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FOREWORD

The author of this book Mr. Sheshrao Chavan


had met me only once. He had come to see me with
my old friend Mr. Prakash Almeida. That was a long
meeting in which we discussed many issues including
politics. In the very next visit Mr. Chavan handed over
a typed manuscript of his book, “Mohammad Ali
Jinnah: The Great Enigma” and requested me to
write a Foreword to the book.
I am not a politician, nor am I a historian. Of
course I have had always keen interest in politics and
so I had followed the events that culminated in the
partition of India rather intimately. Perhaps through
our discussion Mr. Chavan got the impression that
being a vintage man of 90, which I am, and who spent
the first 20 years of his life in Sind, which I did, I
might be the just right person to write Foreword to his
book, which I do not think I am! Nevertheless I agreed
to Mr. Chavan’s request mainly because the subject is
very dear to me.
My Recllections of Jinnah:
I had the opportunity to see Mr. Jinnah twice
during the early years of my career as ENT Surgeon, a
couple of years before independence. The first time I
saw him was when I was in London for my FRCS
examination. A public meeting was held at the famous
Prince Albert Hall to be addressed by Jinnah and
Liaqat Ali. I attended that meeting out of curiosity.
About 1500 Indians mostly Muslims, had gathered. As
soon as Mr. Jinnah referred to Pakistan in his speech,
one young man, a student like me, got up and started
shouting that there would be no division of India!
Expectedly the young man was heckled by the crowd,
which was already charged with jingoism. I later learnt
that the young man was none other than Dr. Rafiq
Zakaria, the great Islamic scholar, who passed away
recently. In the heart of my heart, I felt proud of the
young man who had displayed exemplary courage to
speak up what he believed even at the risk of
attracting mob fury.
The next time I saw Mr. Jinnah was when I was
called to examine him for his minor ENT complaint at
‘Bombay House,’ (Tata House) where he was a regular
visitor. Jinnah himself wanted to be examined only by
an ENT Specialist, who had FRCS degree from
England, and I fitted his requirement aptly. Mr.
Jinnah was very polite to me during the meeting
where besides us, Dr. Jal Patel, Tata’s In-house doctor
was also present. I was proud to have examined such
a highly distinguished person like Jinnah, who had by
then already reached the status of a cult figure.
Thereafter there was no occasion for me to see
Mr. Jinnah. However, I followed almost all major
events concerning Jinnah and Pakistan. Needless to
say, mere name of the book was enough to goad me to
read the entire manuscript not once, but thrice!
The purpose of writing this book is to explore,
once again, answer to questions that have haunted
our mind for years like: Who divided India? Was
Jinnah alone responsible for Partition? Whether the
Congress party and its leaders like Gandhiji and
Jawaharlal Nehru too were responsible in some

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measure? Finally as the name of the book suggests, it
is an attempt by the author to unravel the enigma
called Jinnah.
Mr. Sheshrao Chavan, without any emotional
attachment and without any prejudice and completely
unbiased brought out the facts after going through
several books relating to the subject, archival material
and authentic references. He has narrated the facts
and left it to the reader to form his own opinion. When
any such books are written, mostly a person is already
known about his views and he tries to justify the facts
in his favour or against them. I think, Chavan is an
exceptional person. This is the best part of his
character and qualities. He has followed Rajtarangini
of Kalhana. This book should serve as a beacon to
students and research scholars on how a subject as
intense and intricate as Jinnah’s life should be
treated, researched and presented.
Having read about the political life of Jinnah by
various authors including Dr. Rafiq Zakaria, I have
formed certain impressions about Jinnah in my
memory based on my own assessment and those of
others.
Die-hard Nationalist:
There is no doubt that Jinnah who returned
from England in 1896 to practice law in Bombay was
a perfect nationalist and an ardent votary of Hindu-
Muslim unity and rightly thought that religion was a
personal matter of an individual. He first attended the
20th Session of the Congress held in Bombay in the
year 1904. The first person who captivated his mind
then was Gopal Krishna Gokhale, a Brahmin and

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Founder of the Servants of India Society. Gokhale was
one of the most prominent leaders during 19th
century, and was mentor to both Gandhi and Jinnah.
So impressed was Jinnah with Gokhale’s personality
that he actually wanted to become a “Muslim
Gokhale.” Gokhale had described Jinnah as the best
“Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.” Till Gokhale’s
demise in 1915, Jinnah and Gokhale remained
greatest admirers of each other. Sarojini Naidu was
another great admirer of Jinnah. In her biography of
Jinnah, she has showered high praise on Jinnah for
his intense patriotism
Jinnah’s Defence of Lokmanya Tilak:
One of the tallest nationalists of the
independence struggle, Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar
Tilak had chosen Jinnah to defend him in the Court of
Law, when he was charged with seditious writing in
his newspaper ‘Kesari.’ Tilak lost the case and was
sentenced to six years of imprisonment. Every body
felt that the punishment awarded to Tilak by an
Indian Judge, Justice Davar was rather harsh. An
appeal was filed and Jinnah again appeared for Tilak.
This time Tilak was exonerated by the Court. Tilak
was an orthodox Brahmin and a great patriot.
Engaging the services of Jinnah by Tilak itself was a
tribute to Jinnah’s legal acumen and patriotism,
especially since there were several legal luminaries
practicing in the Bombay High Court then.
After Justice Davar sentenced Tilak to six years
of rigorous imprisonment, the British Government
conferred Knighthood on Davar. The Bar Association
of Bombay High Court wanted to give him dinner.

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When the circular informing the event went to Jinnah,
he wrote a very strong remark that the Bar should feel
ashamed to want to give a dinner to a judge who had
obtained knighthood by doing what the Government
wanted, and by sending a great patriot to jail with a
savage sentence. When Justice Davar called Jinnah to
his chamber to know the reason for the latter writing
such strong words against the Judge, Jinnah told him
that what he had written was truth and that he could
not suppress the strong feeling about the manner in
which the Judge had handled Tilak’s case. This shows
the very high regard Jinnah had for Tilak.
Jinnah Hall:
Jinnah was such a staunch nationalist that
people of Bombay collected 65,000 rupees by way of
contributions and built the ‘Jinnah Hall,’ at
Lamington Road in Girgaum area of Bombay to
commemorate their triumph under Jinnah, who led a
popular movement to oppose the public reception that
was to be accorded to Lord Wellington when his
tenure as Governor of Bombay came to an end in
1918. A majority of those who contributed to the fund
were Hindus.
Why Jinnah distanced himself from the Congress:
Many incidents were responsible for creating a
hiatus between Jinnah and the Congress. But three of
them could be termed as ‘turning points’ that changed
his attitude towards the Congress.
1.The Khilafat Movement:
The word Khilafat draws its origin from ‘Caliph.’
Before discussing the Khilafat movement and its
objectives, we need to understand the origin of the

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word itself. Caliph is the term or title for the Islamic
leader of the Ummah, or community of Islam. It is an
Anglicised version of the Arabic word Khalifah, which
means “successor” or “representative.” Caliphs were
often so referred to as leaders of the Muslims. After
the first four Sunni Caliphs, the title was claimed by
the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the Ottomans, as
well as by others, competing lineages in Spain, North
Africa, and Egypt.
The Turkish Ottoman Caliphate (Empire) had
existed for over six centuries. At the height of its
power in the 16th and 17th centuries, its territory
included the Middle East, parts of North Africa, and
much of South-Eastern Europe. During these two
centuries, the Ottoman Empire was among the world’s
most powerful political entities. It was the only non-
European power to seriously challenge the rising
power of the West between the 15th and 20th centuries,
to such an extent that it became an integral part of
European balance of power politics.
The defeat of Turkey in the First World War
caused apprehensions in India over the Khalifa’s
custodianship of the Holy places of Islam. The Khilafat
Movement was launched in India by Ali brothers –
Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, - Maulana Abul
Kalam Azad, Dr. M.A. Ansari, and Hasrat Mohani in
1919 as a movement to protect the Turkish Khalifa
and save his (Ottoman) Caliphate from
dismemberment by Great Britain and other European
powers.
Gandhiji supported the Khilafat Movement and
became a member of the Central Khilafat Committee.

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The position taken by Gandhiji in support of his own
stand was: “If I deem the Mahomedan to be my
brother, it is my duty to help him in his hour of peril
to the best of my ability, if his cause commends itself
to me as just.” A resolution passed by the Congress at
its special session held in Calcutta read thus: “…It is
the duty of every non-Muslim Indian in every
legitimate manner to assist his Muslim brother in his
attempt to remove religious calamity that has
overtaken him.”
The resolution was opposed by Chittaranjan
Das, B.C. Pal, Annie Besant, Rabindranath Tagore
and Jinnah. Jinnah said: “I strongly oppose Indian
Muslims engaging themselves in extra territorial
affairs relating to Muslims outside India.”
I myself cannot understand the justification for
the Khilafat Movement. The Khilafat Movement was a
failure as the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished by
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, one of the greatest
charismatic leaders of modern Turkey in 1924. The
title of Caliph has since become defunct.
Although Mahatma Gandhi had on record
stated that he would gladly ask for postponement of
Swaraj activity if thereby we could advance the
interests of Khilafat, the Muslims were not prepared to
wait for Swaraj. In desperation they did exactly what
Hindus feared. Maulana Mohamad Ali wrote to the
ruler of Afganistan Amir Amanullah and requested
him to invade India. He requested to …”invade
Hindustan, to destroy the power of Marhatahs, and to
free the down-and-out-Muslims from the clutches of
non-Muslims.” This would have been a disaster for

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India. Luckily, the British were very strong and the
Amir of Afganistan did not venture to attack India.
Maulana Mohamad’s words were nothing short of
treason.
Surprisingly, Gandhiji supported Ali brothers
saying that “…They have done nothing, which I would
not do. If they had sent a message to Amir, I would
also send one to inform Amir that if he came, no
Indian so long as I can help it, would help the
Government to drive him back.”
Chagla in his book, “Roses in December,” has
stated that he felt that Gandhiji was wrong in trying to
bring about Hindu-Muslim unity by supporting the
cause of Khilafat. Such unity, he felt, was based on
‘shifting sands.’
Annie Besant felt thus: “Since the Khilafat
agitation, things have changed and it has been one of
the many injuries inflicted on India by the
encouragement of the Khilafat crusade, that the inner
Muslim feeling of hatred against unbelievers has
sprung up, naked and unashamed, as in the years
gone by.”
Here one finds Jinnah reasonable and logical in
his public stand on the issue of Khilafat. He spoke as
a true patriot and not one guided by religious
sentiments. As things turned out, Gandhiji did
succeed in attracting Muslims closer to the Congress
by supporting the Khilafat Movement, but it was a
temporary gain. Before long Muslims deserted the
Congress.
2. Motilal Nehru Report:

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The Indian Statutory Commission was a group
of seven British Members of Parliament that had been
sent to India in 1927 to study constitutional reforms.
It was commonly referred to as the Simon Commission
after its Chairman, Sir John Simon. The Commission
had to face popular resistance, as there was no
representative from India on it. Motilal Nehru chaired
the famous Nehru Commission in 1928, that was a
counter to the Simon Commission. Nehru Report, the
first constitution written by Indians only, conceived a
Dominion Status for India within the Empire. It was
endorsed by the Congress party, but rejected by more
radical Indians who sought complete independence,
and by many Muslims who did not feel their interests,
concerns and rights were properly represented. On
Justice Chagla’s instance, joint electorates were
accepted as one of the basic principles of Nehru
Report. Later, on behalf of the Muslim League he
endorsed the Report. When Jinnah came to know this,
he became furious. Jinnah had suggested four
amendments to the report including one seeking one-
third representation for Muslims in the Central
Legislature, but these were rejected.
According to Karachi Mayor Jamshedji
Nusserwanji, “the first time I saw Jinnah weep was
after his amendments had been rejected at the
Calcutta meeting to consider Nehru Report…He had
tears in his eyes as he said, Jamshed, this is the
parting of the ways.” This was another significant
instance of Jinnah’s alienation from the Congress.
It may be mentioned here that initially Jinnah
was not particularly enamoured of separate

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electorates and separate representation, but constant
persuasion by Muslims made him change his stance.
3. Election of 1937:
When preparations started for the election of
1936-1937 under the Government of India Act 1935,
Jinnah was still thinking in terms of co-operation
between the Muslim League and the Congress. But the
results of elections proved to be a turning point in the
relations between the two organizations. Congress
came to power in nine out of eleven provinces. Muslim
League failed to form Government in any province.
Jinnah proposed Congress to accept his nominee as
Muslim ministers in the two provinces of U.P. and
Bombay, but Congress rejected the offer.
The States where Congress got majority
included the North West Frontier Province where 95%
of the population was Muslim. Congress thought that
it was the sole party, which had absolute control over
the country and that it could afford to ignore the
Muslim League. Even in U.P. where the number of
Muslims was large, Congress refused to take any
Muslim nominee suggested by Jinnah. This neglect by
the Congress forced him to reconsider his options.
Although it was not binding for the Congress to
make members of other party as its Cabinet ministers,
Jinnah took the Congress position as a serious affront
and started a mass movement to strengthen the base
of his party. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru thought that the
League had no following. During a bye-election in U.P.
in 1937, Jinnah asked votes in the name of Allah and
the Holy Koran something unknown till then. Nehru
was shocked by Jinnah’s new avataar. He soon

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realized that it was a mistake not to take Muslim
League in the cabinet. But then had Nehru consented
to taking Muslim League members in the Congress
Governments in U.P. and Bombay, Jinnah would have
practically controlled the Government and exploited
the situation and created obstacles for the
Government the same way as he did at the time of
formation of Interim Government in 1946-47.
Dangerous Proposition:
It is the irony of fate that Jinnah, a die-hard
champion of Hindu-Muslim unity, had changed
completely in 1938 and charged the Congress with
dividing Muslims. Jinnah had turned against his own
past. Speaking on the Lahore Resolution of 1940,
Jinnah said: “It is extremely difficult to appreciate why
our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of
Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the
strict sense of the word, but are in fact, different and
distinct social orders and it is a dream that the
Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common
nationality, and this misconception of one Indian
nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause
of most of our troubles and will lead India to
destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The
Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious
philosophies, social customs and literature. They
neither inter-marry nor inter-dine together and,
indeed, they belong to two different civilizations, which
are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.
Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite
clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their
inspiration from different sources of history. They

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have different epics, different heroes and different
episodes. Very often, the hero of one is a foe of the
other, and likewise their victories and defeats overlap.
To yoke together two such nations under a single
State, one as numerical minority and the other as a
majority, must lead to growing discontent and the
final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up
for the Government of such a State.”
Subsequently Jinnah said: “Muslim India will
not be satisfied unless the right of national self-
determination is unequivocally recognized….In order
to giving real effect to the principle of Pakistan and
Muslim self-determination, His Majesty’s Government
and Sir Stafford Cripps, will not hesitate to make
necessary adjustments on their behalf.”
Rajagopalachary’s Support for Pakistan’s Demand:
Surprisingly, Madras Chief Minister who went
on to become the first Indian Governor General of
India Mr. C.Rajagopalachariar addressed a small
gathering of Congress supporters in the Madras
Legislature, and carried two resolutions for
submission to the All India Congress Committee. First,
recommending acceptance of Pakistan in principle as
a basis for settlement between the Congress and the
Muslim League. The second resolution requested
permission of the All India Congress Committee for the
Madras Congress to unite with the Muslim League and
other provincial parties to restore popular Government
as a coalition ministry in Madras. The All India
Congress Committee at its meeting held on 29th April
at Allahabad rejected Rajagopalachary’s resolutions
and strongly opposed efforts to disintegrate India.

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Our Independence and their Independence:
Congress’s sustained fight for independence
under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and
American pressure compelled the British to grant
independence to India. As political awareness grew
among Indians, the British encountered serious
resistance to their continuation in India. Most of the
leaders who led the independence struggle like
Dadabhai Naoroji, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Lomanya
Tilak, Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi, and Jawaharlal
Nehru were exposed to western education and they
created awakening among the people about
independence. The British had no desire to give
independence to India. The Minto-Morley Reforms
(1909), the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms (1919), The
Simon Commission (1927), the Round Table
Conference (1930-33), the Government of India Act
1935, were all attempts to keep Indians engaged and
desist from demanding total Independence. One of the
less cited reasons why the British gave independence
to India was that financially it had become difficult for
them to carry on with colonies. It was our good
fortune that the Labour Party came in power with
Richard Clement Attlee as the Prime Minister of
England. Attlee had already declared in a speech
made in the British Parliament, to which I was a
witness, that if voted to power the Labour Government
would grant Independence to India and nationalize
health. It was ecstasy for me when I heard these
words that India would be free. There was a loud
applause from the Labour members and jeers from the

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Conservatives and derogatory statements by Churchill
against India. Churchill said very clearly that India is
still a savage country and these ethnic people would
fight and disintegrate if England left. …There were
already rumblings in India that partition would cause
hardships and there would be civil war.” If instead of
Labour Government, the Conservatives had come to
power, Churchill as the Prime Minister would never
have granted independence to India. This is proof of
the fact that on several occasions in the Parliament,
Churchill had spoken that India was a jewel in the
crown of the King and it will be kept under
subjugation at any cost. He once said: “I have not
become His Majesty’s Prime Minister to liquidate the
empire.”
Jinnah- the Diplomat:
Creation of Pakistan is a tribute to Jinnah’s
diplomatic skills and political acumen. While for India,
non-violence movement spear-headed by Gandhiji won
the freedom, Jinnah’s power of persuasion and
diplomatic moves to convince the Muslims and the
British about his two-nation theory won him a nation-
State in the form of Pakistan, that too without his or
his followers going to jail or suffering hardships.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, I would say, the seeds of
Jinnah’s alienation from the Congress were sowed
much before. Gandhiji came into prominence only in
1916-almost 12 years after Jinnah began his
associations with the Congress. Jinnah was thus
senior to both Gandhi and Nehru and yet he did not
get what he thought to be his rightful place in the

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Congress. When Gandhiji made it clear that
Jawaharlal Nehru would be his heir, Jinnah realized
that he had no chance in India. It dawned on him that
Muslims who had enjoyed political power as rulers of
India for almost one thousand years until the British
arrived were not going to wield any political clout. In
the new political set up, Jinnah surmised that
Muslims would remain in minority and suffer. The
best chance for his political revival as also that of his
party was to take up the Muslim cause by insisting on
representation of minorities.
I had known the late justice M.C. Chagla
intimately. Justice Chagla was the Chief Justice of the
Bombay High Court. Whenever I met Justice Chagla,
we often discussed politics. Once I asked Justice
Chagla his opinion about Jinnah. He said: “Jinnah
was without doubt a brilliant lawyer, but he was also
egoistic.” Justice Chagla described Jinnah as a great
patriot who left the Congress because Gandhiji did not
give him due importance within the Congress party.
Was Creation of Pakistan Good or Bad:
Was creation of Pakistan good or bad for India?
My opinion is: it was good for both. In 1946-47, the
Interim Government formed at the Centre, of Congress
and League representatives, was a ghastly failure.
League members had literally held Government to
ransom on even small and insignificant issues. Liaqat
Ali brought the Government to its knees. At this point,
the League was in a commanding position to dictate
terms to the Congress. At that time, had League asked
for separate electorates for Muslims, the Congress
would have in all probability given in to its demand,

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which would have been a disaster for the country. But
then had Pakistan not been created, the country
would have witnessed chaotic conditions.
Dr. Rafiq Zakaria had a different opinion. He
said had partition not occurred, Muslims would have
ruled democratically in at least seven States in India
including Sind, North West Frontier Province,
Baluchistan, Punjab , U.P. and Assam.
Jinnah Returns to Secularism:
Thankfully, Jinnah became the votary of
secularism once again as evidenced by the speech he
made on August 11, 1947 in the Pakistan Constituent
Assembly in front of Lord Mountbatten. In that
speech, Jinnah had said that in a future Pakistan,
everyone would be treated equally irrespective of their
religion, and non-Muslims would be free to practice
their respective religions.
Again, in his inaugural address as first
Governor General of Pakistan, Jinnah said: “You will
find that in the course of time, Hindus would cease to
be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims,
not in the religious sense because that is the personal
faith of each individual, but in the political sense as
citizens of the State.”
Alas! Jinnah did not live to see the development
of his fledging country. He died just thirteen months
after the birth of Pakistan. His vision of Secular State
was not realized during his life time.
Jinnah Proved Wrong:
Jinnah’s claim that Hindus and Muslims can
never live together has been proved wrong. Hindus
and Muslims have lived together peacefully for 57

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years in India, small incidents of discords
notwithstanding. But then small incidents occur
elsewhere too, including in Pakistan.
Nevertheless, I am happy to see Pakistan
making steady progress as a civilized developing
nation. In 1982, I visited Pakistan. I met Hindus and
Muslims both and tried to obtain their opinion of
Pakistan. I found people happier than I had expected.
Partition is thus a history. Let us accept it without
grudge. The focus should now be on India and
Pakistan becoming good neighbours.
Did Jinnah Repent Over Pakistan:
Mr. Chavan’s conclusion that Jinnah repented
after creating Pakistan is difficult to prove and I do not
agree with him. The conclusion is based on Jinnah’s
reported comments made in private conversation with
a couple of persons. There was no reason for Jinnah
to be apologetic for something he had achieved single-
handedly. Moreover what has been ascribed to him as
having said cannot be verified. In fact, I believe Jinnah
must be the happiest person in the world for creating
a nation-State for Muslims. Had Muslims not have a
leader like Jinnah, Pakistan would never have been
created. It is quite possible that had his views were
honoured by Gandhiji and other leaders of the
Congress, Jinnah might not have gone to the extent of
seeking separation from India. But to conclude that
Gandhiji, Nehru and Patel were equally responsible to
create Pakistan appears farfetched. They accepted the
creation of Pakistan finding that India as one country
would be a failure.

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Partition, A Boon for Sindhis:
Being a Sindhi, I think it was good that
Partition occurred. After the partition, Sindhis
migrated to India although unlike Bengal and Punjab
there were no compelling circumstances that
necessitated their migration. In Sind, there were no
industries and even today Sind does not have many
industries. Had Sind Hindus stayed back, they would
have remained in an undemocratic country without
any powers. They would have certainly not become
prosperous the way they did had they stayed in Sind.
It is true that Sindhis had to suffer extreme conditions
for the first ten years after coming to India, but that
perhaps hardened their enterprising spirit and they
established themselves in different parts of India as a
highly successful enterprising people. Today Sindhis
are extremely happy in India and making valuable
contribution to almost every field of human
endeavour, especially, health, education, trade and
business.
To a discerning reader, the book serves as a
window not just to the life of Jinnah, but also
importantly to the most significant epoch in the pre-
Independence history of India (1904-1947) that
changed the whole complexion of the Indian
subcontinent. The book is a brave attempt to put the
personality of Barrister Jinnah in proper perspective
based on historical evidence so diligently gathered by
Mr. Sheshrao Chavan. In fact, by reading this book,
readers can by and large acquaint themselves with the
story of India’s Independence Struggle from the

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British. The book spurs the reader to know more
about the history of the tumultuous period leading to
the partition of India. I think, therein lies the success
of Mr. Chavan’s book.

Dr. L. H. Hiranandani

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PREFACE

Ever since India became a free nation,


simultaneously with the partition of the country, while
every one is eager to take credit for the freedom of the
country, no one is prepared to take responsibility or
blame for the partition of the country between India and
Pakistan. It is also the source and cause of four wars
between the two countries, continuous terrorist
activities, huge defense expenditure incurred by both
countries with resultant poverty of the masses on both
sides. The decision to partition the country was most
uncalled for and most unfortunate in the long and
cherished history of India. It resulted in killing of
around a million people and uprooting millions more
from their homes and lands they had tilled for
generations.
What is sad and surprising is that the blame is
attempted to be placed on the shoulders of the man,
who is not at all responsible for partition. Contrary, he
tried his best to prevent it. He was forced to accept it as
a fait accompli by his own ardent followers, particularly
Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbahi Patel.
A lot of literature is available, historical records
are there and a number of books have been written on
the subject as also on the creator of Pakistan-
Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Jinnah is considered as the
villain of peace, so much even today that a leader of a

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political party, who spoke a few words favourable to
Jinnah was made to step down as a leader of political
party, which he built to a large extent.
Then who is responsible for partition of India? I
would like to list down them in order of their culpability.
1. British Government
2. Mohammed Ali Jinnah
3. Hindu Fundamentalist Organizations like
Hindu Maha Sabha and R.S.S.
4. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel
Let us first examine the role of Mohammed Ali
Jinnah in the freedom struggle of India and
subsequently in the creation of Pakistan.
Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity:
The political career of Jinnah began with
th
attending the 20 session of the Indian National
Congress in 1904. He met Gopal Krishna Gokhale at
this session and was so captivated by the wisdom,
fairness and moderation of Gokhale that he became his
ardent admirer and later expressed that his fond
ambition is to become the “Muslim Gokhale.” And in
turn, Gokhale said: “Jinnah has true stuff in him, and
that freedom from all sectarian prejudice will make him
the best Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.”
Dadabhai Naoroji in his presidential address at
the Calcutta session of the Congress in 1906 made an
appeal for national unity to achieve Swaraj. Jinnah
echoed this theme at every political meeting, he
addressed during the next ten years and emerged as,
“Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.”
When Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak was
arrested for seditious writings in his news paper,

21
“Kesari,” Jinnah pleaded for his release, but failed.
Later in the appeal filed against the conviction, Jinnah
succeeded in setting aside the sentence.
On a circular issued by Bar for giving dinner to
Justice Davar, Jinnah wrote: “The Bar should be
ashamed of giving dinner to a judge, who obtained a
Knighthood by doing what the Government wanted, and
by sending a great patriot (Tilak) to jail with savage
sentence.” This speaks for the regards, Jinnah had for
Tilak and also his courage of conviction and spirit of
nationalism.
In his very first speech at the age of thirty five, in
the Imperial Legislative Council, held at Calcutta on 25th
February 1910, Jinnah lent his support to Mahatma
Gandhi’s work in South Africa and made scathing attack
on the harsh and cruel treatment meted out to the
Indians in South Africa for which he was reprimanded
by Lord Minto, who was presiding over the Council
meeting. Jinnah shot back at Minto: “My Lord, I should
feel much inclined to use much stronger words…I do say
that the treatment meted out to Indians is the harshest
and the feeling in the country is unanimous.”
Jinnah invariably supported national issues like
Gokhale’s Elementary Education Bill and Basu’s Special
Marriage Bill. However, even before the advent of
Gandhiji on our political scene, though proclaiming
himself against separate electorates for Muslims he had
no problem in formally enrolling himself as a member of
the All India Muslim League in1913 on his
understanding that his loyalty to Muslim League and
Muslim interests would in no way and at no time imply

22
even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national
cause to which his life was dedicated.
In 1914, Jinnah led a delegation to England to
place the views of the Congress before the Secretary of
State for India on the Council of India Bill. When the Bill
was postponed after its second reading, Jinnah
remarked: “India is perhaps the only member of the
British Empire without any real representation, and the
only civilized country in the world that has no system of
representative Government.
On 14th January 1915, Gurjar Sabha held a
function to felicitate Gandhiji and Kasturba Gandhi
under the Chairmanship of Jinnah.
Jinnah in his speech said: “Mr. and Mrs Gandhi
deserved not only the welcome of the Gurjar Sabha, not
only the Gujrathi, but of the whole India…For a woman
to standby her husband, share his trials and sufferings
and sacrifices and even to go to jail was a model of
womanhood of which any country would be proud…
Such a son of India and such a daughter of India had
not only raised the reputation of India, but had
vindicated the honour of this great and ancient land…”
In his Presidential address to the Bombay
Provincial Conference held in October 1916 at
Ahmedabad, Jinnah said: “….The key to the real
progress lies in the goodwill, concord, harmony and
cooperation between the two great sister communities.
Lucknow Pact:
The Indian National Congress and the All India
Muslim League held their sessions in December 1916 at
Lucknow. Yet Gandhiji was not on scene.

23
The Lucknow session of the Congress and the
Muslim League ended with the Congress-League
agreement, which came to be known as “Lucknow Pact.”
Tilak, Jinnah and Annie Besant emerged as the
architects of the Lucknow Pact.
Rowlett Bills:
In protest of the passing of the Rowlett Bills,
Jinnah resigned from the Imperial Legislative Council
and said: “…The Government that passes or sanctions
such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to be
called a civilized Government.”
In an attempt to shift the blame on Gandhiji,
often cited is Jinnah’s opposition to Gandhiji’s methods,
but then initially many of us had not approved methods
of Gandhiji, because they were accustomed to passing
annual resolutions only. In fact Gandhiji started Civil
Disobedience in August 1920 and in a speech in
September 1920 Jinnah almost endorsed Gandhiji. To
quote: “We will have to think about some course of
action more efficient than passing of resolutions of
disapproval and we shall surely find a way alike France
and Egypt.”
Alarmed by growing Hindu-Muslim unity in the
wake of Khilafat, British had started cultivating Jinnah,
in particular and the Muslim League in general.
In his presidential address to the All India
Muslim League session held in 1923 at Lahore Jinnah
said: “India will get Dominion Republic Government, the
day Hindus and Muslims are united. Swaraj is almost
interchangeable term with Hindu-Muslim unity. If we
wish to be free people, let us unite, but if we wish to
continue slaves of bureaucracy, let us fight amongst

24
ourselves and gratify petty vanity over petty matters,
Englishmen being our arbiters.”
Gandhi, just released from jail commented: “I
agree with Mr. Jinnah that Hindu-Muslim unity means
Swaraj.”
In all parties conference held in November 1924
at Bombay Jinnah said: “the dispute between the
Hindus and Muslims was a question, which had been a
terrible monster in the way of country’s progress. It was
not for the Hindus or Muslims alone to ask what they
wanted, it was up to everyone to try and find a solution
to the question. Without removing this terrible obstacle,
they could not make any progress in any direction.”
On the floor of the Central Assembly in 1925,
Jinnah said: “I am a nationalist first, a nationalist
second and a nationalist last.
Simon Commission:
Jinnah’s feelings on Simon Commission were so
bitter that he declared: “…Jalianwala Bagh was a
physical butchery, the Simon Commission is a butchery
of our souls….” He was as firm as a rock in boycotting
the Simon Commission. Proposals were made that the
boycott should be only political and not social. Jinnah
did not budge an inch and said: “Boycott is boycott and
it must be total and complete.”
At 1928, Congress Session presided over by
Motilal Nehru in Calcutta Jinnah’s speech on Hindu-
Muslim unity on Nehru Report was not received in right
spirit by Sikhs, Hindu Mahasabha and a section of the
Congress. They shouted that Jinnah represented only a
section of musalmans, who are communal minded, and
undue importance should not be given to him. Jinnah

25
returned to Bombay from the convention with a deep
wound in his heart. With tears in his eyes, he told his
Parsi friend Jamshed Nusserwanjee, at Calcutta railway
station “Jamshed, this is the parting of the ways.”
Jinnah left the Congress never to return to it again.
M.C. Chagla, in his book, “Roses In December,”
writes: “Jinnah’s attitude began to change from then on
though the final steps which converted him from the
nationalist into communalist came much later.”
Dfferences begin to widen:
Shri Sheshrao Chavan has enumerated as to how
and when Jinnah started drifting away from the
Congress and its leaders and the issues on which he
came out openly.
Home Rule League:
When Jinnah resigned from the Home Rule
League in protest of Gandhi’s arbitrary action in
converting the Home Rule League in Swarajya Sabha,
Gandhi wrote to Jinnah to reconsider his resignation to
take his share in the new life opened up before the
country and benefit the country by his experience and
guidance.
Turning down the request, Jinnah wrote to
Gandhi: “If by new life you mean your methods and your
program, I cannot accept them; for, I am fully convinced
that it must lead to disaster. Your methods have already
caused split and division in every institution that you
have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the
country, not only amongst Hindus and Hindus and
Muslims and Muslims, but even between fathers and
sons; your extreme program has for the moment struck
the imagination of the inexperienced youth and the

26
ignorant and the illiterate.” Jinnah further wrote: “The
only way for the nationalists is to unite and work for a
program, which is universally acceptable for the early
attainment of complete responsible Government. Such a
program cannot be dictated by any single individual, but
must have the approval and support of all the
prominent nationalist leaders of the country.”
This was the beginning of Jinnah’s differences
with Gandhi.
Nagpur Session of Congress:
The annual sessions of the Indian National
Congress and the All India Muslim League were held in
December 1920 at Nagpur. Gandhi moved a resolution
proposing the attainment of Swaraj by all legitimate and
peaceful means. Jinnah objected the resolution saying
that it was impractical and dangerous to dissolve the
British connections without greater preparations for
independence. But Jinnah was shouted and voted down.
Yet Jinnah continued to work for Hindu-Muslim unity
and did not leave Congress.
British had silently but surely started working on
Jinnah and also for Hindu-Muslim division on
communal lines.
Ramsay MacDonald to secure greater cooperation
from Jinnah gave him hint that in view of the
forthcoming changes in India, the British Government
would be looking for distinguished Indians for
appointment as Provincial Governors. As a sharp
reaction to this, Jinnah told MacDonald that his
services were not available for sale and firmly rejected
the offer, which he believed was nothing short of an
attempt to bribe him.

27
Second Round Table Conference:
Jinnah had returned to India a few days prior to
the second Round Table Conference. In a speech at
Bombay, he said: “I am an Indian first and a Muslim
afterwards. But at the same time no Indian can serve
this country, if he neglects the interests of the Muslims.
Seventy million Muslims cannot be tied hand and foot in
a constitution where Hindus can tyrannise over and deal
with them as they like. No body could hope to make
India strong by suppressing the vital interests and
political aspirations of Muslims and untouchables, and
people trying to indulge in such manoevres were only
leading India to weak and degrading position from which
it would be hard for her to recover… Hindus are
foolish…utterly foolish in their attitude…Unless certain
reasonable safe-guards and brakes were provided for the
purpose of preventing any undue mischief, the
constitution would not work.”
Nehru wrote to Gandhiji: “If I had to listen to
Jinnah talking the most unmitigated non-sense about
his 14 points for any length of time, I would have to
consider the desirability of returning to the South Sea
Island.”
Gandhiji attended the Second Round Table
Conference as a sole representative of the Congress. The
deliberations of the Conference have been narrated in
detail by the author and how it ended in the declaration
of the Communal Award by Ramsay McDonald.
Jinnah decides to settle in London:

28
Jinnah was not included in the Third Round
Table Conference. As a result, he was disheartened and
decided to settle in London. He told a Muslim student in
Oxford: “The Hindus are short sighted and incorrigible.
The Muslim camp is full of spineless people, who will
consult the Deputy Collector about what they should do.
Where between these two groups is any place for a man
like me.” He purchased a house in London and started
flourishing practice in Privy Council. He also aspired to
becoming a Labour Member of the House of Commons.
In July 1933, Liaqat Ali and his Brahmin wife
during their stay in London urged upon Jinnah to
return to India to put new life in the Muslim League to
save it. Jinnah advised the husband and wife to go back
to India and survey the situation; test the feelings of
people in all parts of the country and inform him. Liaqat
Ali did as he was advised and sent his report to Jinnah
with a request to return to India.
Permanent President of Muslim League:
While in London, Muslim League unanimously
elected Jinnah as its permanent president. He was also
elected to the Imperial Legislative Assembly unopposed
from the Muslim Constituency of Bombay. Jinnah came
to India in January 1935 to attend the first meeting of
the Assembly. In his speech Jinnah forcefully said: “…It
may be that our Hindu friends are not satisfied with the
Communal Award, but at the same time, Muslims are
not satisfied with it either…We must face the question
as a political problem; we must solve it and not evade
it.” Jinnah hoped that the Congress would overcome the
extreme attitude of Hindu Maha Sabha and assure the
Muslims that it is not going to be a Hindu government,

29
but an Indian Government, in which the Muslims will
not only have a fair and just treatment but also that
they will be treated as the equals of the Hindus.
Jinnah’s speech in the Assembly raised a hope for
the settlement of the communal problem by mutual
agreement. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who was Congress
President also made sincere efforts for an agreed
solution, but they failed to evolve a formula, which could
satisfy all parties. They, ultimately issued the following
statement:
“We regret that in spite of our best efforts, we
have not been able to find a formula…We can only hope
that forces will arise, which will make a future attempt
more fruitful.”
Jinnah told the Associated Press: “Nothing will
give me greater happiness than to bring about complete
cooperation and friendship between Hindus and
Muslims… Musalmans are in no way behind any other
community in their demand for national self-
Government.”
1937 Elections:
Flushed with pride and arrogance at the
overwhelming success in 1937 elections to the Provincial
Assemblies, Jawaharlal Nehru declared: “In the political
evolution of the country, there are only two parties-the
British and the Congress that counted.” Jinnah shot
back: “There is a third party in the country and that is
Muslim League, whom the Congress will ignore at its
own risk and peril.”
Jinnah maintained this posture with vehemance
until everyone realized that there would be no

30
settlement in India that left the Muslim League and
Jinnah out.
Jinnah launched a vigorous counter
propaganda, which was so effective that in a number of
bye-elections in Muslim constituencies, the Congress
candidates had to meet defeat.
Having seen the position and respect Aga Khan
enjoyed at Round Table Conferences, Jinnah was in
search of new identity that can satisfy his ego, his desire
to be number one after British left. Though, he was sure
that in a battle for power, Gandhi will never be in his
competition, but that Nehru will always see that he
becomes number one after British-a case of personal
egos, ambitions and to do anything to achieve goal. His
friends both in Muslim League and among British
encouraged Jinnah.
Nationalist turns into Communalist:
Lucknow Session of the Muslim League-1937:
Lucknow session of the Muslim League in 1937
marked the birth of the new Jinnah, converting the
“Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity,” into staunch
communalist. Sir Mohamad Iqbal wrote to Jinnah
urging upon him the necessity of redistributing the
country and providing one or more Muslim States with
absolute majority. Iqbal further wrote to Jinnah: “You
are the only Muslim in India today to whom the
community has right to look up for safe guidance
through the storm which is coming to the North-West
India and perhaps to the whole of India.”
Jinnah heeded this letter of Iqbal in his speech
on 15th October 1937 at Lucknow. He said: “…the
Congress policy would result in class bitterness and

31
communal war and strengthening of the Imperialistic
hold. He further said: “The present leadership of the
Congress has been responsible for alienating the
Musalmans of India more and more, by pursuing a
policy which is exclusively Hindu. They have by their
words, deeds and programs have shown that the
Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fairplay at their
hands.
Jinnah made an appeal to the Muslims in which
he said: “…Do not be disturbed by the slogans and the
taunts such as are used against the Musalmans-
communalist, toadies, and reactionaries. The most
wicked communalist today amongst Muslims, when he
surrenders unconditionally to the Congress and abuses
his own community, becomes the nationalist of
nationalists tomorrow! Eighty millions of Musalmans in
India have nothing to fear. They have their destiny in
their own hands.”
Maulana Hasrat Mohini moving the resolutionm
for full independence of India said: “Those who believe
that Jawaharlal Nehru was above communalism or that
he was the man who will solve the communal problem
by bringing lasting amity and unity between the Hindus
and Muslims, either were living in fools paradise or are
the enemy of Islam in India.”
Jawaharlal Nehru described the Lucknow League
session as the last ditch of the political reaction. In a
crushing reply to Nehru and the Congress, Jinnah said:
“The Congress far from being a national organization
became a symbol of Hindu revivalism and the Hindu Raj
for the exploitation and suppression of minorities. The
Brahmin hierarchy and the British bureaucracy entered

32
into an unholy alliance. The Congress wanted to
establish an authoritative, totalitarian and Fascist
Hindu Raj. They were striving their utmost to delude
Muslims into believing that the League was an ally of
imperialism and imperialistic Government. No where in
my career, I have allied myself with imperialism, out
side or in side the Legislature. The League would not be
ally of any one except the Muslim nation.”
In his address to the Jamait-ul-Ulema conference
in Delhi, Jinnah said: “I am not afraid of being called a
communalist, because I am helping my community. I
am helping eighty million Muslims of India and if they
are more organized, they will be all the more useful for
the national struggle.”
During negotiations with Subhash Chandra Bose
in April 1938, Jinnah put forward the claim that the
Muslim League must be accepted as the authoritative
and representative organization of the Musalmans and
since then onwards he kept on harping on it. But the
Congress never accepted this claim of Jinnah.
Addressing the Provincial Muslim League
th
conference of Sind at Karachi on 8 October 1938
Jinnah said: “Truth is suppressed and falsehood is
broadcast in the Congress press and news agencies.
Congress has adopted the most brutal, oppressive and
inimical attitude towards the All India Muslim League
since they secured majority in six provinces. The foolish
policy of the Congress is responsible not only for intense
bitterness between the two sister communities, but
among the various clashes and conflicts and ill-will.”
Creator of Pakistan:

33
The All India Muslim League at its historical
session held in 1940 at Lahore adopted the famous
resolution, which came to be known as, “Pakistan
Resolution.” The author has reproduced the resolution
with the speech of Jinnah, which he concluded by
saying: “No power on earth can prevent Pakistan.” And
true to his words, he saw Pakistan created in his life-
time, which he least expected.
Jawaharlal Nehru wrote of the Lahore Resolution
as Jinnah’s fantastic proposals, reading it as a cat’s paw
of British Imperial duplicity.
Jinnah made a proposal to the Viceroy on 1st July
at Simla in which he reiterated his demand for the
partition of India and insisted that the Muslim leaders
should be associated as equal partners in the
Government, both at the center and the provinces and
for the duration of the war the Executive Council of the
Viceroy be expanded to include at least as many Muslim
members as Hindus.
Jinnah, in his presidential address to the Muslim
league on 12th April 1941 at Madras said: “We have
defined in the clearest language our goal and the goal is
Pakistan.” To the Muslim Students Federation on 26th
December 1941 at Nagpur, Jinnah said: “The Muslim
League has given you the goal which is going to lead you
to the promised land where we shall establish our
Pakistan.” In his speech at Calcutta on 13th February
1942 after hoisting the Muslim League Flag, Jinnah
said: “Up to the present moment, the Muslims were
absolutely demoralized. Our blood had become cold, our
flesh was not capable of working and the Muslim nation
was dead. Today, we find that our blood circulation is

34
improving. Our flesh is getting stronger and above all,
our mind is getting more clarified.” Addressing the
Bengal Provincial Muslim League Conference, Jinnah
said: “We are going through a life and death struggle.
We have many opponents. We must stand on our own
legs and rely on our own strength, if we have to achieve
anything in this world.”
Muslim League Chief Ministers of Punjab and
Sind were not at all favourably inclined to creation of
Pakistan. At the request of Jinnah, and to oblige him to
further their diabolic plans for division of this country, it
was the Viceroy, who pursued them to support Jinnah.
Quit India:
The Congress Working Committee at its meeting
held at Wardha on 14th July resolved: “The British rule
in India must end immediately. Neither settlement of the
communal tangle nor effective resistance to foreign
aggression was possible while British authority lasted.
In the alternative, the Congress would be compelled to
utilize non-violent strength under the leadership of
Gandhi.”
As a sharp reaction to the Congress resolution,
Jinnah issued a statement in which he said: “The
resolution of the Congress Working Committee to launch
a mass movement is the culminating point in the policy
and program of Gandhi and his Hindu Congress of
blackmailing the British and coercing them to concede a
system of Government and transfer of power to that
Government, which would establish a Hindu Raj,
thereby throwing the Muslims and other minorities at
the mercy of the Congress Raj.”

35
On a question from two American journalists,
Gandhi said: “The two communities will come together
immediately after British power comes to a final end in
India.” Jinnah at once responded: “I am glad that at last
Mr. Gandhi has openly declared that unity and Hindu-
Muslim settlement can only come after the achievement
of India’s independence.”
The All India Congress Committee adopted a
resolution calling upon the British to quit India. Gandhi,
Nehru, Sardar, Azad and Kriplani and other prominent
leaders were arrested on 9th August. Gandhi’s last
message was: “Do or Die.”
The Muslim League Working Committee on 20th
August at Bombay condemned the Quit India resolution
as an instrument for forcing the British and Muslims to
surrender to Congress dictation, and directed the
Muslims to refrain from participating in it.
At a subsequent meeting, the League passed a
resolution, which said that the Muslims of India were a
nation and not a minority.
Gandhi proceeded on 21 days fast on 10th
February 1943. All Party leaders conference was held in
Delhi on 19th February, which was attended by 300
representatives. Jinnah refused to attend the conference
saying: “The situation arising out of Gandhi’s fast is a
matter for Hindu leaders to consider and advice him
accordingly.”
Rajaji Formula:
Jinnah refused to accept the Rajaji Formula as it
did not meet the League’s full demand for Pakistan. He
told the Muslim League Council that Rajaji Formula is

36
“shadow and husk, maimed and mutilated, and moth-
eaten Pakistan.”
Simla Conference:
The Viceroy held a conference of prominent
political leaders from 25th June to 14th July 1945 at
Simla. The deep differences developed between the
Congress and the League on the composition of the
Viceroy’s Executive council. Jinnah demanded that the
Congress could nominate all the Hindu members, but all
the Muslim members must be nominees of the Muslim
League. Azad vehemently opposed it and said: “The
Congress has approached all political problems from a
national point of view and recognized no distinction
between Hindus and Muslims on political issues. It
could not in any circumstances agree to be an
organization of Hindus alone.”
At the last meeting of the conference, Jinnah
claimed parity in the Executive Council with all other
parties combined. The Viceroy announced the failure of
the conference on 14th July 1945.
Jinnah in his statement characterized the
Viceroy’s Plan as a ’snare’ and a ‘death warrant,’ for the
Muslim League. He further said: “There was the
combination consisting of the Gandhi-Hindu Congress
who stand for India’s Hindu national independence as
one India and the latest exponents of geographic unity,
Lord Wavell and Glancy-Khizr, who are bent upon
creating disruption among the Musalmans in the
Punjab.”
General Elections:
The Congress with reservations decided to
contest elections. The Muslim League also announced to

37
fight the elections on the issue of Pakistan and the claim
of the League to represent all Muslims. The results of
the elections showed that the Congress and the Muslim
league were the only political parties that counted in
India.
The Viceroy addressed the newly elected Central
Legislature on 28th January 1946, in which he
emphasized the determination of His Majesty’s
Government to establish a new Executive Council and to
form a constitution-making body as soon as possible.
On the Viceroy’s address, Jinnah declared that
the Muslim League was not prepared to consider
anything short of immediate recognition of Pakistan and
the League would not be prepared to cooperate in any
interim arrangements until this principle has been made
clear beyond all doubts and until it had been decided
that there would be two constitution-making bodies, one
for the Pakistan areas and the other for the rest of India.
However the Viceroy told Jinnah that if he refused to
participate in the interim Government, the Government
would be compelled to go without the League.
Cabinet Mission:
The Cabinet Mission interviewed in all 472 Indian
leaders in 182 sittings. In all the interviews the
discussion revolved round, “United India Vs Pakistan.”
Azad in his capacity as Congres President emphatically
said that the Congress would never agree to the
partition of India. Gandhi said that Jinnah’s Pakistan
was a sin, which he would not commit.” Gandhi further
said: “In his view two-nation theory was most
dangerous. The Muslim population, but for a
microscopic minority was a population of converts. They

38
were all descendents of India-born peole. He was
opposed to two-nation theory or to two constitution-
making bodies.”
Gandhi suggested that Jinnah should be asked to
form the first Government. If Jinnah refused, then the
offer should be made to the Congress. To this suggestion
of Gandhi, Jinnah replied: “The Congress offer is a
complete humbug. It would not work at all. We would be
fighting like Kilkenny Cats all the times.”
Jinnah called a convention of over 400 members
of the various legislatures elected on the Muslim League
tickets on 10th April at Delhi. A resolution was passed at
this convention, which demanded sovereign and
independent State of Pakistan, comprising the six
provinces of Bengal, Assam in the North-East and the
Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and
Baluchistan in the North-West of India; the setting up of
two separate constitution-making bodies by the people
of Pakistan and Hindustan for framing their respective
constitutions and the provision of safeguards for the
minorities.”
Jinnah threatened that any attempt to impose a
constitution or to force on them the Interim Government
contrary to their demand would leave the Muslims with
no alternative but to resist such imposition by all the
means possible for their survival and national existence.
Azad issued a statement in which he said: “The
very term Pakistan goes against my grain. It suggests
that some portions of the world are pure and others are
impure. Such a division of pure and impure is un-
Islamic. Islam recognizes no such division. The prophet
says, “God has made the whole world a mosque for me.”

39
Jinnah maintained that it was only when the
Muslims were the majority in Pakistan and the Hindus
in Hindustan that their could be sufficient united force
running through the State from top to bottom to provide
a steel frame which will hold it together.”
Second Simla Conference:
The second Simla Conference began on 5th May
1946 with four representatives each from the Congress
and the Muslim League. After two days, the gulf between
the Congress and the League was still as wide as ever.
On 8th May, Lord Pethic Lawrence suggested his points
for agreement between the Congress and the League.
Jinnah informed Pethic Lawrence that the points
suggested by him were a fundamental departure from
the original formula suggestd by the Secretary of State
for India. Therefore no useful purpose will be served by
discussion on them.
Azad also informed Pethic Lawrence that some of
the suggestions were entirely opposed to the views of the
Congress.
The differences between the Congress and the
League provided no hope for settlement and therefore, it
was announced on 12th May that the Conference failed
to bring the Congress and the League to agreement.
May 16th Declaration:
The Cabinet Mission declared their own scheme,
which came to be known as May 16th Declaration.
Jinnah issued a statement on 22nd May describing the
Cabinet Mission scheme as ‘cryptic with several
lacunas.’ He regretted that the Cabinet Mission should
have negative the League’s demand for Pakistan.

40
Gandhi advised the Congress Working Committee
th
on 25 June 1946 the wholesale rejection of the Plan.
Nehru, Azad and Patel were for compromise. The
Congress ultimately rejected the proposal for the
formation of Interim Government at the Centre, but
accepted the long term proposal for constitution-making
with its interpretation on disputed clauses.
The Congress Working Committee’s decision was
communicated to the Cabinet Mission on the same day.
It treated the Congress decision as an acceptance of
their plan of May 16th.
The Working Committee of the Muslim League
agreed to join the Interim Government on the basis of
May 16th Plan. However, ultimately the negotiations for
the formation of the Interim Government failed. The
Viceroy decided to set up a care-taker Government
composed of officials, who would function until such
time as his efforts with the political leaders could be
renewed.
Nehru’s Damaging Role:
Winding up the proceedings of the All India
Congress Committee on 6th July 1946, Nehru in his
capacity as the Congress President said: “….It was not a
question of the Congress accepting any plan-long or
short. It was merely a question of their agreeing to enter
the Constituent Assembly and nothing more than that.
They would remain in the Constituent Assembly so long
as they thought that it was for India’s good and they
would come out when they thought it was injuring their
cause.” Nehru further said: “We are not bound by a
single thing except that we have decided for the moment
to go to the Constituent Assembly.” Nehru continued:

41
“We accept no out siders interference, certainly not the
British Government’s interference.” With regard to
Grouping, Nehru said that there would be no grouping
of provinces.
Jinnah characterized Nehru’s statement as the
complete repudiation of the basic form on which the
long-term plan rests and all its fundamentals and terms
and obligations and rights of parties accepting the plan.
Jinnah wrote a strictly private, personal and confidential
letter on 6th July to Lord Attlee in which he said: “The
British Government would still avoid compelling the
Muslims to shed their blood, for, their surrender to the
Congress. Its consequences will be most disastrous and
a possible settlement will then become impossible.”
On 10th July, Nehru made an astonishing
statement in his press conference at Bombay that the
Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly
completely unfettered by the agreements and free to
meet all situations as they arise. He further said that
the Congress had agreed only to participate in the
Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change
or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best.
Reacting sharply to Nehru’s statement Jinnah
said: “If the Congress could change while the British
were still in the country and power had not come to its
hands, what assurance would minorities have that once
the British left, the Congress would not again change to
go back to the position taken up in Jawaharlal’s
statement.”
Jinnah convened a meeting of the Working
Committee of the Muslim League on 27th July 1946 in
which he said: “In view of the true intention of the

42
Congress as expressed in Nehru’s statement, it was no
longer possible to work in cooperation with the
Congress. The League had no alternative, but to adhere
once more to the national goal of Pakistan. There is no
room left for compromise. Let us march on to our
cherished goal of Pakistan.” Jinnah declared: “that the
British and the Congress, each held a pistol in their
hands, the one of authority and arms and the other of
mass struggle and non-cooperation. Today, we have also
forged a pistol and we are in a position to use it.” The
Muslim League called upon the Muslims to observe 16th
August as, Direct Action Day.
Interim Government:
On 6th August 1946, the Viceroy invited Nehru to
submit proposal for the formation of the Interim
Government on the basis of the assurance contained in
his letter of 30th May to Azad. The Congress Working
Committee on 8th August decided to accept the invitation
extended to Nehru and authorized him to negotiate with
the Viceroy. The Congress Working committee also
hoped that in view of its resolution, the Muslim League
will join the Interim Government. However, Jinnah
stuck to his view that Nehru’s statement represented the
concealed intention of the Congress and he believed that
the moment the British left the country, the Hindu
dominated Constituent Assembly would do away with
the half way house to Pakistan.
On 13th August Nehru wrote to Jinnah about
Viceroy’s invitation to him and his acceptance of it. On
15th August, Jinnah replied to Nehru: “If the Viceroy had
commissioned him to form an Interim Government, it
was not possible for him to accept such a position.”

43
Nehru submitted a list of 12 members for the
Interim Government. Two names were left to be filled by
the Muslim League, if and when they joined the
Government. On 24th August His majesty’s Government
appointed the members of the Interim Government. The
Interim Government was sworn in on 2nd September.
Jinnah said that the Viceroy had struck a severe
blow to the Muslim League and Muslim India. He
reiterated his demand for the partition of India.
Nehru in his broadcast from the All India radio on
7th September said: “ The Constituent Assembly would
soon be meeting to give shape to the constitution of a
free and independent India. Jinnah in his interview to
the ‘London Daily Mail’ on 8th September said: “Nehru
had made no definite proposals to me; I have been
stabbed and kind words will not stop bleeding.”
The Viceroy continued his efforts to bring about
settlement between Nehru and Jinnah. Jinnah set out
his nine conditions for joining the Interim Government.
The Viceroy sent his point wise reply to Jinnah.
Exchange of correspondence took place between the
Viceroy, Nehru and Jinnah, which culminated in
Jinnah’s letter of 13th October to the Viceroy in which
Jinnah said: “We have decided to nominate five
members on behalf of the Muslim League in terms of
your broadcast of 24th August 1946 and your two letters
to me dated 4th and 12th October 1946 embodying
clarifications and assurances.”
On 25th October, names of the Muslim members
of the Interim Government were announced, which
included Liaqat Ali Khan, I.I.Chundrigar, Abdul Rab
Nishtar and Jogendra Nath Mandal. The League

44
members behaved and functioned as if Pakistan had
already become Fait Accompli. Liaqat Ali Khan went to
the extent of announcing that the Interim Government
consisted of Congress bloc and the Muslim bloc each
functioning under separate leadership. From the start
League members acted as a parallel Government and
ignored Nehru’s status as Vice President of the Council.
Jinnah publicly said: “If Nehru can only come down to
earth and think coolly and calmly, he must understand
that he is neither Prime Minister nor it is a Nehru
Government, he is only the member of the External
Affairs and Commonwealth department.”
Divide and Quit:
The Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced in
the House of Commons on 20th February 1947 that
Britain would transfer power to responsible Indian
hands by a date not later than June 1948. He also
announced that Lord Mountbatten will succeed Lord
Wavell.
Lord Mountbatten was sworn in as the Viceroy
and Governor General of India on 24th March 1947.
Gandhi, on 1st April submitted his eight point
proposal to Lord Mountbatten, which included an offer
to Jinnah to form the Government and if he declined the
offer, the same then should be made to the Congress.
Gandhi was opposed to the whole logic of Pakistan. He
said that the partition would solve none of the problems.
On the contrary, it would accentuate those that were
already there and create fresh ones. All except Azad told
Gandhi that the partition was inescapable. Gandhi
wrote a letter to the Viceroy on 11th April 1947 in which
he said: “I have several talks with Nehru and a number

45
of members of the Congress Working Committee about
the plan I placed before you. I am sorry to say that I
have failed to carry them with me except Badsha Khan
Abdul Gaffar Khan. I therefore ask you to omit me from
your consideration. But Mountbatten requested Gandhi
to stay on and exert his influence infavour of the
acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan.
In the course of his discussion with the party
leaders, particularly Jinnah, Mountbatten was
convinced that there was no prospect of agreed solution
on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan and an attempt
to resurrect it was useless.
Mountbatten sent his revised plan to London with
Lord Ismay and Allen Campbell on 2nd May. He received
back his plan from London duly approved by the British
Cabinet. Mountbatten held a meeting with Nehru and
explained to him as to how the revised plan would meet
his objections. The conference proposed to be convened
on 17th May was postponed to 2nd June. In the
meanwhile Mountbatten was called to London by Attlee.
Before leaving for London. Mountbatten asked
V.P.Menon to prepare a draft, “Heads of Agreement” to
be shown to leaders for their acceptance. Acordingly
Menon prepared a draft on 16th May.
On 18th May Mountbatten left for London with
Menon. The British Cabinet approved the revised plan
and finalized the statement of His Majesty’s
Government. It was decided that Mountbatten should
present this plan to the Indian leaders on 2nd June.
Mountbatten returned to India on 31st May 1947.
The historic conference of seven leaders was held
on 2nd June at Viceroy’s house. The Viceroy handed over

46
the copies of the statement of His Majesty’s Government
to the leaders and asked them to let him know the
reaction of their Working Committees by mid night. The
next day on 3rd June, the Viceroy informed the Secretary
of State for India the assuarance given to him by Nehru,
Jinnah and Baldev Singh about the acceptance of the
plan. Attlee announced the plan in the House of
Commons on 3rd June. Hence it came to be known as 3rd
June Plan.
Prime Minister Attlee in his broadcast made that
night said: “As the Indian leaders have failed to agree on
the Cabinet Mission Plan for united India, partition
becomes an inevitable alternative. The 3rd June Plan, he
added, provided for the handing over of power that year
to one or two Governments, each having Dominion
Status.
On the evening of 3rd June Mountbatten
broadcast over All India radio in which he said: “It had
been impossible to obtain agreement on the Cabinet
Mission Plan or on any other plan that would preserve
the unity of India. Hence it was left to the people of India
themselves to decide the question of partition.
Immediately thereafter, His Majesty’s Government’s
statement was also broadcast and released to the press.
Then followed broadcast by Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev
Singh indicating their acceptance of the plan.
Thus India was divided into two Sovereign States
of Pakistan and India, which made Jinnah, the first
Governor General of Pakistan and Jawaharlal Nehru,
the first Prime Minister of India.
Who is Responsible for Partition:

47
The British were convinced that the creation of
Pakistan was their absolute need and they started
actively working on it. The Plan of Partition was
prepared much before the arrival of Lord Mountbatten in
India. He only implemented the Plan. In the meanwhile,
the British with their large resources and influence
started their tactics to make people all over the world
believe, on one hand that they were keen to give freedom
to India, but Indians were divided among themselves, on
the other hand they encouraged Jinnah to become more
and more vehement on his demand for Pakistan.
Jinnah was most egoistic and wanted nothing
short of Prime Ministership of independent India.
Gandhiji sensed this and that is why he proposed that
Jinnah should be made the first Prime Minister, if
partition could be avoided thereby. Gandhji’s proposal
was not simple as it apparently appeared. It was a
shrewd and far-sighted move. Gandhiji knew that
Jinnah was in the last stage of T.B. and would not
survive more than a year. Gandhiji also knew that after
British left, Congress will remain in majority and can
largely influence future constitution once interested
brokers (British) left. Had Gandhiji’s proposal been
accepted, the partition of India could have been avoided.
But his heir Jawaharlal Nehru was not prepared to wait
for a moment to be the first Prime Minister of
independent India.
Nehru and Patel had accepted partition. Before
they said yes to it, they neither consulted All India
Congress Committee nor Gandhiji. Gandhiji was
shocked when he came to know. His instant reaction
was: “Every one today, is impatient for independence.”

48
Nehru had told Michael Brecher: “We saw no
other way of getting our freedom and so we accepted
partition. Nehru also told Leonard Mosley: “We were
tired men and we were getting on years too. The plan of
partition offered a way out and we took it.” Even
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad said: “Nehru’s action gave
the Muslim League in U.P. a new lease of life. Jinnah
took full advantage of the situation and started an
offensive, which ultimately led to Pakistan.”
Nehru in his broadcast on 3rd June revealed his
mind when he said: “I am convinced that our decision to
divide India is the right one.” Later 1949-50, he said:
“We were anxious to have freedom as quickly as
possible, so we agreed for partition, but subsequently he
admitted that the partition could have been avoided.
Sardar Patel was so frustrated and disgusted by
Jinnah and his League that he wanted to get rid of both.
He said: “Whatever some people may say, I am
convinced and remain convinced that our having agreed
to partition has been for the good of the country. And
therefore, I have never repented my agreeing to
partition.”
Shri Sheshrao Chavan says that Gandhiji should
have remained firm on his stand and statements. But in
my opinion, had he done so there would have been mass
revolt against Nehru and Patel, in particular and the
Congress in general. Gandhiji being a practical visionary
realized this and suppressing his conscience told the All
India Congress Committee on 14th June 1947: “…You
must remember that the country needs most today is
peace. If you are sure that your rejection of the scheme
will not lead to further breach of peace and further

49
disorder, you can do so… The country is already divided
in two camps. If I felt strong enough myself, I would
alone take up the flag of revolt. But today I do not see
the conditions for doing so… Sometimes certain
decisions, however unpalatable they might be had to be
taken.”
British apart from their usual policy of divide and
rule had direct interest in partition of this country. By
early 1947, the British chiefs of staff had become
enthusiastic proponents of Pakistan that would
cooperate with Britain in military matters. ON 12th May
1947 General Leslie Hollis wrote to Prime Minister
Clement Attlee who wanted to deal with western India
first of all. From the strategic point of view there are
overwhelming arguments in favour of a western
Pakistan remaining in the Commonwealth i.e.
maintaining defense ties with Britain. He put forward
the following points to buttress his views:
1. We should obtain important strategic facilities
such as the port of Karachi and air bases-in
North West India and the support of Muslim
manpower.
2. We should be able to ensure the continued
independence and integrity of Afganistan.
3. We should increase our prestige and improve
our position throughout the Muslim World,
and demonstrate, by the assistance Pakistan
would receive, the advantages of links with the
British Commonwealth.
4. Our link with Pakistan might have a
stabilizing effect on India as a whole, since an
attack by Hindustan on Pakistan would

50
involve Hindustan in war, not with Pakistan
alone, but also with the British
Commonwealth.
5. The position on the Frontier might well
become more settled since relations between
the tribes and Pakistan would be easier than
they could be with a united India.
When second world war started, while initially
Gandhiji supported British, Jinnah went a long way and
told the Viceroy to turn the Congress ministries out at
once. He told the Viceroy: “….Their object is nothing less
than to destroy both you British and us Muslims. They
will never stand by you.” He advised that Muslim areas
should be separated from Hindu India and run by
Muslims in collaboration with Great Britain. British had
also started thinking in terms of post-war equations,
and wanted an ally against likely spread of influence up
to Iran. They knew that nationalist Indian leaders can
never be their stooges while Jinnah can be relied. Hence
it was a part of global conspiracy by British. They finally
decided on partition after second world war.
Shri Sheshrao Chavan in preparing this book, has taken
great pains and has come out with a very valuable and
authentic information, which will feed readers with
correct and unbiased history. He has not dealt with the
matter in a stereotyped manner but has delved deep into
the record of these historic events and focused light on
them without fear or favour. I think that this book
would create fresh awareness of very significant period
of India’s history and will help readers to form their own
opinion as to who were the really responsible for the
Partition of our Mother land into India and Pakistan.

51
History can and should never, as Sheshrao Chavan has
shown respect individuals but only facts though some
time not to one’s liking.

Dhiru S. Mehta

APPRAISAL

When, in a different context, Winston


Churchill spoke about a mystery wrapped in an enigma
he did not, of course, have Mohammad Ali Jinnah in
mind though the description fits the founder of Pakistan
well enough. And yet anyone who had followed Indian
history from 1900 and the background to the
development and sharp changes in the course of
Jinnah’s life would surely have predicted his stand on
Pakistan and on the Two-Nation Theory. The changes
that took place in his life were painfully drastic. But, in
retrospect, were predictable. When Mohammad Ali
Jinnah returned to India in the autumn of 1896 as a
young barrister in his twenties and set up his legal
practice in Mumbai, he was a staunch nationalist. When
he began his political career with attending the 20 th
session of the Indian National Congress in December
1904 he was captivated by the wisdom, fairness and
moderation of Gopal Krishna Gokhale that he was to tell
his friends that his ambition was to become the “Muslim
Gokhale.” At that time nobody could possibly have
predicted the future. Here was a man who stood by Bal
Gangadhar Tilak and defended him when charged with
sedition. Again it was in appreciation of Jinnah’s

52
commitment to Hindu-Muslim unity that the people of
Mumbai joined hands to set up Jinnah Hall through
public subscription. All that became things of the past
when, at the Nagpur Session of the Congress the man
who was once hailed as the champion of Hindu-Muslim
unity was hooted out with cries of “Shame, Shame.” A
transformation was then to take place in Jinnah’s life
and thought. Born was a new communalist who, in an
address to the students of the Aligarh Muslim University
in February 1938 could say: “The Congress policy is to
divide the Muslims among themselves. It is the same old
tactics of the British Government. They follow the policy
of their masters. Do not fall into their trap.” Jinnah had
turned against his own past. Such was his hatred
towards the Congress that when Congress ministries in
five provinces resigned in 1939, he could call for a “Day
of Deliverance” on 22nd December 1939. After that, for
Jinnah there was no going back.
What Sheshrao Chavan has done in his highly
dramatic but painstakingly authentic work is to trace
the changes that had taken place in Jinnah’s political
philosophy, year, by year, step by step. Reading it is to
wipe one’s tears from one’s eyes. The man who stood for
national unity had become a vicious advocate of
Pakistan based on the theory that Hindus and Muslims
cannot live together in amity and Muslims, in the
circumstances, needed a separate State of their own,
Pakistan.
Chavan records with dedicated objectivity what
happened since 1939 such as the arrival in India in
1942 of the Cripps Mission, the conflict within the
Congress over the Cripps’ offer, the manner in which

53
negotiations between the Government of India and the
political parties broke down, the passing by the
Congress of Quit India Resolution and what followed,
ending with the arrival of the Cabinet Mission in India
on 24th March 1946. What subsequently followed is
history much too close to us. To dismiss it as pathetic is
to say the obvious. In the end India was partitioned.
Pakistan came into being and Jinnah had his revenge
against the Congress, against Gandhi and against
Nehru.
Jinnah left Delhi for Karachi on 7th August 1947
to take over charge as the first Governor-General of
Pakistan. On arrival in Karachi, and walking up the
steps of the Government House, Jinnah was to tell a
Naval Officer who accompanied him: “Do you know, I
never expected Pakistan in my life time.”
The man who said Hindus and Muslims
could never live together had a last message to
Muslims in India. It was to the effect that they
should remain loyal citizens of India! Even more
significantly in his first address to the Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan, Jinnah was to say, miracle of
miracles, that in the newly formed Pakistan their
should be no distinction between one community
and another and that if that ideal was maintained
“in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus
and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in a
religious sense because that is the personal faith of
each individual, but in the political sense as
citizens of State…” And this was the man who

54
insisted that Hindus and Muslims could not live
together.
The setting up of Pakistan is the beginning of the
third phase of Jinnah’s political career. He had again
become a changed man. He was leading people to
believe that he had abandoned the Two-Nation Theory
and wanted Pakistan to be a Secular State. Indeed, he
was even to admit that he had committed the biggest
blunder of his life and wanted to go back to India. He is
reported to have told Sri Prakasa, the first Indian High
Commissioner to Pakistan to convey to Nehru not to
requisition his house in Bombay because he desired to
return to live in it! This is Jinnah’s “Third Face,”
inexplicable and yet students of history will say, basing
that assessment of Jinnah’s mountainous ego,
inevitable.
Says Chavan himself: “Why did he (Jinnah)
convert himself from an Ambassador of Hindu-
Muslim Unity to the creator of Pakistan? The reply,
according to me is, it was only for psychological
satisfaction to show that he was more than a match
to Gandhi, Nehru, Patel and Azad put together,
because they had hurt him in one way or the other
and did not give him recognition as he expected.”
Chavan’s own assessment is that Gandhi, Nehru
and Patel were equally responsible for creating a
feeling of separation in Jinnah’s mind….” Reading
this absorbing book one feels like shading tears, the
reader is invited to read this painful recounting of

55
history but to keep a towel by one’s side. There is
no way one can escape crying.

M.V.Kamath

INTRODUCTION

Jinnah was held as an ambassador of Hindu-


Muslim unity by no less a person than Mahatma
Gandhi’s guru, Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Florence
Nightingale of India Sarojini Naidu. Jinnah made
sincere efforts to prove worthy of it-nay developed an
ambition to become Muslim Gokhale. why such a
man turned to be a communalist from a nationalist
and went to the extent of saying that Hindus and
Muslims cannot live together. And therefore, India
should be divided to provide home land for Muslims.
This is the theme of this book.
The introduction highlights the turning points in
Jinnah’s life, which reveal three faces of Jinnah; 1.
Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity 2. Creator of
Pakistan and 3. Repentant for his blunder in
creating Pakistan. The last chapter of the book deals
with as to who are responsible for partition of India.
The first turning point came in the life of Jinnah
when he was howled down with cries of ‘shame,
shame at the 1920 session of the Indian National
Congress at Nagpur right in the presence of his

56
sweat-heart Ruttie. Jinnah left Nagpur by first
available train. But remained in congress.
The second turning point was when his
amendments to the Nehru Report were turned down
at the All Parties Conference held in 1928 at Calcutta
and he was branded as a representative of
communal Muslims by Sikhs, Hindu Mahasabha and
a section of the Congress in the audience. Jinnah left
Calcutta and Congress with a deep wound in his
heart. Yet continued to work for Hindu-Muslim unity
and claim himself to be an Indian first, an Indian
second and an Indian last.
The third turning point was when Jawaharlal
Nehru, intoxicated with the results of the 1937
elections to the Provincial Legislatures in favour of
Congress declared: “In the political evolution of the
country, there are only two parties-the British and
the Congress.” Jinnah retorted: “There is a third
party in the country and that is the Muslim League,
whom the Congress will ignore at its own risk and
peril.”
The fourth turning point was 1940 session of the
Muslim League at Lahore, where a resolution termed
as, “Pakistan Resolution” was passed and Jinnah
on the top of his voice pronounced that no power on
earth can prevent Pakistan.
Nehru called Lahore Resolution as Jinnah’s
fantastic proposal, reading it as a cat’s paw of British
Imperial duplicity and said, we have nothing to do
with this mad scheme.
This was enough for Jinnah to convert himself
from a nationalist to a rabid communalist.

57
Disowned by the Congress, humiliated by Nehru,
Jinnah allowed himself to be used by the British. But
in turn he exploited British to strengthen his
demand for Pakistan.
His Majesty’s Government declared in 1940 that
their responsibility would not be transferred to any
Government, whose authority was directly denied by
a large and powerful elements in India.
This declaration made Jinnah the sole
spokesman of the Muslim League, thus virtually
according him veto power. He came out openly with
two-nation theory and made it the only point of
agreement for settlement.
Jinnah was invited to broadcast a special
message on the occasion of the Id festival-an explicit
recognition of the League President as the
spokesman of Muslim community. Never before was
Jinnah a man of the masses. He distrusted them. To
exclude them from political power, he was always for
a high franchise. He was never known to be very
devout, pious or a professing Muslim. Besides
kissing the Holy Quran as and when he was sworn in
as a member of the Legislative Assembly, he did not
appear to have bothered much about its contents or
its special tenets. It is doubtful whether he
frequented any mosque either out of curiosity or
religious fervour. He was never found in the midst of
Muslim congregation, religious or political.
But since Jinnah became protagonist advocate
of Pakistan, he became a man of the masses. He was
no longer above them. He was among them. Masses
raised him above themselves and called him Quid-e-

58
Azam. He not only became a believer in Islam, but
was prepared to die for Islam. He knew more of Islam
than mere Kalama. He went to the mosque to hear
Khutba. Jinnah began to learn Urdu and to don the
‘Sherwani’ with gold button engraved with ‘P’ to his
collar and a black lamb cap, which came to be
known as ‘JinnahCap,’ for official photographs,
actions reminiscent of what that old saw from the
French Revolution: “I am their leader, I must follow
them.”
Linlithgow-Jinnah Alliance in 1940 was the first
step that opened the way for the creation of Pakistan.
Churchill’s idea of the, ‘provincial option,’ in 1942
was the second step towards this goal. And Attlee’s
statement of 20th February 1947 in British
Parliament was a green signal for the creation of
Pakistan.
Lord Mountbatten with his charm, skill and
persuasiveness got the Congress to agree to partition
and prepared Jinnah to yield to truncated Pakistan.
Mountbatten’s master stroke was to win over
Mahatma Gandhi, which is evident from what
Gandhi said in his prayer meeting. He said: “…The
British Government is not responsible for partition.
The Viceroy Mountbatten has no hand in it. If both of
us, Hindus and Muslims cannot agree on anything
else then the Viceroy is left with no choice.”
The two sovereign states of Pakistan and India
saw their birth on 14th August 1947 and 15th August
1947 respectively.
Jinnah was certainly responsible for the partition
of India on the cry of two-nation theory, which was in

59
fact voiced by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan way back in
1888. Jinnah only echoed it to satiate his ego to
remain number one. But the triumvirate-Gandhi,
Nehru and Patel are equally responsible. Nehru for
his ambition to become the first Prime Minister of
free and independent India; Sardar to remain King
Maker; Gandhi for his exhaustion in the evening of
his life to create a new set of leaders to launch a
movement to adhere to his vow that the vivisection of
India will be over his dead body.
While aiming to help the reader by placing before
him all the material relevant, and important, the
reader will find that I have not sought to impose my
opinion on him. However, the reader may complain
that I have been provocative in stating the relevant
facts. I am conscious that such a charge may be
leveled against me. My excuse is that I have no
intention to hurt anybody. I have only one purpose,
that is, to focus the attention of the indifferent and
casual reader on the issues dealt with in the book. I
request the reader to put aside any irritation that he
may feel with me and concentrate his thoughts on
the question: Who are responsible for the partition of
India? Can Pakistan and India live as good
neighbours? And Can Hindus and Muslims live in
harmony in India?

Sheshrao Chavan

60
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The credit of this book goes to Shri L.K.Advani,


India’s former Home Minister and President of the
Bharatiya Janta Party. His statement on Jinnah during
his visit to Pakistan provoked me to make in-depth study
of Jinnah and his determination to create Pakistan to be
its first Governor General.
I have studied the books written by authors
referred to in the book at the appropriate places. I record
my deep sense of gratitude to them and their publishers.
Besides, I have gone through several other books,
manuscripts and documents to make the book as
authentic as possible. I acknowledge one and all with my
profuse thanks.
I feel honoured to have ‘Foreword’ from
Padmabhushan Dr. L.H.Hiranandani.
Dr. Hiranandani is recipient of Padmabhushan,
Dhanwantri Award, Golden Award from International
Federation of Oto-Laryinology. ( the first Indian Surgeon
and the fifth in the world to get it) and the prestigious
SAARC–ENT- Award.

61
Dr. Hiranandani, in his heart in heart desires that
India and Pakistan should live in peace as good
neighbors. He was sent as an emissary of the then Prime
Minister of India Shri Deve Gowda to Pakistan with his
proposal to convert the Line of Control (LOC) into an
International Border. But before his proposal was
considered, Deve Gowda Government collapsed.
I came in contact with Dr. Hiranandani only six
months back, but I feel that I have known him for ages-
may be this has some thing to do with the previous birth,
in which I firmly believe.
I have no words to thank Dr. L.H. Hiranandani
for taking pains to read every line of the manuscript to
write ‘Foreword’ at his ninety years of age. He is old in
age, but amazingly young in spirit with razor sharp
memory and a heart full of love and compassion.
I am beholden to Shri Dhiru S. Mehta for his
Preface. Shri Mehta is a true Gandhian. He carried
Gandhian legacy from his father-in-law and mother-in-
law Shri Radhakrishna Bajaj and Smt. Anusaya Bajaj
respectively, who need no introduction for their close
associations with Mahatma Gandhi and Vinoba Bhave.
Shri Mehta is President of the Kasturba Gandhi
National Memorial Trust, which runs 450 centers in India
for the welfare of women and children. He is also a
Trustee of the Gujrath Vidyapeeth founded by Mahatma
Gandhi at Ahemadabad and Vice President of Mani
Bhavan Sanghralaya, where Gandhiji used to stay in
Mumbai. I feel obliged to have Preface to the book from
such an illustrious son of India.
I deem it privilege to have Appraisal from
Padmabhushan Shri M.V.Kamath.

62
Shri Kamath has had a long career as a reporter,
foreign correspondent and editor, having served in
Mumbai, Bonn, Paris, Geneva, United Nations, New York
and Washington DC. He himself has authored over 40
books on a wide range of subjects including history,
biography, politics, journalism and fiction. His Memoirs,
“A Reporter at Large,” is an immense source of inspiration
to journalists and readers, young and old all over the
world. He is recipient of several prestigious Awards, the
latest being “Padmabhushan”. He is President of the
Prasar Bharati of Government of India.
I am indebted to Padmashri Shri Muzzaffar Husain,
critic, writer and doyen of journalists for his valuable
information on Jinnah and working of the mind of
Jinnah.
I have had benefit of discussion with Prof. K.D.
Gangrade, Dr. Savita Singh and Dr. R.B. Chavan from
Delhi; Prof. Moazziz Ali Beg and Prof. Umeshchandra
Vashistha from Lucknow; Dr. Aloo Dastur, Padmashri Dr.
R.T. Doshi, Major General E. D’ Souza, Shri Madhu
Deolekar, Shri Azgar Ali Engineer, Mr. and Mrs. Kekoo
Gandhi, Shri Nandkumar Moghe and Shri Prakash
Almeida from Mumbai; Dr.J.S. Sardar and Shri G.R. Rege
from Aurangabad, I extend my thanks to all of them.
I have special thanks for Shri Ghanshyam
Ajgaonkar and his Librarian for providing me books I
needed from Mani Bhavan Library.
I am obliged to my grand daughter Miss Nikita
for layout and final print out of the manuscript on
computer. I place my appreciation on record for the
assistance given to me by my grand daughters Apurva
and Rucha and also grand son Anurag.

63
My thanks are due to all those who have directly
or indirectly helped me in the preparation of this book.

Sheshrao Chavan

64
AMBASSADOR OF HINDU MUSLIM UNITY

Jinnah has true stuff in him, and that


Freedom from all sectarian prejudice which will
make him the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim
unity.
Gopal Krishna Gokhale

Mohammad Ali Jinnah returned to India in the


autumn of 1896 as a young barrister in his twenties and
set up his legal practice in Mumbai. During the years of
his success as a lawyer, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, who was
hailed as the Nightingale of Bombay wrote of Jinnah:
“Never was there a nature whose outer qualities provided
so complete an antithesis of its inner worth. Tall and
stately, but thin to the point of emaciation, languid and
luxurious of habit, Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s attenuated
form is the deceptive sheath of a spirit of exceptional
vitality and endurance. Some what formal and fastidious,
and a little aloof and imperious of manner, the calm
hauteur of his accustomed reserve but masks-for those
who know him-a naïve and eager humanity, an intuition
quick and tender as a woman’s, a humour gay and
winning as a child’s. Pre-eminently rational and practical,
discreet and dispassionate in his estimate and
acceptance of life, the obvious sanity and serenity of his
worldly wisdom effectually disguise a shy and splendid
idealism which is the very essence of the man.”

65
Jinnah’s political career began with attending the
twentieth session of the Indian National Congress in
December 1904 at Bombay. He met Gopal Krishna
Gokhale first at this session. At the very first meeting,
Jinnah was so captivated by the wisdom, fairness and
moderation of Gokhale, that he became his ardent
admirer and later stated that his fond ambition is to
become the “Muslim Gokhale.”
Phirozshah Mehta, who chaired the reception
committee of this twentieth session, was so impressed by
the performance of Jinnah that he proposed that Gokhale
and Jinnah be sent as deputies to London, the following
year to lobby what he and other well informed observers
of Britain’s political climate correctly anticipated would
be the new liberal government in Westminster and
Whitehall.
Gokhale, who was to preside over the next session
of the Congress seemed an obvious choice, but with
regard to Jinnha, who was still unknown to most
congress delegates, enough questions were raised to hold
up release of any funds for his passage.
In 1906, Dadabhai Naoroji came down from
England to preside over the Calcutta session of the
Indian National Congess. Jinnah attended the congress
as a delegate and acted as a Private Secretary to the
President.
Dadabhai was too weak to read the address
himself that Jinnah had helped write. In his address,
which was read by Gokhale, Dadabahi called for a
thorough political union among the Indian people of all
creeds and classes and said: “I appeal to the Indian
people for this because it is in their own hands. They

66
have in them the capacity, energy and intellect to hold
their own and to get their due share in all walks of life of
which the State Services are but a small part. State
Services are not everything. Once self-government is
attained, then there will be prosperity for all, but not till
then. The thorough union, therefore, of all the people for
their emancipation is an absolute necessity. They must
sink or swim together. Without this union, all efforts will
be vain.”
The address of Dadabhai Naoroji ended with
fervent plea for unity. He said: “Be united, persevere and
achieve self-government, so that the millions persisting
by poverty, famine and plague, and the scores of millions
that are starving on scanty subsistence may be saved,
and India once more occupy her proud position of yore
among the greatest and civilized nations of the world.”
The Grand Old man, in his eighty-first year
became a warrior. His slogan, “SWARAJ,” was writ on the
new banner of Congress.
Jinnah echoed this theme of national unity at
every political meeting he attended during the next ten
years and emerged as “Ambassador of Hind-Muslim
unity.”
Sarojini Naidu, who met Jinnah first at the
Calcutta Congress said: “In 1906, when I met Jinnah in
Calcutta at the historic sessions of the national congress
where Dadabhai Naoroji first enunciated the glorious
ideal of “Swaraj” -Self-government for India, Mohd Ali
Jinnah, for the moment acting as Private Secretary to his
old master, was already accounted a rising lawyer and a
coming politician. For, true to his early teaching, and
fired no doubt the virile patriotism of men like the late

67
Badruddin Tyabji and lion-hearted Pherozeshah Mehta,
he had long since joined the ranks of the national
Congress and regularly attended its annual gatherings.”
Jinnah left Calcutta inspired with his mission of
advancing the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity, perceiving
as few of his contemporaries did how indispensable such
unity was to the new goal of SWARAJ that congress had
adopted. He was politician enough to realize that his only
hope of succeeding his liberal mentors and friends
Dadabhai, Pherozeshah, and Gokhale as leaders of
Congress was by virtue of his secular constitutional
national appeal, not through his double minority status.
He had risen above all parochial prejudice, a
Shakespearian hero in modern garb, with the noblest
imprecations of Burk, Mill, and Morley ringing in his
mind, stirring his heart. Congress’s national political
platform had become his new dramatic stage, grander
and more exciting than Bombay’s high court. In one
short decade after returning from London he had
virtually emerged as heir-apparent to the Bombay
triumvirate which led Congress’s slow–moving, political
bullock-cart toward the promised land of freedom.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 27)
Tilak was arrested in the summer of 1908, charged
with “seditious writings,” in his newspaper, ‘Kesari’
published from Poona. Tilak secured the services of
Jinnah to plead for his release pending trial. Jinnah
argued valiantly, but to no avail, for British justice had
closed its mind to Tilak long before his trial began. Tilak
was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment. Every
Indian patriot felt that even though Tilak might have
been technically guilty of the charge of sedition, the

68
sentence passed by Indian judge–Mr. Davar- was a
savage one. Later an appeal, which was filed against the
conviction was heard by Justice Mr. Bachelor and Justice
Mr. Shah. The appeal on behalf of Tilak was argued by
Jinnah and the conviction was set aside.
After Justice Davar sentenced Tilak to six
years rigorous imprisonment, the Government conferred
a knighthood upon Davar, and the Bar Association of the
High Court of Bombay wanted to give him a dinner. A
circular went round asking those who wanted to join the
dinner to sign it. When the circular came to Jinnah, he
wrote a scathing note that the Bar should be ashamed to
want to give a dinner to a judge who had obtained a
knighthood by doing what the Government wanted, and
by sending a great patriot to jail with a savage sentence.
Justice Davar came to know about this, and he
sent for Jinnah in his chambers. Davar asked Jinnah
whether he had any grievance against him. Jinnah said
he had none. Davar then asked: “Why did you write a
note like this against me?” Jinnah replied that he wrote it
because he thought that it was the truth, and however
well Davar might have treated him he could not suppress
his strong feeling about the manner in which he had
treated Tilak’s case. This goes to demonstrate the great
regard, which Jinnah had for Tilak, and also the courage
and the spirit of nationalism, which Jinnah displayed as
a young man.
(Roses in December by M.C.Chagla, pg 14-15)
Imperial Legislative Council:
Jinnah, at the age of thirty-five was elected by the
Muslims of the Bombay Presidency to the Imperial
Legislative Council as their representative. In his very

69
first speech in the council meeting held at Calcutta on
25th February 1910, Jinnah lent support to Mahatma
Gandhi’s activities in South Africa. In his speech, Jinnah
said: “…It is a most painful question-a question, which
has roused the feelings of all classes in this country to
the highest pitch of indignation and horror at the harsh
and cruel treatment that is meted out to Indians in South
Africa.”
Lord Minto, who was presiding over the council
meeting reprimanded Jinnah for using the words, “cruel
treatment,” as he considered them too harsh to be used
for a friendly part of the Empire.”
“My Lord,” Jinnah retorted, “I should feel much
inclined to use much stronger language. But I am fully
aware of the constitution of this council, and I do not
wish to trespass for one single moment. But I do say that
the treatment meted out to Indians is the harshest and
the feeling in this country is unanimous.”
Up to this date, no one had shown such a courage
right on the face of the Viceroy. As a result Jinnah’s
speech received wide publicity in the press all over India
and it was recognized that a forceful voice has entered
the council.
Jinnah, invariably lent his willing support to every
liberal measure involving the larger national issues like
Gokhale’s Elementary Education Bill, and Mr. Basu’s
Special Marriage Bill, to which conservative India as a
whole was so violently opposed. His original work,
however, was in the introduction of Wakf Validating Bill
on 17th March 1911. His admirable skill and tact in
piloting through such an intricate and controversial
measure won him not only the appreciation of his

70
collegues but also his first meed of general recognition
from his co-religionists all over India, who while still
regarding him a little outside the orthodox pale of Islam
were soon to seek his advice and guidance in their
political affairs.
Speaking on the financial aspect of Gokhale’s
Education Bill, Jinnah said: “If you have money, you will
get teachers; if you have money, you will get school
building. The real point is whether, you have got the
money or not… Now Sir, this is a very, very old story that
you have no money, and all that I can say is this- Find
money! Find money! Find money!
“I ask is it such an insurmountable difficulty to
get three crores of rupees from the Imperial Exchaquer?
Is it such a great, gigantic feat to be found for a country
like India, with its three hundred million people? I say
Sir, that there is nothing in the argument. I ask the
Government, I say, find the money-if necessary, tax the
people… You must remove the reproach that is justly
leveled against British rule, namely, the neglect of
elementary education… It is the duty of every civilized
Government to educate masses,”
Jinnah attended the annual meeting of the
Congress as well as the Council meeting of the Muslim
League both held in December 1912 at Bankipur. Jinnah
had not as yet formally joined the League, but he was
permitted to support the resolution that expanded the
League’s goals to include, the attainment of a system of
self-government suitable to India, to be brought about
through constitutional means, a steady reform of the
existing system of administration; by prompting national
unity and fostering public spirit among the people and by

71
cooperating with other communities for the said
purposes.
In April 1913, Gokhale and Jinnah sailed together
from Bombay for Liverpool to meet Lord Islington, Under
Secretary of State for India and Chairman of their Royal
Public Service Commission. Gokhale was then almost
forty-seven years old; Jinnah was thirty-six.
A Public meeting was held on 28th June 1913, at
the Caxton Hall, Westminster to discuss a scheme for the
establishment of a Central Association and that in
London for Indian students. Mr.H.N. Lall presided. The
following resolution was moved:
“This meeting of the Indian students in the United
Kingdom resolves that a central association be formed
with the following aims and objects: 1. To maintain and
foster unity, and to strengthen and encourage friendship
between the Indian students in the United Kingdom by
providing various opportunities for social intercourse and
interchange of thought and ideas by holding (a) debates
and discussions on various subjects of interest, (b) social
gatherings, (c) by acquiring a club-house. 2. Provided
that this association does not take any part in actual and
administrative politics.
Its aim was to remove restrictions imposed upon
Indians wishing to enter the Universities and Inns of
Court; also to acquire a central club-house in which the
students could meet, for debates and social functions.
Speaking on the resolution, Jinnah said: “…The
caste system-a system which; admirable though it might
have been when initiated, was now responsible for the
backwardness of their country. In England they had set
up a dozen such societies, but they lack one thing-a

72
central organization where they could meet together and
form friendship.
“The position of the Indian students in this
country was one without a parallel. They came to
England when between the ages of 18 and 23; they were
totally separated from their relatives and friends; they
were away from the influence of their elders; they had no
one to guide them. The Indian student class was typically
representative of the best the country could produce, and
their action and conduct were inflicted upon their
country at home. They were, so to speak, the custodians
of the reputation of India. Unfortunately just now, so far
as the British public was concerned, they had not a good
name. Instead of conducting themselves merely as
students and learning all they could of the civilization,
which the British people had taken centuries to build up
they had been tempted to use strong language and take
strong action in political questions….To take part in
politics would simply be to injure their position as
students.
“By communion with one another, by the
exchange of ideas, they would come better to understand
one another; they would get broader view, they would
widen their outlook, and fit themselves for the more
responsible duties which would fall on them when they
returned home. Today in India the men who were taking
the most active part in politics were men who were
educated in England and had returned home to serve
their country. The students of yesterday were the active
politicians of today.”
Concluding his speech, Jinnah said: “Students
must observe a high code of honour and morality; they

73
should abandon strong language and hysterical ideas,
become earnest workers and serious thinkers, and then
they could hope to go back home as great missionaries in
the cause of progress.”
On the eve of his departure for India, in the
autumn of 1913, at the express desire of his two friends
namely Maulana Mohmod Ali-Pan-Islamic scholar and
Editor of ‘Comrade.’ And Syed Wazir Hassan, Secretary of
the Muslim League then in England, Jinnah formally
enrolled himself as a member of the All India Muslim
League. However, his two friends were required to make a
solemn preliminary covenant that loyalty to the Muslim
League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at
no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger
national cause to which his life was dedicated.
(Mohmod Ali Jinnah: Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity by
Sarojini Naidu, pg 11)
Gokhale and Jinnah returned to India in
September 1913 and in December they went to attend
the Karachi session of the Congress. In this session,
Jinnah moved the following resolution:
“That this Congress is of the opinion that the
Council of the Secretary of State for India, as at present
constituted, should be abolished, and makes the
following suggestions for its construction”:
(a) That the salary for the Secretary of State
should be placed on the English estimates.
(b) That with a view to the efficiency and
independence of the Council it is expedient
that it should be partly nominated and
partly elected.

74
(c) That the total number of members of the
Council should not be less than nine.
(d) That the elected portion of the Council
should consist of not less than one-third of
the total number of members, who should
be non-official Indians chosen by a
constituency consisting of the elected
members of the Imperial and Provincial
Councils.
(e) That not less than 0ne-half of the
nominated portion of the Council should
consist of public men of merit and ability
unconnected with Indian administration.
(f) That the remaining portion of the
nominated Council should consist of
officials who have served in India for not
less than ten years and have not been away
from India for more than two years.
(g) That the character of the Council should be
advisory and not administrative.
(h) That the term of office of each member
should be five years.
The resolution was unanimously adopted
Jinnah made the All India Muslim League pass the
following resolution in 1913 itself:
“The All India Muslim League places on record its
firm belief that the future developments and the progress
of the people of India depended on the harmonious
working and co-operation of the various communities
and hopes that leaders of both sides will periodically
meet together to find a modus operandi for joint and
concerted action in question.”

75
(Jinnah & Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 23)
In the Karachi session of the congress, Bhupendra
Nath Basu moved a resolution thanking the Muslim
League for their above resolution. It was also decided on
the inspiration of Jinnah that both the Congress and the
League should hold their annual sessions at Bombay in
1915.
Jinnah’s position was now unique: he was a
member of the Imperial Legislative Council, a member of
the Congress and of the Muslim League, to whose
expanded outlook, he had contributed so signally by his
example.
From Karachi, Jinnah went to Agra, where the
Muslim League met on 3oth and 31st December 1913.
At the Agra session, Jinnah made an appeal to the
Muslim League to postpone reaffirmation of faith in the
principle of communal representation for another year,
urging his coreligionists that such special representation
would only divide India into two watertight
compartments.
The Muslim League, however, rejected Jinnah’s
appeal to them, considering the separate electorate
formula absolutely necessary to the League’s immediate
future.
In May 1914, Jinnah led a delegation to England,
to lay before the Secretary of State the views of the
Congress on the Council of India Bill, due for its first
reading in the House of Lords on May 25th. He repeated
and explained its terms to the members of both the
Houses of Parliament, at a breakfast-party given by Sir
William Wedderburn at the Westminster Palace Hotel.
The Bill was postponed after its second reading. Reacting

76
to the postponement of the Bill, Jinnah wrote in the
‘Times’: “India is perhaps the only member of the British
Empire without any real representation, and the only
civilized country in the world that has no system of
representative Government.”
Jinnah returned to India, empty-handed; and the
reforms he advocated had to wait. His compensation for
failure were personal: he had been listened to by officials
in Westminster, for the first time; he had been described
by Sir William Wedderburn as one of the gentlemen of
recognized position in the public life of India.
(Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 61)
Sarojini Naidu remarked that: “It was no small
compliment to Jinnah’s social as well as mental qualities
that he was chosen to be the spokesman of articulate
India before the British Parliament and the British
Public. The leading English Journals published
numerous interviews and his concise and lucid statement
of the Indian case, which appeared in the ‘London Times,’
attracted wide spread attention and comment.”
The tragic death of Gopal Krishna Gokhale in
February 1915 brought Hindus and Muslims close
together in a bond of common loss and sorrow. It was
keenly felt that the time was now ripe for a more direct
and definite rapprochement between the two great
communities that had so recently exchanged such cordial
expressions of goodwill and fellowship from afar.
The Indian National Congress was to hold its
session that year in Bombay. Jinnah supported at that
time by all the leading local Muslims, sent an invitation
to the All India Muslim League to hold its next annual
session in Bombay in December. About the situation

77
prevailing then, Sarojini Naidu said: “…That in an hour
of such grave and bitter crisis, calculated to shatter the
master-dream of Indian nationalism this dauntless
soldier (Jinnah) of unity rose to the heights of an
invincible patriotism. With a proud and splendid
indifference, to all personal suffering and sacrifice
heedless alike of all official dissuasion or disfavour, the
aggressive malice and machinations of his opponents or
even the temporary injustice of distant friends, Mohomed
Ali Jinnah strove with an incomparable devotion and
courage to create that supreme moment in our national
history which witnessed a birth of a new India, redeemed
and victorious in the love of her united children.”
The December 1915 sessions of Congress and the
Muslim League were the first held within walking
distance of one another, facilitating attendance at both
by members interested in fostering Hindu-Muslim unity
and hammering out a single nationalist platform.
The President-elect of the Congress was Lord
S.P.Sinha, and that of the League was Mr. Mazahar-ul-
Haque. There was so much communal cordiality at these
sessions of the Congress and the League that Maulana
Mahammad Ali humerously wrote: “So rapid has been
the progress of the Musalmans that a critic from among
their own community observed that Lord Sinha had
traveled by the same train as his Bihari neighbour and
brother lawyer who presided over the Muslim League,
and the two had borrowed one another’s presidential
addresses in order to compare notes. But the two
presidents forgot to take back their own productions, and
by an irony of fate Maulana Mazhar-ul-Haque had read
to his Muslim audience as his own the pungent oration

78
characteristic of the Bengalee, and Lord Sinha had done
likewise and read to the Congress delegates the cautious
and halting address of the ever loyal Muslim.”
(Jinnah by M.H.Saiyid, pg 120)
While reiterating Congress’s general major
demands for reform, Sinha focused on three specific
matters concerning which he had found practical
unanimity of opinion. The first called for army
commissions for qualified Indians and military training
for the people, the second for extension of local self-
government, and the third for development of commerce
and industries including agriculture.
Mazhar-ul-Haque argued: “It is said that our
object in holding the League contemporaneously with the
Congress in the same city is to deal a blow at the
independence of the League, and to merge its
individuality with that of the Congress. Nothing could be
farther from the truth. Communities like individuals’ love
and cherish their individuality. When unity is evolved out
of diversity, then there is a real and abiding national
progress.”
A number of members vehemently opposed the
rapprochement. Jinnah appealed to them saying: “We are
bound by our constitution. Reverence for and obedience
to that constitution, and discipline, are absolutely
necessary qualities to enable us to say that we are fit for
real political franchise, freedom and self-government. At
this juncture, we are watched not only by India, but by
the whole of the British Empire, of which we aspire to be
an independent, free and equal member. He asked, “Can
we not bury our differences-show a united front? It will
make our Hindu friends value us all the more and will

79
make them feel, more than ever, that we are worthy of
standing shoulder to shoulder with them.” However, his
appeal went on deaf ears and the meeting was required to
be adjourned and convened on 1st January 1916 in
Bombay’s Taj Mahal Hotel. On a call from Haque, Jinnah
moved a resolution to appoint a committee to formulate
and frame a scheme for reforms in consultation with
other political organizations, which would allow them to
demand a single platform of reforms in the name of
United India. The resolution was adopted and a
committee of seventy-five leaders of the Muslim League
was constituted under the Chairmanship of Raja of
Mahmudabad. Jinnah among others was a prominent
member of this committee. Before closing the meeting,
President Haque said that the entire Muslim community
of India owed a deep debt of gratitude to Jinnah, for
without his exertions they could not have met in
Bombay. In a unique tribute, the president then turned
to Jinnah, saying: “Mr. Jinnah, we the Musalmans of
India thank you.” It was the first such tribute, Jinnah
received from the Muslim League.
Bombay Provincial Conference-1916:
Bombay Provincial Conference was held in
Ahemdabad in October 1916 under the Presidentship of
Mohd Ali Jinnah. This was the sixteenth conference and
the first after Surat split. In his address, Jinnah at the
outset said that India no longer wishes to continue as the
subject race, or to put it in the words of Lord Hardinge,
“the trusty dependent,” but claims to be an equal partner
with the other members of the Empire. After dealing with
several important issues, Jinnah came to the all
absorbing question which had stirred India because of

80
the declaration of the “Entente Cordiale” between Hindus
and Muslims made in the city of Bombay last Christmas
and said:
“I believe all thinking men are thoroughly
convinced that the key-note of our real progress lies in
the goodwill, concord, harmony and cooperation between
the two great sister communities. The true focus of
progress is centered in their union and remember that
this is a matter which is entirely in our hands.
“Political future of the country depends on the
harmonious working and cooperation of the various
communities in the country which has been the
cherished ideal of the Congress. This conference most
heartily welcomes the hope expressed by the League that
the leaders of the different communities will make every
endeavour to find a modus operandi for joint and
concerted action on all questions of national good and
earnestly appeals to all the sections of the people to help
the object which we all have at heart.”
Inviting attention to the question of separate
electorates, Jinnah said: “The demand for separate
electorates is not a matter of policy but a matter of
necessity to the Mohamedans, who require to be aroused
from the coma and torpor into which they had fallen so
long. I would therefore appeal to my Hindu Brethren that
in the present state of position they should try to win the
confidence and trust of the Mohamedans who are, after
all, in the minority in the country. If they are determined
to have separate electorates, no resistance should be
shown to their demand… It is not a question of a few
more seats going to the Mohamedans or Hindus. It is a
question of transfer of power from the bureaucracy to

81
democracy. The Hindus and Mohamedans should stand
united and use every constitutional and legitimate means
to effect transfer as soon as possible. But for the real new
India to arise, all petty and small things must be given
up.”
In conclusion Jinnah told his audience: “Hindus
and Mahomedans united and firm, the voice of the three
hundred millions of people vibrating throughout the
length and breadth of the country, will produce a force
which no power on earth can resist… We are on a
straight road; the promised land is within sight.
“Forward” is the motto and clear course for Young India.
But in the onward march, we must be circumspect, and
never lose sight of the true perspective before us. And
Wisdom and Caution should be our watch-words.”
Lucknow Pact:
The Indian National Congress and the All India
Muslim League held their sessions in December 1916 at
Lucknow.
In pursuance of the resolution adopted in Bombay
session of the League and the Congress, the Reform
Committee met at Lucknow on 21st August 1916 to
consider a tentative scheme of reforms. Earlier
discussions were held at Allahabad from 22nd to 24th April
1916 at the residence of Pandit Motilal Nehru.
Motilal Nehru introduced Jinnah, “as unlike most
Muslims, is keen a nationalist as any of us…He is
showing his community the way to Hindu-Muslim unity.”
The proposals were then considered at a joint
meeting of the All India Congress Committee and the
Council of the Muslim League held in October and
November 1916 at Calcutta.

82
The scheme recommended by the Reform
Committee was then presented to the All India Congress
Committee in December 1916 at Lucknow with the
following speech from Surendra Nath Banerjee, who had
chaired the Committee:
“I had the honour of presiding over the
deliberations of the Conference and I will say this, on
behalf of the representatives of the Congress and the
Muslim League, that throughout they exhibited a spirit of
compromise, of sweet reasonableness, which, to my
mind, constitutes the most valuable qualification for self
Government. The spirit of compromise was conspicuous
in our deliberations. The scheme is before you, and it is a
crowning testimony to the growing unity of feeling
between Hindus and Muslims. Today the leaders of the
Mohamedan community have joined the Congress. Three
cheers for them. They have received us with open arm…”
Congress President announced: “The Hindus and
Muslims have agreed to make a united demand for self-
Government. The All-India Congress Committee and the
representatives of the Muslim League have in one voice
resolved to make a joint demand for a representative
Government in India.”
Jinnah in his presidential address to the Muslim
League said: “Our joint Conferences in Lucknow were
marked by honest efforts on either side to find a lasting
solution of our differences, and I rejoice to think that a
final settlement has at last been reached which sets the
seal on Hindu-Muslim co-operation and opens a new era
in the history of our country. A few irreconcilable spirits
in either camp may still exist here and there, but the
atmosphere has on the whole been rid of the menace of

83
sectarian thunder and the prospects of the future are
bright with a promise that gladdens, the hearts of India’s
devoted sons.”
Concluding his address, Jinnah said: “Towards the
Hindus our attitude should be of good-will and brotherly
feelings. Cooperation in the cause of our Motherland
should be our guiding principle. India’s real progress can
only be achieved by a true understanding and
harmonious relations between the two great sister
communities… We should remove the root causes and
the evil effects of the process of disintegration. We should
maintain a sustained loyalty to and cooperation with
each other. We should sink personal differences and
subordinate personal ambitions to the well-being of the
community. We must recognize that no useful purpose is
served in petty disputes and in forming party
combinations. We must show by our words and deeds
that we sincerely and earnestly desire a healthy national
unity. For, the rest of seventy millions of Musalmans
need not fear.”
Jinnah ultimately said: “The Renaissance of India
really lies in our own hands. Let us work and trust to
God so that we may leave a richer heritage to our
children than all the gold of the world, viz. Freedom for
which no sacrifice is too great.”
The “Lucknow sessions of the Indian National
Congress and the Muslim League ended with the
Congress-League Agreement, which came to be known
as, “Lucknow Pact.” M.R.Jayakar described the hopeful
atmosphere it created as follows:
“The achievement of the Lucknow Pact was a
memorable event. It showed that the Hindus and

84
Muslims could unite to make a common political demand
on the British Government. Vital concessions were made
to Muslim sentiments. Confining our attention to the
three main demands of the Muslims, viz., separate
electorates, extent of Muslim representations and
safeguards, the Pact conceded that adequate provision
should be made for the representation of important
minorities by election and Muslims should be
represented through special electorates.”
Pandit Jagatnarayan said: “The joint conference of
the Congress and the League marked a great step
forward in our political evolution and disclosed a
substantial identity of views between Hindus and
Muslims.”
Tilak, Jinnah and Annie Besant emerged as
architects of the “Lucknow Pact.” It was a matter of
surprise to many that Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak
himself played a prominent role in bringing about the
Pact between the Hindus and Muslims.
Once again in December 1917, when the sessions
of the All India Muslim League and the Indian National
Congress were held in Calcutta, Jinnah played a unique
role of the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity by
supporting the resolution on the Congress-League
scheme and self-Government in both the organizations as
a member of both. In his speech, Jinnah said:
“It is said that we are going on at a tremendous
speed, that we are a minority and that it might
afterwards become a Hindu Government. I want to give
an answer to that. I particularly wish to address my
Muslim friends on this point. Do you think, in the first
instance, as to whether it is possible that this country

85
could become a Hindu Government? Do you think that
the Government could be conducted by ballot boxes? Do
you think that because the Hindus are in majority,
therefore, they would carry on measure in the Legislative
Assembly and there is end of it? If seventy millions of
Muslims do not approve of a measure, which is carried
by a ballot box, do you think that it could be enforced
and administered in this country? Do you think that the
Hindu statesmen, with their intellect, with their past
history, would ever think of-when they get self-
Government-enforcing a measure by ballot box? Then
what is there to fear? This is a boggy, which is put before
you by your enemies to frighten you, to scare you away,
from the co-operation with Hindus, which is essential for
the establishment of self-Government. If this country is
not to be governed by the Hindus, let me tell you in the
same spirit, it was not to be governed by the Muslims
either and certainly not by the English. It is to be
governed by the people and the sons of this country and I
stand here-I believe that I am voicing the feelings of the
whole of India-say that what we demand is the immediate
transfer of the substantial power of Government of this
country and that is the principle demand of our scheme
of reforms…”
The Congress, which was holding its session in the
same city reciprocated in full the sentiments expressed
by the Muslim League. Babu Ambica Charan Mazumdar,
the president of the Congress remarked:
“The Congress and the League have come to meet
at the same place and the day may not be far distant
when, in spite of the siren song, which so far diverted
their course, they will come to meet in the same pavilion

86
and at the same time.” He further said: “The stock
argument based upon occasional differences and
disturbances between Hindus and Musalmans cannot
have much force. These are confined to mostly lower
classes of people on either side.”
Recommendations of joint conference of the
Congress and the League were adopted in the form of
joint scheme for reforms, and were submitted to the
Government.
Events of those days showed that the League and
the Congress though different in body were one in soul. A
joint meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim
League and All India Congress Committee was held in
Bombay on 27th and 28th July 1917. It decided to send a
deputation to London consisting of the members of the
Congress and the League. It also resolved that a petition
be submitted to the Parliament in support of the scheme
of Reforms adopted by the Congress and the Muslim
League.
Rowlett Bills:
As a sequel to the recommendations of the Rowlett
Committee, two Bills were introduced in the Imperial
Legislative Council in early 1919. One of the Bills was a
temporary measure intended to deal with the situation
arising from the expiry of the Defence of India Act. The
second Bill was intended to introduce permanent
changes in the ordinary criminal law of the land. Both
the Bills brought countrywide agitation. Gandhi issued a
statement from Sabarmati Ashram in which he said: “The
Bills are unjust, subversive of principles of liberty and
justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of
individuals on which the safety of the community, as a

87
whole and the State itself is based.” Gandhi further said:
“In the event of these Bills becoming law and until they
are withdrawn, we shall refuse to obey these laws and
launch Satyagraha-Civil Disobedience Movement.”
When the Bill was tabled on 6th February 1919,
Jinnah warned: “… To substitute the Executive for the
Judicial will lead to the abuse of these vast powers…
There was no precedent or parallel in the legal history of
any civilized country to the enactment of such laws. …
This was the most inopportune moment for this
legislation as high hopes about momentous reforms had
been raised…If these measures were passed they will
create unprecedented discontent, agitation and will have
the most disastrous effect upon the relations between the
Government and the people.
Jinnah’s warning fell on deaf ears. Despite the
unanimous opposition of all 22 Indian members on the
Council, the Bill was passed into law in March 1919.
Jinnah wrote to Chelmsford: “By passing this Bill
Your Excellency’s Government have actively negatived
every argument they advanced but a year ago when they
appealed to India for help at the War Conference and
have ruthlessly trampled upon the principles for which
Great Britain avowedly fought the war. The fundamental
principles of justice have been uprooted and the
constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a
time when there is no real danger to the State, by an
over-fretfull and incompetent bureaucracy which is
neither responsible to the people nor in touch with real
public opinion. I, therefore, as a protest against the
passing of the Bill and the manner in which it was
passed tender my resignation. For, I feel that under the

88
prevailing conditions I can be of no use to my people in
the Council nor consistently with one’s self-respect is
cooperation possible with a Government that shows such
utter disregard for the opinion of the representatives of
the people in the Council Chamber, and for the feelings
and the sentiments of the people outside. In my opinion,
Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times
of peace forfeits its claim to be called a civilized
Government and I still hope that the Secretary of State
for India, Mr. Montagu, will advise His Majesty to signify
his disallowance to this Black Act.
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 61, 62)
Gandhi fixed 6th of April as the day of All India
Hartal-Strike. Public response was overwhelming, but it
did not remain non-violent at all places. Government
replied with bullets.
General Michael O’ Dyer ordered to open fire on
the people who had gathered in Jalianwala Bagh. About
500 persons were killed and over a thousand were
wounded. The wounded were left to suffer through out
the night without water to drink, without medical
attendance or without aid of any character. General Dyer
in his evidence before the Hunter Commission appointed
by the Government to enquire into the massacre, said
that he deliberately acted in the way he did to create a
moral effect from a military point of view, not only on
those who were present, but more specially through out
Punjab.
Government held Gandhi and his Satyagrah-
Passive Resistance directly responsible for all
disturbances and mishaps and gave a stern warning to
him to withdraw his movement.

89
Gandhi declared to suspend the Satyagrah and
proclaimed three days fast and also made an appeal to
people to undergo a similar fast for a day.
Royal Proclamation:
Towards the end of the year, the annual session of
the Indian National Congress was held at Amritsar with
Pandit Motilal Nehru as its president. Two days before
the commencement of the session, a Royal Proclamation
was issued on 24th December 1919, announcing new
Reforms, known as Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.
In the Amritsar session of the Congress, Gandhi
moved a resolution in which he said: “…On the question
of the propriety of obstruction I say that Indian culture
demands that we shall trust the man who extends the
hand of fellowship. The King Emperor has extended the
hand of fellowship and if he has done so we do not reject
the advance. Tell Mr. Montagu and all the officials of the
bureaucracy, we are going to trust you…”
While seconding the resolution, Jinnah said: “...I
ask you, do you object to work the Reforms so as to make
the establishment of full responsible Government as early
as possible? (Cries of No, No) Then why not say so? I,
therefore, say that Mahatma Gandhi does not propose to
do anything more than what this house has expressed
over and over again –that we must work the Reforms
Act.”
It is to be particularly noted that, along with the
Congress, the Muslim League, the Khilafat and the
Jamait-ul-ulema held their sessions simultaneously in
Amritsar. The resolution passed by the Muslim League
was on the lines adopted by the Congress.
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Mazumdar, pg 48,49)

90
Non-Cooperation Program:
Non-cooperation Program of Gandhi was started
st
on 1 August 1920. While presenting the non-
cooperation program, Gandhi said: “The days of
deputations and memorials were over. We must withdraw
all support from the Government and this alone would
persuade the Government to come to the terms. He
suggested that all Government titles should be returned,
law courts and educational institutions should be
boycotted, Indians should resign from the services and
refuse to take any part in the newly constituted
legislatures.”
(India Wins Freedom by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, pg 10)
In September 1920, All India Muslim League and
Indian National Congress both met at Calcutta in special
sessions under the presidentship of Jinnah and Lala
Lajpat Rai respectively.
Jinnah in his address said: “…One thing there is
which is indisputable, and that is that this Government
must go and give place to a completely responsible
Government. Meetings of the Congress and the Muslim
League will not effect this. We shall have to think out
some course more effective than passing resolutions of
disapproval to be forwarded to the Secretary of State for
India. And we shall surely find a way, even as France and
Italy did-and the new-born Egypt has. We are not going
to rest content until we have attained the fullest political
freedom in our own country.”
Jinnha further said: “ Mr. Gandhi has placed his
program of non-cooperation, supported by Khilafat
Conference before the country. The operations of this
program will strike at the individual in each of you, and

91
therefore, it rests with you alone to measure your
strength and to weigh the pros and cons of the question
before you arrive at decision. But once you have decided
to march, let there be no retreat under any
circumstances.”
(Mohammad Ali Jinnah by Matlabul Hasan Saiyid, pg 258 and
Muslim India by Mohammad Noman, pg 215-216)
Towards the close of the year 1921, a bid was
made by the Government to enlist the cooperation of
those who had been out of the non-cooperation
movement. Jinnah issued a statement to the press in
which he said: “The non-cooperation movement is only a
symptom and expression of general dissatisfaction, owing
to the utter disregard of public opinion and of
outstanding grievances. Every country has got an
extreme section of opinion but it will be impossible for
that section to make any headway if the bulk of the
people are satisfied. And my reading of the Indian
situation is that, leave alone the bulk of the people, even
intellectual and reasonable section is far from satisfied
with the present policy of the Government.”
Soon after Nagpur session, as a result of the
agitation started by Gandhi, Titles were renounced by a
few. Attempts were made to close down schools and
colleges. Law Courts were boycotted at some places.
Some lawyers gave up their practice. A number of
graduates tore up their degrees. Government servants
resigned their posts. Mob fury came into vogue. The
arrest of Ali Brothers at Karachi added fuel to the fire.
The communal riots became order of the day.
All Parties Conference was convened in the middle
of January 1922 at Bombay, with Sir M.Visesvaryya as

92
the Chairman and Jinnah, Jayakar and Natrajan as
Secretaries. This conference condemned the Government
policy of repression, and advised the Congress to
abandon the resolution passed at Bardoli, which
contemplated the inauguration of Civil Disobedience. It
also recommended to the Government to convene a
Round Table Conference.
Gandhi, however, considered the idea of a Round
Table Conference for devising a scheme of full Swaraj
premature. He argued that India has not yet proved her
strength. Two weeks later, however, the fatal immolation
of 22 Indian Police-men in the Chuari Chaura police
station by a mob convinced Gandhi that Indians were not
yet ready for a non-violent movement. Early in February
of 1922, he suspended the movement and said: “God has
been abundantly kind to me. He has warned me the third
time that there is not as yet in India that truthful and
non-violent atmosphere which and which alone can
justify mass disobedience which can be at all described
as civil, which means gentle, truthful, humble knowing,
willful yet loving, never criminal and hateful…God spoke
clearly through Chauri Chaura.”
The year 1923 was the blackest as regards riot,
because of the Tanzeem, Tableegh, Sanghtan and
Shuddhi movements in operation. Gandhi appealed to
Hindus and Muslims to maintain communal harmony. A
Hindu conference was held in Delhi. At the same time,
Muslim League met in Lahore under the presidentship of
Jinnah, who in his address said: “There is a fearless and
persistent demand that the steps must be taken for
immediate establishment of Dominion Responsible
Government in India. The ordinary man in the street has

93
found his political consciousness and realized that self-
respect and honor of the country demand that the
Government of the country should not be in the hands of
any one else except the people of the country... We must
not forget that one essential requisite condition to
achieve SWARAJ is the political unity between the
Hindus and Muslims, for, the advent of foreign rule and
its continuation in India is primarily due to the fact that
the people of India, particularly Hindus and Muslims are
not united and do not sufficiently trust each other. The
domination of the bureaucracy will continue so long as
Hindus and Muslims do not come to a settlement… India
will get Dominion Responsible Government, the day
Hindus and Muslims are united. Swaraj is almost
interchangeable term with Hindu-Muslim unity. If we
wish to be free people, let us unite, but if we wish to
continue slaves of bureaucracy, let us fight amongst
ourselves and gratify petty vanity over petty matters,
Englishmen being our arbiters.”
Gandhi just released commented: “I agree with Mr.
Jinnah that Hindu-Muslim unity means Swaraj.”
In November 1923, Jinnah was elected to the
Central Legislative Council unopposed. His plea, before
the election, was moderate. He said: “I have no desire to
seek any post or position or title from the Government.
My sole object is to serve the cause of the country as best
as I can.
(Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 88)
On the eve of the special session of the Muslim
League held at Lahore in May 1924, Jinnah issued a
statement in which he said: “The object of holding the

94
session is to concentrate the united Muslim Opinion with
regard to:
1. The question of the amendment of the
constitution of India. 2. To bring about a
friendly understanding in the Punjab in
particular, where owing to certain causes,
which seem insignificant, a great deal of
misunderstanding has been created between
Hindus and Mohamedans; and 3. To bring
about, in due course, through and by means of
the All India Muslim League organization once
more a complete settlement between Hindus
and Muslims as was done in 1916.
Jinnah in his statement further said: “The League
is not in any way going to adopt a policy or program
which will, in the least degree as far as I can judge, be
antagonistic to the Indian National Congress. On the
contrary, I believe it will proceed on lines which are best
calculated to further general national interests, not
forgetting the particular interests of the Muslim
community.”
Jinnah in his presidential address emphasized
that, “One essential requisite condition to achieve Swaraj
is the political unity between Hindus and Muslims. I am
almost inclined to say that India will get Dominion
Responsible Government, the day the Hindus and
Muslims are united.” He further declared that the main
task before he League was to see that an atmosphere of
fraternity is created in the country between various
elements in order that a joint scheme of constitution is
once again formulated as it was done in 1916 at
Lucknow.

95
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 107)
The League also appointed a special committee
headed by Jinnah to frame a scheme for a constitution
for the Government of India. The League further resolved
to cooperate in establishing conciliatory boards on which
members of all communities could meet regularly to
resolve communal differences and try to alleviate causes
of conflict. A resolution was also moved deploring the
scandalous state of disorganization existing among
Muslims in all spheres of life, which not only prevents all
healthy interchange of ideas and cooperation for the good
of the community, but also seriously handicaps the
Muslims in shouldering their proper share of
responsibility in the national struggle for progress and
self-Government.
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 83)
The above course of action of Jinanh shows that
he was in a conciliatory mood and was anxious for a
complete settlement between Hindus and Muslims as
was done in 1916. But, unfortunately, Mr. Mohammad
Ali did a very imprudent thing. He issued a statement to
the press in which he ridiculed the League and its new
leader. Jinnah was deeply hurt but did not lose his
balance. In reply, he issued an appeal to the Hindus to
consider his proposal on its merits. He concluded his
appeal in the following words:
“In conclusion, I would appeal to my Hindu
friends not to be carried away by the antics of
Mohammad Ali. I am not, as is well known, one of those
who are enamoured of separate electorates and separate
representation. But the Muslim opinion is so strong on
this question that we might take it as a settled fact for

96
the time being. On that basis the Muslims should have
an adequate and effective representation, wherever they
are in minority. The percentage, the ratio on the
population can only be fixed by mutual good will and
consent, in order to secure success of any scheme that
may come in force for representation of the Municipalities
and the Legislatures. I, therefore, hope that the Hindus
will not misunderstand me, as I still stand as a tried
nationalist and if the Muslims are ought to be organized
it is not with a view to prejudicing national advance, or
national interest, but on the contrary, to bring them into
line with the rest of India.”
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 108)
All Parties Conference was convened at Bombay in
November 1924. Jinnah made it clear that he has not
come to the conference to say what the Musalmans
wanted, but he was there to sit with the Hindus as a co-
worker and he appealed to all to put their heads together
not as Hindus or Muslims but as Indians. He further
appealed that the dispute between the Hindus and the
Muslims was a question, which had been a terrible
monster in the way of country’s progress. It was not for
the Hindus or Muslims alone to ask what they wanted, it
was up to every one to try and find a solution to the
question. Without removing this terrible obstacle, they
could not make any progress in any direction.”
Concluding his speech, Jinnah said: “We have come in a
spirit of meeting you as friends, and as responsible men
who occupy eminent and representative position in their
respective communities, let us put our heads together.”

97
On the floor of the Central Assembly in 1925, Jinnah
said: “I am a nationalist first, a nationalist second and a
nationalist last.”
(Eight Lives by Rajmohan Gandhi, pg 138)
Jinnah was again elected to the Central Legislative
Assembly in November 1926. In March 1927, at Delhi,
Jinnah and other Muslim leaders set down their
proposals for representation in the various Legislatures
in any future scheme of constitution. Their good faith
towards Hindus was shown by their willingness to give to
Hindu minorities in the predominantly Muslim provinces,
the same concessions that Hindu majorities in other
provinces are prepared to make to the Muslim minorities.
In May, there was a hope that Jinnah might have
his way, when the Committee of Congress agreed to his
proposals for Muslim representation. But these local
affairs were overshadowed, in November 1927, by an
announcement of Simon Commission.
(Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 90)
Simon Commission:
In November 1927, His Majesty’s Government
announced the appointment of Simon Commission
consisting of all the seven English members to suggest
reforms to be given to India. The exclusion of Indians
from the membership of the Commission was widely
resented in the country. No important section of the
Indian opinion was prepared to cooperate with the
Commission, who were derisively described as the Simon
Seven. Even leaders of moderate opinion like Sir Tej
Bahadur Sapru, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, and Jinnah
declined to do anything with them. Jayakar, who met the
Viceroy on 5th November 1927, told him frankly that it

98
was impossible for him to co-operate with the
Commission except on honourable terms. Speaking in
the Legislative Assembly on 16th February 1928, Jayakar
said: “…I say that the door is left open even now. The
Government must not imagine that the door will be kept
open for long. What is possible today will not be possible
tomorrow… We reject the statement of John Simon
because it is not a bona fide statement.” On 18th
February, the Legislative Assembly passed a resolution
amidst scenes of great excitement, placing on record its,
entire lack of confidence in the foreign investigators.
Supporting the Congress resolution to ignore the
Commission, Dr. Annie Besant declaed: “Let us say: ‘you
have said that no Indian shall sit on the Commission. We
say: Let no Englishman judge India’s fitness. Our honour
is our own.’” Speaking in the Legislative Assembly on 16th
February 1928, Lala Lajpat Rai said that he had no faith
in the bona fides of those who had appointed the
Commission. It was a foreign body, which had come to
India to function as both jury and judge. Attacking the
British Government’s policy, he said: “I say the
Government and the Anglo-Indian mercantile community
have absolutely no intention to leave us.”
(M.R.Jayakar by V.B.Kulkarni, pg 171-172)
The Muslim League, was however, divided over the
Simon Commission issue. A small group mostly from the
Punjab, lined up behind ex-Law Minister Shafi met in
Lahore, where they voted to welcome and cooperate with
the Commission. Most members of the League’s council,
however, joined the ‘Jinnah Group,’ in Calcutta on
December 30, 1927, and New Year’s Day, 1928. Annie
Besant and Sarojini Naidu attended as honoured guests

99
and the Aga Khan was to have presided, but he withdrew
at the last moment. Maulvi Mohamad Yakub took his
place and delivered his presidential address extempore in
Urdu. The most important resolution, carried by
acclamation, declared emphatically that the Statutory
Commission and the procedure, as announced, are
unacceptable to the people of India. It (the Jinnah
League) therefore, resolves that the Musalmans through
out the country should have nothing to do with the
Simon Commission at any stage or in any form. Jinnah
was reelected permanent president of the League for
another three years. He declared:
“A constitutional war has been declared on Great
Britain. Negotiations for a settlement are not to come
from our side. Let the Government sue for peace. We are
denied equal partnership. We will resist the new doctrine
to the best of our power. Jalianwala Bagh was a physical
butchery, the Simon Commission is a butchery of our
souls. By appointing an exclusively white Commission,
Lord Birkenhead has declared our unfitness for self-
Government. I welcome Pandit Malviya and I welcome the
hand of fellowship extended to us by Hindu leaders from
the platform of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha.
For, to me, this offer is more valuable than any
concession, which the British Government can make. Let
us then grasp the hand of fellowship. This is indeed a
bright day; and for achieving this unity, thanks are due
to Lord Birkenhead.
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 90)
Immediately after Calcutta, Jinnah returned to
Bombay to organize the boycott of Simon Commission.
He chaired the local boycott committee, and his assistant

100
Chagla, was its secretary. “I must say,” Chagla recalled,
“Jinnah was as firm as a rock as far as the question of
the boycott of the Simon Commission was concerned.
Proposals were made that the boycott should be only
political and not social. Jinnah would not agree and did
not give an inch. He said boycott was a boycott, and it
must be total and complete.
Birkenhead had briefed Simon on the eve of his
departure from London; he wrote to remind Viceroy Irwin
the next day: “We have always relied on the non-
boycotting Moslems; on the depressed community; on the
business interests; and on many others, to break down
the attitude of boycott. You and Simon must be the
judges whether or not it is expedient in these directions
to try to make a breach in the wall of antagonism.”
Officialdom cracked down with a vengeance as the
nationwide boycott proved more effective than
Birkenhead dreamed it would be.
Jinnah’s role in this boycott was underscored by
Birkenhead’s singling him out as the leader to be
undermined. “I should advice Simon to see at all stages
important people who are not boycotting the
Commission,” Birkenhead urged Irwin, “particularly
Moslems and depressed classes. I should widely advertise
his interviews with representative Moslems.” He then
announced, as put into writing by a British official, the
“whole policy” of divide et impera, advising that Simon’s
“obvious” goal was “to terrify the immense Hindu
population by the apprehension that the Commission is
being got hold of by the Moslem support, and leaving
Jinnah high and dry.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 92-93)

101
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 111)
In the All India National Convention held at
Calcutta, three chief speakers were Sir Tej Bahadur
Sapru, Mr. M.R.Jayakar and Mr. Jinnah representing
three different points of view.
Jinnah while expressing his views said: “…Hindus
and Muslims should march together until our object is
attained. Therefore, it is essential that you must get not
only the Muslim League, but the Musalmans of India and
here I am not speaking as a Musalman but as an Indian.
And it is my desire to see that we get seven crores of
Musalmans to march along with us in the struggle for
freedom.”
Jinnah then drew the attention of the Convention
to the constitutional developments of Canada and Egypt.
The minorities, he said, were always afraid of majorities.
The majorities, particularly the religious majorities, were
apt to be tyrannical and oppressive. The minorities,
therefore, had a right to be absolutely secured. He further
proceeded as follows:
“These are big questions and they can be settled
by the exercise of the highest order of statesmanship and
political wisdom. I, therefore, ask you once more to
consider this question most carefully before you decide.
Please do not think that in anything that I have said I am
threatening any party and I hope that I shall not be
misunderstood: If you do not settle this question today,
we shall have to settle it tomorrow, but in the meantime
our national interests are bound to suffer. We are all
sons of this land. We have to live together, we have to
work together and whatever our differences may be, let
us not, at any rate, create more bad blood. If we cannot

102
agree, let us at any rate agree to differ, but let us part as
friends. Believe me that there is no progress for India
until the Musalmans and Hindus are united, and let no
logic, philosophy or squabble stand in the way of coming
to a compromise and nothing will make me more happy
than to see a Hindu-Muslim union.”
(Jinnah by M.H.Saiyid, pg 434-435)
This was a speech worthy of the Ambassador of
Hindu-Muslim Unity. It was a superb effort on his part
and he put his whole heart into it. But the speech was
not well received by the Hindu and the Sikh sections of
the audience. Following the line of argument of Mr.
Jinnah, the Sikhs also made extreme demands, while the
Hindu Mahasabha delegates refused to make any further
concessions beyond what had already been conceded in
the Nehru Report. He was also not well treated by a
section of the Congress side of the audience who shouted
that Jinnah represented only a section of Musalmans,
who were communal-minded, and the undue importance
should not be given to him. Jinnah returned from the
meeting of the convention with a deep wound in his
heart.
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 112-113)
Jamshed Nusserwanjee, a friend of Jinnah said:
“…Jinnah left Calcutta by train, and I went to see him
off. He was standing at the door of his first-class coupe
compartment, and he took my hand. He had tears in his
eyes as he said, Jamshed, this is the parting of the
ways.”

******

103
CREATOR OF PAKISTAN

Beginning of differences:
Home Rule League:

The Home Rule League was founded by Mrs Annie


Besant on 3rd September 1916 with herself as President.
Under her able leadership the Home Rule movement
spread like wild fire. She issued a strong statement for
Indian Home Rule at the Cuddalore Political Conference.
Lord Pentland, who was then Governor of Madras sent for
her and asked her to leave India. She refused. There
upon in June 1917, she was interned under the orders of
the Madras Government. Mrs Besant’s internment stirred
the whole of India, the Hindus and the Muslims alike.
Jinnah, out of sympathy for Besant joined the
Home Rule League as its President with M.R.Jayakar as
its Secretary. In his message as the President of the
Home Rule League Jinnah said: “My message to the
Musalmans is to join hands with your Hindu brethren.
My message to the Hindus is to lift your backward
brother up. In that spirit let the foundation of the Home
Rule League be consecrated and there is nothing for us to
fear.”
In a crowded mass meeting held under the
auspices of the Bombay Association on 30th July 1917,
Jinnah spoke as follows:

104
“…We protest against the internment of Mrs.
Besant and her co-workers not only on principle but also
because it is an attempt to intern Home Rule or self-
Government scheme framed and adopted co-jointly by
the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim
League at Lucknow. We declare that we stand by that
scheme unswervingly and unflinchingly, and we shall do
all that lies in our power for its realization at the close of
the war…” At this time Gandhi’s reputation as a public
worker was at its peak. Jinnah in one of the meetings of
the Home Rule League proposed Gandhi’s name to be its
president. Jayakar as the Secretary of the Home Rule
League was sceptic about the fitness of Gandhi to be its
president and therefore, he wrote a letter to Gandhi in
which he said: “It is not impossible that you will demand
from us before long a change in our objects and aims,
even try to secure in our creed a place for some of your
pet theories, which many of us may be inclined to regard
as fantastic fads.”
Gandhi, in his reply to Jayakar said: “A great deal
of what you say appeals to me, though I am disturbed by
your description as ‘fads’ of some of my theories. May I
tell you that the only ‘fad’ on which I would insist, if I
ultimately decided to join your League, would be a
common language for India, to be found in one of the
vernaculars of the country and the gospel of Swadeshi.
You need have no apprehension that any other theories
of mine your League will be called upon to accept.”
(Story of My Life by M.R. Jayakar, Vol. I, pg 318)
Jayakar considered Gandhi’s assurance as enough
to satisfy him and his collegues in the Home Rule League

105
and allowed Gandhi to join the Home Rule League and
become its president.
After assuming the Presidentship of the League,
Gandhi called a general meeting of the members to
change the name and creed of the League. He proposed
to change the name of the Home Rule League to that of
Swarajya Sabha. Jinnah and some other members
opposed Gandhi’s proposal. But, Gandhi as Chairman of
the meeting, overruled their objections and declared: “It
was open to any member, be he a life member or
otherwise, to resign his membership if he thought he
could not remain a member of the Swarajya Sabha under
its altered constitution.”
In protest of Gandhi’s arbitrary action in changing
the name and creed of the Home Rule League Jinnah,
Jayakar, K.M.Munshi, Mangaldas Pakvasa, Jamnadas
Dwarkadas, Nagindas Master and thirteen others
resigned from the Home Rule League.
Gandhi wrote to Jinnah requesting him to
reconsider his resignation to take his share in the new
life that opened up before the country, and benefit the
country by his experience and guidance. Jinnah turned
down Gandhi’s request through his letter in which he
said:
“I thank you for your kind suggestion offering me
to take my share in the new life that has opened up
before the country. If by new life you mean your methods
and your program, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I
am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster. But the
actual new life that has opened up before the country is
that we are faced with a Government that pays no heed
to the grievances, feelings and sentiments of the people;

106
that our own countrymen are divided; the Moderate Party
is still going wrong; that your methods have already
caused split and division in every institution that you
have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the
country not only amongst Hindus and Hindus and
Muslims and Muslims and even between fathers and
sons; people generally are desperate all over the country
and your extreme program has for the moment struck
the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and
the ignorant and illiterate. All this means complete
disorganization and chaos. What the consequence of this
may be, I shudder to contemplate; but I for one am
convinced that the present policy of the Government is
the primary cause of it all and unless that cause is
removed, the effects must continue. I have no voice or
power to remove the cause; but at the same time I do not
wish my countrymen to be dragged to the brink of a
precipice in order to be shattered.”
Jinnah further said: “The only way for the
nationalists is to unite and work for a program, which is
universally acceptable for the early attainment of
complete responsible Government. Such a program
cannot be dictated by any single individual, but must
have the approval and support of all the prominent
nationalist leaders in the country.”
This was the beginning of the differences between
Jinnah and Gandhi, which kept on widening with every
passing day.
Congress-League Sessions at Nagpur:
The annual sessions of the Indian National
Congress and the All India Muslim League were held in
December 1920 at Nagpur.

107
Gandhi first moved his resolution at a meeting of
the subject committee proposing “the attainment of
Swaraj by the people of India by all legitimate and
peaceful means.” Jinnah immediately objected that it was
impractical and dangerous to dissolve the British
connection without greater preparation for independence,
but Gandhi argued: “I do not for one moment suggest
that we want to end the British connection at all costs
unconditionally. If the British connection is for the
advancement of India we do not want to destroy it… I
know before we have done with this great battle on which
we have embarked, we have to go probably, possibly,
through a sea of blood, but let it not be said of us that we
are guilty of shedding blood, but let it be said by
generations yet to be born that we suffered, that we shed
not somebody’s blood but our own; and so I have no
hesitation in saying that I do not want to show much
sympathy for those who had their heads broken or who
were said to be even in danger of losing their lives. What
does it matter?”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 71)
Jinnah argued as best he could against the
resolution but was shouted as well as voted down.
“Bombay Chronicle” wrote an editorial on the
incidence in which it was said: “…The whole atmosphere
changed suddenly and when the question was put to the
house, fifty thousand of the audience recorded their
approval, but out of this vast assemblage, there was only
one tall, thin man who had the courage to stand up to
signify his dissent. Every one was astonished. Col.
Wedgwood, who attended the Congress as a fraternal
delegate of the Labour Party of England, exclaimed that

108
India was capable of producing at least one man who had
the strength of character enough to stand by his
conviction in the face of a huge opposition and no
support whatsoever. This man of steel nerves was no
other than Mohamad Ali Jinnah. He believed that the
religious frenzy with which the whole political
atmosphere was charged and which governed all spheres
of activity would ultimately result in confusion, and
would do more harm than good to India in general and to
Muslims in particular, and therefore he remained aloof
from the movement.”
(Mohamad Ali Jinnah by Matlubul Hassan Saiyid, pg 264-268)
“Times of India reported: “Jinnah alone rose and
demanded to be heard in opposition, striding to the dais.
Mr Jinnah with the usual smile on his face mounted the
platform with ease suggestive of self-confidence and the
conviction of the man, and opposed in an argumentative,
lucid and clear style, the change of creed... He was
howled down with cries of ‘shame, shame,’ and ‘political
imposter.’ Even in this atmosphere, Jinnah continued to
say, “At the moment the destinies of the country are in
the hands of Gandhi. Therefore, standing on this
platform, knowing as I do that he commands the majority
in this assembly, I appeal to him to pause, to cry halt
before it is too late.”
Sir Chimanlal Setalvad in his ‘Recollections and
Reflections, says: “Jinnah strongly opposed the change
and boldly stood his ground in spite of violent opposition
from a large part of the audience. After this, Jinnah
parted with Congress.”
Jawaharlal Nehru described the departure of
Jinnah from the Congress in the following words:

109
“A few old leaders, however, dropped out of the
Congress and among those a popular and well-known
figure was that of Mr. M.A.Jinnah. Sarojini Naidu called
him Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity, and he had
been largely responsible in the past for bringing the
Muslim League nearer to Congress. But new
developments in the Congress-Non Cooperation and the
new constitution which made it more of a popular and
mass organization-were thoroughly disapproved by him.
He disagreed on political grounds. Temperamentally he
did not fit in at all with the new Congress. He felt
completely out of his element in the Khadi-clad crowed
demanded speeches in Hindustani. The enthusiasm of
the people outside struck him as mob-hysteria.
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 78-79)
Stanley Wolpert in his book, ‘Jinnah of Pakistan,’
at page 72 says: “ It was the most bitterly humiliating
experience of his (Jinnah) public life. He left Central India
with Ruttie by the next train, the searing memory of his
defeat at Nagpur permanently emblazoned on his brain.
Whatever hopes he had of National leadership were
buried that day. Gandhi had scaled the heights of
political popularity; Jinnah plummeted over the precipice
to a new low, reviled by fellow-Muslim Khilafat leaders
even more than by Mahatma’s devoutest Hindu disciples.
Shaukat Ali hated him and made no secret of his
sentiments wherever he went.”
Wolpert further says: “Though he had presided
over the Muslim League only three months earlier,
Jinnah did not even bother to attend its Nagpur session,
rightly gauging the futility of his opposition to the
Gandhi-Khilafat express. He had no more heart for

110
raucous confrontations that bitter December, no stomach
left for the names he had been called. He had warned
them openly of the futility of their battle plan, told them
honestly of the havoc he correctly anticipated would be
unleashed by and against the suddenly politicized
masses. League had rejected his arguments as
outmoded, cowardly, or invalid. There was no court of
appeals left for the moment, so Jinnah went silently
home-his “career” in politics a shambles, though hardly
at an end.”
Jinnah had earlier written to Gandhi in June 1919
from London asking him what he thought of Montagu’s
Bill then in Parliament, and Gandhi replied: “…I cannot
say anything about the Reforms Bill, I have hardly
studied it. My preoccupation is Rowlett legislation…Our
Reforms will be practically worthless, if we cannot repeal
Rowlett legislation…And as I can imagine no form of
resistance to the Government than civil disobedience, I
propose, God willing, to resume it next week. I have
taken all precautions, that are humbly possible to take,
against recrudescence of violence.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 65)
After Nagpur session, Jinnah seemed to withdraw
from politics. He did not attend League meeting for three
years. He strove for Hindu-Muslim unity but, henceforth,
only from Muslim shore and no longer from an All India
boat.
Khilafat Movement:
The Khilafat Movement was started on 27th
October 1919, when the day was observed as, “Khilafat
Day,” all over India. Gandhi made an appeal to the
Hindus to join the Muslims in fasting, prayer and hartal.

111
Gandhi did so to test the strength of Muslim feelings over
the Khilafat, and the extent to which they were prepared
for confrontation with the Government. At the same time,
he wanted to assess the Hindu response to the Khilafat
cause which was important for the success of Khilafat
movement as well as for the future of Hindu Muslim
unity.
The first All India Khilafat Conference was
rd
convened by Hakim Ajmal Khan on 23 November 1919
at Delhi. It was presided over by Fazlul Haq and among
others attended by Gandhi and Swami Shraddhanand.
Resolutions were passed to boycott the peace
celeberations, to boycott British goods, to send a
deputation to England and, if necessary to America, and
to refuse to cooperate with the Government unless the
Khilafat and the Holy places were treated inaccordance
with Muslim desires. A sub-committee was appointed
consisting of Syed Hosain, Fazlul Haq, Abdul Bari, Ajmal
Khan to examin the questions of noncooperation further
and to propose effective action.
(A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress: Dr. B.N.
Pande, pp 295-296)
The Calcutta Provincial Khilafat Conference held
th
on 29 February 1920 was another landmark in the
intensification of the agitation. It registered the
supremacy of the leadership of the extremist ulema over
the movement. Abdul Bari’s violent speech on the second
day was an important feature of the conference. He said:
“The Holy Book urged that the Musalmans should
never hope for friendship with Jews and Christians. Each
Mohammedan should become a Saladin to check the
flood of non-Muslims encroaching on the territories of

112
Muslims. They must be ready to give up their lives if
necessary. The enemies of Islam were four crores and
they were seven crores (the population in England and
the Muslim population in India). Should they have to
fight against them, they, the Mohammedans, had no
guns or canon but they will have to try to injure them
even by throwing bricks. Even if each Mohammedan were
to throw a handful of dust at them they would be buried
under the heap that would be raised. If the peace terms
were unsatisfactory from that time, God had made every
kind of retaliation legal from them. They could sacrifice
every Christian life and property and still get Fatwa i.e.
religious sanction and they would not have sinned before
God, as Christians had burnt the Muslim’s heart. If he
could get at his disposal canon and guns he would have
preferred to declare war and burn Christians, having
saturated them with kerosin oil.”
The resolutions passed at the conference included
a call for suspension of work on 19th March; resignation
by every Muslim serving in the Indian Army if their
religion is endangered; an appeal for the cooperation of
the Hindus; a call for boycott of British goods; and
approval of the movements of Mustafa Kamal and Envar
Pasha and other Turk patriots.
The Calcutta session was presided over by
Maulana A.K. Azad. In his presidential address Azad
said:
“…In the Muslim organization or society, the
authority to provide centralized direction rests with the
prophet and his caliph. With the Ymayyad rule and
thereafter the centralization came to be expressed not in
religious terms but in the form of a monarchial universal

113
Khilafat. But it continued to remain a legal authority and
a political center of the Muslim world. It is the duty of
every Muslim to owe allegiance to the Khalifa and one
who does not submit to him ceases to be a part of the
community. On this point there is no difference between
the Sunnis and the Shias. It is obligatory on the part of
every Muslim to defend the Khilafat by means of Jihad
which does not necessarily mean violence. Abolition of
Khilafat would lead to chaos in the Islamic world.”
Azad also suggested the necessity to struggle
against the British who will allow one to pray but who
will not permit one to uphold Khilafat, which is also a
religious duty. The religious neutrality of the British is a
fiction. He also said that those non-Muslims who do not
invade Muslim lands and threaten Islam must be trusted
and befriended. The Muslims must be united and
disciplined and should join hands with the Hindus in
their struggle against the British for the protection of
Khilafat.
In March 1920, the Khilafat Conference was held
at Kanpur. It confirmed and reasserted the decisions
taken at the Calcutta Provincial Khilafat Conference. The
Kanpur Copnference decided to boycott the coming
elections and support the principles of ‘complete
independence.’ 19th March 1921 was observed as
‘Khilafat Day’ throughout the country.
On 11th April 1920, the All-India Khilafat
Committee met in Bombay and passed a reasolution to
the effect that a second Khilafat Delegation be sent to
Europe. It was also decided that no action other than
propaganda should be taken for the present. When
further action should become necessary, it should take

114
the form of withdrawal of cooperation with the
Government, step by step, in the order shown below,
which was drafted by a special committee of which
Gandhi was the principal member. The other members
were Shaukat Ali and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.
All Government-awarded titles and honours to be
relinquished; Resignations by members of Councils;
Private servants of officials to give up their jobs;
Resignation of subordinate government servants
including the police; Resignation of superior government
servants; Withdrawal of Muslims from the army and
Refusal to pay taxes.
The Central Khilafat Committee met at Allahabad
from 1st to 3rd June 1920 to decide its course of action in
consultation with the Hindu leaders like Gandhi, Motilal
Nehru, Tej Bahadur Sapru and Annie Basent. On 2nd
June, Hasrat Mohani said that he was ready to join any
Afghan army which might invade India to drive the
British out. He was supported by Shaukat Ali, Zafar Ali
Khan and Azad Subhani. The Hindu leaders not only
disapproved of this but reacted strongly against it. On 3 rd
June, in deference to Gandhi’s wishes, the non-
cooperation resolution was passed.
On 9th June 1920, the Khilafat Conference again
met at Allahabad and unanimously reaffirmed their
resolve to resort to non-cooperation and appointed an
Executive Committee to enforce and lay down a detailed
program. Gandhi was the only Hindu taken on the
Executive Committee. On 22nd June 1920, Muslims sent
a message to the Viceroy stating that they would start
non-cooperation, if the Turkish grievances were not
redressed before 1st August 1920. On the same day,

115
Gandhi also sent a letter to the Viceroy explaining the
justice of the Khilafat cause, the reasons why he has
taken up the cause and necessity of strengthening the
hands of Khilafatists. The position taken by Gandhi is
given below in his own words:
“In my opinion, The Turkish claim is not only not
immoral and unjust, but it is highly equitable, only
because Turkey wants to retain what is her own. And the
Mahomedan manifesto has definitely declared that
whatever guarantee may be necessary to be taken for the
protection of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish races,
should be taken so as to give the Christians theirs and
the Arabs their self-government under the Turkish
suzerainty.
“I do not believe the Turk to be weak, incapable or
cruel. He is certainly disorganized and probably without
good generalship. The argument of weakness, incapacity
and cruelty one often hears quoted in connection with
those from whom power is sought to be taken away.
About the alleged massacres a proper commission has
been asked for, but never granted. And in any case
security can be taken against oppression:
“I have already stated that, if I were not interested
in the Indian Mahomedans, I would not interest myself in
the welfare of the Turks any more than I am in that of the
Austrians or Poles. But I am bound as an Indian to share
the sufferings and trials of fellow-Indians. If I deem the
Mahomedan to be my brother, it is my duty to help him
in his hour of peril to the best of my ability, if his cause
commends itself to me as just;
“It is, therefore, a matter of feeling and opinion. It
is expedient to suffer for my Mahomedan brother to the

116
utmost in a just cause and I should, therefore, travel with
him along the whole road so long as the means employed
by him are as honourable as his end. I cannot regulate
the Mahomedan feeling. I must accept his statement that
the Khilafat is with him a religious question in the sense
that it binds him to reach the goal even at the cost of his
own life.”
(Young India, 2nd June 1920)
On 30th June 1920, Khilafat Committee meeting
held at Allahabad resolved to start non-cooperation after
a month’s notice to the Viceroy. Notice was given on 1st
July 1920 and non-cooperation commenced on 1st
August 1920. Addressing the Committee, Gandhi said:
“This is going to be a great struggle…You must be
prepared to lose everything, and you must subject
yourself to the strictest non-violence and discipline.
When war is declared, martial law prevails; and in our
non-violent struggle, there will also have to be
dictatorship and martial law on our side if we are to win.
You have every right to kick me out, to demand my head,
or to punish me whenever and howsoever you choose.
But, so long as you keep to choose me as your leader,
you must accept dictatorship and the discipline of the
martial law, and you must accept my conditions. But
that dictatorship, will always be subject to your good-will
and to your acceptance and to your co-operation. The
moment you have had enough of me, throw me out,
trample upon me, and I shall not complain.”
Gandhi then directed his energies to persuade the
Congress to adopt non-cooperation and strengthen the
Khilafat Movement. He traveled all over India between 1st
August and 1st September 1920, with Ali Brothers,

117
impressing upon the people the necessity of non-
cooperation.
The Congress at its special session held at
Calcutta on 7th and 8th September 1920 passed the
following resolution, which was carried by 1886 votes
against 884 votes. The motion was opposed by C.R.Das,
B.C.Pal, Annie Basent, Rabindranath Tagore and Jinnah.
“In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question
both the Indian and Imperial Governments have signally
failed in their duty towards the Muslims of India and the
Prime Minister has deliberately broken his pledged word
given to them, and that it is the duty of every non-
Muslim Indian in every legitimate manner to assist his
Muslim brother in his attempt to remove religious
calamity that has overtaken him;
“And in view of the fact that, in the matter of the
events of the April of 1919, both the said Governments
have grossly neglected or failed to protect the innocent
people of the Punjab and punish officers guilty of
unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour towards them, and
have exonerated Sir Michael O’Dwyer who proved himself
directly responsible for most of the official crimes and
callous to the sufferings of the people placed under his
administration, and that the debate in the House of Lords
betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of
India, and systematic terrorism and frightfulness adopted
in the Punjab, and that the latest Viceregal
pronouncement is proof of entire absence of repentance
in the matters of the Khilafat and the Punjab;
“This Congress is of opinion that there can be no
contentment in India without redress of the two
aforementioned wrongs, and that the only effectual

118
means to vindicate national honour and to prevent a
repetition of similar wrongs in future is the establishment
of Swarajya.
“This Congress is further of opinion that there is
no course left open for the people of India but to approve
of and adopt the policy of progressive non-violent non-
cooperation inaugurated by Mahatma Gandhi, until the
said wrongs are righted and Swarajya is established.”
In November 1920, about 500 ulema signed a
Muttafiqa fatwa making non-cooperation a duty and
declared it lawful to join hands with the Hindus under
the leadership of Gandhi.
Gandhi returned the Kaiser-e-Hind Medal and the
Zulu and Boer War Medals awarded to him by the British
for his services in those wars. While doing so, he wrote:
“Valuable as these honours have been to me, I cannot
wear them with an easy conscience so long as my
Musalman countrymen have to labour under the wrong
done to their religious sentiments. I venture to return
these Medals, in pursuance of the scheme of non-
cooperation in connection with Khilafat movement.”
Gandhi further said: “I would, in order to achieve success
in the Khilafat issue, even postpone the issue of Swaraj.”
In the Bareilly Khilafat Conference held in March
1921, Azad said that the complete independence of the
country was necessary for the integrity of the Islamic
Shariat. The idea of the establishment of Dar-ul-Qaza
(House of Justice) was also mooted.
The All-India Khilafat Conference met at Meerut
from 7 to 10th April 1921. One of the resolutions passed
th

at this Conference stated that the Muslims were bound to


adhere to non-cooperation until Swaraj was won. In the

119
District Conference held on 19th June 1921, at Belgaum,
which was attended by Mohamed Ali, it was resolved that
an Indian Republic should be declared in consultation
with the Indian National Congress, if Great Britain,
directly or through the Greeks, fought the Turkish
Government at Angora. In the All India Khilafat
Conference held in July 1921 at Karachi, the Khilafat
leaders held out a threat that if Britain waged war
against Turkey, the Muslims would be compelled to
launch a civil disobedience movement and also declare
India an Independent Republic at the next session of the
Congress at Allahabad.
The Khilafat agitation received a jolt with the
outbreak of Moplah rebellion in Malabar. It was marred
by acts of violence and retaliation between the Hindu and
Muslim communities. The Government considered that it
was the fanaticism of the Muslims and religious
orientation of the Khilaft movement that was responsible
for the Moplah uprising against the Hindu landlords.
(A Centenary History of Indian National Congress: Dr.
B.N.Pande, pg 299-303)
The All-India Khilafat Conference met at
Ahemadabad in December 1921 with Hakim Ajmal Khan
as its president. A resolution to declare independence
without foreign control was passed. Another resolution
stated that, for the success of Khilafat cause, and for the
achievement of Swaraj for the country and justice for the
Punjab, the Central Khilafat Committee would issue
instructions from time to time regarding civil
disobedience.
A manifesto was issued by Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr.
Ansari, M.M.Chotani, Dr. Syed Mahmud and

120
A.H.S.Khatri declaring that it was the duty of the Indian
Muslims to make their voices heard and to warn the
Powers that only the complete acceptance of the Khilafat
demands by the nations of Europe would satisfy the
Islamic people of Asia and Africa. To achieve this, they
were asked to fill the gaols of British India when our
Director Mahatma Gandhi bids us; and to preserve non-
violence and Hindu-Muslim unity at all costs because
success depends on it. This was confirmed by the Central
Khilafat Committee meeting held at Bombay on 12th and
13th January 1922.
To those Hindus, who wanted to give support to
Khilafat on the condition that the Muslims give up cow
killing, Gandhi in “Young India” of 10th December 1919
wrote: “The Hindus may not open the Goraksha (cow
protection) question here. The test of friendship is
assistance in adversity, and that too, unconditional
assistance. Cooperation that needs consideration is a
commercial contract and not friendship. Conditional
cooperation is like adulterated cement, which does not
bind. It is the duty of the Hindus, if they see the justice of
the mahomedan cause to render cooperation. If the
Mahomedans feel themselves bound in honour to spare
the Hindu’s feelings and to stop cow killing, they may do
so, no matter whether the Hindus cooperate with them or
not. Though therefore, I yield to no Hindu in my worship
of the cow, I do not want to make the stopping of cow
killing a condition precedent to cooperation.
Unconditional cooperation means the protection of the
cow.”
To those Hindus, who feared to join the Non-
cooperation Movement for the reasons that Muslims may

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invite the Afghans to invade India, Gandhi in “Young
India of 9th June 1920 wrote:
“It is easy enough to understand and justify the
Hindu caution. It is difficult to resist the Mahomedan
position. In my opinion, the best way to prevent India
from becoming the battle ground between the forces of
Islam and those of the English is for Hindus to make
non-cooperation a complete and immediate success, and
I have little doubt that, if the Mahomedans remain true
to their declared intention and are able to exercise self-
restraint and make sacrifices, the Hindus will play the
game and join them in the campaign of non-cooperation.
I feel equally certain that Hindus will not assist
Mahomedans in promoting or bringing about an armed
conflict between the British Government and their allies,
and Afghanistan. British forces are too well organized to
admit of any successful invasion of the Indian frontier.
The only way, therefore, the Mahomedans can carry on
an effective struggle on behalf of the honour of Islam is to
take up non-cooperation in real earnest. It will not only
be completely effective, if it is adopted by the people on
an extensive scale, but it will also provide full scope for
individual conscience. If I cannot bear an injustice done
by an individual or a corporation, and, I am directly or
indirectly instrumental in upholding that individual or
corporation, I must answer for it before my Maker; but I
have done all that is humanly possible for me to do
consistently with the moral code that refuses to injure
even the wrong-doers, if I cease to support the injustice
in the manner described above. In applying, therefore,
such a great force, there should be no haste, there
should be no temper shown. Non-cooperation must be

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and remain absolutely a voluntary effort. The whole
thing, then, depends upon Mahomedans themselves. If
they will but help themselves, Hindu help will come and
the Government, great and mighty though it is, will have
to bend before the bloodless opposition of a whole
nation.”
Unfortunately the hope of Gandhi that no
Government can possibly withstand the bloodless
opposition of the whole nation did not come true. Within
a year of the starting of the Non-cooperation Movement,
Gandhi had to admit that the Muslmans had grown
impatient. He said:
“In their impatient anger, the Musalmans ask for
more energetic and more prompt action by the Congress
and Khilafat organizations. To the Musalmans, Swaraj
means, as it must mean, India’s ability to deal effectively
with the Khilafat question. The Musalmans, therefore,
decline to wait if the attainment of Swaraj means
indefinite delay of a program that may require the
Musalmans of India to become impotent witnesses of the
extinction of Turkey in European waters.
“It is impossible not to sympathise with this
attitude. I would gladly recommend immediate action if I
could think of any effective course. I would gladly ask for
postponement of Swaraj activity if thereby we could
advance the interest of Khilafat. I could gladly take up
measures outside non-coopertion, if I could think of any,
in order to assuage the pain caused to the millions of the
Musalmans.
“But, in my humble opinion, attainment of Swaraj
is the quickest method of writing the Khilafat wrong.
Hence it is, that for me the solution of the Khilafat

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question is attainment of Swaraj and vice versa. The
only way to help the affiliated Turks is for India to
generate sufficient power in time, there is no way out for
India and she must resign herself to the inevitable. What
can a paralytic do to stretch forth a helping hand to a
neighbour but to try to cure himself of his paralysis?
Mere ignorant, thoughtless and angry outburst of
violence may give vent to pent-up rage but can bring no
relief to Turkey.”
The Musalmans were not in a mood to listen to the
advice of Gandhi. They refused to worship the principle of
non-violence. They were not prepared to wait for Swaraj.
And the Muslims in their impatience did exactly what the
Hindus feared. They extended invitation to the Afghans to
invade India. This is evident from the letter written by
Maulana Mohamed Ali to the Ruler of Afghanistan, Amir
Amannulah. Mohamed Ali in his letter said:
“The presence of the Kings of Islam is a great
blessing from Allah. You should know that the country of
Hindustan is a large land. In olden days, the Kings of
Islam had struggled hard and for a long in order to
conquer this foreign country. They could do it only in
several turns. Every Muslim King got mosques erected in
his territory, and created Madrasas. Muslims of Arabia
and ajam (non-Arab Muslim lands) migrated from their
own lands and arrived in these territories. They became
agents for the publicity and spread of Islam here. Uptil
now their descendants are firm in the ways of Islam.
Among the non-Muslim communities, one is that of
Marhatah (Maratha). They have a chief. For some time
past, this community has been raising its head, and has
become influential all over Hindustan. It is easy to defeat

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Marhatah community, provided the ghazis of Islam gird
up their loins and show courage.”
Ali further said: “In the countryside between Delhi
and Agra, the Jat community used to till the land. In the
reign of Shahjahan, this community had been ordered
not to ride on horses, or keep muskets with them, or
build fortresses for themselves. The Kings that came later
became careless, and this community has used the
opportunity for building many forts, and collecting
muskets.
“In the reign of Muhammad Shah, the impudence
of this community crossed all limits. And Surajmal, the
cousin of Churaman, became its leader. He took to
rebellion. Therefore, the city of Bayana which was an
ancient seat of Islam, and where Ulama and Sufis had
lived for seven hundred years, has been occupied by force
and terror, and Muslims have been turned out of it with
humiliation and hurt. Whatever, influence and oprestige
is left with the kingship at present is wielded by the
Hindus. For no one except them is there in the ranks of
managers and officials. Their houses are full of wealth
and varieties. Muslims live in a state of utter poverty and
deprivation. The story is long and cannot be summerised.
What I mean to say is that the country of Hindustan has
passed under the power of non-Muslims. In this age,
except Your Majesty, there is no other king who is
powerful and great, who can defeat the enemies, and who
is farsighted and experienced in war.”
Mohammed Ali continued: “It is Your Majesty’s
bounden duty (Farz-I-ain) to invade Hindustan, to
destroy the power of the Marhatahs, and to free the
down-and-out Muslims from the clutches of non-

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Muslims. Allah forbid, if the power of infidels remains in
its present position, Muslims will renounce Islam and not
even a brief period will pass before Muslims become such
a community as will no more know how to distinguish
between Islam and non-Islam. This will be a great
tragedy. Due to the grace of Allah, no one except Your
Majesty has the capacity for preventing this tragedy from
taking place.
“We who are the servants of Allah and who
recognize the Prophet as our saviour, appeal to you in the
name of Allah that you should turn your holy attention to
this direction and face the enemies, so that a great merit
is added to the roll of your deeds in the house of Allah
and your name is included in the list of mujahidin fi
Sabilallah (warriors in the service of Allah). May you
acquire plunder beyond measure, and may the Muslims
be freed from the stranglehold of the infidels. I seek
refuse in Allah when I say that you should not act like
Nadir Shah who oppressed and suppressed the Muslims,
and went away leaving the Marahatahs and the Jats
whole and prosperous.
“The enemies have become more powerful after
Nadir Shah, the army of Islam has disintegrated, the
Empire of Delhi has become childrens’ play. Allah forbid,
if the infidels continue as at present, and Muslims get
further weakened, the very name of Islam will get wiped
out. When your fearsome army reaches a place where
Muslims and non-Muslims live together, your
administrators must take particular care. They must be
instructed that those weak Muslims who live in the
countryside should be taken to towns and cities. Next,
some such administrators should be appointed in towns

126
and cities as would see to it that the properties of the
Muslims are not plundered, and the honour of no Muslim
is compromised.”
(Khilafat Experiment: A Himalyan Blunder by Madhu Deolekar,
pg 13-15)
Surprisingly, Gandhi supported Ali Brothers in
inviting Amir of Afghanistan to invade India. When asked,
he said: “…They have done nothing, which I would not
do. If they had sent a message to Amir, I also would send
one to inform the Amir that if he came, no Indian so long
as I can help it, would help the Government to drive him
back.”
Gandhi’s decision to support Khilafat Movement
was criticized by some of his collegues, contemporary
thinkers and leaders of political shades. I reproduce
below a few:
M. C. Chagla:
“Muslim League believed in the cause of Hindu-
Muslim unity and was entirely a secular institution,
except for the name. People like Jinnah and Mazrul Haq,
who belonged to the League, had no truck with the
fanatical Muslims whom the Khilafat movement had
thrown up. I have always felt that Gandhiji was wrong in
trying to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity by supporting
the cause of the Khilafat. Such unity was built on
shifting sands. So long as the religious cause survived,
the unity was there; but once that cause was removed
the unity showed its weakness. All the Khilafatists who
had been attracted to the Congress came out in their true
colours, that is, as more devoted to their religion than to
their country. The Muslim League wanted to fight this

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element and to make common cause with the secular
Congress.”
(Roses in December by M.C.Chagla, pg 78)
B. R. Ambedkar:
“There were many people who doubted the ethical
basis of the Khilafat movement and tried to dissuade Mr.
Gandhi from taking part in a movement, the ethical basis
of which was so questionable. But Mr Gandhi had so
completely persuaded himself of the justice of the
Khilafat agitation that he refused to yield to their advice.
Time and again he argued that the cause was just and it
was his duty to join it.”
(Pakistan or Partition of India by Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, Vol. 8, pg
152)
Koenraad Elst-A Belgian Scholor:
“Gandhi’s trail of fruitless concessions to Muslim
demands started with the Khilafat movement, the
movement in support of the preservation of the Ottoman
Caliphate and its restoration to sovereignty over the
sacred places of Islam. This movement, opposed by
Muslim modernists like Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was led
by the brothers Mohammad and Shaukat Ali, to whom
Gandhi offered the Congress as a platform and
organizational instrument.” Koenraad further says:
“British rulers were able, out of Indian resources,
continuously to make concessions to Muslims and to
keep the various communities divided. By 1919 Gandhi
had become desperate in his endeavours to get the
Muslims to trust him and went from one absurd promise
to another. He promised a blank cheque to the Muslims.
He backed the Khilafat movement and was able to enlist
the full support of the National Congress in that policy.

128
The Ali Brothers became defacto Muslim leaders. Gandhi
welcomed this as the coming promise of leadership of the
Muslims. He made most of the Ali Brothers, raised them
to the skies by flattery and unending concessions; but
what he wanted never happened.”
V.S.Srinivasa Sastri, C.Y.Cintamani and
C.F.Andrews candidly told Gandhi that his speeches and
writings were such as to justify the act of Mohammad
Ali’s invitation to the Amir of Afghanistan.
Ms. Annie Basent said: “…Since the Khilafat
agitation, things have changed and it has been one of the
many injuries inflicted on India by the encouragement of
the Khilafat crusade, that the inner Muslim feeling of
hatred against unbelievers has sprung up, naked and
unashamed, as in the years gone by. We have seen
revived, as guide in practical politics, the old Muslim
religion of the sword, we have seen the dragging out of
centuries of forgetfulness, the old exclusiveness, claiming
the Jazirut-Arab, the island of Arabia, as a holy land
which may not be trodden by the polluting foot of a non-
Muslim, we have heard Muslim leaders declared that if
the Afghans invaded India, they would join their fellow
believers, and would slay Hindus who defended their
motherland against the foe; We have been forced to see
that the primary allegiance of Musalmans is to Islamic
countries, not to our motherland; We have learned that
their dearest hope is to establish the Kingdom of God, not
God as Father of the world, loving all his creatures, but
as a God seen through Musalman spectacles resembling
in his command through one of the prophets, as to the
treatment of unbelievers-the Mosaic JEHOVA of the early
Hebrews, when they were fighting as did the early

129
Muslims, for freedom to follow the religion given to them
by their prophet. The claim now put forward by
Musalman leaders that they must obey the laws of their
particular prophet above the laws of the State in which
they live, is subversive of civic order and the stability of
the State; it makes them bad citizens for their center of
allegiance is outside the nation and they cannot, while
they hold the views proclaimed by Maulana Mahomed Ali
and Shaukat Ali, to name the most prominent of these
Muslim leaders, be trusted by their fellowcitizens. If India
were independent the Muslim part of the population-for
the ignorant masses would follow those who appealed to
them in the name their prophet-would become an
immediate peril to India’s freedom. Allying themselves
with Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Persia, Iraq, Arabia,
Turkey and Egypt and with such of the tribes of Central
Asia who are Musalmans, they would rise to place India
under the Rule of Islam and would establish Musalman
Rule. We had thought that Indian Musalmans are loyal to
their motherland, and indeed, we still hope that some of
the educated class might strive to prevent such a
Musalman rising; but they are too few for effective
resistance and would be murdered as apostates. Malabar
has taught us what Islamic rule still means, and we do
not want to see another specimen of the ‘Khilafat Raj’ in
India. How much sympathy with the Moplas is felt by
Muslims outside Malabar has been proved by the defence
raised for them by their fellow believers, and by Mr.
Gandhi himself, who stated that they had acted as they
believed that religion taught them to act… People living in
the 20th century must either educate people who hold
these Middle Age views, or else exile them. Their place is

130
in countries sharing their opinions, where they can still
use such arguments against any who differ from them.”
(Pakistan or Partition of India: Dr.B.R.Ambedkar, pg 274-275)
Rabindranath Tagore in his interview to a
Bengalee paper said that he could definitely state that
even such men as Mahomed Ali had declared that under
no circumstances was it permissible for any Mohamedan,
whatever his country might be, to stand against any
other Mohamedan.
The tenet of Islam says that in a country which is
not under Muslim rule wherever there is a conflict
between Muslim law and the law of the land, the former
must prevail over the latter and a Muslim will be justified
in obeying the Muslim law and defying the law of the
land.
According to Muslim Canon Law the world is
divided into two camps, Dar-ul-Islam (Abode of Islam)
and Dar-ul-Harb (Abode of war). A country is Dar-ul-
Islam when it is ruled by Muslims. A country is Dar-ul-
Harb when Muslims only reside in it but are not rulers of
it. That being the Canon Law of the Muslims, India
cannot be the common motherland of the Hindus and the
Musalmans. It can be the land of the Musalmans-but it
cannot be the land of the Hindus and the Musalman
living as equals. Further, it can be the land of the
Musalmans only when, it is governed by the Muslims.
The moment the land becomes subject to the authority of
a non-Muslim power, it ceases to be the land of the
Muslims. Instead of being Dar-ul-Islam it becomes Dar-
ul-Harb.
(Pakistan or Partition of India by Dr.B.R.Ambedkar, pg 294)

131
While speaking at Aligarh and Ajmer Mahomed Ali,
who was President of the Indian national Congress, said:
“However pure Mr. Gandhi’s character may be, he must
appear to me from the point of view of religion inferior to
any Musalman, even though he be without character.”
Mahomed Ali was asked at a meeting held in
Luckhnow whether the sentiments attributed to him were
true. Mahomed Ali without any hesitation or
compunction replied: “Yes, according to my religion and
creed, I do hold an adulterous and a fallen Musalman to
be better than Mr. Gandhi.”
(Pakistan or partion of India by Dr.B.R.Ambedkar, pg 302)
Gains of Khilafat Movement:
The biggest gain of the Khilaft movement was the
communal harmony during 1919-1922. The approaches
of Gandhi and of the Khilafat leaders were identical. They
believed that true understanding of religion would bring
about Hindu-Muslim unity. Gandhi always defended his
participation in the Khilafat movement. ‘Had I been a
prophet and foreseen all that has happened, I should
have still thrown myself into the Khilafat agitation.’ It was
not possible ‘to induce Musalmans to take interest in
Swaraj except in terms of the Khilafat.’ The Khilafat
leaders agreed with Gandhi that Hindu participation in
the Khilafat movement and Muslim refusal to kill the cow
would ensure harmony and unity between the two
communities. The Khilafat leaders appealed to their co-
religionists to abandon cow killing but there was no
consensus on this front from the ulema. On 31st January
1920, a deputation of the Muslims waited upon Abdul
Bari to discuss his stand on cow slaughter. He told them
that he never asserted that cow sacrifice was forbidden to

132
good Muslims, but in view of the attitude Hindus had
adopted over the Khilafat question, Muslims should
respect their prejudices as far as possible and refrain
from cow slaughter whenever other animals could equally
well be sacrificed.
What Gandhi said about the Khilafat movement is
true: “In spite of the present strained relations between
the two communities, both have gained as a result of the
movement. The awakening of the masses, it itself a
tremendous gain.”
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad said: “Gandhi
converted the religious problem of the Muslim
community in the country, especially of the Hindus and
Muslims. The achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity was
the great contributionm of the Khilafat movement. This
was based on the Quranic injunction which lays down
that there are two kinds of non-Muslims: Those who
attack Muslim religion and property, and those who are
not inimical to Islam and the Muslims. In the first
category are the British; in the second are the Hindus
with whom friendship and cooperation was required by
Quranic mandate. Therefore, cooperation with the
British, in any form, is Kufr and the assertion of united
nationhood is a duty enjoined by the Quran. The prophet,
on the basis of the same principle united the different
tribes of Madina and formed one nation.”
The religious nature of the Khilafat question and
Gandhi’s championship of the issue added a radically
different dimension to the national struggle of the anti-
colonialism, an unprecedented degree of Hindu-Muslim
unity and Muslim association with the Congress.

133
Dr. Ambedkar said: “In taking up the cause of
Khilafat Mr. Gandhi achieved a double purpose. He
carried the Congress plan of winning over the Muslims to
its culmination. Secondly, he made the Congress a power
in the country, which it would not have been if the
Muslims had not joined it. The cause of the Khilafat
appealed to the Musalmans far more than political
safeguards, with the results that the Musalmans who
were outside it trooped in the Congress. The Hindu
welcomed them. For, they saw in this a common front
against the British, which was their main aim.”
Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak was also
sympathetically disposed towards the Khilafat question.
The Ali Brothers regarded him as their Guru. Tilak’s
newspapers ‘Marhatta’ and ‘Kesari’ upheld the cause of
Khilafat.
I have enumerated the details of the Khilafat
movement as much as I could to show that the Muslim
League had insignificant role to play in the Khilafat
movement for the reasons that the membership of the
League in 1919 was only 777. After three years, it
increased to 1097 and its income from subscription and
donations was extremely meager. Its leadership consisted
the titled gentry, nawabs, landlords and ‘yes Sir’ (jee
huzurs), who were generally well meaning gentlemen but
wanted to serve the Muslim cause only so far as it did not
affect their position either socially or in Government
quarters. They were all wedded to constitutional
methods. Commenting on the nature of Muslim league,
Abdul Bari wrote to M.M.Chotani:
“You are well acquainted with the attitudes of the
members of the League. They never undertake any

134
responsibility on their shoulder in taking up a difficult
question, but only look to their own interests with a view
to guard their prestige. They merely speak but do not
care to see that good results are derived from their
demands.”
The Khilafat leaders also did not approve of the
atrtitude of the leaders like Amir Ali and the Aga Khan.
Yakub Hasan wrote to Mohamed Ali on 29th January
1920:
“Altough Right Honourable Amir Ali and H.H. Aga
Khan have made representations to the authorities from
time to time about Turkey, much still remains to be done
there. You are aware that these two leaders are timid.
They always discourage agitation for fear of losing the
sympathy of few Europeans who support the cause of
Turkey not for the love of Muslims but only in the best
interest of the British Empire itself.”
Jinnah refused to join the Khilafat movement on
the ground that he was opposed to the Indian Muslims
engaging themselves in extra-territorial affairs relating to
Muslims outside India. He vehemently opposed the stand
taken by Gandhi on Khilafat question and warned him
not to encourage the fanaticism of the Muslim religious
leaders and their followers.
Jinnah proved his wisdom and vision in not
joining the Khilafat movement.
M.R.Jaykar in his letter of 8th September 1925 to
Lajpat Rai wrote: “The unity of Khilafat days was artificial
and unreal, more formal than intimate. It was artificial
because it did not spring from any concrete or tangible
interests but was built on a foundation of religious
sentimentalism.”

135
Gandhi’s suspension of the non-cooperation
movement and the abolition of the Khilafat by the Turks
themselves created an awkward situation for the Indian
Khilafat leaders.
The ulema ceased to carry much weight in Indian
politics after 1922. They complained that they had been
only made a catspaw by the educated Muslims and
Gandhi who were now only too anxious to get rid of them.
The secular politicians’ break with the ulema was
inevitable as their alliance rested on shaky foundation.
But the ulema’s participation in the Khilafat and non-
cooperation movement paved the way for the subsequent
growth of Muslim nationalism. By its emphasis on Islam,
the movement made the Muslims conscious of their being
Muslims and that too Muslims first and Indian
afterwards. This proved the biggest blow to Hindu-
Muslim unity. The active part that the ulema played in
the Khilafat movement and their unceasing repeatation of
the religious idiom proved powerful factors leading to the
Hindu-Muslim divide.
The independent existence of the Khilafat
Committee throughout the period 1919-1922 should also
be considered as a factor in separating the Muslims from
the Congress organization and the national movement.
This became evident after the abolition of the Khilafat by
Mustafa Kamal Pasha. Many prominent Khilafat leaders
parted company with Gandhi. Subhas Chandra Bose,
however, held that this development was not due to any
mistake on Gandhi’s part. He said:
“The real mistake, in my opinion, did not lie in
connecting the Khilafat issue with other national issues,
but in allowing the Khilafat Committee to be set up as an

136
independent organization throughout the country, quite
apart from Indian national Congress. If no separate
Khilafat Committee had been organized and all the
Khilafat Muslims had been persuaded to join the ranks of
the Indian National Congress, they would probably have
been absorbed by the latter when the Khilafat issue
became a dead one.”
The Ali Brothers left Gandhi and continued to be
attached to the Central Khilafat, Committee which had
become an anachronism after the end of Khilafat. Hakim
Ajmal Kahan and many of the U.P. Muslim politicians felt
that a change was essential in the Congress policy,
particularly regarding Council entry. These leaders joined
Swaraj Party-a party within the Congress-formed by
C.R.Das and Motilal Nehru. Council entry was a major
issue, which divided the Congress into ‘changers and no-
changers.’
But an equally important issue, which agitated the
minds of Congressmen was the increasing incidence of
the communal violence throughout the country. It also
divided the Congressmen along communal lines. The
Hindu Maha Sabha was founded by the end of 1922 with
which were associated men like Lajpat Rai and Madan
Mohan Malviya. Shuddhi and Sangathan movements
were also started in 1923. They were accompanied by the
movements of Tabligh and Tanzim. The Hindu-Muslim
unity of the Khilafat days was being replaced by
communal polarization. The Khilafat and non-
cooperation movements were being analysed in terms of
the gains and losses of the Hindus and Muslims.
Communal harmony was discredited as mere claptrap.
The talk of ‘crystallizing Hindu public opinion’ and

137
uniting all Hindus for shaping the destiny of Hindu
nation became quite frequent. Muslim leaders began to
express anxiety for the defence of the Muslim interests,
and as a result the relations between the communities
were so greatly strained that each community had
practically arrayed itself in an armed camp against each
other.
(A Centenary History of Indian National Congress: Dr.
B.N.Pande, pg 314-315)
Khilafat movement, after a brilliant beginning,
pettered out, taking along with it the last chance of
Hindu-Muslim unity.
(Pilgrimage to Freedom: K.M.Munshi, pg 22)
Nehru Report:
Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India
believed that the Hindus and Muslims were irreconcilable
and all the conferences in the world cannot bridge the
unbridgeable. Nevertheless, early in 1928, he challenged
the Indian leaders to produce their own scheme of
constitution, instead of always indulging in mere
destructive criticism of the Government.
The challenge led first to All Parties Conference in
Bombay. A Committee was appointed under the
Chairmanship of Motilal Nehru. The members of the
committee were, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Subhash
Chandra Bose, M.R.Jayakar, Sir Ali Imam, G.R.Pradhan,
Shoib Qureshi, N.M.Joshi, M.S.Aney and Sardar Mangal
Singh. This committee later came to be called, “Nehru
Committee.”
The Committee met at Lucknow to draft the
Report. Motilal Nehru anticipated Jinnah’s objections
and to adopt position acceptable to him on the most

138
thorny issues, he invited M.C. Chagla to Lucknow.
Chagla participated in the prolonged discussions, which
ultimately resulted in the publication of the Nehru Report
in August 1928. A copy of the Report reached Jinnah at
Eden, on his way home.
Chagla in his book, “Roses in December,” at pages
95-97 says: “…My contribution to the Report was my
steadfast adherence to the belief in joint electorates.
Motilal Nehru for a moment thought, that in order to get
the minorities to accept the Report, we should agree to
separate electorates. I argued we were drafting a
constitution not for the present but for the future-a
document, which was expected to endure for a long time,
and we must not therefore incorporate into it any
principle which on the face of it was anti-national.
Ultimately Motilal agreed, and joint electorates were
accepted as one of the basic principles of the Nehru
Report.”
Chagla further says: “The draft Report came up
before an All Parties Conference in Lucknow in August. I
was there, and on behalf of the Muslim League I accepted
the Report. At that time Jinnah was in England. Soon
thereafter he returned and I went on board the ship to
see him before he landed. I went to his cabin and found
him in furious temper. He shouted at me; “What right did
you have to accept the Nehru Report on behalf of the
Muslim League? Who authorized you? I told him that
whatever I had done, I had done according to my lights
and in the best interest of the community and the
country. And I pleaded with him: “Please do not rush to
the press and issue a statement rejecting the report out
of hand. Listen to what I have to say first, and then

139
decide.” After thinking for a moment he said: “All right, I
will reserve judgment, we will consider the report at a
regular meeting of the League.”
On a question from the press, Jinnah said that he
had not yet had enough time to digest the Nehru Report.
He further said: “The signatories and various prominent
men who met at Lucknow had made an effort towards the
Hindu-Muslim unity. One cannot help appreciating their
great endeavour. However, the Nehru Report and the
decisions of the Lucknow Conference are not like the
laws of the Medas and Persians, the last word in the
matter.”
At Lucknow, the meeting of the Muslim League
council did not go as Jinnah hoped, and to his personal
disappointment he found many Muslim collegues so
enamoured of the Nehru Report that he dared not call for
a vote on it in early November. Even the Maharaja of
Mahmudabad, who was elected that year’s president of
the Muslim League, liked the report and was ready to
accept it. Chagla was overjoyed to find so many allies and
hoped Jinnah would see the wisdom of his earlier
actions, but Jinnah remained set against the Nehru
constitution, viewing it only a “Hindu Document.”
Motilal Nehru, Dr. Ansari and Abul Kalam Azad
met Jinnah in Lucknow, urging him to attend a special
meeting of the Nehru Committee before the League or the
Congress met in December. And before the All Parties
Convention was convened in Calcutta, to try to fashion a
compromise formula on communal issues. Jinnah turned
them down. He still insisted that first his League has to
meet and officially take its stand. He asked Motilal Nehru
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140
annual sessions of League and Congress. Jinnah
returned to Bombay and prepared for a Provincial League
meeting, which was held on 23rd November, hoping at
least to win a majority in his home town. But, Chagla
stood up and argued so effectively for the Nehru Report
that Jinnah adjourned the meeting without putting the
question to a vote.
(Jinnah of Pakistan: Stanley Wolpert, pg 99)
All Parties Convention as scheduled started in
Calcutta on 22nd December 1928. Dr. Ansari’s eloquent
presidential address calling on his co-religionists to
endorse the Nehru Report, fell on deaf ears. He pointed
out that constitutional safeguards were “bounties on
inefficiency.” A minority that became accustomed to
special protection can never acquire the ability to face the
competition. It would in fact sink deeper and deeper into
ignorance, fanaticism and sloth to be stifled ultimately by
those, who had adhered to offer it a partial support.”
Pleading for a national approach to the Nehru
Committee’s recommendations, Dr. Ansari said: “I am
unable to understand the mentality which is not satisfied
with what the draft constitution has given but would ask
for more in a manner as if any denial involved a question
of life and death.” He recalled what a Committee of the
League of Nations had said earlier. The expert
international body observed: “The true safeguard of a
minority is the good-will of the majority.” Dr. Ansari was
convinced that it would be possible to promote communal
concord by accepting the Swaraj Constitution
unreservedly.
(M.R.Jayakar: V.B.Kulkarni, pg 124)

141
Chagla in his book, ‘Roses in December’ says: “In
the Subject Committee of the League, we sat up till about
2 a.m. discussing the Nehru Report. Jinnah was in
favour of outright rejection. I appealed to him that we
should not reject it outright, but instead suggest
amendments, which might be accepted by the
Convention. After a long and protracted debate, we
ultimately decided to accept the Nehru Report with
amendments.
Jinnah moved four amendments to the Nehru
Reoport in the All-Parties Convention held at Calcutta in
the last week of December 1928. Speaking on the first
amendment relating to the Muslim demand for 33 1/3 %
representation in the Central Legislature, Jinnah said:
“The Nehru Report has stated that according to
the scheme which they propose the Muslims are likely to
get one-third in the Central Legislature and perhaps
more, and it is argued that the Punjab and Bengal will
get much more than their population proportion. If one-
third is going to be obtained by Muslims, then the
method which you have adopted is not quite fair to the
provinces where the Muslims are in a minority because
the Punjab and Bengal will obtain more than their
population basis in the Central Legislature. You are going
to give to the rich more and keeping the poor according to
population. It may be sound reasoning but it is not
wisdom.
“Therefore, if the Musalmans are, as the Nehru
Report suggest, to get one-third, or more, they cannot
give the Punjab or Bengal more, but let six or seven extra
seats be distributed among provinces which are already
in a very small minority, such as, Madras and Bombay,

142
because, if Sind is separated, the Bombay Province will
be reduced to something like 8%. There are other
provinces where we have small minorities. This is the
reason why we say, fix one-third and let it be distributed
among Muslims according to our own adjustment.”
The second amendment related to the reservation
of seats on population basis in the Punjab and Bengal i.e.
the claim to a statutory majority. On this Jinnah said:
“That originally proposals emanated from certain
Muslim leaders in March 1927 known as the ‘Delhi
Proposals.’ They were dealt with by the All India Congress
Committee in Bombay and at the Madras Congress and
the Muslim League in Calcutta last year substantially
endorsed at least this part of the proposal. I am not going
into the detailed arguments. It really reduces itself into
one proposition, that the voting strength of the
Mahomedans in the Punjab and Bengal, although they
are in a majority, is not in proportion to their population.
That was one of the reasons. The Nehru Report has now
found a substitute and they say that if adult franchise is
established then there is no need for reservation, but in
the event of its not being established we want to have no
doubt that in that case there should be reservations for
Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal, according to their
population, but they shall not be entitled to additional
seats.”
The third amendment was in regard to residuary
powers which the Nehru Committee had vested in the
Central Government. In moving his amendment that they
should be lodged in the Provincial Government, Jinnah
pleaded:

143
“This is purely a constitutional question and has
nothing to do with the communal aspect. We strongly
hold-I know Hindus will say Muslims are carried away by
communal consideration-we strongly hold the view that,
if you examin this question carefully, we submit that the
residuary powers should rest with the province.”
The fourth amendment was concerned with the
separation of Sind. The Nehru Report had agreed to the
separation of Sind but had subjected it to one proviso,
namely, that the separation should come only on the
establishment of the system of Government outlined in
the Report. Jinnah in moving for the deletion of the
proviso said:
“We feel this difficulty… Suppose the
Government choose, within the next six months, or a
year or two, to separate Sind before the establishment of
a Government under this constitution, are the
Mahomedans to say, ‘we do not want it.’ So long this
clause stands it’s meaning is that Mahomedans should
oppose its separation until simultaneously a Government
is established under this constitution. We say delete
these words and I am supporting my argument by the
fact that you do not make such a remark about the
NWFP. The Committee says that it cannot accept it as the
resolution records an agreement arrived at by parties
who signed at Lucknow. With the utmost deference to the
members of the Committee, I venture to say that that is
not valid ground. Are we bound, in this Convention,
bound because a particular resolution was passed by an
agreement between certain persons?”
Replying to his critics, Jinnah said: “Every country
struggling for freedom and desirous of establishing a

144
democratic system of Government has had to face the
problem of minorities wherever they existed, and no
constitution, however, idealistic it may be, and however
perfect from theoretical point of view it may seem, will
ever receive the support of the minorities unless they can
feel that they as an entity, are secured under the
proposed constitution and Government, and whether the
constitution will succeed or not must necessarily depend
as a matter of acid test whether the minorities are in fact
secure.”
In response to Jinnah’s plea, Sir Tej Bahadur
Sapru said: “…If you examine the figures, you will find
that, including nominated members, Muslim
representation in the Central Legislature is 27 per cent
and Mr. Jinnah wants 33%… Speaking for myself, I
would like you to picture Mr. Jinnah, whom I have
known intimately for fifteen years. If he is a spoilt child, a
naughty child, I am prepared to say, give him what he
wants and be finished with it.”
Mr. M.R. Jayakar, who was a spokesman of Hindu
Mahasabha in the convention said: “I have also known
Jinnah for last sixteen years in close association as a
collegue in nationalist life and I can assure you that he
comes before us today neither as a naughty boy nor as a
spoilt child…One important fact to remember is that well-
known Muslims like the esteemed patriots Maulana Abul
Kalam Azad, Dr. Ansari, Sir Ali Imam, Raja Sahib of
Mahmudabad and Dr. Kitchlew have given their full
assent to the compromise embodied in the Nehru
Committee Report. It is further to be borne in mind that
even in the Muslim League, a large body of members
have given their assent to the Nehru Committee Report.

145
Mr. Jinnah, therefore, represents, if I may say so without
offence, a small minority of Muslims.”
Jinnah, in his reply to the remarks of Sapru and
Jayakar, said: “We are engaged today in a very serious
and solemn transaction. We are here, as I understand,
for the purpose of entering into a solemn contract and all
parties who enter into it will have to work for it and fight
for it together. What we want is that Hindus and Muslims
should march together until our object is attained.
Therefore, it is essential that you must get not only the
Muslim League but the Musalmans of India and here I
am not speaking as a Musalman but as an Indian…
Would you be content with a few? Would you be content
if I were to say, I am with you? Do you want or do you
not want the Muslim India to go along with you?
Minorities cannot give anything to majority. It is,
therefore, no use asking me not to press for what you call
“these small points.” I am not asking for these
modifications because I am a naughty child.” If they are
small points, why not concede? It is up to the majority,
and majority alone can give. I am asking you for this
adjustment because I think it is the best and fair to the
Musalmans… We are all sons of this land. We have to live
together. We have to work together and whatever our
differences may be, let us at any rate not create more bad
blood. If we cannot agree, let us at any rate agree to
differ, but let us part as friends. Believe me there is no
progress of India until the Musalmans and Hindus are
united, and let no logic, philosophy or squabble stand in
the way of coming to a compromise and nothing will
make me more happy than to see a Hindu-Muslim
union.”

146
(Jinnah of Pakistan: Stanley Wolpert, pg 100-101)
Among those who listened to Jinnah’s
speech was a Parsee, Jamshed Nusserwanjee, who had
become builder and the Mayor of Karachi recalled: “…The
first time I saw Jinnah weep was after his amendments
had been rejected at the Calcutta meeting to consider the
Nehru Report… He was sadly humbled, and he went back
to his hotel. About half-past eight next morning, he left
Calcutta by train, and I went to see him off at the railway
station. He was standing at the door of his first-class
coupe compartment, and he took my hand. He had tears
in his eyes as he said, Jamshed, this is the parting of the
ways.”
(Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 95)
Dr. K.M.Munshi, in his book, “Pilgrimage to
Freedom,” at pages 24-25 writes: “The Convention was
kept waiting; then he (Jinnah) arrived, surrounded by
leading members of the Muslim League, with the air of
conquering hero, completely undermining the
representative status of the whole convention. Jinnah in
a truculent mood found fault with the Nehru Report;
Jayakar expressed in no uncertain terms the indignation
of the convention at being treated that way. Thus ended
the communal harmony, which was one of the Nehru
Reports outstanding achievements. Motilal Nehru issued
a statement asking the Muslim League to enter into
discussions regarding the amendments, which it had
suggested to the Nehru Report, and to try to see whether
some compromise could be achieved. Chagla wrote to
Jinnah appealing to him to meet Motilal Nehru and also
issued a press statement to that effect. The Pioneer,
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147
in its issue of 25th July 1929, captioned, ‘A great
opportunity-Let Pandit Motilal Nehru and Jinnah meet’
and congratulating Chagla for making this suggestion.
Jinnah in a letter of 5th August, 1929, wrote to Chagla: “I
fear that the Hindu-Muslim question, as it is generally
called, is not likely to be settled unless we all who are
working for the freedom of India come to recognize it as a
national problem and not a communal dispute. Unless
the majority community and the leaders grasp that
elementary principle and deal with it in that spirit, it will
not be possible to get the minority community into line
with any national programme.”
On receipt of this letter, Chagla said: “As late as
August 1929, Jinnah was still looking upon the
communal dispute as really a national problem.
Undoubtedly, Jinnah’s attitude began to change from
then on, though the final steps which converted him from
the nationalist that he was into an unmistakable
communalist came much later.”
Chagla did not approve of the rejection by the
Muslim League of the Nehru Report, and he resigned
from the League on that issue. He published a pamphlet
called Muslims and the Nehru Report, and carried on
propaganda both in the press and from the platform for
its acceptance. He contended that, even without the
amendments, the Nehru Report was not prejudicial to the
interests of the Muslim community, and was a great
document, which served the national purpose of the
country while safeguarding the rights of the minorities.
(Roses in December: M.C.Chagla, pg 97)
Mohammad Noman in his book, “Muslim India”
from pages 289 to 292 says: “One thing about which

148
most of the League leaders were determined was to keep
the Musalmans away from Motilal Nehru. The
Musalmans had lost confidence in the bona fides of the
Swarajist politicians. The Musalmans were convinced
that after ten years, there will not be a single Muslim left
in the Provincial Legislature. Muslims will become hewers
of wood and drawers of water to their masters. There
would be no difference between position that was
accorded to the Irish Catholic by Statute of the Irish
Parliament of 1695. The Nehru Report was the result of
one-sided view of pandit Motilal Nehru and his Hindu
myrmidons, so far as the Muslims of India were
concerned. The chameleon-like attitude which Nehru
assumed had not helped the cause which he had so
much at heart, much less the greater, nobler and truer
cause of our motherland. Nehru felt that to sustain his
party only thing was to imbibe the new doctrines of
communal nationalism and to do away with the separate
electorates. The Nehru Report had become an eye-sore
for the whole of the country. Not only did the Nehru
Report deprive the communities, races and interests of
India of their immemorial rights, it also produced a
monster designated by the Central Government, which
was to swallow provinces, Indian States, individual
religious, racial rights, law, liberty and order, at one gulp.
Never in India did such a document prepared by so many
able men proved to be so howling failure. No event in the
history of India created greater disunion than the
publication of the Nehru Report. The Nehru Committee,
at one stroke of pen, destroyed Muslims’ right of separate
representation by substituting for it mixed electorates
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149
features, knowing as it did that no Muslim who failed to
placate the majority of Hindu electors could ever have a
chance of success. Though a few carpet-knights, political
malcontents from the Muslim camp were pressed into
service to support the Nehru Report, the vast bulk of the
thinking Musalmans saw through the game and realized
that it was a scheme savouring of the Shuddhi and
Sanghatan movement. It was pity that Pandit Nehru by
short-sightedness fell into the trap of Mahasabha and
thus, in the absence of the goodwill and cooperation of
the Musalmans, gave a tremendous blow to the cause of
India’s advance at the most critical moment in its history.
The Musalmans had lost their faith in their Hindu
brethren and no amount of pious fraud practiced in the
name of nationalism could induce the Muslim minority to
risk its existence by giving a blank cheque to the majority
whose very superior maneuvers and dialectics alike failed
to lull into sleep the great dangers that the Nehru Report
aroused as to the intents and purposes of its authors.
Instead of appreciating the point of view of minorities and
safeguarding their legitimate interests, the Nehru
Committee adopted measures which were calculated to
dislodge them from every position of power and prestige.”
The Congress passed the following resolution
moved by Gandhi:
“This Congress, having considered the constitution
recommended by the All-Parties Committee Report,
welcomes it as a great contribution towards the solution
of India’s political and communal problems, and
congratulates the committee on the virtual unanimity of
its recommendations and, whilst adhering to the
resolution relating to complete independence passed at

150
the Madras Congress approves of the constitution drawn
up by the committee as a great step in poltical advance,
especially as it represents the largest measure of
agreement attained among the important parties in the
country.
“Subject to the exigencies of the political situation
this country will adopt the constitution in its entirety if it
is accepted by the British Parliament on or before 31 st
December 1929, but in the event of its nonacceptance by
that date or its earlier rejection, Congress will organize a
non-violent non-cooperation by advising the country to
refuse taxation or in such other manner as may be
decided upon. Consistently with the above, nothing in
this resolution shall interfere with the carrying on, in the
name of the Congress, of the propaganda for complete
independence.”
Maulana Mahomed Ali, in his presidential address
to the All-India Khilafat Conference held at Calcutta in
1928 said: “The Nehru Report had as its preamble
admitted the bondage of servititude. Freedom and
Dominion Status were widely divergent things.” Ali
further said: “You make compromises in your
constitution every day with false doctrines, immoral
conceptions and wrong ideas but you make no
compromise with our communalists- with sparate
electorates and reserved seats. 25% is our portion of
population and yet you will not give us 33% in the
Assembly. You are a Jew, a Bania. But to the English you
give the status of your dominion.
“The Conference passed the one line resolution:
“The Conference declares once more that complete
independence is our goal.”

151
Maulana Hasrat Mohani, as President of the
Jamiat-ul-Ulema Conference held at Allahabad in 1931
condemmed the Nehru Report and said:
“My political creed with regard to India is now well
known to everybody. I cannot accept anything short of
complete independence, and, that too, on the model of
the United States of America or the Soviet Russia, which
is essentially democratic, federal and centrifugal, and in
which the rights of Muslim minorities are safeguarded.
“For some time the Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Delhi held
fast to the creed of complete independence and it was
mostly for this reason that it repudiated the Nehru
Report which devised a unitary constitution instead of a
federal one. Besides, when, after the Lahore session, the
Congress, at the instance of Mahatma Gandhi, declared
the burial of the Nehru Report on the banks of the Ravi
and the resolution of complete independence was
unanimously agreed upon, the Delhi Jamiat ventured to
cooperate with the Congress and its programs of civil
disobedience simply because it was the duty of every
Indian, Hindu or Muslim, to take part in the struggle for
independence.
“But unfortunately, Gandhi very soon went back
upon his words and while yet in jail he told the British
journalist Mr. Slocombe that by complete independence
he meant only the substance of independence. Besides,
when he was released on expressing his inclination for
compromise he devised the illusory term of ‘Purna
Swaraj’ in place of complete independence and openly
declared that in ‘Purna Swaraj’ there was no place for
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152
pact with Lord Irwin he definitely adopted the ideal of
Dominion Status under the British Crown.
“After this change of front by Gandhi, the Delhi
Jamiat ought to have desisted from blindly supporting
the Mahatma and like the Nehru Report it should have
completely rejected this formula of the Congress Working
Committee by which the Nehru Report was sought to be
revived at Bombay.
“But we do not know what unintelligible reasons
induced the Delhi Jamiat-ul-Ulema to adopt ‘Purna
Swaraj’ as their ideal, in spite of the knowledge that it
does not mean complete independence but something
even worst than complete independence. And the only
explanation for adopting this creed is said to be that,
although Gandhiji has accepted Dominon Status, he still
insist that Britain should concede the right of secession
from the British Empire to the Indians… Gandhiji and
his followers know it full well that even if this right of
secession is given to Indians, it would perhaps be never
put into practice.
“If someone considers this contention of mine to be
based on suspicion and contends that the Congress will
certainly declare for secession from the Empire whenever
there is need of it, I will ask him to let me know what will
be the form of Indian Government after the British
connection is withdrawn. It is clear that no one can
conceive of a despotic form and a democratic form,
whether it would be unitary or federal but centripetal,
will be nothing more than Hindu Raj, which the
Musalmans can in no circumstances accept.”
Hasrat Mohani concluded his address by saying:
“We must, therefore, oppose Dominion Status in all

153
circumstances as this is not the half-way house or part of
our ultimate aim, but its very negation and rival.”
The U.P. Branch of the All India Muslim
Conference in its session held at Cawnpore on 4th
November 1928 passed the following resolution:
“In the opinion of the All-Parties U.P. Muslim
Conference, Musalmans of India stand for the goal of
complete independence, which shall necessarily take the
form of a federal republic.”
Khan Bahadur Masoodul Hassan and some other
persons opposed the resolution on the grounds that it
would go against the best interests of Musalmans. Upon
this, a number of women from their Purdah gallery sent
a written statement to the president saying that if men
had not the courage to stand for complete independence,
women would come out of Purdah, and take their place
in the struggle for independence.
(Pakistan or Partitrion of India by Dr.B.R. Ambedkar, pg 290)
Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, ultimately rejected the
Nehru Report on the ground that constitution-making for
India was the exclusive prerogative of the British
Parliament.
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad wrote epitaph on the
convention and caustically remarked that the Muslims
were fools to ask for safeguards and the Hindus were
greater fools to refuse them.
First Round Table Conference:
In June 1929, Lord Irwin, the Viceroy went to
England with a view to device some means whereby the
constitutional question might be clarified, and a greater
degree of cooperation could be obtained from all the

154
sections of Indian political opinion before the Parliament
was asked to pronounce Reforms for India.
Jinnah wrote a letter to the Prime Minister
Ramsay MacDonald on 19th June 1929, in which he said:
“The present position is a very serious deadlock and if
allowed to continue it will, in my opinion, prove
disastrous both to the interest of India and Great
Britain.” He then briefly outlined political events of the
preceding few years, especially since the appointment of
the Simon Commission and the futility of awaiting its
report, saying: “So far as India is concerned, we have
done with it. India has lost her faith in the word of Great
Britain. The first and foremost thing that I would ask you
to consider how best to restore that faith and revive the
confidence of India in the ‘bona fides’ of Great Britain.”
He warned that “there is a section in India that has
already declared in favour of complete independence, and
I may tell you without exaggeration that the movement
for independence is gaining ground, as it is supported by
the Indian National Congress.” To diminish the
momentum of such a movement, which Jinnah
considered no less dangerous a threat to India’s security
than did the Viceroy, he suggested as step one, a
declaration “without delay” by His Majesty’s Government
that “Great Britain is unequivocally pledge to the policy of
granting to India full responsible Government with
Dominion Status. The effect of such a declaration will be
very far-reaching and go a great way to create a different
atmosphere in the country.” As a practical action to
implement such a declaration, he urged the Prime
Minister “to invite representatives of India, who would be
in a position to deliver goods (because completely

155
unanimous opinion in India is not possible at present) to
London to meet with British officials till they could reach
a constitutional “solution which might carry, to use the
words of the Viceroy, the willing assent of the political
India.” The proposals thus formulated could then be
placed before Parliament.
Ramsay MacDonald sent a private letter to Jinnah
on 14th August in which he said: “The suggestions which
you make in your letter will be pondered over with a
desire to use them in every way that circumstances will
allow. But one thing I can say here-because I have said it
before repeatedly and it still remains the intention of the
Government, that we want India to enjoy Dominion
Status. There will probably be announcement made very
soon regarding future proceedings.”
Jinnah was very pleased and optimistically replied
to the Prime Minister on 7th September, “If you carry out
my suggestion with which I am glad to find that you are
in accord, it will open up a bright future for India and the
name of Great Britain will go down in history as one
nation that was true to its declarations.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan: Stanley Wolpert, pp 107-108)
Lord Irwin returned to India and made the
following declaration on 31st October 1929:
“I am authorized on behalf of His Majesty’s
Government to state clearly that in their judgment it is
implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue
if India’s constitutional progress, as contemplated, is the
attainment of Dominion Status.” He also announced that
A Round Table Conference of Indian and British
representatives would be convened to consider the Simon

156
Commission’s Report before its submission to
Parliament.
Jinnah, in a joint statement welcomed Viceroy’s
announcement as a fundamental change of procedure
whereby the representatives of India will be invited to
meet His Majesty’s Government in conference for the
purpose of arriving at the greatest possible measure of
agreement regarding the proposals to be submitted to the
Parliament for the attainment of Dominion Status by
India and thereby reaching a solution which might carry
the willing assent of political India.
The statement was signed, among others by
Chimanlal Setalvad, Sarojini Naidu, Bhulabhai Desai, Sir
Homy P. Mody, M.C. Chagla and Kanji Dwarkadas.
In New Delhi, at a meeting chaired by Motilal
Nehru, a policy of general conciliation was called for,
together with the grant of general amnesty for political
prisoners, and the predominant representation of the
Indian National Congress at the forthcoming Round Table
Conference. This leaders’ manifesto, as it came to be
called, further insisted that the Round Table Conference
is to meet not to discuss when Dominion Status is to be
established but to frame a scheme of Dominion
Constitution for India.
No sooner did Jawaharlal sign that Manifesto he
regretted doing so, and wanted to resign from the
presidentship of Congress, which he had just accepted.
Gandhi told Jawaharlal: “You must not resign…it will
affect the national issue. There is no hurry and no
principle is at stake. About the crown, no one else can
wear it. It never was to be a crown of roses. Let it be all
thorns now.” Nehru did not, in fact, resign, but his

157
emotional threat of resignation stiffened both Gandhi and
Motilal in their resolve to stand by the leaders’ manifesto
at the most they would be willing to do by way of
“accommodating” the Viceroy and His Majesty’s
Government. Irwin, however, had secured as much
promise of change as Ramsay MacDonald was prepared
to offer. Jinnah, therefore, found himself in the
unenviable, yet not unfamiliar position, of having to try to
bridge the gap remaining between both sides.
(Jinnah of Pakistan: Stanley Wolepert, pg 110)
Jinnah, Gandhi, Motilal, Sapru and Patel met
Irwin on 23rd December 1929. Gandhi asked Irwin
whether the interpretation of his announcement
published in the Congress leaders’ manifesto was
accurate. Gandhi explained that unless agreement was
reached on this point he felt it fruitless to proceed to any
other questions.” Irwin replied: “The object of the
conference was to thrash out the problems which arose
out of His Majesty’s Government’s definite declaration of
policy… It would have the fullest opportunity to discuss
any proposals put before it. The conference would be
absolutely free... There would be no closure to the freest
discussion; the conference would not, proceed to definite
voting, but would rather follow the lines of the Imperial
Conference, a record being kept of the general sense of
the members.”
Gandhi argued that unless the establishment of
Dominion Status could be “presumed as an immediate
result of the Conference,” he could not take part in it. He
demanded complete freedom at once.
Lord Irwin thought it unreasonable and looked to
Jinnah and Sapru at this point for more effective

158
support. Both reasoned at some length with Gandhi and
Motilal. They argued that those who went to the
Conference would be at liberty to propose Dominion
Status. Supposing from the opposite side somebody
pointed out the difficulties, that would at least narrow
the issues, and the true function of the Conference would
be to discuss the difficulties in the way of immediate
conferment of full Dominion Status and to argue about
safeguards. Gandhi and Motilal refused to argue about
issues unacceptable to all the parties with their divergent
perspectives.
Congress met in Lahore and passed a resolution
demanding complete independence. Sunday, January 26,
1930, was proclaimed Purna Swaraj Day by the
Congress Working Committee.”
Jinnah blamed Gandhi for the sudden outburst of
political hysteria. Sapru wrote to Jinnah on 5th January
1930: “…I entirely agree with you. The Congress has gone
mad, but the worst of it is that in its madness it is going
to involve the country in disaster. We must act and act
together and with a determination that we will solve our
differences. I have no doubt that on this occasion you
can be of the greatest possible use to the country.” He
assured Jinnah, “I personally think that we should not
find it difficult to bring about a settlement of the Hindu
Mohamedan question. But without flattering you I do say
that it is impossible to get a settlement effected without
your cooperation and guidance.” Jinnah agreed to give it
a try, as did Shafi and Raja of Mamudabad. Hindu Maha
Sabha leaders were also willing to join all parties’
conference, after much persuading and cajoling by
Sapru. Jinnah selected most of the Muslim

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representatives to the Conference in Delhi that met on
26th February 1930. More than fifty delegates were
invited, including leading liberals, Mahasabhites,
Christians, Anglo-Indians, and Madras Justice Party,
“Untouchables,” as well as Muslim Leaguers. Early in
February, Jinnah met Madan Mohan Malviya to discuss
communal problem and felt the atmosphere has
improved for possible settlement. Yet nothing had really
changed since February 1928, except that Congress was
not in attendance at the latest futile all parties
conference.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan: Stanley Wolpert, pg 114)
On March 12, Gandhi accompanied by 78 persons
made the historic march to Dandi to break the salt laws.
The movement soon acquired the strength and speed of a
revolution, causing considerable disquiet to the
imperialists. “The spark having ignited,” wrote Prof.
Brecher, “in a dramatic fashion, the explosion followed
with devastating effect. The pent up emotions of
thousands burst forth, and a nationwide violation of the
Salt Law followed.” By the end of 1930, more than
90,000 men and women were swept into prison. The
Government became panicky and hoped to stifle the
popular movement by acts of savagery. The Government’s
brutality towards the peaceful Satyagrahis repelled most
people, including foreign observers. Webb Miller wrote a
memorable description of the scene that unfolded before
his eyes near the salt pans of Dharsana. The police
attacked the “raisers” with such brutality that “the
waiting crowd of watchers groaned and sucked in their
breaths in sympathetic pain at every blow.”

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The arrest of Gandhi on May 20, failed to calm
down the convulsive movement, which gained greater
strength on that account.
(M.R.Jayakar: V.B. Kulkarni, pg 175-177)
On August 13, Tej Bahadur Sapru and
M.R.Jayakar had an interview with Gandhi in Yervada
Jail to persuade him to attend the Round Table
Conference. However, in spite of their best, they failed to
convince Gandhi.
George Slocombe, a special representative of “Daily
Herald,” who interviewed Gandhi in Yervada jail writes:
“Gandhi was prepared to suspend Civil Disobedience and
advice cooperation with the Round Table Conference
provided that the terms of reference of the Conference
included the framing of a constitution giving India, “the
substance of independence.”
Commenting on Gandhi’s imprisonment, George
Slocombe wrote: “The imprisonment of Mahatma now
incarnates the very soul of India.”
The first Round Table Conference, which was
inaugurated in London on November 12, 1930, and was
presided over by Prime Minister Ramsay Mac Donald had
an unpropitious start. It began in the depressing climate
of Congress rejection, countrywide unrest and an
unsolved communal tangle. The issue before it was what
would be the next step in India’s constitutional progress.
But the most vital element in India’s political life, namely,
the Congress, was not there, while the most essential
ingredient of such a progress, namely communal
settlement was a far cry.
The invitees of the Conference were the Liberals
and other elements not sympathetic to non-cooperation,

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the representatives of organizations like the Sikhs, the
Muslims, the Depressed classes and the others, those of
commercial and industrial interests and Europeans,
delegates from the Indian States and so on. The list of
invitees was carefully made as if to advertise the
fragmented nature of India’s political life rather than its
basic unity.
Jawaharlal Nehru dismissed the Conference as a
stage-managed affair, which could yield no positive
results. “It was,” he wrote, “fitting that in this assembly of
vested interests-imperialists, feudal, financial, industrial,
religious, communal- the leadership of the British Indian
delegation should usually fall to the Aga Khan, who in his
own person happened to combine all these interests in
some degree.”
Matlubul Hasan Saiyid in his book, “Mohamed Ali
Jinnah,” at page 476 says: “Jawaharlal Nehru’s remarks
regarding the delegates of the Round Table Conference
were hardly befitting a man of his responsibility and
public eminence specially in view of the fact that these
very men had at that time probably contributed more to
India’s welfare than what he himself had done. Patriotism
is a virtue, which is not necessarily restricted to the
members of the Indian National Congress, and such
remarks were calculated to do more harm than good at
that time.”
It is interesting to know as to what Saiyid has said
about Jawaharlal and his father Motilal. He says: “In
fact, Jawaharlal Nehru’s election to the Congress
presidentship was a main cause of the Congress refusal
to cooperate with the Conference on the first occasion…
At the end of Motilal Nehru’s term, the Congress had

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elected Gandhi as the next president, but the later
refused and suggested Jawaharlal’s name for the Lahore
Congress and ultimately it became an accomplished fact.
At this time the Congress was badly divided on the
question of Round Table Conference. “A section of
Congress,” says F.W.Wilson, “notably that led by
Jawaharlal Nehru, the president designate, wished to try
to force the Government to release all political prisoners,
to give a pledge about Dominion Status and to show
themselves willing to listen more attentively to the desires
of the Indian people in the matter of day-to-day
administration. It was pointed out to the Viceroy, and
fully appreciated by him, that the promise of cooperation
could most advantageously be coupled with certain
concessions. Then occurred the debates in the Commons
and in the Lords, and the fortunate speech of the late
Lord Russell. Indian opinion, fickle as ever, began to veer
round, with the result that there had to be another
conference of Indian leaders at Allahabad to reconsider
the Delhi manifesto, and discuss the whole situation.
This again ended in a triumph for moderate opinion. It
was decided to bring private pressure to bear upon the
Viceroy, with regard to the question of political prisoners,
but to proceed on the assumption that a plan of Round
Table Conference was acceptable to Indian opinion. The
constitutionalists in the congress party left this meeting
overjoyed. Motilal Nehru had shown himself most
conciliatory. Pandit Malviya was strong for cooperation.
Gandhi himself was telling everybody that the Viceroy
was a good man and that he was hoping for the best.
Alone in that throng, Jawaharlal kept his counsel. He
had tried to complicate matters at Delhi by insisting

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upon the release of men convicted of attempted
assassination. He had incurred a scathing rebuke from
Gandhi and had been reduced to tears. Particularly, he
did not like the new scheme and, as events proved, he
was to be the real author of the coming sabotage. Just
before Christmas, Jawaharlal conducted, as president,
the proceedings of the All India Federation of the Trade
Union at Nagpur. There he successfully led the revolt
against the constitutionalists, and delivered an inaugural
address which breathed class hatred and rampant
communism. Then he returned to Allahabad for a day or
two to prepare his speech for the Lahore session of the
congress. The dates are important, as they convict Motilal
and Gandhi of a deception, which is hard to forgive.
Jawaharlal left for Lahore about the middle of December
to get in touch with the local atmosphere, and to
superintend for the Chriastmas week conference. Before
he left, he showed to his father the draft of his speech as
president-elect. Motilal Nehru told me (Matlubul Hasan
Saiyid) it was not so extreme as he thought it was going
to be. Its true nature would be seen later. Meanwhile,
Gandhi was indulging in an orgy of moral doubts and
typical hesitations, but he was in close touch with
Motilal. Motilal on his part was keeping in close touch
with Sapru, and one evening after the receipt of a
communication from Gandhi, went to Sapru’s house, and
with him drafted a telegram to the Viceroy asking for an
interview to clarify certain matters. That evening he was
talking brightly and harmoniously about the forthcoming
visit to London. The Viceroy was due to return to Delhi
on the early morning of 23rd December; and through Sir
Malcolm hailey, wired to Sapru making an appointment

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with Gandhi, Motilal, Patel, Jinnah and Sapru for the
afternoon of 23rd. In the interval, Motilal followed his son
to Lahore, and what happened there is a secret known
only to the Congress leaders. The most obvious theory is
that at Lahore Motilal saw quite clearly that there was
going to be a majority in the Congress in support of
independence, and against the acceptance of Round
Table Conference. He saw that if Gandhi and he were to
go there as Advocates of the cooperation, there would be
a split in the Congress ranks, and the beloved son would
find himself isolated, heading the extremists. He then
had to make a rapid decision. If he allowed Congress to
split, the moderates had triumphed, and the Viceroy’s
policy was bound to be an overwhelming success. If he
supported his son, the unity of Congress would be
secured, its prestige in the eyes of the people would be
enhanced, and the only fly in the ointment would be that
he would have to break faith with Sapru and Lord Irwin.
The only question was when it came to a tussel between
his love for his son and his faith to his friend: what was
going to be the question on which he would break?
Gandhi and Motilal, who had been in close touch,
and the conference arrived, the day before with their
secret plan settled and ready for execution. Sapru and
Jinnah arrived in high spirits, expecting that the
afternoon conference would finally and definitely secure
Congress support. Not even Speaker Patel was in the
secret, and he too was optimistic. Mrs Naidu was
present, cheerful and vivacious as ever, not knowing and
having no inkling as to what was going to happen.
Gandhi was enjoying one of his usual and convenient
days of silence, and so no preliminary conference

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between the Indians was possible. Motilal was observed
to be distinctly distant and secretive, and after lunch the
five men proceeded to see Lord Irwin. Gandhi began
proceedings with perfunctory congratulatory statement
about Viceroy’s escape from bomb blast. The Viceroy,
who expected a reasonable sincere request for
enlightenment, was so prepared to cooperate that he had
actually brought with him a list of certain political
prisoners, whose release he was willing to contemplate.
Then the bombshell was thrown. Gandhi asked the
Viceroy to give a pledge that the Round Table Conference
would recommend nothing short of full Dominion Status,
and that the British Government would honor such a
pledge. The Viceroy, to put it mildly, was flabbergasted.
Sapru, Patel and Jinnah felt themselves betrayed and
could not believe their ears. Gandhi and Motilal were
rude to their collegues and rude to the Viceroy. They had
determined to force a break, and spared no pains to
succeed… But Gandhi and Motilal have denied the
substance of this interview. But it is, I, (Matlubul Hasan
Saiyid) maintained an accurate representation of what
took place and is based on the notes of the conversation,
which were taken down during the meeting by the
Viceroy’s Private Secretary. The official record still exists.
Unusual care was taken to see that Mr. Cunnigham’s
notes agreed with the recollection of those present, and
his original draft was amended and expanded in at least
one instant, of which I (M.Hasan) have personal
knowledge. Gandhi and Motilal retired from this interview
armed with a fresh grievance against the Government.
Motilal had escaped from the unwelcome shackles of the
moderates. He had betrayed his friend and ally Sapru

166
and could go to Lahore surrounded with a halo of
moderation, but also decorated with a garland of
Congress patriotism. Gandhi, too, had found a way out
from an association, which would circumscribe his
personal prestige and opportunities for personal
popularity. The two Congress leaders hastened to give
their version to the public. In their view the offer of the
British Government was not sincere. It meant nothing. It
was merely beating about the bush. Gandhi said that he
had given the British Government a year to show itself
amenable to reason, and prepared to accept Dominion
Status according to the Nehru Report model. He had
waited the whole year, he said, expecting some gesture,
some evidence of sincerity. He could find nothing
substantial in the Viceregal Declaration, nothing
satisfactory in his conversations with Lord Irwin. He then
proceeded to weep buckets of crocodile tears, and to
lament that if something satisfactory did not happen
before midnight of 31st December, he would with extreme
reluctance, and after a Gethsemane of prayer and fasting,
wake up on January 1st a convinced believer in
independence.
Jawaharlal was thus saved from political
isolation, when, after a few months, Motilal died and the
Congress leadership passed on to Sardar Patel, Gandhi
found the horizon clear to pursue his line of action, at
the cost of the prestige and honor of the Indian National
Congress and recommended the Gandhi-Irwin Pact to his
followers in the following terms:
“If the Congress succeeds in making its position
acceptable to the Conference, then I claim that the fruit
of that effort will be complete independence. But I know

167
that the way to it is weary. There are many rocks, many
pitfalls to be found across the way. But if Congressmen
will approach the new task to which they are called with
confidence and courage, I have no misgivings about the
result. It is, therefore, in their hands either to make
something noble and worth looking at out of the new
opportunity that has come to them, or, by lack of self-
confidence and want of courage, to fritter away the
opportunity. But I know that in this task Congressmen
will require the aid of the other parties, the aid of the
great princes of India, and last, but by no means the
least, the aid of Englishmen. I need not make any appeal
at the present juncture to the different parties. I have
little doubt that they are no less eager than Congressmen
for the real freedom of their country.”
(Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, pg 485-492)
Jinnah, as spokesman for the sixteen Muslim
delegates said: “…I am glad, Mr. President (MacDonald),
that you referred to the fact that the declarations made
by British sovereigns and statesmen from time to time
that Great Britain’s work in India was to prepare her for
self-Government have been plain. But I must emphasize
that India now expects translation and fulfillment of
these declarations into action.” In conclusion, Jinnah
said: “I must express my pleasure at the presence of the
Dominion Prime Ministers and representatives. I am glad
that they are here to witness the birth of a new Dominion
of India, which would be ready to march along with them
within the British Commonwealth of Nations.”
Jinnah again addressed the conference on 20th
November in which he said: “I have no hesitation in
conceding this position-that you (Great Britain) have a

168
great interest in India, both commercial and political, and
therefore you are a party, if I may say so, gravely
interested in the future constitution of India. But I want
you equally to concede that we have a greater and far
more vital interest than you have, because you have the
financial and commercial interest, and the political
interest, but to us it is all in all.” And as to the question
of parties, Jinnah stated that “There are four main
parties sitting round the table now. There are the British
party, the Indian princes, the Hindus and the Muslims.”
He warned that unless the Round Table negotiated a
settlement to satisfy the aspirations of India then the
seventy million Muslims and all others who had kept
aloof might be tempted to join the non-cooperation
movement. Jinnah then stated that: “India wants to be
mistress in her own house; and I cannot conceive of any
constitution that you may frame which will not transfer
responsibility in the Central Government to a Cabinet
responsible to the Legislature. It was the least that would
now suffice to satisfy political leaders through out the
subcontinent, those who came to London, as well as
those who had remained in British India’s crowded
prison cells.” He reminded MacDonald that two years
earlier, he had said: “I hope that within a period of
months, rather than years, there will be a new Dominion
of another race, a Dominion that will find self-respect as
an equal within the Commonwealth-I refer to India.”
After the plenary session, the conference divided
itself into several committees to go into details. The
Federal Structure Committee framed a federation
scheme, the other committees made a number of
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169
and so on. The results produced by these committees
were discussed at the Conference. But it was in the
Minorities Committee that the deadlock occurred. In that
it was agreed on principle that the proposed new
constitution must assure the minorities that their
interests would be safeguarded. Beyond this it was found
difficult to make any further headway. The Muslims and
the Sikhs demanded safeguards. Even the Depressed
Classes asserted their separate electoral identity. Jinnah
and Shafi insisted on communal safeguards as a
condition precedent to the working of any constitution to
be framed. Their stand was, “Either Jinnah’s 14 points or
none of any responsible constitution devoid of British
control.” These were the only possible alternatives
present in their thought.
On 4th January 1931, the Aga Khan, Jinnah and
Shafi called on Ramsay MacDonald to warn him that,
“unless his statement of the Government’s policy is
accompanied by an announcement of satisfactory
safeguards for the communities, most of the Muslim
delegates will dissociate themselves from the findings of
the conference.”
Ramsay MacDonald tried to win greater
cooperation from Jinnah during the conference by
casually remarking to him in the course of conversation
that in view of the forthcoming changes in India the
British Government would be looking for distinguished
Indians for appointment as Provincial Governors. The
obvious implication of this suggestion was that Jinnah
would have an excellent chance if he proved to be a good
boy. Jinnah at once made it clear to Ramsay MacDonald
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170
rejected the offer, which he believed was nothing less
than an attempt to bribe him.
(Jinnah of Pakistan: Stanley Wolpert, pg 123-125)
In summing up his speech the Prime Minister
made the following major points:
(a) The Government’s view was that responsibility
should be placed upon the Legislature both
Central and Provincial, subject to certain
safeguards;
(b) The Government took note of the unanimous
recommendation about federation;
(c) Regarding the minorities problem it was the
duty of the communities to come to an
agreement among themselves;
(d) Those who engaged in civil disobedience would
response to the Viceroy’s appeal made in the
Central Assembly and thus turn their attention
to co-operative work.
The Conference adjourned on 9th January 1931,
until the following 7th September.
Samuel Hoare in his book, “Nine Troubled
Decades,” writes: “Jinnah intermittently took prominent
part in the debates, but many of us could never follow
the movements of his volatile mind. He never seemed to
wish to work with anyone. Was he in favour of All-India
Federation? We could not tell for certain, though it is
worth remembering that he then never suggested the
division of India and the creation of Pakistan.Was he in
favour of provincial autonomy without change in the
center? Sometimes, he gave us the impression that he
did not wish to go beyond provincial autonomy, and at
other times that he demanded responsible Government

171
both in the center and provinces. It was this illusiveness
that made it difficult for us to cooperate with him, or for
him to give any clear lead to his Muslim collegues.”
British reactionaries were, however, dead set on
conceding nothing to Indians. Long before the conference
was convened, Winston Churchill had declared: “Sooner
or later you will have to crush Gandhi and the Indian
Congress and all they stand for.” In December, when the
London conference was still in session, he said: “The
British nation has no intention whatever to relinquishing
control of Indian life and progress… We have no intention
of casting away the most truly bright and precious jewel
in the Crown of the King, which, more than all our
Dominions and dependencies, constitutes the glory and
strength of the British Empire.”
(M.R. Jayakar: V.B. Kulkarni, pg 197-198)
Ramsay MacDonald, the Labour Prime Minister,
was non-commital. For him also, India was too great a
prize to be lost. Besides, the Labour Ministry was not
prepared to incur Tory antagonism by pursuing a
progressive India policy. “If,” writes H.N. Brailsford, “Mr.
MacDonald had then given publicly the pledge which Mr.
Gandhi sought, it is probable that both the opposition
parties could have repudiated it and brought his
Government down.” The communal bigots supported the
British reactionaries in ensuring the emptiness of the
deliberations.
(M.R. Jayakar: V.B.Kulkarni, pg 198)
Second Round Table Conference:
On 25th January 1931, Gandhi and the members
of the Congress Working Committee with several other
Congress leaders were released from jail. Motilal Nehru

172
immediately called a conference in Allahabad, which
decided that Gandhi should call on the Viceroy.
Accordingly, Gandhi met Lord Irwin in Delhi.
The Gandhi-Irwin parleys began on the afternoon
of 17th February 1931. On 4th March an agreement was
reached, which came to be known as Gandhi-Irwin Pact.
The important terms of the pact were as follows:
A. On behalf of the Congress Gandhi agreed’
1. To suspend the Civil Disobedience movement.
2. To participate in the forthcoming second Round
Table Conference for drafting a constitution for
India on the basis of (a) Federation (b)
Responsibility and (c) Adjustments and
safeguards that may be necessary in the
interest of India.
B. On behalf of the Government the Viceroy
agreed
1. To release all prisoners of non-violent activities;
2. To withdraw the Emergency Ordinances;
3. To permit people who live within certain
distance of the seashores to collect or
manufacture salt free of duty.
Jawaharlal Nehru took the pact as a surrender. He
in his autobiography at page 258 said: “Was it for this
that our people had behaved so gallantly for a year? Were
all our brave words and deeds to end in this?”
A special session of the Congress was held in
March 1931 at Karachi under the presidentship of Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel to ratify Gandhi-Irwin Pact. Gandhi
made a speech in which he said that he would refuse to
go to London, if he failed to solve the communal question
in India. “I do not guarantee,” he said, “that we will come

173
back with Swaraj, but I guarantee that we will not return
with slavery.”
Gandhi-Irwin Pact was ultimately ratified. It was
agreed that the Congress would participate in the Second
Round Table Conference and that its sole representative
would be Gandhi.
Jinnah had returned to India for a few days prior
to the Second Round Table Conference. In a speech at
Bombay, he expressed that the present age is an age of
organization and unless the Muslims organize themselves
there was no solution for them. He was glad, however, to
observe that members of his community were waking up
and that there was great activity among them. “I am an
Indian first and a Muslim afterwards,” he said, “But at
the same time I agree that no Indian can ever serve his
country, if he neglects the interests of the Muslims,
because it is by making Muslims strong, by bringing
them together, by encouraging them and by making them
useful citizens of the State that you will be able to serve
your country. What is a State? What is representative
Government? Does it mean that the seventy million
Muslims should be tied hand and foot in a constitution
where a particular class of Hindus can possibly tyrannize
over and deal with them as they like? Is that
representative Government? Is that democratic
Government? Certainly not.” Remarking on the future
constitution of India, he emphatically declared that no
Government of any country could succeed by keeping the
minorities under bondage and perpetual subjugation.
Similarly nobody could hope to make India strong by
suppressing the vital interests and political aspirations of
Muslims and untouchables, and people trying to indulge

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in such manoevres were only leading India to a weak and
degrading position from which it would be hard for her to
recover. I said this openly. I have no eye on any party. I
have no mind for popularity. I can tell you honestly that
the Hindus are foolish, utterly foolish in the attitude that
they have adopted today. The bulk of the Hindus have
lost their heads and their mentality, perhaps you may
not know, I know it. I assure that unless Hindus will
have the courage and confidence-they are afraid of
Muslims-this India will never get Swaraj. It is not the
joint or separate electorates or five or ten seats. Hindus
have not necessary courage. In the Punjab and Bengal,
Hindus were refusing to give Muslims a statutory
majority. I like straight play. Tell me that I do not want to
give you a majority in the Punjab and Bengal. Hindus do
not say that. They say, you can have a majority with joint
electorates. Hindus know perfectly well that Muslims
have got only 40% of voters in these provinces.” Jinnah
continued that unless certain reasonable safeguards and
brakes were provided for the purpose of preventing any
undue mischief, the constitution would not work.
On the eve of his departure for London, a
representative of the “Times of India,” Bombay
approached Jinnah in order to know his views about the
forthcoming Round Table Conference. Jinnah told the
representative: The success or the failure of the Round
Table Conference is entirely dependent on the
consideration of the Hindu-Muslim question… The
question of the future constitution of India is stupendous
and one feels there are rocks ahead, but given goodwill
and determination, we may yet find a solution which will
bring peace and prosperity to the people of India.” He

175
further told: “I am not likely to return for a considerable
long time. Nevertheless, India’s welfare and her future
progress will be certainly nearest my heart. I shall spare
no efforts to serve India.”
The Second Round Table Conference began on 7th
September 1931. Gandhi, the sole delegate of the
Congress arrived in London on 12th September and
remained in London till 5th December. All eyes were on
Gandhi, for his was the voice of Congress on every
committee as well as at the plenary session where he
spoke.
Jinnah felt gloomy about the conference and its
prospects, as he told his journalist friend Durga Das, at
lunch in Simpson’s: “What can you expect from a
jamboree of this kind? The British will only make an
exhibition of our difference.” He anticipated that nothing
would come of Gandhi’s appearance on the scene,
predicting that the British will make a fool of him, and he
will make a fool of them and asking, where is the
Congress claim that it represents the Muslims as well? I
expect nothing to come out of this conference.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 128)
Soon after the conference commenced its
business, it was found that the representatives of the
various communities had concluded a pact among
themselves demanding representation for minorities in
the proposed federal and provincial legislatures. Gandhi
protested and urged that the conference had assembled
mainly for the purpose of drawing up an All-India
Constitution and that priority should be given to the
main object of the conference. He argued that the
communal issue should be tackled later, after the basic

176
issues had been resolved. But, no heed was paid to his
protest. Ramsay MacDonald retorted that the Minorities
Pact represented the considered opinion of the
representatives of 115 millions of people of India and
therefore the British Government was bound to give
serious attention to it. He also administered a mild
rebuke to Gandhi telling him that his attitude on the
communal question was hampering the progress of
Constitution-making.
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 142)
The Federal Structure Committee met from 2-27
September under Lord Sankey’s Chairmanship. The next
day the Minorities Committee was reconvened by Ramsay
MacDonald, with Gandhi joining the ranks; it met till 18th
November, ten days after which the entire conference
gathered again in St. Jame’s Palace in plenary session.
Lord Sankey reported that his committee had
concluded its lengthy deliberations with the hope that an
All-India Federation was possible. However, Jinnah
insisted: “I am still of the opinion that the achievement
and completion of the scheme of All-India Federation
must, with the best will in the world, take many years.
No outstanding vital ingredient of the scheme has yet
been agreed upon.” He urged the British Government to
give Provincial Autonomy without delay simultaneously
with responsibility at the Centre in British India. He
further advised Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to
decide communal question provisionally. He said: “If the
British Government settle the communal question and
make a substantial advance towards real responsibility at
the Centre in British India, both Hindus and Muslims
will realize the earnestness on the part of the

177
Government and the bulk of the people will accept their
decision.”
Gandhi was last to address the conference on 1st
December. He said: “All the other parties at this meeting
represent sectional interests. Congress alone claims to
represent the whole of India and all interests. It is no
communal organization; it is a determined enemy of
communalism in any shape or form. And yet here I see
that the Congress is treated as one of the parties. I wish I
could convince all the British public men, the British
Ministers, that the Congress is capable of delivering the
goods. The Congress is the only All-India wide national
organization, bereft of any communal basis. Believe me
that Muslim problem exists here, and I repeat, that
without the problem of minorities being solved there is no
Swaraj for India, there is no freedom for India… But I do
not despair of some day or other finding a real and living
solution in connection with the minorities’ problem. I
repeat so long as the wedge in the shape of foreign rule
divides community from community and class from class,
there will be no living solution, there will be no living
friendship between these communities… Were Hindus
and Musalmans and Sikhs always at war with one
another when there was no British rule, when there was
no English face seen there? This quarrel is not old; this
quarrel is coeval with the acute shame. I dare to say it is
coeval with the British advent.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 128)
Gandhi put forward the suggestion that the
Minorities’ Sub Committee be adjourned Sine Die and
the fundamentals of the constitution be hammered into
shape as quickly as may be. Meanwhile, the informal

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work of discovering a true solution of the communal
problem will and must continue; only it must not baulk
or be allowed to block the progress of constitution-
making. Attention must be diverted from it and
concentrated on the main part of the structure.
The Prime Minister, in his concluding observations
said: “…The British Government wants to go on; the
British Government wants you to go on. The British
Government will take its action if you cannot go on to an
end, because we are determined to make such
improvements in the Government of India as will make
the Government of India something that is capable of
greater and greater expansion towards liberty. That is
what we want. I appeal to the Delegates here today-
Delegates representing all communities-do not stand in
our way; because that is what happening.”
Acting on the suggestion of the Prime Minister, the
minorities met to consider if they could produce a
settlement. They produced a settlement which was
submitted to the Prime Minister before the next meeting
of the Minorities Committee, which took place on 13th
November 1931.
In his opening remarks, the Prime Minister said:
“The work of this committee, was from the very beginning
of supreme importance, and I am sorry that you have
been unable to present to us an agreed plan.
“Last night, however, I received a deputation
representing the Mohammedans, the Depressed Classes,
a section of the Indian Christians, the Anglo-Indians and
the British community. They came with a document,
which embodied an agreement that they had come to
amongst themselves. They informed me, that it covered

179
something in the region of 46% of the population of
British India.
“I think the best thing would be, to treat this
document as a document, which is official to the records
of this committee and in order that may be done I shall
ask His Highness The Aga Khan formally to present it
here, so that it may be entered in our official record.”
His Highness The Aga Khan then got up and said:
“Mr. Prime Minister, on behalf of the Muhammedans, the
Depressed Classes, the Anglo-Indians, the Europeans
and a considerable section of Indian Christian groups, I
present the document embodying the agreement which
has been arrived at between them with regard to the
inter-communal problem with which the Round Table
Conference in general and the Minorities Committee in
particular are concerned. We desire to make it clear that
this agreement has been arrived at after careful and
anxious consideration of this difficult and complicated
problem and must be taken as a whole. All parts of the
agreement stand or fall as a whole.” This document was
known as the “Minorities Pact.”
In the general discussion that followed, Gandhi
said: “I would like to repeat what I said before, that, while
the Congress will always accept any solution that may be
acceptable to the Hindus, the Muhammedans and the
Sikhs, the Congress will be no party to the special
electorates for any other minorities.”
At the plenary session on the 1st December 1931,
the Prime Minister announced the decision that the
North-West Frontier Province should be constituted a
separate province, and that Sind should be constituted a

180
separate province, if satisfactory means of financing
could be found.
Regarding the main problem of constitutional
progress of India, the Second Round Table Conference
did not, on the whole, advance the matter much further
beyond where it was left by the first Round Table
Conference.
M.R.Jayakar says: “Jinnah, whose political stock
rose beyond all recognition, played an evasive and
enigmatic part in its proceedings. Asked why he did not
cooperate with Gandhi, and Sapru to promote communal
unity, he replied that his attempts would have failed
because of the opposition of Mian-Fazl-I-Husain and the
Aga Khan.
In later years, it was revealed in the Legislative
Assembly that the Aga Khan, who had played a decisive
role to bring the Round Table Conference to a deadlock,
had asked to be raised to the status of a ruling prince in
India by ceding some territory to him as a reward for his
destructive role at he Round Table Conference.
(M.R. Jayakar by V.B.Kulkarni, pg 204)
Gandhi left London in friendly mood. He had
arranged to visit Rome on his return journey, not to see
Mussolini but to see Signora Montessori, the woman
Pope of Educational Reforms. In Rome the usual crowd of
admirers gathered around him. In the ship that took him
to India from Italy, Gandhi heard a wireless message
from Rome describing a fictitious interview that he was
said to have given to Gayada of GIORNALE D’ ITALIA.
According to this Gandhi had made the following
declaration:

181
“The Round Table Conference has been for the
Indians a long and slow agony. It has, however, served to
make quite clear the spirit of the Indian Nation and of its
leaders, and to unmask the true intentions of England,
which was to take the form of passive resistance and the
boycott of British goods. He considered that the boycott
would prove a powerful means of rendering more acute
the British crisis already difficult through the devaluation
of the currency and unemployment.”
When Samuel Hoare heard a report of the
interview, he telegraphed Gandhi for its confirmation.
Gandhi replied that he had made no such statement and
that the reported interview was a fake. After receipt of
Gandhi’s reply, Hoare said: “While the disclaimer brought
me great relief, the harm was unfortunately done. The lie
like caumny in Don Basilios famous song in the Barber of
Seville, had already spread over the world, and had been
accepted in London and Delhi as clear proof of Gandhi’s
irreconciliable opposition. “We always told you so,” said
the diahard critics. “We always know that he was our
bitterest enemy.”
(Nine Troubled Years: Templewood, pg 65)
Communal Award:
On 17th August 1932, Ramsay MacDonald
announced the Communal Award simultaneously from
London and Simla. As a background to it, a Government
communiqué stated: “The Minorities Committee had
failed to solve the communal problem at the Round Table
Conference. The Prime Minister had offered to give an
award himself, but this was not unanimously acceptable
to the members. In the final plenary session therefore, he
declared that, in view of the RTC members’ continued

182
failure to bring about a communal settlement, the
Government might have to frame and provide one.”
The Communal Award accorded separate
electorates for Muslims, Europeans, Sikhs, Indian
Christians and Anglo-Indians. Seats were reserved for
Marathas in certain selected general constituencies in
Bombay. The Depressed Classes were given seats which
were to be filled by election from special constituencies in
which they alone could vote, though they were entitled to
vote also in the general constituencies. A number of
seats, also communally divided, were allotted to women.
Special seats were allotted to labour, commerce and
industry, mining and planting, and landlords.
Dr. K.M.Munshi, in his “Pilgrimage to Freedom” at
pages 34 and 35 writes: “Months later an interesting
development took place, which could have had great
possibilities, had we been gifted with miraculous
foresight. Jinnah apparently got wind of our Council
entry Programme, and told me in the Bar Library of the
Bombay High Court: ‘You will join me and let us jointly
prepare our case against the White Paper. Let us accept
the Communal Award so that even the Muslims will come
round.’”
Munshi further writes: “Pursuant to our talk,
Jinnah invited Sarojini Naidu, Bhulabhai Desai, the
eminent lawyer, K.F.Nariman, the then President of the
Bombay Provincial Congress Committee, S.A. Brelvi,
Editor of ‘Bombay Chronicle,’ Mathuradas Tricumdas,
Gandhiji’s nephew and an influential Congressman of
Bombay, and me. We met twice. On the first occasion we
just talked about things in general. On the second
occasion Bhulabhai could not come, and Mathuradas

183
and myself, the only persons to attend, made it clear that
we could not support the Communal Award. We met
again in Sarojini Naidu’s room in Taj Mahal Hotel, but
Jinnah was not present; Bhulabhai agreed with us. We
decided to drop the matter.”
Gandhi, who had earlier declared that he would
resist the grant of separate electorates to the Depressed
Classes even with his life, announced his determination
to fast until the Award was modified so far as it
concerned the Depressed Classes. The fast, which was
termed as Epic Fast commenced in the Yervada Jail on
20th September 1932, creating a heart-breaking situation.
An entire nation was in agony. A most precious life was
at stake. The Hindu leaders met in Bombay under the
presidentship of Madan Mohan Malviya. The Depressed
Classes leaders headed by Dr. B.R.Ambedkar were
consulted. There was a prolonged conference in Yervada
jail among the Hindu and Depressed Classes leaders. The
leaders, ultimately came to an agreement, which came to
be known as “Poona Pact.” A cable was sent to the Prime
Minister requesting him to withdraw the separate
electorates decision for the Depressed Classes. The
British Government having accepted the Poona Pact on
26th September, Gandhi broke his fast to the great relief
of his countrymen.
The Communal Award assured Muslims some 51%
of the legislative seats in the Punjab, and just under 50%
in Bengal, where special interest Europeans would hold
the balance of power, retaining separate electorates and
Muslim representation in excess of total population
proportions in all Hindu majority provinces.
Jinnah decides to settle in London:

184
It seems that by the end of the second Round
Table Conference, Jinnah had retired into a state of
stubbornness and eclipse. He was not included in the
third Round Table Conference, which began on 17th
November 1932 and dispersed on 24th December. He was
depressed and chose not to return to India. He told a
Muslim student in Oxford: “The Hindus are short-sighted
and I think incorrigible. The Muslim camp is full of
spineless people who will consult the Deputy
Commissioner about what they should do. Where,
between these two groups, is any place for a man like
me.” Abandoning all other interests, he decided to make
his home in London and to practise at the Privy Council
Bar. He bought a three-storied West Heath House in West
Heath Road from Lady Graham Wood. In September
1931, he took possession of the house. His sister Fatima
joined him. His thirteen year old daughter Dina, entered
in an English boarding school, spent her holidays with
them. His practice was flourishing. It was said that he
wanted to become a Labour member of the House of
Commons, so that he could fight India’s battles in
Westminster, as Dadabhai Naoroji had fought them
before. At the time of his death in 1948, the Sunday
Chronicle (Manchester) recalled that Jinnah had
addressed the Selection Committee of the Yorkshire
divisional Labour Party, but was turned down because of
his immaculate dress. “We do not want a toff like that,”
one of the Labour men remarked.
There is no proof in any letters, nor any records in
the archives of the Trade Union Congress to support this
story; nor did Jinnah ever refer to such a wish in his
subsequent speeches. There is only a report in the

185
Yorkshire Post, of April 1932, of a speech which he
made to the members of the Leeds Luncheon Club, to
whom he said: “If the British people wish to bring peace
and good-will in India, its best policy would be to
introduce at once a bill giving India self-government, and
to leave out the idea of a federation of all India…the
federation is a golden illusion, a mirage, to my mind…”
(Jinnah-Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 100)
Jinnah’s life was now dignified and secure: his
fortune was growing and he could enjoy the pleasant
luxuries he had learned to accept- carefully chosen
dinners at the Carlton Grill, and talks with calm,
intelligent lawyers, in the still security of their London
clubs. Also, enjoyed the constant companionship of his
sister, Miss Fatima Jinnah, who had resigned from her
work in Bombay, to travel to England and be with her
brother. From this time to his death, she abandoned all
other interests, to his care, and his career.
On Saturdays and Sundays, Jinnah liked to walk
across Hampstead Heath to Kenwood-past jack Straw’s
Castle, the inn before which Karl Marx used to sit during
his exile, drinking ginger beer with his children. Jinnah
seemed to enjoy leisure, for the first time in his life. These
were Jinnah’s years of order and contemplation, wedged
in between the time of early struggle, and the final storm
of conquest.
One morning in November 1932, Jinnah read a
review of H.C.Armstrong’s Grey Wolf, An Intimate
Study of a Dictator, in the Literary Supplement of the
‘Times.’ After breakfast he walked-past the pond and
down the hill at Hampstead-and bought a copy of the
book. Jinnah read of Mustafa Kemal in the full flood-

186
light of his great prestige, high up alone on a pinnacle of
greatness. It would not have occurred to him that he was
to enjoy similar prestige and eminence, and achieve
them, not by ordering two thousand of his cavalry to
advance towards the English lines, but with the lone
sword of his own argument, over a conference table.
(Jinnah-Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 102 - 103)
In Cambridge a pamphlet was published in 1932,
written by 35 year old Muslim student from the Punjab,
Choudhary Rahmat Ali. “Now or Never” was its title; it
was subtitled “Are we to live or perish for ever? Rahmat
Ali identified himself as Founder of the Pakistan National
Movement and named three associates, also Cambridge
students, Mohmmad Aslam Khan, Sheik Mohammad
Sadiq, and Inayat Ullah Khan, who apparently
contributed to the contents of the pamphlet, which first
publicized the name, “Pakistan.” Rahmat Ali’s proposed
solution of the great Hindu-Muslim problem was written
on behalf of the thirty million Muslims of PAKISTAN, who
live in the five Northern Units of India-Punjab, N.W.F.P.,
Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan, embodying their
inexorable demand for the recognition of their separate
national status as distinct from the rest of India. Rahmat
Ali and his associates insisted that their plan was
basically different from the suggestion put forward by Dr.
Sir Mohammad Iqbal, whose Northwest unit was to have
remained within an all India federation, by insisting:
“These provinces should have a separate Federation of
their own. There can be no peace and tranquility in the
land if we, the Muslims, are duped into Hindu-dominated
Federation where we cannot be the masters of our own
destiny and captains of our own souls.”

187
Sir Reginald Craddock, appointed to Linlithgow’s
Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, also
knew about the Pakistan idea by 1st August 1933, when
he asked Abdullah Yusuf Ali, of the North-West Frontier
Province, “whether there is a scheme for Federation of
Provinces under the name of Pakistan?” Yusuf Ali’s
answer was: “As far as I know, it is only a student’s
scheme; no responsible people have put it forward.” Sir
Reginald was more sanguine about its prospects,
however, stating: “They have not so far, but …You have
advanced very quickly in India, and it may be, when
those students grow up it will be put forward; that
scheme must be in the minds of the people anyhow.” Mr
Zafrulla Khan, who became Pakistan’s Foreign Minister,
had never heard of the word or movement. Mr Isaac Foot,
a Liberal member of Parliament asked. “What is
Pakistan?” To this Yusuf Ali, who served as a spokesman
for the joint five-member Muslim delegation of the
Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference to
the Parliamentary Committee, replied: “So far we have
considered it, we have considered it chimerical and
impracticable. It means the Federation of certain
provinces.” Yet Reginald was not willing to drop this
“chimerical” subject, pressing on with, “I have received
communications about the proposal of forming a
Federation of certain Muslim States under the name of
Pakistan.” Another member of the Muslim deputation,
Dr. Khlifa Shujauddin, insisted, “Perhaps it will be
enough to say that no such scheme has been considered
by any representative gentlemen or association so far.”
If Jinnah knew about the Pakistan scheme at this
date, there was no indication in his papers of such

188
knowledge or of any personal interest expressed in it. Nor
would he agree to meet with Rahmat Ali the following
year, despite several attempts by the latter to discuss his
idea with Jinnah in London, nor was Jinnah willing as
yet to accept the Muslim League’s invitation to return to
India to preside over its annual deliberations in Delhi in
April 1933. “I cannot return to India before December
next,” he replied to the telegraphic invitation from Abdul
Matin Choudhary in March. In his reply he further said:
“Besides I do not see what I can do there at present. You
very rightly suggest that I should enter the Assembly. But
is there much hope in doing anything there? There are
questions which still make me feel that there is no room
for my services in India. Yet I am sorry to repeat, but
there is no chance of doing anything to save India till the
Hindus realize the true position… The Hindus are being
fooled…by chance any scheme goes through, it will be
worse than what is at present… Thank you for your
suggestion that I should try and stand for election as Sir
Ibrahim Rahimtoola is going to resign. Well I cannot say
till I come to India as I am due in December, at any rate
for a few months.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 131-133)
In July 1933, Liaquat Ali Khan and his beautiful
Brahmin wife arrived in London on their honeymoon.
Jinnah invited them for dinner at his Hampstead house.
After dinner Liaquat Ali urged Jinnah: “You must come
back. The people need you. You alone can put new life
into the League and save it.” Begum Liaquat also made
an appeal. Jinnah listened to Liaquat and his wife and in
the end said: “You go back and survey the situation; test
the feelings of all parts of the country. I trust your

189
judgment. If you say, “Come back,” I will give up my life
here and return.”
Liaquat did as he was told. He amassed his
evidence, talked to hundred people and only when he was
convinced, he sent a message to Jinnah to return.
Jinnah returned to Bombay in 1934. One evening
he met Diwan Chamanlal at the Willington Club and told
him: “Politics! I am finished. But if you could only get six
persons like you to support me, I would come back.”
Diwan Chamanlal sent telegrams to six of the
honest and stalwart ones, asking them if they would
support Jinnah if he returned. They all replied “Yes.” He
already had the whole-hearted devotion of Liaquat Ali
Khan, to encourage these encouraging signs. Jinnah
returned to England again and gave up his practice
before the Privy Council; he sold his house at Hampstead
and he came home to Bombay.
Mr. T.W.Ramsay, who was Jinnah’s neighbour in
King’s Bench Walk described their farewell thus; “I
remember the day when he came in and said he was
returning home. Several other lawyers had their eye on
his beautiful office furniture and they wished to buy it.
There were some lovely mahogany pieces. One of my
collegues said to Jinnah that he would buy it all, but he
answered, ‘it is yours’ I do not care about these chattels. I
am going on a grand mission to India.”
(Jinnah-Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 106)
Permanent President of Muslim League:
In April 1934, the Muslim League unanimously
made Jinnah its permanent President. In October, while
still in England, he was elected to the Indian Legislative
Assembly, unopposed from the Muslim constituency of

190
Bombay. He came to India in January, 1935 to attend the
first session of the Assembly. In February, he moved an
amendment in the debate on the Indian constitutional
reform. His three-part amendment was to accept the
Communal Award segment of the White Paper until a
substitute is agreed upon by various communities
concerned; to urge the removal of objectionable features
from the provincial government section, particularly the
establishment of Second Chambers, the extraordinary
and special powers of the Governors, provision relating to
police rules, Secret Service and Intelligence Departments,
which render the real control and responsibility of the
Executive and Legislature ineffective; and to reject the
all-India federation scheme proposed for the center as a
thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally
unacceptable. Jinnah in a forceful speech made in favour
of his amendment said: “My amendment accepts the
Communal Award until a substitute is agreed upon
between the communities concerned. It may be that our
Hindu friends are not satisfied with Communal Award,
but at the same time I can also tell the House that my
Muslim friends are not satisfied with it either…and, again
speaking as an individual, my self-respect will never be
satisfied until we produce our own scheme… But why do
I accept it? …I accept it because we have done everything
that we could so far to come to a settlement…therefore,
whether I like it or whether I do not like it, I accept it,
because unless I accept that no scheme of Constitution is
possible. ...Sir, this is a question of minorities and it is a
political issue… Minorities means a combination of
things. It may be that a minority has a different religion
from the other citizens of the country. Their language

191
may be different, their race may be different, their culture
may be different, and the combination of all these various
elements-religion, culture, race, arts, music, and so forth
makes the minority a separate entity in the State, and
that separate entity as an entity wants safeguards.
Surely, therefore, we must face this question as a
political problem; we must solve it and not evade it.”
Jinnah’s argument carried the House by a vote of
68 to 15 with the official block and elected Europeans
voting with him.
Jinnah’s speech in the Assembly raised the hope
on all the sides that there would be a settlement of
communal problems by mutual agreement. At this time
Dr. Rajendra Prasad was the Congress President and he
was also anxious for a settlement. Both of them made
sincere efforts for an agreed solution, but unfortunately
they failed to evolve a formula, which could satisfy all
parties concerned. Ultimately, they issued the following
statement:
“We have made earnest efforts to find a solution.
We regret that in spite of our best efforts, we have not
been able to find a formula. We realize that the
communal harmony and concord are essential for the
progress of the country and we can only hope that forces
will arise which will make a future attempt more fruitful.”
Jinnah was so anxious to arrive at a settlement
with the Congress that he often absented himself from
the Assembly debates so as to be free to resume his
conversations with Dr. Rajendra Prasad. He was very
much impressed with his talks with Rajendra Prasad and
realized the difficulties the later had with the extreme
attitude of Hindu Mahasabha. Jinnah, however, hoped:

192
“The leaders of the Congress with their wider experience
and very good training, would overcome that section and
assure the Muslims that it is not going to be a Hindu
Government, but an Indian Government in which the
Muslims will not only have a fair and just treatment but
also that they will be treated as the equals of the
Hindus…”
(Mohammad Ali Jinnah by M.H Saiyid, pg 526)
Jinnah’s strategy at this point was to turn back
toward the Congress to see if its leadership might not, in
fact, be prepared to concede all that MacDonald’s
Communal Award had promised to Muslims, thus
clearing the way for Hindus and Muslims to join forces in
a common front against the White Paper. Jinnah hoped
the time was ripe for communal peace and was ready to
launch a new series of talks aimed at weaning Congress
from its dependence upon the Hindu Mahasabha
position. “Can we at this eleventh hour bury the hatchet,
and forget the past in the presence of imminent danger,”
Jinnah asked Congress in his statement to the
Associated Press: “Nothing will give me greater happiness
than to bring about complete cooperation and friendship
between Hindus and Muslims; and in this desire, my
impression is that I have the solid support of
Musalmans…Muslims are in no way behind any other
community in their demand for national self-government.
The crux of the whole issue, therefore, is: Can we
completely assure Muslims that the safeguards to which
they attach vital importance will be embodied in the
future constitution of India?”
Jinnah’s position at this time was rather peculiar.
He was admired among the intelligentsia and educated

193
Hindus for his patriotism and political sagacity, but the
extremist Hindus, particularly the Hindu Mahasabha,
looked upon him with suspicion. Among the Musalmans,
a section believed that his nationalistic views were not
altogether serviceable to Muslim interests. British were
not happy with him because of his strong criticism of the
new Government of India Act.
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 157)
Jinnah’s anxiety to settle all communal problems
by mutual agreement is well illustrated by the following
incident.
In March 1936, great communal tension arose
between the Muslims and the Sikhs for the possession of
a building at Shahidganj, Lahore. The Muslims claimed
the building as an old mosque and their claim was
denied by the Sikhs. The situation was going out of
control. In these circumstance, Jinnah was asked to
settle the dispute. He accepted the invitation and came to
Lahore. He was very much vexed that in those
momentous times, the Muslims and the Sikhs should
fritter away their energies in communal squabbles. In a
meeting of the Muslims in Lahore, he said: “While we are
not going to give up our claim for Shahidganj, we are
going to make every effort for an honorable
understanding with the sister community. We shall seek
all remedies, by means of constitutional and peaceful
methods, and there are many avenues and channels
open to us…There is no question of defiance to or
intimidation of the sister community. The Sikhs are a
great community and nothing will please us more than
an honorable settlement with them.”

194
On his initiative, a strong reconciliation committee
was formed consisting of Sir Mohd Iqbal, Raja Narendra
Nath, Sardar Buta Singh and several other prominent
Hindu, Muslim and Sikh leaders and the dispute was
amicably settled. His Excellency the Governor of the
Punjab paid the following tributes to Jinnah’s peace-
efforts:
“I am greatly obliged to the efforts of Mr. Jinnah
for this improvement and I wish to pay an unqualified
tribute to the work he has done and is doing. Mr. Jinnah
succeeded in his first task, namely, bringing the Muslim
agitation to strictly constitutional and legal lines, and
thus made it possible for Government to take action for
which they had been awaiting an opportunity.”
(Jinnah by M.H.Saiyid, pg 532-533)
Hector Bolitho, in his book, “Jinnah-Creator of
Pakistan at page 111 says: “The episode was important
because it had obliged Jinnah to apply his theories to a
specific incident; important also because it revealed
Liaquat Ali Khan’s influence on his leader. Up to this
time, Jinnah had never stepped down, to mingle with the
people in their troubles: he had usually theorized over
them, from afar. But, within twelve months of the first
elections under the new constitution, Jinnah was
learning to come closer to the voters who were to decide
the shape of India’s political affairs, and his own destiny,
in the next decade.”
Jinnah always tried to be persuasive, as will be
seen from a speech he made in April 1936 before the
Jamait-ul-ulema Conference at Delhi. He said: “It was for
the first time that a representative Government was being
established in India and this meant the rule of majority,

195
and naturally the minorities had apprehensions as to
what the majority would do. Majorities were likely to be
tyrannical. Power and authority were likely to intoxicate
people; therefore provisions for safeguards are essential
for the minorities in any scheme of a democratic
constitution.” In the same speech, he said: “The eighty
million Muslims of India are willing and even more
anxious than any other community to fight for the
freedom of Mother India, hand in hand with other
communities.”
(Jinnah by M.H.Saiyid, pp 537-538)
Earlier in March, while speaking to some of the
members of the League in Delhi, Jinnah said: “We must
think of the interests of the community. Unless you make
the best efforts, you will fail and you will command no
respect and no body will bother to consult you. Organize
yourselves and play your part… The Hindus and Muslims
must be organized separately, and once they are
organized they will understand each other better, and
then we will have not to wait for years for an
understanding…I am helping eighty million people, and if
they are more organized they will be all the more useful
for the national struggle.”
(Jinnah-Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 112)
Bombay Session of the Muslim League:
The Muslim League met in Bombay in April 1936.
The Bombay session of the Muslim League initiated the
process of transforming the Muslim League into a mass
movement with district branch volunteers throughout the
country to spread the League’s message in every Muslim
town and village. An initial fund of half a million was
raised by the League Council to pay for expanded

196
secretariat needs. The student volunteers were recruited
from Aligarh and other universities to carry on the
political spade work. Jinnah’s idea voiced by Sir Syed
Wazir Hasan in his presidential address, was to issue a
joint Congress-League invitation to all other progressive
political parties in the country, to find such minimum
measure of agreement to act together to draft
constitution for India. It was one more try for the original
Lucknow Pact approach and pre-Nehru report all parties
conference concept. He had even gone so far as to draft
four points that would serve to lure Congress Liberals,
and possibly even the Mahasabha to a Round Table
Conference, this time on Indian soil.
1. A democratic responsible government, with
adult franchise, to take place of the present
system;
2. Repeal of all exceptionally repressive laws and
the granting of the right of free speech,
freedom of the press and organization;
3. Immediate economic relief to the peasantry;
state provision for educated and uneducated
unemployed; and an eight-hour working day,
with fixed minimum wages for the workers;
4. Introduction of free, compulsory primary
education.
Jinnah moved the resolution stating League’s
emphatic protest against forcing the constitution as
embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, upon
the people of India against their will, and in spite of their
repeated disapproval and dissent. Speaking on the
resolution, Jinnah advised his followers, indeed all
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197
the Germans had reacted to the Treaty of Versailles. He
viewed constitutional agitation as the only sound
approach for pressuring the British into changing their
scheme, since, as he put it, armed revolution is an
impossibility, while non-cooperation had been tried and
found a failure. To effect such a constitutional
transformation, however, required all communities to
stand shoulder to shoulder.”
That same month, Jinnah stood before the Muslim
League, urging his followers to stand shoulder to
shoulder with Congress and other Hindu majority parties
in the nation.
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 140-141)
To strengthen the Muslim League, bolster its
bargaining position, and help prepare it for contesting
elections, Jinnah was authorized at its Bombay meeting
to appoint and preside over a new Central Parliamentary
Board and affiliated provincial parliamentary boards.
These boards, similar to those earlier established by
Congress, were to become Jinnah’s organizational arms
in extending his power over the entire Muslim
community. It was not before late May that he managed
to win acceptance from 54 prominent Muslim politicians
to serve on his central board, which met for the first time
in Lahore from June 8-11, 1936. Sir Fazl-I died on July
9, removing Jinnah’s foremost rival from the venue of his
board’s birth. Jinnah’s lieutenants included men of
wealth and business experience as well as wisdom.
Elections to Provincial Assemblies:
The elections to the Provincial Assemblies were held
in 1937 under the Government of India Act of

198
1935. When the results of the elections were
declared, it was found that the Congress had an
overwhelming victory in comparison with the Muslim
League and all other parties. In seven provinces, it
obtained clear majority and only in Bengal, Punjab and
Sind, it was in minority. The Muslim League could not
make any headway in the Muslim majority provinces of
Punjab and Bengal. In the Punjab, the majority of the
Muslim seats went not to the League but to the Unionist
Party led by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan. In Bengal, it was
not the Muslim League but the Krishak-Praja Party of
Maulvi Fazlul Haque, which captured the largest number
of Muslim seats. Out of a total of 485 Muslim seats, the
League was able to secure only 108 seats. The Congress
contested 58 Muslim seats, through the nationalist
Muslims and won 26.
B.R. Nanda in his book, “Critics of Gandhi, at
pages 86-88 says: “Jinnah met with an electoral disaster
of the first magnitude in 1937. Not only had the Muslim
electorate failed to vote his party to office in the Muslim-
majority provinces, his party had been routed. It seemed
he could do little to improve his position until the next
round of elections. He set out to achieve through a
propaganda what the ballot box had denied him. He
decided to use the dynamic of religious emotions to
acquire political influence and power. Nehru was
horrified when during a bye-election in U.P. in 1937,
Jinnah appealed in the name of Allah and the Holy Koran
for support of the Muslim League candidate. “To explain
the name of God and religion in an election context,”,
Nehru declared, “is an extraordinary thing…even for a
humble canvasser. For Mr. Jinnah to do so is

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inexplicable. I would beg him to consider this aspect of
the question.”
B.R.Nanda further says: “When Nehru returned
from Europe in 1938, he remarked: “The League leader
had begun to echo the Fascist tirade against democracy…
Nazis were wedded to negative policy. So also was the
League. The League was anti-Hindu, anti-Congress, anti-
national. The Nazis raised the cry of hatred against the
Jews, the League raised its cry against the Hindus.”
Some time after the election results were out K.M.
Munshi saw Gandhi at Wardha and pressed his view that
the Congress should accept office in the provinces where
it held majority. Rajgopalachari had also been pressing
Gandhi for the same.
Gandhi told Munshi in his characteristic knack of
giving a political formula a moral edge, that he would
advise the Working Committee to accept office only where
the Congress had a majority in the Provincial
Legislatures and that too under certain conditions. He
told Munshi: “If I invite you to my place, I have to assure
you that I will treat you as a friend. If the Government of
India wants us to accept the office, they must assure us
that the Governor will not use his powers under the 1935
Act.”
On 22nd June 1937, the Viceroy Linlithgow, issued
a statement, the substance of which was that the
Governors would not provoke conflict with the Ministers.
On 7th July, the Congress Working Committee,
which met at Wardha resolved that “Congressmen be
permitted to accept office where they may be invited
thereto. But it desires to make it clear that office is to be
accepted and utilized for the purpose of working in

200
accordance with the lines laid down in the Congress
Policy of combating the new Act on the one hand and
prosecuting a constructive program on the other.”
The Congress ministries were formed in eight
provinces, including Bombay. A serious situation arose
with regard to the choice of the Muslim member,
wherever Congress ministries were formed. At that time it
did not appear to be formidable; but, as events were to
show ten years later, it was the beginning of the end of
united India.
Democratically speaking, the election had
established the Congress claim to represent the country
as a whole, but only technically. Out of a total of 836
general i.e. Hindu seats in the Provinces, it had won 715
seats. But the Congress Muslims had fared very badly;
out of a total of 485 Muslim seats in the Provinces, the
Congress could contest only 58 seats and win 26.
The situation in the United Provinces and Bombay
was particularly difficult. In U.P., the Congress had
contested 9 seats out of 66 Muslim seats and lost all; In
Bombay, it had contested 2 Muslim seats out of 30 and
lost both.
In General Election, the League could win only 108
seats on its official ticket; in the Province of Bombay it
had won only 20 seats out of 30, the rest going to the
independents.
Jinnah was in a depressed mood. Rejected by the
Muslim electorate, suspected by the orthodox Leaguers,
and slighted by the British, he hoped for recovery with
Congress help. Quite for some time after the elections he
was trying for an understanding with the Congress for
Ministry making. During the elections in the United

201
Provinces the League had opposed the powerful groups of
Muslim landlords and taluqdars and had maintained
rapproachment with the Congress. It was in this context
and in that province that Jinnah thought of an
experiment on Congress-League coalition and hoped that
a success there might lead to similar experiments
elsewhere. But when his emissary Khaliquzzaman first
broached this idea to Nehru, the latter showed no
interest. Subsequently the Chief Minister designate of the
United Provinces, Govind Ballabh Pant, and the League
leaders discussed the issue but could not reach
agreement. In mid-July 1937, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
finally laid down conditions for Congress-League
cooperation viz. that the Muslim League group in the U.P.
Legislature should cease to function as a separate group
and that the Muslim League Parliamentary Board in U.P.
should be dissolved. The negotiations continued for a few
days more before they finally broke down.
K.M. Munshi writes: After the elections were over
and the Congress had agreed to accept office, Jinnah told
me that ‘we’ (Congress and the Muslim League) should
work together. I promised to convey his wishes to Sardar
and Gandhiji, which I did. I understand at the time that
Jinnah had a similar discussion with B.G. Kher. After we
were sworn in as Ministers, Sir Cowsji Jehangir, formally
approached Sardar and the Maulana, on Jinnah’s behalf.
At the time, both of them were my guests in Poona, and
Kher and myself were present on several occasions when
the discussions took place.”
Munshi further writes: “The League wanted two
Muslim Ministers in the Bombay Cabinet; when
appointed they would not join the Congress nor accept its

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discipline. In effect, they would be at the disposal of
Jinnah to obstruct, defy or sabotage and, by using a veto,
black-mail the Congress into submission. As this kind of
arrangement would reduce Prliamentary Government and
joint responsibility to mockery, both Sardar and Maulana
could not entertain the demand.”
Munshi continued: “About 8 or 10 independent
Muslim members met Maulana and Sardar during those
days, each one pressing his claim to be included in the
Ministry. Ultimately Mohamad Yunus Nuri, a lawyer from
Ahemadabad joined the Congress and was given a place
in the Bombay Cabinet.”
(Pilgrimage to Freedom: K.M. Munshi, pg 47-48)
Jinnah’s ego as a formidable former Congress
leader was deeply offended at what he regarded as
neglect and disregard on the part of persons whom he
regarded as his juniors in national politics and his
reaction was one of raging fury. An earlier statement by
Nehru that, “In the final analysis there are only two
forces in India today-British imperialism and the
Congress representing Indian nationalism” continued to
jar on his ears as he began to read between the lines of
Nehru’s latest Muslim mass contact theory. On 26th July
1937, Jinnah expressed his bitter feelings in a statement
saying:
“The Congress policy was that Musalmans should
join the Congress unconditionally and sign their pledge.
After the Congress was flushed with its majority in six
provinces, it deliberately decided to ignore, nay, decided
to non-cooperate with the Muslim League Paties in the
various Provincial Legislatures, and they have in forming
the ministries vindicated the justice and the fair

203
treatment to the minorities urged and promised by
Mahatma Gandhi very recently by having made a good
feast of all the loaves and fishes that are at present
available for the Congress Party in the various
Legislatures and getting a stray Musalman to exchange a
pledge overnight to accept Ministry the next morning.”
(A Centenary History of Indian National Congress: Dr.
B.N.Pande, pg 18-19)
To Nehru’s statement that there are only two
parties-the British and the Congress that counted,
Jinnah shot back: “There is a third party in this
country and that is Muslims, whom the Congress will
ignore at its own risk and peril.” He warned the
Congress: “We are not going to be dictated by anybody.
We are willing to cooperate with any group of a
progressive and independent character provided, its
program and policy correspond to our own. We are not
going to be camp followers of any party. We are ready to
work as equal partners for the welfare of India.”
A few days later, Jinnah publicly warned Nehru
and the Congress to leave the Muslims alone; but Nehru
refused to be intimidated and decided, instead of backing
away from India’s Muslim electorate, to seek to convert
the vast mass of them to Congress’ platform. “Mr
Jinnah…objects to the Congress interfering with Muslim
affairs in Bengal and calls upon the Congress to let
Muslims alone… Who are the Muslims? Apparently only
those who follow Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League.”
“What does the Muslim League stand for?” Nehru asked.
“Does it stand for the independence of India, for anti-
imperialism? I believe not. It represents a group of
Muslims, no doubt highly estimable persons, for

204
functioning in the higher regions of the upper middle
classes and having no contacts with the Muslim masses
and few even with the lower middle class. May I suggest
to Mr. Jinnah that I come into greater touch with the
Muslim masses than most of the members of the Muslim
League.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 147-148)
Nehru had propounded his mass contact theory in
his presidential address at the All-India National
Convention of Congress legistors on 19th March 1937.
The first Muslim to feel alarm at Nehru’s mass
contact theory was Muhammad Iqbal who drew the
attemtion of Jinnah to Nehru’s address almost
immediately. “It is absolutely necessary,” Iqbal advised
Jinnah on 20th March, “to tell the world both inside and
outside India that the economic problem is not the only
problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view
the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to
most Indian Muslims. At any rate it is not less important
than the economic problem. In his subsequent letters
during those last days of his life, Iqbal assured Jinnah
that the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to
receive much response from the Muslims and urged him
to rescue the League fom the clutches of the upper
classes and make it a body of the masses. Side by side,
he drilled the idea of Islamic separatism into the mind of
Jinnah by suggesting the redistribution of the country to
provide one or two Muslim States with absolute
majorities. “Don’t you think,” he asked Jinnah on 28th
May, “that the time for such a demand has already
arrived? Perhaps, this is the best reply you can give to
the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru. Muslim India

205
hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will
discover some way out of our present difficulties. Iqbal
again wrote to Jinnah on 21st June: “I know that you are
a busy man, but I do hope that you won’t mind my
writing to you so often, as you are the only Muslim in
India today to whom the community has a right to look
up for safe guidance through the storm which is coming
to the North-West India and perhaps to the whole of
India.”
Rapidly did Jinnah transform himself into a
spirited communal leader, having everything to say
against Congress ministries, against Hindi and Bande
Mataram, the Congress flag and Hindu nationalism, even
though his vision for separation was yet to take place.
(A Centenary History of Indian Congress: Dr.B.N.Pande, pg
117-119)
The short-sightedness of Jawaharlal Nehru is well
illustrated by what happened in U.P. after the elections.
There the League and the Congress fought the elections
hand in hand. Jamait-ul-Ulema-Hind was an influential
Muslim organization. The Jamait had supported the
League as well as the Congress on the express
understanding that after the elections were over, the
League and the Congress would work in cooperation.
Chaudhari Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan were
then the leaders of the Muslim League in U.P. They
naturally expected some substantial share in the
composition of the ministry as the League had returned a
substantial number of members to the Assembly. But
when the time came to form the U.P. Ministry, Nehru
refused to give them their due share. With regard to
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206
in his book, “India Wins Freedom” says: “If the U.P.
League’s offer of cooperation had been accepted, the
Muslim League Party would for all practical purposes
have merged in the Congress. Jawaharlal’s action gave
the Muslim League in U.P. a new lease of life. All
students of Indian politics know that it was from U.P.
that the League was reorganized. Mr. Jinnah took full
advantage of the situation and started an offensive which
ultimately led to Pakistan.”
Brecher in his book, “Nehru-A Political biography”
writes:
“ The Congress went beyond contemptuous words.
During the election campaign the two parties had
cooperated to some extent, notably in the United
Provinces, where developed a tacit understanding that a
Coalition Government would be formed. However, this
was before the elections, when the Congress did not
expect a clear majority. After the elections it was no
longer necessary to make concessions. The League offer
of cooperation was now treated with disdain.”
Frank Moraes in his biography of Nehru says:
“Had the Congress handled the League more tactfully
after the elections, Pakistan might never have come into
being…Jinnah certainly created Pakistan. But the
Congress by its sins of omission and commission also
helped to make it possible. Misreading the poor showing
of the Muslim League at the polls…the Congress spurned
Muslim League’s overture for a Coalition. The result was
not to drive the League into political wilderness but to
strengthen Jinnah’s hands as the foremost champion of
Muslim claims and rights.”

207
Penderel Moon, who served with the I.C.S. before
and after independence, describes Congress’ failure to
cooperate with the League as the prime cause of the
creation of Pakistan.
Pyarelal, Gandhi’s Secretary calls it a tactical error
of the first magnitude and says that the decision of the
Congress High Command to exclude the League was
taken against Gandhiji’s best judgment.
Sir Percival Griffiths, a leader of the European
Group in the Indian Central Legislature has written of
this tactical blunder in his book, ‘British Impact on India:
“The Congress High Command refused to sanction
Congress-League Coalitions and in the Hindu majority
provinces ministries consisting only of Congressmen were
formed. In the United Provinces, for example, Muslim
representatives were invited to join the ministry, but only
on condition that they became members of the Congress
Party and that the Muslim League ceased to exist. In
other provinces, similar conditions were imposed, and
with one exception members of the Muslim League were
rigorously excluded from office.
“The Congress Party was fully within its rights in
adopting this exclusive policy and may even have felt that
it was following normal parliamentary practice. There can
be little doubt, however, that it made a grave tactical
blunder. There was no difference in social or economic
policy serious enough to make Congress-League
Coalitions unnatural or unworkable, and the Muslims
therefore felt that they were excluded from office merely
because the Congress was essentially a Hindu body. This
aroused resentment among the Muslims and
strengthened the authority of the Muslim League.

208
Moreover, it increased the danger that political division in
India would be drawn permanently on communal lines.
“…Although the Muslims were uneasy at the
growing strength of the Congress, they had not seriously
thought of demanding Pakistan. All the Congress Party
leaders had to do in order to establish their power was to
be a little conciliatory in their dealings with the
Muslims…”
Stanley Wolpert, in his book “Jinnah of Pakistan,”
at page 148 writes: “It would not be last of Nehru’s
political errors of judgment in his dealings with Jinnah,
but it was one of the most fatal mistakes he ever made in
a moment of hubris. More than Iqbal, it was Nehru who
charted a new mass strategy for the League, prodding
and challenging Jinnah to leave the drawing rooms of
politics to reach down to the hundred million Muslims
who spent most of each day laboring in rural fields. There
was, of course, only one possible way for the League to
stir that mass, to awaken it, and to lure it to march
behind Muslim leadership. The cry of Islam-in danger- of
din (religion) alone could emerge as the unique stand of
Muslim League. “No common principle or policy binds
them,” Nehru had taunted, referring to Jinnah’s
independent ‘party’ in the Assembly. And for Jinnah this
was as significant a turning point, traumatically triggered
by public humiliation, as the Congress non-cooperation
resolution rebuke he had sustained at Nagpur in 1920.”
However, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, in his
autobiography justifies the action of the Congress thus:
“As a matter of fact, the Muslim League had not acquired
any great prestige and popularity at that time. …The

209
Congress, therefore, had no reason to take a Muslim
Leaguer as a minister.”
Rajmohan Gandhi in his book, “Eight Lives-A
Study of Hindu Muslim Encounter,” at page 146 says:
“We can fairly accuse the Congress of 1937 of being
stingy and haughty. It could have openly invited the
League as a partner and disproved allegations that it
sought Hindu rule. Yet it would be an error to conclude
that the Congress rejected partnership with Jinnah
merely because of miserliness or because success had
turned its head; it did so also in the interest of the
cohesion. Nehru, Patel and Azad believed that Jinnah
would be a difficult partner. The thought of having to
obtain his concurrence for every measure of the new
ministries did not appeal to them or to other
Congressmen.”
Lucknow Session of the Muslim League1937:
To strengthen the League vis-à-vis the Unionists,
Iqbal wanted Jinnah to hold the League’s 1937 session in
Punjab, but Jinnah shrewdly chose to woo rather than
alienate Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan. Iqbal thought he
needed Jinnah for the sake of Punjab; Jinnah knew that
he needed Hyat for the sake of the Qaum as a whole.
Jinnah instinctively realized that his main strength
would come from Muslims in Hindu-majority provinces.
He therefore chose Lucknow as the venue for the session
that would mark the birth of the new Jinnah,
transforming the “Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity”
into the advocate of Muslim separation-the Lucknow
where, in 1916, Jinnah had architected the League-
Congress Pact.

210
(Eight Lives-A Study of Hindu Muslim Encounter by Rajmohan
Gandhi, pg 147)
The All-India Muslim League session was held in
Lucknow on 15th October 1937. In his presidential
address Jinnah said:
“The Muslim League stands for full national
democratic self-government for India. Various phrases
are used such as, Purna Swaraj, Self-government,
complete independence, responsible government, and
Dominion Status. There are some who talk of complete
independence. But it is no use having complete
independence on your lips and the Government of India
Act 1935, in your hand. These paper declarations,
slogans and shibboleths are not going to carry us
anywhere. What India requires is a complete united front
and honesty of purpose and then by whatever name you
may call your Government is a matter of no consequence,
so long as it is a Government of the people, by the people
and for the people.”
Drawing the attention of his audience to the
burning questions like the enforcement of Bande
Mataram, and the Congress Flag, Jinnah explained how
the Hindu Governments were influencing all and sundry
to obey their mandates in these regards. “On the very
threshold,” he said, “of what little power and
responsibility is given, the majority community has
clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for Hindus.
The result of the present Congress policy will be class
bitterness, communal war, and strengthening of the
Imperialistic hold. As a consequence, I dare say, that the
British Government will give the Congress a free hand in
this direction. I feel that a fearful reaction will set in

211
when the Congress has created more and more divisions
amongst Indians themselves, and made the united front
impossible.”
Analysing the Congress attitude towards the
Hindu-Muslim question and the minority problem,
Jinnah said:
“The present leadership of the Congress during
the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the
Musalmans of India more and more, by pursuing a policy
which is exclusively Hindu; and since they have formed
Governments in the six provinces where they are in
majority; they have by their words, deeds and programs
shown, more and more, that the Musalmans cannot
expect any justice or fair play at their hands. Wherever
they were in a majority and wherever it suited them, they
refused to cooperate with the Muslim League parties and
demanded unconditional surrender and the signing of
their pledge.”
Jinnah made an appeal to the Muslims to ponder
over the situation and decide their own fate by having
one single, definite, uniform policy, which should be
loyally followed through out India. He said: “It is the
height of defeatist mentality to throw ourselves to the
mercy and good-will of others and the highest act of
perfidy to the Muslim community; and if that policy is
adopted let me tell you, the community will seal its doom
and will cease to play its rightful part in the national life
of the country and the Government…Do not be disturbed
by the slogans and the taunts such as are used against
the Musalmans-communalists, toadies and reactionaries.
The worst today on earth, the most wicked communalist
today amongst Muslim, when he surrenders

212
unconditionally to the Congress and abuses his own
community, becomes the nationalist of nationalists
tomorrow! These terms and words and abuses are
intended to create an inferiority complex among the
Muslims and to demoralize them; and are intended to
sow discord in their midst and give us a bad name in the
world abroad.”
To the Musalmans of India in every province, in
every district, in every tehasil, in every town Jinnah said:
“Your foremost duty is to formulate a constructive and
ameliorative programme of work for the people’s welfare,
and to devise ways and means for the social, economic
and political uplift of the Musalmans… Organize
yourselves, establish your solidarity and complete unity.
Equip yourselves as trained and disciplined soldiers.
Create the feeling of an esprit de corps, and of
comradeship amongst yourselves. Work loyally, honestly
and for the cause of your people and your country. No
individual or people can achieve anything without
industry, suffering and sacrifice. There are forces which
may bully you, tyrannize over you, and intimidate you,
and you may even have to suffer. But it is by going
through this crucible of the fire of persecution which may
be leveled against you, the tyranny that may be
exercised, the threats and intimidations that may
unnerve you-it is by resisting, by overcoming, by facing
these disadvantages, hardships and suffering, and
maintaining your true convictions and loyalty, that a
nation will emerge, worthy of its past, glory and history,
and will live to make its future history greater and more
glorious not only in India, but in the annals of the world.
Eighty millions of Musalmans in India have nothing to

213
fear. They have their destiny in their hands, and as a
well-knit, solid, organized, united force can face any
danger, and withstand any opposition to its united front
and wishes. There is a magic power in your own hands.
Take your vital decisions-they may be grave and
momentous and far-reaching in their consequences.
Think a hundred times before you take any decision, but
once a decision is taken, stand by it as one man.”
Jinnah for the first time at this session appeared
in a black punjabi sherwani (long coat) and loose
trousers and black Persian lamb cap, which later came to
be known as ‘Jinnah Cap’ shedding the Saville Row suit.
Maulana Hasrat Mohani, who moved the
resolution for full independence said: “Mr. Jawaharlal
Nehru and others are talking of breaking, tearing and
burning the federal plan but he was convinced that
Messrs. Gandhi, Nehru and Malviya would very soon
accept it with thanks for they believed that although it
might not bring real independence and freedom for India,
it would inaugurate Hindu Raj at the Center as in the
Provinces and that the entry of the Hindu princes in the
Government of India would strengthen the power and
position of Hindus as a whole. Those who believed that
Jawaharlal Nehru was above communalism or that he
was the man who would solve the communal problem by
bringing lasting amity and unity between the Hindus and
Muslims, either were living in a fools’ paradise or are the
enemy of Islam in India.” Mohani further said:
“Jawaharlal’s secret of popularity with the Hindus was
his wanton attack on Muslim leaders and his pet theories
are, that there is no Hindu-Muslim problem that the
question of minorities did not exist at all and that the

214
Muslims have no separate culture, individuality,
distinguished from that of the Hindus requiring any
special safeguards for their protection and preservation.
This was exactly the plea of Mahasabhaits-Hindu
communalists. Accordingly Bhai Permanand, the
president of the Hindu Mahasabha welcomed Nehru’s
statement and congratulated him on his boldness. The
fundamentally Hindu nature and Brahmanical
communalism of Nehru was not decreasing but
increasing in intensity.”
The League’s resolution on independence, which
was adopted runs as follows:
“Resolved that the object of the All-India Muslim
League shall be the establishment in India of full
independence in the form of a federation of free
democratic states in which the rights and interests of the
Musalmans and other minorities are adequately and
effectively safeguarded in the constitution.”
Gandhi immediately wrote to Jinnah: “I carefully
went through your speech. As I read it, it is a declaration
of war.” Jinnah replied: “I am sorry you think my speech
at Lucknow is a declaration of war. It is purely in self-
defence. Kindly read it again and try to understand it;
evidently you have not been following the course of
events of the last twelve months.”
Gandhi wrote back to Jinnah: “You seem to deny
that your speech was a declaration of war, but your later
pronouncements too confirm the first impression…In
your speeches, I miss the old nationalist. When in 1915, I
returned from the self-imposed exile in South Africa,
everybody spoke of you as one of the staunchest of
nationalists and the hope of both Hindus and Muslims.

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Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah? If you say you are, in
spite of your speeches, I shall accept your word.”
Jinnah, in reply sent a letter to Gandhi in which
he said: “…You are not acquainted with what is going on
in the Congress press-the amount of vilification,
misrepresentation and falsehood that is daily spread
about me-otherwise I am sure you would not blame me.”
Jinnah further wrote: “You say that in my speeches you
miss the old nationalist. Do you think that you are
justified in saying that? I would not like to think what
people spoke of you in 1915 and what they speak and
think of you today. Nationalism is not the monopoly of
any single individual, and in these days it is very difficult
to define it; but I do not wish to pursue this line of
controversy any further.”
In his speech at Patna on 27th October 1937,
Jinnah said:
“Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru described the League
session as the last ditch of the political reaction. He was
so confident of his program of mass contact that he
closed his eyes to all realities. But what happened to the
mass contact program? What was it for? It was to get
hold of men who will be their creatures, who will sign
their program and sing Bande Mataram. The majority of
the Muslims have no confidence in those Muslims who
are willing to sign the pledge to work out the policy of the
Congress. Yet there are just the persons who are
accepted as ministers-Muslim ministers. This is adding
insult to the injury. It is following the policy of ostrich.
They think that we are all fools.
“Jawaharlal Nehru talks of hunger and poverty,
goes about threatening zamindars with complete

216
extinction and brings the large peasants under his
influence. The Hindu industrial magnets, merchants,
princes and money lenders- the real blood-suckers of
millions of poor men, receive his blessings, for they feed
the Congress organization. He assured the mill owners of
Bombay that one could amass any amount of wealth and
yet remain a socialist! The Congress never hesitated to
break its principles whenever it suited its purpose.”
In a crushing reply to the Congress and his
opponents, Jinnah said: The Congress far from being a
national organization became a symbol of Hindu
revivalism and the Hindu Raj under the ages of British
Crown for the exploitation and suppression of minorities.
The Brahmin hierarchy and the British bureaucracy
entered into an unholy alliance. The British Government
threw all its notion of its Governmental prestige to the
winds and went out of its way to placate the Hindus.
British Imperialism consistently pandered to the whims
and fancies of the majority community.”
Jinnah further said: “The Congress wanted to
establish an authoritative totalitarian and Fascist Hindu
Raj. They were striving their utmost to delude Muslims
into believing that the League was an ally of imperialism
and the imperialistic Government. Nowhere in my career,
I have allied myself with imperialism, out side or inside
the Legislature. The League would never be an ally of
anyone except the Muslim nation.”
(Muslim India by Mohammad Noman, pg 358, 367, 368)
Jinnah was invited to address the Jamait-ul-
Ulema Conference in Delhi. In his address Jinnah said:
“It was for the first time that a representative
Government was being established in India and this

217
meant, in other words, the rule of majority. A majority is
likely to be tyrannical. Power and authority are likely to
intoxicate them; therefore provisions for safeguards were
essential for the minorities in any scheme of democratic
constitution… Close the controversy over Communal
Award for the time being, and God willing, we would
produce a better settlement.” “Even the Law member”
said Jinnah, “ had told Hindus that the question was not
only dead but cremated and its ashes thrown in the
Ganges.” Jinnah added, “No constitution is permanent.
Constitutions are made by men but men are not made by
constitutions.”
Referring to the future step for Muslims, he said:
“We must think of the interests of our community. Unless
you make the best efforts, you will fail and command no
respect and no body will bother to consult you. Organize
yourselves and play your part. There was nothing wrong
in working for one’s community. It has been a fashion to
decry persons serving their own community as a
communalist, but I am not afraid of being called a
communalist, because I am helping my community. I am
helping eighty million people and if they are more
organized, they will be all the more useful for the national
struggle.”
Lord Brabourne, the Govrnor of Bombay wrote a
letter to Lord Linlithgow in 1937 in which he said:
“Jinnah told him that he was planning to consolidate the
Muslim League throughout India. His policy is to preach
communalism morning, noon and night and teach the
Mohamedans, generally to stand on their own feet and
make themselves independent of the Hindus.”

218
Jinnah went to Calcutta to inaugurate the All-
India Muslim Students Federation on 29th December
1937. This federation was the outcome of a merger of the
Lucknow Muslim Students’ Conference with the Aligarh
Muslim University Union and All-Bengal Muslim
Students’ League. Some three hundred Muslim students
from the North-West Frontier Province to Assam had
assembled. Jinnah, in his inaugural address said: “…I
have only rung the alarm bell at Lucknow. The bell is still
ringing. But I do not see the fire brigade. I want you to
produce the fire brigade. And God willing, we shall
extinguish the fire… We do not want to be reduced to the
position of the Negroes of America.”
The Raja of Mamudabad and Mohammad Noman
were elected as president and general secretary of the
newly born All-India Muslim Students’ Federation
respectively. The objectives of the federation were: to
arouse political consciousness among the Muslim
students and to prepare them to take their proper share
in the struggle for the freedom of the country; to work for
the advancement of the economic and social conditions of
the Musalmans; and to popularize Islamic culture and
studies and to strengthen the Islamic religion and faith
by combating anti-Islamic forces.
In January 1938, Jinnah visited Allahabad. He
appealed to the Congress leaders to join hands with the
League and settle the communal problem, which he said,
was essential for unity and for the political advancement
of India. He pleaded that he had nothing nearer and
dearer to his heart than the general welfare of India and
amelioration of his countrymen. Both in private and
public, he had been making incessant efforts to convince

219
the Congress leaders that their policy was disastrous and
would lead them nowhere.
Jinnah moved the following resolution in the All-
India Muslim League assembled in Bombay in January
1938:
“…The League is of the opinion that the All-India
Federal Scheme of the Central Government, embodied in
the Government of India Act 1935, is fundamentally bad;
it is most reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal to
the vital interest of British India vis-à-vis the Indian
States, and it is calculated to thwart and delay
indefinitely the realization of India’s most cherished goal
of complete responsible Government.
“The League feels convinced that the present
scheme will not bring peace and contentment to the
people, but on the contrary it will lead to disaster if
forced upon and persisted in as it is entirely unworkable
in the interest of India and people.
“Federation was wholly rotten and totally
unacceptable and absolutely unworkable in as much as
it consisted 80% safeguards and 20% responsibility. This
20% responsibility too was hampered and hedged in, in
several ways.”
In February 1938, addressing the students of the
Muslim University in Aligarh, Jinnah reviewed the work
done by the Muslim League right from 1924 to the Round
Table Conference and said:
“In the face of danger, the Hindu sentiment, the
Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion
that there was no hope of unity. The Musalmans were
dwellers in No Man’s Land; they were led either by
flunkeys of the British Government or the camp followers

220
of the Congress. Whenever the attempts were made to
organize Muslims, toadies and flunkeys on the one hand
and traitors in the Congress camp on the other hand
frustrated the efforts. I began to feel that neither could I
help India, nor change the Hindu majority, nor could I
make the Musalmans realize their precarious position. I
felt so disappointed and so depressed that I decided to
settle down in London. Not that I did not love India; but
felt utterly helpless. However, I kept in touch with India.
At the end of four years I found that the Musalmans were
in the greatest danger. I made up my mind to come back
to India, as I could not do them any good from London.
Having no sanction behind me I was in the position of the
beggar and received the treatment that a beggar deserves.
“Then in 1935, I entered into negotiations with
Congress President. A formula was evolved but the
Hindus won’t look at it. In 1936, I requested the
Congress to stop bitter controversy over the Communal
Award. Good, bad or indifferent, let it stand in the
absence of an agreed solution. Let us face the bigger
issues. From 1924 to 1936- it came to this nothing doing.
In sheer desperation I called the session of the Muslim
League in April 1936, and the League decided to contest
the elections in the provinces and achieved a
considerable measure of success.”
Recapitulating the position from 1936, Jinnah
said:
“Firstly, there was the bureaucracy, they felt that
they have acquired a prescriptive right over the
Musalmans. They said; well, if this Jinnah fellow comes,
Muslims will be out of our hands. It has happened so.
The Musalmans, thank God. They are today out of their

221
hands. But now the power has passed to certain extent
into the hands of the majority community. It is now clear
that the British Government shows no signs of coming to
the help of Muslims but is throwing them to the wolves. I
am glad; so far so good. To a very great extent, the
Muslim League has freed the Musalmans from the
clutches of the British Government. But now there is
another power, which claims to be the successor of
British Government. Call it by whatever name you like,
but it is Hindu and Hindu Government.
“… We were trying to make the Muslim League
completely representative of the Muslim community. … I
was dubbed as a communalist by the Congress press.
They said; ‘Well Jinnah may be alright, but he is
surrounded by toadies and flunkeys, who will swallow
him up.’ Every time some plausible excuse was made to
ignore the Muslims. The Congress tried to poison the
minds of our youths to delude them into the belief that
the Congress stood for complete independence and would
remove poverty and hunger. But what were really their
designs? They wanted certain assurances from the
British Government, which they failed to get. They are
not only utilizing, but working the very constitution they
had so vehemently professed to wreck. To Muslims they
gave all sorts of silly assurances and good-will. In politics
good-will and love and affection and regard can only be
demonstrated when you are strong.
“…The constitution foisted on us is also modeled
more or less on the British pattern. But there is an
essential difference between the body politics of this
country and that of Britain. The majority and minority
parties in Britain are alterable, tomorrow Liberal and day

222
after Labour. Here we have a permanent Hindu majority
and the rest are minorities which cannot within any
conceivable period of time hope to become majorities. The
majority can afford to assume a non-communal label, but
it remains exclusively Hindu in its spirit and action. The
only hope for minorities is to organize themselves and
secure definite and statutory safeguards for their rights
and interests. Without such safeguards for their rights
and interests no constitution can work successfully in
India.”
Jinnah made the following appeal to the
Musalmans:
“Come to the platform of League. If the Muslims
are united the settlement will come sooner than you
think. You will have established your claim to achieve
freedom. After a few months work, the League’s name is
known in every corner of India. Lakhs of people are
joining it. Even those who are against us, will realize that
they are under a serious delusion and their only course
is to join the League and make the Musalmans speak
with one voice.
“What the League has done is to set you free from
the reactionary elements of Muslims and to create the
opinion that those who play their selfish game are
traitors. It has certainly freed you from that undesirable
element of Maulvis and Maulanas. I am not speaking of
Maulvis as a whole class. There are some of them who
are as patriotic and sincere as many others, but there is
a section of them which is undesirable.”
Concluding his address Jinnah said:
“I am convinced and you will agree with me that
the Congress policy is to divide the Muslims among

223
themselves. It is the same old tactics of the British
Government. They follow the policy of their masters. Do
not fall into their trap. This is a moment of life and death
for the Musalmans. Take it from me that unless there is
unity among the Muslims at any cost, they will be lost. If
our house is defective, we must set it right ourselves. If
you support us we will set it right ourselves as we like
and desire.
“The Muslim League is determined to win
freedom, but it will be a freedom not only for the strong
but also for the weak and the suppressed… We have
succeeded in organizing Musalmans all over India as they
were never at any rate during the last century and a half.
They are beginning to realize that they are a power, and if
only they will take their affairs in their own hands and
stand together united there is no power that can resist
their will. Before the Lucknow session, the membership
of the League ran in several thousands but today there
are hundreds of thousands of Musalmans who are under
the banner of the League. Today it can be said that every
thinking and patriotic Musalman is in the fold of the
Muslim League. If we continue with the same enthusiasm
and vigour, there is not a least doubt that the All-India
Muslim League will soon be a power to reckon with.”
Analysing the attitude of the Congress, Jinnah
said:
“The Congress attitude so far can be summed up
thus. First, that the Communal Award must go lock,
stock and barrel; second, that there must be no separate
electorates; and third, that there must be no differential
franchise and if possible there should be no reservation
of seats for any community. The result of this will be

224
obvious, namely, that the Musalmans will be wiped out
from securing any adequate representation whether in
the Legislature or in the Municipal, Local and District
Boards.”
Jinnah declared; “Muslims have made it clear
more than once that besides the question of religion,
culture, language and personal laws, there is another
question equally of life and death for them and that their
future destiny and fate are dependent upon their
securing definitely their political rights, their due share
in the national life, the Government and the
administration of the country. They will fight for it till the
last ditch and all the dreams and notions of the Hindu
Raj must be abandoned. They will not be submerged or
dominated and they will not surrender so long as there is
life in them. The Muslim League claims the status of
complete equality with the Congress or any other
organization. We cannot surrender, submerge or submit
to the dictates of the High Command of the Congress,
which is developing into a totalitarian authoritative
caucus functioning under the name of the Working
Committee and aspiring to the position of a ‘Shadow
Cabinet’ of a future Republic. The Muslim League is not
only carrying on struggle for the Muslims but it
maintains that all other important minorities must have
the same sense of security and place in the Sun of India
where, they will enjoy the rights and privileges of free
citizens and not be ground down by caste tyranny and
caste rule. In my opinion, the Congress is making one of
the greatest blunders by pursuing its present policy.”

225
Before passing the mantle of Congress
presidentship to Subhashchandra Bose, the following
correspondence took place between Nehru and Jinnah:
On 25th February 1938, Nehru wrote to Jinnah: “I
am afraid I must confess that I do not yet know what the
fundamental points of dispute are. It is for this reason
that I have been asking you to clarify them. So far, I have
not received any help in this direction.”
Six days later, Jinnah replied: “…I am only
amazed at your ignorance. This matter has been tackled
since 1925 right upto 1935 by the most prominent
leaders in the country. So far no solution has been found.
I would beg of you to study it, and …not take up a self-
complacent attitude; and if you are in earnest I do not
think you will find much difficulty in realizing what the
main points in dispute are, because they have been
constantly mentioned both in the press and public
platform, even very recently.”
On 6th April Nehru wrote in the name of Congress:
“…Obviously, the Muslim League is an important
communal organization and we deal with it as such. But
we have to deal with all organizations and individuals
that come within our ken. We do not determine the
measure of importance or distinction they possess…
Inevitably, the more important the organization, the more
the attention paid to it, but this importance does not
come from outside recognition but from inherent
strength. And the other organizations, even though they
might be younger and smaller, cannot be ignored.”
Jinnah replied to Nehru after six days: “It seems
to me that you cannot even accurately understand my
letter… Your tone and language again display the same

226
arrogance and militant spirit, as if the Congress is the
sovereign power… I may add that, in my opinion, as I
have publicly stated so often, that unless the Congress
recognizes the Muslim League on a footing of complete
equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a
Hindu-Muslim settlement, we shall have to wait and
depend upon our inherent strength which will determine
the measure of importance or distinction it possesses.
Having regard to your mentality, it is really difficult for
me to make you understand the position any further…”
(Jinnah-Creator of Pakistn: Hector Bolitho, pg 116-117)
In an interview later, Jinnah remarked of Nehru:
“…He seems to carry the responsibility of the whole world
on his shoulders and must poke his nose into everything
except minding his own business.”
During negotiations with Subhash Chandra Bose,
in April 1938, Jinnah put forward the claim that the
Muslim League must be accepted as the authoritative
and representative organization of Musalmans. To this
Bose made the following observations in a note, which he
handed over to Jinnah.
“The Congress cannot possibly consider itself or
function as if it represented one community only and
thus itself becoming a communal organization. At the
same time the Congress is perfectly willing to confer and
cooperate with their organizations which represent
minority interests…. It is true that All-India Muslim
League is an organization representing a large body of
Muslim opinion which must carry weight. It is for this
reason that the Congress endeavoured to understand the
view point of the League and to come to an
understanding with it. The Congress, however, would be

227
bound to consult other existing Muslim organizations
which have cooperated with the Congress in the past.
Further, in the event of other groups of minority interests
being involved, it will be necessary to consult
representatives of such interests.”
The League Executive Council discussed this note
on 6th June 1938 and decided that the League president
cannot proceed to discuss the matter with the Congress
president except on the basis outlined by him already.
The Council also considered the suggestion of Gandhiji
for the appointment of a committee for the settlement of
communal question and resolved that it would not be
desirable for the Congress to include any Muslim to
represent the Congress.
The Congress Working committee at its meeting
held on 25th July 1938 decided to send the following reply
to the League as dictated by Gandhi:
“There are Muslim organizations which have been
functioning independently of the Muslim League. Some of
them are strong supporters of the Congress. Moreover,
there are individual Muslims who are Congressmen,
some of whom exercise no inconsiderable influence in the
country. Then there is the Frontier Province, which is
overwhelmingly Muslim and which is solidly with the
Congress.
“…It has been an unbroken tradition with the
Congress to represent all communities, all races, and all
classes to whom India is their home. From its inception it
has often had distinguished Muslims as Presidents and
as General Secretaries who enjoyed the confidence of the
Congress and of the country…. No one comes to the
Congress by virtue of his faith, he is in and out of the

228
Congress by virtue of his endorsement of the political
principles and policy of the Congress. The Congress,
therefore, is in no sense a communal organization.
“…So far as the Working Committee is aware, the
Muslim League is a purely communal organization, and
its membership too is open only to Muslims. So far as the
Congress is concerned, if the other minorities have a
grievance against the Congress, it is always ready to deal
with them as it is its bounden duty to do, being by its
very constitution and organization representative of all
India without distinction of caste or creed.”
The Executive Council of the Muslim League at its
meeting held on 2nd August 1938, authorized Jinnah to
send the following reply to the Congress Working
Committee:
“The Council is fully convinced that the Muslim
League is the only authoritative political organization of
the Musalmans of India. The position was accepted when
the Congress-League Pact was arrived at in 1916 at
Lucknow and ever since, till 1935, when Jinnah-
Rajendra Prasad conversation took place, it has not been
questioned. The All-India Muslim League, therefore, does
not require any admission or recognition from the
Congress. But in view of the fact that the position of the
League has been questioned by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,
the President of the Congress, in one of his statements
wherein he asserted that there were only two parties in
the country, namely, the British Government and the
Congress, it was considered necessary by the Executive
Council to inform the Congress of the basis on which the
negotiations between the two organizations could
proceed.

229
“The Council is of the opinion that the Muslims in
the Congress do not and cannot represent the
Musalmans of India, for the simple reason that their
number is very insignificant and that as members of the
Congress they have disabled themselves from
representing or speaking on behalf of the Muslim
community.
“The Council still hopes that the representative
character of the Muslim League will not be questioned
and that the Congress will proceed to appoint a
committee.”
The Congress President Subhash Chandra Bose
informed Jinnah on 2nd October 1938:
“The substance of your letter seems to be that the
League does not expect the Congress, whether implicitly
of explicitly, to acknowledge its status as the
authoritative Muslim organization of India. If this view is
accepted by the League, I am authorized to state that the
Working Committee will confer with the Committee that
may be appointed by the League to draw up the terms of
settlement.
“The Working Committee will be represented by at
least five of its members at the sitting of the Conference.”
As authorized by the League Executive Council,
Jinnah sent the following reply to Subhash Chandra
Bose on 10th October 1938:
“The Executive Council of the All-India Muslim
League regrets very much that the Working Committee of
the Congress should have entirely misread my letter
dated 2nd August 1938 which is quite clear and does not
require any elucidation or further interpretation. The
Muslim League is still ready to proceed with the

230
negotiations for settlement of the Hindu Muslim question
on the basis defined by my letter referred to above and
would appoint its representative to meet the Committee
that may be appointed by the Congress on the footing
indicated by us in our three resolutions of the 5 th June
1938 already communicated to you.”
(Mohammad Ali Jinnah by Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, pg 606-618)
A Provincial Muslim League Conference was called
by the Province of Sind at Karachi on 8th October 1938.
Addressing the Conference Jinnah said:
“…Truth is suppressed and falsehood is broadcast
in the Congress press and news agencies. Of course, we
have no press. But the greater misfortune of India is that
the High Command of the Congress have adopted a most
brutal, oppressive and inimical attitude towards the All-
India Muslim League since they secured majority in six
provinces. It is common knowledge that the average,
common man, whether he is a member of the conviction
or convenience arrogates to himself the role of a ruler of
this country, and although he does not possess the
educational qualification, training and culture and
traditions of the British Bureaucrat, he behaves and acts
towards the Musalmans in a much worse manner than
the British did towards Indians.
“…The foolish policy of the Congress is responsible
not only for intense bitterness between the two sister
communities but among the various classes and
interests. It has resulted in serious clashes and conflicts
and ill-will, which are bound to recoil in long run on the
progress and welfare of India. And it seems that the
Congress is only tumbling into the hands of those who

231
are looking forward to the creation of a serious situation
which will break India vertically and horizontally.”
Speaking of the situation the Muslamans had to
face, Jinnah said:
“It is no use relying upon any one else. We must
stand on our own inherent strength and build up our
own power and forge sanctions behind our decisions. It is
no use our blaming others. It is no use accusing our
opponents only. It is no use expecting our enemies to
behave differently. If the Musalmans are going to be
defeated in their national goal and aspirations it will only
be by the betrayal of Musalmans who honestly feel for
their community and its welfare and those who are
misled or misguided and indifferent to come on to the
platform of the Muslim League and under its flag; and
united at any and all costs and speak and act with one
voice... I am not fighting the Hindu community as such
nor have I any quarrel with the Hindus generally for I
have many personal friends amongst them.”
Patna Session of All-India Muslim League:
The 26th Annual session of the Muslim League was
held at Patna from 26-29, December 1938. Jinnah, in his
presidential address reviewed the progress made by the
Muslim League in a short span and said:
“…Things have now changed. One thing has been
demonstrated beyond doubt, namely, that the Congress
High Command wanted the Muslims to be a mere under
study of the Congress, mere foot-pages of the Congress
leaders, to be used, governed and brought under the
heels when they had served the purpose of the Congress.
The Congress leaders wanted them to submit
unconditionally to their Hindu Raj. That game has now

232
fully been exposed. The Congress has killed every hope of
Hindu-Muslim settlement in the right royal fashion of
Fascism. The Congress does not want any settlement
with the Muslims of India. The Congress wants the
Muslims to accept the settlement as a gift from the
majority. The Congress High Command makes the
preposterous claim that they are entitled to speak on
behalf of the whole of India, that they alone are capable
of delivering goods. Others are asked to accept the gift as
from a mighty sovereign. I want to make it plain to all
that we Muslims want no gifts. The Muslims want no
concessions. We, Muslims of India, have made up our
minds to have our fullest rights but we shall have them
as rights, not as gifts or concessions.
“There are four forces at play in the country.
Firstly, there is the British Government. Secondly, there
are rulers and the people of the Indian States. Thirdly,
there are the Hindus and fourthly, there are Muslims.
The Congress press may clamour as much as it likes,
they may bring their morning, afternoon, evening and
night editions, the Congress leaders may cry as much as
they like that the Congress is a national body. But I say it
is not true. The Congress is nothing but a Hindu body.
The presence of the few Muslims-the few misled and
misguided ones and the few who are there with ulterior
motives- does not, and cannot make it a national body. I
challenge anybody to deny that the Congress is mainly a
Hindu body. The Congress does not even represent all the
Hindus.
“The Congress High Command, in the intoxication
of power, like persons who are drunk, may make any
claim it pleases them to make. But such claim cannot

233
alter the true character of the Congress. It remains what
it is-mainly a Hindu body.”
Proceeding further, Jinnah said: “ I have no
hesitation in saying that the genius behind the Congress
attitude and the Congress policy is no other than
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who is out to destroy
the ideal with which the Congress was started. He is the
one man responsible for turning the Congress into an
instrument for the revival of Hinduism. His ideal is to
revive Hindu religion and establish Hindu Raj in India,
and he is utilizing the Congress to further this object…
Today the Hindu mentality, the Hindu outlook, is being
carefully nurtured, and Muslims are being forced to
accept these new conditions and to submit to the orders
of the Congress leaders.”
(Mohammad Ali Jinnah by Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, pg 24-33)
The second day of the Patna session was devoted
to discussing the resolution authorizing the Working
Committee of the League to resort to “Direct Action,” if
and when it decided to do so, to redress the grievances
and to protect the elementary rights of the Musalmans of
Bihar, the United Provinces, and the Central Provinces,
three Hindu majority Provinces from which most
atrocities against Muslims had been reported. This
resolution was carried unanimously. Jinnah, called it a
revolutionary departure from the past, for until this
juncture the League had been wedded only to the policy
of constitutional progress.
The Council of All-India Muslim League passed a
resolution asking ulema to issue “Fatwas” warning
Muslims against joining the Congress. The Fatwas were
to be published under the authority of the Muslim

234
League and propagated among Fridy congregations in the
moaques in towns and villages.
While speaking on the Finance Bill in the
Assembly in March 1939, Jinnah said:
“Sir, I cannot possibly approve of the Budget as it
has been presented to us, because we have no lot or
share in it. Now, Sir, the position of the All-India Muslim
League Party in this House is very peculiar one.
Fortunately or unfortunately, we hold the balance in the
House. If we are supporting the Government, then I think
the Finance Member can safely pilot this Bill to his
satisfaction and he can carry this Bill without a comma
of it being altered… Sir, in the past we have been
following the principle that if the Government brought in
a measure which was really for the good of the people,
then we would support it… But, Sir, I see now that the
policy must be altered. …Why do you expect us, I ask the
Government, to draw the chest-nuts out of the fire on
your behalf? Why do you expect us to continue to be
subservient on the specious pleas which you put forward
before us.”
It was Jinnah’s most forthright explanation of the
policy of mutual support he and the British Central
Government adopted in 1938. He was, however, open in
warning Congress not to misread his message to
Government, which ended with a curt, “You may go on
your own way.” On the other hand as regards the
Congress party, Jinnah continued, “The Congress party
is not only hostile to the Muslim League but they are
inimical. Therefore, I say to them that cooperation
between you and us is not possible... But let me tell you-
and I tell both of you-that you alone or this organization

235
alone or both combined will never succeed in destroying
our souls. You will never be able to destroy that culture
which we have inherited, the Islamic culture, and that
spirit will live, is going to live and has lived. You may
overpower us; you may oppress us; and you can do your
worst. But we have come to the conclusion and we have
now made a grim resolve that we shall go down, if we
have to go down, fighting.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan: Stanley Wolpert, pg 170)
Prelude to Crisis:
On 3rd September 1939, Lord Linlithgow, the
Viceroy broadcast the news of Germany’s invasion on
Poland. Linlithgow requested Gandhi to meet him for
discussion and the later met him the next day.
Gandhi gave the Viceroy a bit of his mind about
the British hand in the communal tangle, expressing his
fears that the British would never desire to see a unified,
self-governing India and would ever continue to exploit
the Muslim anxieties and communal differences in order
to stay on.
The hour of crisis had indeed struck in Indo-
British relations. There could be no uncertainty in the
Viceroy’s mind about Congress opposition to the war
effort. Princely India was of course with him. But much
depended on the support of the Muslim League when
Congress support was out of question. The same day that
Linlithgow met Gandhi, he also met Jinnah. The
discussion centred on strengthening each other’s hand
and the Viceroy asked Jinnah a piquant question: Would
he like him to turn the Congress ministries out? ‘Yes,’
replied Jinnah forthwith. “Turn them out at once.
Nothing else will bring them to their senses. Their object,

236
though you may not believe it, and though I did not
believe it till two years ago, is nothing less than to
destroy both you British and us Muslims. They will never
stand by you.” On that day, 4th September 1939, Jinnah
told Linlithgow that the real escape from the prevailing
deadlock lay in the partition of the country.
The Congress was in no mood for any
understanding with British, nor were the general public.
Gandhi assured the nation that there was no question of
any understanding at a personal level when grave
national issues were involved. He said: “I have returned
from the Viceregal Lodge empty-handed and without any
understanding, open or secret. If there is to be any
understanding, it would be between the Congress and the
Government.”
Nehru was on a brief visit to China when the war
broke out. He cut short the visit and hastened back. At
an interview to the press at Rangoon on 8th September,
he said:
“We do not approach the problem with a view to
taking advantage of Britain’s difficulties. This war is
going to change the face of things. The old order is dead
and cannot be revived. If we are making for a new order
let us do so consciously, defining it clearly and acting up
to it from now onwards. The real test as to whether this
struggle is for democracy does not lie in the loud
enunciations of the principles but in the practice. If
England stands for self-determination the proof of that
should be India.”
Nehru returned to India on 10th September.
The Congress Working Committee met in an
urgent session at Wardha from 8 to 15 September to

237
decide its policy in regard to the war. At Gandhiji’s
special invitation, Subhash Chandra Bose attended the
meeting. The committee passed the following resolution
on 14th September:
“The Congress has laid down that the issue of war
and peace for India must be decided by the Indian
people, and no outside authority can impose this decision
upon them, nor can the Indian people permit their
resources to be exploited for imperialist ends. Any
imposed decision, will necessarily have to be opposed by
them. The people of India have, in the recent past, faced
great risks and willingly made great sacrifices to secure
their own freedom and establish a free democratic state
in India, and their sympathy is entirely on the side of
democracy and freedom. But India cannot associate
herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom when
that very freedom is denied to her and such limited
freedom as she possesses taken away from her.”
The Working Committee invited the British
Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their
war aims were in regard to democracy and imperialism
and how those aims were going to be applied to India and
given effect to immediately. “The real test of any
declaration is its application in the present, for it is the
present that will govern action today and give shape to
the future,” declared the Working Committee.
Within four days of the announcement of the
Congress resolution, the Working Committee of the
Muslim League passed a resolution given below:
“The Committee expressed their deep sympathy for
Poland, England and France. The Committee, however,
feels that real and solid Muslim cooperation and support

238
to Great Britain in this hour of her trial cannot be
secured successfully if His Majesty’s Government and the
Vicroy are unable to secure to the Musalmans justice and
fair play in the Congress governed provinces where today
their liberty, person, property and honour are in danger
and even their elementary rights are most callously
trampled upon.”
The League further urged: “In order to counteract
the Congress demand for a Constituent Assembly, the
Legue leaders demanded an assurance from His
Majesty’s Government that no declaration regarding the
question of constitutional advance for India should be
made without the consent and approval of the All-India
Muslim League nor any constitution be framed and
finally adopted by His Majesty’s Government and the
British Parliament without such consent and approval.”
Sardar Patel advised all the Congress Prime
Ministers not to allow their responsibilities to be
overridden. A draft resolution for the Congress-
dominated Provincial Assemblies was prepared to express
reget that the British Government have declared India as
a participant in the war between Great Britain and
Germany, without the consent of the Indian people and
without consulting this Assembly. The Assembly
considers this declaration, made in complete disregard of
the opposition from Indian opinion, a contravention of
the spirit of provincial autonomy, as also further
measures adopted and laws passed in England and India
limiting the powers and activities of Provincial
Governments.
The Viceroy, on the other hand sure of the
support of the princes and the League, did not pay much

239
heed to the Congress terms. On 26th September, Gandhi
met him at Simla and during a discussion lasting more
than three hours, tried to make him agree to only two
specific demands, namely, a declaration of the British
intentions after the war, and an immediate sharing of
power with the Indians. Lord Zetland in England
announced on 27th September in the House of Lords that
time has been ill chosen by the leaders of the Congress
for a reiteration of their claims. “If Lord Zetland’s speech
represents the mind of the English people or
Government,” rejoined Nehru, “I have no hesitation in
saying that there can be no compromise between the
Congress and the British Government now or a thousand
years hence.”
Lord Linlithgow began a series of conversations
with various party leaders. He saw Jawaharlal Nehru and
Rajendra Prasad on 3rd October but had no better
success than before. Nehru demanded a full-blooded,
positive and unambiguous declaration which must use
the phrase, “absolute freedom” for India at the end of the
war and provide also for her unfettered liberty to frame
her own constitution by means of a Constituent
Assembly.
Linlithgow wrote to Zetland: “It is a tragedy in
many ways that at a time such as this we should have in
so important a position a doctrinaire like Nehru with his
amateur knowledge of foreign politics and of the
international stage.”
Nehru told the All-India Congress Committee
convened at Wardha on 11th October 1939: “A slave India
cannot help Britain. We want to assume control of our
Government and when we are free we can help the

240
democracies.” Gandhi issued his own statement next day
in which he said: “The long statement made by the
Viceroy simply shows that the old policy of divide and
rule is to continue. So far as I can see the Congress will
be no party to it, nor can the India of Congress
conception be a partner with Britain in her war with Herr
Hitler.”
The Viceroy made a statement on 17th October in
which he said that the intentions and aims of His
Majesty’s Government remained what they had been
when the Act of 1935 was adopted.
The Congress Working Committee at its meeting
held on 22nd October at Wardha declared: “It could not
give any support to Great Britain, for it would amount to
an endorsement of the imperialist policy which the
Congress has always sought to end. As first step in this
direction, the Committee call upon the Congress
Ministries to tender their resignations.”
On 26th October 1939, speaking in the House of
Commons, Sir Samuel Hoare declared that His Majesty’s
Government was prepared, if certain conditions were
secured to associate Indian opinion in a closer and more
responsible manner with the conduct of the war by
provisional expansion of the Viceroy’s Executive Council.
This, however, failed to appeal to the Congress, and the
Congress Ministries in the Congress majority provinces
resigned and the Governors in those provinces assumed
power under Section 93 of the Government of India Act,
1935. In Bengal, Punjab and Sind, the non-Congress
Ministries continued to function as before, and in Assam,
a coalition ministry was formed under Muhammad
Saadullah.

241
On 1st November 1939, Lord Linlithgow invited
Gandhiji, Rajendra Prasad and Jinnah for a joint
discussion to explore the possibilities of Hoare’s
declaration; but the discussion proved barren.
The next day the Viceroy repeated his offer in
writing, and Jinnah met Gandhiji and Rajendra Prasad,
probably at the instance of the Viceroy. Nothing came out
of this meeting.
In an interview the Viceroy conceded a veto to
Jinnah over the political future of the country:
“The position which I invited you and the other
gentlemen present to consider as leaders of the Congress
and Muslim League (is that), given the great importance
of enduring harmonious working at the centre, you
should enter upon discussions between yourselves with a
view to discovering whether you could reach a basis of
agreement between yourselves in the provincial field
consequent on which you could let me have proposals
which would result in participating in the Central
Government as members of the Executive Council.”
Some time later, Sir Francis Low, then the Editor
of the Times of India met Jinnah, who told him that at
this interview Gandhiji and he were speaking in different
languages. Gandhiji kept on insisting on the need for a
Constituent Assembly based on adult suffrage. Jinnah
claimed special safeguards for the Muslims and opposed
the very idea of a Constituent Assembly. At this interview
with Low, Jinnah characterized Gandhiji as the ‘biggest
Hindu in India’ who had, for his main object, the
domination of India by Hindus.
K.M. Munshi, in his book’ The Pilgrimage to
Freedom’ writes: “The parting of the ways between

242
national democracy and the ‘master-racist’ attitude was
complete.
“To many of the ‘master-racists’ who gathered
under the leadership of the Muslim League, Pakistan was
not a goal; it was a step to gain a solid base from which
to conquer Hindu India, as their imaginary ancestors had
done, if necessary with foreign aid. It was a price that
was demanded of the nationalists, if India had to secure
freedom from British rule. The choice before nationalist
India was between the devil and the deep sea.
“Even after the price was paid, there were certain
sections, who could not out-grow the ‘master-race’
complex. In 1948, Kasim Razvi, a U.P. Muslim, graduated
from the Aligarh Muslim University, and the leader of the
Ittehad, unequivocally adopted the ‘master-race’ attitude
towards the Hindus on India’s achieving freedom from
the British rule. It was a recurrent theme of his speeches:
‘…A Hindu who is a Kafir, a worshipper of stone
and a monkey, who drinks cow’s urin and eats cow-dung
in the name of religion and who is a barbarian in every
sense of the word, wants to rule (over) us! What an
ambition and what a day-dream!… Hyderabad will
shortly recover the Ceded Districts. The day is not far off
when the waves of the Bay of Bengal will be washing the
feet of our sovereign, who will not be called the Nizam of
Hydrabad and Berar but also of the Northern Sircars.’”
Munshi further writes: “The declaration made in
1965 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan,
in the Security Council of the United Nations, that the
Muslims had ruled over and “civilized” India for eight
hundred years and that they would do it again, expressed
rather crudely the ‘master-race’ complex towards Hindus

243
which, even after partition, characterizes some Muslim
leaders in Pakistan.”
(Pilgrimage to Freedom: K.M.Munshi, pg 70-71)
Gandhi made the following appeal to Jinnah
through his Harijan journal:
“British refusal to make the required declaration
of British war aims about India has perhaps come as a
blessing in disguise. It removes the Congress out of the
way to enable the Muslim League to make its choice,
unfettered by the Congress administration in eight
provinces (Assam, Bihar, Bombay, C.P, Madras, Orissa,
U.P. and NWFP), as to whether it will fight for the
independence of an undivided India. I hope that the
League does not want to vivisect India… Presently the
talks between Janab Jinnah Saheb and Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru will be resumed. Let us hope that they
will result in producing a basis for a lasting solution of
the communal tangle.”
Day of Deliverance:
On 2nd December 1939, Jinnah issued a dramatic
proclamation, announcing his choice of Friday, 22nd
December as a Day of Deliverance and thanks giving as a
mark of relief that the Congress regime has at last ceased
to function. Jinnah’s proclamation stated:
“…The Congress Ministries have conclusively
demonstrated and proved the falsehood of the Congress
claim that it represents all interests justly and fairly, by
its decidedly anti-Muslim policy.
“…The Congress Ministries both in the discharge
of their duties of the administration and in the
legislatures have done their best to flout the Muslim
opinion, to destroy Muslim culture, and have interfered

244
with their religious and social life, and trampled upon
their economic and political rights; that in matters of
differences and disputes the Congress …invariably have
sided with, supported and advanced the cause of the
Hindus in total disregard and to the prejudice of the
Muslim interests.
“The Congress Governments constantly interfered
with the legitimate and routine duties of district officers
even in petty matters to the serious detriment of the
Musalmans, and thereby created an atmosphere which
spread the belief amongst the Hindu public that there
was established a Hindu Raj, and emboldened the
Hindus, mostly Congressmen, to ill-treat Muslims at
various places and interfere with their elementary rights
of freedom.”
Gandhi felt as soon as he read this proclamation
that any prospect of resolving the Hindu-Muslim problem
by further talks was over. Nehru wrote to Jinnah: “…
What has oppressed me terribly is the realization that
our sense of values and objectives in life and politics
differs so very greatly. I had hoped, after our conversation
that this was not so great, but now the gulf appears to be
wider than ever.” Jinnah replied: “It was not possible to
carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement till
we reach an agreement with regard to the minority
problem… I can only say that if you desire to discuss the
matter further I am at your disposal.”
Jinnah won strong support from South India’s
“Dravidistan” Justice Party’s leader Periyar
E.V.Ramaswami Naicker for his Day of Deliverance.
Naicker called upon his party as well as all Dravidians to
celebrate 22nd December on a grand scale to get rid of the

245
Congress menace. Similar statements of enthusiastic
support were issued by leaders of the All India Depressed
Classes Association and smaller Anglo-Indian groups. At
a public meeting in Bombay, Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim of
the Muslim League moved a resolution, and Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar, untouchable leader of he Independent Labour
party seconded it.
Jinnah wrote an article for the “Time and Tide,”
London in January 1940, in which he said: “Democratic
systems based on the concept of a homogeneous nation
such as England are very definitely not applicable to
heterogeneous countries such as India and this simple
fact is the root cause of all India’s constitutional ills. The
British people, being Christians, sometimes forget the
religious wars of their own history and today consider
religion as a private and personal matter between man
and God. This can never be the case in Hinduism and
Islam, for both these religions are definite social codes
which govern not so much man’s relation with his God as
man’s relation with his neighbour.”
The Viceroy Lord Linlithgow made an
th
announcement on 10 January 1940 from Bombay:
“I know gentlemen, that you appreciate the
difficulty of the position of the Viceroy and the difficulty
of the position of His Majesty’s Government, faced as they
are with strong and conflicting claims advanced by
bodies and interests to whose views the utmost attention
must be paid, and whose position must receive the fullest
consideration. Justice must be done as between the
various parties, and His Majesty’s Government are
determined to see justice done, and I would venture
again to emphasise the case for compromise… As to the

246
objective there is no dispute. His Majesty’s Government
are not blind-nor can we be blind here-to the practical
difficulties involved in moving at one step from the
existing constitutional position into that constitutional
position which is represented by Dominion Status. But
here, again, I can assure you that their concern and mine
is to spare no effort to reduce to the minimum the
interval between the existing state of things and the
achievement of Dominion Status.”
K.M. Munshi had an interview with Lord
Linlithgow on 12th January 1940. The following questions
and answers are relevant to the subject and therefore
reproduced below:
Munshi: Why do you let Mr. Jinnah make things
impossible? You have got the Aga Khan, you have got
your friend Sir Sikandar. It is your actions which send up
Mr. Jinnah’s rates. That leads him to make absurd
charges against us. You do not even reply to them. And
he is so difficult now that any friendly approach to him
has become impossible.
Linlithgow: I know that he has become very
difficult, but that is only from a short view of things. For
the present he has made himself into a rallying center of
minorities. Time alone can remove him from that
position. Sikandar cannot occupy that position. But from
a long view of things Jinnah cannot succeed. He would
soon be found out as a stumbling block to progress.
Munshi: If there is no alliance between nationalist
India and Britain it may be that we may go, may be for a
long time, but then Savarkar and Jinnah will fight it out.
Linlithgow: It will be a disaster.
(Pilgrimage to Freedom: K.M.Munshi, pg 392-393)

247
Fifty-third session of the Congress was held at
Ramgarh on 19-20 March 1940 under the presidentship
of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. In his presidential
address, Azad urged his co-religionists to realize the
value of the teachings and the splendid traditions of
Islam in India, and how for centuries the Muslims have
lived as the children of the soil, enjoying brotherhood
with the Hindus in developing common nationality. In
order to dispel the fear complex, as a minority, from the
Muslim mind, he pointed out that in four provinces out of
eleven in India there is a Muslim majority, the other
religious groups being minorities. If British Baluchistan
is added, there are five provinces with Muslim majorities.
Even if we are compelled at present to consider this
question on the basis of religious groupings, the position
of the Muslims is not that of a minority only. If they are
in a minority in seven provinces, they are in a majority in
five. This being so, there is absolutely no reason why they
should be oppressed by the feeling of being a minority.
Azad referred to the British hand behind the communal
controversy, to their policy of divide and rule, and their
constant attempt to convince the world that the question
of the minority barred the way to a proper solution of
India’s political problem.
The Ramgarh session passed the following
resolution:
“The British made India a belligerent country
without any reference to the people was considered an
affront to them which no self-respecting and freedom-
loving people could accept or tolerate. The policy of
Britain was to carry on the war for imperialist ends for
preservation of her empire. Under these circumstances, it

248
is clear that the Congress cannot in any way, directly or
indirectly, be party to the war, which means continuance
and perpetuation of this exploitation. The Congress
therefore strongly disapproves of Indian troops being
made to fight for Great Britain and of the drain from
India of men and material for the purpose of the war.
Neither the recruiting nor the money raised in India can
be considered to be voluntary contributions from India.
Congressmen and those under the Congress influence
cannot help in the prosecution of the war with men,
money or material.”
Nothing short of complete independence was once
again declared as the goal of the Congress. With it, the
demand for a Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis
of adult suffrage, was reiterated with greater vehemence.
Ramgarh session was dissolved on 20th March
1940. Within three days, on 23rd March, India was
stunned at the news of the Lahore resolution of the All-
India Muslim League.
Lahore Session of the Muslim League 1940:
On 26th March of 1940 the All India Muslim
League at its Lahore Session passed the following
Resolution:
1. While approving and endorsing the action
taken by the Council and the Working
Committee of the All-India Muslim League as
indicated in their resolution dated the 27th of
August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of
October 1939 and February 1940 on the
constitutional issue, this Session of the All-
India Muslim League emphatically reiterates
that the Scheme of Federation embodied in the

249
Government of India Act, 1935, is totally
unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar
conditions of this country and is altogether
unacceptable to Muslim India;
2. It further records its emphatic view that while
the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939
made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty’s
Government is reassuring in as far as it
declares that the policy and plan on which the
Government of India Act 1935, is based will be
reconsidered in consultation with the various
parties, interests and communities in India,
Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the
whole constitutional plan is reconsidered de
novo and that no revised plan would be
acceptable to the Muslims, unless it is framed
with their approval and consent;
3. Resolved that it is the considered view of this
Session of the All India Muslim League that no
constitutional plan would be workable in this
country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it
is designed on the following basic principles,
viz, that geographically contiguous units are
demarcated into regions which should be so
constituted with such territorial readjustments
as may be necessary, that the areas in which
the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in
the North-West and Eastern Zones of India
should be grouped to constitute “Independent
States” in which the Constituent Units shall be
autonomous and sovereign;

250
4. That adequate, effective and mandatory
safeguards should be specifically provided in
the constitution for minorities in these units
and in the regions for the protection of their
religious, cultural, economic, political,
administrative and other rights, and interests
in consultation with them; and in other parts of
India where the Musalmans are in a majority,
adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards
shall be specifically provided in the constitution
for them and other minorities for the protection
of their religious, cultural, economic, political,
administrative and other rights, and interests
in consultation with them;
5. This Session further authorizes the Working
Committee to frame a Scheme of Constitution
in accordance with these basic principles,
providing for the assumption finally by the
respective regions of all powers such as
defence, external affairs, communications,
customs, and such other matters as may be
necessary.
While speaking on the resolution Jinnah said:
“The problem in India is not of an intercommunal
character, but manifestly of an international one, and it
must be treated as such. So long as this basic and
fundamental truth is not realized, any constitution that
may be built will result in disaster and will prove
destructive and harmful not only to the Musalmans, but
to the British and Hindus also. If the British
Government, really is earnest and sincere to secure peace
and happiness of the people of this sub-continent, the

251
only course open to us all is to allow the major nations
separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous
national states. There is no reason why these states
should be antagonistic to each other. On the other hand,
the rivalry and the natural desire and efforts on the part
of one to dominate the social order and establish political
supremacy over the other in the Government of the
country will disappear. It will lead more towards natural
good-will by international pacts between them, and they
can live in complete harmony with their neighbours. This
will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more
easily with regard to minorities by reciprocal
arrangements and adjustments between Muslim India
and Hindu India, which will far more adequately and
effectively safeguard rights and interests of Muslim and
various other minorities.
“It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our
Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam
and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense
of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social
orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims
can ever evolve a common nationality, and this
misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond
the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and
will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our
notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two
different religious philosophies, social customs, and
literature. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine
together and, indeed, they belong to two different
civilizations, which are based mainly on conflicting ideas
and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are
different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans

252
derive their inspiration from different sources of history.
They have different epics, different heroes and different
episodes. Very often, the hero of one is a foe of the other,
and, likewise their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke
together two such nations under a single state, one as a
numerical minority and the other as a majority, must
lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of
any fabric that may be so built up for the Government of
such a state.
“Jinnah pointed out: “History has presented to us
many examples such as the Union of Great Britain and
Ireland, Czechoslovakia and Poland. History has also
shown to us many geographical tracts, much smaller
than the sub-continent of India, which otherwise might
have been called one country but which have been
divided into as many states as there are nations
inhabiting them. The Balkan Peninsula comprises as
many as seven or eight sovereign states. Likewise the
Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian
Peninsula. Whereas under the plea of unity of India and
one nation which does not exist, it is sought to pursue
here the line of one central government which we know
that the history of the twelve hundred years has failed to
achieve unity and has witnessed, during these years,
India always divided into Hindu India and Muslim India.
The present artificial unity of India dates back only to the
British conquest and is maintained by the British
bayonet, but the termination of the British regime, which
is implicit in the recent declaration of His Majesty’s
Government, will be the herald of the entire break-up
with worst disaster than has ever taken place during the
last one thousand years under Muslims. Surely, that is

253
not the legacy, which Britain would bequeath to India
after 150 years of her rule, nor would Hindu and Muslim
India risk such a sure catastrophe.”
Jinnah declared: “Muslim India cannot accept any
constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu
majority Government. Hindus and Muslims brought
together under a democratic system forced upon the
minorities can only mean Hindu Raj. Democracy of the
kind with which the Congress High Command is
enamoured would mean the complete destruction of what
is most precious in Islam.”
Jinnah threatened: “We have had ample
experience of the working of the provincial constitutions
during the last two and a half years and any repeatation
of such a government must lead to civil war and raising
of private armies as recommended by Mr. Gandhi to
Hindus of Sukkur when he said that they must defend
themselves violently or non-violently, blow for blow, and
if they could not they must emigrate.”
Concluding his speech, Jinnah said: “Musalmans
are a nation according to any definition of a nation and
they must have their homeland, their territory and their
state. We wish to live in peace and harmony with our
neighbours as free and independent people. We wish our
people to develop to the fullest spiritual, cultural,
economic, social and political life in a way that we think
best and in consonance with our own ideals and
according to the genius of our people. Honest demand
and vital interest of millions of our people impose a
sacred duty upon us to find an honourable and peaceful
solution, which would be just and fair to all. But at the
same time, we cannot be moved or diverted from our

254
purpose and objective by threats or intimidations. We
must be prepared to face all difficulties and
consequences, make all the sacrifices that may be
required of us to achieve the goal we have set in front of
us.”
After his speech, Jinnah turned to Matlubul Hasan
Saiyid, who was present at the Session and said: “Iqbal is
no more amongst us, but had he been alive he would
have been happy to know that we did exactly what he
wanted us to do.”
The Indian newspapers next day pronounced the
Lahore resolution as, “Pakistan Resolution.” Jinnah
accepted it; and in a speech he delivered later said: “No
power on earth can prevent Pakistan.
In winding up the session, Jinnah called it a
“landmark in the history of India,” and concluded “the
more you organize yourself, the more you will be able to
get your rights.” The next day before leaving Lahore,
Jinnah told reporters, “I have thoroughly enjoyed my stay
in Lahore because of the result; otherwise I was worked
to death.”
The Lahore Resolution merely resuscitates a
scheme which was put forth by Sir Mohamed Iqbal in his
presidential address to the Muslim League in December
1930. It was however, taken up by one Rehmat Ali, who
gave it the name ‘Pakistan.’ Mr. Rehmat Ali founded the
Pakistan movment in 1933 while studying in London. He
divided India into two, namely Pakistan and Hindustan.
His Pakistan included the Punjab, Noth West Frontier
Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. The rest to
him was Hindustan. His idea was to have an independent
and separate Pakistan composed of five Muslim provinces

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in the North as an independent State. The proposal was
circulated to the members of the Round Table
Conference, but never officially put forth. It seems an
attempt was made privately to obtain the assent of the
British Government, who, however, declined to consider
it because they thought this was a revival of the old
Muslim Empire.
The League had only enlarged the original scheme
of Pakistan. It sought to create one more Muslim State in
the East to include the Muslims in Bengal and Assam.
Barring this, it expressed in its essence and general
outline the scheme put forth by Sir Mohamed Iqbal and
propagated by Rehmat Ali.
(Pakistan or Partition of India by Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, pg 22-23)
Stanley Wolpert in his book, Jinnah of Pakistan at
page 182 writes: “Jinnah’s Lahore address lowered the
final curtain on any prospects for a single united
independent India. Those who understood him enough to
know that once his mind was made up he never reverted
to any earlier position realized how momentous a
pronouncement their Quai-I-Azam had just made. The
rest of the world would take at least seven years to
appreciate that he literally meant every word he had
uttered that important afternoon in March. There was no
turning back. The Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity
had totally transformed himself into Pakistan’s great
leader. All that remained was for his party first, then his
inchoate nation, and then his British allies to agree to the
formula he had resolved upon.”
A few days later Gandhi was asked: “Do you intend
to start general Civil Disobedience although Quaid-I-
Azam Jinnah has declared war against Hindus and has

256
got the Muslim League to pass a resolution favouring
vivisection of India into two? If you do, what becomes of
your formula that there is no Swaraj without communal
unity?” To this Gandhi replied:
“I do not believe that the Muslims, when it comes
to a matter of actual decision, will ever want vivisection.
Their good sense will prevent them. Their self-interest will
deter them. Their religion will forbid the obvious suicide
which the partition would mean. The two-nation theory is
an untruth. Hindus and Muslims of India are not two
nations. Those whom God has made one, man will never
be able to divide.”
However, Gandhi admitted that the step taken by
the Muslim League at Lahore creates a baffling situation
and said: “But I do not regard it so baffling as to make
disobedience an impossibility…The Muslims must have
the same right of self-determination that the rest of India
has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may
claim a division.”
Other leaders of Congress reacted more strongly.
Rajagopalachari, who was the first Indian Governor-
General of India said: “I consider it a sign of a diseased
mentality that Mr. Jinnah has brought himself to look
upon the idea of one India as a misconception and the
cause of most of our trouble.” Jawaharlal Nehru
described the resolution as: “Jinnah’s fantastic
proposals, reading it as a cat’s paw of British imperial
duplicity.” He further said:
“The whole problem has taken a new complexion
and there is no question of settlement or negotiation now.
The knot that is before us is incapable of being united by
settlement; it needs cutting open. It needs a major

257
operation. Without mincing words, I want to say that we
will have nothing to do with this mad scheme. I do not
know what the consequences to the country would be.
Who can say… We will, of course, oppose the partition
scheme, but our goal is clear and we will march on our
path. A struggle is inevitable now.”
Sardar Patel too, felt that a final showdown with
the British who were behind the entire episode of Muslim
transigence had to come, but the question was when to
start the fight.
Master Tara Singh presiding over a Sikh
conference at Lucknow on 15th April said: “If the Muslim
League want to establish Pakistan they will have to pass
through an ocean of Sikh blood.”
(A Centenary History of Indian national Congress: B.N.Pande,
pg 35)
The Azad Muslim Conference:
In April 1940, a conference of Muslims was held in
Delhi under the name, “The Azad Muslim Conference.”
The Muslims who met in the Azad Muslim Conference
were those who were opposed to the Muslim League as
well as to the Nationalist Muslims. They were opposed to
the Muslim League firstly, because of their hostility to
Pakistan and secondly because they did not want to
depend upon the British Government for the protection of
their rights. They were also opposed to the Nationalist
Musalmans i.e. Congressites, because they were accused
of indifference to the cultural and religious rights of
Musalmans.
The Azad Muslim Conference passed the following
resolutions:

258
“This conference, representative of Indian Muslims
who desire to secure the fullest freedom of the country,
consisting of delegates and representatives of every
province, after having given its fullest and most careful
consideration to all the vital questions affecting the
interests of the Muslim community and the country as a
whole declares the following:
India will have geographical and political
boundaries of an individual whole and as such is the
common homeland of all the citizens irrespective of race
or religion who are joint owners of its resources. All
nooks and corners of the country are hearths and homes
of Muslims who cherish the historical eminence of their
religion and culture, which are dearer to them than their
lives. From the national point of view every Muslim is an
Indian. The common rights of all residents of the country
and their responsibilities, in every walk of life and in
every sphere of human activity are the same. The Indian
Muslim by virtue of these rights and responsibilities, is
unquestionable an Indian national and in every part of
the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of
every Indian national in every sphere of governmental,
economic and other national activities and in public
services. For that very reason Muslims own equal
responsibilities with other Indians for striving and
making sacrifices to achieve the country’s independence.
This is a self-evident proposition, the truth of which no
right thinking Muslim will question. This conference
declares unequivocally and with all emphasis at its
command that the goal of Indian Muslims is coplete
independence along with protection of their religious and
communal rights, and that they are anxious to attain this

259
goal as early as possible. Inspired by this aim they have
in the past made great sacrifices and are ever ready to
make greater sacrifices.
“The Conference unreservedly and strongly
repudiates the baseless charge levelled against Indian
Muslims by the agents of British Imperialism and others
that they are an obstacle in the path of Indian freedom
and emphatically declares that the Muslims are fully
alive to their responsibilities and consider it inconsistent
with their traditions and derogatory to their honour to lag
behind others in the struggle for independence.
By this Resolution they repudiated the scheme of
Pakistan. Their second resolution was in the following
terms:
“This is the considered view of this Conference that
only that constitution for the future Government of India
would be acceptable to the people of India which is
framed by the Indians themselves elected by means of
adult franchise. The constitution should fully safeguard
all the legitimate interests of the Muslims in accordance
with the recommendations of the Muslim members of the
Constituent Assembly. The representatives of other
communities or of an outside power would have no right
to interfere in the determination of these safeguards.
By this Resolution the Conference asserted that
the safeguards for the Muslims must be determined by
the Muslims alone. The third Resolution was as under:
“Whereas in the future constitution of India it
would be essential, in order to ensure stability of
government and preservation of security, that every
citizen and community should feel satisfied, this
Conference considers it necessary that a scheme of

260
safeguards as regards vital matters should be prepared to
the satisfaction of the Muslims.
(Pakistan or Partition of India by Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, pg 200-
201)
His Highness the Aga Khan, pressed K.M.Munshi
to meet Jinnah and arranged for an interview for 23 rd
June 1940.
Munshi met Jinnah at his residence in Bombay.
The moment, Munshi touched the subject of Congress-
League alliance, Jinnah emphatically told: “Partition of
India was the only way out. There was no arguing the
thing, whatever the consequences.”
(Pilgrimage to Freedom: K.M.Munshi, pg 72)
Simla Talks:
In June 1940, the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, asked
Jinnah and Gandhi to visit him in Simla. He hoped that
they might inspire both Congress and the League to more
lively support of Britain’s war.
Diwan Chaman Lall and other non-partisan
friends believed that India’s cause would be strengthened
if the two leaders met and talked amiably together, before
they were received by the Viceroy. Unfortunately, their
pride made this cooperation impossible. Diwan Chaman
Lall has said: “I went to Gandhi and proposed that
Jinnah should meet him. I found the Mahatma sitting
upon a white sheet, eating from a silver bowl. He looked
up when I made the proposal, and gave me the surprising
answer, ‘Adversity makes strange bedfellows.’
Diwan Chaman Lall then went to Jinnah, at the
Cecil Hotel, in Simla, and tried to impress upon him the
advantages that might come if only he and Gandhi could
meet. He asked Jinnah, “May I tell Gandhi that you wish

261
to see him? Jinnah answered, “No. I am willing to see
him, if he wishes; but I am not willing that you should
say that I wish to see him.”
Diwan Chaman Lall went back to Gandhi and
asked, “Do you wish to see Jinnah?” Gandhi answered,
“If I were to say that I wish to see Jinnah, it would be a
lie. But if Jinnah wishes to meet me, I will walk on bare
feet from here to the Cecil Hotel.”
Mahatma and the Quaid-e-Azam did not meet, and
the fragile hope of amity, before seeing the Viceroy, was
lost.
(Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 136-137)
Jinnah saw Lord Linlithgow on 27th June and had
a long discussion. He submitted his proposal to the
Viceroy on 1st July in which he repeated the demands of
the Muslims for the division of India, and insisted that
Muslim leaders should be associated as equal partners in
the Government both at the Centre and the Provinces
and for the duration of war the Executive Council of the
Viceroy be expanded to include at least as many Muslim
members as Hindus, if the Congress comes in; otherwise
Muslims, all to be chosen by the League, were to have the
majority of additional council members.”
Gandhi published his open letter to every Briton,
in which he said: “No cause, however just, can warrant
the indiscriminate slaughter that is going on minute by
minute… I do not want Britain to be defeated, nor do I
want her to be victorious in a trial of brute strength… I
want you to fight Nazism without arms. I would like you
to lay down the arms you have as being useless for
saving you or humanity. You will invite Herr Hitler and
Signor Mussolini to take what they want of the countries

262
you call your possessions. Let them take possession of
your beautiful Island, with your many beautiful
buildings. You will give all these, but neither your souls,
nor your minds. If these gentlemen choose to occupy
your homes, you will vacate them. If they do not give you
free passage out, you will allow yourselves, man, woman
and child, to be slaughtered, but you will refuse to owe
allegiance to them… I am telling His Highness the Viceroy
that my services are at the disposal of His Majesty’s
Government, should they consider them of any practical
use in advancing the object of my appeal.”
Ignoring Gandhi’s open letter, Winston Churchill
declared: “We shall defend our Island, whatever the cost
may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on
the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields, and in
the streets, we shall fight in the hills, we shall never
surrender.”
The Congress Working Committee held an
emergency meeting from 3rd to 7th July 1940 at Delhi. It
passed a resolution sponsored by Rajaji, renewing the
demand for an immediate and an unequivocal declaration
of full independence for India; and, in exchange for a
provisional national government at the Centre
commanding in confidence of all the elected elements in
the Central Legislature, the Congress pledged to throw its
full weight into the effort for the effective organization of
the defence of the country. The resolution was ratified by
the All India Congress Committee at its Poona Session on
27th July. On 8th August Linlithgow made an
announcement on behalf of the British Government,
which came to be known as the August Offer.

263
The August offer proposed the expansion of the
Executive Council and the establishment of a War
Advisory Council, and suggested that soon after the war
a body of reperesentatives of principle elements in India’s
national life be set up to frame a new constitution. “
As a result of Linlithgow’s interview with the
Indian leaders, the Secretary of State, L.S.Amery, felt the
necessity of issuing a declaration setting forth the aims
and intentions of the British Government. Amery himself
drew up a rough draft which he sent to Linlithgow for
comments and criticisms, but the draft was changed to
such an extent as to make it practically unacceptable to
Indian leaders.
For example, the declaration contained the
following provision regarding the position of minorities:
His Majesty’s Government’s concern that full
weight should be given to the views of the minorities in
any revision has also been brought out. That remains the
position of His Majesty’s Government. It goes without
saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of
their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of
India to any system of Government whose authority is
directly denied by large and powerful elements in India’s
national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of
such elements into submission to such a Government.
This was a further step in giving Jinnah practically
a veto in any constitutional set-up.
The provision regarding the Constituent Assembly
was equally unsatisfactory. The declaration stated:
…His Majesty’s Government authorize me to
declare that they will most readily assent to the setting
up, after the conclusion of war, with the least possible

264
delay, of a body representative of the principal elements
in India’s national life, in order to devise the frame work
of the new constitution, and they will lend every aid in
their power to hasten decisions on all relevant matters to
the utmost degree.
It was certain that the principal elements of
national life were to be determined by the British
Government, who could be depended upon to collect
such diverse elements as they did during the Round
Table Conferences.
However, before publishing the August offer,
Linlithgow sent advance copies to the leaders of the
Congress, the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha.
Maulana Azad was at the time the President of the
Congress. He writes: “Even without consulting my
collegues, I declined the offer.” Gandhiji supported Azad,
because he was a conscientious objector of war and
violence. The other leaders were not willing to help the
British in a war, which might or might not go in favour of
Britain, and the British were not prepared to convert the
Executive Council into a national government which
might or might not support their war effort.
Gandhiji again saw Linlithgow, but without coming
to an agreement. The situation as it was developing could
not continue any longer. On 13th October 1940, the
Congress Working Committee after three day session,
approved Gandhiji’s plan for ‘individual civil
disobedience’ by a limited number of Satyagrahis
selected by him. Acharya Vinoba Bhave, the great leader
of Bhoodan Movement was the first Satyagrahi to be
selected by Gandhiji; he addressed a meeting on 17th

265
October and was taken into custody; then followed
Nehru, Azad, Sardar, Munshi and others.
(Pilgrimage to Freedom by K.M.Munshi, pg 72-74)
In November 1940, Amery made a speech stressing
the essential unity of India and the need of maintaining
the same. He pointed out the disastrous effect of the
Balkanisation of the South-Eastern Europe on its people.
He said that his object was to lay down the foundation of
a constitution which would reconcile Indian differences
and preserve India united in essentials. He regretted that
the spirit of ‘India First’ was not strong enough to
overcome the insistence on unpractical demands on one
side, or undue suspicion on the other.
The Working Committee of the Muslim League on
22nd February 1941 adopted the following resolution:
“The Working Committee view with disapproval
the recent pronouncements of Mr. Amery, Secretary of
State for India, which are likely to create grave
apprehensions in the minds of the Musalmans as they
give an impression, contrary to his previous
pronouncements, that His Majesty’s Government are still
complementing the possibility of a constitution based on
the economic and political unity of India…
“It is unfortunate that Mr. Amery, having regard
to his responsibility as the Secretary of State for India,
should have allowed himself to indulge in slogans such
as ‘India First.’ Musalmans of India are proud to be
Indians and firmly believe in India for the Indians. It is in
that spirit that the Lahore resolution was adopted,
because the Musalmans are convinced that it is the only
solution of India’s constitutional problems which will

266
ensure peace, harmony and satisfaction among all
elements, interests and inhabitants of this vast country.”
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 183-184)
The annual session of the Muslim League was held
on 12th April 1941 in Madras. Jinnah in his presidential
address said:
“…Since the fall of the Moghul Empire, Muslim
India was not so well organized and so alive and so
politically conscious as it is today. We have established a
flag of our own, a national flag of Muslim India. We have
established a remarkable platform, which displays and
demonstrates a complete unity of the entire solid body of
Muslim India. We have defined in the clearest language
our goal about which Muslim India was groping in the
dark, and the goal is Pakistan. …That is our five year
plan of the past. We have succeeded in raising the
prestige and reputation of the League not only
throughout this country-we have now reached the
farthest corners of the world, and we are watched
throughout the world.
“Now what next? No people can ever succeed in
anything that they desire unless they work for it and
work hard for it. What is required now is that you should
think-and I say this particularly to you, Delegates of the
All-India Muslim League who have gathered here from all
parts of India-we must now think and devise the
programme of the five-year plan, and part of the five-year
plan should be how quickly and how best the
departments of the national life of Muslim India may be
built up.
“Speaking about the Congress, Jinnah said: “The
Congress has taken up a position about which there is

267
absolutely no doubt. I should like to ask any man with a
grain of sense, Do you really think that Gandhi, the
supreme leader, commander and general of the Congress,
has started his Satyagraha merely for the purpose of
getting liberty of speech? Don’t you really feel that this is
nothing but a weapon of coercion and blackmailing the
British, who are in tight corner, to surrender and
concede the Congress demands?”
Jinnah concluded his speech with a warning to the
British Government, because after all they are in
possession of this land and the Government of this
subcontinent. Please stop your policy of appeasement
towards those who are bent upon frustrating your war
efforts and doing their best to oppose the prosecution of
war. You are not loyal to those who are willing to stand
by you and sincerely desire to support you; you desire to
placate those who have the greatest nuisance value in
political and economic fields. ….If the Government want
the whole-hearted cooperation of Muslim India, they
must place their cards on the table.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 191-192)
Jinnah withdrew the League’s elected members
from the Central Legislature to impress upon the Viceroy
his dissatisfaction with the government’s behaviour, and
he called for a clear declaration of British policy toward
all Muslim countries, demanding that Great Britain
affirm its non-intervention policy with regard to universal
Muslim sovereignty and independence.
Jinnah went to Nagpur to address the All-India
Muslim Students’ Federation on 26th December 1941. In
his address, he said: “…My young friends, today you
compare yourselves with what was the position of the

268
Muslims even three years ago…Five years ago it was
wretched. Ten years ago you were dead. The Muslim
League has given you a goal which in my judgment is
going to lead you to the promised land where we shall
establish our Pakistan. People may say what they like
and talk as they like. Of course he who laughs last,
laughs best.” And then he asked: “What is the Congress
Party doing in Bengal? The Congress Party has supported
new coalition ministry formed by Fazlul Haq, and by
virtue of it he was able to form a government and
continue to be the Premier. Now I make a Christmas gift
of Mr. Haq to Lord Linlithgow! I make another new years
gift of the Nawab of Dacca to the Governor of Bengal! I
am very glad and I am happy that Muslim India is rid of
these men who are guilty of the grossest treachery and
betrayal of the Muslims.
Both Bengali leaders were expelled from the
League, “weeded out” as Jinnah put it.
Jinnah went to Calcutta on 13th February 1942 to
hoist a Muslim Flag. In his speech there before a large
gathering, Jinnah said: “Up to the present moment, the
Muslims were absolutely demoralized. Our blood had
become cold, our flesh was not capable of working and
the Muslim nation was, for all practical purposes, dead.
Today, we find that our blood circulation is improving.
Our flesh is getting stronger and, above all, our mind is
getting more clarified.”
Jinnah was driven to Sherganj in East Bengal from
Calcutta to preside over the Bengal Provincial Muslim
League Conference. Addressing the Conference, Jinnah
said: “…We are going through a life and death struggle.
We have many opponents. We must stand on our own

269
legs and rely on our own strength if we are to achieve
anything in this world.”
Cripps Mission:
The spread of war to the Pacific and Japanese
occupation of South-East Asia had brought India into the
front line of battle. She became the keystone of allied
defence in the Indian ocean, the principal route for
supplies from Britain and the United States to China,
and an important source of man-power and war
materials for allied forces in the Near and Far East. When
Rangoon fell on 7th March 1942, it seemed as if the tide of
Japanese conquest would soon be sweeping into Bengal
and Madras. On 11th March, Winston Churchill
announced in the House of Commons that the War
Cabinet had agreed on a plan for India, and that Sir
Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House
of Commons would be sent to India to ascertain whether
this plan would secure a reasonable and practical
measure of acceptance and thus promote the
concentration of all Indian thought and energies on
defence against Japan.
Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in Delhi on 23rd March.
That day was the second anniversary of Lahore
Resolution and it was being celebrated in Delhi in a
mammoth public meeting. Addressing the meeting
Jinnah said: “I can say without fear of contradiction that
the Muslim League stands more firmly for the freedom
and independence of this country than any other party….
We are asking for justice and fair play. We have no
designs on our sister communities. We want to live in
this land as a free and independent nation. We are not a
minority but a nation.” Referring to the Cripps Mission,

270
he said: “There is a fear that he is a friend of the
Congress. He has enjoyed the hospitality of Jawaharlal
Nehru… That is all true but we should not be afraid on
that score. Don’t get cold feet… We are prepared to face
all consequences if any scheme or solution which is
detrimental to the interests of the Muslims is forced upon
us. We shall not only not accept it, but resist it to the
utmost of our capacity. If we have to die in the attempt
we shall die fighting.”
After meeting Lord Linlithgow and the members of
the Central Government and other high officials, he
began a series of conversation with the leaders of all the
political parties. The proposals embodied in the draft
declaration as explained by him to the press were as
follows:
1. In order to achieve earliest possible realization
of self-government in India, the British
Government propose that steps should be
taken to create a new Indian Union which will
have the full status of a dominion with the
power to secede, if it so chooses, from British
Commonwealth.
2. Immediately upon the cessation of the
hostilities a constitution-making body shall be
set up, representing both British India and the
Indian states, and the British Government
undertakes to accept and implement the
constitution framed by that body on two
conditions: (a) Any province or provinces which
do not acquiesce in the new constitution will be
entitled to frame a constitution of their own,
giving them the same full status as the Indian

271
Union; and any Indian state or states shall be
similarly free to adhere to the new constitution
or not. (b) A treaty shall be negotiated between
the British Government and the constitution-
making body to cover all matters arising out of
the complete transfer of responsibility from
British to Indian hands.
3. In the meantime, the British Government must
retain the control of the defence of India as part
of their world war effort, but the task of
organizing the military, moral and material
resources of India rests with the government of
India in co-operation with the people, and to
that end they earnestly invite the immediate
participation of their leaders in the counsels of
their country, of the Commonwalth and the
United Nations.
The negotiations began on 25th March and ended
on 10th April. In the course of these seventeen days, Sir
Stafford Cripps interviewed the leaders of all major
political parties and Gandhi, who explained that he
represented only himself and not the Congress. Sir
Stafford’s discussions with the Congress were carried on
mainly through Azad and Nehru, but he saw several
other members of the Working Committee who were
sitting at Delhi throughout the negotiations.
Jinnah came alone for the Muslim League. Cripps
told Jinnah that he had not taken the Muslim League or
Pakistan propaganda very seriously during his last visit
to India, but assured him that he has changed his view
because of the change in the communal feeling in India
and the growth of the Pakistan movement and then gave

272
him the document he had brought from London. Jinnah
told Cripps that he will place the matter before his
Working Committee and come back to him.
Jinnah had already talked to Sir Stafford Cripps
during his previous visit to India in March 1940 and he
had been disappointed by the results of the meeting.
Jinnah had written a letter to Major Gardiner in which he
said: “I had a frank talk with Sir Stafford Cripps on his
recent visit to India, explaining the Muslim point of view.
His expression of agreement with me appeared genuine,
but even had he disagreed I feel there was no justification
for the complete misrepresentation of my views,
amounting to nothing less than deliberate falsehood,
which he published in a news paper on his return to
England. I am aware that he was not at the time a
member of your party, but I thought he occupied an
important position in the public, and in his own
profession.”
Jinnah-Creator of Pakistan by Hector Bolitho, pg 138)
The Hindu Mahasabha was represented by
Savarkar and four other delegates, the Depressed Classes
by Dr.Ambedkar and M.C.Rajah, and the Indian Liberals
by Sapru and Jayakar. All other parties and communal
interests had their say.
The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha
declared itself more or less satisfied with parts of the
British scheme. But the scheme as a whole was rejected
mainly because of the non-adherence provisions. A fierce
protest against the non-adherence provision came from
the Sikhs. Sikhs said: “We shall resist by all possible
means separation of the Punjab from the All-India Union.
The firmest stand was taken by the representatives of the

273
Depressed Classes who denounced the scheme for its
failure to provide the necessary safeguards for them.
Their leaders said: “We are convinced that the proposals
are calculated to do the greatest harm to the Depressed
Classes and are sure to place them under an unmitigated
system of Hindu Raj.”
Sapru and Jayakar submitted a memorandum in
which they said: “The creation of more than one union,
howsoever consistent in theory with the principle of self-
determination, will be disastrous to the lasting interests
of the country and its integrity and security.”
“Why did you come if this is what you have to
offer?” Gandhi said to Cripps. “I would advice you to take
the first plane home.” He described the declaration as “a
post-dated cheque on a crashing bank.” He left Delhi for
Sevagram on 4th April, asking the Congress Working
Committee to make up its own mind.
The Congress Working Committee ultimately
turned down the proposal on 10th April 1942 rejected the
Cripps scheme for two reasons. First, it ignored the
ninety millions of people in the Indian states, who were to
have no voice in shaping the constitution. The states
might become barriers to the growth of Indian freedom
and secondly, the novel principle of non-accession was a
severe blow to the conception of Indian unity.
The Congress claimed that, in order to rally the
Indian public to a maximum effort of patriotism, there
must be an Indian Defence Minister. This was conceded
on the British side, but it was held that the Commander-
in-Chief could not transfer his major duties to any
civilian colleague in the middle of the war. Col. Johnson,
special representative of President Roosevelt, arrived on

274
the scene to iron out the differences. Formulas
apportioning responsibility were interchanged. The
Congress insisted that a convention should be observed
that the Viceroy was to treat his new council as a Cabinet
and accept its decisions.
The Working Committee of the Muslim League
issued its following resolution on the Cripps offer shortly
after Congress resolved upon rejection:
“The Committee, while expressing their
gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recognized
by implication by providing for the establishment of two
or more independent Unions in India, regret that no
alternative proposal is invited. In view of the rigidity of
the attitude of His Majesty’s Government with regard to
the fundamentals not being open to any modification, the
Committee have no alternative but to say that the
proposals in the present form are unacceptable …The
Musalmans cannot be satisfied by such a Declaration on
a vital question affecting their future destiny, and
demand a clear and precise pronouncement on the
subject. Any attempt to solve the future problem of India
by the process of evading the real issue is to court
disaster.”
Jinnah complained that the talks had been carried
on with the Congress leaders over the heads of the
Muslims, and other parties had been utterly ignored.
Sir Stafford Cripps sent a wire to Churchill: “There
is clearly no hope of agreement and on 12th April left
Delhi for London in a huff.
On 13th April, Gandhi made following comments
on the Cripps proposals:

275
“It is a thousand pities that the British
Government should have sent a proposal for resolving the
political deadlock which, on face of it, was too ridiculous
to find acceptance anywhere. And it was a misfortune
that the bearer should have been Sir Stafford Cripps,
acclaimed as a radical among the radicals and a friend of
India. I have no doubt about his goodwill. He believed
that no one could have brought anything better for India.
But he should have known that at least the Congress
would not look at dominion status even though it carried
the right of secession the very moment it was taken. He
knew too that the proposal contemplated the splitting up
of India into three parts, each having different ideas of
governance. It contemplated Pakistan, and yet not the
Pakistan of the Muslim League’s conception. And last of
all, it gave no real control over defence to responsible
ministers.
“It is no use brooding over the past or British
mistakes. It is more profitable to look within. The British
will take care of themselves, if we will take care of
ourselves. Our mistakes or rather our defects are many.
Why blame the British for our own limitations?
Attainment of an independence is an impossibility till we
have solved the communal tangle… There are two ways of
solving what has almost become insoluble. The one is the
royal way of non-violence, and the other of violence… I
suppose the choice has already been made by the chief
actors…”
“Whether those who believe in the two-nation
theory and communal partition of India can live as
friends cooperating with one another I do not know. If the
vast majority of Muslims regard themselves as a separate

276
nation having nothing in common with the Hindus and
others, no power on earth can compel them to think
otherwise. And if they want to partition India on that
basis, they must have the partition, unless the Hindus
want to fight against such a division. So far as I can see,
such a preparation is silently going on, onbehalf of both
parties. That way lies suicide. Each party will probably
want British or foreign aid. In that case, good-bye to
independence.
Gandhi later wrote: “Sir Stafford has come and
gone. How nice it would have been if he did not come
with the dismal mission… My firm opinion is that the
British should leave India now in the orderly manner and
not run the risk that they did in Singapore, Malaya and
Burma. The act would mean courage of high order,
confession of human limitations, and right doing by
India.” In Harijan, he pleaded for the British withdrawal
from India.
(Mahatma by D.G.Tendulkar, pg 74-75)
Some pressmen asked Gandhi what could Sir
Stafford Cripps have done in the absence of an
agreement between the Congress and the League?
“Sir Stafford,” Gandhi replied, “could have asked
either the Congress or the League to form the Cabinet. If
he had done so, probably the party they entrusted with
responsibility would have succeeded in having the
cooperation of the other party. In any even, the
Government would then have dealt with the real
representatives of their party rather than having their
own nominees. If the Muslims wanted anything-no
matter what it is-no power on earth can prevent them
from having it. For the condition of refusal will be to

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fight. Supposing the Muslims ask for some thing, which
the non-Muslims do not want to give, it means a fight.
This applies to both the communities. But my hope is
that some day or other, all parties will come to their
senses and consent to go to arbitration.”
(Mahatma by D.G.Tendulkar. pg 87)
On 23rd April, Rajgopalachari addressed a small
gathering of his Congress supporters in the Madras
Legislature, and carried two resolutions for submission to
the All India Congress Committee, First, recommending
the acceptance of Pakistan in principle as a basis for
settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League.
The second resolution requested permission of the All
India Congress Committee for the Madras Congress to
unite with the Muslim League and other provincial
parties to restore popular Government, as a coalition
ministry, to Madras. Both the resolutions were passed
with overwhelming majority.
In his presidential address to the Muslim League
at its session held in April at Allahabad, Jinnah said: “…
the Musalmans feel deeply disappointed that the entity
and the integrity of the Muslim nation has not been
expressly recognized… Muslim India will not be satisfied
unless the right of national self-determination is
unequivocally recognized… In order to give the real effect
to the principle of Pakistan and Muslim self-
determination, His Majesty’s Government, and Sir
Stafford Cripps, will not hesitate to make necessary
adjustments on their behalf. Let us hope that there will
emerge out of these negotiations a settlement that will be
just, honourable, and finally acceptable to all.”

278
The Secretary of State, Mr Amery stated in the
House of Commons on 28th April: “Such a national
Government as the Congress demanded would have been
responsible in the last resort neither to Parliament here
under the existing constitution, nor to an agreed and
fairly balanced constitution in India, but only to its own
majority,-a majority presumably of Congress or, at any
rate, Hindus. That demand, whether made by Sir Tej
Bahadur Sapru and his collegues, or by the Congress,
was the one thing, which the Muslims and other
minorities were determined at all costs to reject. They
were and are convinced that such a Government would,
in fact, prejudge the whole future situation to their
detriment. There was, therefore, never any question in
our view of conceding that demand because it was, in
fact, if not in intention, a demand which precluded all
agreed co-operation in India.”
Amery added that the main object of the draft
declaration was to set at rest India’s suspicions, as to the
British Government’s intention. “Our ideal,’ he
concluded, remains a United All-India.”
The result of the Cripps negotiations, instead of
bridging the gulf between the Government and the
political parties in India, only served to widen it. The
manner in which the negotiations had broken down
tended to strengthen the doubts and suspicions in the
minds of political leaders that there was no genuine
desire on the part of His majesty’s Government to part
with power.
Quit India:
The All-India Congress Committee at its meeting
held on 29th April at Allahabad rejected Rajagopalachari’s

279
resolutions by thumping majority and adopted a counter-
resolution, “That any proposal to disintegrate India by
giving liberty to any component State or territorial unit to
secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be
detrimental to the best interests of the people of the
different States and provinces and the country as a whole
and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such
proposal.”
The Committee called upon the people of India to
offer complete non-violent non-cooperation to the
invading forces and not to render them any assistance.
Rajagopalachari launched a drive for the establishment of
a national government and for the mobilization of the
country for defence. Nehru took serious objection to
Rajagopalachari’s drive being detrimental to the interests
of the country and said: “It appears to me that he is
breaking to pieces the weapon which the Congress have
fashioned after 22 years of innumerable sacrifice.” Rajaji
resigned his membership from the Congress and the
Madras Legislature.
Gandhi wrote a series of articles in, “Harijan” in
which he urged the British to Quit India. He wrote: “If
British left India to her fate, non-violent India would not
lose any thing.” He referred to the conditions in India
which the people of India were living as a state of ‘ordered
anarchy’ and said: “If this ordered anarchy was to be
replaced by complete lawlessness in India as a result of
the withdrawal of British, he was prepared to take that
risk and could only hope that the people would evolve
real popular order out of Chaos.”
The Congress Working Committee met in Wardha
on 14th July and resolved: “…The British rule in India

280
must end immediately…Neither settlement of the
communal tangle, nor effective resistance to foreign
aggression, was possible while British authority lasted.
On the withdrawal of British rule, responsible men and
women of the country would come together to form a
provisional government representative of all important
sections of the people of India… In the alternative, the
Congress would be reluctantly compelled to utilize all its
accumulated non-violent strength in a widespread
struggle, under the leadership of Gandhiji.”
Gandhi made an appeal to the Muslims, including
believers in Pakistan, to join the mass movement to end
British rule. He appealed to the British to declare India
free and make the independence a reality. Side by side,
he defined his coming movement as an open rebellion
which should be as short and swift as possible. “I am
lighting my own funeral pyre to end the agony,” he said.
As a sharp reaction to the above resolution,
Jinnah issued a statement in which he said: “The latest
decision of the Congress Working Committee resolving to
launch a mass movement if the British do not withdraw
from India is the culminating point in the policy and
program of Mr. Gandhi and his Hindu Congress of
blackmailing the British and coercing them to concede a
system of government and transfer of power to that
government which would establish a Hindu Raj
immediately under the aegis of the British bayonet,
thereby throwing the Muslims and other minorities and
other interests at the mercy of the Congress Raj.”
Two American journalists interviewed Gandhi in
Wardha and asked, “What does a free India mean, if, as
Mr. Jinnah said, Muslims will not accept Hindu rule?”

281
Gandhi replied: “I have not asked the British to handover
India to the Congress or the Hindus. Let them entrust
India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all
the parties will fight one another like dogs, or will, when
real responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable
agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that
chaos.” Gandhi was reminded that until recently he had
said there could be no Swaraj without Hindu-Muslim
unity, but of late he said that there would be no unity
until India has achieved independence. To this Gandhi’s
reply was: “Time is a merciless enemy. I have been asking
myself why every whole-hearted attempt made by all
including myself to reach unity has failed, and failed so
completely that I have entirely fallen from grace and I am
described by some Muslim papers as the greatest enemy
of Islam in India. It is a phenomenon I can only account
for by the fact that the third power, even without
deliberately wishing it, will not allow real unity to take
place. Therefore I have come to the resultant conclusion
that the two communities will come together almost
immediately after the British power comes to a final end
in India.”
Jinnah, immediately responded to this by saying:
“I am glad that at last Mr. Gandhi has openly declared
that unity and Hindu-Muslim settlement can only come
after the achievement of India’s independence and has
thereby thrown off the cloak that he had worn for the last
22 years.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 206-207)
The Secretary of State Amery in the House of
Commons and Stafford Cripps in a broadcast declared
that the government would not flinch from taking every

282
possible step to meet the Congress challenge. They said
that the demand of the Congress for British withdrawal
would, if conceded, completely disrupt the governmental
machinery in one of the most vital theatres of the war at
a time when every energy was needed for the struggle
against the common enemy. They affirmed that the
British Government would stand firmly by the broad
intentions embodied in the Cripps proposals.
“Struggle-eternal struggle, that is my reply to
Amery and Stafford Cripps,”declared Nehru
“Daily Herald of London wrote: “If you (Congress)
persist in demands which are at this moment impossible
to grant, you will cripple your cause and humble the
influence of us who are your proud and faithful
advocates. You will do worse, you will convey to the world
the impression that India’s leaders are incapable of
distinguishing between the ideal of the United Nations
and the petty standards of nationalism; that you rate
political strategy higher than the prospect of liberty,
equality and fraternity with the progressive peoples of the
earth.”
(The Transfer of Power by V.P.Menon, pg 166)
The All India Congress Committee met in Bombay
on 7th and 8th August and approved the Working
Committee’s resolution. While moving the resolution
Jawaharlal Nehru said:
“The Congress is plunging into a stormy ocean and
it would emerge either with a free India or go down.
Unlike in the past, it is not going to be a movement for a
few days, to be suspended and talked over. It is going to
be a fight to finish.”
In seconding the resolution Sardar Patel said:

283
“If America and England were still thinking that
they could fight their enemies from India without the
cooperation of 400 millions of people they were foolish. It
must dawn on the people that this war was a people’s
war and they should fight for their country and their
freedom.”
The next day on 8th August, the resolution was
passed “The Committee appeals to the people of India,”
the resolution said, “to face the dangers and hardships
that will fall to their lot with courage and endurance, and
to hold together under the leadership of Gandhiji, and
carry out his instructions as disciplined soldiers of Indian
freedom.” The resolution further said: “Every Indian who
desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide
urging him on along the hard road where there is no
resting place and which leads ultimately to the
independence and deliverance of India.”
Gandhi congratulated the All-India Congress
Committee when the resolution was passed by an
overwhelming majority and asked the people to imprint a
mantra in their hearts-Do or Die. “We shall either free
India or die in the attempt,” he said impassionately, “we
shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery. Take
a pledge with God and your conscious as witness, that
you will no longer rest till freedom is achieved and will be
prepared to lay down your lives in the attempt to achieve
it. He who loses his life will gain it; he who will seek to
save it shall lose it. Freedom is not for the coward or the
faint-hearted.”
(A Centenary History of Indian National Congress: B. N. Pande,
pg 50-51)

284
London considered Congress’ resolution as open
rebellion, and the War Cabinet authorized Linlithgow, the
Viceroy to arrest Gandhi and the members of the
Congress Working Committee at any time he deemed
appropriate.
In the early morning of 9th August, Gandhi,
Nehru, Sardar, Azad, Kriplani and all important leaders
of the Congress were arrested and the Congress was
banned. Serious disorder followed the arrest of Congress
leaders.
Gandhi’s last instructions conveyed to the nation
through Pyarelal were: “Let every non-violent soldier of
freedom write out the slogan, ‘Do or Die’ on a piece of
paper or cloth, and stick it on his clothes, so that in case
he died in the course of offering Satyagraha, he might be
distinguished by that sign from other elements who do
not subscribe to non-violence.”
“The disturbances,” said Churchill, “were crushed
with all the weight of the Government…Larger
enforcements have reached India and the number of
white troops in that country is larger than any time in
the British connections.” Later, he stated: “I have not
become the King’s first minister in order to preside over
the liquidation of the British Empire.”
The Working Committee of the All India Muslim
League, in a resolution passed at Bombay on 20 th August,
condemned the Congress civil disobedience movement as
an instrument of forcing the British Government and
Muslims to surrender to Congress dictation, and directed
Muslims to refrain from participating in it. At the same
time it demanded from the British Government an
immediate declaration guaranteeing to the Muslims the

285
right of self-determination and a pledge that they will
abide by the verdict of a plebiscite of Musalmans and give
effect to the Pakistan Scheme.
At a subsequent meeting, the League passed a
resolution which said that the Muslims of India were a
nation and not a minority, they were entitled to
autonomous homelands and the areas in the North-West
and North-East where they were in a majority. The
Muslims themselves should decide their fate by means of
plebiscite after the war. The League was ready to
participate in a provisional government, provided its
post-war claims were not prejudiced thereby; any
provisional government so set up was likely to have a
decisive voice in the negotiations immediately after the
war and therefore the League must have parity in any
such government to ensure that its claims were not
prejudiced. The Congress movement was condemned as
an instrument for coercing both the British and Muslims
to surrender to the Congress demands.”
The international press asked Jinnah at his Delhi
house on 13th September: “If there was any chance of any
modification of his party’s demand, what would he do?”
Jinnah replied: “If you start by asking for sixteen annas
(Indian one Rupee), there is room for bargaining. The
Muslim League has never put forward any demand which
can by any reasonable man be characterized as
unreasonable. The Muslim League stands for
independence for the Hindus and for the Musalmans.
The Hindu India has got three-fourths of India in its
pocket and it is Hindu India which is bargaining to see if
it can get the remaining one-fourth for itself and diddle
us out of it.”

286
In October 1942, Rajagopalachari suggested a plan
according to which the Viceroy should act as the Crown
would in a crisis in England and select the most popular
and most responsible leaders of India to assist him in
running what would in effect be a national government.
Five important Congressmen should first be chosen, and
then Jinnah could be invited to join this government with
men of his choice. There might, additionally, be three
others to represent the lesser minorities.” Jinnah
immediately dismissed the plan.
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 211)
The year 1942 ended with a letter from Gandhi to
Linlithgow in which Gandhi hinted that he would have to
go on fast unless the Viceroy could convince him of his
errors. On 13th January 1943, Lord Linlithgow replied to
Gandhi: “If I am right in reading your letter to mean that
in the light of what has happened you wish to retrace
your steps and disassociate yourself from the policy of
last summer, you have only to let me know and I will at
once consider the matter further.”
Replying, Gandhi placed the whole blame for the
events that had taken place since 9th August at the door
of the Government of India. He put two alternatives to the
Viceroy: i. If you want me to act singly, convince me that
I was wrong and I will make amends; ii If you want me to
make proposal on behalf of the Congress you should put
me among the Working Committee members.
The Viceroy was not prepared to accept either of
these suggestions; instead, he insisted on having from
Gandhi not only an admission of guilt but appropriate
assurance with regard to the future.

287
Gandhi replied that it was the Government that
had goaded the people to the point of madness…If then I
cannot get soothing balm for my pain, I must resort to
the law prescribed for the Satyagrahi, namely, a fast
according to capacity. He gave notice that the fast would
begin on 9th February and that it would continue for 21
days.
Gandhi began his fast on 10th February. The news
of his fast caused deep anxiety. A shadow of gloom
descended upon the country, as it happened during the
great ordeal he had gone through the Yervada prison in
1932. All party leaders Conference was held in Delhi on
19th February under the presidentship of Sir Tej Bahadur
Sapru. About 300 representatives of all communities
attended. Jinnah, who was invited for the Conference
flatly refused to attend. In reply to the invitation, he said:
“The situation arising out of Gandhi’s fast is really a
matter for Hindu leaders to consider and advice him
accordingly.”
The Conference passed a strong resolution urging
unconditional release of Gandhi and cabled it to
Churchill, whose reply was: “The Government of India
decided last August that Mr. Gandhi and other leaders of
the Congress must be detained for reasons which have
been fully explained and are well understood…There can
be no justification for discriminating between Mr. Gandhi
and other Congress leaders. The responsibility therefore
rests entirely with Gandhi himself.”
All Parties Conference was again held in the
second week of March. They decided that a deputation
headed by Rajagopalachari may call on the Viceroy to
request him to grant permission to meet Gandhi in the

288
jail. The Viceroy did not receive the deputation, but sent
his reply in which he said: “Nothing positive has emerged
as a result of the talks between Gandhi and his friends
during his fast and that there was no reason to believe
that he was any more ready to repudiate the policy as a
result of which the Congress leaders were under
detention. So long as Gandhi’s attitude and that of the
Congress remained unchanged, special facilities for
contact with him or with other Congress leaders could
not be given.
Rajagopalachari characterized the Viceroy’s reply
as revealing the Versailles spirit wishing to humiliate the
Congress and others and influenced by passion and
prejudice.
The Viceroy backed by the authorities at home did
not budge an inch. He described the fast as ‘political
blackmail.’
Rajagopalachari was permitted to see Gandhi
during the last four days of his fast. Rajaji placed before
Gandhi a formula for a settlement between the Congress
and the Muslim League. The salient features of the
formula, which came to be known as, “Rajaji Formula”
were as follows:
1. Subject to the terms set out below as regards
the constitution for free India, the Muslim
League endorses the Indian demand for
independence and will cooperate with the
Congress in the formation of a Provisional
Interim Government for the transitional period.
2. After the termination of the war, a Commission
shall be appointed for demarcating contagious
districts in the Northwest and East of India,

289
wherein the Muslim population is in absolute
majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a
plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the
basis of adult suffrage, or other practicable
franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of
separation from Hindustan. If the majority
deciding in favour of a Sovereign State separate
from Hindustan, such decision shall be given
effect to without prejudice to the right of
districts on border to choose to join either
State.
3. It will be open to all parties to advocate their
points of view before the plebiscite is held.
4. In the event of separation, mutual agreements
shall be entered into for safeguarding Defence,
Commerce and Communications and for other
essential purposes.
5. Any transfer of population shall only be on an
absolutely voluntary basis.
6. These terms shall be binding only in case of
transfer by Britain of full power and
responsibility for the governance of India.
Gandhi gave his approval to the Rajaji Formula.
Armed with this approval, Rajaji discussed the Formula
with Jinnah. But Jinnah expressed his inability to
approve of the Formula as it did not meet the League’s
full demand for Pakistan. In a speech before the Muslim
League Council, he characterized it as a “shadow and
husk, maimed, mutilated, and moth-eaten Pakistan.”
Gandhi broke his fast on 3rd March.
The annual session of the Muslim League was held
in Delhi at the end of April. A map of Pakistan adorned

290
the dais, and a banner flew over it reading, “Freedom of
India lies in Pakistan.” Jinnah wore a white sherwani
with a gold button engraved with “P” pinned to his
starched collar. He was greeted with tremendous ovation
and cheering as he entered the packed pandal. With his
League ministries now running Bengal, the Punjab, Sind,
and Assam, Jinnah insisted: “This is only the starting
point… In the North-West Frontier Province my
information is-and it is based on very reliable sources
that the Muslim public is entirely with the Muslim
League. Do not forget the minority provinces. It is they
who have spread the light when there was darkness in
the majority provinces. It is they who were the
spearheads that the Congress wanted to crush… We have
got a great deal to do. Our goal is clear; our demands are
clear.”
Jinnah then reviewed the history of Hindu-Muslim
conflicts from the dawn of the century, after which he
indulged in a blistering attack on Gandhi and his tactics,
accusing the Mahatma of wanting to turn the whole of
India into his Hindu ashram. He went so far as to
suggest a new summit with Gandhi, however, arguing:
“No body would welcome it more than myself, if Mr.
Gandhi is even now really willing to come to a settlement
with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan. Let me
tell you it would be the greatest day for both Hindus and
Musalmans.
Openly before the mass audience that listened to
his presidential address, Jinnah said:
“…If they have got any honest and capable agents
they ought to be kept informed in London. I once more
draw the attention of the British Government to this fact.

291
It is a very serious situation indeed, and I inform them
from this platform that the cup of bitterness, and
disappointment-not to use any stronger language-at the
shabby treatment meted out to Muslim India is in danger
to them…The Muslim League calls upon the British
Government to come forward, without any further delay,
with an unequivocal declaration guaranteeing to the
Musalmans the right of self-determination, and to pledge
themselves that they will abide by the verdict of a
plebiscite on the lines of the resolution passed at the
Muslim League Session in Lahore in 1940.
“I say to the Musalmans, 100 million Musalmans
are with us. When I say 100 million Musalmans, I mean
that 99 % of them are with us, leaving aside some who
are traitors, cranks, supermen or lunatics-an evil from
which no society or nation is free. The way in which I see
them is that the phoenix-like rise and regeneration of
Muslim India from the very ashes of its ruination is a
miracle. The people who had lost everything and who
were placed by providence between the two stones of a
mill, not only came into their own in a very short time,
but became, after the British, socially the most solid,
militarily most virile, and politically the most decisive
factor in modern India. Now it is time to take up the
constructive program to build up this nation so that it
can march on the path of our goal to Pakistan. The goal
is near, stand united, persevere and march forward.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 217-219)
Jinnah expressed his profound dissatisfaction with
the British attitude. He urged Provincial Leagues to place
themselves on a war footing in preparation for what is to
come; he castigated the capitalists and pampered the

292
masses by his references to social justice and economic
reorganization; he tried to impress upon the Provincial
Premiers the fact that their own future lies only in
following his lead and above all he, in order to show his
bona fides to the neutral world, extended an open and
almost final invitation to the Congress to approach him
for a settlement if it so desires.
The main resolution regretted the Government’s
failure to guarantee Muslim self-determination, and
warned the Government that the imposition of any kind
of federal constitution would be forcibly resisted, and
exhorted Muslims to face the effort and sacrifice required
to reach the cherished goal of Pakistan.
Jinnah visited Baluchistan in July to address the
League’s third provincial conference. In his address,
Jinnah exhorted the Muslims of Baluchistan to shake off
their lethargy and march in line with their nation. He
appealed them to give up mutual jealousies and sectional
interests and differences over small things, petty quarrels
and tribal notions. The following day he addressed the
same conference after it had passed all the resolutions he
had advocated. He reiterated his pre-battle plan for
Pakistan, seeking first to lay the foundation of reforms
and growth, later to press his separatist demands. To the
students in his audience he cautioned: “Do not run after
cheap slogans or catchwords. Concentrate your whole
attention on education. Get equipped and qualify yourself
for action. The better you are equipped the brighter are
your chances of success.”
A meeting of the Working Committee of the Muslim
League was held in Delhi in November. Addressing the
meeting, Jinnah said: “The constitution of the Muslim

293
League is the most democratic that could be framed.
There is no Muslim to whom the doors of the Muslim
League are not open. If the Musalmans are dissatisfied
with the leader, the remedy lies in their hand. They can
remove him, if they so desire by exercising their rights
under the constitution of the party, but if they try to
settle things by force and violence, nothing but blood-
shed will ensue.”
The 31st session of the Muslim League was held in
Karachi in December. Some 10,000 delegates had
gathered. Jinnah was greeted with thunderous shouts,
“Quaid-I-Azam Zindabad,” “the Conqueror of Congress
Zindabad. He told his audience: “When a man is sick and
almost dying, he has not got the energy either to
complain or to ask for anything. That was the condition
of Muslim India seven years ago; but today, the sick man
has recovered from his sick bed. He has acquired
consciousness. He is not only convalescent but he is in a
position to move about. Now he has got so many
suggestions and proposals to make, so many disputes
and so many quarrels to settle. It is a good sign, provided
it is kept within limits… I am thankful to God that
Muslim India is awake-I am thankful that Muslim India
has regained consciousness. I am thankful that Muslim
India is taking interest in things around it, not only in
India, but through out the world.”
By February 1944, Jinnah was back in Bombay.
He urged the Muslim Students’ Federation to erect pillars
of hard work, industry and perseverance upon which the
edifice of Pakistan could be built. He alluded to
suggestions made that he should be made the First Prime
Minister of India, calling them mere “camouflage” made

294
in order to mislead and confuse the Muslims. Jinnah
returned to Delhi at the end of the month for the opening
session of the Assembly, where Wavell’s maiden speech
as Viceroy stressed the “geographical unity” of India as
central to its postwar constitution. Jinnah was outraged
by that formulation and viewed it as nothing less than an
attempted negation of Cripps’s implicit promise of
Pakistan. He launched a fresh attack in the Assembly
upon the Government’s budget to remind Wavell of the
League’s powers to prevent the Government from
mustering a Central Legislative Assembly majority.
Speaking to the Aligarh Union that month, Jinnah called
the Viceroy’s address provocative and thoughtless of the
Muslim opposition, adding: “Lord Wavell like his
predecessor has started fishing the Congress waters,
Lord Linlithgow hopelessly failed, but soldier-Viceroy
thinks that he would succeed where his predecessor had
failed in landing a big fish or a number of small ones
sufficient for his purpose. This has created deep
resentment throughout Muslim India.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 228)
A British spy attending all the Muslim League
sessions reported: “Jinnah’s speeches both in the
meetings of the Working Committee and the Subject
Committees held in camera and in the Open Session
have confirmed impressions that of late his mind has
been passing through a certain process of change. He has
become more aggressive, more challenging and more
authoritative. The reason appears to be consciousness of
power lately acquired and of certain old injuries which
can now be avenged therewith.”
Gandhi-Jinnah Talks:

295
Gandhi wrote a letter to Jinnah from the Aga Khan
Palace, where he was confined. The Government did not
forward the letter to Jinnah. However, it made the
substance of the letter available to Jinnah. After receipt
of the substance, Jinnah declared that this was not the
kind of letter, which he had wanted from Gandhi. He
wanted Gandhi first to agree to the Muslim League
demand for partition and then write to him. “This letter of
Mr. Gandhi can only be construed as a move on his part
to embroil the Muslim League to come into clash with the
British Government solely for the purpose of his release,”
said Jinnah.
Gandhi wrote to Jinnah again on 17th July 1944
addressing him as “Brother Jinnah” and signing the
letter as “your brother Gandhi.” Gandhi in his letter
wrote: “…Let us meet whenever you wish. Do not regard
me as an enemy of Islam or of Indian Muslims. I have
always been a servant and friend to you and mankind.
Do not dismiss me.”
Jinnah promptly replied that he would be happy to
receive him at his residence in Bombay after his return
from Kashmir sometime in the middle of August 1944.
Gandhi’s talks with Jinnah began on 9th
September 1944, and continued for eighteen days at the
latter’s residence. The whole period was covered with an
exchange of letters, and even Rajaji commented: “The
talks are to get round you (Gandhiji) and the
correspondence is in anticipation of failure.”
Jinnah’s Statement:
Jinnah issued his statement to the press on 27th
September in which he said:

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“Mr. Gandhi from the very commencement of our
talks made it clear that he had approached me in his
individual capacity and that he represented no one but
himself. However, he assured me that he was open to
conversion to the Muslim League Lahore Resolution of
March 1940.
“Without prejudice to my objection that in order to
reach any settlement, negotiations can only be carried on
properly when the other side is also fully represented and
vested with authority. In deference to Mr. Gandhi’s
wishes I agreed to the task of persuading and converting
him to the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution.
“I have placed before him everything and every
aspect of the Muslim point of view in the course of our
prolonged talks and correspondence, and we discussed
all the pros and cons generally, and I regret to say that I
have failed in my task of converting Mr. Gandhi.
“We have, therefore, decided to release to the
press the correspondence that has passed between us.
Nevertheless, we hope that the public will not feel
embittered, and we trust that this is not the final end of
our effort.”
Gandhi’s Statement:
Gandhi addressed the Press Conference and
issued the following statement:
“It is a matter of deep regret that we two could not
reach an agreement. But there is no cause for
disappointment. The break down is only so-called. It is
an adjournment Sine die. Each one of us must now talk
to the public and put our view points before them. If we
do so dispassionately and if the public co-operate, we
reach a solution of the seemingly insoluble at an early

297
date. My experience of the previous three weeks confirms
me in the view that the presence of a third party hinders
the solution. A mind enslaved cannot act as if it was free.
I need not impute base motives to the rulers to prove
what seems to me to be an axiomatic truth. Nevertheless,
I am going to continue to work for the solution as I have
been during these three weeks. The questions for
consideration are simple. Has the Rajaji Formula or mine
made a reasonable approach to the Lahore Resolution? If
they or either of them is such an approach, all parties,
and especially the members of the Muslim League,
should ask the Quaid-I-Azam to revise his opinion. If
Rajaji and I have stultified the Lahore Resolution we
should be educated.”

Reactions on Gandhi-Jinnah Talks:


Maulana Abul Kalam Azad:
“Gandhiji’s approach to Jinnah was a great
blunder. It gave a new and added importance to Jinnah,
which he later exploited fully. Jinnah had lost much of
his political importance after he left the Congress in
twenties. It was largely due to Gandhiji’s acts of
commission and omission that Jinnah regained his
importance in Indian political life. In fact, it is doubtful if
Jinnah could have ever achieved a supremacy, but for
Gandhiji’s attitude. Large sections of Indian Muslims
were doubtful about Jinnah and his policy, but when
they found that Gandhiji was continuously running after
him and entreating him, many of them developed a new
respect for Jinnah. They also thought that Jinnah was

298
perhaps the best man for getting advantageous terms in
the communal settlement.
“It was Gandhiji, who first gave currency to the
title Quaid-I-Azam or great leader as applied to Mr.
Jinnah. Gandhij had in his camp a foolish but well-
intentioned woman called Amtus Salam. She had seen in
some Urdu papers a reference to Jinnah as Quaid-I-
Azam. When Gandhiji was writing to Jinnah asking for
interview, she told him that the Urdu papers called
Jinnah Quaid-I-Azam and he should use the same form
of address. Without pausing to consider the implications
of his action, Gandhiji addressed Jinnah as Quaid-I-
Azam. This letter was soon after published in the press.
When Indian Muslims saw that Gandhiji also addressed
Jinnah as Quaid-I-Azam, they felt that he must really be
so. When in July 1944, I read the report that Gandhiji
was corresponding with Jinnah and going to Bombay to
meet him, I told my collegues that Gandhiji was making a
great mistake. His action would not help to solve but on
the contrary would aggravate the Indian political
situation. Later events proved that my apprehensions
were correct. Jinnah exploited the situation fully and
built up his own position, but he did not say or do
anything, which could in any way help the cause of
Indian freedom.”
(India Wins Freedom by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, pg 96-97)
Dr. K.M. Munshi:
“Gandhiji, I felt, was committing a mistake in
seeking an interview with Jinnah, who was inflexible in
his objective. Rajaji’s formula envisaged Pakistan with a
transfer of population. If Gandhiji had been his normal
self physically, or if Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel

299
had been with him, I am sure he would not have
anything to do with Rajaji formula. He was feeling lonely,
and the deep void created in his life by the death of
Kasturba and Mahadev Desai had its effect on him.
“Had Rajaji known Jinnah better, he would have
seen that the latter’s object in granting an interview to
Gandhiji was only to secure a spectacular triumph which
would add to his prestige as the dominating factor in
Indian politics.
“As I look back, I see that if settlement had taken
place in 1944, Jinnah would have got away with the
Punjab, Bengal and Assam, with a corridor from East to
West Pakistan and without Mountbatten to usher it with
prompt effectiveness.
(Pilgrimage to Freedom by K.M.Munshi, pg 91-92)
Gandhi-Jinnah talks were useful to Jinnah only in
so far as they raised his prestige with his own following.
Simla Conference:
Lord Wavell was convinced that the deadlock in
India could be broken only by a demarche by the third
party, the British Government or himself as a proconsul.
He wrote a letter to Winston Churchill on 24th October
1944 in which he said:
“…I feel very strongly that the future of India is the
problem on which the British Commonwealth and the
British reputation will stand or fall in the post war
period. Our prestige and prospects in Burma, Malya,
China and the Far East generally are entirely subject to
what happenes in India. If we can secure India as a
friendly partner in the British Commonwealth our
predominant influence in these countries will, I think, be
assured; with a lost and hostile India, we are likely to be

300
reduced in the East to the position of commercial bag-
man.
“The present Government of India cannot continue
indefinitely, or even for long. Though ultimate
responsibility still rests with His Majesty’s Government,
His Majesty’s Government has no longer to take effective
action. We shall drift increasingly into situation-financial,
economic and political- for which India herself will be
responsible but for which His Majesty’s Government will
get the discredit.
“If our aim is to retain India as a willing member of
the British Commonwealth, we must make some
imaginative and constructive move without delay. We
have every reason to mistrust and dislike Gandhi and
Jinnah, and their followers. But the Congress and the
League are the dominant parties in Hindu and Muslim
India, and will remain so. Even if Gandhi and Jinnah
disappeared tomorrow I can see no prospect of our
having more reasonable people to deal with. We have had
to negotiate with similar rebel before e.g., De Valera and
Zaghlul.”
Wavell proposed: “that a fresh start should be
initiated as early as possible. Since India could not be
any longer held down by force, he felt the necessity of
installing a provisional Government, and of devising
means to reach a constitutional settlement. Unless steps
were taken to show a change of attitude in a friendly
direction to convince the educated Indians that the
British were sincere in their intentions, the deep-rooted
feeling of suspension, mistrust and enmity might result
in total chaos.”

301
The Viceroy informed the Prime Minister that the
view that something must be done before long was the
considered opinion of the Commander-in-chief, of all the
eleven provincial governors, and of all the senior
members of the Indian Civil Service with whom he had
consulted. He appealed to Churchill not to ignore the
weight of the entire British official opinion in this regard.
Wavell’s words, however, fell on Churchill’s deaf
ears. He showed no sign of having been moved by the
Viceroy’s logic and the Secretary of State informed him in
December 1944 that the War Cabinet would make no
move about India until the Viceroy came home and
convinced them of the wisdom of such a move.
The Viceroy was ultimately summoned to
London. He left Delhi on 20th March, 1945 accompanied
by V.P. Menon and Evan Jenkins. Churchill and Amery
discussed Indian problem with the Viceroy. Churchill
opened his mind to suggest that he favoued the partition
of India into Hindustan, Pakistan and Princestan.
(A Centenary History of Indian Congress: B.N.Pande, pg 66-67
& 70)
After discussion in 26 sittings from 26th March to
31st May 1945, Wavell returned to India on 5th June and
made the following announcement through broadcast on
14th June:
“…The new constitution must be framed as
declared in 1942 by the Indians. In the meantime
Government is anxious to secure cooperation of all
communities and sections of the Indian people in
carrying on the war with Japanese and in planning the
post-war economic development.

302
“The Viceroy will call a conference of party leaders
and Provincial Premiers and ex-Premiers to submit to
him the names from which he can select the persons for
the new Executive Council.”
Mr Amery, the Secretary of State for India made
the following announcement on the same day in the
House of Commons:
“His Majesty’s Government are most anxious to
make contribution that is practicable to the breaking of
the political deadlock in India. While that deadlock lasts
not only political but social and economic progress is
being hampered.
“All that is urgently required to be done for
agricultural and industrial development and for the
peasants and workers of India cannot be carried through
unless the whole-hearted cooperation of every community
and section of the Indian people is forthcoming.
“His Majesty’s Government have therefore
considered whether there is something which they could
suggest in this interim period, under the existing
constitution, pending the formulation by Indians of their
future constitutional arrangements which will enable the
main communities and parties to cooperate more closely
together and with the British to benefit the people of
India as a whole.
“It is proposed that the Executive Council should
be re-constituted and that the Viceroy should in future
make his selection for nomination to the Crown for
appointment to his Executive Council from amongst the
leaders of Indian political life at the Centre and in the
Provinces, in proportions which would give a balanced

303
representation to the main communities, including equal
proportions of Muslims and caste-Hindus.
“The Viceroy will call into conference a number of
leading Indian politicians, who are the heads of the most
important political parties, or who have had recent
experience as Prime Ministers of Provinces, together with
a few others of special experience and authority. The
Viceroy intends to put before this conference the proposal
that the Executive Council should be re-constituted as
above stated and to invite from the members of the
conference a list of names. Out of these, he would choose
the future members whom he would recommend for
appointment by His majesty to the Viceroy’s Council.
“The members of the Executive Council would be
Indians with the exception of the Viceroy and the
Commander-in-Chief, who would retain his position as
War Members. This is essential so long as the defence of
India remains a British responsibility.
“The Viceroy has been authorized by His Majesty’s
Government to place this proposal before the Indian
leaders. His Majesty’s Government trust that the leaders
of the Indian communities will respond. For the success
of such a plan must depend upon its acceptance in India
and the degree to which the responsible Indian
politicians are prepared to cooperate with the object of
making it a workable interim arrangement.
“The plan now suggested gives the utmost progress
practicable within the present constitution. None of the
changes suggested will in any way prejudice or prejudge
the essential form of the future permanent constitution
or constitutions of India.

304
“His Majesty’s Government feel certain that, given
goodwill and genuine desire to co-operate on all sides,
both British and Indians, these proposals can make a
genuine step forward in the collaboration of the British
and Indian peoples towards Indian self-government and
can assert the rightful position, and strengthen the
influence, of India in the counsels of the nations.”
(Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon, pg 544-547)
King, while proroguing the Parliament on 15th
June expressed the hope that the invitation extended to
Indian political leaders would be accepted, so that the
immediate task might be undertaken with the full
cooperation of all sections of Indian public opinion.
In accordance with the announcement a
conference was held at Simla from 25th June to 14th July
1945 under the Chairmanship of the Viceroy Lord Wavell.
Invitation was extended to 21 political leaders of all
shades. The Viceroy in his introductory speech said: “The
statesmanship, wisdom and goodwill of all of us, is here
on trial, not only in the eyes of India but before the whole
world. It was necessary to rise above the level of old
prejudices and enmities and of party and sectional
advantages and to think of the good of the four hundred
million people of India…”
By the end of second day the conference had
agreed on certain principles like representation for
minorities, whole-hearted support to the war effort and
continuance of the reconstituted Executive Council under
the Government of India Act 1935 till the end of the war.
Differences, however, arose about the composition of the
Executive Council. Jinnah demanded that the Congress
could nominate all the Hindu members but all the

305
Muslim members must be nominees of the Muslim
League. Azad vehemently opposed and said: “Congress
has approached all political problems from a national
point of view and recognized no distinction between
Hindus and Muslims on political issues. It could not in
any circumstances agree to be an organization of Hindus
alone. The Congress should have freedom to nominate
any Indian it liked regardless of whether he was a Hindu
or a Muslim or a Christian, or a Parsi, or a Sikh.
Congress should participate on the basis of Indian
nationhood or not participate at all. So far as the Muslim
League was concerned, it was for it to decide who should
be its nominees.”
(India Wins Freedom by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, pg 116-
117)
The Congress wanted the League to accommodate
two non-League Muslims within its quota as the
Congress was accommodating the same number of non-
Congress men within its quota.
When the conference met on 29th June, the Viceroy
announced that since the parties were unable to come to
an agreement, he would use his personal offices to
resolve the differences. He asked all interests represented
in the conference to send him lists of persons they would
like to be selected for joining the national Government.
He would add to them some names himself and after
scrutinizing all the names, and after consulting with the
parties concerned, he would try to arrive at a list, which
would be generally acceptable to the conference.
Jinnah was not agreeable to the Viceroy’s
proposal. He first wanted to know whether, if the list
sent, the viceroy would accept the League panel en bloc.

306
The Viceroy replied that he could give no such guarantee
beforehand. It was his function to do the final selection.
But the conference would be given opportunity to discuss
and finally accept or reject the names recommended by
him.
Jinnah next asked whether the Viceroy will still
proceed with his proposal if one of the parties finally
rejected it, to which the Viceroy replied that he could not
commit himself in advance as to what he would do in the
contingency envisaged.
Finally, when the Viceroy asked Jinnah point blank
whether the League would submit the list of names or
not, Jinnah answered that he was there only in his
individual capacity; he would need the Viceroy’s proposal
in writing to place it before his Working Committee for a
definite reply. Jinnah was told that he would have it.
Jinnah later wrote to Wavell: “The Working
Committee of the Muslim League desires to point out that
when a similar proposal was made by your predecessor,
Lord Linlithgow, the Working Committee opposed it and,
when its objections were brought to the notice of
Linlithgow, he dropped the proposal and informed: ‘the
selection of representatives will be based in the case of
Muslim League not on a panel formally submitted, but on
confidential discussion between the leader of the party
concerned and the Viceroy.’ The Working Committee,
therefore, is of the opinion that the procedure settled on
the previous occasion should be followed so far as the
Muslim League is concerned.”
Jinnah further wrote: “The working Committee
desires me to state that it regrets very much to note that
Your Excellency is not able to give assurance that all the

307
Muslim members of the proposed Executive Council will
be selected from the Muslim League, and in the
circumstances, I regret, I am not in a position to send the
names on behalf of the Muslim League for inclusion in
the proposed Executive Council”
(Mahatma Gandhi-the Last Phase by Pyarelal, pg 135- 136)
By 7th July, the Congress and the other parties
submitted their lists to the Viceroy. Congress list
included representatives of all major parties, including
Jinnah and two other members of the League; and the
names of only five congressmen were submitted, two of
whom were Azad and Asaf Ali.
Azad made it explicit that the inclusion of those
two Muslims in the Congress panel was a matter of
principle. He said: “the Congress is essentially a national
organization, and cannot possibly be a party to any
arrangement, howsoever, temporary it may be, that
prejudices its national character and tends to impair its
growth of nationalism, and reduces the Congress
indirectly to a communal body.”
Mahatma by D.G.Tendulkar, Vol. VII, pg 10)
On 11th July, Wavell told Jinnah that he was
prepared to include in the Council four members of the
Muslim League, together with a non-League Muslim from
the Punjab, all of whom he named, adding that if Mr.
Jinnah wanted to substitute other League names he
would consider them-indeed he would be glad if Mr.
Jinnah himself would serve. But Jinnah refused even to
discuss the names unless he could be given the absolute
right to select all Muslims and some guarantee that any
decision which the Muslims opposed in the Council could
only be passed by a two-thirds majority-in fact a kind of

308
communal veto. Wavell told Jinnah that these conditions
were entirely unacceptable.
At the last meeting of the conference on 4th July,
Jinnah claimed parity inside the Council with all other
parties combined. “If he really meant this,”commented
Wavell, “it shows that Jinnah had never at any time an
intention of accepting the offer, and it is difficult to see
why he came to Simla at all.”
(The Origins of Partition of India: Anita Inder Singh, pg 122-
123)
Wavell did not want the conference to break down.
He proposed to send his own list of nominees to Amery
for approval. He then wanted to show the list to Jinnah
and other party leaders. If either the League or the
Congress or both rejected the list, he would close the
conference and disclose the names put forward by him in
a broadcast.
At the fifth and the last session of the conference
on 14th July, the Viceroy accepted the full responsibility
for the failure of the Conference and made a statement in
which he said:
“On 29th June I asked the parties to let me have
lists of names, and said that I would do what I could to
produce a solution acceptable to the leaders and the
conference. I received lists from all parties represented,
except the European Group, who decided not to send the
list and the Muslim League. I was, however, determined
that the conference should not fail until I have made
every possible effort to bring it to a successful ending. I
therefore, made my provisional selections including
certain Muslim League names, and I have every reason to
believe that if these selections had been acceptable here,

309
they would have been acceptable to His Majesty’s
Government.
“My selection would, I think, have given a balanced
and efficient Executive Council, whose composition
would have been reasonably fair to all parties. I did not
find it possible, however, to accept the claims of any
party in full. When I explained my solution to Jinnah, he
told me that it was not acceptable to the Muslim League,
and he was so decided that I felt it would be useless to
continue the discussions. In the circumstances, I did not
show my selections as a whole to Mr. Jinnah and there
was no object in showing them to the other leaders.
“The conference has therefore failed. Nobody can
regret this more than I do myself. …I propose to take a
little time to consider in what way I can best help India
after the failure of the conference. You can all help best
by refraining from recriminations. …Until I see my way
more clearly than I do now, it may be difficult, perhaps
impossible, to suggest any new move… Do not any of you
be discouraged by this set back. We shall overcome our
difficulties in the end. The future greatness of India is not
in doubt.”
(The Transfer of Power: V.P.Menon, pg 242-243)
Jinnah in a statement characterized the Wavell
Plan as a ‘snare’ and ‘a death warrant’ for the Muslim
League because, even if all the Muslims in Government
were to be the Muslim Leaguers, they would still be in a
minority of one-third in the Cabinet. “The representatives
of all the minorities,” he said, “would in actual practice,
invariably vote against us in the Government.”
Previously, Jinnah used to say that the Muslim League
was the champion and protector of all minorities in India,

310
and the Congress represented not even Hindus but caste-
Hindus only. But now he said: “All other minorities, such
as Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, and Christians have the
same goal as the Congress. Their goal and ideology is of a
united India. Ethnically and culturally, they are very
closely knitted to Hindu society.”
Jinnah blamed all except himself and his men for
the failure of the Simla conference. “There was,” he said,
“the combination consisting of the Gandhi-Hindu
Congress who stand for India’s Hindu national
independence as one India, and the latest exponents of
geographical unity, Lord Wavell and Glancy-Khizr, who
are bent upon creating disruption among the Musalmans
in the Punjab.”
In a penetrating analysis of Jinnah’s attitude at the
conference, M.R.Jayakar wrote to Gandhi: “…True to his
habit, intensified by frequent successes, Jinnah swallows
the concessions Muslims have received, viz, parity
between Hindus and Muslims and now wants parity
between Muslims and all other interests put together, i.e.
50 for Muslims, 50 for all the rest of India-a
mathematical monstrosity that 27 equals 73. He is in no
hurry to attain freedom and would demand for its
attainment a price which would almost render it
nugatory.”
(Mahatma Gandhi-the Last Phase: Pyarelal, Vol.II, pg 137)
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, in his book, “India
Wins Freedom” says: “If the conference had not broken
down because of Jinnah’s opposition, the result would
have been that Muslims who constituted only about 25 %
of total population of India, would have had seven
representatives in the Council of fourteen. This is

311
evidence of the generosity of the Congress and also
throws in lurid light the stupidity of the Muslim League.
The League was supposed to be the guardian of Muslim
interests and yet it was because of its opposition that the
Muslims of India were denied a substantial share in the
Government of Undivided India.”
“The abandonment of the Wavell Plan
undoubtedly strengthened the position of Jinnah and the
League, at a time when their fortunes were none too
good. It weakened the position of those Muslims who had
been opposing the League, particularly the Unionist Party
in the Punjab, and since it was clear that Jinnah could
alone deliver goods, the wavering and middle-of-the-road
Muslim politicians tended to gravitate to the Muslim
League… The Simla Conference afforded a last
opportunity to the forces of nationalism to fight a rear-
guard section to preserve the integrity of the country, and
when the battle was lost the waves of communalism
quickly engulfed it. Only the Hobson’s Choice of Partition
was left.” (Transfer of Power: V.P.Menon, pg 250-251)
K.M.Munshi in his book, Pilgrimage to Freedom
said: “The Simla Conference changed the course of our
political development. The British Government lost its
initiative and was hardly counted as a party to any
political settlement. Wavell’s personal prestige declined.
The Congress, which had made the genuine attempt to
make the conference a success lost whatever faith it had
in the British Government. Jinnah’s position as the sole
determining factor in India’s political fortunes, however,
remained unshaken.”
General Elections:

312
The breakdown of the Simla Conference was
followed by landslide victory of the Labour Party at the
general elections in England. As a result, Winston
Churcill’s care-taker Government was replaced on 26th
July 1945 by Labour Government with Clement Richard
Attlee as Prime Minister and Lord Pethic Lawrence as
Secretary of State for India.
Lord Wavell made the following announcement on
th
19 September 1945 after consulting the Secretary of
State for India and the India Committee of the Cabinet:
“His Majesty’s Government are determined to do
their utmost to promote in conjunction with the leaders
of India the early realization of full self-government in
India.
“Elections to the Central and Provincial
Legislatures, will be held during the coming cold weather.
Thereafter, His Majesty’s Government earnestly hope that
ministerial responsibility will be accepted by political
leaders in all provinces.
“It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government to
convene as soon as possible a constitution-making body,
and as a preliminary step they have authorized me to
undertake, immediately after elections, discussions with
the representatives of the Legislative Assemblies in the
provinces to ascertain whether the proposals contained
in the 1942 declaration are acceptable or whether some
alternative or modified scheme is preferable. Discussions
will also be undertaken with the representatives of the
Indian States with a view to ascertaining in what way
they can best take their part in the constitution-making
body.

313
“His Majesty’s Government have further
authorized me, as soon as the results of the provincial
elections are published, to take steps to bring into being
an Executive Council which will have the support of the
main Indian parties.
In a message broadcast on the same day, Prime
Minister Attlee said: “Although the Cripps proposals had
not been accepted by the Indian parties, the British
Government were acting in the spirit of those proposals.
He gave an assurance that the British Government would
not try to introduce into the proposed treaty any matter
which was incompatible with the interests of India, and
appealed to Indians to make united effort to evolve a
constitution which would be accepted as fair by all
parties and interests in India.”
The All India Congress Committee held its meeting
on 21st September in Bombay and passed a resolution,
which characterized Lord Wavell’s proposal as vague,
inadequate and unsatisfactory. However, decided to
contest elections to demonstrate the will of the people,
especially on the issue of the immediate transfer of
power.
The Muslim League announced to fight the
elections on the issue of Pakistan and the claim of the
League to represent all Muslims. Jinnah declared that
their demand was that the provinces of the Punjab, Sind,
North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Bengal and
Assam in their entirety should be formed into a separate
Sovereign State to be known as Pakistan.
The Congress leaders declared that they would
make no more approaches to the Muslim League, but
would contact the Muslim masses direct and would try to

314
reassure them by appropriate means through the election
manifesto. The Congress Working Committee, accordingly
prepared manifesto and issued it.
The results of the elections clearly showed that the
Congress and the Muslim League were the only parties
that counted in India.
Dr.K.M.Munshi said: “The result proved that the
Muslim League dominated the Muslims as completely as
the Congress dominated Hindus. They should have been
an eye opener to some of our leaders who would not
believe that Jinnah had acquired complete hold over the
Muslim masses.”
(Partition of India-Legend & Reality by H.M.Seervai, pg 39)
The Viceroy addressed the newly elected Central
Legislature on 28th January, in which he emphasized the
determination of His Majesty’s Government to establish a
new Executive Council and to form a constitution-making
body as soon as possible.
On Viceroy’s address, Jinnah declared that the
Muslim League was not prepared to consider any thing
short of immediate recognition of the Pakistan demand
and that the League would not be prepared to cooperate
in any interim arrangements until this principle has been
made clear beyond all doubts and until it had been
decided that there would be two constitution-making
bodies, one for the Pakistan areas and the other for the
rest of India. Subsequently in an interview to the press,
Jinnah added that if the British carried out their
intention of calling a single constitution-making body,
the only result would be revolt through out India.
(The Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon, pg 266)

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Lord Wavell drew up a plan of action, the
immediate objectives of which were: i. To form a
constitution-making body, which would produce a
workable and acceptable constitution. ii. To form
Governments in the provinces on a coalition basis as far
as possible. With regard to the Muslim League, Wavell
indicated that if Jinnah refused to participate in the
interim government, he would tell him that the
government would be compelled to go ahead without the
League.
Cabinet Mission:
Lord Pethic Lawrence, the Secretary of State for
India made the following statement in the House of Lords
on 19th February 1946:
“…The British Government have decided with the
approval of His Majesty the King to send out to India a
special mission of Cabinet Ministers consisting of Lord
Pethic Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr.
A.V.Alexander.”
The Cabinet Mission arrived in Delhi on 24th
March 1946. During its stay in India, the Cabinet
Mission held 182 sittings in which they interviewed 472
Indian leaders from various shades. In all the interviews
the discussion revolved round, “United India vs
Pakistan.”
The Congress case was presented by Azad on 3rd
April. He said that the future constitution would be
determined by the constitution-making body and in the
intervening period, there should be an interim
Government at the Centre…On the completion of the
work of constitution-making, a province should have
three options. 1. To stand out of the constitution 2. To

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enter the constitution by federating for the compulsory
subjects only and 3. To federate for the compulsory as
well as for the optional subjects. Arguing against the
demand of the Muslim, Azad said: “The Congress could
never agree to the partition of India.”
Gandhi, in his interview told the Cabinet Mission:
“He had never been able to appreciate the Pakistan which
Mr. Jinnha says he means… His Pakistan was a sin
which he (Gandhi) would not commit. Rajaji formula, if
put into shape, should serve as the basis for
negotiations; and unless he himself were to be reasoned
into it, he could not go further, beyond that Pakistan was
an untruth.” Gandhi further said: “In his view the two-
nation theory was most dangerous. The Muslim
population, but for a microscopic minority was a
population of converts. They were all descendents of
India-born people. He was opposed to the two-nation
theory or to two constitution-making bodies.”
Gandhi suggested that Jinnah should be asked to
form the first Government with personnel chosen from
the elected members of the Legislature. The Viceroy
would appoint them formally, but in fact, Jinnah would
choose them. If Jinnah refused, then the offer to form a
Government should be made to the Congress.
To this, Jinnah’s reply was: “The Congress offer to
serve under his leadership is a complete humbug.” “The
Congress,” he said, “had always insisted that such a
Government should be responsible to a legislature, which
meant that it would be quickly withdrawn. It would not
work at all. We should be fighting like Kilkenny Cats all
the times.”
(The Origin of Partition of India: Anita Inder Singh, pg 155)

317
Jinnah was invited to justify his demand for a
separate Pakistan. He told the Cabinet Mission: “Through
out the history, from the days of Chandragupta, there
had never been any Government of India in the sense of
single Government. After the British had come, they had
gradually established their rule in a large part of India,
but even then the country had only then partly united.
The Indian States had been separate and sovereign. It
was said that India was one, but this was not so. India
was really many and was held by the British as one…
The Muslims had the different conception of the life from
the Hindus. They admired different qualities in their
heroes; they had a different culture based on Arabic and
Persian instead of Sanskrit origins. The social customs
were entirely different. Hindu society and their
philosophy were the most exclusive in the world. Muslims
and Hindus had been living side by side in India for a
thousand years, but if one went into any Indian city, one
would see separate Hindu and Muslim quarters. It was
not possible to make a nation unless there were essential
uniting factors. He had therefore come to the conclusion,
after fifty years of experience, that there was no other
solution but the division of India. There were in India two
totally different and deeply rooted civilizations side by
side, and the only solution was to have two steel frames,
one in Hindustan and the other one in Pakistan.
At this time, Nehru was in Malaya delivering
speeches on Asiatic unity. A British official reported to
India Office. “He (Nehru) was a little scornful of Jinnah
and doubted very much whether he had either the
intention or the power to start a revolt in India if he did
not secure Pakistan.” Jinnah,” said Nehru: “rather

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reminds me of the man who was charged with the
murder of his mother and father and begged the
clemency of the Court on the ground that he was an
orphan.”
(Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert, pg 258)
Jinnah called a convention of over 400 members of
the various legislatures elected on the Muslim tickets on
10th April at Delhi.
A resolution was passed at this convention, which
demanded sovereign and independent State of Pakistan,
comprising the six provinces of Bengal, Assam in the
north-east and the Punjab, the NWFP, Sind and
Baluchistan in the north-west of India; the setting up of
two separate constitution-making bodies by the people of
Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their
respective constitutions, and the provision of safeguards
for the minorities. The acceptance of the Muslim League
demand for Pakistan, and its implementation without
delay, were declared to be Sine qua non for Muslim
League cooperation and participation in the formation of
an Interim Government at the Centre. Any attempt to
impose a constitution or to force on them an interim
Gvernment contrary to their demand would leave the
Muslims no alternative but to resist such imposition by
all the means possible for their survival and national
existence.
(The Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon, pg 287-288)
Azad issued the following statement regarding
demands of Muslims and other minorities:
“I have considered from every possible point of
view the scheme of Pakistan as formulated by the Muslim
League. As an Indian I have examined its implications for

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the future of India as a whole. As a Muslim I have
examined its likely effects upon the fortunes of Muslims
of India.
“Considering the scheme in all its aspects I have
come to the conclusion that it is harmful not only for
India as a whole, but for Muslims in particular. And in
fact it creates more problems than it solves.
“I must confess that the very term Pakistan goes
against my grain. It suggests that some portions of the
world are pure while others are impure. Such a division
of territories into pure and impure is un-Islamic and is
more in keeping with orthodox Brahmanism which
divides men and countries into holy and unholy-division
which is a repudiation of the very spirit of Islam. Islam
recognizes no such division and the prophet says, ‘God
has made the whole world a mosque for me’.
“Further, it seems that the scheme of Pakistan is
a symbol of defeatism and has been built up on the
analogy of the Jewish demand for a national home. It is a
confession that Indian Muslims cannot hold their own in
India as a whole and would be content to withdraw to a
corner specially reserved for them.
“One can sympathise with the aspiration of the
Jews for such a national home, as they are scattered all
over the world and cannot in any region have any
effective voice in the administration. The conditions of
Indian Muslims is quite otherwise. Over 90 million in
number, they are in quantity and quality a sufficiently
important element in Indian life to influence decisively all
questions of administration and policy. Nature has
further helped them by concentrating them in certain
areas.

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“In such a context, the demand for Pakistan looses
all force. As a Muslim, I for one am not prepared for a
moment to give up my right to treat the whole of India as
my domain and to share in the shaping of its political
and economic life. To me it seems a sure sign of
cowardice to give up what is my patrimony and content
myself with mere fragment of it.
“As is well known, Mr. Jinnah’s Pakistan scheme
is based on his two-nation theory. His thesis is that India
contains many nationalities based on religious
differences. Of them the two major nations, the Hindus
and Muslims, must as separate nations have separate
states. When Dr. Edward Thompson once pointed out to
Mr. Jinnah that Hindus and Muslims live side by side in
thousands of Indian towns, villages and hamlets, Mr.
Jinnah replied that this in no way affected their separate
nationality. Two nations according to Mr. Jinnah
confront one another in every hamlet, village and town,
and he, therefore, desires that they should be separate
into two states.
“I am prepared to overlook all other aspects of the
problem and judge it from the point of view of Muslim
interests alone. I shall go still further and say that if it
can be shown that the scheme of Pakistan can in any
way benefit Muslims I would be prepared to accept it
myself and also to work for its acceptance by others. But
the truth is that even if I examine the scheme from the
point of view of the communal interests of the Muslims
themselves, I am forced to the conclusion that it can in
no way benefit them or allay their legitimate fears.
“Let us consider dispassionately the consequences
which will follow if we give effect to the Pakistan scheme.

321
India will be divided into two states, one with a majority
of Muslims and the other of Hindus. In the Hindustan
State there will remain three and half crores of Muslims
scattered in small minorities all over the land. With 17%
in U.P. 12% in Bihar and 9% in Madras, they will be
weaker than they are today in the Hindu majority regions
for almost a thousand years and built up well known
centers of Muslim culture and civilization there
“They will awaken overnight and discover that they
have become alien and foreigners. Backward industrially,
educationally and economically, they will be left to the
mercies to what would become an unadulterated Hindu
Raj.
“On the other hand, their position within the
Pakistan State will be vulnerable and weak. Nowhere, in
Pakistan will their majority be comparable to the Hindu
majority in the Hindustan States.
“In fact, their majority will be so slight that it will
be upset by the economical, educational and political
lead enjoyed by non-Muslims in these areas. Even if this
were not so and Pakistan were overwhelmingly Muslim in
population, it still could hardly solve the problem of
Muslims in Hindustan.
“Two States confronting one another, offer no
solution of the problem of one another’s minorities, but
only lead to redistribution and reprisals by introducing a
system of mutual hostages. The scheme of Pakistan
therefore solves no problem for the Muslims. It cannot
safeguard their rights where they are in a minority nor as
citizens of Pakistan secure them for a position in India or
world affairs, which they would enjoy as citizens of a
major State like the Indian Union.

322
“The formula which I have succeeded in making
the Congress accept secures whatever merit the Pakistan
scheme contains while all its defects and drawbacks are
avoided… The Congress scheme ensures that the Muslim
majority provinces are internally free to develop as they
will, but can at the same time influence the Centre on all
issues which affect India as a whole.”
(India Wins Freedom by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, pg 150-
152)
The Cabinet Mission interviewed both Jinnah and
Azad again with a view to exploring the possibilities of a
compromise. Jinnah was interviewed on 16th April and
Azad on the following day.
Jinnah said that no amount of equality provided
on paper would work. Equality could not exist between
the majority and the minority within the same
government systems. He did not think that the
domination of the Muslims by the Hindus could be
prevented in any scheme in which they were kept
together. It was only when the Muslims were the majority
in Pakistan and the Hindus in Hindustan that their could
be sufficient united force running through the state from
the top to the bottom to provide a steel frame which
could hold it together.
Jinnah further said that once the principle of
Pakistan was conceded, the question of the territory of
Pakistan could be discussed. He concluded that his claim
for six provinces was reasonable demand, but he was
willing to discuss the areas. However, he stressed that he
could not in any event accept the exclusion of Calcutta.
When Lord Pethic Lawrence brought to his notice that

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the Congress would not agree to this, Jinnah declared
that the unity of India was ‘myth.’
Mr. Alexander said: “I have never seen a man with
such a mind twisting and turning to avoid as far as
possible direct answers. I came to the conclusion that
Jinnah is playing this game, which is one of life and
death for millions of people, very largely from the point of
view of scoring a triumph in a legal negotiations by first
making large demands and secondly insisting that he
should make no offer reducing that demand but should
wait for the other side always to say how much they
would advance towards granting that demand.”
(The Origins of Partition of India by Anita Inder Singh, pg 158)
Lord Pethic Lawrence wrote a letter to both the
Congress president and the Muslim League president on
27th April in which he said:
“The Cabinet Mission and His Excellency the
Viceroy have come to the conclusion that they should
make one further attempt to obtain agreement between
the Muslim League and the Congress. They realize that it
would be useless to ask the two parties to meet, unless
they were able to place before them a basis for
negotiation, which could lead to such an agreement
“I am, therefore, asked to invite the Muslim
League to send four negotiators to meet the Cabinet
Mission and the Viceroy, together with a similar number
from the Congress Working Committee, agreement upon
a scheme based upon the following fundamental
principles.
“The future constitutional structure of the British
India to be as follows; A Union Government dealing with
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. There will

324
be two groups of provinces, the one of the predominantly
Hindu provinces and the other of the predominantly
Muslim provinces, dealing with all other subjects, which
the provinces in the respective groups desire to be dealt
with in common. The provincial Governments will deal
with all other subjects and they will have all the
residuary sovereign rights.
“It is contemplated that the Indian States will take
their appropriate place in this structure on terms to be
negotiated with them.”
In reply, Azad wrote on 28th April:
“As you are aware, we have envisaged a Federal
Union of the autonomous units. Such a Federal Union
must of necessity deal with certain essential subjects of
which the defence and its allied subjects are the most
important. It must be organic and must have both an
executive and legislative machinery, as well as the
finance relating to those subjects, and the power to raise
revenues of these purposes in its own right. Without
these functions and powers, it would be weak and
disjointed, and defence and progress in general would
suffer. Thus, among the common subjects, in addition to
the Foreign Affairs and Defence and Communications,
there should be the Currency, Customs, Traffic and such
other subjects, as may be found on close scrutiny to be
intimately allied to them.
“…We consider it wrong to form groups of
provinces under the Federal Union and on religious or
communal basis. …It would be wholly wrong to compel a
province to function against its own wish. …It would be
open to any province to exercise its option to have more
common subjects with the Federal Union. Any sub-

325
federation within the Federal Union would weaken the
Federal Centre, and would be otherwise wrong. We do
not, therefore, favour any such development.
“We consider it essential that the states should be
part of the Federal Union in regard to the common
subjects. The manner of their coming into the Union can
be considered fully at a later stage.
“You have referred to certain fundamental
principles, but there is no mention of the basic issue
before us, that is, the Indian Independence and the
consequent withdrawal of the British army from India. It
is only on the basis of that we can discuss the future of
India, or any interim arrangement.
“While we are ready to carry on negotiations with
any party, as to the future of India, we must state our
conviction that reality will be absent from any
negotiations whilst an outside ruling power still exist in
India.”
The Muslim League agreed to participate in the
Conference without commitment or prejudice to its
position as set forth in its Lahore Resolution of 1940 on
Pakistan.
The Cabinet Mission explained that the proposed
conference would not imply preliminary acceptance or
approval of the terms suggested. The Congress President,
thereupon accepted the invitation to attend the
conference. The four Congress representatives were,
Azad, Nehru, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, and Sardar Patel
(Mahatma by D.G. Tendulkar, pg 106-107)
The Cabinet Mission desired Gandhi’s presence at
Simla so as to be available for consultation and advice
during the conference. Gandhi agreed but made it clear

326
that he could give advice only as a friend and well-wisher
of the British people and the Cabinet Mission. The
Congress view point could be represented only by the
Maulana Saheb, its President, or Pandit Nehru. If his
advice run contrary to that of Pandit Nehru, for instance,
Gandhi told them, they should follow Pandit Nehru’s
advice rather than his.
(Mahatma Gandhi- the Last Phase, part II by Pyarelal, pg 204)
2nd Simla Conference:
The Simla Conference began on 5, May 1946. The
Congress and the League each sent four representatives:
Mulana Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel and Khan
Abdul Gaffar Khan from the Congress and Jinnah,
Liaquat Ali Khan, Abdul Rab Nashtar and Nawab Ismail
Khan from the Legue.
After two days of discussions the gulf between the
Congress and the Muslims League was still as wide as
ever.
On 6th May, Azad sent a letter to Lord Pethic
Lawrence in which he said:
“There can be no independence so long there is a
sovereign army on Indian soil. We stand for the
independence of the whole of India now and not in the
distant or near future. Other matters are subsidiary to
this and can be fitly discussed and decided by the
Constituent Assembly.
“The Constituent Assembly would represent the
will of the free Indian nation and give effect to it. For that
it would have to be preceded by a provisional
Government, which must function, as far as possible, as
a Government of free India, and which should undertake,
to make all arrangements for the transitional period.

327
“We are emphatically of the opinion that it is not
open to the conference to entertain any suggestion for a
division of India. If this is to come, it should come
through the Constituent Assembly, free from any
influence of the present governing power.
“…We do not accept the proposal of parity as
between groups in regard to the Executive or the
Legislature. We realize that every thing possible should
be done to remove fears and suspicion from the mind of
every group and community. But the way to do this is not
by unreal methods which go against the basic principles
of democracy on which we hope to build our
constitutions.”
On 8th May, Lord Pethic Lawrence suggested the
following points to the President of the Congress and the
Muslim League for agreement between the
representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League.
Suggested points for agreement between the
representatives of the Congress and the Muslim
League:
1.There should be an All-India Union Government
and Legislature dealing with foreign affairs, defence,
communications, fundamental rights and having the
necessary powers to obtain for itself the finances it
requires for these subjects.
2. All the remaining powers shall vest in the
provinces.
3. Groups of provinces may be formed and such
groups may determine the provincial subjects which they
desire to take in common.
4. The groups may set up their own executives and
legislatures.

328
5. The Legislature of the Union shall be composed
of equal proportions from the Muslim majority provinces
and from the Hindu-majority provinces whether or not
these or any of them have formed themselves into groups,
together with representatives of the States.
6. The Government of the Union shall be
constituted in the same proportion as the legislature.
7. The constitutions of the Union and the groups
(If any) shall contain in a provision whereby any province
can by a majority of vote of its Legislative Assembly call
for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after
an initial period of ten years and at ten yearly intervals
thereafter.
For the purpose of such reconsideration, a body
shall be constituted on the same basis as the original
Constituent Assembly and shall have power to amend the
constitution in any way decided upon.
8. The constitution-making machinery to arrive at a
constitution on the above shall be as follows:
(a) Representatives shall be elected from each
provincial Assembly in proportion to the strengths of the
various parties in that Assembly on the basis of 1/10 of
their numbers.
(b) Representatives shall be invited from the States
on the basis of their population in proportion to the
representation from British India.
(c) The Constituent Assembly so formed shall meet
at the earliest date possible in New Delhi.
(d) After its preliminary meeting at which the
general order of business will be settled, it will divide into
three sections, one section representing the Hindu-

329
majority provinces, one section representing the Muslim
majority provinces and one representing the States.
(e) The first two sections will then meet separately
to decide the provincial constitutions for their groups.
And if they wish, a group constitution.
(f) When these have been settled, it will be open to
any province to opt out its original group or to the other
group or to remain outside any group.
(g) Thereafter, the three bodies will meet together
to settle the constitution for the Union on the lines
agreed in paragraph 1-7 above.
(h) No major point in the Union constitution,
which affects the communal issue shall be deemed to be
passed by the Assembly unless a majority of both the two
major communities vote in its favour.
(I) The Viceroy shall forthwith call together the
above constitution-making machinery which shall be
governed by the provisions stated in paragraph 8 above.
(Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon, pg 299-300)
Jinnah protested in a letter to Pethic Lawrence
that the points were a fundamental departure from the
original formula proposed by the Secretary of State for
India; that there were many objectionable features in the
new suggestions, and that no useful purpose will be
served by a discussion of them.
Azad also wrote to Pethic Lawrence pointing out
that some of the suggestions were entirely opposed to the
views of the Congress.
Nevertheless, the suggested points for agreement
were taken up for discussion when the conference met
on 9th May. Nehru suggested that an umpire may be
appointed to settle the points of disputes. Jinnah agreed

330
to this. But when conference met on 11th May, he refused
to accept the decision of the umpire. There upon each of
the parties was asked to furnish a statement setting out
its attitude on the points that were still outstanding.
The Muslim League submitted a memorandum
setting out its minimum demands, by way of an offer in
the following terms:
“Six Muslim provinces (the Punjab, North-West-
Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and Assam)
shall be grouped together as one group and will deal with
all other subjects and matters except foreign affairs,
defence and communications necessary for defence,
which may be dealt with by the constitution-making
bodies of the two groups of provinces-Muslim provinces,
herein after named Pakistan group and Hindu provinces
sitting together.
“There shall be a separate constitution-making
body for the six Muslim provinces named above, which
will frame constitutions for the group and provinces in
the group, and will determine the list of subjects that
shall be provincial and central (of the Pakistan
Federation) with residuary sovereign powers vesting in
the provinces.
“The method of the elections of the representatives
to the constitution-making body will be such as would
secure proper representation to the various communities
in proportion to their population in each province of the
Pakistan Group.
“After the constitution of the Pakistan Federal
Government and provinces are finally framed by the
constitution-making body, it will be open to any province
of the group to decide to opt out of its group, provided the

331
wishes of the people of that province are ascertained by a
referendum to opt out or not.
“It must be open to discussion in the joint
constitution-making body as to whether the Union will
have a legislature or not. The method of providing the
Union with finance should also be left for decision of the
joint meeting of the two constitution-making bodies, but
in no event shall it be by means of taxation.
“There should be parity of representation between
the two groups of provinces in the Union Executive and
the legislature, if any.
“No major point in the Union Constitution which
affects the communal issue shall be deemed to be passed
in the joint constitution-making body, unless the
majority of the members of the constitution-making body
of the Hindu provinces and the majority of the members
of the constitution-making body of the Pakistan group,
present and voting, are separately in its favour.
“No decision, legislative, executive or
administrative shall be taken by the Union in regard to
any matter of controversial nature, except by a majority
of three-fourths.
“In groups and provincial constitutions,
fundamental rights and safeguards concerning religion,
culture and other matters affecting the different
communities will be provided for.
“The constitution of Union shall contain a
provision whereby any province can, by a majority vote of
its Legislative Assembly, call for the reconsideration of
the terms of the constitution, and will have the liberty to
secede from the Union at any time after an initial period
of ten years.”

332
The following were the points suggested on behalf
of the Congress as a basis for agreement:
The Constituent Assembly to be formed as follows:
“Representatives will be elected by each Provincial
Assembly by proportional representation (single
transferable vote). The number so elected should be one-
fifth of the number of members of the Assembly and they
may be members of the Assembly or others;
“Representatives of the States on the basis of their
population in proportion to the representation from
British India. How these representatives are to be chosen
is to be considered later;
“No major point in the Federal Constitution which
affects the communal issue shall be deemed to be passed
by the Constituent Assembly unless a majority of the
members of the community or communities concerned
present in the Assembly and voting are separately in its
favour. Provided that in case there is no agreement on
any such issue, it will be referred to arbitration. In case
of doubt as to whether any point is a major communal
issue, the Speaker will decide, or if so desired, it may be
referred to the Federal Court.”
The Congress also submitted the following note to
show in what respects its own proposals differed from
those embodied in the Muslim League’s memorandum:
The most suitable method of election would be
single transferable vote. This would give proper
representation to the various communities in proportion
to their present representation in the legislatures.
The provision to the effect that no major
communal issue in the Union constitution shall be
deemed to be passed by the Constituent Assembly unless

333
a majority of the members of the community or
communities concerned present and voting in the
Constituent Assembly are separately in its favor, is
sufficient and ample safeguard for all minorities.
Once we have safeguarded major communal issues
other matters, whether controversial or not, require no
safeguards.
(Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon, pg 302-306)
The differences of views between the Congress and
the Muslim League provided no hope for settlement.
However, the conference met as scheduled on 12th May
and came to the conclusion that no useful purpose would
be served by further discussion and therefore it was
announced that the conference has failed to bring the
Congress and the League to agreement. The members of
the Cabinet Mission returned to Delhi.

May 16th Declaration:


The Cabinet Mission arrived at its own conclusion
and drafted its famous plan, which came to be known as
May 16, Plan as the basis for settlement.
The Cabinet Mission explained how they examined
the question of a separate and fully independent
sovereign state of Pakistan consisting of six provinces as
demanded by the League, but felt staggered at the size of
the non-Muslim minority population in that proposed
Pakistan. In view of this they felt that the setting up of an
independent Pakistan on a religious basis would not
solve the communal minority problem. ‘Nor can we see
any justification for including within a sovereign Pakistan
those districts of the Punjab and Bengal and Assam in

334
which the population is predominantly non-Muslim,’ they
said. ‘Every argument that can be used in favour of
Pakistan can equally, in our view, be used in favour of
the exclusion of the non-Muslim areas from Pakistan.’
A smaller sovereign Pakistan confined to the
Muslim-majority areas thus appeared to the Cabinet
Mission as the only alternative for the basis of a
compromise with the Congress. But that called for a
radical partition of the Punjab and Bengal, which
appeared dangerous. Moreover, a smaller Pakistan
without Punjab, without the whole of Assam except the
district of Sylhet, and without a large part of western
Bengal including Calcutta appeared impracticable. ‘We
have therefore been forced to the conclusion,’ said the
Cabinet Mission, ‘that neither a larger nor a smaller
sovereign state of Pakistan would provide an acceptable
solution for the communal problem.’ They also pointed
out how the two halves of the proposed Pakistan would
remain geographically separated by some seven hundred
miles of Indian territory.
The Cabinet Mission thus upheld the unity of
India and recommended that there should be a Union of
India embracing both British India and the Indian States.
The Union Centre should deal with Foreign Affairs,
Defence, and Communications. All subjects other than
the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest
in the provinces. These autonomous provinces should be
formed into three groups, of which two would consist of
Muslim-majority provinces and one of Hindu-majority
provinces. These groups would draft their own
constitutions. The constitutions of the Union and of the
groups should contain a provision whereby any province

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could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call
for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after
an initial period of ten years and at ten-yearly intervals.
The Cabinet Mission finally recommended that a
constitution-making body should be brought into being
forthwith to frame a new constitution, and that while this
would proceed, an interim government having the
support of the major political parties should be set up.
(A Centery History of Indian National Congress: B.N.Pande, pg
80-81)
Jinnah issued a statement on 22nd May, describing
the Cabinet Mission Proposals as ‘cryptic with several
lacunas.’ He regretted that the Mission should have
negatived the Leagu’s demand for the establishment of a
complete Sovereign State of Pakistan, which he said, was
the only solution of the constitutional problem of India
and which alone could secure stable government and
lead to the happiness and welfare, not only of the two
major communities, but of all the peoples in Indian
subcontinent.
The Congress Working Committee held its meeting
on 24th May and opined that the provision for initial
grouping was inconsistent with the freedom promised to
the provinces in the matter of choice of the group in
which it may want to join.
The Council of the Muslim League met in Delhi on
6th June. It accepted the Cabinet Mission proposals in as
much as the basis of the foundation of Pakistan were
inherent in the said plan by virtue of the compulsory
grouping of the Muslim majority provinces. It expressed
its willingness to join the Constituent Assembly, keeping
in view the opportunity and the right of secession of

336
provinces or groups from the Union which had been
provided in the Mission’s plan by implication. It finally
declared that though a separate sovereign Pakistan was
still its aim, it has accepted the plan prompted by an
earnest desire for a peaceful solution of the Indian
Constitutional problem.
The Congress Working Committee finally met on
25th June 1946 to deliberate on the Cabinet Mission Plan.
Gandhi advised wholesale rejection of the Plan with its
short-term and long-term parts. On the other hand,
Azad, Nehru and Patel were for a compromise. Azad in
his autobiography, “India Wins Freedom” says at page
150:
“In our discussions in the Working committee, I
pointed out that the Cabinet Mission Plan was basically
the same as the scheme Congress had accepted. As such
the Working Committee did not have much difficulty in
accepting the main political solution contained in the
Plan. In the end, the Committee only partially agreed
with Gandhiji. It rejected the proposal for the formation
of an Interim Government at the Centre but accepted the
long-term proposal of the constitution-making with its
own interpretation of disputed clauses.
“How fundamentally Gandhiji and his collegues
differed with each other as to the course to be followed
with regard to the Cabinet Mission Plan will be apparent
from the following description given by Shri Pyare Lal as
to the happenings on the morning of 25th June when the
Working committee met to give their final decision:
“At 8 A.M. Bapu went to attend the Working
Committee meeting. He asked me to read out the note,
which he had written to Cripps last night. He then

337
addressed them very briefly: ‘I admit defeat. You are not
bound to act upon my unsupported suspicion. You
should follow my intuition if it appeals to your reason.
Otherwise you should take an independent course. I shall
now leave with your permission. You should follow the
dictates of your reason.’
“A hush fell over the gathering. Nobody spoke for
sometime. The Maulana Saheb with his unfailing
alertness at once took in the situation. ‘What do you
desire”? Is there any need to detain Bapu any further? He
asked. Everybody was silent. Everybody understood. In
that hour of decision they had no use for Bapu. They
decided to drop the pilot. Bapu returned to his residence.
“The Working Committee again met at noon and
addressed a letter to the Cabinet Mission, rejecting the
proposal for the formation of the Interim Government at
the Centre and accepting the long-term plan with its own
interpretation of the disputed clause. At noon, the
Cabinet Mission invited the members of the Working
committee to meet them. Bapu not being a member was
not sent for and did not go. On their return nobody told
Bapu a word about what happened at the meeting.”
The Working Committee’s decision of the 25th June
was communicated to the Cabinet Mission on the same
day. It treated the Congress decision as an acceptance of
their plan of 16th May.
Immediately after the Congress decision, the
Cabinet Mission saw Jinnah and informed him that the
plan of 16th June had fallen through; that the Congress
had, however, accepted the Statement of 16th May; and
that, since both the Congress and the League had now
accepted the Statement, it was proposed to set up a

338
coalition Government, including both parties, as soon as
possible.
Jinnah straight went to his Working Committee,
which passed a resolution to join the Inrerim
Government on the basis of 16th May Plan.
Thus a new situation developed. Paragraph 8 of
the Statement of 16th May stated that in the event of two
major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join
in the setting up of a coalition Government on the above
lines, it is the intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the
formation of an Interim Government which will be as
representative as possible of those willing to accept the
Statement of 16th May. Jinnah interpreted this to mean
that if the Congress rejected the Interim Government
proposals, but the League accepted them, the Viceroy
would at once be obliged to form a Government
consisting of representatives of the Muslim League and
any other parties which had accepted the Statement of
16th May. In a letter to Jinnah the Viceroy repeated what
the Mission and he had already told him as to the course
which the Mission proposed to adopt. But Jinnah held to
his own interpretation and insisted that the Mission had
gone back on their word by postponing to form an
Interim Government; that the long-term plan and the
formation of the Interim Government formed one whole,
and that it was undesirable to proceed with one part, i.e.
the elections to the Constituent Assembly, and to
postpone the other. The Viceroy denied that they had
gone back on their word, and added that there was no
intention of postponing the elections to the Constituent
Assembly, arrangements for which had already been put
into operation.

339
The negotiations for the formation of Interim
Government failed. The existing Executive Council had
lost some of his members by resignation. It became
necessary to make transitional arrangement at the
Centre pending further negotiations with the parties. The
Viceroy decided to set up a care taker Government
composed of officials, who would function until such time
as his efforts with the political leaders could be renewed.
(Transfer of Power by V.P.Menon, pg 324-325)
The Cabinet Mission left India for England on 29th
June 1946 with the depressing feeling that no solution
was in sight since the Congress and the League were still
in divergence regarding the workable aspect of the Plan.
Nehru’s Damaging Role:
At the session of the All India Congress Committee
on 6th July 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru was installed as
Congress President in place of Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad. Winding up the proceedings of the All India
Congress Committee, Nehru said:
“…It was not a question of Congress accepting
any plan, long or short. It was merely a question of their
agreeing to enter the Constituent Assembly and nothing
more than that. They would remain in the Constituent
Assembly so long as they thought that it was for India’s
good and they would come out when they thought it was
injuring their cause. We are not bound by a single thing
except that we have decided for the moment to go to the
Constituent Assembly.”
Referring to the provisions laid down by the
Cabinet Mission, namely proper arrangements for
minorities and a treaty between India and England,
Nehru said that he would have no treaty with the British

340
Government, if they sought to impose anything upon
India; and we shall no doubt, succeed in solving it. We
accept no outsider’s interference in it, certainly not the
British Government’s interference, and therefore, these
two limiting factors to the sovereignty of the Constituent
Assembly are not accepted by us.
With regard to the question of grouping Nehru
said: “The big probability is, from any approach to the
question, there will be no grouping. There is a four to one
chance to the North-West Frontier province deciding
against grouping. Then group B collapses. It is likely that
Bengal and Assam will decide aginst grouping, although I
would not like to say what the initial decision may be
since it is evenly balanced. But I can say with every
assurance and conviction that there is going to be finally
no grouping there, because Assam will not tolerate it
under any circumstances whatever. Thus you see this
grouping business, approached from any point of view,
does not get us on at all.”
Dealing with the powers of the proposed Union
Centre, Nehru said that defence and communications
would embrace a large number of industries necessary
for their support. Foreign affairs must inevitably include
foreign trade policy. It was equally inevitable that the
union must raise its finances by taxation, rather than by
any system of contribution or doles from the provinces.
Further, the centre must obviously control currency and
credit; and there must be an overall authority to settle
inter-provincial disputes and to deal with administrative
or economic breakdowns.
(Transfer of Power in India; V.P.Menon pg 327-328)

341
Nehru’s statement on the Cabinet Mission Plan
was at once taken up by Jinnah. He characterized it as a
complete repudiation of the basic form on which the long-
term plan rests and all its fundamentals and terms and
obligations and rights of parties accepting the plan.
Jinnah suggested that His Majesty’s Government should
make it clear beyond doubt and remove the impression
that the Congress has accepted the long-term plan.
In an editorial, DAWN-the League’s official Daily,
posed a question whether the British Government was
going to delude itself and mislead the world with the
illusion that the Congress had accepted the long-term
plan, or whether it was going to make it clear that should
any party proceed inside the Constituent Assembly on
any other basis, than that prescribed in the Statement of
May 16, the plan would be deemed to have failed and the
Constituent Assembly would be dissolved.
(Transfer of Power in India V.P. Menon, pg 328)
The DAWN threatened that the moment a Hindu
Government is set up without the consent and the
collaboration of Muslims, the first shot of aggression will
have been fired against them and that will be signal for
Muslims to do or die.
(The Origins of Partition of India by Anita Inder Singh, pg 181)
Jinnah wrote a strictly private, personal and
confidential letter on 6th July 1946 to Lord Attlee in
which he said; “…The British Government would still
avoid compelling the Muslims to shed their blood, for,
your surrender to the Congress as the sacrifice of the
Muslims can only result in that direction. If politics is
going to be the deciding factor in total disregard of fair
play and justice, we shall have no other course open to

342
us except to forge our sanction to meet the situation,
which in that case, is bound to arise. Its consequences, I
need not say, will be most disastrous and a possible
settlement will then become impossible.”
(Partition of India Legend & Reality by H.M. Seervai, pg 55)
On 10th July 1946, Nehru held a press conference
in Bombay in which he made an astonishing statement.
Some press representatives asked him whether with the
passing of the resolution by the AICC, the Congress now
accepted the plan in toto including the composition of the
interim Government.
Nehru in reply stated that the Congress would
enter the Constituent Assembly completely unfettered by
the agreements and free to meet all situations as they
arise.
Press representatives further asked him, if this
meant that the Cabinet Mission Plan could be modified.
Nehru replied emphatically that the Congress had agreed
only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and
regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet
Mission Plan as it thought best.
(India Wins Freedom by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad pg 164)
The belief that Nehru expressed these views
because he was carried away by his feelings is not
correct. Nehru’s statements at the press conference
represented a view, which he firmly held. He had
expressed similar views in his interviews with the Cabinet
Mission and the Viceroy on 10th June 1946, in which he
had said: “…The Congress was going to work for a strong
center and to break the group system and they would
succeed. They did not think that Mr. Jinnah had any real
place in the country. The Muslim League and the

343
Congress each represented entirely different outlooks on
the work of the constitution- making body and they were
bound to have strong differences in the Interim
Government.
(Partition of India Legend and reality by H.M.Seervai pg 64 &
74)
The Working Committee of the Congress tried to
undo the damage done by Nehru’s statement by passing
a resolution, which reaffirmed the acceptance of the
Cabinet Mission Plan by the Congress. But the damage
could not be undone. In the words of Maulana Abul
Kalam Azad:
“Mr. Jinnah, did not however, accept the position
and held that Jawaharlal’s statement represented the
real mind of the Congress. He argued that if the Congress
could change so many times while the British were still in
the country and power had not come to its hands, what
assurance would minorities have that once the British
left, the Congress would not again change and go back to
the position taken up in Jawaharlal’s statement”.
(Partition of India Legend & Reality by H.M. Seervai, pg 76)
Dr. K.M. Munshi wrote: “Jawaharlal Nehru as
president of the Congress spoke on 10th July, what was in
our hearts, but gave a handle to Jinnah.”
(Pilgrimage to Freedom by K.M. Munshi, pg 104)
The statement of Nehru was perhaps the worst of
all indiscrete statements that were ever made by any
politician. It was a moment in history when
circumspection should have been the order of the day.
There was much to be gained by silence. The fortunes of
India were in balance, and one false move could upset
them. Nehru chose the moment to launch into what his

344
biographer, Mchael Brecher, has described as, “one of the
most fiery and provocative statements in his forty years
of public… Did Nehru realize what he was saying? He
was telling the world that once in power, Congress would
use its strength at the centre to alter the Cabinet Mission
Plan as it thought fit.”
(Jinnah and Gandhi: S.K. Mujumdar, pg 228)
(Mosley: The Last days of British Raj; pg 28)
Following Nehru’s statement, Jinnah held a
th
meeting of the Council of the Muslims League on 27
July 1946 in Bombay to review the whole issue in the
light of Nehru’s declaration. At the concluding session of
the Council on 29th July, Jinnah announced:
“The League, throughout the negotiations, was
moved by a sense of fair play and sacrificed the full
sovereign state of Pakistan at the alter of the Congress for
securing the independence of the whole of India. They
voluntarily delegated three subjects to the Union, and by
doing so did not commit a mistake. It was the highest
order of statesmanship that the League displayed by
making this concession. But this has been treated with
defiance and contempt. Then, are we alone to be guided
by reason, justice, honesty and fairplay, when on the
other hand there are perfidious dealings by the Congress.
(A Centenary History of Indian National Congress: B.N.Pande,
pg 83)
Jinnah concluded by saying that in view of the
true intentions of the Congress as expressed in Nehru’s
speech, it was no longer possible to work in cooperation
with the Congress, and therefore, the League had no
alternative but to adhere once more to the national goal
of Pakistan. In a passionate voice he gave a marching

345
call, “We have learnt a bitter lesson, the bitterest, I think,
so far. Now there is no room left for compromise. Let us
march on to our cherished goal of Sovereign Pakistan.”
(Jinnah: Hector Bolitho, pg 165)
The Working Committee of Muslims League then
passed two resolutions. The first resolution was to the
effect that in the events that had happened, the Muslim
League Council had felt that their interests would not be
safe in the Constituent Assembly and decided that the
acceptance of the Plan contained in the Cabinet Missions
Statement of May 16, should be revoked. The second
resolution called upon the Working Committee to draw
up a plan for direct action and called upon all the
members of the League to renounce titles conferred by
the Government. After the resolution had been passed
Jinnah declared:
“What we have done today is the most historic act
in our history. Never have we in the whole history of the
League done anything except constitutional methods and
constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and forced into
this position. This day we bid goodbye to the
constitutional methods. He recalled that through out the
fateful negotiations with the Cabinet Mission the other
two parties, the British and the Congress, each held a
pistol in their hands, the one of authority and arms and
the other of mass struggle and non-cooperation. Today,
we have also forged a pistol and we are in a position to
use it.”
(Transfer of Power in India: V.P. Menon, pg 331)
The Working Committee of the League followed up
the Council’s resolution by calling upon the Muslims

346
through out India to observe 16 th August as ‘Direct Action
Day.’
The effect of Nehru’s answers at his press
conference and their grave aftermath is best summed up
in the words of Azad:
“Jawaharlal’s mistake in 1937 had been bad
enough. His mistake in 1946 proved even more costly.
One may perhaps say in Jawaharlal’s defence, that he
never expected the Muslim League to resort to direct
action. Mr. Jinnah had never been a believer in mass
movement.”
Nehru had earlier written a letter to Cripps on 27th
January 1946 in which he had said: “The Muslim League
leadership is far too reactionary (they are mostly land
lords) and opposed to social change to dare to indulge in
any form of direct action. They are incapable of it, having
spent their lives in soft jobs. If it is made once clear that
violence on their part will not help them at all, they will
subside.”
(Partition of India –Legend and Reality by H.M. Seervai, pg 77)
While the elections were in progress, the Viceroy
had been in correspondence with the Secretary of State
on the subject of formation of an Interim Government to
replace the care taker Government at the centre. As
agreed the Viceroy wrote to the presidents of the
Congress and the Muslim League on 22nd July as follows:
“I propose the following for your consideration:
1. The Interim Government will consist of 14
members
2. Six members, including Scheduled Caste
representative will be nominated by the
Congress. The five members will be nominated

347
by the Muslim League. Three representatives of
minorities will be nominated by the Viceroy.
One of these places will be kept for a Sikh. It
will not be open either to the Congress or the
League to object to the names submitted by
othe party, provided they are accepted by the
Viceroy.
Distribution of portfolios will be decided after the
parties have agreed to enter the Government and
submitted their names. The Congress and the Muslim
League will each have an equitable share of the most
important portfolios.
3. The assurances that the status of the Interim
Government which I gave in my letter dated
30th May to Maulana Azad will stand.
Concluding his letter, the Viceroy said: “We should
not spend further time in negotiations; but should try out
a Government at once on the basis as proposed above. If
it does not work, and if you find the conditions uneasy, it
will be open to you to withdraw, but I am confident that
you will not.”
Nehru sent his reply on 23rd July in which he said:
“The assurances which the Viceroy had given to Azad in
his letter of 30th May with regard to the status of the
Interim Government were very far from satisfying the
Congress, which had all along attached the greatest
importance, to what it called the ‘independence of action’
of the Interim Government. This meant that the
Government should have perfect freedom and that the
Governor-General should function only as a
constitutional head. Nor would it be proper for the

348
Governor-General to select representatives of the
minorities.”
Nehru concluded that in view of what he had
stated above, he was wholly unable to cooperate in the
formation of a Government on the lines suggested by the
Viceroy. So far as he knew the mind of the Congress, it
would want the political independence issue settled
before it could enter any government.
(Transfer of power in India by V.P. Menon, pg 335)
Meanwhile there came the resolution of the
Council of the All India Muslim League rejecting the
Cabine Mission plan. At his meeting with Nehru, the
Viceroy suggested that this resolution was partly a
reaction to the language used by him (Nehru) and other
Congress leaders since the meeting of the All India
Congress Committee in Bombay. It would be most
unfortunate, said the Viceroy, if the League did not join
the Constituent Assembly. Here was a chance to the
Congress to show real statesmanship by giving the
Muslim League assurances, which would bring its
representatives into the Constituent Assembly. Nehru
said he did not see what assurances could be given. The
Viceroy said that he was anxious to form an Interim
Government as soon as possible, but that it was
impossible to go beyond the assurances given in his letter
to Azad regarding the status and the powers of the
Interim Government. He expressed a desire to see Nehru
as soon as possible after the meeting of the Congress
Working Committee which was to take place in Wardha
on 8th August.
On 31st July, Jinnah sent his reply to the
Viceroy’s letter of 22nd July with regard to the Interim

349
Government. He said that the Viceroy’s basis for the
formation of an Interim Government gave go-by to all the
important terms that were favourable to the Muslim
League. It straightway broke the principle of parity. The
Scheduled Castes had been let down, in as much as one
of them was proposed to be nominated by the Congress
and not by their own spokesman. It would be next open
to the Congress to nominate a ‘Quisling Muslim.’
Moreover, the distribution of portfolios would be
equitable and not equal as had been originally proposed.
As to the assurance about the safeguards, he said that
the Viceroy did not seem to attach much importance to it.
This was a very clear and substantial departure that was
most detrimental to the Muslim League and was
obviously intended to appease the Congress. Jinnah
concluded that in his opinion there was no chance of his
Working Committee accepting Viceroy’s proposal.
Interim Government:
On 6th August 1946, the Vicoroy acting under the
instructions of His Majesty’s Government invited Nehru
as Congress President to submit proposals for the
formation of an Interim Government on the basis of the
assurance contained in his letter of 30th May to Azad. The
Viceroy further wrote: “It would be for Nehru to consider
whether he should first discuss the proposals with
Jinnah. If he could reach an agreement with Jinnah, he
would naturally be delighted.” (Transfer of Power in India
by V.P.Menon, pg 339)
The Congress Working Committee met on 8th
August at Wardha and decided to accept the invitation
extended to Nehru to form an Interim Government and
authorized him to negotiate with the Viceroy. In another

350
resolution, the Congress Working Committee expressed
its genuine regret that the League had decided not to
participate in the Constituent Assembly. The resolution
pointed out that neither the Working Committee nor the
AICC ever objected to the principle of grouping, their
objection being confined to short point whether a
province can be forced to a particular group against its
will? The Congress Working Committee hoped that the
Muslim League and all other concerned in the wider
interest of the nation, as well as for their own, will join in
this great task.
The resolution, however, did not satisfy Jinnah. In
a statement issued soon after, he said that but for its
phraseology, the resolution was only a repeatation of
what had been the Congress stand from the beginning.
He stuck to his view that Nehru’s statement represented
the concealed intention of the Congress. He said, he
could not trust the Congress and he believed that the
moment the British left the country, the Hindu-
dominated Constituent Assembly would do away with the
half-way house to Pakistan built by the Cabinet Mission
by means of grouping of the provinces. Jinnah concluded
that the situation remains as it was and we are where we
were.
(Jinnah and Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 229)
After the meeting of the Congress Working
Committee, Nehru wrote to the Viceroy: “In view of the
resolution adopted by the Muslim League and the
statements made on behalf of it, the best course would be
to make a public announcement to the effect that he had
invited the president of the Congress to form the
provisional Interim Government and the latter has

351
accepted his invitation. It will then be possible for us to
approach the Muslim League and invite its cooperation.”
The Viceroy accepted Nehru’s suggestion and
made the necessary announcement on 12th August and
accordingly issued a communiqué.
On 13th August, Nehru wrote to Jinnah about
Viceroy’s invitation to him and his acceptance of it.
On 15th August, Jinnah replied to Nehru stating
that he knew nothing of what transpired between the
Viceroy and him, nor had he any idea of what agreement
had been reached between them. If the Viceroy had
commissioned Nehru to form an Executive Council and
accept and act upon his advice, it was not possible for
him (Jinnah) to accept such a position. However, if Nehru
cared to meet him on behalf of the Congress to settle the
Hindu-Muslim question and resolve the serious dead-
lock, he would be glad to see him.
In his reply to Jinnah, Nehru made it clear that
there was no arrangement between the Viceroy and
himself, except that was contained in the Viceroy’s brief
offer and the Congress acceptance. He regretted Jinnah’s
decision, but suggested that perhaps on fuller
consideration he might be agreeable to reconsider it. The
latter finally agreed to meet Nehru. They had a long
discussion, which did not, however, lead to any result.
On 17th August, Nehru requested the Viceroy to
raise the number of members in the Interim Government
from 14 to 15 for the efficient discharge of their functions
as also to enable a representative of the Anglo-Indian
community. But the Viceroy objected on the ground that
it would make the League’s joining the Government more
difficult. He said: “The matter of paramount importance

352
is to leave no stone unturned to get the Muslim League
join the Interim Government.
On 19th August, Nehru wrote to the Viceroy that
he had consulted his collegues, whose reaction was
identical with him. He contended that he had accepted
the Viceroy’s invitation to make proposals for the
formation of an Interim Government on the
understanding that the rsponsiblity would be his and
that of the Congress.
On the same day, Jinnah issued a statement to
the press, the tone and temper of which convinced the
Viceroy that it would be useless to make any approach to
Jinnah.
On 22nd August, Nehru wrote a letter to the
Viceroy stating that the Congress had been anxious to
form a coalition Interim Government with the Muslim
League and that they would continue to work to that end;
but he wanted to make it clear that the Congress idea of
a coalition did not mean a submission to the demand or
the peculiar ways which the League adopted. A coalition
could come into existence on the clear understanding
that the League nominates its five representatives,
including the nationalist Muslim.
Nehru submitted a list of 12 members for the
Interim Government. Two names were left to be filled by
the League, if and when they joined the Government.
On 24th August, a press communiqué was issued
stating that the King had accepted the resignations of the
existing members of the Governor-General’s Executive
Council and that His Majesty’s Government had been
pleased to appoint in their places the following:

353
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Mr. Asaf Ali, C
Rajagopalachariar, Sarat Chandra Bose, Dr. John
Mathai, Sardar Baldev Singh, Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan,
Jagjivanram, Syd Ali Zaheer and C.H.Bhaba. Two more
Muslim members would be appointed later. The Interim
Government would take office on 2nd September.
On the same day, the Viceroy in his broadcast said
that he would fully implement His Majesty’s Government
policy of giving the new Government maximum freedom,
in the day to day administration of the country. As a sop
to the provinces ruled by the Mulsim League ministries,
the Viceroy declared that the new Government had
neither power nor any desire to trespass on the field of
provincial administration. But this assurance failed to
convince Jinnah. He said that the Viceroy had struck a
severe blow to the Muslim League and Muslim India. He
reiterated his demand for the vivisection of India, and
said if Viceroy’s appeal is really sincere and if he is in
earnest, he should translate it into concrete proposals by
his deeds and actions.
(Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon, pg 350)
The Interim Government was sworn in on 2nd
September. Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan, a scholarly and
patriotic Muslim, who had agreed to join the Interim
Government was the victim of a murderous assault on
the eve of his accepting the office.
On 7th September, Nehru broadcast from the All
India Radio in which he said that the Interim
Government was a part of a larger scheme, which
included the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent
Assembly would soon be meeting to give shape to the

354
constitution of a free and independent India. There had
been much heated argument about sections and
groupings in the Constituent Assembly, but the Congress
was perfectly prepared to accept, indeed had accepted,
the position of setting in sections which would consider
the question of the formation of groups. On behalf of his
colleagues and himself, he wished to make it clear that
they did not take upon the Constituent Assembly as an
arena of conflict, or for the forcible imposition of one
point of view over another. That would not be the way to
build a contended and united India.
Jinnah gave an interview to the representative of
‘London Daily Mail’ on 8th September in which he said:
“Nehru has made no definite proposals to me; I have been
stabbed and kind words will not stop the bleeding.”
(Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon, pg 356-357)
The Viceroy saw Jinnah on 25th September. Jinnah
pressed for acceptance of a convention that major
communal issues in the Interim Government be decided
by a vote of both communities.
Nehru did not desire the Viceroy to see Jinnah.
This is evident from Pethic Lawrence’s letter of 30th
September to Cripps in which he said: “…Nehru objects
to Viceroy having talks with Jinnah re-entering the
Interim Government. I do not see how you can possibly
give him any assurance on this point……I do not feel
disposed to stop Viceroy doing it and if I did, I think the
Viceroy would resign…It is essential that we should stand
behind the Viceroy in pressing Congress for
accomodation.”
(Partition of India: Legend & Reality by H.M. Seervai, pg 83)

355
The Viceroy continued his efforts to bring about
settelment with Nehru and Jinnah. He informed Jinnah
on 2nd October that he had failed to secure any
concession from the Congress over the nationalist
Muslim issue. He emphasised at the same time that it
was in the obvious interest of the Muslim League to come
into the Government at once and unconditionally. Jinnah
did not enter in any argument on the nationalist Muslim
issue, but said that if he was to have any chance of
satisfying his Working Committee, he must show them
some success on other points, e.g., a safeguard on major
communal issues. Finally, Jinnah agreed to summon his
Working Committee as soon as possible and undertook to
send the Viceroy a note setting on the points on which he
required elucidation.
Jinnah sought elucidation on the following nine
points:
1. The total number of the members of the
Executive Council to be fourteen.
2. Six nominees of the Congress will include one
Scheduled Caste representative, but it must
not be taken that the Muslim League has
agreed to, or approves of, the selection of the
Scheduled Caste representative, the ultimate
responsibility on that behalf being with the
Governor-General and the Viceroy.
3. The Congress should not include in the
remaining five members of their quota a
Muslim of their choice.
4. Safeguard: there should be a convention that
on major communal issues, if the majority of
the Hindu or Muslim members of he Executive

356
Council are opposed, then no decision should
be taken.
5. Alternative or rotational Vice President should
be appointed in fairness from both the major
communities as it was adopted in the U.N.O.
Conference.
6. The Muslim League was not consulted in the
selection of the three minority representatives
i.e. Sikh, Indian Christian and Parsi and it
should not be taken that the Muslim League
approved of the selection that had been made.
But in future, in the event of there being a
vacancy owing to death, resignation or
otherwise, representatives of these minorities
should be chosen in consultation with the two
major parties-the Muslim League and the
Congress.
7. Portfolios: The most important portfolios must
be equally distributed between the two major
parties-the Muslim League and the Congress.
8. The above arrangement should not be changed
or modified unless both the major parties-the
Muslim League and the Congress agree.
9. The question of the settlement of the long-term
plan should stand over until a better and more
conducive atmosphere is created and an
agreement has been reached on the points
stated above and after the Interim Government
has been formed and finally set up.
After consultation with Nehru on 4th October, the
Viceroy sent pointwise reply to Jinnah as follows:
1. This is agreed.

357
2. I note what you say and accept that the
responsibility is mine.
3. I am unable to agree to this. Each party must
be equally free to nominate its own
representatives.
4. In coalition Government, it is impossible to
decide major matters of policy when one of the
main parties to the coalition is strongly against
a course of action proposed. My present
collegues and I are agreed that it would be fatal
to allow major communal issues to be decided
by vote in the Cabinet. The efficiency and the
prestige of the Interim Government will depend
on ensuring that differences are resolved in
advance of Cabinet meetings by friendly
discussions. A coalition Government either
works by a process of mutual adjustment or
does not work at all.
5. The arrangement of alternative or rotational
Vice-presidentship would present practical
difficulty, and I do not consider it feasible. I
will, however, arrange to nominate a Muslim
League member to preside over the Cabinet in
the event of the Governor-General and the Vice
president being absent. I will also nominate a
Muslim League member as Vice Chairman of
the Coordination Committee of the Cabinet,
which is most important post. I am Chairman
of this Committee, and in the past have
presided almost invariably, but I shall probably
do so only on special occasions in future.

358
6. I accept that both major parties would be
consulted before filling a vacancy in any of
these three seats.
7. In the present condition all the portfolios in the
Cabinet are of great importance and it is a
matter of opinion which are the most
important. The minority representatives cannot
be excluded fom the share of a major portfolio.
But subject to this, there can be equal
distribution of the most important portfolios
between the Congress and the Muslim League.
Details would be matter of negotiations.
8. I agree.
9. Since the basis of participation in the Cabinet
is, of course, acceptance of the Statement of
May 16, I assume that the League Council
would meet at a very early date to reconsider
its Bombay resolution.
(Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon, pp 263-65)
Nehru refused to accept the League’s claim that it
must be consulted on future appointments to the Interim
Government of representatives of minorities. The
Congress, he said, could not allow its position vis-à-vis
Scheduled Castes or other minorities to be challenged by
the League. Nor could the Congress agree to the demand
that the office of the Vice president should be held in
turn by members of both parties. Instead an offer was
made that the Vice Chairmanship of the Cabinet
Coordination Committee would be given to a member of
the Muslim League; or, in the alternative, a League
member of the Cabinet would be the leader of the House
of the Central Assembly. With regard to the procedure for

359
settling such differences of opinion as might arise over a
major communal issue, the Congress view was that
matters coming before the Cabinet should not be referred
to a court; that agreement should always be reached, and
that if this were not possible the matter should be
referred to arbitration. The net result of the discussions
was to accentuate the bitterness between the two parties
and to cause further confusion in the public mind.
When the Viceroy saw Jinnah, the latter sprang a
surprise by asking, since the Congress had the right to
nominate a Muslim in its quota, he could nominate a
representative of Scheduled Castes or other minority in
its quota. The Viceroy admitted that he could do so, but
pointed out that such a nomination would not help
towards a harmonious working of the Cabinet. He
confirmed this in writing on 12th October
On 13th October Jinnah wrote to the Viceroy as
follows:
“…My Committee, for various reasons, have come
to the conclusion that in the interest of Musalmans and
other Communities it would be fatal to leave the entire
field of administration of the Central Government in the
hands of the Congress. Besides, you may be forced to
have in your Interim Government Muslims who do not
command respect and confidence of Muslim India, which
would lead to various serious consequences, and lastly,
for other very weighty grounds and reasons which are
obvious and need not be mentioned, we have decided to
noninate five members on behlf of the Muslim League in
terms of your broadcast of 24th August 1946 and your
two letters to me dated 4th October 1946, and 12th

360
October 1946, respectively, embodying clarifications and
assurances.”
Now that the League decided to join the Cabinet,
Jinnah acted in a most peculiar manner. Apart from
Liaqat Ali, the most important and experienced leaders of
the Muslim League were Khwaja Nazimuddin and Nawab
Ismail. Khan had never taken an extreme position in the
disputes between the Congress and the League. This had
obviously displeased Jinnah. He thought that they would
not be yes men and he therefore decided to exclude them
from the list. It would, however, have created a furor in
the League Council if this fact was prematurely known.
He therefore, induced the League Council to pass a
resolution delegating full authority to him.
When Jinnah submitted the list to Lord Wavell on
th
14 October the names included were those of Liaqat Ali,
I.I.Chundrigar, Abdul Rab Nishtar Ghaznafar Ali, and
Jogendra Nath Mandal. Khwaja Nazimuddin and Ismail
Khan were discarded in favour of Jinnah’s henchmen.
On 25th October, names of the Muslim League
members of the Interim Government along with allocation
of their portfolios were announced. Khwaja Nazimuddin,
Nawab Ismail Khan and other Muslim League leaders
were waiting anxiously in the Imperial Hotel for the
announcement. They were absolutely sure about their
own inclusion and so were their supporters, Accordingly,
a large number of Muslim League members had come
with garlands and bouquets. When the names were
announced and neither was included in the list, one can
imagine their disappointment and anger. Mr. Jinnah had
poured ice-cold water on their hopes.

361
An even more ridiculous thing the Muslim League
did was to include Jogendra Nath Mandal in its list.
Congress had nominated Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Parsi,
Scheduled Castes and Christian members on the
Executive Council, but when the limitations under which
it worked, it could include only one representative of
Scheduled Castes. The Muslim League thought that it
would put the Congress to shame by nominating a
second reprsentative of the Scheduled Castes and in this
way prove that it was a geater friend of Scheduled Castes,
than the Congress. It did not strike to Jinnah that this
action was inconsistent with his earlier claim that
Congress should nominate only Hindus and the Muslim
League only Muslims. Besides, the choice of his nominee
caused both amusement and anger. When Suhrawardy
formed a Muslim League ministry in Bengal, the only
non-Muslim included in his ministry was Jogendra Nath
Mandal. He was then almost unknown in Bengal and had
no position whatever in all India politics. Since he was
nominee of the Muslim League, he was appointed Law
Minister. Most of the Secretaries to the Government of
India were British. Mr. Mandal had also a British
Secretary, who complained almost every day that it was
difficult to work with a member like Mr. Mandal.
(India Wins Freedom:Maulana Azad pg 176-177)
The inclusion of Mr. Mandal appears to be an
assertion by the League of the right to appoint a non
Muslim belonging to the third largest minority in India,
and secondly to make good the reference in the League’s
resolution of the Working Committee of the need to
protect not only the interests of the Muslims, but also the
other communities.

362
If Congress, Jinnah alleged, divided the Muslims,
he would divide Harijans.
Now that the League had agreed to join the
Government, the Congress had to reconstitute the
Government to accommodate the representatives of the
League. Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose, Sir Shafaat Ahmed
and syed Ali Zaheer were asked to resign. Regarding
portfolios, Lord Wavell suggested that one of the major
portfolios should go to Muslim League. His own
suggestion was that the Congress should give Home
Department, but Sardar Patel, who was Home member
vehemently opposed the suggestion and said that he
would rather leave the Government than give up the
Home Department.
Azad was of the view that law and order was
essentially a provincial subject. In the picture envisaged
in the Cabinet Mission Plan, the centre would have very
little to do in the field. As such, the Home Ministry in the
centre would not have much importance in the new set
up. Azad was therefore in favour of accepting Wavell’s
suggestion.
When Sardar Patel refused to part with the Home
portfolio, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai suggested that the Congress
should offer Finance portfolio to the Muslim League.
Kidwai thought because of the technical nature of the
subject, the League would refuse the offer. If this
happened, the Congress would lose nothing. If on the
other hand the League nominee accepted the portfolio, he
would soon make fool of himself. Either way the Congress
would stand to gain.
Sardar Patel jumped on the idea and gave his
strongest support. Azad tried to point out that Finance

363
was the key to Government and the Congress would have
to face major difficulties if Finance was under the control
of the League. Sardar Patel countered that the League
would not be able to manage Finance and would have to
decline offer. Azad did not feel happy at the decision but
since all others agreed, he submitted. The Viceroy was
informed that the Congress would offer Finance to a
nominee of the Muslim League.
When Lord Wavell conveyed the decision of the
Congress to Jinnah, he said that he would give his reply
the next day. He had decided to nominate Liaqat Ali as
the chief representative of the League in the Cabinet, but
he was doubtful whether Liaquat Ali would adequately
handle Finance. Some Muslim officers of the Finance
Department heard this news and they immediately
contacted Jinnah. They told him that offer of the
Congress was a real windfall and marked a great victory
for the League. With the control of Finance Department,
the League would have a say in every department of the
Government. They would give every help to Mr. Liaqat Ali
and ensure that he discharged his duties effectively.
Jinnah accepted the proposal and accordingly, Liaqat Ali
became the member for Finance. Congress soon realized
that it had committed a great mistake in handing over
Finace to the Muslim League.
When Liaqat Ali became Finance Member, every
proposal of every department was subject to scrutiny by
his department. In addition he had the power of veto. Not
a peon could be appointed in any department without the
sanction of the Finance Department.
Sardar Patel realized that he had played into the
hands of the Muslim League by offering him Finance, but

364
it was too late. Whatever proposal he made either rejected
or modified beyond recognition by Liaqat Ali. His
persistent interference made it difficult for any Congress
member to function effectively.
The Interim Government was born in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust between the
Congress and the League and it went on increasing. After
the Interim Government was formed it had been agreed
that all the members would meet informally before the
formal meeting of the Cabinet. It was felt that if members
had informal discussions among themselves, it would
help to develop the convention that the Viceroy was only
constitutional head. These formal meetings used to be
held by turn in the rooms of the different members of the
Council, but very often Jawaharlal asked the other
members to tea. Usually invitations were sent by
Jawaharlal’s private Secretary. Liaqat Ali took great
objection to this and said that he felt humiliated that a
private Secretary to Jawaharlal should ask him to tea.
Besides, he did not agree that Jawaharlal had any right
as Vice-President of the Council to hold such informal
meetings. This is a small incident but shows the length to
which the Muslim League representatives were prepared
to go in their non-cooperation with the Congress.
Soon after the Interim Government was formed,
Jawaharlal issued orders for stopping aerial
bombardment of tribesmen in South Waziristhan. In the
meantime he was reeiving official reports that a large
section of the people in the Frontier were against
Congress and the Khan Brothers. Local officers
repeatedly said that the Congress had largely lost local
support and the people had transferred their loyalty from

365
Congress to the League. Jawaharlal was of the view that
these reports were not correct and were fabricated by
British officers. He said that he would tour in the
Frontier and assess the situation for himself.
Azad advised Jawaharlal not to take any hasty
action, he said his tour in the Frontier would give the
dissident elements an opportunity of organizing their
opposition to the Congress. It would therefore be better if
he postponed his visit till a more appropriate time.
Gandhi also supported Azad’s view, but Jawaharlal
insisted and said that whatever be the consequences he
would go. When Jawaharlal reached Peshawar, he was
shocked to know that Khan brothers did not enjoy as
much support in the Frontier as it was thought in Delhi.
He was greeted with black flags and anti-slogans at the
airport. Dr. Khan Saheb and other ministers who had
come to receive Jawaharlal were themselves under police
protection and proved completely ineffective. As
Jawaharlal came out slogans were raised against him
and some people in the mob wanted to attack his car. Dr.
Khan Saheb was so worried that he took out his revolver
and threatened to shoot. Only under this threat did the
crowd give way and the cars came out under police
escort.
The next day Jawaharlal left for a tour of the tribal
areas. He found everywhere a large section of the people
against him. In some places his car was stoned and one
stone hit him on the forehead. After his return, Lord
Wavell expressed his regret about the whole affair and
wished that an enquiry should be made into the conduct
of the officers. However, Jawaharlal did not agree to take
an action against anybody.

366
The League members of the Executive Council
were thwarting the Congress at every step. They were in
the Government and yet against it. In fact, they were in a
position to sabotage every move Congress took. The
powers of the finance member were being stretched to the
limit and a new shock awaited the Congress members
when the budget for the next year was presented by
Liaqat Ali.
It was declared policy of the Congress that
economic inequalities must be removed and capitalist
society replaced by one of the socialist pattern. This was
also the stand in the Congress election manifesto. The
Congress members felt that the Government of India
should take strong action to recover taxes, which were
due but had remained unpaid.
Liaqat Ali framed a budget, which was ostensibly
based on Congress declaration, but in fact, it was a clever
dvice for discrediting the Congress. He proposed taxation
measures which have impoverished all rich men and
done paramount damage to commerce and industy.
Simulteneously he brought forward a proposal for
appointing a commission to enquire into allegations
regarding unpaid taxes and recovere them from
businessmen. When Liaqat Ali raised the matter in the
Cabinet, he openly said that his proposals were based on
the declarations of responsible Congress leaders. He did
not, however, give details so that on general grounds the
Congress agreed with him in principle. Having secured
assent in principle, he proceeded to frame specific
measures that were not only extreme but calculated to
harm the national economy.

367
Rajgopalachari and Sardar Patel felt that Liaqat Ali
was more concerned with harassing industrialists and
businessmen than in serving the interests of the county.
They thought that his main motive was to harm the
business community as the majority of them were
Hindus, Rajaji openly said in the Cabinet that he was
opposed to Liaqat Ali’s proposals and hinted that the
proposals were based on communal considerations.
(India Wins Freedom by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad pg 176-
190)
The League Members of the Interim Government
behaved and functioned as if Pakistan had already
become fait accompli. One of them declared that the
events in East Bengal were but a dress rehearsal for his
party’s countrywide struggle to force India’s division.
Liaqat Ali Khan, who led the League wing in the
Executive Council, announced that the Interim
Government consisted of Congress bloc and Muslim
League bloc each functioning under separate leadership.
(The Indian Triumvirate by V.B. Kulkarni pg 200)
Isphani, Jinnah’s ‘personal envoy’ in America said,
“The League’s participation only means that the struggle
for Pakistan will now be carried on within as well as
without the Government. From the start, the League
members acted as a parallel Government and ignored
Nehru’s status as Vice-President of the Council.” Jinnah
publicly said; “If he (Nehru) can only come down to earth
and think coolly and calmly, he must understand that he
is neither the Prime Minister, nor is it a Nehru
Government, he is only the member of the External
Affairs and Commonwealth Department.” The coalition
Government was a house at war.

368
(Rajaji story by Rajmohan Gandhi, pg 126-127)
Gandhi declared that the League’s entry into the
Interim Government had not been straight. He was forced
to wonder whether the League members had come into
the Government also to fight.
The League’s entry into Interim Government did
not bring about the expected lull in communal violence.
Even as the League joined the Government, there
occurred in the districts of Noakhali and Trippura in East
Bengal one of the worst communal riots ever seen in
India, all the more brutal, because, like the communal
killings in Bihar, and in the Punjab in March 1947, they
were organized. There was evidence of organization
behind all aspects of the troubles, which included
murder, rape, conversions and forced marriages. The
method of attacks was consistent. First, a Muslim group
approached a Hindu house and told the family that if
their wealth was given to this group, they would be
protected from other Muslims. Upon the departure of this
group, another Muslim group would arrive and tell the
Hindus that the only way to escape with their lives was to
accept conversion to Islam. Local Maulvis traveled with
the second group to perform the conversion. Hindus, who
resisted were murdered, as were those with influence in
the district. A third group would complete the looting and
set fire to the Hindu houses. The Hindus who had been
forcibly converted were given white caps with ‘Pakistan
Zindabad’ written on them so that they would be
protected from further attacks. Officials found local
Muslims sympathetic to the forced conversions, and
some were shown the caps which the converted Hindus
were made to wear after the conversion had taken place.

369
Hindu women were raped, their conchshells were broken
and their caste marks were erased from their forehead.
(The Origin of Partition of India by Anita Inder Singh, pg 195-
196)
Prime Minister Attlee extended personal invitation
to Nehru and Jinnah to come to London for a fresh round
of talks. So accompanied by the Viceroy, Nehru, Baldev
Singh, Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan arrived in London on
3rd December 1946.
Dr. B.N.Pande, in his introduction to “A Centenary
History of Indian National Congress” writes:
“Jinnah at this stage, was passing through a
mental metamorphosis. The Indian Civil war had taught
him the awesome lesson that, even if he got his Pakistan,
there would yet be millions of Muslims in Hindustan
whose existence might be perpetually threatened by
Hindu antagonism. The genie of communalism, which he
had himself released to do its worst would prove hard to
contain in the forceable future, or rather might continue
to grow after the birth of Pakistan. ‘The exchange of
population will have to be considered seriously as far as
possible, he had thought after the Bihar tragedy.’ But the
enormity of the population discouraged him from further
advocating that idea. In an overall perspective of the
entire situation, he was having second thoughts
concerning whether a return to the Cabinet Mission Plan
might not be of greater advantage to Muslim areas as well
as Muslim populations. It was at this time that he was
invited to London to meet Attlee.
“Throughout the brief duration of the London
Conference from 3rd to 6th December, Jinnah did not
manifest his real self but was in rather a subdued mood.

370
In contrast, Nehru was vigorous in charging the League
with seeking to obtain its ends by violence and playing a
negative role within the Interim Government. Wavell was
surprised to see Nehru’s frequent and sudden outbursts
during his discussions with the British leaders. He had a
long duel with Cripps, and at one time he threatened the
British saying that the Congress was a revolutionary
party. He complained that the approach of the Muslim
League to join the Interim Government had been made
over his head, and alarmed the Viceroy by saying that he
would put everything to vote in the Cabinet and make the
Viceroy’s position impossible.
The London Conference produced no result. It
reminded a disgusted Wavell of a poem of Browning
which began, “Let them fight it out, friends: things have
gone too far.” Nehru and Baldev Singh returned to India
in a hurry on 7th December since the Constituent
Assembly was to meet on 9th December, without the
League members of course. Purposefully enough, Jinnah
and Liaqat stayed on in England for further discussions
with their hosts. And, quite surprisingly, within a few
days, Jinnah was once again in his former form,
announcing with greater vigour and determination that
he would agree to nothing but a full-fledged Pakistan of
his original design.
The most surprised man in India at Jinnah’s
extraordinary revival was Sardar Patel. Closely
scrutinizing the former’s latest trends of thought before
the London negotiations, the Sardar had come to believe
that there was a possibility of the League accepting a
united India with autonomy for the proposed Pakistan
provinces. But Jinnah’s reversion to the theory of

371
Partition while still in London was most intriguing. Patel
suspected Stafford Cripps as being behind the game and
wrote to him agrily:
“You called the League delegation there to London
at a time when there was some relization violence is a
game at which both parties can play and the mild Hindu
also, when driven to desperation, can retaliate as bruttaly
as a fanatic Muslim. Just when the time for settlement
was reached Jinnah got the invitation, and he was able to
convince the Muslims once again that he has been able
to get more concessions by creating trouble and violence.
You must have seen what Jinnah has said in London
immediately after the debate. He swears by Pakistan and
everything conceded to him is to be used as a lever to
work to that end. You wish that we should agree in this
mad dream. All of us here feel that there has been a
betrayal.
“The real brain behind the scene, however, was
Winston Churchill, playing a greater part than Cripps or
anybody else. In this connection, the Quaid-e-Azam
Jinnah Papers reveal an interesting episode. When
Jinnah decided to discuss the matter with Churchill who
was the Leader of the Opposition, the latter thought it
judicious not to come out openly into the picture because
of his fear of the Congress reaction. Yet, he wanted to be
his invisible mentor at the most crucial point.
Unbelievable though it seems, Churchill named himself
Miss E.A.Gilliatt while in correspondence with Jinnah.
From 28 Hyde Park Gate in London, he wrote the
following top-secret letter to Quaid-e-Azam on 11th
December 1946: “My dear Mr. Jinnah, I should greatly
like to accept your kind invitation to luncheon on

372
December 12. I feel, however, that it would perhaps be
wiser for us not to be associated publicly at this juncture.
I greatly valued our talk the other day, and I now enclose
the address to which any telegrams you may wish to
send me can be sent without attracting attention in
India. I will always sign myself “Gilliatt.” Perhaps you will
let me know to what address I should telegraph to you
and how you will sign yourself. The address to which
Jinnah was advised to communicate was Miss
E.A.Gilliatt, 6 Westminster Gardens, London S.W.1
Brief though it is, the letter is clear evidence of the
Churchill-Jinnah deal in those final days of the Indian
tangle. As before, Churchill’s visible or invisible hand
operated in building up Jinnah and in laying the
foundation of Pakistan.
Jinnah returned to India in January 1947. On 20th
January 1947 the Constituent Assembly of India met to
proceed with its great work. At the end of the month, the
Working Committee of the Muslim League, meeting in
Karachi, raised the demand that the Constituent
Assembly be dissolved. Communal disturbances by then
were playing havoc in the country, having spread into the
Punjab. The Congress, in retaliation to League’s proposal
about the Constituent Assembly, demanded that the
Viceroy dismiss the League members from the Interim
Government. Wavell advised Nehru on 1st February not to
invite chaotic condition by forcing out the Muslim League
from the Central Government, which the Congress was in
a position to do. This crisis began to deepen as the
administration was more or less coming to a standstill.
By then, the Labour Government had only one
option left to them-to let the world know that the British

373
wanted to quit, leaving India to the Indian parties to
settle its fate. Thus there came the ultimate declaration
of Prime Minister Attlee on 20th February 1947
announcing the date before which the British-Indian
Empire would cease to exist.”
(A Centenary History of Indian Nationasl Congress: B.N.Pande,
pg 87-90)
Divide and Quit:
Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee presented
British Government’s White Paper on the constitutional
future of India in the House of Commons on 20 th
February 1947. After presenting the White Paper, Attlee
said that His Majesty has been pleased to approve, as
successor to Lord Wavell, the appointment of Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten, who will be entrusted with the
task of transferring to Indian hands responsibility of the
Government of British India in a manner that will best
ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India. The
change of office will take place during March. Attlee also
said that Britain would transfer power to responsible
Indian hands by a date not later than June, 1948.
Giving his first reaction to Attlee’s statement,
Gandhi wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on 24th February
1947: “Evidently, I had anticipated practically the whole
of it….My interpretation of the speech of Attlee is this:
1. Independence will be recognized of those
parts which desire it and will do without
British protection;
2. The British will remain where they are
wanted;
3. This may lead to Pakistan for those
provinces or portions which may want it.

374
No one will be forced one way or the
other. The Congress provinces, if they
are wise, will get what they want;
4. Much will depend upon what the
Constituent Assembly will do and what
you as the Interim Government are able
to do;
5. If the British Government are and able
to remain sincere, the declaration is
good. Otherwise, it is dangerous.
On the same day, Nehru wrote to Gandhi: You
must have seen my statement on the new declaration
made by the British Government. The statement was
considered carefully by all our collegues in the Interim
Government minus, of course, the Muslim League…Mr
Attlee’s statement contains much that is indefinite and
likely to give trouble. But I am convinced that it is, in the
final analysis, a brave and definite statement. It meets
our off-repeated demand for quitting India. …Matters will
move swiftly now or, at any rate after Mountbatten
comes…The Working Committee is meeting on the 5th
March. Your advice at this critical moment would help us
greatly. But you are too far away for consultation and
you refuse to move out of East Bengal. Still, if you could
convey to us your ideas on the subject, we would be very
grateful.”
In his next letter on 28th February 1947, Nehru
wrote: “The Working Committee is meeting here soon and
all of us were anxious to have you here on the occasion.
We considered the question of sending you a joint
telegram, appealing you to come. But we decided
ultimately not to send it. We felt sure that you would not

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come at this stage and our telegram would only be an
embarrassment.
“But though we are not sending the telegram, we
feel very strongly that your advice during the coming
critical weeks is most necessary. It is possible, of course,
for one or two of us to visit you, but that is not
satisfactory way of doing things. It is full discussion
among all of us that we would have liked to have. At
present, it is exceedingly difficult for any of us to leave
Delhi, even for two or three days. For several to go
together would upset work completely. There is the
budget in the Assembly, the negotiations with the
princes, the change in Viceroys and so many other things
that demand constant attention. So we cannot go away
and if you will not come, how are we to meet?”
Gandhi’s persistent refusal to come to Delhi, till
his mission in Noakhali had borne fruit, created a
dilemma for the Congress leaders. It was vividly
expressed in one of Nehru’s letters:
“I know that we must learn to rely upon ourselves
and not run to you for help on every occasion. But we
have got into this bad habit and we do often feel that if
you had been easier of access, our difficulties would have
been less.”
But Gandhi’s position remained unchanged:
“I know that if I were free, I could take my share
in trying to solve the various problems that arise in our
country. But I feel that I should be useless unless I could
do something here….We are all in the hands of the Power
which we call God.”
In the end, it was neither his nor Nehru’s will that
prevailed but, as he had put it to Nehru, “the power

376
which we call God.” He was decreed to be neither in
Noakhali nor in Delhi, but in Bihar.
(Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase-1, pp 565-68)
Mountbatten arrived in Delhi on 22nd March, 1947
with plenipotentiary powers from His Majesty’s
Government and was sworn in as Viceroy and Governor
General on 24th March. He broke tradition by making a
speech at the swearing in ceremony. He said that his was
not a normal Viceroyalty. His Majesty’s Government were
resolved to transfer power by June 1948, and since new
constitutional arrangements must be made and many
complicated questions of administration resolved, it
meant that a solution had to be reached within the next
few months. He believed that all the political leaders in
India felt, as he did, the urgency of the task before them.
He hoped soon to be in close consultation with them; he
would give them all the help he could. He appealed to
everyone to do his best to avoid any word or action,
which might lead to further communal bitterness or add
to the toll of innocent victims.” He concluded: “I am
under no illusion about the difficulty of my task. I shall
need the greatest goodwill of the greatest possible
number, and I am asking India today for that goodwill.”
(Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon, pg 408)
In the very first meeting with Mountbatten on 1st
April, Gandhi suggested that the Viceroy should dismiss
the Interim Government and submitted his following plan
for consideration:
1. Mr. Jinnah should be given option of forming
the Government.
2. The selection of the Cabinet should be left
entirely to Mr. Jinnah. The members may be all

377
Muslims or non-Muslims, or they may be
representatives of all classes and creeds of the
Indian people.
3. If Mr. Jinnah accepted this offer, the Congress
would guarantee to cooperate freely, and
sincerely, so long as all measures that Mr.
Jinnah’s Cabinet bring forward are in the
interests of the Indian people as a whole.
4. The sole refree of what is or is not in the
interest of India as a whole will be Lord
Mountbatten, in his personal capacity.
5. Mr. Jinnah must stipulate, on behalf of the
League or any other parties represented in the
Cabinet formed by him that so far as he or they
are concerned, they will do their utmost to
preserve peace through out India.
6. There shall be no national guards or any other
form of private army.
7. Within the frame work hereof, Mr. Jinnah will
be perfectly free to present for acceptance a
scheme of Pakistan even before the transfer of
power, provided, however, that he is successful
in his appeal to reason and not to the force of
arms, which he abjures for all time for his
purpose. Thus, there will be no compulsion in
this matter over a province or a part thereof.
8. In the Assembly, the Congress has a decisive
majority. But the Congress shall never use that
majority against the League policy simply
because its identification with the League, but
will give its hearty support to every measure
brought forward by the League Government,

378
provided that it is in the interest of the whole of
India. Whether it is in such interest or not shall
be decided by Lord Mountbatten as a man and
not in his representative capacity.
9. If Mr. Jinnah rejects this offer, the same offer
should be made Mutatis Mutandis to the
Congress.
(Mahatma Gandhi: Last Phase-II, p 79)
Gandhi in his prayer meeting on the same day said:
“….I was with Lord Mountbatten for more than two hours
yesterday and today I talked with the Viceroy for two
hours. He said he was eager to hand over this county
even to a single Parsi, if he came forward to take it, not to
mention a Hindu or a Muslim. Why should I not listen to
one who comes to me with such honest intentions? The
British have done us enough harm in the past. But Lord
Mountbatten has done no harm. He says that he would
like to be a servant right from today, if it were possible.
But it is not proper that he should run away while we are
fighting with each other. He after all, belongs to a brave
race. Why should he run away? He is thinking of the
manner in which he should leave the country. He is
making good efforts. He is proceeding honourably. If we,
too, proceed accordingly, what has never before
happened will happen now. If anyone wants to
accommodate a fellow who would not conduct himself
honourably but would act barbarously. Let him learn
from me how to do it. I am prisoner of the Viceroy till
Friday. Jawahar also wants to detain me here. After three
days, I shall tell you everything. I do not hide any
anyhing. But what can possibly happen? Whatever the

379
Congress decides will be done; nothing will be according
to what I say.”
Gandhi further said: “My writ runs no more. If it
did, the tragedies in the Punjab, Bihar and Noakhali
would not have happened. No one listens to me any
more. I am a small man. True, there was a time when
mine was a big voice. Then everyone obeyed what I said;
now neither the Congress nor the Hindus nor the
Muslims listen to me. Where is the Congress today? It is
disintegrating. I am crying in the wilderness. Today
everyone can forsake me, but God will not. He has his
devotee tested. An English poem written by Francis
Thompson describes God as the “Hound of Heaven.” He is
the retriever of Dharma, i.e. He seeks out Dharma. It
would be enough if He hears me.”
(The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol. LXXXVII, p186)
Gandhi strove with the Congress for the
acceptance of his plan. He was opposed to the whole logic
of partition. He said that the partition would solve none
of the problems. On the contrary, it would accentuate
those that were already there and create fresh ones. All
except, Azad told the Mahatma that the partition was
enescapable. His disciples were eager; their ages
discouraged waiting. He could not easily disown men
with whom he had shared hopes, sorrows and struggle
for thirty years and into whom he had built much. One
final revolutionary movement was within his sight, but it
needed a second front of leadership, which was not at
hand. A combination that could be an alternative to
Nehru, Patel, Rajaji and Prasad did not exist.
(Rajaji Story by Rajmohan Gandhi, pg 133)

380
Gandhi wrote a letter to Mountbatten on 12th April
1947 in which he said: “…I had several short talks with
Pandit Nehru and an hour’s talk with him alone; and
then several members of the Congress Working
Committee last night about the formula I had skecthed
before you and which I had filled in for them with all the
implications. I am sorry to say that I failed to carry any
of them with me except Badsha Khan.
“I do not know that having failed to carry both the
head and heart of Pandit Nehru with me, I would have
wanted to carry the matter further. But Panditji was so
good that he would not be satisfied until the whole plan
was discussed with the few members of the Congress
Working Committee who were present. I felt sorry that I
could not convince them for the correctness of my plan,
from every point of view. Nor could they dislodge me from
my position, although I had not closed my mind against
wevery argument. Thus, I have to ask you to omit me
from your consideration.
“Congressmen, who are in the Interim
Government are stalwarts, seasoned servants of the
nation, and therefore, so far as the Congress point of view
is concerned, they will be complete advisers.
“I would still love to take place that the late
C.F.Andrews took. He represented no one but himself.
And if you ever need my service on its merit, it will be
always at your disposal.
“In the circumstances above mentioned, subject to
your consent, I propose, if possible, to leave tomorrow for
Patna.”
(Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase-II, p 84)

381
Mountbatten called Jinnah for discussion on 8th
April 1947. After discussion the Viceroy noted:
“I invited Mr. Jinnah to put forward his argument
for partition. He recited the classic ones. I then pointed
out that his remarks applied also to the partition of the
Punjab and Bengal, and that by sheer logic if I accepted
his arguments in the case of India as a whole, I had also
to apply them in the case of these two provinces. Whilst
admitting my logic, he expressed himself most upset at
my trying to give him a ‘moth-eaten’ Pakistan. He said
that this demand for partitioning of the Punjab and
Bengal was a bluff on the part of Congress to try and
frighten him off Pakistan. He was not to be frightened off
so easily; and he would be sorry if I were taken in by the
Congress bluff.’ I replied, ‘I would not be taken in;
because if I agreed to such partition, it would be on your
able advocacy; but I could not of course allow your
theories to stop short at the provinces.’ He was most
distressed, and said that it would greatly weaken his
Pakistan, and appealed to me not to destroy the unity of
Bengal and the Punjab, which had national characteristic
in common: common history, common ways of life; and
where the Hindus have stronger feelings as Bengalis and
Punjabis than they have as members of the Congress.”
Next day a dejected Jinnah returned to tell the
Viceroy that nothing would bring peace to India except a
full Pakistan since anything less would produce further
strife and blood-shed. But the Viceroy expressed his
categorical opinion that it was impossible for him to agree
to the partition of India without also agreeing to the
partition of the provinces where the same majority-
minority problem remained. That afternoon Mountbatten

382
inflicted on the crestfallen Quaid-e-Azam a long lecture
on the need of keeping India united. He painted the
picture of the greatness that India could achieve-‘four
hundred million people of different races and creeds, all
bound together by a central Union Government, with all
the economic strength that would accrue to them from
increased industrialization, playing a great part in world
affairs as the most progressive single entity in the Far
East.’ Jinnah did not show any sign of being attracted
towards the prospects of a united independent India even
under his own Prime Ministership since, as he said, ‘the
behaviour of the Hindus had made it impossible for the
Muslims to share in this,’ but went back with the sad
thoughts of a reduced Pakistan which the Congress had
injected into the Viceroy’s mind.
The emerging concept of a moth-eaten Pakistan
was considered in Congress circles as a substantial
victory. ‘The object in view,’ observed the Manchester
Guardian, ‘clearly stated by many pro-Congress journals
is to reduce the Muslim majority provinces to such small
dimensions that the idea of Pakistan should no longer
appear a workable or attractive to the most ardent
Muslim.’ To Sardar Patel it seemed that the moment the
Viceroy announced the partition of Bengal, Muslims of
that province would desert the League in order to
preserve the unity of Bengal. He told Mountbatten that
the same thing might happen in the Punjab, and it would
not be unlikely that there would be revolt of the League
against Mr. Jinnah if he had nothing better than the
Sind, and possibly half of the Punjab to offer them for
Pakistan, if Congress still retained their hold on N.W.F.P.
Maulana Azad, still hopeful of a united India, came to feel

383
that a truncated Pakistan would bring disaster to the
Muslims. And that Jinnah would be committing suicide
by accepting it.”
(A Centenary History of Indian National Congress: B.N.Pande,
pg 93-95)
On overall discussions with the leaders, Lord
Mountbatten was convinced that there was no prospect
of an agreed solution on the basis of the Cabinet Mission
Plan and attempt to resurrect it was useless. So an
alternative plan for the transfer of power had to be found
and implemented without loss of time, in order to ease
the growing political tension. Accordingly, he drew up an
outline of an alternative plan, the broad basis of which
was the demission of authority to the provinces, or to
such confideration of provinces as might decide to group
themselves in the intervening period before the actual
transfer of power takes place. The plan provided that the
members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the
Punjab should meet separately in two parts, i.e.
representatives of the predominantly Muslim areas, and
representatives of the predominantly non-Muslim areas,
and if both sections of each of these Assemblies voted for
partition of Bengal, the predominantly Muslim district of
Sylhet in Assam would have option of joining the Muslim
province. The plan also envisaged the holding of an
election in the North-West Frontier Province to ascertain
the wishes of the people of the province.
Lord Mountbatten placed his plan before the
Governors at a conference held on 15th and 16th April.
Consultations with the Governors gave him a good deal of
idea of the colossal administrative difficulties involved in
the transfer of power based on partition. But the problem

384
that actually confronted Mountbatten was, if it became
inevitable to divide the country then how was this to be
brought about with the willing concurrence of the parties
concerned? The greater the insistence by Jinnah on his
province wise Pakistan, the stronger was the Congress
demand that he should not be allowed to carry unwilling
minorities with him. Nehru, in a public speech on 20th
April declared: “The Muslim League can have Pakistan, if
they wish to have it, but on the condition that they do
not take away the other parts of India, which do not wish
to join Pakistan.”
Dr. Rajendra Prasad, President of the Constituent
Assembly, on 28th April said: “While we have accepted the
Cabinet Mission’s Statement of May 16, which
contemplated a union of different provinces and states
within the country, it may be that the union may not
comprise all provinces. If that unfortunately comes to
pass, we shall have to be content with a constitution for a
part of it. In that case, we can and should insist that one
principle will apply to all parts of the country and no
constitution will be forced upon any unwilling part of it.
This may mean not only the division of India, but division
of some provinces. For this we must be prepared and the
Assembly may have to draw up a constitution based on
such a division.”
In Bengal, the demand for creation of a separate
province of Bengal was gaining momentum. It was
endorsed by the provincial Congress and the Hindu Maha
Sabha. At this stage the Premier of Bengal, Suhrawardy
came out with a proposal for a sovereign, independent
and undivided Bengal in divided India. Sarat Chandra
Bose, the left wing leader, supported the proposal, but it

385
received little support from either the Muslim League or
the Congress.
Jinnah issued a statement that the proposal for
the partition of Bengal and the Punjab was a sinister
move actuated by spite and bitterness. He said that the
principle underlying the Muslim demand for Pakistan
was that the Muslims should have a national home and a
national state in their home lands comprising six
provinces of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province,
Sind, Baluchistan, Bengal and Assam. If the Punjab and
Bengal partitioned, all the other provinces would have to
be cut up in a similar way. Such a process would strike
at the root of the administrative, economic and political
life of the provinces which for nearly a century had been
developed and built up on that basis and had grown and
were functioning as autonomous provinces. He suggested
that an exchange of population would sooner or later
have to take place and that this could be effectively
carried out by respective Governments in Pakistan and
Hindustan. He finally demanded the division of the
defence forces and stressed that the states of Pakistan
and Hindustan should be made absolutely free,
independent and sovereign.
Jinnah’s statement evoked strong reaction from
Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who said: “The demand for the
division of Bengal and the Punjab was in the terms of the
Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution of 1940 and that it
could not claim any areas which were not numerically in
a majority. He said that if there was to be a division of
India, then it should be as complete and thorough as
possible, including the division of the Punjab and Bengal,
so that there might not be any room for contention or

386
conflict. If it required the division of the defence forces,
that should also be brought about, and the sooner the
better.”
The communal tension in the country was
mounting. Serious communal outbreaks and incidents of
stabbing and arson were occurring in various districts of
the Punjab. In the North-West Frontier Province, the
Muslim League agitation against the Congress ministry
had taken a turn for the worse. Lord Mountbatten
convened a conference which was attended by Nehru,
Governor Sir Olaf Caroe and Dr. Khansaheb, and as a
result, the provincial Government decided to release all
political prisoners not charged with violence, who had
been arrested in connection with the Muslim League
agitation and to withdraw the ban on public meetings.
But backed by Jinnah, the League leaders in detention
refused to get released, or to suspend agitation, unless
the Congress ministry resigned or general elections were
ordered.
In the face of the progressively deteriorating
situation in the country, Mountbatten felt that if the
procedure for the transfer of power was not finalized
quickly, there was a possibility that at least in some parts
of the country, there would be no authority to whom
power could be transferred. He revised his tentative plan
in the light of his discussions with the Governors and
party leaders and sent this revised plan to London with
Lord Ismay and George Allen Campbell on 2nd May.
Mountbatten urged that His Majesty’s Government
approval should be communicated to him by 10th May.
His purpose was to call a meeting of the party leaders on
17th May to ascertain their reactions. In the afternoon of

387
the same day, he would also see the members of the
State Negotiating Committee and apprise them of the
plan. If the party leaders did not accept the plan and
were themselves unable to produce an agreed alternative
solution, His Majesty’s Government would demit power in
accordance with its own plan.
Lord Mountbatten received back his plan from
London on 8th May finalized and approved by the British
Cabinet. A press communiqué was issued to the effect
that the Viceroy had invited Nehru, Jinnah, Patel, Liqat
Ali Khan, Baldev Singh to meet him in Delhi on the
morning of 17th May, when he would present to them the
plan which His Majesty’s Government had approved for
the transfer of power to Indian hands. He also invited the
members of the States Negotiating Committee to meet
him on the same afternoon.
On the night of 10th May, Lord Mountbatten
showed Nehru the Plan as he had received it from
London. Nehru turned it down most vehemently and
made it clear that the Congress would in no
circumstances accept it.
Nehru sent a note to the Viceroy, embodying his
reactions to the plan. He said that the picture presented
by the proposals was an ominious one. Not only do they
menace India but also they endanger the future relations
between the Britain and India. Instead of producing any
sense of certainty, security and stability, they would
encourage disruptive tendencies everywhere and chaos
and weakness. They would particularly endanger
important strategic areas.
In these proposals the whole approach had been
changed completely. Starting witht the rejection of an

388
Indian Union as the successor to power, they invited the
claims of large numbers of successor States who would
be permitted to unite if they so wished into two or more
States. Nehru had no doubt that a pronouncement by His
Majesty’s Government on the lines proposed would
provoke wide and deep resentment all over India and that
no responsible leader, out side the Muslim League, would
be able to persuade the country either to accept or to
acquiesce the proposals.
Nehru further held that the present proposals
involved a complete retraction by His Majesty’s
Government of its previous decisions and pledges, the
virtual scraping of the Constituent Assembly and casting
overboard the Cabinet Mission Plan. The inevitable
consequences of the proposals would be to invite the
Balkanization of India; to provoke certain civil conflict
and add to violence and disorder; to cause a further
breakdown of the central authority, which alone could
present the growing chaos and demoralize the army, the
police and the central services. The proposal that each of
the successor States should conclude independent
treaties, presumably also with His Majesty’s Government
was likely to create many ‘Ulsters’ in India which would
be looked upon as so many bases on Indian soil and
would create almost unbridgeable gulf between national
India and the British people.
Nehru emphasized that acquiescence on the part
of the Congress in the splitting of those areas which were
predominantly League in their loyalty was in no way wise
and acquiescence in throwing overboard the All-India
basis of future settlement. It was only a stretching of the
Cabinet Mission plan to make opting out operable in

389
keeping with its oft-repeated policy of non-coercion. The
partition of provinces to which the Congress had agreed
was not at all inconsistent with an All-India Union of
both separated with the retention of separate identities.
Nehru described the so-called self-
dertermination in the case of Baluchistan as
‘preposterous.’ It left the future of that province to a
single individual who would be chosen by a group of
sardars and nominated persons who obviously
represented a vested semi-feudal element. Baluchistan
had an importance as a strategic frontier of India and its
future could not be dealt with in so partial and casual
manner. There could be no objection for the surrender of
a part of Assam to East Bengal, if the people concerned
so wished, but some such procedure should be equally
applicable to parts of Sind.
Nehru further said: “If it was indeed His Majesty’s
Government’s sole purpose to ascertain the wishes of the
people of India and to tranfer power with the least
possible dislocation, the purpose would not be advanced
or achieved by these proposals. Before the people chose,
they should have a proper picture of what they were
choosing. Two or three vague proposals with no clear
background would produce nothing but confusion, and
the transfer of power, instead of being made without
dislocation, would be obstructed by violence, by a mass
of complications and by weakness of the Cabinet
Government and its organs.”
Nehru went on: “If there was to be any genuine
assessment of opinion, the only practical way was for two
constitutions, two appeals and two prospects to be placed
before the people. This meant that the Constitution-

390
making on the basis of an All-India Union with full
freedom for provinces and effective guarantees for all. In
the same way, the League could prepare its own schemes
and present its own proposals on an equal level, and the
two constitutions could be presented to all the provinces
of India on a plebiscite basis on such terms as might be
agreed upon.” Nehru concluded: “Until these decisions
are made, the Government of India must remain as one,
In view of the impending British withdrawl, the coalition
forming the Central Government must be a Cabinet with
joint responsibility based upon full dominion autonomy.
It may be made clear that the Central Government will
not take any step to prejudice self determnation or
subsequent partition and as such other guarantees as
are necessary may also be given so as to assure the
League in regard to certain agreed matters.”
Lord Mountbatten held a meeting with Nehru. He
explained to Nehru as to how the new plan would meet
his objections. At the end of the meeting Mountbatten
asked him whether the Congress would accept a plan
based on their discussion. Nehru replied that he would
have to see the draft before he could commit himself.
In view of this new development, it was decided
that the conference of party leaders which had been
summoned to meet on 17th May, at Simla, should be
postponed to 2nd June and a communiqué was issued to
that effect.
Lord Mountbatten returned to Delhi from Simla on
th
14 May. He had already apprised the Secretary of State
of the development in Simla and communicated to him
an outline of the alternatives plan. Immediately on his

391
arrival in Delhi, he received an invitation from the Prime
Minister Attlee to go to London.
The Viceroy felt that he should get the consent of
the leaders of the three parties to the alternative plan
before leaving for London. He asked V.P. Menon to
prepare a draft, “Heads of Agreement,” to be shown to
the leaders for their acceptance.

Heads of Agreement-V.P.Menon Plan:


On 16th May, Menon drew up a draft, “Heads of
Agreement,” the features of which were as follows:
a) That the leaders agree to the procedure laid
down for ascertaining the wishes of the people whether
there should be a division of India or not;
b) That in the event of the decision being taken
that there should be one central authority in India, the
powers should be transferred to the existing Constituent
Assembly on a Dominion Status basis;
c) That in the event of a decision that there
should be two Sovereign States in India, the Central
Government of each State should take over power and
responsibility to their respective Constituent Assemblies,
again on the Dominion Status basis.
d) That the transfer of power in either case should
be on the basis of the Government of India Act 1935,
modified to conform to the Dominion Status position.
e) That the Governor-General should be common
to both the Dominions and that the present Governor
General should be reappointed.
f) That a Commission should be appointed for
the demarcation of boundries in the event of a decision in
favour of partition;

392
g) That the Governors of the provinces should
be appointed on the recommendation of the respective
Central Governments;
h) In the event of two Dominions coming into
being the Armed Forces in India should be divided
between them. The units sould be allocated according to
the territorial basis of recruitment and would be under
the control of the respective Governments. In the case of
mixed units, the seperation and redistribution should be
entrusted to a Committee consisting of Field Marshal Sir
Claude Auchinleck and the Chiefs of the General Staff of
the two Dominions, under the supervision of the Council
consisting of the Governor General and the two Defence
Ministers. This Council would automatically cease to
exist as soon as the process of division was completed.
(Transfer of power in India by V.P. Menon, pg 426-427)
After the Viceroy had approved the draft, “Heads of
Agreement,” Menon took it to Nehru, Patel and Baldev
Singh and had discussions with them; Sir Eric Mieville
did like wise with Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan. Thereafter
the Viceroy consulted Nehru, Patel on behalf of the
Congress; Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan on behalf of the
League; and Baldev Singh on behalf of the Sikhs. In the
light of their discussions the new plan was finalized. The
Viceroy was anxious to obtain the acceptance of it by the
leaders in writing if possible. Nehru readily complied on
behalf of the Congress. In his letter, Nehru stated that
the Congress accepted the plan generally, but that its
acceptance was strictly subject to other parties agreeing
to it as a final settlement and to no further claims being
put forward.

393
Jinnah and Liaqat Ali seemed willing to accept the
general principles of the plan, but refused to state their
acceptance in writing.
On 18th May, Lord Mountbatten left for London
with Menon. The Cabinet approved the new plan and
finalized the statement of His Majest’s Government. It
was decided that Mountbatten should present this plan
to the Indian leaders on 2nd June. Mountbatten returned
to India on 31st May 1947.
During the absence of Mountbatten from India,
Jinnah made a fantastic demand of a 800 mile corridor to
link West and East Pakistan. His demand was carefully
timed and was well advertised in the press of the West
and was intended to exert maximum pressure on London
to exact favourable terms for Pakistan in the belief that
the British people would go to any length to give him a
mighty Pakistan. The DAWN, the mouth piece of the
Muslim League wrote: “If Pakistan is to be real and
strong, the creation of a corridor linking up to Eastern
and Western areas is an indispensable adjunct. Be that
as it may, we have no doubt, however, that if Muslims
can win Pakistan-as indeed they have already won it-they
can just as well build a corridor somewhere for the
linking of the two segments of Pakistan.”
This demand had an effect in England opposite to
what Jinnah intended. Mountbatten became careful and
armed himself with a letter from Churchill to Jinnah
intimating to the latter that such a fantastic demand
would, on the other hand, prevent the creation of
Pakistan. Thereafter, nothing more was heard about it.
(Jinnah & Gandhi by S.K.Majumdar, pg 259)
2nd June Conference:

394
The historic conference was held on 2nd June 1947
at the Viceroy’s house. It was attended by seven leaders-
Nehru, Patel and Kripalani on behalf of the Congress;
and Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan and Abdul Rab Nashtar on
behalf of the League, and Baldev Singh representing the
Sikhs.
Mountbatten handed over the copies of the
statement of His Majesty’s Government to the leaders and
asked them to place the same before their respective
Working Committees and let him know their reaction by
midnight.
On the same day, Sir B.N.Rau, Gopalaswamy
Aiyangar, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and K.M.Munshi
were called in by the Congress High Command to help it
in considering the constitutional implications of the
Indian Independence Bill.
They joined Gandhiji, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar
Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Kripalani and probably Maulana
in the Cabinet room of the Government House. Jinnah
and his advisers were in the next room, similarly invited.
At short intervals, Mountbatten used to hop from
one conference room to the other, helping in the
solutions of doubts and removing difficulties raised by
one group or the other.
When they read the Independence Bill, they were
shocked to find that Paramountcy was to lapse on the
Bill being enacted by the British Parliament. The country
would then have two Dominions and five hundred odd
States, large and small, floating rudderless in the
vacuum of power created by the British. The Congress
leaders were equally unhappy about it. When Mountbtten
came into the room, there was some talk of amending

395
this clause. However, he showed his helplessness; no
change was possible in this matter. His majesty’s
Government had to keep its word pledeged to the Indian
Rulers-broken time and again in the past when British
interests were at stake.
Another point that they raised was that the
Constituent Assembly should be invested with
constituent power, so that it would amend the
Constitution itself without recourse to the British
Parliament. This had been done in the case of the South
African Constitution in 1909.
Mountbatten appreciated the point and said he
would take instructions from Whitehall. As he had kept
the telephone to London open, he secured the consent of
the British Government to incorporate the provision
vesting full constituent powers in the Constituent
Assembly, as suggested. This would complete the transfer
of power from the British Parliament to the Constituent
Assembly.
Munshi later said: “Had the two groups not been
thus brought together, conferring with each other
through the intermediation of Mountbatten, the
Independence Act would have never been agreed to by
the two parties so easily and in such a short time.
Mountbatten’s speed and adroitness saved the country
from a catastrohe.”
Munshi further said: “If I remember aright, on the
evening of the same day, thorough-going Lord Ismay, who
was a marvel of efficiency, forwarded to both sides a
scheme of partition, including the division of assets.
Nobody had any time to give any second thought to the

396
assurances which had already been given to
Mountbatten.”
(Pilgrimage to Freedom: K.M.Munshi, pg 128-29)
On 3rd June, Mountbatten’s conference with
leaders was resumed. He told them that he has received
written assurance from the Congress and the Sikhs and a
verbal assurance from the Muslim League. The Viceroy
turned to Jinnah, who nodded his head. The Viceroy said
that the plan represented as complete an agreement as it
was possible to get and that, in his judgment, what was
being done was in the best interests of the people of
India.
The Viceroy communicated to the Secretary of
State for India the assurances given to him by Nehru,
Jinnah and Baldev Singh about the acceptance of the
plan. Attlee announced the plan in the House of
Commons on 3rd June. Hence it came to be known 3rd
June Plan.
Prime Minister Attlee, in his broadcast made that
night said: “As the Indian leaders have finally failed to
agree on the Cabinet Mission Plan for a united India,
partition becomes the inevitable alternative.” He
explained that the two-fold purpose of the plan was 1. To
make possible the maximum degree of cooperation and
harmony between the political parties in order that the
partition, if decided upon, might involve as little loss and
suffering as possible; 2. To enable the British
Government to handover their responsibilities in an
orderly and constitutional manner at the earliest
opportunity. The plan, he added, provided for the
handing over of power that year to one or two
Governments, each having Dominion Status.

397
On the evening of 3rd June, the Viceroy Lord
Mountbatten broadcast over All India Radio. He said:
“Nothing I have seen or heard in the past few
weeks has shaken my firm opinion that with a reasonable
measure of goodwill between the communities a unified
India would be by far the best solution of the problem.
“ For more than a hundred years 400 millions of
you have lived together and this country has been
administered as a single entity. This has resulted in
ubnified communications, defence, postal services and
currency; an absence of tariffs and customs barriers; and
the basis for an integrated political economy. My great
hope was that communal differences would not destroy
all this.
“My first course, in all my discussions, was
therefore to urge the political leaders to accept
unreservedly the Cabinet Mission Plan of 16 May 1946.
In my opinion, that plan provides the best arrangement
that can be devised to meet the interests of all
communities of India. To my great regret it has been
impossible to obtain agreement either on the Cabinet
Mission Plan, or on any other plan that would preserve
the unity of India. But there can be no question of
coercing any large areas, in which one community has a
majority, to live against their will under a Government in
which another community has a majority. And the only
alternative to coercion is partition.
“But when the Muslim League demanded the
pasrtition of India, the Congress used the same
arguments for demanding in the events of the partition of
certain provinces. To my mind this argument is
unassailable. In fact neither side proved willing to leave a

398
substantial area in which their community have a
majority under the Government of the other. I am, of
course, just as much opposed to the partition of
provinces as I am to partition of India herself and for the
same basic reasons.
“For just as I feel there is an Indian consciousness
which should transcend communal differences so I feel
there is a Punjabi and Bengali consciousness which
evoked a loyalty to their province.
“And so I felt it was essential that the people of
India themselves should decide this question of partition.
“The procedure for enabling them to decide for
themselves whether they want the British to hand over
power to one or two Governments is set out in the
statement which will be read to you. But there are one or
two points on which I should like to add a note of
explanation.
“It was necessary in order to ascertain the will of
the people of the Punjab, Bengal and part of Assam to
play down boundaries between the Muslim majority areas
and the remaining areas, but I want to make it clear that
the ultimate boundaries will be settled by the Boundary
Commission and will almost certainly not be identical
with those which have been provisionally adopted.
“We have given careful consideration to the
position of the Sikhs. This valiant community forms
about an eighth of the population of the Punjab, but they
are so distributed that any partition of this province will
inevitably divide them. All of us who have good of the
Sikh community at heart are very sorry to think that the
partition of the Punjab, which they themselves desire,
cannot avoid splitting them to a greater or lesser extent.

399
The exact degree of the split will be left to the Boundary
Commission on which they will of course be represented.
“The whole plan may not be perfect; but like all
plans, its success will depend on the spirit of goodwill
with which it is carried out. I have always felt that once it
was decided in what way to transfer power the transfer
should take place at the earliest possible moment, but
the dilemma was that if we waited until a constitutional
set-up for all India was agreed, we should have to wait a
long time, particularly if partition was decided on.
Whereas if we handed over power before the Constituent
Assemblies had finished their work we should leave the
country without a constitution. The solution to this
dilemma, which I put forward, is that His Majesty’s
Government should transfer power now to one or two
Governments of British India each having Dominion
Status as soon as the necessary arrangements can be
made. This I hope will be within the next few months. I
am glad to announce that His Majesty’s Government have
accepted this proposal and are already having legislation
prepared for introduction in Parliament this session. As a
result of these decisions the special function of the India
Office will no longer have to be carried out, and some
other machinery will be set up to conduct future relations
between His Majesty’s Government and India.
“I wish to emphasise that this legislation will not
impose any restriction on the power of India as a whole,
or of the two States if there is partition, to decide in the
future their relationship to each other and to other
member States of the British Commonwealth.
“Thus the way is now open to an arrangement by
which power can be transferred many months earlier

400
than the most optimistic of us thought possible, and at
the same time leave it to the people of British India to
decide for themselves on their future, which is the
declared policy of His majesty’s Government.
“If the transfer of power is to be effected in a
peaceful and orderly manner, every single one of us must
bend all his efforts to the task. This is no time for
bickering, much less for the continuation in any shape or
form of the disorders and lawlessness of the past few
months. Do not forget what a narrow margin of food we
are all working on. We cannot afford any toleration of
violence. All of us are agreed upon.”
The Viceroy concluded: “I have faith in the future
of India and I am proud to be with you all at this
momentous time. May your decisions be wisely guided
and may they be carried out in the peaceful and friendly
spirit of Gandhi-Jinnah appeal.”
Immediately thereafter, His Majesty’s
Government’s Statement was also broadcast and released
to the press. Then followed broadcast by Nehru, Jinnah
and Baldev Singh.
Nehru in his broadcast said: “….It is with no joy in
my heart that I commend these proposals to you though I
have no doubt in my mind that this is the right course.
For generations we have dreamt and struggled for a free
and independent united India. The proposal to allow
certain parts to secede if they so will is painful for any of
us to contemplate. Nevertheless I am convinced that our
present decision is the right one from the larger
viewpoint. The united India that we have laboured for
was not one of compulsion and coercion but a free and
willing association of a free people. It may be that in this

401
way we shall reach that united India sooner than
otherwise and that she will have a stronger and more
secure foundation.
“On this historic occasion each one of us must
pray that he might be guided aright in the service of the
motherland and of humanity at large. We stand on a
watershed dividing the past from the future. Let us bury
that past in so far as it is bad and forget all bitterness
and recrimination. Let there be moderation in speech and
writing. Let there be strength and perseverance in
adhering to the cause and the ideals we have at heart.
Let us face the future not with easy optimism or with any
complacency or weakness but with conficdence and a
firm faith in India.
“On this the eve of great changes in India we have
to make a fresh start with clear vision and firm mind,
with steadfastness and tolerance and a stout heart. We
should not wish ill to anyone but think always of every
Indian as our brother and comrade. The good of the four
hundred millions of India must be our supreme
objective.”
Paying homage to Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru said:
“Inevitably on every occasion of crisis and difficulty we
think of our great leader, Mahatma Gandhi, who has led
us unfalteringly for over a generation through darkness
and sorrow to the threshold of our freedom. To him we
once again pay our homage. His blessings and wise
counsel will happily be with us in the momentous years
to come, as always.”
Jinnah in his broadcastg said: “…We must
examine the plan, its letter and spirit and come to our
conclusions and take our decisions.”

402
“It is clear that the plan does not meet in some
important respects our point of view; and we cannot say
or feel that we are satisfied or that we agree with some of
the matters dealt with by the plan. It is for us now to
consider whther the plan as presented to us by His
Majesty’s Government should be accepted by us as a
compromise or settlement. On this point I do not wish to
prejudge the decision of the Council according to our
constitution, precedence and practice. But so far as I
have been able to gather on the whole the reaction in the
Muslim League circles in Delhi has been hopeful. Of
course the plan has to be very carefully examined in its
pros and cons before the final decision can be taken.
“Now the plan that has been broadcast already
makes it clear in paragraph 11 that a referendum will be
made to the electorates of the present Legislative
Assembly in the North-West Frontier Province who will
choose which of the two alternatives in paragraph 4 they
wish to accept; and the referendum will be held under
the agies of the Governor-General in consultation with
the Provincial Government. Hence it is clear that the
verdict and the mandate of the people of the Frontier
Province will be obtained as to whether they want to join
the Pakistan Constituent Assemmbly or the Hindustan
Constituent Assembly. In these circumstances, I request
the Provincial Muslim League of the Frontier Province to
withdraw the movement of peaceful civil disobedience
which they had perforce to resort to; and I call upon all
the leaders of the Muslim League and Musalmans
generally to organize our people to face this referendum
with hope and courage and I feel confident that the

403
people of the Frontier will give their verdict by a solid vote
to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.”
Sardar Patel wrote a letter to Lord Mountbetten on
the same day i.e. 3rd June 1947 in which he said: “I am
deeply distressed at the abuse by Mr. Jinnah of the
hospitality extended to him by All India Radio and his
breach of the rules of broadcast which, as you are aware,
are almost as inviolable as the laws of nature. I had not
seen the script before the broadcast but I noticed later
that not only did he depart from the script but he has
also committed a sacrilege by making a political, partisan
and propagandist broadcast. Had I known it in time I
would have certainly prevented him from turning All
India Radio into a Muslim League platform by not only
justifying a movement which has resulted in so much
bloodshed and destruction of property but also by
appealing to Frontier voters to vote according to League
persuation.”
Sardar further said: “I fully realize that you
yourself did not expect, or had not sufficient notice to
prevent it but I am really disappointed that he should
have taken undue advantage of the courtesy and
consideration extended to him by you, particularly on a
solemn occasion when India and the whole world were
watching us. I only hope that its consequences will not be
equally mischievous and that he stood before the
listeners self-condemned.”
(Sardar Patel’s Correspondence: Durga Das, Vol. 4, pg 125)
Lord Mountbatten addressed the Press Confernece
on 4th June presided over by Sardar Patel. He declared:
The date of the transfer of power is going to be much
earlier, this year, somewhere round about by August. I

404
think the transfer could be about the 15th August. He
appealed to the press to aim at one thing when putting
out their news and their leading articles-peaceful, quick
and speedy settlement, which all of them so sincerely
desired.
The Council of the All India Muslim League passed
the following resolution at its meeting held on 9th June
1947 at Delhi:
“The Council of the All India Muslim League after
full deliberation and consideration of the statement of His
Majesty’s Government dated 3rd June 1947 laying down
the plan of transfer of power to the peoples of India, notes
with satisfaction that the Cabinet Mission’s Plan of 16
May 1946 will not be proceeded with and has been
abandoned. The only course open is the partition of India
as now proposed in HMG’s statement of 3rd June.
“The Council of the All India Muslim League is of
the opinion that the only solution of India’s problem is to
divide India into two-Pakistan and Hindustan. On that
basis, the Council has given its most earnest attention
and consideration to HMG’s statement. The Council is of
the opinion that although it cannot agree to the partition
of Bengal and the Punjab or give its consent to such
partition, it has to consider HMG’s Plan for the transfer of
power as a whole.
The Council, therefore, hereby resolves to give full
authority to the President of the All India Muslim League,
Quaid-e-Azam M.A.Jinnah, to accept the fundamental
principles of the Plan as a compromise and to leave it to
him with full authority to work out all the details of the
Plan in an equitable and just manner with regard to
carrying out the complete division of India on the basis

405
and fundamental principles embodied in HMG’s Plan,
including Defence, Finance, Communications.
“The Council further empowers the President,
Quaid-e-Azam M.A. Jinnah, to take all steps and
decisions which may be necessary in connection with and
relating to the Plan.”
Sardar Patel wrote a letter to Mountbatten on 10th
June 1947 in which he said:
“You will notice that the resolution passed by the
All India Muslim League Council is contradictory and
there is studiedevasion of straightforward acceptance. At
one place, it says it cannot agree to the partition og
Bengal and the Punjab or give its consent to such
partition. At the another place, it says it accepts the
fundamental principles of the Plan of 3rd June as a
compromise. You have to judge the resolution in the light
of the speeches at he Council meeting. I have been able
to obtain a copy of the proceedings through a source of
the Intelligence Bureau. From these proceedings it is
quite clear that the Pakistan of the statement of 3 rd June
would merely be a springboard for action against
Hindustan, and that there is no possibility of a
settlement on this basis. The position is such as is bound
to fill us with grave apprehension.
“In these circumstances, unless Mr. Jinnah issues
a clear statement accepting the Plan, there are bound to
be difficulties at the AICC meeting.”
(Sardar Patel’s Correspondencr, Vol. 4, pg 147-48)
The All-India Congress Committee met on 14th
June 1947 and passed a resolution accepting the 3rd
June plan. While moving the resolution Govind Ballabh
Pant said: “Acceptance of the 3rd June plan was the only

406
way to achieve freedom and liberty for the country… The
choice today was between accepting the 3rd June plan or
committing suicide.”
In seconding the resolution, Azad disagreed with
Pant that 3rd June plan was better than the Cabinet
Mission Plan. He had all along held the view that the
Statement of 16th May was the best solution of the
problem. He added: “I told Jawaharlal that I could not
possibly accept his views. I saw quite clearly that we were
taking one wrong decision after another. Instead of
retracting our steps, we are now going deeper in the
morass. The Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet
Mission Plan and a satisfactory solution of the Indian
problem seemed in sight. Unfortunately, the position
changed and Mr. Jinnah got a chance of withdrawing
from the League’s earlier acceptance of the Plan. I warned
Jawaharlal that history would never forgive us if we
agreed to partition. The verdict would then be that India
was divided as much by the Muslim League as by the
Congress.”
Azad further said: “It was impossible for me to
tolerate this abject surrender on the part of the Congress.
In my speech I said clearly that the decision, which the
Congress Working Committee had reached was the result
of a most unfortunate development. Partition was a
tragedy for India….”
(Partition of India-Legend & Reality: H.M.Seervai, pg 125-126)
In an impassioned speech, Purushottamdas
Tandon said: “The decision of the Working Committee
was an admission of weakness and that it arose out of a
sense of dispair. Accepting the 3rd June Plan would
benefit neither the Hindus nor the Muslims. The Hindus

407
in Pakistan would live in fear and the Muslims in India
would do the same way.”
Intervening the debate, Nehru said: “It was wrong
to suggest that the Congress Working Committee had
taken fright and therefore surrendered, though it was
correct to say that they were very much disturbed at the
prevailing madness.”
Sardar Patel said: “Looking at the Cabinet
Mission’s proposals in the light of his experience in the
Interim Government during the past nine months, he was
not at all sorry that the Statement of 16th May had gone.
Had they accepted it, the whole of India would have gone
the Pakistan way. Today, they have 70 to 80% of India,
which they could develop and make strong according to
their genius.”
Acharya Kriplani, the Congress president answred
the charge that the Working Committee had taken the
decision out of fear. He said: “I must admit the truth of
this charge, but not in the sense in which it is made. The
fear is not for the lives lost, or of the widows’ wail, or the
orphans’ cry, or of the many houses burnt. The fear is
that if we go on like this, retaliating and heaping
indignities on each other, we shall progressively reduce
ourselves to a stage of cannibalism and worse. In every
fresh communal fight, the most brutal and degraded acts
of the previous fight became the norm.”
Addressing the meeting Gandhi said:
“I wish I had made some preparations for this
meeting. Unfortunately, I could not. You will no doubt
agree that no one could be as much hurt by the division
of the country as I am. And I do not think that anyone
can be as unhappy today as I am. But what has

408
happened has happened. You know my efforts in the
building up of the Congress. Why was the Congress
Working Committee was formed? When a Government
has to be run, even if it is a Government of the people, a
Cabinet of Munisters has to be appointed. Our Working
Committee performs a similar function. It acts in your
name. You have the power to keep it going or to dismiss
it. The Working Committee has, on your behalf, accepted
partition. Now we have to consider what our duty is. If
you want to throw out the Resolution, you can do so. But
you cannot make any changes in it. If the Congress
Working Committwee has done this, it has done so
deliberately and for certain weighty reasons. And this
decision has been taken jointly by the Congress, the
Muslim League and the British Government. The Working
Committee does not approve of the scheme in its entirety.
But even so, it has accepted it. The Cabinet Mission Plan
had been devised by the British Government, but not this
new plan. Both the Congress and the League have a
share in its formulation. If you reject it, the world will call
you irresponsible. You must, therefore, go along with
those who have acted on your behalf. If you want to reject
it, you must remember that what the country needs most
today is peace. If you are sure that your rejection of the
scheme will not lead to further breach of the peace and
further disorders, you can do so. Whatever you decide to
do, you must do after a great deal of deliberation.
Gandhi further said:
“So many things are happening today which bring
to mind the English saying about swallowing a camel and
straining at gnat. The decision that has been arrived at
has been reached with your complicity, and yet you

409
complain of the Working Committee-the Working
Committee, which has men of such great caliber on it.
Those people had always said that the Congress would
not accept Pakistan, and I was opposed to Pakistan even
more. However, we may leave aside my position. The
decision has not been mine to take, and the Working
Committee has accepted it because there was no other
way. They now see it clearly that the country is already
divided into two camps.
“But our constitution permits it, and your duty
demands it, that if you feel that the Working committee is
in the wrong, you should remove it, you should revolt
and assume all power. You have a perfect right to do so,
if you feel that you have the strength. But I do not find
that strength in us today. If you had it, I would also be
with you; and if I felt strong enough myself, I would alone
take up the flag of revolt. But today I do not see the
conditions for doing so.”
Gandhi continued:
“We have great problems to tackle and mere
criticism cannot help in the solution of great problems. It
is easy to criticize, but doing some work is not so easy.
The Congress has to its credit some important
achievements, but the Congress so far has not borne the
responsibility of government. It has not even had a look
at it. It was kept busy by work, which was even more
important. Everything cannot be done at the same time.
When now the responsibility of Government has devolved
on us, we have gladly accepted it and we have detailed
some of our best workers for the job. There, they have to
grapple with some very intricate problems. They have to
attend to the affairs of the millions of our countrymen.

410
“I criticize them, of course, but afterwards what?
Shall I assume the burdens that they are carrying? Shall
I become a Nehru or a Sardar or a Rajendra Prasad?
Even if you should put me in their place, I do not know
what I should be able to do. But I have not come here to
plead for them. Who will listen to my pleading? But the
President said that I should at least show my face here.
Hence, I have come to show my face and to speak a few
words.”
Concluding his address Gandhi said:
“It is most important that you should understand
the times. The demand of the times is that we should
bridle our tongues and do only what will be for India’s
good. You will have seen from the newspapers what I
have been doing these days. But you may also hear it
from me. If through me something has been spoiled, then
it is my duty to use all my power for putting it right. It is
open to me whether to spoil it further or to mend it. I
shall cite here the example of Rama. His father went mad
and his mother became foolish, and Rama was exiled.
The people of Ayodhya were grieved, but it all led to
something glorious coming out at the end. I do not
consider the Ramayana as history, but the lesson that is
to be drawn from it is of daily use. It would be wrong to
believe that Ravana had ten heads. But there was a
Ravana that was adharma. It was this Ravana that
Rama killed during his exile and saved dharma.
“This is what we have to do today. We have to
draw something good out of this bad thing. I am not the
one to be upset by defeat. From my childhood up, I have
spent my life fighting and my struggle has been to extract
good from evil. If there is gold in mud, even if there is a

411
lot of the mud and very little gold, it should not be
thrown away. We should draw out gold and diamonds
even from mud.”
(The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi: Vol. LXXXVIII, pg.
153)
The resolution was carried by 157 votes to 29
votes, 32 members remaining neutral. Thus the 3rd June
Plan was accepted and India was partitioned to the
triumph of Jinnah and to the satisfaction of Jawaharlal
Nehru, who was impatient to wear the crown and for
which he even agreed for transfer of power on 15th
August, which was according to the noted astrologers,
including Swami Madamanand of Calcutta most
inauspicious. Further in his impatience, Nehru handed
over an envelop to Mountbatten said to be the names of
persons to be sworn in as Ministers. When Mountbatten
opened the envelop, to his surprise, he found that the
envelop was empty. When Mountbatten brought it to the
notice of Nehru the latter said: “You and I have been
through this so often, it does not matter. You and I have
agreed who is going to be.”
(Mounbatten and the Partition of India: Larry Collins &
Dominique Lapierre, pg 110)
Although Jawaharlal Nehru did not believe in
religious rituals, he sat at the Yajna on 15th August 1947,
performed by the Brahmins of Benaras to celebrate the
event of a Brahmnin becoming the first Prime Minister of
free and independent India and wore the Raja Danda
given to him by these Brahmins and drank the water of
the Ganges brought by them.
(Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar’s Writings & Speeches, Vol. 1, p,
149)

412
*******

413
JINNAH -THE REPENTANT

Jinnah left Delhi for Karachi on 7th August 1947 to


take over as the first Governor General of Pakistan. His
parting message to the Muslims of India was: “Now the
country was divided, they should be loyal citizens of
India.” On arrival in Karachi, While walking up the steps
of the Government House, Jinnah told Navel Lieutentant
S.M.Ahsan: “Do you know, I never expected Pakistan in
my life time.”
The first meeting of the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan was held on 11th August 1947. Jinnah was
unanimously elected as its President. Mohammed Ayub
Khuhro, who filed one of the seven nomination papers for
Quid-e-Azam as President of the Constituent Assembly
said: “The Lahore Resolution of 1940, which many at the
time had considered a dream but now seven years later
without any bloody war and without any serious sacrifice
Pakistan had been achieved.”
(Mohammed Ayub Khuhro-A life of courage in Politics by
Hamida Khuhuro, pg 315)
In his presidential address, which was extempore,
Jinnah said: “…I know, there are people who do not quite
agree with the division of India and the partition of the
Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but
now that it has been accepted, it is the duty of every one
of us to loyally abide by it and honorably act according to
the agreement, which is now final and binding on all…
But the question is whether it was practicable or possible
to act otherwise than what has been done. A division had
to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan,
there are sections of people who may not agree with it,

414
who may not like it, but in my judgment there was no
other solution and I am sure that future history will
record its verdict in favour of it. And what is more it will
be proved by actual experience as we go on that that was
the only solution. Any idea of United India could never
have worked and in my judgment it would have led us to
terrific disaster. May be that view is correct; may be it is
not; that remains to be seen. What shall we do now? If we
want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and
prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on
the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses
and the poor. If you will work in cooperation, forgetting
the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed.
If you change your past and work together in a spirit that
every one of you, no matter to what community he
belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the
past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first,
second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights,
privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the
progress you will make. We should begin to work in that
spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the
majority and minority communities, the Hindu
community and the Muslim community-because even as
regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Sunnis,
and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins,
Vaishnavs, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on-
will vanish. Indeed, if you ask me this has been the
biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain freedom
and indpendence and but for this we would have been
free people long long ago.”
Jinnah further said: “You are free; you are free to
go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or

415
to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan.
You may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that has
nothing to do with the business of the State. We are
starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no
distinction between one community and another. We are
starting with this fundamental principle that we are all
citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of
England in course of time had to face the realities of the
situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and
burdens placed upon them by the Government. Today,
you might say that Roman Catholics and Protestants do
not exist; what exist now is that every man is citizen, an
equal citizen of Great Britain. All members of the nation.”
Jinnah continued: “ If you keep this ideal before
you then you will find that in course of time Hindus
would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be
Muslims, not in a religious sense, because that is the
personal faith of each individual, but in the political
sense as citizens of State…”
Concluding his address Jinnah said: “I shall
always be guided by the principles of justice and fair play;
without any prejudice, or ill-will; partiality or favouratism.
My guiding principle will be justice and complete
impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and
cooperation, I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one
of the greatest Nations of the world.”
Jinnah, in his address made it clear that in
Pakistan (a) There would be religious freedom i.e. freedom
of religious belief, profession and practice, (b) There
would be no discrimination on the grounds of religion,
caste or creed and (c) All citizens will be equal,
irrespective of their personal religion or faith.

416
Jinnah, earlier in his interview to the Reuters
Correspondent, Doon Campbell in 1946 had said: “The
new State of Pakistan would be a modern democratic
State with sovereignty resting in the people and members
of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship
regardless of their religion, caste or creed.”
Again at a press conference on 14th July 1947,
Jinnah said: “The minorities in Pakistan will enjoy
freedom of religion; their religion will be secure and there
would be no interference with freedom of worship.
Secondly, the members of minority communities would be
citizens of Pakistan in all respects.”
Jinnah’s address prima facie makes one believe
that he had abandoned the two-nation theory and that he
wanted Pakistan to be a Secular State.
Jinnah’s address, however, became the subject
matter of debate-how a person who on the basis of two-
nation theory and on the plea that the Hindus and
Muslims cannot live together in one country brought
Pakistan into existence could abandon the two-nation
theory and proclaim that Pakistan would be a Secular
State.
Sharif-al-Mujahid in his book, “Quid-e-Azam
Jinnah” says: “That assurance such as equal citizenship
of Pakistan for all without discrimination between
followers of various creeds, and Hindus and Muslims
ceasing to be Hindus and Muslims in the political sense
as citizens of the State clash with the classical concept of
Islamic polity which does not accord to the Dhimmis
(Peoples of the Book, like Jews and Christians), the same
political rights and privileges as enjoyed by the Muslims.”
Sharif-al-Mujahid further says: “It must be remembered

417
that in all of Jinnah’s numerous pronouncements during
his stewardship of Pakistan, this was the solitary
instance of its kind. Mujahid calls it a somewhat
squinting statement. However, Mujahid later suggested
that the assurance to minorities in Jinnah’s address to
the Constituent Assembly became necessary because of
the chaotic political climate in the entire sub-continent
and the raging, tearing civil war in progress which had
unnerved the minorities in both the dominions..
Istiaq Ahmad in his book, “The Concept of an
Islamic State,” writes: “Jinnah’s speech contradicted the
whole rationale of Pakistan. Muslim nationalism was
based on relgion and Jinnah and all other Muslim League
leaders had used Islam to legitimize their demand for a
separate State. Therefore, Jinnah’s discourse on a
Secular State was hardly consistent with the logic of
Pakistan.”
The DAWN, the mouthpiece of the Muslim League
in its editorial, “Perverse Propaganda,” wrote on 26th
August 1947: “When Jinnah declared that in course of
time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims
would cease to be Muslims not in the religious sense, but
in a political sense, he merely meant that a Hindu or any
other person not professing the Muslim faith will not be
debarred from participating in the administration of
Pakistan, nor will he be discriminated against by its laws,
nor will he suffer economically.”
During the debate in the Constituent Assembly,
Dr. Mahmud Hussain, Deputy Minister distinguished
between common nationality as a legal concept, and
nation as a sociological concept; the Hindus and Muslims
of Pakistan, he maintained, are not one nation though

418
they are citizens of the same State. He emphasized that
Pakistan exists only on that basis-Muslims are a separate
nation and on no other basis.
Khalid B. Sayeed says: “The Quid-e-Azam, who
advocated the two nation theory as the raison d’etre for
the creation of Pakistan, probably felt after the
establishment of the State that he could calm religious
passions so that communal carnage and killings might be
brought under control.”
Justice Mohammad Munir after examining the
address of Jinnah came to the conclusion that Jinnah
was opposed to theocratic Government. He wanted a
secular democratic Government; that Pakistan nationality
would not be based on an individual’s creed, religion and
sect.
Earlier Jinnah had described the question whether
Pakistan would be a secular or theocratic State as
absurd. He had said: “I do not know what theocratic State
means. …Muslims learned democracy 1300 years ago.
Jinnah also probably felt that the hostage doctrine could
not provide protection to the Muslims of India.
In 1948, in Dacca, Jinnah categorically assured a
fair deal to the minorities. While talking to the leader of
the opposition in the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah said:
“You will tell these two things to your people; i. Not to be
afraid and ii. Not to leave Pakistan, because Pakistan will
be a democratic State and the Hindus will have the same
rights as the Muslims.”
In his public meeting in Dacca on 21st March
1948, Jinnah reiterated: “We shall treat the minorities in
Pakistan fairly and justly. Their lives and properties in
Pakistan are far more secure and protected than in India.

419
We shall maintain peace, law and order, and protect and
safe guard fully every citizen of Pakistan without
distinction of caste, creed or community.”
On a visit to the riot affected spot, Jinnah said that
Hindus are citizens of Pakistan and ordered the police to
use force to protect them. He further said: “I would rather
be protector General of the Hindu minority than
Governor-General of Pakistan.
When Iskander Mirza asked Jinnah whether he
wanted to make Pakistan an Islamic State, Jinnah
replied: “Nonsense, I want a modern State.”
Jinnah’s statements in the Constituent Asembly
raised storms of indignation even among his close
followers that he had to propiciate them by offering
“Namaz” publicly, which he had hardly done through out
his political career. Many parts of his speeches were not
published by most of the newspapers in Pakistan. He
became the target of both the paper propaganda and
physical attack. Within a week of the creation of Pakistan,
some Muslim refugees carrying a lethal weapon entered
into the Government House. They wanted to kill him, but
were overpowered. Different political factions opposing
him also instigated the refugees to hold demonstrations
against him. This happened in Lahore on 11th September
1947. A violent mob took out the effigy of Jinnah and
raised slogans, “Down with Jinnah.” Again in Lahore on
25th September, another demonstration was held against
him. There were at least four attempts on Jinnah’s life.
Jinnah’s relations with his closest collegues
deteriorated rapidly. Dr. Mohamed Ayub Khuhru
blatently defied Jinnah and refused to call him Quid-e-
Azam. At a private and exclusive lunch at the Nawab of

420
Bhawalpur’s house, Jinnah called Liaqat Ali, a mediocre.
Liaqat Ali offered to resign as Prime Minister after
learning Jinnah’s dissatisfaction with his work. Jinnah
expressed equal frustration and disgust at the way Nawab
of Mamdot handled the problems of refugees.
Jinnah told Lieutanent Col. Dr. Illahi Baksh on
29th August 1948: “You know, when you first came to
Ziarat, I wanted to live. Now, however, it does not matter
whether I live or not. Dr. Baksh noticed tears in Jinnah’s
eyes and was startled by this manifestation of feeling in
one generally looked upon as unemotional and
unbending. Baksh said: “I had always felt that Jinnah
had been kept going, despite his low vitality, by an
indomitable will. I knew from experience that when a
patient gave up the fight no treatment, however, perfect
could achieve much, and was therefore, greatly distressed
to find that the man of iron will had given up the fight.”
Jinnah lived on a few cups of tea and coffee, and
some plain water to swallow his pills. He lay in bed
quietly, apathetic and depressed. He told his sister
Fatima: “I am no longer interested in living. The sooner I
go the better.” And he breathed his last on 11th September
1948 at 10.20 p.m.
The Muslim fanatics who used to condemn Jinnah
as “Kafir (Infidel) felt relieved. Maulana Maudoodi, the
leader of Jamat-e-Islami refused to lead “Namaz-e-
Janaza” (Funeral Prayer). Instead, he held a thanks-
giving prayer and celebrated the death of Jinnah as a day
of rejoicing.
(Gandhi Marg: April-June 2005, pg 15)
This was the irony of fate of the man, who for his
ego satisfaction created Pakistan.

421
On Jinnah’s death, “The Statesman” wrote: “On
th
11 September 1948, departed from the field of his
mundane activities, a great Indian, who had helped to
disrupt the unity and integrity of his father land.”
Jinnah Wanted to Return to India:
Jinnah wanted to come back to India. He is
reported to have said in a meeting of the Muslim League
in Karachi: “…I still consider my self to be an Indian. For
the moment I accepted the Governor-Generalship of
Pakistan. But I am looking forward to the time, when I
would return to India and take my place as a citizen of
my country.”
Jinnah is reported to have defended his own
migration from India saying: “I would have gladly stayed
behind in India, if I had the confidence that a satisfactory
alternative was available to the new State.
The above statements of Jinnah show that his
heart was not in the Government House of Karachi, but
in the Malabar Hill of Bombay. When Sri Prakasa told
that the Indian Government was seeking requisition of his
house in Bombay, Jinnah was taken aback and almost
pleadingly said to Sri Prakasa: “Do not break my heart.
Tell Jawaharlal Nehru not to break my heart. I have built
it brick by brick. Who can live in a house like that.” He
further said: “You do not know how I love Bombay. I still
look forward to going back there.” Sri Prakasa asked
Jinnah: “Do you really desire to go back to Bombay? May
I tell the Prime Minister that you are wanting to be back
in Bomaby? Jinnah replied: “Yes, you may.” It may be
recollected that Jinnah had told the Muslim League
Council in Delhi immediately after partition was accepted:

422
“I have won Pakistan for you; now do what you can with
it.”
Jinnah told Liaqat Ali Khan, as reported by
“Frontier Post,” published from Peshawar on 23rd January
1948: “I have committed the biggest blunder of my life. If
now, I get the opportunity, I would go to Delhi and tell
Jawaharlal Nehru to forget about the follies of the past
and become friends.”
Victory and Defeat of Jinnah:
Victory:
Creation of Pakistan was a significant achievement
of Jinnah. He converted his dream rather ego satisfaction
in reality that too in his life time, which he had not
expected as told to S.M. Ahesan while entering his
Government House in Karachi. Jinnah took pride in
saying that he created Pakistan with the help of his
stenographer and his typewriter. And this in a way was
true. It was a unique unprecedented example in the world
history that an individual, almost single-handedly
established a Sovereign State. He created history and also
altered the geography. But at the cost of the lives of ten
lakh people and displacement of 20 crore and 20 lakh
people.
Penderal Moon said: “To have transferred in little
more than seven years the chimerical idea of Pakistan
into a living political reality was an astounding
achievement.” Carl Posey says: “By sheer force of will,
Jinnah sundered the grand ruby that had been British
India and raised Pakistan from shards.”
According to Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah made three
unique contributions: i. He significantly altered the

423
course of history. ii. He modified the map of the world
and iii. He created a nation-state.
Defeat:
Jinnah admitted that he committed the biggest
blunder of his life in creating Pakistan and wanted to
come back to India. He also said that he still considers
himself to be an Indian and looking forward to a time
when he would return to India and take his place as a
citizen of India. He requested Sri Prakasa to convey to
Jawaharlal Nehru not to requisition his house in Bombay,
because he wanted to come back to stay in that house,
which he built brick by brick. About his migration to
Pakistan Jinnah said: “I would have gladly stayed behind
in Inida, if I had the confidence that a satisfactory
alternative was available to the new State.”
The million-dollar question arises, if all this was in
his heart in heart, why did he convert himself from an
Ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity to the Creator of
Pakistan. The reply according to me is, it was only for
psychological satisfaction to show that, he was more than
a match to Gandhi, Nehru, Patel and Azad all put
together, because they had hurt his ego in one way or the
other and did not give him recognition as he expected.
But what was the price he had ultimately to pay?
Mohamed Ayub Khuhru declined to address him Quid-e-
Azam. Instead he was called, Kafir-e-Azam. Maulana
Maudoodi refused to lead “Namaz-e-Janaza” for him. This
was Jinnah’s defeat.

********

424
WAS JINNAH ALONE RESPONSIBLE
FOR PARTITION

My emphatic reply is “NO.” With British, Mahatma


Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel were equally
responsible for creating a feeling of separation in Jinnah’s
mind and subsequently they kept on strengthening it by
their utterances. I reproduce below the statements made
by these leaders. I begin with Mahatma Gandhi.
Mahatma Gandhi’s Role:
In April 1940 after the Lahore Resolution, Gandhi
wrote in “Harijan”: “I know no non-violent method of
compelling the obedience of eight crore Muslims to the
will of the rest of India. The Muslims must have the same
right to self-determination that the rest of India has. We
are at present a joint family. Any member may claim a
division.”
Speaking on the Cripps proposals on 13th April
1942, Gandhi said: “…If the vast majority of Muslims
regard themselves as a separate nation having nothing
common with the Hindus and others, no power on earth
can compel them to think otherwise. And if they want to
partition India on that basis, they must have the
partition, unless the Hindus want to fight against such a
division.” Gandhi further said: “If the Muslims wanted
anything–no matter what it is-no power on earth can
prevent them from having it.”
On 24th September 1944, Gandhi wrote to Jinnah
that he was prepared to recommend to the Congress and

425
the country to accept the claim for separation contained
in the Muslim League Resolution of 1940 at Lahore, if
Muslims desired to live in separation from the rest of
India.
Diwan Chaman Lal wanted Gandhi and Jinnah to
meet to settle the issue of Hindu-Muslim unity amicably.
He made the proposal to Gandhi, who replied that
adversity makes strange bedfellows. Chaman Lal then
went to Jinnah and asked him, May I tell Gandhi that
you wish to see him? Jinnah answered “No”. I am willing
to see him, if he wishes; but I am not willing that you
should say that I wish to see him. Diwan Chaman Lal
went back to Gandhi and asked, do you wish to see
Jinnah? Gandhi’s reply was, “If Jinnah wishes to meet
me, I will walk on bare feet from here to Cecil Hotel.”
Chaman Lal says, “Gandhi and Jinnah did not overcome
the human weaknesses and the hope of amity was lost.”
Gandhi told the Cabinet Mission: “I had never been
able to appreciate the Pakistan, which Mr. Jinnah says he
means. His Pakistan was a sin which he would not
commit.” Gandhi further said: “In my view, the two nation
theory was most dangerous. I oppose the two-nation
theory or two-constitution making bodies.”
Gandhi suggested to the Cabinet Mission to ask
Jinnah to form the first Government. If Jinnah refused
then the offer to form the Government should be made to
the Congress.
Two American journalists asked Gandhi: “What
does a free India mean, if, as Mr. Jinnah said, Muslims
will not accept the Hindu rule? Gandhi replied: “I have
not asked the British to handover India to the Congress
or the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or to

426
anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another as
dogs, or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to
a reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to
arise out of chaos.”
Gandhi, in his brief address to the Congress
Working Committee on 25th June 1946 said: “You are not
bound to act upon my unsupported suspicion. You
should follow my intuition if it appeals to your reason.
Otherwise, you should take an independent course. I
shall now leave with your permission. You should follow
the dictates of your reason.” And Gandhi quietly left.
On the same day at noon, the Cabinet Mission
invited the members of the Congress Working Committee
to meet them. Gandhi not being a member was not sent
for and did not go. On their return nobody told Gandhi a
word about what happened at the meeting.
On 31st March 1947, Gandhi declared: “If the
Congress wishes to accept Partition, it will be over my
dead body. So long as I am alive I will never agree to the
partition of India. Nor will I allow Congress to accept it.”
On 1st April 1947 Gandhi said: “…My writ runs no
more. If it did, the tragedies in the Punjab, Bihar and
Noakhali would not have happened. No one listens to me
any more. I am a small man. True, there was a time when
mine was a big voice. Then everybody obeyed what I said;
now neither the Congress nor the Hindus nor the
Muslims listen to me. I am crying in wilderness. Today
everyone can forsake me, but God will not. He has His
devotee tested. An English poem by Francis Thompson
describes God as the “Hound of Heaven.” He is the
retriever of Dharma. It would be enough if He hears me.

427
On 1st June 1947, Gandhi woke up earlier than
usual. As there was still half an hour before prayer, he
remained lying in bed and began to muse in a low voice:
“The purity of my striving will be put to the test
only now. Today, I find myself all alone. Even the Sardar
and Jawaharlal think that my reading of situation is
wrong and peace is sure to return if Partition is agreed
upon. They did not like my telling the Viceroy that even if
there was to be Partition, it should not be through British
intervention or under the British rule. They wonder if I
have not deteriorated with age…Nevertheless, I must
speak as I feel, if I am to prove a true and loyal friend to
the Congress and to the British people, as I claim to be
regardless of whether my advice is appreciated or not. I
see clearly that we are setting about this business the
wrong way. We may not feel the full effect immediately,
but I can see clearly that future of independence gained
at this price is going to be dark. I pray that God may not
keep me alive to witness it. In order that He may give me
the strength and wisdom to remain firm, in the midst of
universal opposition, and to utter the full truth, I need all
the strength that purity can give.”
He continued:
“But, somehow, in spite of my being all alone in my
thought, I am experiencing an ineffable inner joy and
freshness of mind. I feel as if God Himself is lighting my
path before me. And that is perhaps the reason why I am
able to fight on single-handed. People ask me to retire to
Kashi or to the Himalayas. I laugh and tell them that the
Himalayas of my penance are where there is misery to be
alleviated, oppression to be relieved. There can be no rest
for me so long as there is a single person in India lacking

428
the necessaries of life…I cannot bear to see Badsha
Khan’s grief. His inner agony wrings my heart. But, if I
gave way to tears, it would be cowardly and, the stalwart
Pathan as he is, he would break down. So, I go about my
business unmoved. That is no small thing.”
“But may be,” he added after a pause, “all of them
are right and I alone am floundering in darkness.”
With a final effort Gandhi concluded:
“I shall perhaps not be alive to witness it, but
should the evil I apprehend overtake India and her
independence be imperiled, let posterity know what agony
this old soul went through thinking of it. Let it not be said
that Gandhi was party to India’s vivisection. But
everybody today is impatient for independence. Therefore,
there is no other help.” Using a well-known Gujarati
metaphor, he likened independence-cum-partition to a
“wooden loaf.” If they (the Congress leaders) eat it, they
die of colic; if they leave it, they starve.”
(Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase-II, p 215)
Speaking on 4th June 1947 on the 3rd June 1947
plan, Gandhi explained that the Congress had to yield to
the force of circumstances. He also explained the reasons,
which led the Congress leaders to accept the partition.
They all disliked the vivisection of India, but they could
not let India bleed continuously. A surgical operation was
to be performed under the circumstances.”
On the same day Gandhi said: “You (Hindus) do
not listen to me. The Muslims have given me up. How can
I fully convince the Congress of my point of view.”
Some people asked him whether he would
undertake a fast unto death in view of the decision of the
Congress Working Committee accepting division of India.

429
Had not he called Pakistan a sin in which he could never
participate? Replying to this, Gandhi said on 5th June
that he could not fast at the dictation of anyone. Such
fasts could not be lightly ubdertaken. They could
conceivably be wholly undesirable. The fasts could not be
undertaken out of anger. Anger was a short madness. He
must, therefore, undertake the fast only when the still
small voice within him called for it. He was servant of the
country and, therefore, of the Congress. Was he to fast
because the congress differed from his views? He had to
be patient.
A woman correspondent wrote to Gandhi that he
should retire to jungle. It was he who spoilt Jinnah and
turned his head. He was responsible for the evil country
was facing. Gandhi’s reply was that she was quite wrong.
Love or ahimsa was the most powerful magnet in the
world. It never did any harm to anyone.
Gandhi wrote to Nehru on 7th June: “...The oftener
we meet the more convinced I am that the gulf between
us is deeper than I had feared…I had told the Badsha
Khan that if I do not carry you with me, I shall retire at
least from the Frontier consultation and let you guide
him. I will not and cannot interpose myself between you
and him.”
Referring to the newspaper report that he had
differed from the decision of the Working Committee and
that the AICC would raise its voice against it, Gandhi
observed on 7th June that the AICC had appointed the
Working Committee and they could not lightly discard its
decisions. Supposing the Working Committee signed a
promissory note on behalf of the AICC, the AICC had to
honour it. The Working Committee might make a

430
mistake. The AICC could punish it by removing it. But
they could not go back upon the decision already taken
by it.
A press correspondent reminded Gandhi that he
had earlier proclaimed that the vivisection of India would
mean vivisection of himself. On 9th June 1947, in his
reply Gandhi stated that when he made the statement
against vivisection, he was voicing the public opinion. But
when the public opinion was against him, was he to
coerce it? Gandhi further said: “If only non-Muslim India
was with him, he could show the way to undo the
proposed partition. But then he admitted that he had
become or was rather considered a back number.”
In the course of his post-prayer speech on 12th
June 1947, Gandhi said:
“The division of India was now a certainty, so far as
man could see. I ask you not to grieve over it. I have never
believed in Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah’s two-nation theory and
never would. Change of religion could never change
nationality. I am as much of Pakistan, as of Hindustan. If
we act in the like manner, Jinnah Saheb would not be
able to prove his theory in spite of the geographical
division of India.”
Gandhi further said: “Does the re-adjustment of
geography of India mean two nations? I admit that the
division having been agreed upon, unity becomes
somewhat difficult. But assuming that the Muslims of
India look upon themselves as a nation distinct from the
rest, they cannot become so, if the non-Muslims do not
respond. The Muslim majority areas may call themselves
Pakistan, but the rest, and the largest part of India, need
not call itself Hindustan. In contradiction to Pakistan, it

431
will mean the abode of the Hindus. Do the Hindus feel
so? Have the Parsis, Christians and the Jews born in
India and the Anglo-Indians, who do not happen to have
white skin, any other home than India? I will omit the
Muslims for the time being… History has shown that
possession of proud names does not make the possessors
great. Men and groups are known not by what they call
themselves, but by their deeds.”
(Mahatma: D.G.Tendulkar, pg 5-12)
Addressing the All India Congress Committee
meeting on 14, 15 June, Gandhi said: “…If at this stage,
the All India Congress Committee rejected the Congress
Working Committee’s decision, the consequences would
be the finding of a new set of leaders, who would not only
be capable of constituting the Congress Working
Committee, but of taking charge of the Government. They
should not forget that peace in the country was very
essential at this juncture.” He further said: “He was one
of those who steadfastedly opposed the division of India.
Yet he has come before the All India Congress Committee
to urge the acceptance of the resolution on India’s
division. Some times certain decisions, however,
unpalatable they might be, had to be taken.”
Mr. N.K. Bose, asked Gandhi in August 1947, why
did he cease to oppose partition? Gandhi replied: “With
whom was I going to carry on fight? Don’t you realize that
as a result of one year of communal riots, the people of
India have all become communal? They can see nothing
beyond communal question. They are tired and
frightened. The Congress has only represented this feeling
of the whole nation. How can I then oppose?

432
I strongly feel that Gandhi should have remained
firm on his stand and statements. It was a settled fact
that the Congress was bent on passing a resolution to
vivisect India with or without the consent of Gandhi.
Gandhi should have opposed the resolution or at least
remained neutral. In that case his conscious would have
been clear and the world would have known that Gandhi
was not a party to the decision of the Congress to
partition India.
Jawaharlal Nehru during his imprisonment in
1942 wrote in his diary: “Gandhi has great qualities in
him. But he was a weak leader, there was no consistency
in his policy. In last three four years, he changed his
stand many times.” And this was proved by the
statements made by Gandhi on the issue of partition of
India.
Gandhi, however, justified his inconsistencies by
saying: “In my search after truth, I have discarded many
ideas and learnt many new things. Old as I am in age, I
have no feeling that I have ceased to grow inwardly or
that my growth will stop at the dissolution of the flesh.
What I am concerned with is my readiness to obey the
call of truth, my God, from moment to moment, and,
therefore, when anybody finds inconsistency between any
two writings of mine, if he has still faith in my sanity, he
would do well to choose the later of the two on the same
subject.”
It is difficult for me to say that Gandhi changed his
mind on the issue of partion to obey the call of truth. The
historians and psychologists, probably, will have to
undertake further research to find out as to why Gandhi

433
ultimately advised the All India Congress Committee to
accept partition of India?
It may be recollected that as soon as Gandhi
captured the Congress, he did two things to populrise it.
The first thing he did was to introduce Civil Disobedience.
The second thing he did was to introduce the principle of
Linguistic Provinces. In the constitution that was framed
by the Congress under his inspiration and guidance,
India was to be divided into the following provinces with
the language and headquarter as mentioned below
against them:

Province Headquarter Language


Ajmere-Mewara Ajmer Hindustani
Andhra Madras Telgu
Assam Gauhati Assamese
Bihar Patna Hindustani
Bengal Calcutta Bengali
Bombay (City) Bombay Marathi-Gujrati
Delhi Delhi Hindustani
Gujarat Ahmedabad Gujarati
Karnatak Dharwar Kannada
Kerala Calicut Malayalam
Mahakoshal Jubbalpur Hindustani
Maharashtra Poona Marathi
Nagpur Nagpur Marathi
N.W.F.P. Peshawar Pustu
Punjab Lahore Punjabi
Sind Karachi Sindhi
Tamil Nadu Madras Tamil
United Provinces Lucknow Hindustani
Utkal Cuttack Oriya
Vidharbha (Berar) Akola Marathi

In this distribution no attention was paid to


considerations of area, population or revenue. The
thought that every administrative unit must be capable of
supporting and supplying a minimum standard of

434
civilized life, for which it must have sufficient area,
sufficient population and sufficient revenue, had no place
in this scheme of distribution of areas for provincial
purposes. The determining factor was only language. No
thought was given to the possibility that it might
introduce a disruptive force in the already loose structure
of the Indian social life.
(Pakistan or Partition of India by Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, pg 27)
In fact the seed for formation of the Linguistic
States are seen in the above decision. Had the proposals
of Sir Mohamed Iqbal, Rehmat Ali and other Muslim
leaders were accepted at the appropriate time, the
partition of India could have been avoided. Alas, it was
not accepted.
Jawaharlal Nehru’s Role:
Jawaharlal described the departure of Jinnah from
the Congress session at Nagpur in 1920 as follows:
“…The developments in the Congress-
noncooperation and the new constitution-were thoroughly
disapproved by Jinnah. He disagreed on political
grounds. Temperamentally, he did not fit in at all with the
new Congress. He felt completely out of his element in the
Khadi-clad crowed. The enthusiasm of the people stuck
him as mob-hysteria.
On the thumping success of the Congress in 1937
election, Jawaharlal Nehru declared that in the political
evolution of the country, there are only two parties
namely the British and the Congress that counted.
Jinnah shot back: “There is a third party in the country
and that is the Muslim League whom the Congress will
ignore at its own risk and peril.”

435
A few days later Nehru asked: “who are the
Muslims? Apparently, those who follow Jinnah and the
Muslim League. What does the Muslim League stand for?
Does it stand for the independence of India? I (Nehru)
believe not. It represents a group of persons having no
contacts with the Muslim masses and a few even with the
lower middle classes. May I suggest to Mr. Jinnah that I
come into greater touch with the Muslim masses than
most of the members of the Muslim League.”
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad said: “If the U.P.
League’s offer of cooperation had been accepted, the
Muslim League would have merged in the Congress.
Nehru’s action gave the Muslim League in U.P. a new
lease of life. Jinnah took full advantage of the situation
and started an offensive, which ultimately led to
Pakistan.”
According to Prof M. Mujeeb, Nehru’s refusal to
make an alliance with the Muslim League drove the
Muslims as a class to feel that it was fighting for its life. If
Khliquzaman had been made a minister, the League in
U.P. would most probably have dissolved.
Prof. B. Sheik Ali said: “The failure of Nehru to
accommodate the League was the first seed of Pakistan.
Again exclusion of the League from the Congress
ministries after the election of 1937 was the last straw on
the Camel’s back that swept off the concept of United
India.”
Stanley Wolpert says: “It would not be last of
Nehru’s political errors of judgment in his dealings with
Jinnah, but it was one of the fatal mistakes he ever made
in a moment of hubris. More than Iqbal, it was Nehru,
who charted a new mass strategy for the League,

436
prodding and challenging Jinnah to leave the drawing
rooms of politics to reach down to the hundred million
Muslims who spent most of each day labouring in rural
fields.” Wolpert further says: “Nehru had taunted Jinnah
in the Legislative Assembly. And for Jinnah this was as
significant a turning point, traumatically triggered by
public humiliation, as the Congress non-cooperation
resolution rebuke he had sustained at Nagpur in 1920”
Maulana Hasrat Mohani, while moving a resolution
for full independence at 1937 session of the Muslim
League at Lucknow remarked: “Those who believed that
Jawaharlal Nehru was above communalism or that he
was the man who would solve the communal problem by
bringing lasting amity and unity between the Hindus and
the Muslims, were living in fools’ paradise.”
Penderal Moon described the Congress failure to
cooperate with the League as the prime cause of the
creation of Pakistan.
In the opinion of Frank Moraes: “Jinnah certainly
created Pakistan. But the Congress by its sins of
commission and omission also helped to make it possible.
The Congress spurned Muslim League’s overtures for a
coalition. The result was not to drive the League into
political wilderness but to strengthen Jinnah’s hands as
the foremost champion of Muslim claims and rights.”
Nehru described the League session of 1937 at
Lucknow as the last ditch of the political reaction. To this,
Jinnah replied: “What happened to Nehru’s mass contact
program? What was it for? It was to get hold of men who
will be their creatures, who will sign their program and
sing Bande Mataram.” Jinnah further said: “Nehru talks
of hunger and poverty, goes about threatening Zamindars

437
with complete extinction and brings the large peasants
under his influence. The Hindu industrial magnets,
merchants, princess, money lenders-the real blood
suckers of millions of poor men, receive his blessings, for
they feed the Congress organization.”
On 25th February 1938, Nehru wrote to Jinnah: “…
I do not yet know what the fundamental points of
disputes are?” Jinnah replied: “I am only amazed at your
ignorance. This matter has been tackled since 1925 right
upto 1935 by most prominent leaders in the country. I
would beg of you to study it and not take a self
complacent attitude.”
On 6th April 1938, Nehru wrote in the name of
Congress: “…Obviously, the Muslim League is an
important communal organization. But the importance
does not come from outside recognition but from inherent
strength.” Jinnah sent a reply to this, in which he said:
“It seems to me that you cannot even accurately
understand my letter. Your tone and language again
display the same arrogance and militant spirit as if the
Congress is the sovereign power. Having regard to your
mentality, it is really difficult for me to make you
understand the position any further.”
In an interview later, Jinnah remarked of Nehru:
“He seems to carry the responsibility of the whole world
on his shoulders and must poke nose into everything
except minding his own business.”
Linlithgow wrote to Zetland: “It is a tragedy in
many ways that at a time such as this we should have in
so important a position a doctrinaire like Nehru with his
amateur knowledge of foreign politics and of the
international stage.”

438
Nehru wrote about League’s Lahore Resolution of
1940 as Jinnah’s fantastic proposals, reading it as a Cat’s
Paw of British imperial duplicity.
In one of his speeches in Malaya, Nehru said:
“Jinnah reminds me of the man who was charged with
the murder of his mother and father and begged the
clemency of the court on the ground that he was an
orphan.”
In 1938, Nehru said: “The League leaders had
begun to echo the Fascist tirade against democracy. Nazis
were wedded to negative policy. So also the League. The
League was anti-Hindu, anti-Congress and anti-national.
The Nazis raised the cry of hatred against the Jews, the
League raised its cry against the Hindus.”
Nehru said: “It is better to give Pakistan to Jinnah
than to suffer his grumbles.”
Nehru in his interview with the Cabinet Mission on
10th June 1946 said: “The Congress was going to work for
a strong center and to break the group system and they
would succeed.” Nehru further said that Jinnah does not
have any real place in the country. The Congress Working
Committee tried to undo the damage done by Nehru’s
statement. But the damage could not be undone. In the
words of Azad: “Mr. Jinnah did not accept the position
and held that Nehru’s statement represented the real
mind of the Congress. If the Congress could change so
many times while the British were still in the country and
power had not come to its hands. What assurance would
minorities have that once the British left, the Congress
would not again change and go back to the position taken
up in Jawaharlal’s statement.

439
On 6th July 1946 at the All India Congress
Committee Nehru said: “…It was not a question of
Congress accepting any plan, long or short. It is merely a
question of their agreeing to enter the Constituent
Assembly and nothing more than that. They would
remain in the Constituent Assembly so long as they
thought that it was for India’s good and they would come
out when they thought it was injuring their cause. We are
not bound by a single thing except that we have decided
for the moment to go to the Constituent Assembly.”
With regard to the question of Grouping Nehru
said: “The big probability is from any approach to the
question, there will be no Grouping…There is going to be
finally no Grouping. This Grouping business, approached
from any point of view, does not get us on at all.”
Jinnah charactarised Nehru’s statement as a
complete repudiation of the basic form on which the long
term plan rests and all its fundamentals and terms and
obligations and rights of parties accepting the plan.
In a Press Conference held on 10th July 1946,
Nehru said: “The Congress would enter the Constituent
Assembly completely unfettered by the agreements and
free to meet all situations as they arise. He emphatically
said that the Congress had agreed only to participate in
the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to
change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought
best.”
Michael Brecher described Nehru’s statement as
one of the most fiery and provocative statements. He told
the world that once in power, the Congress would use its
strength at the center to alter the Cabinet Mission Plan as
it thought fit.

440
Nehru told Michael Brecher: “We saw no other way
of getting our freedom in the near future. And so we
accepted and said, let us build up a strong India and if
others do not want to be in it, well, how can we and why
should we force them to be in it.”
Saeed R. Khairi held: “Nehru and not Jinnah
destroyed the unity of India by his rejection of the
Cabinet Mission Plan, which forced the Muslims to
Pakistan.”
Louis Heren, a Correspondent of the “Times of
India” London in conversation with Kuldip Nayar in 1947
quoted Jinnah as having said: “Nehru was responsible for
partition; had he agreed to the League joining U.P.
Government in 1937, there would have been no
Pakistan.”
Nehru in his broadcast on 3rd June 1947 said: “I
am convinced that our decision to divide India is the right
one even from the larger point of view.”
Disagreeing with the 3rd June 1947 Plan, Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad said: “I told Jawaharlal that I could not
possibly accept his view. I saw quite clearly that we were
taking one wrong decision after another. Instead of
retracting our steps, we are now going deeper in the
morass. The Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet
Mission Plan and a satisfactory solution of the Indian
problem seemed in sight. Unfortunately, the position
changed and Mr. Jinnah got a chance of withdrawing
from the League’s earlier acceptance of the Plan. I warned
Jawaharlal that history would never forgive us if we
agreed to partition. The verdict would then be that India
was divided as much by the Muslim League as by the
Congress.”

441
In his speech in 1949-50, Nehru said: “We came to
the conclusion that partition was probably a lesser evil.
We were anxious to have freedom as quickly as possible,
so we agreed to partition.”
Some years later Nehru said: “The partition of
India became inevitable, I should say, less than a year,
before it occurred. I thought now, looking back, the
partition could have been avoided, if British
Government’s policy had been different.
Nehru told Leonard Mosley in an interview: “The
truth is that we were tired men and we were getting on in
years too. Few of us could stand for a united India, as we
wished it, prison probably awaited us. We saw fires
burning in the Punjab and everyday of the killings. The
plan for partition offered a way out and we took it.”
Rammanohar Loya said: “When the proposal of
partition was debated in the Congress Working
Committee, I made a plea for the rejection of two-nation
theory. Gandhi endorsed it, which made Nehru throw a
fit. To him this continual harping on Hindus and Muslims
being brothers and one nation, when they were flying at
each other’s throat, appeared fantastic, as also the
continual debate with Jinnah. I intervened to say how
fantastic his observation was? Had the Americans ceased
to be brothers and one nation, because they had fought a
war amongst themselves and killed hundreds of
thousands, the North against the South? Nehru knew
how to smile at a lost point. But men like me were only
scoring wordy points.”
Loya wrote in 1946: “He had a private discussion
with Nehru on the advise of Gandhi. Nehru was ready to
accept partition.” He said, ‘What is there in East Bengal

442
except water and jungle and mud? The Hindustan that
you and I know is not that Hindustan.’ Nehru had
accepted partition as vital for India’s independence.
S.Gopal, the biographer of Nehru writes: “Even
before Mountbatten came to India, both British
Government and the Congress Party (Nehru) had come
round to the view that there was no alternative to
accepting Jinnah’s demand in some form or the other.”
Minoo Masani, who was a member of the
Constituent Assembly said: “…Nehru and Patel were
impatient and wanted the Muslims to get out, so that
they could be masters in their homes without any further
delay. The igotism of Jinnah on one side and Nehru on
the other, came in the way of a united India being
independent. Gandhi’s offer of the Prime Ministership to
Jinnah, which would have solved the problem, was
blocked by Nehru and Patel.”
(From Raj to Rajiv: Mark Tully & Zareer Masani, pg 15)
Treaty of Filkins 1938:
Cripps assured Mountbatten of Nehru’s
Cooperation as per their secret Treaty in Filkins in 1938.
The text of this Treaty can be found in the book,
“Empire or democracy,” by Leonard Barnes. The reference
of this Treaty has also been made by Attlee. While
referring to the failure of Cripps Mission of 1942, Attlee
writes: “It went far beyond anything previously conceived
by any government. It embodied in fact some of the main
ideas discussed by Cripps, Nehru and myself one
weekend at Filkins (June 25, 1938).” Barns, who was also
present at that secret meeting gave an interview to Partha
Ghosh and confirmed that such a secret meeting was
held and a Treaty was signed.

443
This meeting took place at the residence of Cripps
where Attlee, Laski, Nehru and V.K.Krishna Menon were
present and after this meeting Cripps visited India many
times for finding solution. He nursed the idea of Partition.
Before the arrival of Mountbatten to India, Menon
had given him a note, which stated that to maintain
peace in the period of transfer of power, the demand of
Muslim League for separate Sovereign State be accepted.
(Jinnah-Man of Destiny by Prakash Almeida, pg 229)
Nehru and Sardar had accepted partition in their
minds. Before they said yes to it, they neither consulted
the All India Congress Committee nor Gandhi. Gandhi
was shocked when he came to know. His instant reaction
was: “Everyone today is impatient for independence.
Congress has practically decided to accept partition. They
have been handed a wooden loaf. If they eat it, they die of
colic; if they leave it, they starve.”
Nehru’s stand and statements seem to be
calculated to provoke Jinnah to eliminate him from his
(Nehru) way to accomplish the goal set by him to become
the first Prime Minister of India.
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s Role:
Maulana Azad holds that Sardar Patel was the
founder of partition of India. Azad says that Jinnah may
have raised the flag of partition, but the real flag bearer
was Sardar Patel. Azad further says that two-nation
theory of Jinnah and demand for Pakistan were only
slogan-a bargaining counter for Jinnah whereas by early
1947, Patel was greater supporter of the two-nation
theory.
Tayebullah, a Congressman from Assam holds
Patel and also Nehru as authors of partition. “Patel and

444
Nehru,” writes Tayebullah, “will be known to posterity as
the co-architects of Indian partition. Patel and Nehru
made partition a Fait-accompli. It was they who signed
Mountbatten’s Decree of 3rd June 1947. That decree was
best executed in the Congress Assizes.”
Azgar Ali Engineer says: “It would be wrong to
entirely blame Jinnah and the Muslim League for
partition. Nehru and Patel were also responsible for it.”
With his experience in the Interim Government,
Sardar realized that Gandhi’s stipulation to agree to
partition only after the departure of the third party i.e.
British would only prolong the British rule and would
therefore be self-destructive.
Sardar Patel told the Associated Press of America
in May 1947 that the aim of the Congress was to have a
strong Center, but if the Muslim League insists on
separation, the Congress will not compel them to remain
by force.”
While speaking on the 3rd June Plan in the All
India Congress Committee, Sardar Patel said: “Looking at
the Cabinet Mission proposals, he was not at all sorry
that the Statement of May 16, had gone. Had they
accepted it, the whole of India would have gone the
Pakistan way. Today, they have 70% to 80% of India,
which they could develop and make strong according to
their genius.”
Later justifying the decision of partition, Sardar
said: “By accepting partition, we could end the quarrel
between Hindus and Muslims. If two brothers cannot stay
together, they divide. After separation, with their
respective shares, they become friends. If on the other

445
hand, they are forced to stay together they tend to fight
everyday.”
On 5th July 1947, Sardar said: “We are on the
threshold of independence. It is true that we have not
been able to preserve the unity of the country entirely
unimpaired in the final stage. To the bitter
disappointment and sorrow of many of us some parts
have chosen to go out of India and to set up their own
Government. But there can be no question that despite
separation, a fundamental homogeneity of culture and
sentiment reinforced by the compulsive logic of mutual
interests would continue to govern us.”
On 11th August 1947, Sardar said: “Inspite of my
previous opposition to partition, I agreed to it because I
was convinced that in order to keep India united it must
be divided.” Sardar further said: “My experience of office
in the Interim Government showed that it was impossible
to do anything constructive with the Muslim League. The
League representatives during their continuance in the
office did nothing but create deadlock and their role was
entirely an obstructionist one. The Muslims save for a few
exceptions, enganged in all capacities in the Government
were with the Muslim League. Thus, the rot that had set
in could not be permitted to prolong any longer except at
the risk of a disaster for the whole country. In order to
settle the issue immediately and prevent the slaughter of
innocent people, the Congress agreed to the division of
India.”
In his another speech in Delhi on 11th August 1947
Sardar said: “I have agreed to the partition of the country
not because of fear or out of sense of defeat. Under the
prevailing conditions in the country, partition was the

446
best thing possible and I have no qualms about it.”
Sardar further said: “I however, strongly believe that
those who have seceded today will be disillusioned soon
and their union with the rest of India is assured. What
nature and God had intended to be one can on no
account be split in two for all time.” Sardar continued:
“India is one and indivisible. One cannot divide the sea or
split the running water of a river. The Muslims have their
roots in India. Their sacred places, their cultural centers
are located here in India. I do not know what they can do
in Pakistan and it will not be long before they begin to
return. If we had not accepted partition, India would have
broken in pieces.”
In his public speech on the same day at the Ram
Lila Grounds in Delhi, Sardar said that as there was
intense communal hatred among the services, the
Congress came to the conclusion that in such
circumstances, instead of fighting and tolerating the
interference of the third party, it is better to separate.
Sardar vehemently said: “Whatever some people
may say, I am convinced and remain convinced that our
having agreed to partition has been for the good of the
country. And therefore, I have never repented my agreeing
to partition.”
Sardar in his speech at Patiala on 22nd October
1947 said: “When we accepted division, it was like our
agreement to have a deceased limb amputed so that the
remaining may live in a sound condition.”
In his public speech at Rajkot on 12th November
1947 Sardar said: “When we accepted partition, we did so
in the hope of a final settlement of a brotherly dispute.
We felt that by satisfying the obstinate demand of a

447
brother, who had been a part of the joint family, we would
bring peace to both of us and prosperity to all. But hardly
had partition been effected when the Punjab disturbances
engulfed us.” Sardar further said: “I bear Pakistan no ill-
will; I wish them God-speed; let them only leave us to
persue our own salvation and stop meddling with our
affairs even in places like far off Tripura. We shall then
each settle down to our respective destiny. May be, after
we have become prosperous, they themselves will awaken
to the need of reunion in the best interest of both. It is
neither our business nor our intention to force reunion.
We only wish to be left alone so that both can live in
peace and prosperity, happiness and harmony.
Sardar in his speech on 3rd January 1948 at
Calcutta said: “India only wishes to be left alone. I would
tell Pakistan, you have now got Pakistan. I wish you joy of
it. It is only when your teeth are soured that you need
come back to us. You want to make Pakistan a heaven on
earth. We ourselves welcome it, for after all we shall also
benefit from it. But the Pakistan authorities say that their
enemies are conspiring to destroy Pakistan. I would say
to them that the enemies of Pakistan are not outside
Pakistan but inside.”
At the end of his speech Sardar said: “We shall not
ask Pakistan to come back to us until it has realized its
error. If we had not accepted the partition, India would
have broken into bits. I have no doubts that small bits of
territory round India would themselves seek our shelter.”
Addressing the Assam Regiment Club in Shillong
nd
on 2 January 1948 Sardar said: “Our country has been
divided. Our conception of division was as between two
brothers who could not live together.”

448
In a speech in Madras on 23rd February 1949
Sardar said: “I honestly believe that it is good for both the
new nations to be rid of a perpetual source of trouble and
quarrels. In 200 years of slavery, the administrtion
created a situation in which we began to drift from each
other. It is good that we have agreed to partition despite
its evils. I have never repented my agreeing to partition.
From the experience of one year of joint Government, had
not we agreed to partition, we would have suffered
grieviously and repented. Therefore, whatever people may
say, I am convinced and remain convinced that our
having agreed to partition has been for the good of the
country.”
K.L.Punjabi in his book, “Indomitable Sardar” says:
“Sardar’s reasons for accepting partition was clear
enough. He had been exasperated by the British policy of
remaining neutral, but holding on to power.”
In 1947, Sardar Patel and K.M.Munshi were living
in Birla House in New Delhi. They often used to walk
together; on such occasions whenever Sardar was in a
mood, he would talk to Munshi about some problem of
the day which was uppermost in his mind. One day, while
talking, Sardar began to tease Munshi: “Well, Akhand
Hindustani, we are now going to divide India.” Munshi
was shocked, for he (Sardar) had all along criticized Rajaji
bitterly for his pro-partition views.
When Munshi expressed his surprise that he had
agreed to partition, Sardar put forward two grounds. One
was that, the Congress being pledged to non-violence, it
was not possible for it to resist violently. Even if it
changed its creed, violent resistance at that stage would
have meant the end of the Congress-a long struggle with

449
the Muslim League through large scale conflicts involving
violence, while the British Government would be sitting
tight over the country with its police and army.
The second ground that Sardar gave to Munshi
was that if partition were not accepted, there was bound
to be long-drawn-out communal strife in cities and rural
areas and even the army and the police would be torn by
communal dissensions. The Hindus, being less fanatic,
were sure to lose for want of a competent organization. If,
on the other hand, the strife had to come, it would be
best to deal with it on the basis of organized
Governments; perhaps it would also be easier to come to
a settlement as between two Governments rather than as
between two communities spread all over the country.
Sardar further told Munshi: “I had bitter
experience of Hindu-Muslim riots, with the British officers
invariably having sympathy for the Muslims. With my
knowledge of the Udaipur troops, I also felt very doubtful
whether even the armies which were maintained by the
Indian Rulers had the strength to stop the communal
orgies in their States.”
After listening to Sardar, Munshi writes: “The
soundness of Sardar’s opinion was brought home to me
when, in the light of the riots of 1946-47, I realized that if
there had been no partition and the Muslim League had
come into the Constituent Assembly, as envisaged by the
Cabinet Mission Plan, our efforts to found a sovereign
democratic State would have failed.”
Munshi further writes: “….But Gandhiji was very
unhappy, now that partition was certainty. He held the
view that, rather than concede partition, the Congress
should let Jinnah alone form the Government of a United

450
India, and it should go into opposition and start a mass
movement. Sardar was not impressed with this stand.
The country was too tired to undertake such a movement
and was anxious to seize the opportunity of securing
freedom.”
(Pilgrimage to Freedm: K.M.Munshi, pg 126-28)
Sardar was so frustrated and disgusted by Jinnah
and his League that he wanted to get rid of both.
Way back in 1946, Nichaldas C Vazirani had
written a letter to Sardar Patel from Karachi on 23rd May
1946 in which he said: “…I have no doubt in my mind
that your strong stand has achieved success for India. I
have always believed that weakness never pays. I have
read Mr. Jinnah’s statement. He has pleased himself by
calling the two alleged groups as two Pakistans. This
indicates that he or his Working Committee is going to
accept the proposals. A bully is always a coward and he
and his Muslim League Nawabs answer that description
fully.”
Sardar Patel replied to Nichaldas Vazirani vide his
letter of 2nd June 1946 in which he said:
“…I hope we will hear no more of that mischievous
cry of Pakistan. In any event, the Muslim League will
expect no such thing from the British Government or to
secure any assistance from that quarter for that
purpose.”
Sardar further wrote: “The Muslim League asked
for parity but I opposed it stoutly. Parity in any shape or
form is against the very principles of democracy and no
amount of quibbling can justify it. Indeed Syed has got a
very good opportunity to strike at Jinnah because Jinnah
and the League have secured nothing for the Muslims

451
after a struggle of five years against the Congress and
after the spreading of so much communal bitterness. His
main demand of Pakistan is buried forever. His demand
for parity is not accepted. The Muslims in Hindu majority
provinces have lost weightage in the Constituent
Assembly. They will be in a hopeless minority. The
principle of representation on a population basis is
accepted. The only thing he got, as a face-saving device, is
grouping which, will be seriously opposed by his own
people.
“The Muslim Leaguers in their convention at Delhi
took oath under which they are bound not to enter the
Interim Government till the principle of Pakistan is
accepted. All of them are now anxious to go in in spite of
the pledge. You will soon find cracks and quarrels in the
Muslim League everywhere.”
(Sardar Patel’s Correspondence: Durga Das, Vol.4,pg 103-105)
Nothing of the sort happened. Contrary, an
agreement had to be signed between the Congress, the
Muslim League and the Nawab of Bhopal on 4th October
1946, which said: “The Congress does not challenge and
accepts that the Muslim League now is the authoritative
representative of an overwhelming majority of the
Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with
democratic principles they alone have today an
unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India.”
Sardar Patel in his letter of 15th December 1946 to
Stafford Cripps said:
“…You called the League delegation at a time when
there was some realization that violence is a game at
which both parties can play and the mild Hindu also,
when driven to desperation, can retaliate as brutally as a

452
fanatic Muslim. Just when the time for settlement was
reached Jinnah got the invitation, and he was able to
convince the Muslims once again that he has been able to
get more concessions by creating trouble and violence.
“I will only say that if strong action had been
taken, or had been allowed to be taken here, when “Direct
Action day,” was fixed by the Muslim League and when
16th August was fixed as a day of demonstration in
Calcutta, all the colossal loss of life and property and
blood-curdling events would not have happened. The
Viceroy here took the contrary view, and every action of
his since the “Great Calcutta Killing,” has been in the
direction of encouraging the Muslim League and putting
pressure on us towards appeasement.
“You must have seen what Jinnah has said in
London immediately after the debate. He swears by
Pakistan, and everything conceded to him is to be used as
a lever to work to that end. You wish that we should
agree to help him in his mad dream. …You know when
Gandhiji was strongly against our settlement, I threw my
weight in favour of it. You have created a very unpleasant
situation for me….”
(Sardar Patel’s Correspondence; Durga Das, Vol.3, pg 314-15)
Jinnah was certainly responsible for creating
Pakistan. But Gandhi, Nehru and Patel were equally
responsible for vivisection of India. Gandhi for his
helplessness and inconsistency or for the reasons best
known to him, Nehru for his impatience to be the first
Prime Minister of Independent India and Sardar for his
disgust and frustration. However, Jinnah repented for his
blunder and Gandhi fell victim to Nathuram Godse’s
bullets. Sardar died with a feeling of injustice done to him

453
by his mentor. It was Jawaharlal Nehru, who not only
enjoyed the fruits of vivisection of India, but created
psychological impact on the minds of Indian voters that
India will be safe only in the hands of Nehru family. And
after him, his daughter Indira Gandhi became Prime
Minister. After Indira Gandhi’s assassination, her Pilot
son Rajive Gandhi was hastily sworn in as Prime
Minister. After his tragic death in bomb blast, his wife
Sonia Gandhi, who had threatened to divorce Rajiv, if he
entered politics has become Congress Supremo and its
saviour. But for her, the Congress party in the recent
elections to the Parliament would not have emerged single
largest party to make Dr. Manmohan Singh Prime
Minister of India. It must be said to the credit of Mrs
Sonia Gandhi that she refused to be the Prime Minister in
spite of unanimous vote. Her decision is said to have
based on her inner voice. She is the only person, after
Mahatma Gandhi, who went by inner voice and remained
firm on it.
Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru had
serious disagreement over the future of Congress. Gandhi
saw it as an independence movement, which should be
disbanded after it had achieved its aim. But Nehru
insisted that Congress was the only institution with the
deep roots in the villages, which were essential if
democracy was to survive and flower. Almost sixty years
after, it is those roots which have dried up; and they have
dried up because the Nehru dynasty has become like a
banyan tree, in the shade of which nothing grows.
The Congress party even today, remains only the
truly national party and the Congress leaders have
continued to bowing to the will of the Nehru dynasty. The

454
cheer leaders who warm up party meetings shout: Jai
Mahatma Gandhi. Jai Jawwaharlal Nehru. Jai Indira
Gandhi. Jai Rajiv Gandhi and now Jai Sonia Gandhi.
Mrs Indira Gandhi did not have enough self-
confidence to be able to make extempore speeches; She
had to prepare a text. But the speed with which she
picked up was quite amazing and impressive. Once she
began to gain in political strength, then all her other
abilities blossomed forth.
Mrs Sonia Gandhi has in toto adopted the political
style of Mrs Indira Gandhi and is marching on her foot-
steps. It appears that she will shape herself as the
“Empress of India,” on the lines of her mother-in-law.

*******

455
CAN PAKISTAN AND INDIA LIVE AS
GOOD NEIGHBOURS

Ever since 1947, Indo-Pak relations have been


disturbed and distrusting. In October 1947, about 5000
tribesmen, led by the Pakistani Army, captured large
parts of Jammu and Kashmir. India accused Pakistan of
sending its regular troops. Pakistan flatly denied that
regular army troops were involved.
The Security Council of the United Nations set up
the Union Commission in India and Pakistan (UNCIP)
under the chairmanship of Dr. Joseph Korbel to assess
the claims of the two countries. The UN officials asked
Pakistan to withdraw its troops in 1948.
Pakistan launched covert “Operation Gibralter” to
seize Kashmir in a sharp short war. Its soldiers began to
infiltrate disguised as local tribesmen. Pakistan reacted to
the Indian accusation by denying the involvement of its
armed forces. However, it was soon proved that these
foreigners were from the Pakistani army. UN Military
Observer, General Robert Nimmo reported the mass
infiltration by the Pakistani army to the United Nations.
Prior to Bangladesh war, Pakistani army unleashed
a reign of terror on civilians-including killings, rapes,
looting and brutalities. Nearly ten million refugees fled to
India.
Pakistan firmly denied that its troops had inflicted
atrocities on civilians. Lt. General Niazi, Chief of Pakistan
Eastern Command wrote in his book, “The Betrayal of
East Pakistan:” “…General Tikka Khan turned the

456
peaceful might into a time of wailing, crying and burning.
The military action was a display of stark cruelty, more
merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad
by Changez Khan and Halaku Khan, or at Jalianwala
Bagh by the British General Dyer.”
Since 1989, India has been fighting low intensity
warfare and infiltration of Pak-sponsored Jihad terrorism.
In December 1999, Air-India Air Bus A-300 with 178
passangers on board was hijacked to Khandar.Pakistan
denied pushing Jihadi terrorists but maintained that it
supported freedom fighters.
Maulana Masood Azhar, a Pakistan based terrorist
was released in exchange for Indian hostages. He roams
freely in Pakistan and has formed the militant group
called Jaish-e-Mohammad, responsible for attacks on
Parliament, civilians and security forces. He is on the US
list of most wanted terrorists.
These military conflicts have resulted in a situation
where India and Pakistan are required to pump huge
sums of money into defence.: Pakistan spends nearly two
billion dollars a year on defence; India as estimated by the
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies
spends 6.3 billion dollars on defence. Neither country can
afford such expenditure. Two-thirds of Pakistan’s 500,000
men military is positioned along the border with India.
India has stationed several crack divisions of its 1.2
million strong armed forces on its side of the border. Both
the countries have now nuclear weapons, the dangers of
which are beyond expression.
The divergence of national resources towards
offensive purposes in the guise of defence expenditure has
kept India and Pakistan both backward.

457
There is hardly any hope that India and Pakistan
will live as good neighbors. Why?
According to the Muslim Canon Law, the world is
divided in two camps - Dar-ul-Islam (Abode of Islam) and
Dar-ul-Harab (Abode of war). A country is Dar-ul-Islam,
when it is ruled by Muslims, A country is Dar-ul-Harab,
when only Muslims reside in it but are not rulers of it.
That being the Canon Law of the Muslims, India cannot
be the common motherland of the Hindus and the
Musalmans. It cannot be the land of Hindus and the
Musalmans living as equals. Further it can be the land of
Musalmans only when it is governed by the Muslims. The
moment the land becomes subject to the authority of a
non-Muslim power, it ceases to be a land of Muslims.
Instead of being Dar~ul-Islam, it becomes Dar-ul-Harab.
There is another injunction of the Muslim Canon Law
called Jihad (crusade) by which it becomes incumbent on
a Muslim ruler to extend the rule of Islam until the whole
world shall have been brought under its way.
Tenet of Islam says that in a country, which is not
under Muslim rule wherever there is a conflict between
Muslim Law and Law of land, the former must prevail over
the later and a Musalman will be justified in obeying the
Muslim Law and defying the law of the land.
(Pakistan or Partition of India: Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, pg 292-94)
Maulana Mahmod Ali, during his prosecution, in
justification of his plea of not being guilty in respect of the
resolution passed by the All-India Khilafat Conference at
Karachi on 8th July 1921 said: "Speaking as a
Musalman, if I am supposed to err from the right path,
the only way to convince me of my error is to refer me to
the Holy Quran or to the authentic traditions of the last

458
Prophet, or the religious pronouncements of recognized
Muslim divines, past or present, which purport to be
based on these two original sources of Islamic authority
demand from me the precise action for which a
Government that does not like to be called Satanic is
prosecuting me today. "Mahmod Ali further said: "Islam
recognizes one sovereignty alone, the sovereignty of God
which is supreme and unconditional, indivisible, and
inalienable....The only allegiance a Muslim, whether
civilian or soldier, whether living under a Muslim or under
a non-Muslim administration, is commanded by the
Quran to acknowledge is his allegiance to God, to his
Prophet or successor of Prophet or Commander of the
faithful. This doctrine of unity is not a mathematical
formula elaborated by abstruse thinkers but a work-a-day
belief of every Musalman learned or unlettered.
Musalmans have before this and elsewhere too, lived in
peaceful subjection to non-Muslim administration. But
the unalterable rule is and has always been that as
Musalmans they can obey only such laws and orders
issued by their secular rulers as do not involve
disobedience to the commandments of God who in the
expressive language of the Quran is the 'all-ruling-ruler."
This must make anyone wishing for a stable
Government in India apprehensive. But this is nothing to
the Muslim tenets, which prescribe when a country is
motherland to the Muslims and when it is not.
This view greatly influenced the conduct of the
Muslims when the British occupied India. The British
occupation raised no qualms in the minds of the Hindus.
But so far as the Muslims were concerned, it at once
raised the question whether India was any longer a

459
suitable place of residence for Muslims. A discussion was
started in the Muslim community, which, according to Dr.
Titus lasted for half a century, as to whether India was
Dar-ul-Harab or Dar-ul-Islam. During the Khilafat
agitation a good number of Muslims, who not only showed
themselves ready to act in accordance with the Muslim
Canon Law, but actually abandoned their homes in India
and crossed over to Afghanistan. The world being divided
into two camps, Dar-ul-Harab and Dar-ul-Islam, all
countries come under one category or the other.
Technically, it is the duty of the Muslim ruler, to
transform Dar-ul-Harab into Dar-ul-Islam. And just as
there are instances of the Muslims in India resorting to
Hijrat, there are instances showing that they have not
hesitated to proclaim Jihad. If India is not exclusively
under Muslim rule, is a Dar-ul-Harab and the
Musalmans, according to the tenets of Islam are justified
in proclaiming a Jihad.
To the Muslims, a Hindu is a Kaffir. A Kaffir is not
worthy of respect. He is a low-born and without status.
That is why a country, which is ruled by Kaffir is called
Dar-ul-Harab by the Muslims. The third tenet is that
Islam does not recognize territorial affinities. Here again
Maulana Mahomed Ali will be the best witness. When he
was committed to the session court in Karachi,
addressing the Jury, he said: "A Musalman's faith does
not consist merely in believing in a set of doctrines and
living up to that belief himself, he must also exert himself
to the fullest extent of his power, of course without
resorting to any compulsion, to the end that others also
confirm to the prescribed belief and practices. This is
spoken of in the Holy Quran as Amribilmaroof and Nahi

460
amilmunkar; and certain distinct chapters of the Holy
Prophet's tradition relate to this essential doctrine of
Islam. A Musalman, cannot say, 1 am not my brother's
keeper, for in a sense he is and his own salvation cannot
be assured to him unless he exhorts others also to do
good and dehorts them against doing evil. If therefore any
Musalman is being compelled to wage war against the
Mujahid of Islam, he must only be a conscientious
objector himself, but must, if he values his own salvation,
persuade his brothers also at whatever risk to himself to
take similar objection. Then and not until then, can he
hope for salvation. This is our belief as well as the belief of
every other Musalman and in our humble way, we seek to
live up to it; and if we are denied freedom to inculcate this
doctrine, we must conclude that the land, where this
freedom does not exist is not safe for Islam."
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in his Writings and Speeches,
Vol. 8 at page 297 writes: "This is the basis of Pan-
Islamism. It is this which leads every Musalman in India
to say that he is a Muslim first and Indian afterwards. It
is this sentiment which explains why the Indian Muslim
has taken so small a part in the advancement of India,
but has spent himself to exhaustion by taking up the
cause of Muslim countries and why Muslim countries
occupy the first place and India occupies a second place
in his thoughts."
Between 1912. when the first Balkan war began
and 1922, when Turkey made peace with the European
powers, the Indian Muslims did not bother about Indian
politics in the least. They were completely absorbed in the
fate of Turkey and Arabia. His Highness the Aga Khan
justified it by saying: "This is a right and legitimate Pan-

461
Islamism to which every sincere and believing
Mahomedan belongs- that is, the theory of the spiritual
brotherhood and unity of the children of the Prophet. It is
a deep, perennial element in that Perso-Arabian culture,
that great family of civilization to which we gave the name
Islamic in the first chapter. It connotes charity and good-
will towards fellow-believers every where from China to
Moroco, from the Volga to Singapore. It means an abiding
interest in the literature of Islam, in her beautiful arts, in
her lovely architecture, in her entrancing poetry. It also
means a true reformation-a return to the early and pure
simplicity of faith, to its preaching by persuasion and
argument, to the manifestation of a spiritual power in
individual lives, to beneficent activity of mankind. The
natural and worthy spiritual movement makes not only
the Master and His teaching but also His children of all
climes an object of affection to the Turk or the Afghan, to
the Indian or to the Egyptian. A famine or a desolating fire
in the Muslim quarters of Kashgar or Sarajevo would
immediately draw the sympathy and the material
assistance of the Mahomedan of Delhi or Cairo. The real
spiritual and cultural unity of Islam must ever grow, for to
the follower of Prophet it is the foundation of the life of the
souls."
Aga Khan further said: "We can build a great South
Asiatic Federation by laying the foundation wide and deep
on justice, on liberty, and on recognition for every race,
every religion, and every' historical entity."
(India in Transition: Aga Khan, pg 157)
The South Asiatic Federation was more for the good
of the Muslim countries such as Arabia, Mesopotamia and
Afghanistan than for the good of India. Dr. Ambedkar

462
said: "What a terrible thing it would have been if this
South Asia Federation had come into being? Hindus
would have been reduced to the position of a distressed
minority. "
The Indian Annual Register records: "Supporters of
British Imperialism in the Muslim community of India
have also been active trying by the organization of an
Anglo-Muslim alliance to stabilize the rule of Britain in
Southern Asia, from Arabia to the Malaya, Archipelago,
where in Muslims will be junior partners at present,
hoping to rise in time to senior partnership."
(Dr. B.R.Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 8, pg 299)
This shows how the thoughts of Indian Muslims
were occupied by consideration of Muslim countries other
than those of India. The situation is no better today.
In his presidential address to the Congress in
1923, Mahomed Ali had said: "Many have compared
Mahatma Gandhi's teachings and latterly his personal
sufferings, to those of Jesus. When Jesus contemplated
the world at the outset of his ministry, he was called upon
to make his choice of the weapons of reform...The idea of
being all-powerful by self-suffering and resignation, and of
over force by purity of heart, is as old as the days of Abel
and Cain, the first progeny of man.
"Be that as it may, it was just peculiar to Mahatma
Gandhi also; but it was reserved for a Christ Government
to treat as felon the most Christ-like man of our time and
to penalize as a disturber of the public peace the one man
engaged in public affairs who comes nearest to the Prince
of Peace. The political conditions of India before the
advent of the Mahatma resembled those of Judea on the
eve of the Advent of Jesus, and the prescription that he

463
offered to those in search of a remedy for the ills of India
was the same that Jesus had dispensed before in Judea.
"The whole of the orthodox Muslim community took
offence for Mahomed Ali's having shown such deference to
Mr. Gandhi, who was a Kaffir, as to put him on the same
pedestal as Jesus. Such praise of a Kaffir, they felt, was
forbidden by the Muslim Canon Law. And therefore,
Mahomed Ali had to recant.
(Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches, Vol. 8. pg 302-303)
Legacy of Muslim Invaders:
The Muslim invaders have left behind them their
aftermath. One aftermath is the bitterness between the
Hindus and the Muslims. This bitterness is so deep-
seated that a century of political life has neither
succeeded in assuaging it, nor in making people forget it.
As the invasions were accompanied with destruction of
temples and forced conversions, with spoliation of
property, with slaughter, enslavement and abasement of
men, women and children, what wonder if the memory of
these invasions has ever remained green, as a source of
pride to the Muslims and as a sense of shame to the
Hindus.
The Muslim invaders, came to India singing a
hymn of hate against the Hindus. But, they did not
merely sing their hymn of hate and go back burning a few
temples on the way. They were not content with so
negative result. They did a positive act, namely to plant a
seed of Islam. The growth of this plant is remarkable. It
has not been a summer sapling. It is as great and as
strong as an oak. Even the Sikh axe could not fell this
oak.

464
In one of his dispatches to Hajjaj, Mahommad-bin-
Quasim is quoted to have said: "The nephew of Raja
Dahir, his warriors and principal officers have been
dispatched, and the infidels converted to Islam or
destroyed. Instead of idol-temples, mosques and other
places of worship have been created, the Kutbah is read,
the call to prayers is read, so that devotions are performed
at stated hours. The Takbir and praise to the Almighty
God are offered every morning and evening.
The work of Muhammad of Ghazni became pious
tradition and was faithfully followed by those who came
after him. In the words of Dr. Titus: "Muhammad Ghazni
in his conquest of Ajmer destroyed pillars and
foundations of the idol-temples, and built in their stead
mosques and the precept of Islam and the customs of the
laws were divulged and established. At Delhi, the city and
its vicinity were freed from idols and idol worship and in
the sanctuaries of the images of Gods mosques were
raised by the worshippers of the one God."
Qutb-ud-Din Aybak is also said to have destroyed
nearly a thousand temples and then raised mosques on
their foundations. Dr. Titus states that he built Jama
Masjid, Delhi and adorned it with the stones and gold
obtained from the temples which had been demolished by
elephants and covered it with inscriptions from Quran
containing the divine commands. The inscription over the
eastern gateway of the Jama Masjid relates that the
materials of 27 idol temples were used in its
constructions. Ala-ud-Din, in his zeal to build a second
Minar to the Jama Masjid, demolished temples of the
infidels to furnish a supply.

465
The Sultan Firoz Shah, in his Futuhat, graphically
relates how he treated Hindus who had dared to build
new temples. When they did this in Delhi and the
environs, in opposition to the law of prophet, which
declares that such are not to be tolerated under Divine
guidance, I destroyed these edifices. I killed these leaders
of infidelity and punished others with stripes, until this
abuse was entirely abolished and where infidels and
idolaters worshipped idols, Musalmans now by God's
mercy perform their devotions to the true God.
Badsha-nama records that Shah Jahan ordered
that in Benares and every place in his domain, all temples
that had been begun should be cast down. In the district
of Benares alone 76 temples were destroyed.
During the reign of Aurangzeb the temple of
Vishwanath in Benares was destroyed in April 1669 A.D.
All this was done with the ruling ideas of the
leaders of Islam. These ideas were well expressed by the
Kazi in reply to a question put by Sltan Ala-ud-Din
wanting to know the legal position of the Hindus under
the Muslim law. Kazi said: "They are called payers of
tribute, when the revenue officer demands silver from
them they should without question and with all humility
and respect tender gold. If the officer throws dirt in their
mouth, they must without reluctance open their mouths
wide and receive it. The due subordination of Dhimmi is
exhibited in his humble payment, and by this throwing
dirt into their mouths. The glorification of Islam is a duty,
and contempt for religion is vain. God holds them in
contempt, for he says, 'Keep them in subjection,' To keep
the Hindus in abasement is especially a religious duty,
because they are the most inveterate enemies of the

466
Prophet, and because the Prophet has commanded us to
slain them, plunder them, and make them captive saying,
convert them to Islam or kill them, and make them slaves,
and spoil their wealth and property. No doctor but the
great Doctor-Hanifah, to whose school we belong, has
assented to the imposition of Jizya on Hindus; doctors of
other schools allow no other alternative but death or
Islam."
(Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches, Vol. 8, pp 55-63)
Muslim Leaders’ Provoking Utterances:
Writing in the Comrade of 14th January 1911, Mr.
Mahomed Ali, who was the president of the Coconada
session of the Congress in 1923 said: "We have no faith in
the cry that India is united. If India was united where was
the need of dragging the venerable president of this year's
Congress from distant home? The bare imagination of a
feast will not dull the edge of hunger. We have less faith
still in the sanctimoniousness that transmutes in the
subtle alchemy a rapacious monopoly into fervent
patriotism the person we love best, fear the most, and
trust the least is the impatient idealist. Goethe said of
Byron that he was a prodigious poet, but that when he
reflected he was a child. Well, we think no better and no
worse of the man, who combines great ideals and a
greater impatience. So many efforts, well meaning as well
as ill-begotten, have failed in bringing unity to this
distracted land, that we cannot spare even cheap and
scentless flowers of sentiment for the grave of another ill-
judged endeavour. We shall not make the mistake of
gumming together pieces of broken glass, and then cry
over the unsuccessful result, or blame the refractory
material. In another words, we shall endeavour to face the

467
situation boldly, and respect facts, howsoever, ugly and
ill-favoured. It is poor statesmanship to slur over
inconvenient realities, and not the least important
success in achieving unity is the honest and frank
recognition of the deep-seated prejudices that hinder it
and the yawning differences that divide."
In 1926, there arose a controversy as to who really
won the third battle of Panipat, fought in 1761. It was
contended for the Muslims that it was a great victory for
them, because Ahmad Shah Abdali had only one lakh of
soldiers, while the Marathas had 4 to 6 lakhs. The Hindus
replied that it was a victory to them, because it stemmed
the tide of Muslim invasions. The Muslims were not
prepared to admit defeat at the hands of Hindus and
claimed that they "will always prove superior to Hindus.
To prove the eternal superiority of Muslims over Hindus it
was proposed by one Maulana Akbar Shah Khan of
Najibabad that the Hindus and Muslims should fight,
under test conditions, fourth battle on the same fateful
plain of Panipat. The Maulana accordingly issued a
challenge to Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya in the
following terms: "If you, Malaviyaji, are making efforts to
falsify the result at Panipat, I shall show you an easy and
an excellent way of testing it. Use your well-known
influence and induce the British Government to permit
the fourth battle of Panipat to be fought without
hindrance from the authorities. I am ready to provide a
comparative test of the valour and fighting spirit of the
Hindus and Musalmans. As there are seven crores of
Muslims in India, I shall arrive on a fixed date on the
plain of Panipat with 700 Musalmans representing the
seven crores of Muslims in India and as there are 22

468
crores of Hindus, I allow you to come with 2200 Hindus.
The proper thing is not to use canon, machine guns or
bombs; only swords and javelins and spears, bows and
arrows and daggers should be used. If you cannot accept
the post of generalissimo of the Hindu host, you may give
it to any descendent of Sadashivrao or Vishwasrao
(Military Commanders of Marathas in the third battle of
Panipat), so that their scions may have an opportunity to
avenge the defeat of their ancestors in 1761. But any way
do come as a spectator; for on seeing the result of this
battle you will have to change your views, and I hope
there will be then an end of the present discord and
fighting in the country. In conclusion, I beg to add that
among the 700 men that I shall bring there will be no
Pathans or Afghans as you are mortally afraid of them. So
! shall bring with me only Indian Musalmans of good
family, who are staunch adherents of Shariat."
Maulana Azad Sobhani, in his speech made on
27th January 1927 at Sylhat said: "If there is any eminent
leader in India who is in favour of driving out the English
from this country; then I am that leader. In spite of this I
want that there should be no fight with English on behalf
of the Muslim League. Our big fight is with the 22 crores
of our Hindu enemies, who constitute the majority. Only
four and half crores of Englishmen have practically
swallowed the whole world by becoming powerful. And if
these 22 crores of Hindus who are equally advanced in
learning, intelligence and wealth as in numbers, if they
become powerful, then these Hindus will swallow Muslim
India, and gradually even Egypt, Turkey, Kabul, Mecca,
Medina and other Muslim principalities, like Yajuj-Majuj-
it is so mentioned in Quran that before the distribution of

469
the world, they will appear on the earth and will devour
whatever they will find..." Sobhani further said: The
English are gradually becoming weak. They will go away
from India in the near future. So if we do not fight the
greatest enemies of Islam, the Hindus, from now on and
make them weak, then they will not only establish
Ramrajya in India but also gradually spread all over the
world. It depends on the 9 crores of the Indian Muslims
either to strengthen or to weaken them (Hindus). So it is
the essential duty of every devout Muslim to fight on by
joining the Muslim League. So that the Hindus may not
be established here and a Muslim rule may be established
in India as soon as the English depart."
Sobhani continued: “Though the English are the
enemies of the Muslims, yet for the present our fight is
not with the English. At first we have to come to some
understanding with the Hindus through the Muslim
League. Then we shall be easily able to drive out the
English and establish Muslim rule in India."
Sobhani warned the Muslims to be careful and not
to fall into the trap of Congress Maulvis; because the
Muslim world is never safe in the hands of 22 crores of
Hindu enemies.
Warning of Mrs Annie Basent:
Mrs Annie Basent during the Khilafat agitation
declared: "Since Khilafat agitation, things have changed
and it has been one of the many injuries inflicted on India
by the encouragement of the Khilafat crusade that the
inner Muslim feeling of hatred against 'unbelievers' has
sprung up, naked and unashamed, as in the years gone
by...We have heard Muslim leaders declared that if the
Afghans invade India, they would join their fellow

470
believers, and would slay Hindus who defended their
motherland against the foe. We have been forced to see
that the primary allegiance of Musalmans is to Islamic
countries, not to our motherland; we have learned that
their dearest hope is to establish the 'Kingdom of God" not
as God father of the world, loving all his creatures, but as
a God seen through Musalman spectacles resembling in
his command through one of the Prophets, as to the
treatment of unbeliever-the Mosaic Jeiiova of the early
Hebrews, when they were fighting as did the early
Muslims for freedom to follow the religion given to them
by their prophet."
In a manifesto on Hindu-Muslim relations issued in
1928, Khwaja Hasan Nizami declared: "Musalmans are
separate from Hindus; they cannot unite with the Hindus.
After bloody wars Musalmans conquered India, and the
English took India from them. The Musalmans are one
united nation and they alone will be masters of India.
They will never give up their individuality. They have ruled
India for hundreds of years, and hence they have a
prescriptive right over the country. The Hindus are a
minor community in the world. They are never free from
internecine quarrels; they believe in Gandhi and worship
the cow; they are polluted by taking other people's water.
The Hindus do not care for self-Government; they have no
time to spare for it; let them go on with their internal
squabbles. What capacity have they for ruling over men?
The Musalmans did rule, and the Musalmans will rule."
Ghazanfar Ali Khan on 1st June 1947 said: "There
were fundamental differences between the Muslims and
the Hindus, People like Muhamad of Ghazni and
Aurangzeb are our national heroes, but they are

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considered by the Hindus as their greatest enemies.
Similarly, Shivaji is considered by us as our arch-enemy
but is revered by Hindus as a national hero. What we eat
away is considered by Hindus the greatest God,"
I.A. Mohajer, Salar-e-Subha of Bengal Muslim
National Guards, on 18th May 1947 said: "The Muslims of
Bengal would not allow an inch of land to be taken out of
Pakistan-Bengal. If 17 " Muslims could conquer this
province, several crores of them could certainly retain it.
(Sardar Patel's Correspondence: Durga Das, Vol. 4, pg
389-90)
Circular from Habibur Rehman:
A circular was issued by the Working Committee of
the Muslim League under the signature of Habibur
Rehman in which it was said:
“All Muslims of India should die for Pakistan; with
Pakistan established, the whole of India should be
conquered; the people of India should be converted to
Islam; the Muslim kingdom should join hands with Anglo-
American exploitation of the whole world; one Muslim
must get rights of five Hindus i.e. each Muslim is equal to
five Hindus.” Until Pakistan and Indian empire is
established, the following action will be taken:
“All factories and shops owned by the Hindus
should be burnt, destroyed and looted and the loot should
be given to League offices. All Muslim Leaguers should
carry weapons in defiance of orders. All temples should be
destroyed. Hindus should be murdered gradually and
their population should be reduced. All nationalist
Muslims, if they do not join the League, must be
murdered by secret League Gestapo. Muslim League spies
should be kept in every village and district of India.

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Congress leaders should be murdered one in one month
by some method. Congress papers, offices should be
destroyed by secret Muslim Gestapo. Karachi, Bombay,
Calcutta, Madras, Vizagapattam, Goa should be paralysed
by December 1946 by Muslim League volunteers. Muslims
should never be allowed to work under Hindus in the
Army Navy, government services or private firms. Muslims
should sabotage the whole of India and Congress
Government for the invasion of India by Muslims.
Financial resources are given for the Muslim League
invasion of India by Nizam, Communists, few Europeans,
Khojas, by Bhopal and a few others; Anglo-Indians, a few
Parsees and a few Christians. The Punjab, Sind and
Bengal will be places of manufacture of all war weapons
for Muslim Leaguers invasion and establishing Muslim
Empire of India. All arms and weapons should be
distributed to Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras,
Bangalore, Lahore, Karachi branches of the Muslim
League. All sections of Muslims should carry minimum
equipments of weapon–at least pocket knife, all the times
to destroy Hindus and drive all Hindus from India. All
transport should be used and organized for battle against
Hindus. Hindu women and girls should be raped,
kidnapped and converted to Muslims from 19th October
1946. Hindu culture should be destroyed. All Leaguers
must try to be cruel at all times to Hindus and boycott
them socially, economically and in many other ways. No
Muslim should buy from Hindu dealers. All Hindu
produced films should be boycotted.
All Muslim Leaguers should obey these instructions
and bring into action by 15th September 1946.”
(Sardar Patel’s Correspondence: Durga Das, Vol. 3, pg 87-88)

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Hazrat Maulana Siddiq Deendar, who posed
himself as the ‘Avatar’ of Channa Basweshwar preached:
“My Muslim brethren! The Quran has taught you only one
thing: that is to change the country in which you live in
into Pakistan; in other words, to compel others to drink
of the water of the ‘Quran-e-Majid. A bowel containing one
quarter milk and three-quarters dung cannot be called
clean. Whether it is Arbastan or Turkestan or
Afghanistan, so long it contains Kafiristan in its territory,
it cannot be called Pakistan.”
Siddiq declared Jihad against the shrines of the
Hindus and issued a public appeal for one lakh
volunteers and a loan of Rs. 500,000 for the purpose.
(The End of an Era: K.M.Munshi, pg 40-41)
Master-racist Attitude:
Dr. K.M. Munshi in his book, “Pilgrimage to
Freedom,” at pages 71-72 writes: “The parting of the ways
between National Democracy and the Master-racist
attitude was complete. To many of the Master-racist who
gathered under the leadership of the Muslim League,
Pakistan was not a goal; it was a step to gain a solid base
from which to conquer Hindu India, as their imaginary
ancestors had done, if necessary with foreign aid. It was a
price that was demanded of the nationalists, if India had
to secure freedom from the British rule. The choice before
nationalist India was between the devil and the deep sea.
“Even after the price was paid, there were certain
sections, who could not out-grow the master race
complex. In 1948, Kasim Razvi, a U.P. Muslim and the
leader of the Ittehad, adopted the Master-racist attitude
towards the Hindus on India’s achieving freedom from the
British rule. In his speeches, Kasim Razvi used to say, a

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Hindu who is a Kafir, a worshiper of stone and monkey,
who drinks cow’s urine and eats cow-dung in the name of
religion and who is a barbarian in every sense of the word,
wants to rule over us! What an ambition and what a day-
dream!….Hyderabad will shortly recover ceded districts.
The day is not far off when the waves of the Bay of Bengal
will be washing the feet of our sovereign, who will not be
called the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar, but also the
Northern Sarcars.” Instead of washing the feet of Nizam,
Kasim Razvi himself washed away to Pakistan.
Munshi further writes: “…The declaration made by
Zulffikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the
Security Council of the United Nations that the Muslims
had ruled over the civilized India for 800 years and that
they would do it again, expresses crudely the master-race
complex towards Hindus, which even after partition,
characterized some Muslim leaders in Pakistan.”
Hindu-Muslim Menace:
The Muslims and Hindus were engaged in making
preparations against each other without abatement. It
was like a race in armaments between two hostile nations.
If the Hindus had the Benares Hindu University, the
Muslims had the Aligarh Muslim University, If the Hindus
started Shuddhi movement, the Muslims launched the
Tabliq movement. If the Hindus started Sanghatan, the
Muslims countered it by Tanjim. If the Hindus had the
R.S.S., the Muslims replied it by organizing the Khaksars.
This race in social armament and equipment was run
with the determination and apprehension characteristic of
nations, which were on the war-path. The Muslims feared
that the Hindus were subjugating them. The Hindus felt
that the Muslims were engaged in re-conquering them.

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Both appeared to be preparing for war and each was
watching the preparation of the other.
It was a vicious circle. If the Hindus made
themselves stronger, the Musalmans felt menaced. The
Muslims endeavoured to increase their forces to meet the
menace and the Hindus then did the same to equalize the
position. As the preparations proceeded, so did the
suspicion, the secrecy, and the plotting. The possibilities
of peaceful adjustment were poisoned at the source and
precisely because everyone was fearing and preparing for
it that "war' between the two tends to become inevitable.
But in the situation in which they found themselves, for
the Hindus and Muslims not to attend to anything, except
to prepare themselves to meet the challenge of each other.
It was a struggle for existence and the issue, that
counted, was survival and not the quality or the plane of
survival. So long as Hindus and Muslims regard each
other as menace, they will be engrossed in preparations
for meeting the menace. It is therefore, obvious that so
long as one community looks upon the other as a menace
there will be no social progress and the spirit of
conservatism will continue to dominate the thoughts and
actions of both.
The prospects might perhaps be different if the past
of the two communities can be forgotten by both. Renon
points out the importance of forgetfulness as a factor in
building up a nation:
"Forgetfulness, and I shall even say historical error,
form an essential factor in the creation of a nation; and
thus it is that the progress of historical studies may often
be dangerous to the nationality. Historical research, in
fact, bring back to light the deeds of violence that have

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taken place at the commencement of all political
formations, even of those the consequences of which have
been most beneficial. Unity is ever achieved by brutality.
The union of Northern and Southern France was the
result of an extermination, and of a reign of terror, that
lasted for nearly a hundred years. The king of France who
was, if I may say so, the ideal type of a secular
crystalliser, the king of France who made the most perfect
national unity in existence, lost his prestige when seen at
too close a distance. The nation he had formed cursed
him; and today the knowledge of what he was worth, and
what he did, belongs only to the cultured.
"It is by contrast that these great laws of the
history of Western Europe become apparent. In the
undertaking which the king of France, in part by his
justice, achieved so admirably, many countries came to
disaster. Under the crown of St. Stephen, Magyars, and
Slavs have remained as distinct as they were 800 years
ago. Far from combining the different elements in its
dominion, the house of Hapsburg has held them a part
and often opposed to one another. In Bohemia, the Czech
element and the German element are super-imposed like
oil and water in a glass. The Turkish policy of separation
of nationalities according to religion has had much graver
results. It has brought about the ruin of East. Take a
town like Smyrna or Salonica; you will find there five or
six communities each with its own memories, and
possessing among them scarcely anything in common.
But the essence of the nation is, that all its individual
members should have things in common; and also that all
of them should hold many things in oblivion. No French
citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, or a

477
Visigoth; every French citizen ought to have forgotten St.
Bartholomew, and the massacre of the South in the 13th
century. There are not ten families in France able to
furnish proof of a French origin; and yet even if such a
proof were given it would be essentially defective, in
consequence of a thousand unknown crosses, capable of
deranging all genealogical systems."
The pity of it is that the two communities can never
forget or obliterate their past. Their past is imbedded in
their religion, and for each to give up its past is to give up
its religion. To hope for this is to hope in vain.
Reasons for failure of Hindu-Muslim Unity:
The failure of Hindu-Muslim unity lies in the
causes, which take their origin in historical, religious,
cultural and social antipathy, of which political antipathy
is only a reflection. These form one deep river of
discontent which being regularly fed by these sources
keeps on mounting to a. head and overflowing its ordinary
channels. Any current of 'water flowing from another
source, however pure, when joins it, instead of altering
the colour or diluting its strength becomes lost in the
main stream. The silt of this antagonism, which this
current deposited, has become permanent and deep. So
long as this silt keeps on accumulating and so long as
this antagonism lasts, it is unnatural to expect this
antipathy between Hindus and Muslims to give place to
unity. Like Christians and Muslims in the Turkish
Empire, the Hindus and Muslims of India have met as
enemies on many fields, and the result of the struggle has
often brought them into the relation of conqueror and
conquered. Whichever party has triumphed, a great gulf
has remained fixed between the two and their enforced

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political union either under the Moghuls or the British
instead of passing over, as in so many other cases, into
organic unity, has only accentuated their mutual
antipathy. Neither religion nor social code could bridge
this gulf. The two faiths are mutually exclusive and
whatever harmonies may be