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Kant and the Self 69

10. B 131. "A" and "B" references here will be to the first and second editions of
Kant's Critique ofPure Reason.
11. Cf. Ernst Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, tr. Paul
Stern, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).
12. B 132; cf. my "Kant and Guyer on Apperception," Archivfiir Geschichte der
Philosophie 65(1983),174-86.
13. More exactly, I take Kant's view to be that, for any of our thoughts con-
tained in sets such as (E), there are corresponding thoughts such as (T), but, given the
psychological limits of finite minds, this need not involve the "real possibility" of one
all-inclusive thought (T) which contains all (E)-thoughts. That is, for any component of
an (E)-set, there needs to be some possible (T)-thought that contains that component
(and, as will be argued, quite a bit more, as well), but there need not be one really pos-
sible (T)-thought that includes all such components. Cf. Henrich, "The Identity of the
Subject," pp. 270-71, on "the coordination of all possible 'I think' -instances."
14. See my "Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy," American Philo-
sophical Quarterly, vol. 19(1982), 1-24; and "Kant and Guyer on Apperception." Cf.
Paul Guyer, "Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis," American Philosophical
Quarterly 17(1980), 205-12; "Review of D. Henrich, Identitiit und Objektivitiit," Jour-
nal ofPhilosophy 76(1979), 151-67.
15. Dieter Sturma, Kant aber SelbstbewufJtsein (Hildesheim: Olms, 1985).
16. A 108, cited in Henrich, "The Identity of the Subject," p. 262. This is a pas-
sage central to his earlier and longer interpretation in Identitiit und Objektivitiit. Cf. n. 33
below.
17. For criticisms of "Henrich Clain1 I," see the works cited above in n. 14.
18. Henrich, "The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction," p.
271. The passage continues: "And it is in this reference that the knowledge of the iden-
tity of the subject consists; which knowledge thus likewise necessarily occurs with
every instance of self-consciousness."
19. Henrich, "den einzigen Fall von einer IdentiUit von Tatigkeit und Getatigtem,"
Fichtes ursprnngliche Einsicht, p. 192, cited in Sturma, Kant aber SelbstbewufJtsein, p. 109.
20. Henrich's other criticism is that it doesn't allow for full "identity" ("Gleich-
heit") of self-consciousness with itself. For a critique of this charge, cf. Sturma, Kant
aber SelbstbewufJtsein, p.1l O.
21. Sturma, Kant aber SelbstbewufJtsein, p. 111. Henrich appears to appreciate
this point in his later "The Identity of the Subject."
22. Henrich, "SelbstbewuBtsein: Kritische Einleitung einer Theorie," in
Hermeneutik und Dialektik, ed. R. Bubner (Tfibingen: Klostermann, 1972), p. 267,
cited in Sturma, Kant aber SelbstbewufJtsein, p. 111n.