the validity o# marria&e o# 3ntonietta Garcia to 0oberto 2hua'
The Supreme 2ourt held that the lower court and the appellate
court are correct in holdin& that petitioner herein #ailed to establish the
truth o# her alle&ation that she was the law#ul wi#e o# the decedent' The
best evidence is a valid marria&e contract which the petitioner #ailed to
produce' Trans#er 2ertifcates o# Title, 0esidence 2ertifcates, passports and
other similar documents cannot prove marria&e especially so when the
petitioner has submitted a certifcation #rom the 6ocal 2ivil 0e&istrar
concerned that the alle&ed marria&e was not re&istered and a letter #rom
the ud&e alle&ed to have solemnized the marria&e that he has not
solemnized said alle&ed marria&e' The lower court correctly disre&arded
the Photostat copy o# the marria&e certifcate which she presented, this
bein& a violation o# the best evidence rule, to&ether with other worthless
pieces o# evidence' 3 valid, ori&inal marria&e contract would be the best
evidence that the petitioner should have presented' Failure to present it as
evidence would ma"e the marria&e dubious'
R'&u+)ic o6 t(' P(i)i&&i-'s vs. CA a-d Castro
$.R. No. 10#0!7 S'&t'%+'r 12" 199!
An 5une <J, )9I+, 3n&elina 1' 2astro and 4dwin F' 2ardenas were
married in a civil ceremony per#ormed by 5ud&e Pablo 1' 1alvar, 2ity 2ourt
5ud&e o# Pasay 2ity' The marria&e was celebrated without the "nowled&e o#
2astro%s parents' =e#endant 2ardenas personally attended to the
processin& o# the documents re-uired #or the celebration o# the marria&e,
includin& the procurement o# the marria&e license' ,n #act, the marria&e
contract itsel# states that marria&e license no' E)9D):< was issued in the
name o# the contractin& parties on 5une <J, )9I+ in Pasi&, 1etro 1anila'
The couple did not immediately live to&ether as husband and wi#e
since the marria&e was un"nown to 2astro%s parents' Thus, it was only in
1arch )9I), when 2astro discovered she was pre&nant, that the couple
decided to live to&ether' .owever, their cohabitation lasted only #or #our
>J? months' Therea#ter, the couple parted ways' An Actober )9, )9I),
2astro &ave birth' The baby was adopted by 2astro%s brother, with the
consent o# 2ardenas'
!hether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences
presented by private respondent are suGcient to establish that no
marria&e license was issued by the 2ivil 0e&istrar o# Pasi& prior to the
celebration o# the marria&e o# private respondent to 4dwin F' 2ardenas'
The law provides that no marria&e shall be solemnized without a
marria&e license frst issued by a local re&istrar' Cein& one o# the essential
re-uisites o# a valid marria&e, absence to the parties is not ade-uate to
prove its non/issuance' The above rule authorized the custodian o#
documents to certi#y that despite dili&ent search, a particular document
does not e$ist in his oGce or that a particular entry o# a specifed tenor
was not bein& #ound in a re&istrar' 3s custodians o# public documents, civil
re&istrars are public oGcers char&ed with the duty, inter alia, o#
maintainin& a re&ister boo" where they are re-uired to enter all
applications #or marria&e license, includin& the names o# the applicants,
the date the marria&e license was issued and such other relevant data'
The certifcation o# due search and inability to fnd issued by the
civil re&istrar o# Pasi& enoys probative value, he bein& the oGcer char&ed
under the law to "eep a record o# all data relative to the issuance o# a
marria&e license' (naccompanied by any circumstance o# suspicion and
pursuant to Section <9, 0ule )E< o# the 0ules o# 2ourt, a certifcate o# due
search and inability to fnd suGciently proved that his oGce did not issue
marria&e license no' )E9D):< to the contractin& parties' There bein& no
marria&e license, the marria&e o# 3n&elina and 4dwin is void ab initio'
$arcia vs. R'cio
$.R. No. 1#,#22 5cto+'r 2" 2001
3rticle <DB The respondent, 0ederic" 0ecio, a Filipino was married
to 4ditha Samson, an 3ustralian citizen, in 0izal in )9:I' They lived
to&ether as husband and wi#e in 3ustralia' ,n )9:9, the 3ustralian #amily
court issued a decree o# divorce supposedly dissolvin& the marria&e' ,n
)99<, respondent ac-uired 3ustralian citizenship' ,n )99J, he married
Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in 2abanatuan 2ity' ,n their
application #or marria&e license, respondent was declared as sin&le8 and
Filipino'8 Since Actober )99*, they lived separately, and in )99D while in
3ustralia, their conu&al assets were divided'
,n )99:, petitioner fled 2omplaint #or =eclaration o# Mullity o#
1arria&e on the &round o# bi&amy, claimin& that she learned o# the
respondent%s #ormer marria&e only in Movember' An the other hand,
respondent claims that he told petitioner o# his prior marria&e in )99E,
be#ore they were married' 0espondent also contended that his frst
marria&e was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in 3ustralia in )9:9
and hence, he was le&ally capacitated to marry petitioner in )99J' The trial
court declared that the frst marria&e was dissolved on the &round o# the
divorce issued in 3ustralia as valid and reco&nized in the Philippines'
.ence, this petition was #orwarded be#ore the Supreme 2ourt'
!hether or not respondent has le&al capacity to marry Grace
,n mi$ed marria&es involvin& a Filipino and a #orei&ner, 3rticle <D o#
the Family 2ode allows the #ormer to contract a subse-uent marria&e in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitatin& him or her to remarry'8 3 divorce obtained abroad by two
aliens, may be reco&nized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective laws' There#ore, be#ore our courts can reco&nize a #orei&n
divorce, the party pleadin& it must prove the divorce as a #act and
demonstrate its con#ormity to the #orei&n law allowin& it'
,n this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and
Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an 3ustralian #amily court'
3lthou&h, appearance is not suGcient, and compliance with the rules on
evidence re&ardin& alle&ed #orei&n laws must be demonstrated, the decree
was admitted on account o# petitioner%s #ailure to obect properly because
he obected to the #act that it was not re&istered in the 6ocal 2ivil 0e&istry
o# 2abanatuan 2ity, not to its admissibility'
0espondent claims that the 3ustralian divorce decree, which was
validly admitted as evidence, ade-uately established his le&al capacity to
marry under 3ustralian law' 4ven a#ter the divorce becomes absolute, the
court may under some #orei&n statutes, still restrict remarria&e'
0espondent also #ailed to produce suGcient evidence showin& the #orei&n
law &overnin& his status' To&ether with other evidences submitted, they
don%t absolutely establish his le&al capacity to remarry'
Pi)a&i) vs. 7+a0-So%'ra
17! SCRA 65#
3rticle <DB An September I, )9I9, petitioner ,melda Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent 4rich Geilin&, a German national,
were married in the Federal 0epublic o# Germany' The marria&e started
auspiciously enou&h, and the couple lived to&ether #or some time in
1alate, 1anila' Therea#ter, marital discord set in, #ollowed by a separation
de #acto between them' 3#ter about three and a hal# years o# marria&e,
private respondent initiatin& a divorce proceedin& a&ainst petitioner in
Germany' .e claimed that there was #ailure o# their marria&e and that they
had been livin& apart since 3pril )9:<' An 5anuary )*, )9:D, Schoneber&
6ocal 2ourt promul&ated a decree o# divorce on the &round o# #ailure o#
marria&e o# the spouses' The custody o# the child was &ranted to
petitioner' Petitioner, on the other hand, fled an action #or le&al separation,
support and separation o# property be#ore the 0e&ional Trial 2ourt o# 1anila
on 5anuary <E, )9:E'
1ore than fve months a#ter the issuance o# the divorce decree,
private respondent fled two complaints #or adultery be#ore the 2ity Fiscal
o# 1anila alle&in& that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
Khad an a@air with a certain !illiam 2hia as early as )9:< and with yet
another man named 5ames 2hua sometime in )9:EK' An Actober <I, )9:I,
petitioner fled this special civil action #or certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer #or a temporary restrainin& order, see"in& the annulment o# the
order o# the lower court denyin& her motion to -uash'
!hether or not the criminal cases fled by the German e$/spouse
may prosper'
(nder 3rticle EJJ o# the 0evised Penal 2ode, the crime o# adultery
cannot be prosecuted e$cept upon a sworn written complaint fled by the
o@ended spouse' 2orollary to such e$clusive &rant o# power to the
o@ended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily #ollows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or le&al representation to do so at
the time o# the flin& o# the criminal action' .ence, 3rticle EJJ o# the
0evised Penal 2ode thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsistin& at the time o# the institution o# the criminal action #or adultery'
,n the present case, the #act that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal 0epublic o# Germany, is admitted'
Said divorce and its le&al e@ects may be reco&nized in the Philippines
inso#ar as private respondent is concerned in view o# the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter o# status o# persons' Private
respondent, bein& no lon&er the husband o# petitioner, had no le&al
standin& to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the o@ended spouse at the time he fled suit'
.a- 3or- vs. Ro%i))o 2r.
1#9 SCRA 1#9
3lice 0eyes, a Filipina, married 0ichard (pton, an 3merican, in
.on&"on& in )9I<' They established residence in the Philippines and had
two children' ,n )9:<, the wi#e sued #or divorce in Mevada, ('S'3', on the
&round o# incompatibility' She later married Theodore Han =orn in Mevada
in )9:E' (pton sued her be#ore 0T2, Cranch 6OH in Pasay 2ity as"in& that
she be ordered to render an accountin& o# her business, which (pton
alle&ed to be conu&al property' .e also prayed that he be declared with a
ri&ht to mana&e the conu&al property' The de#endant wi#e moved to
dismiss the complaint on the &round that the cause o# action was barred by
a previous ud&ment in the divorce proceedin&s wherein he had
ac"nowled&ed that the couple had no community property8'
!hether or not absolute divorce decree &ranted by ('S' court,
between Filipina wi#e and 3merican husband held bindin& upon the latter'
The pivotal #act in this case is the Mevada =ivorce o# the parties'
There can be no -uestion as to the validity o# that Mevada divorce in any
states o# the ('S' The decree is bindin& on (pton as an 3merican citizen'
.ence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state o# the (nited
States' ,t is true that owin& to the nationality principle under article )* o#
the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy a&ainst
absolute divorce abroad, which may be reco&nized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid accordin& to their national law' ,n this case, the
divorce in Mevada released (pton #rom the marria&e #rom the standards o#
3merican law' Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no lon&er the
husband o# the petitioner' .e would have no standin& to sue in the case as
petitioner husband entitled to e$ercise control over conu&al assets' .e is
also estopped by his own representation be#ore the Mevada court #rom
assertin& his ri&ht over the alle&ed conu&al property' .e should not
continue to be one o# her heirs with possible ri&hts to conu&al property'
R'&u+)ic vs. 5r+'cido
!72 SCRA 11!
2ipriano Arbecido ,,, and 6ady 1yros 1' Hillanueva were married
with two children' 6ady 1yros the le#t #or the (nited States with one son
and )st became a naturalized 3merican citizen, <nd obtained a valid
divorce decree in <+++ capacitatin& her to remarry, and Erd contracted a
marria&e with ,nnocent Stanley, an 3merican'
2ipriano then fled a petition #or authority to remarry under 3rticle
<D><? o# the Family 2ode The AGce o# the Solicitor General contends that
the invo"ed article was not applicable and raises this pure -uestion o# law,
they #urther posit that Arbecido should fle #or 6e&al Separation or
3nnulment instead'
!hether or not Arbecido can remarry under 3rticle <D><?'
P4S' 3rticle <D><? should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,
who has been divorced by a spouse who had ac-uired #orei&n citizenship
and remarried, also to remarry' To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice'
For the application o# 3rticle <D><?, there must have been >)? a
valid marria&e celebrated between a Filipino and a #orei&ner, and that ><? a
valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitatin& her to
Ce#ore a #orei&n divorce decree can be reco&nized by our own
courts, the #ollowin& must be proven: >)? divorce as a #act, ><? #orei&n law,
>E? divorce decree capacitated one to remarry'
The rec"onin& point is not the citizenship o# the parties at the time
o# the celebration o# the marria&e, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained by the alien spouse'
3nnulment or 6e&al Separation need not be the proper remedies
#or such would be in the case o# the #ormer, lon&, tedious, and in#easible,
and in the case o# the latter, is #utile to sever marital ties'
Ni4a) vs. *a0ado
#2, SCRA 122
Pepito Mi7al was married to Teodul#a Cellones on September <D,
)9IJ' Aut o# their marria&e were born herein petitioners' Pepito resultin&
to her death on 3pril <J, )9:* shot Teodul#a' Ane year and : months
therea#ter or on =ecember <J, )9:D, Pepito and respondent Morma
Cayado& &ot married without any marria&e license' ,n lieu thereo#, Pepito
and Morma e$ecuted an aGdavit dated =ecember )), )9:D statin& that
they had lived to&ether as husband and wi#e #or at least * years and were
thus e$empt #rom securin& a marria&e license'
3#ter Pepito%s death on February )9, )99I, petitioners fled a
petition #or declaration o# nullity o# the marria&e o# Pepito and Morma
alle&in& that the said marria&e was void #or lac" o# a marria&e license'
!hat nature o# cohabitation is contemplated under 3rticle ID o#
the 2ivil 2ode >now 3rticle EJ o# the Family 2ode? to warrant the countin&
o# the */year period in order to e$empt the #uture spouses #rom securin& a
marria&e license'
The */year common law cohabitation period, which is counted bac"
#rom the date o# celebration o# marria&e, should be a period o# le&al union
had it not been #or the absence o# the marria&e' This */year period should
be the years immediately be#ore the day o# the marria&e and it should be a
period o# cohabitation characterized by e$clusivity/meanin& no third party
was involved at any time within the * years and continuity is unbro"en'
3ny marria&e subse-uently contracted durin& the li#etime o# the
frst spouse shall be ille&al and void, subect only to the e$ception in cases
o# absence or where the prior marria&e was dissolved or annulled'
,n this case, at the time Pepito and respondent%s marria&e, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wi#e
#or at least * years prior to their weddin& day' From the time Pepito%s frst
marria&e was dissolved to the time o# his marria&e with respondent, only
about <+ months had elapsed' Pepito had a subsistin& marria&e at the time
when he started cohabitin& with respondent' ,t is immaterial that when
they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in #act #rom
his law#ul spouse'
The subsistence o# the marria&e even where there is was actual
severance o# the flial companionship between the spouses cannot ma"e
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as bein& one as
husband and wi#e8'
.avin& determined that the second marria&e involve in this case is
not covered by the e$ception to the re-uirement o# a marria&e license, it is
void ab initio because o# the absence o# such element'
Ma-/a-o vs. Sa-c('/
A.M. No. MT2-00-1#29 Marc( ," 2001
2omplainant avers that she was the law#ul wi#e o# the late =avid
1anzano, havin& been married to him in San Gabriel 3rchan&el Parish,
3raneta 3venue, 2aloocan 2ity' Four children were born out o# that
marria&e' .owever, her husband contracted another marria&e with one
6uzviminda Payao be#ore respondent 5ud&e' !hen respondent 5ud&e
solemnized said marria&e, he "new or ou&ht to "now that the same was
void and bi&amous, as the marria&e contract clearly stated that both
contractin& parties were Kseparated'K
0espondent 5ud&e, on the other hand, claims that when he
oGciated the marria&e between 1anzano and Payao he did not "now that
1anzano was le&ally married' !hat he "new was that the two had been
livin& to&ether as husband and wi#e #or seven years already without the
beneft o# marria&e, as mani#ested in their oint aGdavit' 3ccordin& to him,
had he "nown that the late 1anzano was married, he would have advised
the latter not to marry a&ainB otherwise, he >1anzano? could be char&ed
with bi&amy' .e then prayed that the complaint be dismissed #or lac" o#
merit and #or bein& desi&ned merely to harass him'
3#ter an evaluation o# the 2omplaint and the 2omment, the 2ourt
3dministrator recommended that respondent 5ud&e be #ound &uilty o#
&ross i&norance o# the law and be ordered to pay a fne o# P<,+++, with a
warnin& that a repetition o# the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely'
)? !hether or not convalidation o# the second union o# the
respondent #alls under the purview o# 3rticle EJ o# the Family 2ode'
<? !hether or not 0espondent 5ud&e is &uilty o# &ross i&norance o#
the law'
For this provision on le&al ratifcation o# marital cohabitation to apply,
the #ollowin& re-uisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least fve years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have
no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal
impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4.
The parties must execute an adavit stating that they have lived together for
at least fve years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and
5. The solemnizing ocer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the !ualifcations of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
Mot all o# these re-uirements are present in the case at bar' ,t is
si&nifcant to note that in their separate aGdavits e$ecuted on << 1arch )99E
and sworn to be#ore respondent 5ud&e himsel#, =avid 1anzano and 6uzviminda
Payao e$pressly stated the #act o# their prior e$istin& marria&e' 3lso, in their
marria&e contract, it was indicated that both were Kseparated'K 0espondent
5ud&e "new or ou&ht to "now that a subsistin& previous marria&e is a diriment
impediment, which would ma"e the subse-uent marria&e null and void'
Meither can respondent 5ud&e ta"e re#u&e on the 5oint 3Gdavit o# =avid
1anzano and 6uzviminda Payao statin& that they had been cohabitin& as
husband and wi#e #or seven years' 5ust li"e separation, #ree and voluntary
cohabitation with another person #or at least fve years does not severe the tie
o# a subsistin& previous marria&e' 2learly, respondent 5ud&e demonstrated
&ross i&norance o# the law when he solemnized a void and bi&amous marria&e'
Cosca vs. Pa)a0&a0o-
2#7 SCRA 2!9
"ame' 3rticle <I/EJB 4mphasis to the marria&e o# 3bellano and 4dralin,
5ud&e Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marria&e, but he
claims that it was under 3rticle EJ o# the Family 2ode, so a marria&e
license was not re-uired' The contractin& parties here e$ecuted a oint
aGdavit that they have been livin& to&ether as husband and wi#e #or
almost si$ >D? years already'
!hether or not respondent ud&e solemnization o# such marria&e
with the e$ception o# a marria&e license under 3rticle EJ o# the Family
2ode is valid'
,n their marria&e contract which did not bear any date either when
it was solemnized, it was stated that 3bellano was only ): years, < months
and I days old' ,# he and 4dralin had been livin& to&ether as husband and
wi#e #or almost D years already be#ore they &ot married as they stated in
their oint aGdavit, 3bellano must have been less than )E years old when
he started livin& with 4dralin as his wi#e and this is hard to believe' 5ud&e
Palaypayon should have been aware o# this when he solemnized their
marria&e as it was his duty to ascertain the -ualifcation o# the contractin&
parties who mi&ht have e$ecuted a #alse oint aGdavit in order to have an
instant marria&e by avoidin& the marria&e license re-uirement'
This act o# 5ud&e Palaypayon o# solemnizin& the marria&e o#
3bellano and 4dralin #or the second time with a marria&e license already
only &ave rise to the suspicion that the frst time he solemnized the
marria&e it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under
e$ceptional character as there was not marria&e license and 5ud&e
Palaypayon had already si&ned the marria&e certifcate'
Mariat'ui vs. CA
$.R. No. L-57062 2a-uar0 2!" 1992
6upo 1ariate&ui contracted three marria&es durin& his li#etime' An
his frst wi#e, 4usebia 1ontellano, who died on Movember :, )9+J, he be&ot
#our children, Caldomera, 1aria del 0osario, (rbana and ,reneo' !ith his
second wi#e, Flaviana 1ontellano, he be&ot a dau&hter named
2resenciana' 3nd his third wi#e, Felipa Helasco, he be&ot three children,
namely 5acinto, 5ulian and Paulina'
3t the time o# 6upo%s death he le#t certain properties with which he
ac-uired when he was still unmarried' 6upo died without a will' (pon his
death, descendants #rom his frst and second marria&es e$ecuted a deed o#
e$traudicial partition on 6ot Mo' )DE' .owever, the children on 6upo%s third
marria&e fled with the lower court an amended complaint claimin& that
they were deprive on the partition o# 6ot Mo' )DE which were owned by
their common #ather' The petitioners, children on frst and second
marria&e, fled a counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint' Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the respondents,
children on third marria&e'
0espondents elevated the case on 23 on the &round that the trial
court committed an error #or not fndin& the third marria&e to be law#ully
married and also in holdin& respondents are not le&itimate children o# their
said parents' 23 rendered a decision declarin& all the children and
descendants o# 6upo, includin& the respondents, are entitled to e-ual
shares o# estate o# their #ather' .owever, petitioners fled a motion #or
reconsideration o# said decision'
!hether or not respondents were able to prove their succession
ri&hts over the said estate'
!ith respect to the le&al basis o# private respondentsF demand #or
partition o# the estate o# 6upo 1ariate&ui, the 2ourt o# 3ppeals aptly held
that the private respondents are le&itimate children o# the deceased'
6upo 1ariate&ui and Felipa Helasco were alle&ed to have been
law#ully married in or about )9E+' This #act is based on the declaration
communicated by 6upo 1ariate&ui to 5acinto who testifed that Kwhen his
#ather was still livin&, he was able to mention to him that he and his
mother were able to &et married be#ore a 5ustice o# the Peace o# Ta&ui&,
0izal'K The spouses deported themselves as husband and wi#e, and were
"nown in the community to be such' 3lthou&h no marria&e certifcate was
introduced to this e@ect, no evidence was li"ewise o@ered to controvert
these #acts' 1oreover, the mere #act that no record o# the marria&e e$ists
does not invalidate the marria&e, provided all re-uisites #or its validity are
(nder these circumstances, a marria&e may be presumed to have
ta"en place between 6upo and Felipa' The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deportin& themselves as husband and wi#e, have entered into a
law#ul contract o# marria&eB that a child born in law#ul wedloc", there bein&
no divorce, absolute or #rom bed and board is le&itimateB and that thin&s
have happened accordin& to the ordinary course o# nature and the ordinary
habits o# li#e'
3o%i-o vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
=elia =omin&o, private respondent, fled a petition be#ore 0T2 o#
Pasi& #or the declaration o# nullity o# marria&e and separation o# property
a&ainst 0oberto =omin&o, petitioner' She alle&ed that they were married at
2armona, 2avite with evidences o# marria&e certifcate and marria&e
license, un"nown to her, petitioner had a previous marria&e with 4merlina
dela Paz which is still valid and e$istin&' She came to "now the prior
marria&e when 4merlina sued them #or bi&amy' She prays that their
marria&e be declared null and void and, as a conse-uence, to declare that
she is the e$clusive owner o# all properties she ac-uired durin& the
marria&e and to recover them #rom him'
0oberto moved to dismiss the petition on the &round that the
marria&e bein& void ab initio, the petition o# declaration o# nullity is
unnecessary' ,t added that private respondent has no property which in his
!hether or not respondent may claim #or the declaration o# nullity
o# marria&e and separation o# property a&ainst petitioner on the &round o#
There is no -uestion that the marria&e o# petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the #ormerFs previous marria&e with one
4merlina de la Paz was still subsistin& is bi&amous' 3s such, it is #rom the
be&innin&' Petitioner himsel# does not dispute the absolute nullity o# their
marria&e' The 2ourt had ruled that no udicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity o# a void, bi&amous marria&e'
The Family 2ode has clearly provided the e@ects o# the declaration
o# nullity o# marria&e, one o# which is the separation o# property accordin&
to the re&ime o# property relations &overnin& them' ,t stands to reason that
the lower court be#ore whom the issue o# nullity o# a frst marria&e is
brou&ht is li"ewise clothed with urisdiction to decide the incidental
-uestions re&ardin& the coupleFs properties'
Ni4a) vs. *a0ado
#2, SCRA 122
"ame' 3rticle E*
!hether or not the second marria&e o# plainti@sF deceased #ather
with de#endant is null and void ab initio'
3ny marria&e subse-uently contracted durin& the li#etime o# the
frst spouse shall be ille&al and void, subect only to the e$ception in cases
o# absence or where the prior marria&e was dissolved or annulled' The
subsistence o# the marria&e even where there is was actual severance o#
the flial companionship between the spouses cannot ma"e any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as bein& one as
husband and wi#e8'
.avin& determined that the second marria&e involve in this case is
not covered by the e$ception to the re-uirement o# a marria&e license, it is
void ab initio because o# the absence o# such element'
R'&u+)ic vs. CA a-d Mo)i-a
9'+ruar0 1#" 1997
An 3pril )J, )9:*, plainti@ 0oridel A' 1olina married 0eynaldo
1olina which union bore a son' 3#ter a year o# marria&e, 0eynaldo showed
si&ns o# Kimmaturity and irresponsibilityK as a husband and a #ather as he
pre#erred to spend more time with his peers and #riends, depended on his
parents #or aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wi#e in
re&ard to their fnances, resultin& in #re-uent -uarrels between them' The
0T2 &ranted 0oridel petition #or declaration o# nullity o# her marria&e which
was aGrmed by the 23'
!hether or not irreconcilable di@erences and conNictin&
personalities constitute psycholo&ical incapacity'
The #ollowin& &uidelines in the interpretation and application o# 3rt'
ED o# the Family 2ode are hereby handed down #or the &uidance o# the
bench and the bar:
>)? The burden o# proo# to show the nullity o# the marria&e belon&s
to the plainti@' 3ny doubt should be resolved in #avor o# the e$istence and
continuation o# the marria&e and a&ainst its dissolution and nullity'
><? The root cause o# the psycholo&ical incapacity must be >a?
medically or clinically identifed, >b? alle&ed in the complaint, >c?
suGciently proven by e$perts and >d? clearly e$plained in the decision'
>E? The incapacity must be proven to be e$istin& at Kthe time o# the
celebrationK o# the marria&e'
>J? Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable' >*? Such illness must be grave enou&h to brin&
about the disability o# the party to assume the essential obli&ations o#
>D? The essential marital obli&ations must be those embraced by
3rticles D: up to I) o# the Family 2ode as re&ards the husband and wi#e as
well as 3rticles <<+, <<) and <<* o# the same 2ode in re&ard to parents
and their children'
>I? ,nterpretations &iven by the Mational 3ppellate 1atrimonial
Tribunal o# the 2atholic 2hurch in the Philippines, while not controllin& or
decisive, should be &iven &reat respect by our courts'
>:? The trial court must order the prosecutin& attorney or fscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel #or the state'
L'ou') Sa-tos vs. CA
$.R. No. 112019 2a-uar0 !" 1995
6eouel frst met 5ulia in ,loilo 2ity' The meetin& later proved to be
an event#ul day #or both o# them #or they &ot married on September <+,
)9:D' 6eouel and 5ulia lived with the latter%s parents' The ecstasy,
however, did not last lon&' ,t was bound to happen, 6eouel averred,
because o# the #re-uent inter#erence by 5ulia%s parents into the youn&
spouses% #amily a@airs' Accasionally, the couple would also start a
-uarrel8 over a number o# thin&s li"e when and where the couple should
start livin& independently #rom 5ulia%s parents or whenever 5ulia would
e$press resentment on 6eouel%s spendin& a #ew days with his own parents'
An 1ay ):, )9::, 5ulia fnally le#t #or the ('S' to wor" as a nurse
despite his husband%s pleas to so dissuade her' Seven months a#ter her
departure, 5ulia called 6eouel #or the frst time' She promised to return
home upon the e$piration o# her contract but she never did' !hen 6eouel
&ot a chance to visit the ('S', where he underwent a trainin& pro&ram
under the auspices o# the 3rmed Forces o# the Philippines he desperately
tried to locate, or to somehow &et in touch with 5ulia, but all his e@orts
were o# no avail'
6eouel ar&ues that the #ailure o# 5ulia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, #or more than fve years are circumstances
that clearly show her bein& psycholo&ically incapacitated to enter into
married li#e'
!hether or not 5ulia is psycholo&ically incapacitated under 3rticle
ED o# the F2'
The use o# the phrase psycholo&ical incapacity8 under 3rticle ED
o# the 2ode has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases o#
psychoses as, li"ewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
e$tremely low intelli&ence, immaturity and li"e circumstances' 3rticle ED o#
the Family 2ode cannot be construed independently o# but must stand in
conunction with e$istin& precepts in our law on marria&e' Thus, correlated,
psycholo&ical incapacity should re#er to no less than a mental >not
physical? incapacity that causes a party to be truly inco&nitive o# the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and dischar&ed by
the parties to the marria&e which, as so e$pressed by 3rticle D: o# the
Family 2ode, include their mutual obli&ations to live to&ether, observe
love, respect and fdelity and render help and support' There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment o# the law has been to confne the meanin& o#
psycholo&ical incapacity to the most serious cases o# personality disorders
clearly demonstrative o# an utter insensitivity or inability to &ive meanin&
and si&nifcance to the marria&e' This psycholo&ical condition must e$ist at
the time the marria&e is celebrated'
R'&u+)ic vs. :ui-t'ro-;a%a-o
$.R. No. 1!9!9, Ma0 20" 200!
0espondent 6olita ;uintero/.amano fled a complaint #or
declaration o# nullity o# her marria&e to her husband Toshio .amano, a
5apanese national, on the &round o# psycholo&ical incapacity' 0espondent
alle&ed that she and Toshio started a common/law relationship in 5apan'
They later lived in the Philippines #or a month' Therea#ter, Toshio went bac"
to 5apan and stayed there #or hal# o# )9:I' An Movember )D, )9:I, she
&ave birth to their child'
An 5anuary )J, )9::, she and Toshio were married by 5ud&e ,sauro
1' Calderia o# the 1unicipal Trial 2ourt o# Cacoor, 2avite' (n"nown to
respondent, Toshio was psycholo&ically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became mani#est only a#ter the marria&e'
Ane month a#ter their marria&e, Toshio returned to 5apan and promised to
return by 2hristmas to celebrate the holidays with his #amily' 3#ter sendin&
money to respondent #or two months, Toshio stopped &ivin& fnancial
support' She wrote him several times but he never responded' Sometime
in )99), respondent learned #rom her #riends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child'
!hether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to
psycholo&ical incapacity'
The court fnd that the totality o# evidence presented #ell short o#
provin& that Toshio was psycholo&ically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities' Toshio%s act o# abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alle&ed nor proven to be due to some "ind o#
psycholo&ical illness' 3#ter respondent testifed on how Toshio abandoned
his #amily, no other evidence was presented showin& that his behavior was
caused by a psycholo&ical disorder'
3bandonment is also a &round #or le&al separation' There was no
showin& that the case at bar was not ust an instance o# abandonment in
the conte$t o# le&al separation' ,t cannot presume psycholo&ical de#ect
#rom the mere #act that Toshio abandoned his #amily immediately a#ter the
celebration o# the marria&e' ,t is not enou&h to prove that a spouse #ailed
to meet his responsibility and duty as a married personB it is essential that
he must be shown to be incapable o# doin& so due to some psycholo&ical,
not physical, illness' There was no proo# o# a natal or supervenin& disablin&
#actor in the person, an adverse inte&ral element in the personality
structure that e@ectively incapacitates a person #rom acceptin& and
complyin& with the obli&ations essential to marria&e'
,n provin& psycholo&ical incapacity, the court fnds no distinction
between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse' ,t cannot be lenient in the
application o# the rules merely because the spouse alle&ed to be
psycholo&ically incapacitated happens to be a #orei&n national' The
medical and clinical rules to determine psycholo&ical incapacity were
#ormulated on the basis o# studies o# human behavior in &eneral' .ence,
the norms used #or determinin& psycholo&ical incapacity should apply to
any person re&ardless o# nationality'
C(oa vs. C(oa
$.R. No. 1!##76 Nov'%+'r 26" 2002
6eni 2hoa, petitioner, and 3l#onso 2hoa, respondent, were married
on 1arch )*, )9:)' Aut o# this union, two children were born' An Actober
<I, )99E, respondent fled a complaint #or the annulment o# his marria&e
to petitioner' 3lso fled an amended complaint #or the declaration o# nullity
o# his marria&e based on her alle&ed psycholo&ical incapacity' The case
went on trial with the respondent presentin& his evidence' .owever,
petitioner fled a motion to dismiss the evidence' 0T2 denied petitioner%s
demurrer to evidence on the &round that petitioner must controvert the
established -uantum evidence o# respondent' Petitioner elevated the case
to 23 a#ter the motion o# reconsideration was denied' 23 held that denial
o# the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her de#ense
must present evidence'
!hether or not petitioner%s obli&ated to present her evidence
despite the inade-uate evidence o# respondent in the annulment o#
marria&e case &rounded on psycholo&ical incapacity'
The petition is meritorious' .owever, the evidence a&ainst
petitioner is &rossly insuGcient to support any fndin& o# psycholo&ical
incapacity that would warrant a declaration o# nullity o# the parties%
0espondent claims that the flin& by petitioner o# a series o#
char&es a&ainst him are proo# o# the latter%s psycholo&ical incapacity to
comply with the essential obli&ations o# marria&e' These char&es included
2omplaints #or perury, #alse testimony, concubina&e and deportation'
The documents presented by respondent durin& the trial do not in
any way show the alle&ed psycholo&ical incapacity o# his wi#e' ,t is the
hei&ht o# absurdity and ine-uity to condemn her as psycholo&ically
incapacitated to #ulfll her marital obli&ations, simply because she fled
cases a&ainst him' The evidence presented merely establishes the
prosecution o# the cases a&ainst him' To rule that the flin&s are suGcient
to establish her psycholo&ical incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but
also &rave abuse o# discretion borderin& on absurdity'
2ourt clearly e$plained that Kpsycholo&ical incapacity must be
characterized by >a? &ravity, >b? uridical antecedence and >c? incurability'
The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wi#e
could not &et alon& with each other' There was absolutely no showin& o#
the &ravity or uridical antecedence or incurability o# the problems
besettin& their marital union'
A-to-io vs. R'0's
$.R. No. 155,00 Marc( 10" 2006
6eonilo 3ntonio, petitioner, fled a petition to have his marria&e to
1arie 0eyes, respondent, declared null and void' .e anchored his petition
#or nullity on 3rticle ED o# the Family 2ode alle&in& that respondent was
psycholo&ically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obli&ations o# marria&e' .e asserted that respondent%s incapacity e$isted
at the time their marria&e was celebrated and still subsists up to the
3s mani#estations o# respondent%s alle&ed psycholo&ical incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about hersel#, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or thin&s'
,n support o# his petition, petitioner presented =r' 3bcede, a
psychiatrist, and =r' 6opez, a clinical psycholo&ist, who stated, based on
the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type o# person' An the other hand,
they observed that respondent%s persistent and constant lyin& to petitioner
was abnormal or patholo&ical' ,t undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect' They #urther asserted that
respondent%s e$treme ealousy was also patholo&ical' ,t reached the point
o# paranoia since there was no actual basis #or her to suspect that
petitioner was havin& an a@air with another woman' They concluded based
on the #ore&oin& that respondent was psycholo&ically incapacitated to
per#orm her essential marital obli&ations'
3#ter trial, the lower court &ave credence to petitioner%s evidence
and held that respondent%s propensity to lyin& about almost anythin&Qher
occupation, state o# health, sin&in& abilities and her income, amon&
othersQhad been duly established' 3ccordin& to the trial court,
respondent%s #antastic ability to invent and #abricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world o# ma"e/believe' This made her
psycholo&ically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable o# &ivin&
meanin& and si&nifcance to her marria&e' The trial court thus declared the
marria&e between petitioner and respondent null and void'
!hether or not there is suGcient basisRshowin& o# psycholo&ical
incapacity as to render the marria&e null and void'
,t should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as #alse pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marria&e' 1ore
disturbin&ly, they indicate a #ailure on the part o# respondent to distin&uish
truth #rom fction, or at least abide by the truth' Petitioner%s witnesses and the
trial court were emphatic on respondent%s inveterate proclivity to tellin& lies
and the patholo&ic nature o# her mistruths, which accordin& to them, were
revelatory o# respondent%s inability to understand and per#orm the essential
obli&ations o# marria&e' ,ndeed, a person unable to distin&uish between #antasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the le&al nature o# the
marital bond, much less its psychic meanin&, and the correspondin& obli&ations
attached to marria&e, includin& parentin&' Ane unable to adhere to reality
cannot be e$pected to adhere as well to any le&al or emotional commitments'
2learly in this case, there was no cate&orical averment #rom the e$pert
witnesses that respondent%s psycholo&ical incapacity was curable or incurable'
From the totality o# the evidence, however, the court is suGciently convinced
that the incurability o# respondent%s psycholo&ical incapacity has been
established by the petitioner'
C(i Mi- Tsoi vs. CA
$.R. No. 119190 2a-uar0 16" 1997
2hi 1in& Tsoi and Gina 6ao were married on 1ay <<, )9::' (ntil
their separation on 1arch )*, )9:9, there was no se$ual contact between
them' .ence, Gina >wi#e? fled a petition #or the declaration o# nullity o#
their marria&e' 1edical e$aminations showed that the wi#e was healthy,
normal and still a vir&in, while the husband was #ound to be capable o#
havin& se$ual intercourse since he was not impotent'
The wi#e claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet
homose$ual as he did not show his penis and since he was usin& his
mother%s eyebrow pencil and cleansin& cream' She also claimed that her
husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to ac-uire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance o# a normal man' An the other hand, the husband claimed that
it was his wi#e who was psycholo&ically incapacitated to per#orm basic
marital obli&ations' .e asserts that his wi#e avoided him whenever he
wants to have se$ual intercourse with her' .e #urther claimed that his wi#e
fled the case because she was a#raid that she would be #orced to return
the pieces o# ewelry o# his mother, and that he mi&ht consummate their
marria&e' .e also insisted that their marria&e would remain valid because
they are still very youn& and there is still a chance to overcome their
h#h#The trial court declared their marria&e void on account o#
psycholo&ical incapacity o# the husband' The 2ourt o# 3ppeals aGrmed the
decision o# the trial court'
!hether or not the prolon&ed re#usal o# the husband to have
se$ual cooperation #or the procreation o# children with his wi#e is
e-uivalent to psycholo&ical incapacity'
Pes' The prolon&ed re#usal o# the husband to have se$ual
cooperation #or the procreation o# children with his wi#e is e-uivalent to
psycholo&ical incapacity'
,# a spouse, althou&h physically capable but simply re#uses to
per#orm his or her essential marria&e obli&ations, and the re#usal is
senseless and constant, the 2atholic marria&e tribunals attribute the
causes to psycholo&ical incapacity than to stubborn re#usal' The husband%s
senseless and protracted re#usal to #ulfll his marital obli&ations is
e-uivalent to psycholo&ical incapacity'
Ane o# the essential marital obli&ations under the Family 2ode is to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation o#
children throu&h se$ual cooperation is the basic end o# marria&e' 2onstant
non/#ulfllment o# this obli&ation will fnally destroy the inte&rity or
wholeness o# the marria&e' =ecision aGrmed and petition denied #or lac"
o# merit'
Morio vs. P'o&)' o6 t(' P(i)i&&i-'s
$. R. No. 1!5226 9'+ruar0 6" 200!
3ppellant 6ucio 1ori&o and 6ucia Carrete were boardmates at the
house o# 2atalina Tortor at Ta&bilaran 2ity, #or a period o# #our years' 3#ter
school year, 6ucio 1ori&o and 6ucia Carrete lost contact with each other' ,n
)9:J, 6ucio 1ori&o was surprised to receive a card #rom 6ucia Carrete #rom
Sin&apore' The #ormer replied and a#ter an e$chan&e o# letters, they
became sweethearts' ,n )9:D, 6ucia returned to the Philippines but le#t
a&ain #or 2anada to wor" there' !hile in 2anada, they maintained constant
communication' ,n )99+, 6ucia came bac" to the Philippines and proposed
to petition appellant to oin her in 2anada' Coth a&reed to &et married'
6ucia reported bac" to her wor" in 2anada leavin& appellant 6ucio behind'
An 3u&ust )9, )99), 6ucia fled with the Antario 2ourt a petition
#or divorce a&ainst appellant which was &ranted by the court' 3ppellant
6ucio 1ori&o married 1aria 5ececha 6umba&o at Ta&bilaran 2ity' 6ucio fled
a complaint #or udicial declaration o# nullity o# marria&e in the 0e&ional
Trial 2ourt o# Cohol' The complaint see"s amon& others, the declaration o#
nullity o# 6ucio%s marria&e with 6ucia, on the &round that no marria&e
ceremony actually too" place' 3ppellant was char&ed with Ci&amy in
in#ormation fled by the 2ity Prosecutor o# Ta&bilaran 2ity, with the
0e&ional Trial 2ourt o# Cohol'
6ucio 1ori&o moved #or suspension o# the arrai&nment on the
&round that the civil case #or udicial nullifcation o# his marria&e with 6ucia
posed a preudicial -uestion in the bi&amy case' .is motion was &ranted,
but subse-uently denied upon motion #or reconsideration by the
prosecution' !hen arrai&ned in the bi&amy case, 6ucio pleaded not &uilty
to the char&e'
!hether or not 6ucio 1ori&o committed bi&amy even with his
de#ense o# &ood #aith'
3 udicial declaration o# nullity o# a previous marria&e is necessary
be#ore a obrecisubse-uent one can be le&ally contracted' Ane who enters
into a subse-uent marria&e without frst obtainin& such udicial declaration
is &uilty o# bi&amy' This principle applies even i# the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as Kvoid'K
,n the instant case, however, no marria&e ceremony at all was
per#ormed by a duly authorized solemnizin& oGcer' 6ucio 1ori&o and 6ucia
Carrete merely si&ned a marria&e contract on their own' The mere private
act o# si&nin& a marria&e contract bears no semblance to a valid marria&e
and thus, needs no udicial declaration o# nullity' Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marria&e #or
which 6ucio mi&ht be held liable #or bi&amy unless he frst secures a
udicial declaration o# nullity be#ore he contracts a subse-uent marria&e'
The law abhors an inustice and the 2ourt is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in #avor o# an accused and wei&h every
circumstance in #avor o# the presumption o# innocence to ensure that
ustice is done' (nder the circumstances o# the present case, Supreme
2ourt held that petitioner has not committed bi&amy and that it need not
tarry on the issue o# the validity o# his de#ense o# &ood #aith or lac" o#
criminal intent, which is now moot and academic'
La&u/-S0 vs. Eu6'%io
!# SCRA 177
2armen 6apuz/Sy fled a petition #or le&al separation a&ainst
4u#emio, married civilly on September <), )9EJ and canonically on
September E+, )9JE' ,n )9JE, her husband abandoned her' 2armen
discovered 4u#emio cohabitin& with a 2hinese woman, Go .io"' 2armen
prayed #or the issuance o# the decree o# le&al separation' 4u#emio
amended answer to the petition and alle&ed aGrmative'
Ce#ore the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident' !ith these respondent moved to dismiss the petition #or le&al
separation on two &roundsB the petition was fled beyond )/year period and
the death o# petitioner abated the acted #or le&al separation'
!hether or not the death o# plainti@ in action #or le&al separation
be#ore fnal decree abated the action'
3n action #or le&al separation which involves nothin& more than
the bed/and/board separation o# the spouses is purely personal' The 2ivil
2ode o# the Philippines reco&nizes this in its 3rticle )++, by allowin& only
the innocent spouse and no one else to claim le&al separationB and in its
3rticle )+:, by providin& that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop
or abate the proceedin&s and even rescind a decree o# le&al separation
already rendered' Cein& personal in character, it #ollows that the death o#
one party to the action causes the death o# the action itsel# actio
personalis moritur cum persona.
$a-dio-co vs. P'4ara-da
$.R. No. L-729,! Nov'%+'r 27" 19,7
Teresita Gandionco, le&al wi#e o# the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco,
fled with the 0T2 o# 1isamis Ariental a complaint a&ainst petitioner #or
le&al separation on the &round o# concubina&e with a petition #or support
and payment o# dama&es' Teresita also fled a complaint #or concubina&e
a&ainst petitioner with 1T2 o# General Santos 2ity' 3nd a&ain #or the
application #or the provisional remedy o# support pendente lite. The
respondent 5ud&e Pe7aranda ordered the payment o# support pendente
Petitioner contends that the civil action #or le&al separation and the
incidents thereto should be suspended in view o# the criminal case #or
!hether or not the civil action #or le&al separation shall be
suspended on the case o# concubina&e'
Petition is dismissed' 3 civil action #or le&al separation based on
concubina&e may proceed ahead o# or simultaneously with a criminal
action #or concubina&e #or the action #or le&al separation is not to recover
civil liability arisin& #rom the o@ense'
2ivil action is not one to en#orce the civil liability arisin& #rom the
o@ense8 even i# both the civil and criminal actions arise #rom or are related
to the same o@ense' Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed o#
in an action #or le&al separation and &ranted at the discretion o# the ud&e'
*ua0o- vs. $i-'/
$.R. No. L-100## 3'c'%+'r 2," 1956
Cenamin Cu&ayon&, serviceman in the (S Mavy was married to
de#endant 6eonila Ginez in Pan&asinan, while on #urlou&h leave' 3#ter
marria&e, the couples live with the sisters o# the husband, be#ore the latter
le#t to report bac" to duty, the couple came to an a&reement that 6eonila
would stay with Cenamin%s sisters'
6eonila le#t the dwellin& o# her sisters/in/law which she in#ormed
her husband by letter that she had &one to reside with her mother in
Pan&asinan' 4arly in 5uly )9*), Cenamin receive letters #rom his sister
Haleriana Polan&co that her wi#e in#ormin& him o# alle&ed acts o# infdelity'
Cenamin went to Pan&asinan and sou&ht #or his wi#e whom he met in the
house o# 6eonila%s &odmother' They lived a&ain as husband and wi#e and
stayed in the house o# Pedro Cu&ayon&, cousin o# the plainti@/husband' An
the second day, he tried to veri#y #rom his wi#e the truth o# the in#ormation
he received but instead o# answerin&, 6eonila pac"ed up and le#t him which
Cenamin concluded as a confrmation o# the acts o# infdelity' 3#ter he tried
to locate her and upon #ailin& he went to ,locos Morte' Cenamin fled in 2,F
o# Pan&asinan a complaint #or le&al separation a&ainst 6eonila, who timely
fled an answer vehemently denyin& the averments o# the complaint'
!hether or not the acts char&ed in line with the truth o# alle&ations
o# the commission o# acts o# infdelity amountin& to adultery have been
condoned by the plainti@/husband'
Grantin& that infdelities amountin& to adultery were commited by
the wi#e, the act o# the husband in persuadin& her to come alon& with him
and the #act that she went with him and to&ether they slept as husband
and wi#e deprives him as the alle&ed o@ended spouse o# any action #or
le&al separation a&ainst the o@endin& wi#e because his said conduct comes
within the restriction o# 3rticle )++ o# 2ivil 2ode'
Pac't' vs. Cariaa
2#1 SCRA #21
2oncepcion 3lanis fled with the court below a complaint #or the
declaration o# nullity o# the marria&e between her erstwhile husband 4nrico
Pacete and one 2larita de la 2oncepcion, as well as #or le&al separation
>between 3lanis and Pacete?, accountin& and separation o# property' ,n her
complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete be#ore the 5ustice o#
the Peace o# 2otabatoB that they had a child named 2onsueloB that Pacete
subse-uently contracted in )9J: a second marria&e with 2larita de la
2oncepcion in Morth 2otabatoB that she learned o# such marria&e only on
)9I9B that durin& her marria&e to Pacete, the latter ac-uired vast property
consistin& o# lar&e tracts o# land, fshponds and several motor vehiclesB
that he #raudulently placed the several pieces o# property either in his
name and 2larita or in the names o# his children with 2larita and other
KdummiesBK that Pacete i&nored overtures #or an amicable settlementB and
that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently pre#erred to continue livin& with 2larita'
!hether or not 0T2 o# 2otabato 2ity &ravely abused its discretion
in denyin& petitionersF motion #or e$tension o# time to fle their answer on
the decree o# le&al separation'
Petition is &ranted' The special prescriptions on actions that can
put the inte&rity o# marria&e to possible eopardy are impelled by no less
than the StateFs interest in the marria&e relation and its avowed intention
not to leave the matter within the e$clusive domain and the va&aries o# the
parties to alone dictate'
,t is clear that the petitioner did, in #act, specifcally pray #or le&al
separation' That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have
li"ewise been sou&ht in the same action cannot dispense, nor e$cuse
compliance, with any o# the statutory re-uirements a#ore-uoted'
3n action #or le&al separation must Kin no case be tried be#ore si$
months shall have elapsed since the flin& o# the petition,K obviously in
order to provide the parties a Kcoolin&/o@K period' ,n this interim, the court
should ta"e steps toward &ettin& the parties to reconcile'
Macada-da- vs. CA
10, SCRA #1!
0espondent 4lizabeth 1eias is a married woman, her husband
bein& 2rispin 3nahaw' She alle&edly had intercourse with petitioner
3ntonio 1acadan&dan& sometime in 1arch, )9DI' She also alle&es that
due to the a@air, she and her husband separated in )9DI' She &ave birth
to a baby boy who was named 0olando 1acadan&dan& in baptismal rites'
0espondent, then plainti@, fled a complaint #or reco&nition and support
a&ainst petitioner, then de#endant, with the 2,F o# =avao' =e#endant, now
petitioner, 1acadan&dan& fled his answer, opposin& plainti@Fs claim and
prayin& #or its dismissal'
The lower court in a pre/trial con#erence, issued a Pre/trial Arder
#ormalizin& certain stipulations, admissions and #actual issues on which
both parties a&reed' 2orrespondin&ly, upon a&reement o# the parties, an
amended complaint was fled by plainti@' ,n its decision rendered, the
lower court dismissed the complaint' The decision invo"ed positive
provisions o# the 2ivil 2ode and 0ules o# 2ourt and authorities'
!hether or not the wi#e may institute an action that would
bastardize her child without &ivin& her husband, the le&ally presumed
#ather, an opportunity to be heard'
S2 fnd no merit in petitioner%s submission that the -uestioned
decision had not become fnal and e$ecutory since the law e$plicitly and
clearly provides #or the dissolution and li-uidation o# the conu&al
partnership as amon& the e@ects o# the fnal decree o# le&al separation'
,t also appears that her claim a&ainst petitioner is a dis&uised
attempt to evade the responsibility and conse-uence o# her rec"less
behavior at the e$pense o# her husband, her illicit lover and above all her
own son' For this 2ourt to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization
o# respondentFs son would &ive rise to serious and #ar/reachin&
conse-uences on society' This 2ourt will not tolerate schemin& married
women who would indul&e in illicit a@airs with married men and then
e$ploit the children born durin& such immoral relations by usin& them to
collect #rom such moneyed paramours' This would be the #orm o# wrec"in&
the stability o# two #amilies' This would be a severe assault on morality'
Pot'-cia-o vs. CA
$.R. No. 1#97,9" 1#9,0, 2u)0 19" 2001
4rlinda ,lusorio, the matriarch who was so lovin&ly inseparable
#rom her husband some years a&o, fled a petition with the 2ourt o#
3ppeals #or habeas corpus to have custody o# her husband in consortium'
.owever, the 2ourt o# 3ppeals promul&ated its decision dismissin& the
petition #or lac" o# unlaw#ul restraint or detention o# the subect,
Potenciano ,lusorio'
4rlinda ,lusorio fled with the Supreme 2ourt an appeal via
certiorari pursuin& her desire to have custody o# her husband Potenciano
,lusorio' This case was consolidated with another case fled by Potenciano
,lusorio and his children, 4rlinda Cildner and Sylvia ,lusorio appealin& #rom
the order &ivin& visitation ri&hts to his wi#e, assertin& that he never re#used
to see her' The Supreme 2ourt dismissed the petition #or habeas corpus #or
lac" o# merit, and &ranted the petition to nulli#y the 2ourt o# 3ppealsF rulin&
&ivin& visitation ri&hts to 4rlinda ,lusorio'
!hether or not petitioner can assert 3rticle D: and D9 o# Family
2ode to have custody o# her husband in consortium'
The Supreme 2ourt a&rees that as spouses, they are duty bound to
live to&ether and care #or each other as provided by 3rticle D: and D9'
.owever, there was absence o# empathy between spouses 4rlinda and
Potenciano, havin& separated #rom bed and board since )9I<' Anly the
moral obli&ation o# the spouses constitutes the motivatin& #actor #or
ma"in& them observe the said duties and obli&ations which are hi&hly
personal' There#ore, they deny the petitioner%s motion #or reconsideration'
$oitia vs. Ca%&os-Ru'da
#5 P(i). 252
"ame. 3rticle D:
!hether or not petitioner may claim support #rom her husband
outside o# the conu&al domicile'
The law provides that de#endant, who is obli&ed to support the
wi#e, may #ulfll this obli&ation either by payin& her a f$ed pension or by
maintainin& her in his own home at his option' The law provides that
de#endant, who is obli&ed to support the wi#e, may #ulfll this obli&ation
either by payin& her a f$ed pension or by maintainin& her in his own home
at his option'
.owever, the option &iven by law is not absolute' The law will not
permit the de#endant to evade or terminate his obli&ation to support his
wi#e i# the wi#e was #orced to leave the conu&al abode because o# the lewd
desi&ns and physical assaults o# the de#endant, 3rticle D: emphasize
mutual love, respect and fdelity amon& husband and wi#e'
T0 vs. CA
$.R. No. 127!06 Nov'%+'r 27" 2000
4d&ardo 0eyes, private respondent, married to 3nna 1aria
Hillanueva both in a civil and church ceremony respectively' .owever, the
5uvenile and =omestic 0elations 2ourt o# ;uezon 2ity declared their
marria&e null and void ab initio #or lac" o# marria&e o# license'
Ce#ore the decree o# was issued in nulli#yin& the marria&e o# said
spouses, private respondent wed A#elia Ty, petitioner, in the 2ity 2ourt o#
Pasay and therea#ter in a church weddin& in 1a"ati' Aut o# their union bore
two dau&hters' (ntil private respondent petition that their marria&e be
declared null and void #or lac" o# marria&e o# license and that at the time
they &ot married, he was still married to 3nna 1aria' .e stated that at the
time he married petitioner the decree o# nullity o# his marria&e to 3nna
1aria had not been issued'
A#elia de#ended that lac" o# marria&e license in their marria&e is
untrue' She submitted the marria&e license in court and private
respondent did not -uestion the evidence' .owever, 0T2 and 23 aGrmed
their decision in #avor o# private respondent'
!hether or not petitioner may claim dama&es #or #ailure to comply
with marital obli&ations o# the respondent'
There can be no action #or dama&es merely because o# a breach o#
marital obli&ation' Supreme 2ourt also viewed that no dama&es should be
awarded in the present case, but #or another reason' Petitioner wants her
marria&e to private respondent held valid and subsistin&' She is suin& to
maintain her status as le&itimate wi#e' ,n the same breath, she as"s #or
dama&es #rom her husband #or flin& a baseless complaint #or annulment o#
their marria&e which caused her mental an&uish, an$iety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation #rom her parents'
Should they &rant her prayer, they would have a situation where
the husband pays the wi#e dama&es #rom conu&al or common #unds' To
do so, would ma"e the application o# the law absurd' 6o&ic, i# not common
sense, militates a&ainst such incon&ruity'
7)usorio vs. *i)d-'r
$.R. No. 1#97,9 Ma0 12" 2000
4rlinda Salaw and Potenciano ,lusorio contracted matrimony and
lived to&ether #or a period o# thirty years' Aut o# their marria&e, the
spouses had si$ children' ,n )9I<, they separated #rom bed and board #or
undisclosed reasons' Potenciano lived in 1a"ati when he was in 1anila and
in ,lusorio penthouse when he was in Ca&uio 2ity' An the other hand,
4rlinda lived in 3ntipolo 2ity'
!hen Potenciano arrived #rom (nited States and lived with 4rlinda
in 3ntipolo 2ity #or fve months' The children, Sylvia and 6in, alle&ed that
their mother overdosed their #ather with an antidepressant dru& which the
latter%s health deteriorated' 4rlinda fled with 0T2 o# 3ntipolo 2ity a petition
#or &uardianship over the person and property o# her husband due to the
latter%s advanced a&e, #rail health, poor eyesi&ht and impaired ud&ment'
Potenciano did not return to 3ntipolo 2ity and instead lived in a
condominium in 1a"ati 2ity a#ter attendin& a corporate meetin& in Ca&uio
2ity' !ith these, 4rlinda fled with 23 a petition #or habeas corpus to have
custody o# her husband and also #or the reason that respondent re#used
petitioner%s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibitin&
Potenciano #rom livin& with her in 3ntipolo 2ity'
!hether or not 4rlinda ,lusorio may secure a writ o# habeas corpus
to compel her husband to live with her in conu&al bliss'
The essential obect and purpose o# the writ o# habeas corpus is to
in-uire into all manner o# involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
there#rom i# such restraint is ille&al' To usti#y the &rant o# the petition, the
restraint o# liberty must be an ille&al and involuntary deprivation o#
#reedom o# action' The ille&al restraint o# liberty must be actual and
e@ective, not merely nominal or moral'
Mo court is empowered as a udicial authority to compel a husband
to live with his wi#e' 2overture cannot be en#orced by compulsion o# a writ
o# habeas corpus carried out by sheri@s or by any other mesne process'
That is a matter beyond udicial authority and is best le#t to the man and
woman%s #ree choice' There#ore, a petition #or writ o# habeas corpus is
Ro%ua)d'/-Marcos vs. C5MELEC
2!, SCRA #00
3rticle D9B ,melda 0omualdez/1arcos, fled her certifcate o#
candidacy #or the position o# 0epresentative o# 6eyte First =istrict' An
1arch <E, )99*, private respondent 2irilio 1onteo, also a candidate #or the
same position, fled a petition #or dis-ualifcation o# the petitioner with
2A14642 on the &round that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
re-uirement #or residency'
An 1arch <9, )99*, petitioner fled an amended certifcate o#
candidacy, chan&in& the entry o# seven months to since childhood8 in
item no' : in said certifcate' .owever, the amended certifcate was not
received since it was already past deadline' She claimed that she always
maintained Tacloban 2ity as her domicile and residence' The Second
=ivision o# the 2A14642 with a vote o# < to ) came up with a resolution
fndin& private respondent%s petition #or dis-ualifcation meritorious'
!hether or not petitioner lost her domicile o# ori&in by operation o#
law as a result o# her marria&e to the late President 1arcos'
,t cannot be correctly ar&ued that petitioner lost her domicile o#
ori&in by operation o# law' The presumption that the wi#e automatically
&ains the husbandFs domicile by operation o# law but never automatically
loses her domicile o# ori&in'
The ri&ht o# the husband to f$ the actual residence is in harmony
with the intention o# the law to stren&then and uni#y the #amily,
reco&nizin& the #act that the husband and the wi#e brin& into the marria&e
di@erent domiciles o# ori&in' This di@erence could, #or the sa"e o# #amily
unity, be reconciled only by allowin& the husband to f$ a sin&le place o#
actual residence'
A0a)a 7-v'st%'-ts vs. CA
$.R. No. 11,#05 9'+ruar0 12" 199,
3rticle IEB Philippine Cloomin& 1ills loan #rom petitioner 3yala
,nvestment' 3s an added security #or the credit line e$tended to PC1,
respondent 3l#redo 2hin& T 4$ec' HP, e$ecuted security a&reements and
ma"in& himsel# ointly and severally answerable with PC1%s indebtedness
to 3yala ,nvestments'
PC1 #ailed to pay the loan' Thus, 3yala ,nvestments fled a case #or
sum o# money a&ainst PC1 and 3l#redo 2hin&' The lower court issued a
writ o# e$ecution o# pendin& appeal' Therea#ter, deputy sheri@ 1a&sao
caused issuance and service upon respondents/spouses o# a notice o#
sheri@ sale on three o# their conu&al properties'
Private respondents, spouses 2hin&, fled a case o# inunction
a&ainst petitioners alle&in& that petitioners cannot en#orce the ud&ment
a&ainst conu&al partnership levied on the &round that the subect loan did
not redound to the beneft o# the said conu&al partnership' (pon
application o# private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary
restrainin& order to prevent 1a&sao #rom proceedin& with the
en#orcement o# the writ o# e$ecution and with the sale o# the said
properties at public auction'
!hether or not loan ac-uired by PC1 #rom 3yala ,nvestments as
&uaranteed by 3l#redo 2hin& be redounded to the conu&al partnership o#
the spouses'
The husband and the wi#e can en&a&e in any law#ul enterprise or
pro#ession' !hile it is but natural #or the husband and the wi#e to consult
each other, the law does not ma"e it a re-uirement that a spouse has to
&et the prior consent o# the other be#ore enterin& into any le&itimate
pro#ession, occupation, business or activity' The e$ercise by a spouse o# a
le&itimate pro#ession, occupation, business or activity is always considered
to redound to the beneft o# the #amily'
Cut an isolated transaction o# a spouse such as bein& &uarantor #or
a third person%s debt is not per se considered as redoundin& to the beneft
o# the #amily' There#ore, to hold the absolute community or the conu&al
partnership property liable #or any loss resultin& #rom such isolated
activity, proo#s showin& a direct beneft to the #amily must be presented'
Aa&a0 vs. Pa)a-
276 SCRA #!1
3rticle :IB 1i&uel Palan& contracted his frst marria&e to 2arlina
Hallesterol in the church at Pan&asinan' 3 #ew months a#ter the weddin&,
he le#t to wor" in .awaii' Aut their union was born .erminia Palan&,
respondent' 1i&uel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Uambales
with his brother durin& the entire duration o# his year/lon& soourn, not with
his wi#e or child' 1i&uel had also attempted to divorce 2arlina in .awaii'
!hen he returned #or &ood, he re#used to live with his wi#e and child'
!hen 1i&uel was then DE yrs' old, he contracted his second
marria&e with a nineteen year old 4rlinda 3&apay, petitioner' 3s evidenced
by deed o# sale, both ointly purchased a parcel o# a&ricultural land located
at Cinalonan' 3 house and lot was li"ewise purchased alle&edly by 4rlinda
as the sole vendee'
To settle and end a case fled by the frst wi#e, 1i&uel and 2ornelia
e$ecuted a =eed o# =onation as a #orm o# compromise a&reement' The
parties a&reed to donate their conu&al property consistin& o# si$ parcels o#
land to their only child, .erminia Palan&'
1i&uel and 4rlinda%s cohabitation produced a son and then two
years later 1i&uel died' Therea#ter, 2arlina fled a complaint o#
concubina&e on the previous party' 0espondents sou&ht to &et bac" the
riceland and the house and lot alle&edly purchased by 1i&uel durin& his
cohabitation with petitioner' Petitioner contended that she had already
&iven her hal# o# the riceland property to their son and that the house and
lot is her sole property havin& bou&ht with her own money' 0T2 aGrmed in
#avor o# the petitioner while 23 reversed the said decision'
!hether or not petitioner may own the two parcels o# land
ac-uired durin& the cohabitation o# petitioner and 1i&uel Palan&'
The Supreme 2ourt ruled that the conveyance o# the property was
not by way o# sale but was a donation and there#ore void' The transaction
was properly a donation made by 1i&uel to 4rlinda, but one which was
clearly void and ine$istent by e$press provision o# law because it was
made between persons &uilty o# adultery or concubina&e at the time o# the
Arca+a vs. Ta+a-cura .da. 3' *atoca')
$.R. No. 1!66,# Nov'%+'r 22" 2001
Francisco 2omille and his wi#e Uosima 1ontallana became the
re&istered owners o# two lots in Uamboan&a del Morte' 3#ter the death o#
Uosima, Francisco and his mother/in/law e$ecuted a deed o# e$traudicial
partition with waiver o# ri&hts, in which the latter waived her V share o#
the property' Therea#ter, Francisco re&istered the lot in his name' .avin&
no children to ta"e care o# him a#ter his retirement, Francisco as"ed his
niece 6eticia, the latter%s cousin 6uzviminda and petitioner 2irila 3rcaba, to
ta"e care o# his house and store'
2onNictin& testimonies were o@ered as to the nature o# the
relationship between 2irila and Francisco' 6eticia said that the previous
party was lovers since they slept in the same room while 4rlinda claimed
that Francisco told her that 2irila was his mistress' An the other hand,
2irila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old #or her'
3 #ew months be#ore Francisco%s death, he e$ecuted an instrument
denominated =eed o# =onation #nter $ivos8 in which he ceded a portion o#
the lot to&ether with is house to 2irila, who accepted the donation in the
same instrument' The deed stated that the donation was bein& made in
consideration o# the #aith#ul services she had rendered over the past ten
years'8 Therea#ter, Francisco died and the respondents fled a complaint
a&ainst 2irila #or declaration o# nullity o# a deed o# donation inter vivos,
recovery o# possession and dama&es' 0espondents, who are nieces,
nephews and heirs by intestate succession o# Francisco, alle&ed that 2irila
was the common/law wi#e o# Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void
under 3rticle :I o# the Family 2ode'
!hether or not the deed o# donation inter vivos e$ecuted by the late
Francisco 2omille be declared void under 3rticle :I o# the Family 2ode'
!here it has been established by preponderance o# evidence that
two persons lived to&ether as husband and wi#e without a valid marria&e,
the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in #avor o# the
other is void under 3rticle :I o# the Family 2ode'
There#ore, respondents havin& proven by preponderance o#
evidence that 2irila and Francisco lived to&ether as husband and wi#e
without a valid marria&e, the donation inter vivos is considered null and

<0 vs. CA
$.R. No. 109557 Nov'%+'r 29" 2000
Teodoro 5ardeleza, petitioner, fled a petition in the matter o# the
&uardianship o# =r' 4rnesto 5ardeleza, Sr', upon learnin& that one piece o#
real property belon&in& to the latter spouses was about to be sold' The
petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity
o# =r' 4rnesto 5ardeleza Sr' prevent him #rom competently administerin& his
properties, in order to prevent the loss and dissipation o# the 5ardeleza%s
real and personal assets, there was a need #or a court/appointed &uardian
to administer said properties'
Gilda 5ardeleza, respondent, fled a petition re&ardin& the
declaration o# incapacity o# =r' 4rnesto 5ardeleza Sr', assumption o# sole
powers o# administration o# conu&al properties and authorization to sell
the property' She alle&ed that her husband%s medical treatment and
hospitalization e$penses were pilin& up and that she need to sell one piece
o# real property and its improvements' She prayed #or authorization #rom
the court to sell said property'
0T2 o# ,loilo 2ity rendered its decision, fndin& that it was convinced
that =r' 4rnesto 5ardeleza Sr' was truly incapacitated to participate in the
administration o# the conu&al properties' .owever, Teodoro fled his
opposition to the proceedin&s bein& unaware and not "nowin& that a
decision has already been rendered on the case' .e also -uestioned the
propriety o# the sale o# the lot and its improvements thereon supposedly to
pay the accumulated fnancial obli&ations and hospitalization'
!hether or not Gilda 5ardeleza may assume sole powers o#
administration o# the conu&al property'
The 23, which the S2 aGrmed, ruled that in the condition o# =r'
4rnesto 5ardeleza Sr', the procedural rules on summary proceedin&s in
relation to 3rticle )<J o# the Family 2ode are not applicable' Cecause he
was unable to ta"e care o# himsel# and mana&e the conu&al property due
to illness that had rendered him comatose' ,n such case, the proper
remedy is a udicial &uardianship proceedin& under 0ule 9E o# the )9DJ
0evised 0ules o# 2ourt'
3' La Cru/ vs. 3' La Cru/
1#0 P(i) #2!
4strella de la 2ruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la 2ruz,
de#endant, at Cacolod 2ity' =urin& their coverture they ac-uire seven
parcels o# land in Cacolod 2adastre and three parcels o# land at Silay
2adastre' They are also en&a&ed in varied business ventures'
The de#endant started livin& in 1anila, althou&h he occasionally
returned to Cacolod 2ity, sleepin& in his oGce at the Philippine Te$board
Factory in 1andala&an, instead o# in the conu&al home at Cacolod 2ity'
4strella then fled a petition on the &round o# abandonment upon the
de#endant who had never visited their conu&al abode' She also be&an to
suspect the de#endant in havin& an illicit relation while in 1anila to a
certain Menita .ernandez, which she confrmed upon &ettin& several
pieces o# evidence on the de#endant%s polo shirt and iron sa#e'
The de#endant denied the alle&ations o# the petitioner and that the
reason he trans#erred his livin& -uarters to his oGce in 1andala&an,
Cacolod 2ity was to teach her a lesson as she was -uarrelsome and
e$tremely ealous o# every woman' .e decided to live apart #rom his wi#e
temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his wor"' The
de#endant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wi#e and
#amily, averrin& that he has never #ailed, even #or a sin&le month, to &ive
them fnancial support' ,n point o# #act, his wi#e and children continued to
draw allowances #rom his oGce and he fnanced the education o# their
children, two o# whom were studyin& in 1anila'
!hether or not respondent abandoned his #amily and #ailed to
comply with his obli&ations'
The S2 have made a searchin& scrutiny o# the record, and it is
considered view that the de#endant is not &uilty o# abandonment o# his
wi#e, nor o# such abuse o# his powers o# administration o# the conu&al
partnership, as to warrant division o# the conu&al assets' There must be
real abandonment, and not mere separation'

The abandonment must not
only be physical estran&ement but also amount to fnancial and moral
There#ore, physical separation alone is not the #ull meanin& o# the
term KabandonmentK, i# the husband, despite his voluntary departure #rom
the society o# his spouse, neither ne&lects the mana&ement o# the conu&al
partnership nor ceases to &ive support to his wi#e' The #act that the
de#endant never ceased to &ive support to his wi#e and children ne&atives
any intent on his part not to return to the conu&al abode and resume his
marital duties and ri&hts'
Partosa-2o vs. CA
216 SCRA 692
5ose 5o, respondent, cohabited with three women and #athered
f#teen children' The frst woman, petitioner Prima Partosa/5o claims to be
his le&al wi#e by whom he be&ot a dau&hter'
Petitioner fled a complaint a&ainst 5o #or udicial separation o#
conu&al property and an action #or support' The complaint #or support was
&ranted by the lower court but the udicial separation o# conu&al property
was never entertained' 5o elevated the decision #or support to the 23 but
retain its aGrmation on trial court%s rulin&' !hen their motions #or
reconsideration were denied, both parties appeal to S2 #or the complaint o#
udicial separation o# conu&al property'
The S2, throu&h the defnite fndin&s o# the trial court, holds that
the petitioner and respondent were le&ally married and that the properties
mentioned by the petitioner were ac-uired by 5o durin& their marria&e
althou&h they were re&istered in the name o# an apparent dummy'
!hether or not the udicial separation o# conu&al property be
&ranted to the petitioner on the &round o# abandonment'
S2 &ranted the petition' The record shows that respondent had
already reected the petitioner' The #act that she was not accepted by 5o
demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention o# resumin& their
conu&al relationship' The respondent also re#uses to &ive fnancial support
to the petitioner'
The physical separation o# the parties, coupled with the re#usal by
the respondent to &ive support to the petitioner, suGced to constitute
abandonment as a &round #or the udicial separation o# their conu&al
*A 9i-a-c' Cor&oratio- vs. CA
161 SCRA 60,
3u&usto Pulo, respondent, secured a loan #rom the petitioner, C3
Finance 2orp', as evidenced by his si&nature on a promissory note in behal#
o# the 3 & 6 ,ndustries' 3bout two months prior to the loan, however,
3u&usto Pulo had already le#t 6ily Pulo and their children and had
abandoned their conu&al home' !hen the obli&ation became due and
demandable, 3u&usto Pulo #ailed to pay the same'
Petitioner fled its amended complaint a&ainst the spouses on the
basis o# the promissory note' They also prayed #or the issuance o# a writ o#
attachment that the said spouses were &uilty o# #raud in contractin& the
debt' The trial court issued the writ o# attachment thereby enablin& the
petitioner to attach the properties o# 3 & 6 ,ndustries' Private respondent
6ily Pulo fled her answer with counterclaim, alle&in& that 3u&usto had
already abandoned her and their children fve months be#ore the flin& o#
the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissory
note was e$ecuted' She also alle&ed that her si&nature was #or&ed in the
special power o# attorney procured by 3u&usto'
Petitioner contends that even i# the si&nature was #or&ed or even i#
the attached properties were her e$clusive property, the same can be
made answerable to the obli&ation because the said properties #orm part
o# the conu&al partnership o# the spouses Pulo'
!hether or not the e$clusive property o# private respondent #orms
part o# the conu&al partnership o# the spouses and be made answerable to
the obli&ation'
S2 ordered the release o# the attachment o# the said property'
Thou&h it is presumed that the sin&le proprietorship established durin& the
marria&e is conu&al and even i# it is re&istered in the name o# only one o#
the spouses' .owever, #or the said property to be held liable, the obli&ation
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the beneft o# the
conu&al partnership'
,n the case at bar, the obli&ation which the petitioner is see"in& to
en#orce a&ainst the conu&al property mana&ed by the private respondent
was undoubtedly contracted by 3u&usto Pulo #or his own beneft because
at the time he incurred the obli&ation he had already abandoned his #amily
and had le#t their conu&al home'
2o(-so- & 2o(-so- 7-c. vs. CA
262 SCRA 29,
=elilah Hinluan, de#endant and owner o# Hinluan 4nterprises,
en&a&ed in the business o# retailin& 5ohnson products incurred an
obli&ation to the said company' She issued chec"s amountin& to the
payment o# the obli&ation but the chec"s bounced' 5ohnson & 5ohnson,
petitioner, demands #or the payment and even o@ered accommodations to
pay the obli&ation but #ailed' !ith these, respondent fled a complaint
a&ainst de#endant spouses Hinluan #or collection o# the principal obli&ation
plus interest with dama&es' 0T2 &ranted the complaint and ordered
de#endant to pay'
.owever, a#ter meticulously scrutinizin& the evidence on record
that there was no privity o# contract between respondent and de#endant/
husband re&ardin& the obli&ations incurred by the de#endant/wi#e, they
held that de#endant/husband must not be le&ally held liable #or the said
obli&ation' Thus, they issued a writ o# e$ecution a&ainst the properties o#
the de#endant/wi#e but the two notices o# levy on e$ecution covered also
the real and personal properties o# the conu&al partnership'
=e#endant/husband fled a third/party claim see"in& the li#tin& o#
the levy on the conu&al properties' Subse-uently, petitioner fled a motion
to f$ the value o# the levied properties' =e#endant/husband moved to
-uash the levy on e$ecution but as e$pected petitioner opposed the
!hether or not de#endant/husband be held liable #or the debts o#
his wi#e which were incurred without his consent'
S2 denied petition based on the respondent 2ourt%s ori&inal
fndin&s which had already become fnal and indisputable' The de#endant/
husband did not &ive his consent neither did the obli&ation incurred by the
de#endant/wi#e redound to the beneft o# the #amily' .ence, the conu&al
partnership, as well as the de#endant/husband cannot be held liable' Anly
the de#endant/wi#e and her paraphernal property can be held liable' The
conu&al properties and the capital o# the de#endant/husband cannot be
levied upon'
S&ous's La&'ra) vs. S&ous's =ati+a>
90 P(i) 77
The plainti@s, 0oberto 6aperal 5r' and his wi#e Purifcacion 1'
6aperal sued 0amon Sati&ba", who acted as an a&ent in the sale on the
commission o# ewels, and his wi#e 4velina Sati&ba" to recover the total
sum P))E,*++ plus interest and costs' The de#endant 4velina moved to
dismiss, on the &round that the complaint #ailed to state suGcient #acts to
constitute a cause o# action a&ainst her' The plainti@ opposed the motion
but the court rendered ud&ment dismissin& the complaint' .ence this
Two causes o# action were set #orth in the complaint' The frst
transcribed #our promissory notes #or various sums and the notes are not
si&ned by 4velina' The only alle&ations that may a@ect her liability i# any,
are that 0amon si&ned the notes #or value received Kwhile married to herK,
and that both de#endants re#used to pay the notes'
!hether or not 4velina may be held liable #or the debts o# her
husband a&ainst the spouses 6aperal'
The de#endant 4velina is not personally liable' 0amon was not her
a&ent, and he did not contract #or her' For the repayment o# the sums
borrowed by him, 0amon Sati&ba" was personally responsible with his own
private #unds, and at most the assets o# the conu&al partnership' To reach
both "inds o# property it is unnecessary #or plainti@s to implead the wi#e
4velina Sati&ba"' K!here the husband is alone liable, no action lies a&ainst
the wi#e, and she is not a necessary party de#endant'8
The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property
unless its administration has been trans#erred to him, which is not the
case' Meither can the paraphernal property be made to answer #or debts
incurred by the husband'
.i))a-u'va vs. 7AC
192 SCRA 21
Spouses Graciano 3ranas and Micolasa Cunsa owned a parcel o#
land in 2apiz' 3#ter they died, their survivin& children, 1odesto and
Federico 3ranas adudicated the land to themselves under a deed o#
e$traudicial partition'
1odesto 3ranas obtained a Torrens title in his name #rom the 2apiz
0e&istry o# Property' 1odesto was married to Hictoria 2omorro but they had
no children' 3#ter the death o# 1odesto, his two survivin& ille&itimate
children named =orothea and Teodoro borrowed P):,+++ #rom 5esus
Cernas' 3s a security they mort&a&ed to Cernas their #ather%s property' ,n
the loan a&reement e$ecuted between the parties, a relative 0aymundo
3ranas, si&ned the a&reement as a witness'
=orothea and Teodoro #ailed to pay their loan' 3s a result, Cernas
caused the e$traudicial #oreclosure o# the mort&a&e and ac-uired the land
at the auction sale as the hi&hest bidder' 3bout a month later, 2onsolacion
Hillanueva and 0aymundo 3ranas fled a complaint a&ainst spouses Cernas
prayin& that the property entered in the loan a&reement be cancelled and
they be declared co/owners o# the land' They &round their cause o# action
upon their alle&ed discovery on two wills e$ecuted by 1odesto 3ranas and
his wi#e Hictoria' Hictoria%s will stated that her interests, ri&hts and
properties, real and personal as her share #rom the conu&al partnership be
be-ueathed to 2onsolacion and 0aymundo and also to =orothea and
Teodoro in e-ual shares' 1odesto%s will, on the other hand, be-ueathed to
his two ille&itimate children all his interest in his conu&al partnership with
Hictoria as well as his own capital property brou&ht by him to his marria&e'
!hether or not the property mort&a&ed be a conu&al property o#
the spouses 1odesto and Hictoria'
4ven i# it be assumed that the husband%s ac-uisition by succession
o# the lot in -uestion too" place durin& his marria&e, the lot would
nonetheless be his e$clusive property8 because it was ac-uired by him
durin& the marria&e by lucrative title8'
2ertain it is that the land itsel#, which 1odesto had inherited #rom
his parents, Graciano and Micolasa, is his e$clusive and private property'
The property should be re&arded as his own e$clusively, as a matter o# law'
*P7 vs. Posadas
56 P(i) 215
The estate o# 3dolphe Ascar Schuetze is the sole benefciary
named in the li#e/insurance policy #or W)+,+++, issued by the Sun 6i#e
3ssurance 2ompany o# 2anada' =urin& the #ollowin& fve years the insured
paid the premiums at the 1anila branch o# the company' The deceased
3dolphe Ascar Schuetze married the plainti@/appellant 0osario Gelano'
The plainti@/appellant, the Can" o# the Philippine ,slands, was
appointed administrator o# the late 3dolphe Ascar SchuetzeFs testamentary
estate by an order, entered by the 2ourt o# First ,nstance o# 1anila' The
Sun 6i#e 3ssurance 2ompany o# 2anada, whose main oGce is in 1ontreal,
2anada, paid 0osario Gelano Hda' de Schuetze upon her arrival at 1anila,
the sum o# P<+,)*+, which was the amount o# the insurance policy on the
li#e o# said deceased, payable to the latterFs estate' An the same date
0osario Gelano Hda' de Schuetze delivered the money to said Can" o# the
Philippine ,slands, as administrator o# the deceasedFs estate, which entered
it in the inventory o# the testamentary estate, and then returned the
money to said widow' The appellee alle&es that it is a #undamental
principle that a li#e/insurance policy belon&s e$clusively to the benefciary
upon the death o# the person insured'
!hether or not the li#e insurance policy belon&s to the conu&al
S2 holds, >)? that the proceeds o# a li#e/insurance policy payable to
the insuredFs estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conu&al
partnership, constitute community property, and belon& one/hal# to the
husband and the other hal# to the wi#e, e$clusivelyB and ><? that i# the
premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conu&al #unds, the
proceeds are li"ewise in li"e proportion paraphernal in part and conu&al in
That the proceeds o# a li#e/insurance policy payable to the
insuredFs estate as the benefciary, i# delivered to the testamentary
administrator o# the #ormer as part o# the assets o# said estate under
probate administration, are subect to the inheritance ta$ accordin& to the
law on the matter, i# they belon& to the assured e$clusively, and it is
immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these ,slands or outside'
1o- vs. 7AC
200 SCRA 792
Private respondent 0omarico .enson married Satrina Pineda' They
had been most o# the time livin& separately' The #ormer stayed in 3n&eles
2ity while the latter lived in 1anila' =urin& the marria&e, 0omarico bou&ht
parcel o# land in 3n&eles 2ity #rom his #ather, with money borrowed #rom
an oGcemate'
1eanwhile in .on&"on&, Satrina entered into an a&reement with
3nita 2han whereby the latter consi&ned to Satrina pieces o# ewelry #or
sale' !hen Satrina #ailed to return the pieces o# ewelry within the <+/day
period a&reed upon, 3nita 2han demanded payment o# their value' Satrina
issued in #avor o# 3nita 2han a chec", however, was dishonored #or lac" o#
#unds' .ence, Satrina was char&ed with esta#a' Trial court dismissed the
case on the &round that SatrinaFs liability was not criminal but civil in
3nita 2han and her husband 0ic"y !on& fled a&ainst Satrina and
her husband 0omarico .enson, an action #or collection o# a sum o# money'
3#ter trial, the court promul&ated decisions in #avor o# the !on&%s' 3 writ o#
e$ecution was therea#ter issued, levied upon were #our lots in 3n&eles all in
the name o# 0omarico .enson married to Satrina .enson' 0omarico fled
an action #or the annulment o# the decision as well as the writ o# e$ecution,
levy on e$ecution and the auction' 0omarico alle&ed that he was Knot
&iven his day in courtK because he was not represented by counsel as
3ttys' 3lbino and Pumul appeared solely #or Satrina' That he had nothin& to
do with the business transactions o# Satrina as he did not authorize her to
enter into such transactionsB and that the properties levied on e$ecution
and sold at public auction by the sheri@ were his capital properties'
!hether or not the properties levied on e$ecution are e$clusive
properties o# 0omarico'
The presumption o# the conu&al nature o# the properties subsists
in the absence o# clear, satis#actory and convincin& evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that the properties are e$clusively owned by
0omarico' !hile there is proo# that 0omarico ac-uired the properties with
money he had borrowed #rom an oGcemate, it is unclear where he
obtained the money to repay the loan' ,# he paid it out o# his salaries, then
the money is part o# the conu&al assets and not e$clusively his' Proo# on
this matter is o# paramount importance considerin& that in the
determination o# the nature o# a property ac-uired by a person durin&
coverture, the controllin& #actor is the source o# the money utilized in the
A0a)a 7-v'st%'-ts vs. CA
$.R. No. 11,#05 9'+ruar0 12" 199,
"ame. 3rticle )<)/)<<
!hether or not debts and obli&ations contracted by the husband
alone are considered #or the beneft o# the conu&al partnership'
The respondent directly received the money or services to be used
in or #or his own business or his own pro#ession, that contract #alls within
the term obli&ations #or the beneft o# the conu&al partnership8' .ere, no
actual beneft may be proved' ,t is enou&h that the beneft to the #amily is
apparent at the time o# the si&nin& o# the contract' From the very nature o#
the contract o# loan and services, the #amily stands to beneft #rom the loan
#acility or services to be rendered to the business or pro#ession o# the
husband' ,t is immaterial in the, his business or pro#ession #ails or does not
succeed' Simply stated, where the husband contracts obli&ations on behal#
o# the #amily business, the law presumes and ri&htly so, that such
obli&ation will redound to the beneft o# the conu&al partnership'
Car)os vs. A+')ardo
$.R. No. 1!650! A&ri) !" 2002
.onorio 2arlos averred in his complaint that in Actober )9:9,
respondent and his wi#e 1aria Theresa 2arlos/3belardo approached him
and re-uested him to advance the amount o# (SW<*,+++'++ #or the
purchase o# a house and lot' To enable and assist the spouses conduct
their married li#e independently and on their own, petitioner issued a chec"
in the name o# a certain Pura Halleo, seller o# the property, who
ac"nowled&ed receipt thereo#' The amount was in #ull payment o# the
!hen petitioner in-uired #rom the spouses in as to the status o#
the amount he loaned to them, the latter ac"nowled&ed their obli&ation
but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to ma"e a defnite
settlement o# the same' Therea#ter, respondent e$pressed violent
resistance to petitioner%s in-uiries on the amount to the e$tent o# ma"in&
various death threats a&ainst petitioner'
Petitioner made a #ormal demand #or the payment o# the amount o#
(SW<*,+++'++ but the spouses #ailed to comply with their obli&ation'

petitioner fled a complaint #or collection o# a sum o# money and dama&es
a&ainst respondent and his wi#e be#ore the 0T2 o# Halenzuela' 3s they were
separated in #act #or more than a year prior to the flin& o# the complaint,
respondent and his wi#e fled separate answers' 1aria Theresa 2arlos/
3belardo admitted securin& a loan to&ether with her husband, #rom

She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a
sta&&ered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded
immediate payment o# the #ull amount'
!hether or not the amount o# (SW<*,+++'++ was a loan obtained
by private respondent and his wi#e #rom petitioner'
4arly in time, it must be noted that payment o# personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wi#e be#ore or durin& the marria&e shall
not be char&ed to the conu&al partnership e$cept inso#ar as they
redounded to the beneft o# the #amily' The de#endants never denied that
the chec" o# (SW<*,+++'++ was used to purchase the subect house and
lot' They do not deny that the same served as their conu&al home, thus
beneftin& the #amily' .ence, de#endant/husband and de#endant/wi#e are
ointly and severally liable in the payment o# the loan'
=e#endant/husband cannot alle&e as a de#ense that the amount o#
(S W<*,+++'++ was received as his share in the income or profts o# the
corporation and not as a loan' =e#endant/husband does not appear to be a
stoc"holder nor an employee nor an a&ent o# the corporation, .' 6' 2arlos
2onstruction, ,nc' Since he is not a stoc"holder, he has no ri&ht to
participate in the income or profts thereo#'
Ma))i)i- vs. Casti))o
$.R. No. 1#6,0# 2u-' 16" 2000
Petitioner 4usta-uio 1allilin, 5r' fled a complaint #or KPartition
andRor Payment o# 2o/Awnership Share, 3ccountin& and =ama&esK a&ainst
respondent 1a' 4lvira 2astillo' The complaint alle&ed that petitioner and
respondent, both married and with children, but separated #rom their
respective spouses, cohabited a#ter a brie# courtship while their respective
marria&es still subsisted' =urin& their union, they set up the Super#rei&ht
2ustoms Cro"era&e 2orporation, with petitioner as president and chairman
o# the board o# directors, and respondent as vice/president and treasurer'
The business Nourished and petitioner and respondent ac-uired real and
personal properties which were re&istered solely in respondentFs name'
=ue to irreconcilable di@erences, the couple separated' Petitioner
demanded #rom respondent his share in the subect properties, but
respondent re#used alle&in& that said properties had been re&istered solely
in her name'
0espondent admitted that she en&a&ed in the customs bro"era&e
business with petitioner but alle&ed that the Super#rei&ht 2ustoms
Cro"era&e 2orporation was or&anized with other individuals and duly
re&istered with the S42' She denied that she and petitioner lived as
husband and wi#e because the #act was that they were still le&ally married
to their respective spouses' She claimed to be the e$clusive owner o# all
real personal properties involved in petitionerFs action #or partition on the
&round that they were ac-uired entirely out o# her own money and
re&istered solely in her name'
!hether or not the parties are considered as co/owners o# the
3 co/ownership e$ists between a man and a woman who live
to&ether as husband and wi#e without the beneft o# marria&e, li"ewise
provides that, i# the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties ac-uired by them throu&h their oint contribution o# money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their contributions which, in the absence o# proo# to the contrary, is
presumed to be e-ual' There is thus co/ownership eventhou&h the couple
are not capacitated to marry each other'
.a)d'/ vs. RTC
260 SCRA 211
"ame. 3rticle )JIB 4mphasis to the 0T2%s ud&ment on li-uidation
o# properties in connection with the provision o# property re&ime wRo
unions o# marria&e'
!hether or not 3rticle )JI correctly applied on the status o# the
parties in the li-uidation o# their properties'
The Supreme 2ourt stated that, in avoid marria&e, the property
re&imes are those provided #or in 3rticle )JI or )J:as, the case may be'
The li-uidation o# the co/ownership shall be in accordance with the
provisions on co/ownership under the 2ivil 2ode which are not in conNict
with 3rticle )JI or )J:'
The conu&al home shall e-ually be co/owned by the couple and
shall be divided e-ually durin& li-uidation in accordance with the rules on
co/ownership' .owever, the #ruits o# couple%s separate property are not
included in the co/ownership'
9ra-cisco vs. Mast'r 7ro- 1or>s Co-structio- Cor&.
$.R. No. 151967 9'+ruar0 16" 2005
5osefna 2astillo was only <E years old when she and 4duardo G'
Francisco were married' 4duardo was then employed as the vice president
in a private corporation' The ,mus 0ural Can", ,nc' e$ecuted a deed o#
absolute sale in #avor o# 5osefna 2astillo Francisco, married to 4duardo
Francisco, coverin& two parcels o# residential land with a house' The
0e&ister o# =eeds made o# record at the dorsal portion o# the said titles'
5osefna mort&a&ed the said property to 6eonila 2ando #or a loan'

appears that 4duardo aG$ed his marital con#ormity to the deed'
4duardo, who was then the General 1ana&er and President o#
0each Aut Tradin& ,nternational, bou&ht I,*++ ba&s o# cement #rom 1,!22
but #ailed to pay #or the same' 1,!22 fled a complaint a&ainst him in the
0T2 o# 1a"ati 2ity #or the return o# the said commodities, or the value
thereo#' The trial court rendered ud&ment in #avor o# 1,!22 and a&ainst
4duardo' 5osefna fled the said 3Gdavit o# Third Party 2laim in the trial
court and served a copy thereo# to the sheri@' 1,!22 then submitted an
indemnity bond issued by the Prudential Guarantee and 3ssurance, ,nc'
The sale at public auction proceeded' 1,!22 made a bid #or the property'
5osefna fled a 2omplaint a&ainst 1,!22 and Sheri@ 3leo in the
0T2 o# Para7a-ue #or dama&es with a prayer #or a writ o# preliminary
inunction or temporary restrainin& order' She alle&ed then that she was
the sole owner o# the property levied on e$ecution by Sheri@ 3leo' .ence,
the levy on e$ecution o# the property was null and void'
!hether or not the subect property is the conu&al property o#
5osefna 2astillo and 4duardo Francisco'

The petitioner #ailed to prove that she ac-uired the property with
her personal #unds be#ore her cohabitation with 4duardo and that she is
the sole owner o# the property' The evidence on record shows that the ,mus
Can" e$ecuted a deed o# absolute sale over the property to the petitioner
and titles over the property were, therea#ter, issued to the latter as vendee
a#ter her marria&e to 4duardo'
,t is to be noted that plainti@/appellee &ot married at the a&e o# <E'
3t that a&e, it is doubt#ul i# she had enou&h #unds o# her own to purchase
the subect properties as she claimed in her 3Gdavit o# Third Party 2laim'
2on#ronted with this reality, she later claimed that the #unds were provided
by her mother and sister, clearly an a#terthou&ht in a desperate e@ort to
shield the subect properties #rom appellant 1aster ,ron as ud&ment
Aa&a0 vs. Pa)a-
276 SCRA #!1
"ame. 3rticle )J:'
!hether or not petitioner is co/owner o# the riceland ac-uired by
cohabitation between her and 1i&uel'
The sale o# the riceland was made in #avor o# 1i&uel and 4rlinda'
The provision o# law applicable here is 3rticle )J: o# the Family 2ode
providin& #or cases o# cohabitation when a man and woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other live e$clusively with each other as
husband and wi#e without the beneft o# marria&e or under a void
marria&e' !hile 1i&uel and 4rlinda contracted marria&e, said union was
patently void because earlier marria&e o# 1i&uel and 2arlina was still
subsistin& and una@ected by the latter%s de #acto separation'
4rlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is en&a&ed in
the business o# buy/and/sell and had a sari/sari store but #ailed to persuade
the S2 that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland' Since
petitioner #ailed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price
o# the riceland, S2 fnds no basis to usti#y her co/ownership with 1i&uel
over the same'
2ua-i/a vs. 2os'
,9 SCRA #06
4u&enio 5ose was the re&istered owner and operator o# the
passen&er eepney involved in an accident o# collision with a #rei&ht train o#
the Philippine Mational 0ailways that too" place on Movember <E, )9D9
which resulted in the death to seven >I? and physical inuries to fve >*? o#
its passen&ers' 3t the time o# the accident, 4u&enio 5ose was le&ally
married to Socorro 0amos but had been cohabitin& with de#endant/
appellant, 0osalia 3rroyo, #or si$teen >)D? years in a relationship a"in to
that o# husband and wi#e'
1otion #or reconsideration was fled by 0osalia 3rroyo prayin& that
the decision be reconsidered inso#ar as it condemns her to pay dama&es
ointly and severally with her co/de#endant, but was denied'
!hether or not 3rticle )JJ o# the 2ivil 2ode >now 3rticle )J: o# F2?
is applicable in a case where one o# the parties in a common/law
relationship is incapacitated to marry'
,t has been consistently ruled by this 2ourt that the co/ownership
contemplated in 3rticle )JJ o# the 2ivil 2ode re-uires that the man and the
woman livin& to&ether must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marria&e' Since 4u&enio 5ose is le&ally married to Socorro 0amos, there is
an impediment #or him to contract marria&e with 0osalia 3rroyo' (nder the
a#orecited provision o# the 2ivil 2ode, 3rroyo cannot be a co/owner o# the
eepney' The eepney belon&s to the conu&al partnership o# 5ose and his
le&al wi#e' There is there#ore no basis #or the liability o# 3rroyo #or dama&es
arisin& #rom the death o#, and physical inuries su@ered by, the passen&ers
o# the eepney which f&ured in the collision'
Tu%)os vs. 9'r-a-d'/
$.R. No. 1#7650 A&ri) 12" 2000
Spouses Fernandez fled an action o# eectment a&ainst petitioner
Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos' ,n their complaint, the
said spouses alle&ed that they are the absolute owners o# an apartment
buildin& that throu&h tolerance they had allowed the de#endants/private
respondents to occupy the apartment buildin& #or the last I years without
the payment o# any rentB that it was a&reed upon that a#ter a #ew months,
Guillerma Tumlos will pay P),D++'++ a month while the other de#endants
promised to pay P),+++'++ a month, both as rental, which a&reement was
not complied with by the said de#endants' They have demanded several
times that the de#endants vacate the premises, as they are in need o# the
property #or the construction o# a new buildin&'
Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who fled an answer to the
complaint' She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause
o# action a&ainst her, since she is a co/owner o# the subect premises as
evidenced by a 2ontract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co/
vendee o# the property in -uestion to&ether with 1ario Fernandez' She
then as"ed #or the dismissal o# the complaint'
(pon appeal to the 0T2, petitioner and the two other de#endants
alle&ed in their memorandum on appeal that 1ario and petitioner had an
amorous relationship, and that they ac-uired the property in -uestion as
their Klove nest'K ,t was #urther alle&ed that they lived to&ether in the said
apartment buildin& with their < children #or around )+ years, and that
Guillerma administered the property by collectin& rentals #rom the lessees
o# the other apartments, until she discovered that 1ario deceived her as to
the annulment o# his marria&e'
!hether or not the petitioner is the co/owner o# the property in
Petitioner #ails to present any evidence that she had made an
actual contribution to purchase the subect property' ,ndeed, she anchors
her claim o# co/ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent
1ario' 6i"ewise, her claim o# havin& administered the property durin& the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated' ,n any event, this #act by itsel# does not
usti#y her claim, #or nothin& in 3rticle )J: o# the Family 2ode provides that
the administration o# the property amounts to a contribution in its
ac-uisition' 2learly, there is no basis #or petitioner%s claim o# co/ownership'
The property in -uestion belon&s to the conu&al partnership o#
3oc'-a vs. La&'sura
$.R. No. 1!015# Marc( 2," 2001
2asiano .ombria fled a 2omplaint #or the recovery o# a parcel o#
land a&ainst his lessees, petitioner/spouses 3ntonio and 3l#reda =ocena'
The petitioners claimed ownership o# the land based on occupation since
time immemorial' 3 certain Guillermo 3buda intervened in the case' The
trial court ruled in #avor o# the petitioners and the intervenor 3buda' The
23 reversed the ud&ment o# the trial court and ordered the petitioners to
vacate the land they have leased #rom 2asiano. The 2omplaint in
,ntervention o# 3buda was dismissed'
3 Petition #or 2ertiorari and Prohibition was fled by the petitioners
with the 2ourt o# 3ppeals, alle&in& &rave abuse o# discretion on the part o#
the trial court ud&e in issuin& the Arders and o# the sheri@ in issuin& the
!rit o# =emolition'
!hether or not oint mana&ement or administration does re-uire
that the husband and the wi#e always act to&ether'
4ach spouse may validly e$ercise #ull power o# mana&ement alone,
subect to the intervention o# the court in proper cases' ,t is believed that
even under the provisions o# the Family 2ode, the husband alone could
have fled the petition #or certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs o#
demolition issued a&ainst the conu&al property with the 2ourt o# 3ppeals
without bein& oined by his wi#e' The si&nin& o# the attached certifcate o#
non/#orum shoppin& only by the husband is not a #atal de#ect'
The si&nin& petitioner here made the certifcation in his behal# and
that o# his wi#e' The husband may reasonably be presumed to have
personal "nowled&e o# the flin& or non/flin& by his wi#e o# any action or
claim similar to the petition #or certiorari and prohibition &iven the notices
and le&al processes involved in a le&al proceedin& involvin& real property'
Marti-'/ vs. Marti-'/
$.R. No. 1620,! 2u-' 2," 2005
The spouses 1artinez were the owners o# a parcel o# land as well
as the house constructed thereon' =aniel, Sr' e$ecuted a 6ast !ill and
Testament directin& the subdivision o# the property into three lots' .e then
be-ueathed the three lots to each o# his sons, namely, 0odol#o, 1anolo and
=aniel, 5r' 1anolo was desi&nated as the administrator o# the estate'
0odol#o #ound a deed o# sale purportedly si&ned by his #ather,
where the latter appears to have sold to 1anolo and his wi#e 6ucila'
0odol#o fled a complaint #or annulment o# deed o# sale and cancellation o#
T2T a&ainst his brother 1anolo and his sister/in/law 6ucila be#ore the 0T2'
0T2 dismissed the complaint #or annulment o# deed o# sale on the &round
that the trial court had no urisdiction over the action since there was no
alle&ation in the complaint that the last will o# =aniel 1artinez, Sr' had
been admitted to probate' 0odol#o appealed the order to the 23'
,n the meantime, the spouses 1anolo and 6ucila 1artinez wrote
0odol#o, demandin& that he vacate the property' 0odol#o i&nored the letter
and re#used to do so' This prompted the said spouses to fle a complaint
#or unlaw#ul detainer a&ainst 0odol#o in the 1T2 o# 1anila' They alle&ed
that they were the owners o# the property' The spouses 1artinez alle&ed in
their position paper that earnest e@orts toward a compromise had been
made andRor e$erted by them, but that the same proved #utile' Mo
amicable settlement was, li"ewise, reached by the parties durin& the
preliminary con#erence because o# irreconcilable di@erences'
!hether or not the certifcation to fle action and the alle&ations in
the complaint that the case passed throu&h the baran&ay are suGcient
compliance to prove that earnest e@orts were made'
The petition was &ranted' 3s pointed out by the 2ode 2ommission,
it is diGcult to ima&ine a sadder and more tra&ic spectacle than liti&ation
between members o# the same #amily' ,t is necessary that every e@ort
should be made toward a compromise be#ore liti&ation is allowed to breed
hate and passion in the #amily and it is "nown that a lawsuit between close
relatives &enerates deeper bitterness than between stran&ers'
Thus, a party%s #ailure to comply with 3rticle )*) o# the Family
2ode be#ore flin& a complaint a&ainst a #amily member would render such
complaint premature'
;o-tiv'ros vs. RTC
$.R. No. 125!65 2u-' 29" 1999
The spouses 3u&usto and 1aria .ontiveros, fled a complaint #or
dama&es a&ainst private respondents Gre&orio .ontiveros and Teodora
3yson #or dama&es due to uncollected rentals on a land located at
5amindan, 2apiz'
Petitioners moved #or a ud&ment on the pleadin&s on the &round
that private respondents% answer did not tender an issue or that it
otherwise admitted the material alle&ations o# the complaint' Private
respondents opposed the motion alle&in& that they had denied petitioners%
claims and thus tendered certain issues o# #act which could only be
resolved a#ter trial'
The trial court denied petitioners% motion' 3#ter an assessment o#
the diver&in& views and ar&uments presented by both parties, pleadin&s is
inappropriate not only #or the #act that the de#endants in their answer
specifcally denied the claim o# dama&es a&ainst them, but also because
the party claimin& dama&es must satis#actorily prove the amount thereo#,
however an e$ception to it, that is, that when the alle&ations re#er to the
amount o# dama&es, the alle&ations must still be proved' The court
dismissed the case and petitioners moved #or a reconsideration o# the
order o# dismissal, but their motion was denied' .ence, this petition #or
review on certiorari'
!hether or not the complaint on the &round that it does not alle&e
under oath that earnest e@orts toward compromise were made prior to
flin& thereo#'
Petition was &ranted' The inclusion o# private respondent 3yson as
de#endant and petitioner 1aria .ontiveros as plainti@ ta"es the case out o#
the ambit o# 3rt' )*) o# the Family 2ode' (nder this provision, the phrase
Kmembers o# the same #amilyK re#ers to the husband and wi#e, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether
#ull or hal#/blood' 0eli&ious relationship and relationship by aGnity are not
&iven any le&al e@ect in this urisdiction'
2onse-uently, private respondent 3yson, who is described in the
complaint as the spouse o# respondent .ontiveros, and petitioner 1aria
.ontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse o# petitioner 3u&usto .ontiveros,
are considered stran&ers to the .ontiveros #amily'
Ma-a)o vs. CA
$.R. No. 1292!2 2a-uar0 16" 2001
Troadio 1analo died intestate on February )J, )99<' .e was
survived by his wi#e, Pilar S' 1analo, and his eleven children, who are all o#
le&al a&e' 3t the time o# his death, Troadio 1analo le#t several real
properties located in 1anila and in the province o# Tarlac includin& a
business under the name and style 1analoFs 1achine Shop'
The ei&ht o# the survivin& children o# the late Troadio 1analo fled a

with the respondent 0T2 o# 1anila

o# the udicial settlement o# the
estate o# their late #ather and #or the appointment o# their brother, 0omeo
1analo, as administrator thereo#'
The trial court issued an order and set the reception o# evidence o#
the petitioners therein' .owever, the trial court upon motion o# set this
order o# &eneral de#ault aside herein petitioners >oppositors therein? who
were &ranted then )+ days within which to fle their opposition to the
petition' Several pleadin&s were subse-uently fled by herein petitioners,
throu&h counsel, culminatin& in the fllin& o# an Amnibus 1otion'
!hether or not the motion #or the outri&ht dismissal o# the petition
#or udicial settlement o# estate aver that earnest e@orts toward a
compromise involvin& members o# the same #amily have been made'
The petition was denied #or lac" o# merit' petitioners may not
validly ta"e re#u&e under the provisions o# 0ule ), Section <, o# the 0ules o#
2ourt to usti#y the invocation o# 3rticle <<< o# the 2ivil 2ode o# the
Philippines #or the dismissal o# the petition #or settlement o# the estate o#
the deceased Troadio 1analo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
This is clear #rom the term FsuitF that it re#ers to an action by one
person or persons a&ainst another or other in a court o# ustice in which the
plainti@ pursues the remedy which the law a@ords him #or the redress o# an
inury or the en#orcement o# a ri&ht, whether at law or in e-uity'
A)+a-o vs. $a&usa-
A.M. No. 1022-M2 Ma0 7" 1976
0edentor 3lbano in a verifed complaint char&ed 1unicipal 5ud&e
Patrocinio Gapusan o# ,locos Morte with incompetence and i&norance o# the
law #or havin& prepared and notarized a document providin& #or tile
personal separation o# husband and wi#e and the e$traudicial li-uidation o#
their conu&al partnership'
,n )9J) or fve years be#ore his appointment to the bench,
respondent Gapusan notarized a document #or the personal separation o#
the spouses Halentina 3ndres and Guillermo 1ali&ta o# Hintar, ,locos Morte
and #or the e$traudicial li-uidation o# their conu&al partnership' ,t was
stipulated in that document that i# either spouse should commit adultery or
concubina&e, as the case may be, then the other should re#rain #rom flin&
an action a&ainst the other'
5ud&e Gapusan denied that he dra#ted the a&reement' .e
e$plained that the spouses had been separated #or a lon& time when they
si&ned the separation a&reement and that the wi#e had be&otten children
with her paramour' .e said that there was a stipulation in the a&reement
that the spouses would live to&ether in case o# reconciliation' .is belie#
was that the separation a&reement #orestalled the occurrence o# violent
incidents between the spouses' 3lbano in flin& the malpractice char&e is in
e@ect as"in& this 2ourt to ta"e belated disciplinary action a&ainst 5ud&e
Gapusan as a member o# the bar or as a notary'
!hether or not respondent ud&e committed malpractice as a
To preserve the institutions o# marria&e and the #amily, the law
considers as void Kany contract #or personal separation between husband
and wi#eK and Kevery e$traudicial a&reement, durin& the marria&e, #or the
dissolution o# the conu&al partnershipK'
3 notary should not #acilitate the disinte&ration o# a marria&e and
the #amily by encoura&in& the separation o# the spouses and e$traudically
dissolvin& the conu&al partnership' Motaries were severely censured by
this 2ourt #or notarizin& documents which subvert the institutions o#
marria&e and the #amily
Mod'?ui))o vs. *r'va
1,5 SCRA 766
An 5anuary <9, )9::, a ud&ment was rendered by the 2ourt o#
3ppeals entitled %&rancisco "alinas' et al. vs. (ose )ode!uillo' et al.*
The said ud&ment havin& become fnal and e$ecutory, a writ o#
e$ecution was issued by the 0T2 o# =avao 2ity to satis#y the said ud&ment
on the &oods and chattels o# the de#endants 5ose 1ode-uillo and Cenito
1alubay at =avao del Sur' The sheri@ levied on a parcel o# residential land
located at =avao del Sur re&istered in the name o# de#endant and a parcel
o# a&ricultural land located at 1alala&, =avao del Sur'
3 motion to -uash andRor to set aside levy o# e$ecution was fled
by de#endant 5ose 1ode-uillo alle&in& therein that the residential land
located at Poblacion 1alala& is where the #amily home is built since )9D9
prior to the commencement o# this case and as such is e$empt #rom
e$ecution, #orced sale or attachment under 3rticles )*< and )*E o# the
Family 2ode e$cept #or liabilities mentioned in 3rticle )** thereo#, and that
the ud&ment debt sou&ht to be en#orced a&ainst the #amily home o#
de#endant is not one o# those enumerated under 3rticle )** o# the Family
2ode' 3n opposition thereto was fled by the plainti@s'
!hether or not a fnal ud&ment in an action #or dama&es may be
satisfed by way o# e$ecution o# a #amily home constituted under the
Family 2ode'
(nder the Family 2ode, a #amily home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot #rom the time it is occupied as a #amily residence' There is
no need to constitute the same udicially or e$traudicially as re-uired in
the 2ivil 2ode' ,# the #amily actually resides in the premises, it is, there#ore,
a #amily home as contemplated by law' Thus, the creditors should ta"e the
necessary precautions to protect their interest be#ore e$tendin& credit to
the spouses or head o# the #amily who owns the home'
,n the present case, the residential house and lot o# petitioner was
not constituted as a #amily home whether udicially or e$traudicially under
the 2ivil 2ode' ,t became a #amily home by operation o# law only under
3rticle )*E o# the Family 2ode'
Ma-aco& vs. CA
277 SCRA 9!1
Petitioner Florante F' 1anacop and his wi#e 4ulaceli purchased
residential lot with a bun&alow'

Private 0espondent 4 & 6 1erchantile, ,nc'
fled a complaint a&ainst petitioner and F'F' 1anacop 2onstruction 2o', ,nc'
be#ore the 0T2 o# Pasi&, 1etro 1anila to collect indebtedness' ,nstead o#
flin& an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise
a&reement with private respondent'
The trial court rendered ud&ment approvin& the a#orementioned
compromise a&reement' ,t enoined the parties to comply with the
a&reement in &ood #aith' Private respondent fled a motion #or e$ecution
which the lower court &ranted' .owever, e$ecution o# the ud&ment was
delayed' 4ventually, the sheri@ levied on several vehicles and other
personal properties o# petitioner' These chattels were sold at public auction
#or which certifcates o# sale were correspondin&ly issued by the sheri@'
Petitioner and his company fled a motion to -uash the alias writs
o# e$ecution and to stop the sheri@ #rom continuin& to en#orce them on the
&round that the ud&ment was not yet e$ecutory' Private respondent
opposed the motion' The lower court denied the motion to -uash the writ
o# e$ecution and the prayers in the subse-uent pleadin&s fled by
petitioner and his company' Findin& that petitioner and his company had
not paid their indebtedness even thou&h they collected receivables, the
lower court held that the case had become fnal and e$ecutory' ,t also ruled
that petitionerFs residence was not e$empt #rom e$ecution as it was not
duly constituted as a #amily home, pursuant to the 2ivil 2ode'
!hether or not a writ o# e$ecution o# a fnal and e$ecutory
ud&ment issued be#ore the e@ectivity o# the Family 2ode be e$ecuted on a
house and lot constituted as a #amily home under the provision o# Family
The petition is denied #or utter lac" o# merit' ,t does not mean that
3rticles )*< and )*E F2 have a retroactive e@ect such that all e$istin&
#amily residences are deemed to have been constituted as #amily homes at
the time o# their occupation prior to the e@ectivity o# the F2 and are
e$empt #rom e$ecution #or the payment o# obli&ations incurred be#ore the
e@ectivity o# the F2' 3rt' )D< simply means that all e$istin& #amily
residences at the time o# the e@ectivity o# the F2, are considered #amily
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefts accorded to a #amily
home under the F2'
A-da) vs. Macarai
,9 P(i) 165
1ariano 3ndal, assisted by his mother 1aria =ue7as, as &uardian
ad litem' brou&ht an action in the 2,F o# 2amarines Sur #or the recovery o#
the ownership and possession o# a parcel o# land situated in 2amarines Sur'
The complaint alle&es that 1ariano 3ndal is the survivin& son o# 4miliano
3ndal and 1aria =ue7as and that 4miliano was the owner o# the parcel o#
land in -uestion havin& ac-uired it #rom his mother 4duvi&is 1acarai& by
virtue o# a donation propter nuptias e$ecuted by the latter in #avor o# the
The lower court rendered ud&ment in #avor o# the plainti@s >a?
declarin& 1ariano 3ndal the le&itimate son o# 4miliano 3ndal and such
entitled to inherit the land in -uestionB >b? declarin& 1ariano 3ndal owner
o# said landB and >c? orderin& the de#endant to pay the costs o# suit'
=e#endant too" the case to this 2ourt upon the plea that only -uestion o#
law are involved'
4miliano 3ndal became sic" o# tuberculosis' Sometime therea#ter,
his brother, Feli$, went to live in his house to help him wor" his house to
help him wor" his #arm' .is sic"ness became worse, he became so wea"
that he could hardly move and &et up #rom his bed' 1aria =ue7as, his wi#e,
eloped with Feli$, and both went to live in the house o# 1ariaFs #ather' Feli$
and 1aria had se$ual intercourse and treated each other as husband and
wi#e' 4miliano died without the presence o# his wi#e, who did not even
attend his #uneral' 1aria =ue7as &ave birth to a boy, who was &iven the
name o# 1ariano 3ndal'
!hether or not the child is considered as the le&itimate son o#
1ariano is the le&itimate son o# 4miliano' ,t is already seen that
4miliano and his wi#e were livin& to&ether, or at least had access one to
the other, and 4miliano was not impotent, and the child was born within
E++ days #ollowin& the dissolution o# the marria&e' (nder these #acts no
other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is le&itimate' ,t is also
seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proo# that it was
physically or naturally impossible #or them to indul&e in carnal intercourse'
3nd here there is no such proo#'
*'-it'/-*adua vs. CA
$.R. No. 105625 2a-uar0 2!" 199!
Hicente Cenitez and ,sabel 2hipon&ian owned various properties,
upon their death the f&ht #or administration o# Hicente%s estate ensued'
Hicente%s sister and nephew prayed #or the issuance o# letters o#
administration o# Hicente%s estate' An the other hand, 1arisa Cenitez/
Cadua opposed the petition' She alle&ed that she is the sole heir o# the
deceased spouses and is capable o# administerin& the estate'
,n 0T2, both parties submit their pieces o# evidence' Petitioner
1arissa, prove that she is the only le&itimate child o# the spouses by
submittin& documentary evidence and that the spouses continuously
treated her as le&itimate child' An the other hand, respondents proved by
testimonial evidence that spouses #ailed to be&et a child durin& their
marria&e because the spouse ,sabel was treated by an obstetrician/
&ynecolo&ist which prevented her to &ive birth' The older sister o# Hicente
also declared that petitioner was not the biolo&ical child o# the spouses,
who were unable to procreate, as she was there at the time the spouses
were havin& this problem'
!hether or not the petitioner was the biolo&ical child o# the
spouses and has the ri&ht to be the sole heir'
Petitioner was not the biolo&ical child based on #acts' 6ive o# Cirth
2ertifcate was repudiated by Motarized o# =eed o# 4$tra/5udicial
Settlement o# 4state'
The claim #or inheritance o# a child who is not the biolo&ical or
adopted child o# deceased was denied, on the &round that 3rticles )DJ,
)DD, )I+, and )I) o# the Family 2ode do not contemplate a situation where
a child is alle&ed not to be the child by nature or biolo&ical child o# a
certain couple' 0ather, these articles &overn a situation where the husband
or his heirs denies as his own a child o# his wi#e'
Co-c'&cio- vs. CA
$.R. No. 12#!50 Auust #1" 2005
1a' Theresa 3lmonte married Gerardo 2oncepcion, which they
be&ot a child named 5ose Gerardo' Gerardo 2oncepcion #ound out that his
wi#e was still married to 1ario Gopiao' .ence, he fled #or annulment on the
&round o# bi&amy' Theresa averred that he married 1ario but that was only
a sham and she never lived with him at all' 0T2 ruled that Theresa%s
marria&e with 1ario Gopiao is still valid and subsistin& thus the marria&e
with Gerardo is bi&amous and the child born was condemned ille&itimate'
2ustody was then &iven to Theresa'
Theresa #elt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their
marria&e annulled' She ar&ued that a putative #ather cannot have
visitation ri&hts over the ille&itimate child and the child%s surname be
chan&ed to the mother%s maiden name' Gerardo opposed the motion and
insisted on the visitation ri&hts and retention o# the #ather%s surname to the
!hether or not the child born out o# a bi&amous marria&e is
considered le&itimate'
5ose Gerardo is deemed born le&itimate althou&h the mother may
have declared a&ainst its le&itimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress' The #act that the child was conceived and born at the time the
spouses had lived to&ether'
The law and only the law determine, who are the le&itimate or
ille&itimate children, #or one%s le&itimacy or ille&itimacy cannot ever be
compromised' Mot even the birth certifcate o# the minor can chan&e his
status #or the in#ormation contained therein is merely supplied by the
mother andRor the supposed #ather' ,t should be what the law says and not
what a parent says it is'
Li0ao vs. Li0ao
$.R. No. 1#,961 Marc( 7" 2002
2orazon Garcia is le&ally married to but livin& separately #rom
0amon 1' Pulo #or more than )+ years at the time o# the institution o# the
said civil case' 2orazon cohabited with the late !illiam 6iyao #rom )9D* up
to the time o# !illiam%s untimely demise' They lived to&ether in the
company o# 2orazon%s two children #rom her subsistin& marria&e'
2orazon &ave birth to !illiam 6iyao, 5r' =urin& her three day stay at
the hospital, !illiam 6iyao visited and stayed with her and the new born
baby, !illiam, 5r' >Cilly?' 3ll the medical and hospital e$penses, #ood and
clothin& were paid under the account o# !illiam 6iyao' !illiam 6iyao even
as"ed his confdential secretary to secure a copy o# Cilly%s birth certifcate'
.e li"ewise instructed 2orazon to open a ban" account #or Cilly with the
2onsolidated Can" and Trust 2ompany and &ave wee"ly amounts to be
deposited therein' !illiam 6iyao would brin& Cilly to the oGce, introduce
him as his &ood loo"in& son and had their pictures ta"en to&ether'
0espondents, on the other hand, painted a di@erent picture o# the story'
!hether or not petitioner may impu&n his own le&itimacy to be
able to claim #rom the estate o# his supposed #ather !illiam 6iyao'
S2 denied the petition' 3 child born and conceived durin& a valid
marria&e is presumed to be le&itimate' The presumption o# le&itimacy o#
children does not only Now out #rom a declaration contained in the statute
but is based on the broad principles o# natural ustice and the supposed
virtue o# the mother' The presumption is &rounded in a policy to protect
innocent o@sprin& #rom the odium o# ille&itimacy'
S2 fnds no reason to discuss the suGciency o# the evidence
presented by both parties on the petitioner%s claim o# alle&ed fliation with
the late !illiam 6iyao' ,n any event, there is no clear, competent and
positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alle&ed #ather had
admitted or reco&nized his paternity'
Ec'ta vs. Ec'ta
$.R. No. 1570#7 Ma0 20" 200!
Petitioner 0osalina P' Hda' =e 4ceta was married to ,saac 4ceta
sometime in )9<D' =urin& the subsistence o# their marria&e, they be&ot a
son, Hicente' The couple ac-uired several properties, amon& which is the
disputed property' ,saac died in )9DI leavin& behind 0osalina and Hicente
as his compulsory heirs'
,n )9II, Hicente died' =urin& his li#etime, however, he sired 1aria
Theresa, an ille&itimate dau&hter' Thus at the time o# his death, his
compulsory heirs were his mother, 0osalina, and ille&itimate child, 1aria
,n )99), 1aria Theresa fled a case be#ore the 0T2 o# ;uezon 2ity
#or KPartition and 3ccountin& with =ama&esK

a&ainst 0osalina alle&in& that
by virtue o# her #ather%s death, she became 0osalina%s co/heir and co/
owner o# the property' ,n her answer, 0osalina alle&ed that the property is
paraphernal in nature and thus belon&ed to her e$clusively'
!hether the certifed $ero$ copy #rom a $ero$ copy o# the
certifcate o# live birth is competent evidence to prove the alle&ed fliation
o# the respondent as an Kille&itimate dau&hterK o# her alle&ed #ather
Hicente 4ceta'
Motably, what was fled and tried be#ore the trial court and the
2ourt o# 3ppeals is one #or partition and accountin& with dama&es only'
The fliation, or compulsory reco&nition by Hicente 4ceta o# 1aria Theresa,
was never put in issue' ,n #act, both parties have already a&reed and
admitted, as duly noted in the trial court%s pre/trial order, that 1aria
Theresa is 0osalina%s &randdau&hter'
Motwithstandin&, 1aria Theresa success#ully established her
fliation with Hicente by presentin& a duly authenticated birth certifcate'
Hicente himsel# si&ned 1aria Theresa%s birth certifcate thereby
ac"nowled&in& that she is his dau&hter' Cy this act alone, Hicente is
deemed to have ac"nowled&ed his paternity over 1aria Theresa'
Co-sta-ti-o vs. M'-d'/
209 SCRA 1,
3melita 2onstantino, petitioner and waitress at Tony%s 0estaurant,
met ,van 1endez, respondent' An that frst meetin&, ,van invited 3melita
to dine with him at .otel 4nrico where he stayed' !hile dinin&, ,van
pro#essed his love to 3melita throu&h a promise o# marria&e and then they
have had a se$ual intercourse' Cut a#ter the se$ual contact, ,van con#essed
that he is a married man' .owever, they repeated their se$ual contact in
the months o# September and Movember )9IJ whenever ,van is in 1anila,
which resulted to 3melita%s pre&nancy'
3melita pleas #or help and support to ,van but #ailed' She then fled
#or the reco&nition o# the unborn child and payment #or dama&es'
.owever, ,van rebutted by the petition o# the dismissal o# the complaint #or
lac" o# cause o# action' 0T2 ruled in #avor o# 3melita, respondent petition
the complaint 23 that 0T2 erred in its rulin&' 23 #avored the respondent
and dismissed the complaint o# petitioner'
!hether or not 3melita was able to prove the paternity o# ,van to
her son 1ichael to warrant support'
S2 dismissed the petition' She was inconsistent in her response
whether they did or didn%t have any se$ in 1anila in the )st and <nd wee"
o# Movember' 3t frst, she said she remembered durin& cross/e$amination'
6ater in her response, she said she doesn%t remember'
This is relevant because the child 1ichael is a F(66 T401 baby' .e
was conceived appro$imately sometime in the <nd wee" o# Movember' She
wrote to ,van as"in& #or support around February statin& that she was #our
months pre&nant' This means, she thin"s she conceived the child on
Actober' She wrote to ,van%s wi#e where she revealed her attachment to
,van who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boy#riend'
1oreover, she confded that she had a -uarrel with her boy#riend resultin&
to her leavin& wor"'
*'r-a+' vs. A)'@o
$.R. No. 1!0500 2a-uar0 21" 2002
Fiscal 4rnesto Cernabe alle&edly #athered a son with his secretary,
2arolina 3leo' The son was born and was named 3drian Cernabe' Fiscal
died as well as his le&itimate wi#e, leavin& 4rnestina Cernabe the sole
survivin& heir'
2arolina, in behal# o# her son, fled a complaint prayin& that 3drian
be declared an ac"nowled&ed child o# the deceased and also be &iven the
share o# Cernabe%s estate' 0T2 dismissed the complaint and that the death
o# the putative #ather had barred the action' 23 ruled that 3drian be
allowed to prove that he was the ille&itimate son o# Fiscal Cernabe'
Petitioner 4rnestina averred 23%s rulin& to be o# error due to 0T2%s rulin&
based on 3rticle )I*'
!hether or not respondent has a cause o# action to fle a case
a&ainst petitioner #or reco&nition and partition with accountin& a#ter the
putative #ather%s death in the absence o# any written ac"nowled&ment o#
paternity by the latter'
S2 ruled in aGrmative' an action #or the reco&nition o# an
ille&itimate child must be brou&ht within the li#etime o# the alle&ed parent'
The F2 ma"es no distinction on whether the #ormer was still a minor when
the latter died' Thus, the putative parent is &iven by the new 2ode a
chance to dispute the claim, considerin& that ille&itimate children are
usually be&otten and raised in secrecy and without the le&itimate #amily
bein& aware o# their e$istence' The putative parent should thus be &iven
the opportunity to aGrm or deny the child%s fliation, and this, he or she
cannot do i# he or she is already dead'8
2iso- vs. CA
$.R. No. 12!,5# 9'+ruar0 2!" 199,
1onina alle&ed that Francisco had been married to a certain 6ilia
6opez 5ison' 3t the end o# )9J*, however, F03M2,S2A impre&nated
4speranza 3molar, who was then employed as the nanny o# Francisco%s
dau&hter' 3s a result, 1onina was born in ,loilo, and since childhood, had
enoyed the continuous, implied reco&nition as an ille&itimate child o#
Francisco by his acts and that o# his #amily' 1onina #urther alle&ed that
Francisco &ave her support and spent #or her education, such that she
obtained a 1asterFs de&ree, became a 2P3 and eventually, a 2entral Can"
e$aminer' ,n view o# FranciscoFs re#usal to e$pressly reco&nize her, 1onina
prayed #or a udicial declaration o# her ille&itimate status and that
Francisco support and treat her as such'
Francisco alle&ed that he could not have had se$ual relations with
4speranza 3molar durin& the period specifed in the complaint as she had
ceased to be in his employ as early as )9JJ, and did not "now o# her
whereabouts since then' Further, he never reco&nized 1onina, e$pressly or
impliedly, as his ille&itimate child' 3s aGrmative and special de#enses,
Francisco contended that 1AM,M3 had no ri&ht or cause o# action a&ainst
him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches andRor prescription'
.e thus prayed #or dismissal o# the complaint and an award o# dama&es
due to the malicious flin& o# the complaint'
!hether or not 1onina 5ison is the reco&nized ille&itimate dau&hter
o# Francisco 5ison by the latterFs own acts and those o# his #amily'
S2 aGrmed the decision o# 23 in reco&nizin& 1onina as ille&itimate
dau&hter o# Francisco' 3ll told, 1oninaFs evidence hurdled Kthe hi&h
standard o# proo#K re-uired #or the success o# an action to establish oneFs
ille&itimate fliation when relyin& upon the provisions re&ardin& Kopen and
continuous possessionFF or Kany other means allowed by the 0ules o# 2ourt
and special lawsK' 1oreover, 1onina proved her fliation by more than
mere preponderance o# evidence'
Co-d' vs. A+a0a
1# P(i) 2!9
2asiano 3baya, unmarried, the son o# 0omualdo 3baya and Sabina
6abadia died on the ):99' Paula 2onde, as the mother o# the natural
children 5ose and Teopista 2onde, whom she states she had by 2asiano
3baya moved the settlement o# the intestate succession'
3n administrator has been appointed #or the said estate' .owever,
0oman 3baya brother o# 2asiano, came #orward and opposed said
appointment and claimed it #or himsel# as bein& the nearest relative o# the
deceased' The court declares 0oman 3baya to be the sole heir o# 2asiano
3baya and to be there#ore entitled to ta"e possession o# all the property o#
said estate'
Paula 2onde fled a petition wherein she stated that she
ac"nowled&ed the relationship alle&ed by 0oman 3baya but that she
considered her ri&ht was superior to his and moved #or a hearin& on the
matter' She prayed that she be declared to have pre#erential ri&hts to the
property le#t by 2asiano 3baya'
!hether or not the petitioner may en#orce an action in the
ac"nowled&ment o# the natural child #rom 2asiano 3baya'
The ri&ht o# action #or le&itimacy devolvin& upon the child is o# a
personal character and &enerally pertains e$clusively to him' Anly the child
may e$ercise it at any time durin& his li#etime' 3s e$ception, and in three
cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs o# the child, to wit: i# he or
she died durin& his or her minority, or while insane, or a#ter action had
already been instituted' ,nasmuch as the ri&ht o# action accruin& to the
child to claim his or her le&itimacy lasts durin& his or her whole li#etime, he
or she may e$ercise it either a&ainst the presumed parents or his or her
heirs' The ri&ht o# action which the law concedes to the natural child is not
transmitted to his ascendants or descendants'
Mar?ui-o vs. 7AC
$.R. No. 7207, 2u-' 27" 199!
0espondent Cibiana 0omano/Pa&adora fled an action #or 5udicial
=eclaration o# Filiation, 3nnulment o# Partition, Support, and =ama&es
a&ainst petitioner 4uti-uio 1ar-uino on the 2,F o# Me&ros Accidental' 3lso
impleaded as de#endants, were the wi#e o# 4uti-uio 1ar-uino and their
le&itimate children all surnamed Terenal/1ar-uino'
The records show that Cibiana was born o# Gre&oria 0omano and
alle&edly o# 4uti-uio 1ar-uino'

3t that time, 4uti-uio was still sin&le'
Cibiana became personally "nown to the 1ar-uino #amily when she was
hired as domestic helper in their household at =uma&uete 2ity' She always
received fnancial assistance #rom them' Thus, she claimed that she
enoyed continuous possession o# the status o# an ac"nowled&ed natural
child by direct and une-uivocal acts o# her #ather and his #amily' The
1ar-uinos, on the other hand, stron&ly denied her alle&ations'
=urin& the pendency o# the case and be#ore respondent Cibiana
could fnish presentin& her evidence, she died' .er heirs were ordered
substituted #or her as parties/plainti@s' Petitioners fled a 1otion to
=ismiss' They averred that the action #or reco&nition is intransmissible to
the heirs bein& a personal act' The trial court dismissed the case'
0espondents appealed to the respondent ,32' 4uti-uio 1ar-uino died while
the case was pendin& appeal'
!hether or not the ri&ht o# action to compel reco&nition is
intransmissible in character'
The child can brin& the action durin& his or her entire li#etime, not
durin& the li#etime o# the parents, and even a#ter the death o# the parents'
,n other words, the action does not prescribe as lon& as he lives'
,n the case at bench, it is evident that Cibiana was a natural child'
She was born out o# wedloc" o# Gre&oria 0omano and alle&edly o# 4uti-uio
1ar-uino who at that time was sin&le' Cibiana sued #or compulsory
reco&nition while 4uti-uio was still alive' Sadly, she died be#ore she could
present her proo# o# reco&nition' .er death tolled the action considerin& its
personal nature and intransmissibility'
A+adi))a vs. Ta+i)ira-
2!9 SCRA !!7
2omplainant 3badilla, contends that respondent had scandalously
and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Caybayan durin& the
e$istence o# his le&itimate marria&e with Teresita Canzuela' 0espondent
alle&edly shame#acedly contracted marria&e with the said Priscilla
Caybayan' 2omplainant claims that this was a bi&amous union because o#
the #act that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita
,n respect o# the char&e o# deceit#ul conduct, complainant claims
that respondent caused to be re&istered as Kle&itimateK, his three
ille&itimate children with Priscilla Caybayan by #alsely e$ecutin& separate
aGdavits statin& that the delayed re&istration was due to inadvertence,
e$cusable ne&li&ence or oversi&ht, when in truth and in #act, respondent
"new that these children cannot be le&ally re&istered as le&itimate'
2omplainant mani#ests that the commission by the respondent o#
the #ore&oin& acts renders him unft to occupy the e$alted position o# a
dispenser o# ustice' 0espondent, in his comment, declared that his
cohabitation with Priscilla Caybayan is not and was neither bi&amous nor
immoral because he started livin& with Priscilla Caybayan only a#ter his
frst wi#e had already le#t and abandoned the #amily home and, since then,
and until the present her whereabouts is not "nown and respondent has
had no news o# her bein& alive'
!hether or not respondent commited deceit#ul conduct in
le&itimatin& his three ille&itimate children born out o# adulterous
S2 ruled that respondent commited deceit#ul conduct and orders
his dismissal #rom the service' 3s a lawyer and a ud&e, respondent ou&ht
to "now that, despite his subse-uent marria&e to Priscilla, these three
children cannot be le&itimated nor in any way be considered le&itimate
since at the time they were born, there was an e$istin& valid marria&e
between respondent and his frst wi#e' 6e&itimation is limited to natural
children and cannot include those born o# adulterous relations'
T'otico vs. 3') .a)
1# SCRA !06
0ene Teotico, married to the testatri$Fs niece named 5osefna
1ortera' The testatri$ 5osefna 1ortera as her sole and universal heir to all
the remainder o# her properties not otherwise disposed o# in the will'
Hicente Teotico fled a petition #or the probate o# the will be#ore the 2,F o#
1anila which was set #or hearin& a#ter the re-uisite publication and service
to all parties concerned'
3na del Hal 2han, claimin& to be an adopted child o# Francisca
1ortera, a deceased sister o# the testatri$, as well as an ac"nowled&ed
natural child o# 5ose 1ortera, a deceased brother o# the same testatri$,
fled an opposition to the probate o# the will alle&in& the #ollowin& &rounds'
Hicente C' Teotico, fled a motion to dismiss the opposition alle&in& that the
oppositor had no le&al personality to intervene' The probate court, allowed
the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child o# Francisca 1ortera, and
the oppositor amended her opposition by alle&in& the additional &round
that the will is inoperative as to the share o# =r' 0ene Teotico'
3#ter the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court
rendered its decision admittin& the will to probate but declarin& the
disposition made in #avor o# =r' 0ene Teotico void with the statement that
the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatri$Fs
heirs by way o# intestate succession'
!hether or not oppositor 3na del Hal 2han has the ri&ht to
intervene in this proceedin&'
Appositor has no ri&ht to intervene because she has no interest in
the estate either as heir, e$ecutor, or administrator, nor does she have any
claim to any property a@ected by the will, because it nowhere appears
therein any provision desi&natin& her as heir, le&atee or devisee o# any
portion o# the estate' She has also no interest in the will either as
administratri$ or e$ecutri$' Meither has she any claim a&ainst any portion
o# the estate because she is not a co/owner thereo#'
The oppositor cannot also derive com#ort #rom the #act that she is
an adopted child o# Francisca 1ortera because under our law the
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the
adopted and does not e$tend to the relatives o# the adoptin& parents or o#
the adopted child e$cept only as e$pressly provided #or by law' .ence, no
relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals o# the
adoptin& parents' 3s a conse-uence, the adopted is an heir o# the adopter
but not o# the relatives o# the adopter'
R'&u+)ic vs. CA a-d *o+i)'s
205 SCRA #56
=issatisfed with the decision o# respondent 2ourt o# 3ppeals which
aGrmed in toto the decision o# the 0T2 o# 6e&aspi 2ity &rantin& the petition
o# herein private respondent to adopt the minor 5ason 2ondat, petitioner
see"s the reversal thereo# in the present petition #or review on certiorari'
Uenaida 2orteza Cobiles fled a petition to adopt 5ason 2ondat,
then si$ years old and who had been livin& with her #amily since he was
#our months old' The court a !uo, fndin& the petition to be suGcient in
#orm and substance, issued an order settin& the petition #or hearin&' The
order was duly published, with copies thereo# seasonably served' 3 copy o#
said order was posted on the bulletin board o# the court and in the other
places it had re-uired #or that purpose' Mobody appeared to oppose the
The trial court rendered ud&ment disposin& that the minor child,
5ason 2ondat, be #reed #rom all le&al obli&ations o# obedience and
maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and
purposes, the child o# the spouses =ioscoro and Uenaida Cobiles, and the
surname o# the child be chan&ed to KCobilesK which is the surname o# the
!hether or not 23 erred in aGrmin& the trial courtFs decision which
&ranted the petition to adopt 5ason 2ondat in #avor o# spouses Cobiles'
The ri&hts concomitant to and con#erred by the decree o# adoption
will be #or the best interests o# the child' .is adoption is with the consent o#
his natural parents' The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in
&rantin& the petition #or adoption and we fnd no reason to disturb the
same' Given the #acts and circumstances o# the case and considered in the
li&ht o# the #ore&oin& doctrine, S2 holds that the decree o# adoption issued
by the court a !uo would &o a lon& way towards promotin& the wel#are o#
the child and the enhancement o# his opportunities #or a use#ul and happy
Ta%aro vs. CA
209 SCRA 51,
=omestic 3doption 3ct o# )99:B 3delberto Cundoc, then a minor o#
)+ years o# a&e, shot 5enni#er Tamar&o with an air riNe causin& inuries
which resulted in her death' 3ccordin&ly, a civil complaint #or dama&es was
fled with the 0T2 o# ,locos Sur by petitioner 1acario Tamar&o, 5enni#erFs
adoptin& parent and petitioner spouses 2elso and 3urelia Tamar&o,
5enni#erFs natural parents a&ainst respondent spouses Hictor and 2lara
Cundoc, 3delbertoFs natural parents with whom he was livin& at the time o#
the tra&ic incident'
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa 0apisura had
fled a petition to adopt the minor 3delberto Cundoc in Special Proceedin&s
be#ore the then 2,F o# ,locos Sur' This petition #or adoption was &ranted
that is, a#ter 3delberto had shot and "illed 5enni#er' 0espondent spouses
Cundoc, 3delbertoFs natural parents, recitin& the result o# the #ore&oin&
petition #or adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adoptin&
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa 0apisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shi#ted to
the adoptin& parents #rom the moment the success#ul petition #or adoption
was fled'
Petitioners in their reply contended that since 3delberto Cundoc
was then actually livin& with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relin-uished by the mere flin& and &rantin& o# a petition
#or adoption' The trial court dismissed petitionersF complaint, rulin& that
respondent natural parents o# 3delberto indeed were not indispensable
parties to the action'
!hether or not petitioners, notwithstandin& loss o# their ri&ht to
appeal, may still fle the instant petition'
!hether the 2ourt may still ta"e co&nizance o# the case even
throu&h petitionersF appeal had been fled out o# time'
S2 &ranted the petition' 0etroactive a@ect may perhaps be &iven
to the &rantin& o# the petition #or adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual o# some beneft or advanta&e in #avor o# the adopted
child' ,n the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lod&ed in the 0apisura spouses so as to burden them
with liability #or a tortious act that they could not have #oreseen and which
they could not have prevented would be un#air and unconscionable'
2avi'r vs. Luc'ro
9! P(i) 6#!
Salud 3rca, respondent and 3l#redo 5avier, de#endant had their
marria&e solemnized at the 1T2 o# 1anila' 3t the time o# their marria&e,
they had already be&otten a son named 3l#redo 5avier 5r'
3l#redo 5avier le#t #or (S on board a ship o# (S Mavy, #or he was an
enlisted man in the (S Mavy' Cecause o# de#endant%s departure,
respondent chose to live with de#endant%s parents but le#t due to #rictions
havin& occurred between them' She then stayed to her native place in
Tanza, 2avite'
!ith the events transpired, the relationship o# the spouses become
strained and with that 3l#redo 5avier fled an action #or divorce a&ainst
Salud 3rca at 3labama, (S3' .avin& received the complaint, respondent
averred that de#endant was not a resident o# 3labama but a resident o#
Maic, 2avite' She also pro#essed that the cause o# their separation was not
o# desertion on her part but o# the de#endant' 3nd that since his departure
to (S Mavy, he had always supported his spouse and his son throu&h
allotments by (S Mavy =epartment o# (S Government' Throu&h these she
prayed that the complaint be dismissed'
!hether or not the de#endant is still obli&ed to support his son
even i# he reaches the a&e o# maority'
(n-uestionably, 3l#redo 5avier, 5r' is the son o# petitioner 3l#redo
5avier, and i# fnancial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination
o# the appeal his education, or the completion thereo#, would be unduly
delayed' That is &ood reason #or immediate e$ecution'
Support also includes the education o# the person to be supported
Kuntil he complete his education or trainin& #or some pro#ession, trade or
vocation even beyond the a&e o# maorityK and on the basis o# this article
support was &ranted to 3l#redo 5avier 5r'
$oitia vs. Ca%&os-Ru'da
#5 P(i) 252" 262
"ame. 3rticle <+J' 4mphasis on the options o# support'
!hether or not the wi#e can claim #or support outside o# the
conu&al domicile'
,t has been held that the wi#e, who is #orced to leave the conu&al
abode by her husband, without #ault on her part, may maintain an action
a&ainst the husband #or separate maintenance when she has no other
remedy, notwithstandin& the provision o# the law &ivin& the person who is
obli&ed to #urnish support the option to satis#y it either by payin& a f$ed
pension or by receivin& and maintainin& in his home the one havin& the
ri&ht to the same'
3' Asis vs. 3' Asis
#0# SCRA 176
Private respondent, in her capacity as the le&al &uardian o# the
minor, Glen 2amil 3ndres de 3sis, brou&ht an action #or maintenance and
support a&ainst petitioner be#ore the 0T2 o# ;uezon 2ity, alle&in& that
petitioner is the #ather o# subect minor, and the #ormer re#used andRor
#ailed to provide #or the maintenance o# the latter, despite repeated
demands' Petitioner denied his paternity o# the said minor alle&ed and
that he cannot be re-uired to provide support #or him' The mother%s child
sent in a mani#estation statin& that because o# petitioner%s udicial
declarations, it was #utile and a useless e$ercise to claim support #rom
him' .ence, she was withdrawin& her complaint a&ainst petitioner subect
to the condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim' Cy
virtue o# the said mani#estation, the parties mutually a&reed to move #or
the dismissal o# the complaint' The motion was &ranted by the trial court,
which then dismissed the case with preudice'
Subse-uently, another 2omplaint #or maintenance and support was
brou&ht a&ainst petitioner, this time in the name o# Glen 2amil 3ndres de
3sis, represented by her le&al &uardian, herein private respondent'
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the &round o# res judicata.
The trial court denied the motion, rulin& that res judicata is inapplicable in
an action #or support #or the reason that renunciation or waiver o# #uture
support is prohibited by law' The trial court li"ewise denied petitioner%s
motion #or reconsideration' Petitioner fled with the 23 a petition #or
certiorari. 23 dismissed the same'
!hether or not the lower courts acted in &rave abuse o# discretion
a#ter the frst complaint was dismissed and adud&ed'
The ri&ht to receive support can neither be renounced nor
transmitted to a third person' Furthermore, #uture support cannot be the
subect o# a compromise' The mani#estation sent by private respondent
amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that &ives the subect
minor, the ri&ht to claim support #rom his putative parent, the petitioner'
Furthermore, the a&reement entered into between the petitioner and
private respondent #or the dismissal o# the counterclaim was in the nature
o# a compromise, which cannot be countenanced' ,t violated the
prohibition a&ainst any compromise o# the ri&ht to support'
Es&iritu vs. CA
2!2 SCRA #62
Petitioner 0eynaldo 4spiritu and respondent Teresita 1asaudin&
frst met in ,li&an 2ity where 0eynaldo was employed by the Mational Steel
2orporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital'
Teresita le#t #or 6os 3n&eles, 2ali#ornia to wor" as a nurse' 0eynaldo was
sent by his employer, the Mational Steel 2orporation, to Pittsbur&h,
Pennsylvania as its liaison oGcer and 0eynaldo and Teresita then be&an to
maintain a common law relationship o# husband and wi#e' An )9:D, their
dau&hter, 0osalind Therese, was born' !hile they were on a brie# vacation
in the Philippines, 0eynaldo and Teresita &ot married, and upon their return
to the (nited States, their second child, a son, this time, and &iven the
name 0e&inald Hince, was born on )9::'
The relationship o# the couple deteriorated until they decided to
separate' ,nstead o# &ivin& their marria&e a second chance as alle&edly
pleaded by 0eynaldo, Teresita le#t 0eynaldo and the children and went
bac" to 2ali#ornia' 0eynaldo brou&ht his children home to the Philippines,
but because his assi&nment in Pittsbur&h was not yet completed, he was
sent bac" by his company to Pittsbur&h' .e had to leave his children with
his sister, Guillerma 6ayu& and her #amily'
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and fled
the petition #or a writ o# habeas corpus a&ainst herein two petitioners to
&ain custody over the children, thus startin& the whole proceedin&s now
reachin& this 2ourt' The trial court dismissed the petition #or habeas
corpus' ,t suspended TeresitaFs parental authority over 0osalind and
0e&inald and declared 0eynaldo to have sole parental authority over them
but with ri&hts o# visitation to be a&reed upon by the parties and to be
approved by the 2ourt'
!hether or not the petition #or a writ o# habeas corpus to &ain
custody over the children be &ranted'
S2 dismissed the writ o# habeas corpus petition by the mother and
retain the custody o# the children to the #ather' The illicit or immoral
activities o# the mother had already caused emotional disturbances,
personality conNicts, and e$posure to conNictin& moral values a&ainst the
The children are now both over seven years old' Their choice o# the
parent with whom they pre#er to stay is clear #rom the record' From all
indications, 0eynaldo is a ft person' The children understand the
un#ortunate shortcomin&s o# their mother and have been a@ected in their
emotional &rowth by her behavior'
A%adora vs. CA
160 SCRA 27!
6i"e any prospective &raduate, 3l#redo 3madora was loo"in&
#orward to the commencement e$ercises where he would ascend the sta&e
and in the presence o# his relatives and #riends receive his hi&h school
diploma' 3s it turned out, thou&h, #ate would intervene and deny him that
awaited e$perience' !hile they were in the auditorium o# their school, the
2ole&io de San 5ose/0ecoletos, a classmate, Pablito =amon, fred a &un
that mortally hit 3l#redo, endin& all his e$pectations and his li#e as well'
=a@on was convicted o# homicide thru rec"less imprudence'
3dditionally, the herein petitioners, as the victimFs parents, fled a civil
action #or dama&es under 3rticle <):+ o# the 2ivil 2ode a&ainst the 2ole&io
de San 5ose/0ecoletos, its rector the hi&h school principal, the dean o#
boys, and the physics teacher, to&ether with =a@on and two other
students, throu&h their respective parents' The complaint a&ainst the
students was later dropped' 3#ter trial, the 2,F o# 2ebu held the remainin&
de#endants liable to the plainti@s'

An appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed and all the de#endants were
completely absolved'
!hether or not teachers or heads o# establishments o# arts and
trades shall be liable #or the death o# 3l#redo 3madora'
The 2ourt has come to the conclusion that the provision in
-uestion >3rt' <):+? should apply to all schools, academic as well as non/
Followin& the canon o# reddendo singular singuli, where the school
is academic, responsibility #or the tort committed by the student will attach
to the teacher in char&e o# such student' This is the &eneral rule' +eason,
Ald academic schools, the heads ust supervise the teachers who are the
ones directly involved with the students'
!here the school is #or arts and trades, it is the head and only he
who shall be held liable as an e$ception to the &eneral rule' +eason, Ald
schools o# arts and trades saw the masters or heads o# the school
personally and directly instructed the apprentices'
There#ore, the heads are not liable' The teacher/in/char&e is not
also liable because there%s no showin& that he was ne&li&ent in en#orcin&
discipline a&ainst the accused or that he waived observance o# the rules
and re&ulations o# the school, or condoned their non/observance' 3lso, the
#act that he wasn%t present can%t be considered a&ainst him because he
wasn%t re-uired to report on that day' 2lasses had already ceased'
A)ard' vs. A?ui-o
16# SCRA 697
Private respondent 1ariano Soriano was the principal o# the
Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in
Pan&asinan, private respondent 4d&ardo 3-uino was a teacher therein' 3s
part o# wor" education, private respondent 3-uino ordered the pupils to
help Canez in the buryin& o# the stones caused by the fttered remnants o#
!orld !ar ,,'
!hen the depth was ri&ht enou&h to accommodate the concrete
bloc", private respondent 3-uino and his #our pupils &ot out o# the hole'
Private respondent le#t the children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Canez to borrow some rope' Ce#ore leavin&,
private respondent 3-uino alle&edly told the children Knot to touch the
3#ter private respondent 3-uino le#t, 3lonso, 3lcantara and Plarde,
play#ully umped into the pit' The remainin& 3ba&a umped on top o# the
concrete bloc" causin& it to slide down towards the openin&' 3lonso and
3lcantara were able to scramble out o# the e$cavation on time but
un#ortunately #or Plarde, the concrete bloc" cau&ht him, pinnin& him to the
wall in a standin& position' Plarde sustained inuries, three days later, he
died' PlardeFs parents, petitioners in this case, fled a suit #or dama&es
a&ainst both private respondents 3-uino and Soriano'
!hether or not both private respondents can be held liable #or the
death o# Plarde'
S2 close by cate&orically statin& that a truly care#ul and cautious
person would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent
3-uino did' 1oreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils
would have made sure that the children are protected #rom all harm in his
company' !ere it not #or his &ross ne&li&ence, the un#ortunate incident
would not have occurred and the child Plarde would probably be alive
today, a &rown/ man o# thirty/fve' =ue to his #ailure to ta"e the necessary
precautions to avoid the hazard, PlardeFs parents su@ered &reat an&uish all
these years'
St. Mar0Bs Acad'%0 vs. Car&ita-os
$.R. No. 1!##6# 9'+ruar0 6" 2002
=e#endant/appellant St' 1ary%s 3cademy o# =ipolo& 2ity conducted
an enrollment drive #or the school year )99*/)99D' 3 #acet o# the
enrollment campai&n was the visitation o# schools #rom where prospective
enrollees were studyin&' 3s a student o# St' 1ary%s 3cademy, Sherwin
2arpitanos was part o# the campai&nin& &roup'
3ccordin&ly, on the #ate#ul day, Sherwin, alon& with other hi&h
school students were ridin& in a 1itsubishi eep owned by de#endant
Hivencio Hillanueva on their way to 6arayan 4lementary School, =apitan
2ity' The eep was driven by 5ames =aniel ,, then )* years old and a
student o# the same school' 3lle&edly, the latter drove the eep in a
rec"less manner and as a result the eep turned turtle' Sherwin 2arpitanos
died as a result o# the inuries he sustained #rom the accident' The parents
o# Sherwin fled a case a&ainst 5ames =aniel ,, and his parents, 5ames
=aniel Sr' and Guada =aniel, the vehicle owner, Hivencio Hillanueva and St'
1ary%s 3cademy be#ore the 0T2 o# =ipolo& 2ity and claimed #or dama&es'
!hether or not the petitioner St' 1ary%s 3cademy is liable #or
dama&es #or the death o# Sherwin 2arpitanos'
G03MT4= and 0413M=4= to the 0T2 #or determination o# any
liability o# the school' The 2ourt held that #or the school to be liable there
must be a fndin& that the act or omission considered as ne&li&ent was the
pro$imate cause o# the inury caused because o# ne&li&ence, must have
causal connection to the accident' There is no showin& o# such'
.ence, with the overwhelmin& evidence presented by petitioner
and the respondent =aniel spouses that the accident occurred because o#
the detachment o# the steerin& wheel &uide o# the eep, it is not the school,
but the re&istered owner o# the vehicle who shall be held responsible #or
dama&es #or the death o# Sherwin 2arpitanos'
Ta%aro vs. CA
209 SCRA 51,
"ame. 3rticles <<+/<EE' 4mphasis on e@ects and
suspensionRtermination o# parental authority'
!hether or not the e@ects o# adoption, inso#ar as parental
authority is concerned may be &iven retroactive e@ect so as to ma"e the
adoptin& parents the indispensable parties in a dama&e case fled a&ainst
their adopted child, #or acts committed by the latter, when actual custody
was yet lod&ed with the biolo&ical parents'
G03MT4=' The natural parents o# 3delberto should be held liable
#or dama&es caused by the child #ollowin& the doctrine o# ,1P(T4=
M4G6,G4M24' The simple reason is that the child was still under their care
and custody at the time o# the incident' Parental liability is a conse-uence
o# P304MT36 3(T.A0,TP'
3PP6,23C64 P0AH,S,AMS:
3rt' <)ID: ;uasi/delict T !hoever by act or omission causes dama&e to
another, there bein& no #ault or ne&li&ence, is obli&ed to pay #or the
dama&e done' Such #ault or ne&li&ence, i# there is no pre/e$istin&
contractual relation between the parties, is called a -uasi/delict'
3rt' <):+: ,mputed Me&li&ence T The obli&ation imposed by 3rt' <)ID is
demandable not only #or one%s own acts or omissions, but also #or those
persons #or whom one is responsible'
The #ather and, in case o# his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible #or the dama&es caused by the minor children who live in their
The responsibility treated o# in this 3rticle shall cease when the
person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the dili&ence o# a
&ood #ather o# a #amily to prevent dama&e'
Li+i vs. 7AC
21! SCRA 16
=eceased 5ulie 3nn Gotion&, ): years old, and deceased !endell
6ibi, between ): to )9 years old, were sweethearts #or two years prior to
the incident' 3#ter the &irl decided to end the relationship fndin& the &uy
sadistic and irresponsible, the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that
they be to&ether a&ain this made the &uy resort to threats' Cut, the &irl
hold stead#ast to her decision' ,n order to avoid the &uy, the &irl lived with
her best #riend' An the day o# the incident, the two were #ound shot dead
with a Smith and !esson revolver' The parents o# the &irl instituted this
case a&ainst the parents o# the &uy #or dama&es'
!hether or not the parents o# the !endell 6ibi is still liable #or the
death o# 5ulie 3nn Gotion&'
=4M,4=' The parents o# the &uy are held liable #or not e$ercisin&
due dili&ence, dili&entissimi patris #amilias, >3rt' <):+?' The #ather o# the
&uy owns a &un which he "ept in a sa#ety deposit bo$' The #ather and the
mother each had a "ey' The &uy "new o# it' The "ey must have been
ne&li&ently le#t lyin& around or he had #ree access to it, such as the ba& o#
his mother' The said &un was missin&' The parents were also unable to
e$plain the photo&raph o# their son holdin& a &un' The said photo&raph
was dedicated to the &irl'
1oreover, they were remiss in their duties as parents as not bein& able to
"now that their son was a 2onstabulary 3nti/Marcotics (nite >23M(? a&ent
involved in a dan&erous wor" o# as either a dru& in#ormer or dru& user' The
dama&es is based on 3rt' <):+ o# the 2ivil 2ode' 3rt' )+) o# 0P2 doesn%t
apply since the &uy is or above ): years old already'
La&'ra) vs. R'&u+)ic
$.R. No. L-1,00, 5cto+'r #0" 1962
4lisea 6aperal fled in the 2,F o# Ca&uio a petition which reads:
)' That petitioner has been a bona fde resident o# the 2ity
o# Ca&uio #or the last three years prior to the date o# the flin& o#
this petitionB
<' That petitionerFs maiden name is 46,S43 63P4036B she
married 1r' 4nri-ue 0' SantamariaB that in a partial decision
entered on this .onorable 2ourt, entitled F4nri-ue 0' Santamaria
vs' 4lisea 6' SantamariaF 1r' 4nri-ue Santamaria was &iven a
decree o# le&al separation #rom herB that the said partial decision is
now fnalB
E' That durin& her marria&e to 4nri-ue 0' Santamaria, she
naturally used, instead o# her maiden name, that o# 4lisea 6'
SantamariaB that aside #rom her le&al separation #rom 4nri-ue 0'
Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him #or many years
J' That in view o# the #act that she has been le&ally
separated #rom 1r' 4nri-ue 0' Santamaria and has li"ewise ceased
to live with him #or many years, it is desirable that she be allowed
to chan&e her name andRor be permitted to resume usin& her
maiden name, to wit: 46,S43 63P4036'
Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume usin& her maiden
!hether or not petitioner be allowed to resume usin& her maiden
name o# 4lisea 6aperal'
The #act o# le&al separation alone which is the only basis #or the
petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a suGcient &round to usti#y a chan&e
o# the name o# herein petitioner' ,t is true that in the second decision which
reconsidered the frst it is stated that as the petitioner owns e$tensive
business interests, the continued used o# her husband surname may cause
undue con#usion in her fnances and the eventual li-uidation o# the
conu&al assets' This fndin& is however without basis' ,n the frst place,
these were not the causes upon which the petition was basedB hence,
obviously no evidence to this e@ect had been adduced'
L)a-'ta vs. Arava
$.R. No. L-#250! Ma0 15" 197!
TeresitaFs mother, one 3tanacia 6laneta, was once married to
Serafn Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Hictoriano Ferrer' ,n
)9J< Serafn Ferrer died, and about #our years later 3tanacia had relations
with another man out o# which Teresita was born' Shortly a#ter TeresitaFs
birth, 3tanacia brou&ht her and Hictoriano to 1anila where all o# them lived
with 3tanaciaFs mother/in/law, Hictoria vda' de Ferrer' Teresita was raised in
the household o# the FerrerFs, usin& the surname o# Ferrer in all her
dealin&s and throu&hout her schoolin&' !hen she was about twenty years
old, she applied #or a copy o# her birth certifcate in Sorso&on, where she
was born, as she was re-uired to present it in connection with a
scholarship &ranted to her by the 2atholic 2harities' ,t was then that she
discovered that her re&istered surname is 6laneta not Ferrer and that she is
the ille&itimate child o# 3tanacia and an un"nown #ather'
An the &round that her use thence#orth o# the surname 6laneta,
instead o# Ferrer which she had been usin& since she ac-uired reason,
would cause untold diGculties and con#usion, Teresita petitioned the court
#or chan&e o# her name #rom Teresita 6laneta to Teresita 6laneta Ferrer'
!hether or not petitioner be allowed to chan&e her surname based
on her alle&ed #acts'
The petition o# Teresita 6laneta #or chan&e o# her name to Teresita
6laneta Ferrer is hereby &ranted' The petitioner has established that she
has been usin& the surname Ferrer #or as lon& as she can remember' 3
sudden shi#t at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita 6laneta in
order to con#orm to that appearin& in her birth certifcate would result in
con#usion amon& the persons and entities she deals with and entail
endless and ve$atious e$planations o# the circumstances o# her new