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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners,
as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace
process.While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the
country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate
balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her
discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of
action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat
Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground,
among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards
Marxist-Maoist orientations.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained,
among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights,
negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or
force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.

1. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines;
2. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines.

The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by
shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive,
legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect
upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the
non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral,
financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and
correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal,
Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate
paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and
MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels.
In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states
that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
"ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary
General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr.
Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces,
municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under
the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and
the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its
provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any
provisions therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary
changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall
pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE.
Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present
laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would
have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link
to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the
MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on
GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe
theenvisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall
beassociative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance
based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in
the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be
forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law,
and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal
context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic
model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while
maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between
integration and independence. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept
ofassociation, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign
countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in
the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over
external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of
border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to
or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the
Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted
by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State,
much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the
amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,
namely, a permanent population, a defined territory,
agovernment, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD
on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by
the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in
addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite -
Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present
components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however,
does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted
for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not
comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of
the region. (Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an
amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-
paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the
powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for
instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4
of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade
relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include
aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is
only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is
to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring
supplied) Anassociative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law,
among which are R.A. No. 9054
or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.

Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of
"Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time
of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their
descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be
respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act,
which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in
Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing
in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from
other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains.
The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that
procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed
Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region."
To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not
only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land."
The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of
secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE
RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people
is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic,
social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral
secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by
a peopleconstitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added)
127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect
for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the
existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the
conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing
state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.
x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as
international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land
(spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are
regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated
by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find
themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest.
Examples of groups who have
been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under international law,
but they do have rights amounting to what
was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The
vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own
police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for
indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed
by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the
responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be
the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial
domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands,
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to
grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that
document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
orconstrued as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the
Constitution and the laws as presently worded.
Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or
grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with
the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on
GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for convenience:
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall
be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force
upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until
the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in
the provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is
certainly broad enough to include the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD
the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have
already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the
"negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrityof
the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit
acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing.
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive
clause is invalid, as discussed below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section
5(c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with
different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues,
and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the
PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations
with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently
stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the
"Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even
constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the
processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually
exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall
include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root
causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new
legislation or even constitutional amendments.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this
provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think
outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various
social, economic, and political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal
framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments.
The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked
whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3,
Sec. 4(a).
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of
peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or
should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question
requires a discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
in issue was the
authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution. The Court held thus:
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court,
by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The
rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which
arenecessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation
of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but
not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace,
and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless

The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their
drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going
conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this
conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the
course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being
uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular
position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be
prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them
pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the
option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or
revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for
constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace
negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but
she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the
assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through
initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal
proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad v Comelec, but for their
independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.
These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for
any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine
"people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people.
As the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:

"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC,
that ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their people's' initiative is an
unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns
the Court to be wary of incantations of people's voice' or sovereign will' in the present initiative."
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office,
only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her
authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this
jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the
yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill
has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal
for new legislation coming from the President.

The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guaranteeto any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to
a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the
people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled
with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive
condition - defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the
necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being
contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be
"with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the
Comprehensive Compact."
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework
contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It
bears noting that,
By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior
agreements" from which there could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these
"consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to
propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-
AD.Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the
part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either
as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the
international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither
ground finds sufficient support in international law, however.
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories.
In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These
circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding international
agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the
contrary conclusion.
As gathered from the rulings of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral
declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the
international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give
legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral
declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the
part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear
intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF.
While there were States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and
projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As
held in the Lom Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is
signed by representatives of states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is
internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.
Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments
would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential in the
relations among States.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding,
respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee
that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for
the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with
what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens.
Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE
COURSE and hereby GRANTED.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.