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Emir Yener 2006700837 STEAM, STEEL AND THE FATE OF EMPİRES Naval Transformation of the Ottoman Empire and

Quing China Introduction The “long” 19th century is among the most thorough periods of transformation during whole the world history. The industrial revolution transformed the very nature of societies and states; either directly or indirectly. Among the most fantastic transformations is the change in naval warfare. Starting from early 1830’s, steam power was introduced and refined into all of the first and second rank navies. Then in 1860’s, the ironclad revolution completed the all round transformation of the naval warfare. This transformation had the most profound effects in technological, institutional, strategic and human aspects of navies. Perhaps the most visible effect of the naval revolution is the succesful boom of European imperialism. In previous centuries, especially in 16th and 17th centuries, the first naval revolution of ocean-going and cannon armed sailing ships had enabled Europeans to infiltrate and eventually to topple the hangover stone age cultures of Americas, and to carve out enclaves in Africa and Far East. However, the civilised societies of the east were by no means defenceless nor vulnerable to western colonialism, and united with the limitations of nautical technology, the very existence of european presence in the east hung on a delicate balance of bargain and diplomacy with regional powers; not to coercive force. In 1800, only some %35 of the global territory belonged to the western powers but on the eve of the first world war, that percentage had risen to an astonishing %85. It was the sobering result of the unilateral and overwhelming tip in the balance of military, above all nautical technology. True, the economic and social leap of the west was the “deep” factor in the eventual collapse of old order in Africa and East but without coercive force, it is very doubtful that westerners would have the course of events go as they wished. It was all too natural that the victims of this changing world reacted most urgently to the imminent danger. The only possible way of warding the western interlopers with any chance of success was to reform the state along the lines of antagonists and thus fight on even terms. However, that kind of reformation required the same institutional, socio-political and intellectual framework which spawned the western superiority. In the end, whole human community transformed as a result of this survivalist desire to change. Against this background, a study of the attempts to reform in the non-western navies may provide us a very interesting picture of the degree of success for the overall modernization of these states. The navies in 19th century became the most complex industrial institutions, uniting the most sophisticated advances in engineering, metallurgy, propulsion, communications and ballistics. A modern warship became a true microcosmos of technicians to properly function. In many states, the “modern” or “technical” man first appeared in the navy. The case of two eastern empires with their dramatic fates during the course of 19th century provides us a superb comparative study chance to understand the effectiveness of modernization in non-western powers. These two empires are those of Ottomans and the Chinese The Naval Revolution At the end of Napoleonic Wars, the main arbiter of the naval might on the high seas was the ship-of-the-line. Tracing back its origins to the early 17th century, the ship of the line was the most refined and excelled early modern tool of war. Bristling with 74 to 120 cannons of heavy caliber (mainly 32 and 24 pounders), the ship of the line possessed a firepower which

far surpassed a 30.000 men army corps (30-50 light calibre field guns). Only the most elaborate bastions of latest design with thick masonry would stand off to the deadly broadside of such a battleship. Indeed, the appearance of a small squadron of those floating fortresses off a trouble point was often enough to compel the assailed side to come to terms. The ships of the line were constructed of hardwoods resistant to saltwater rot, such as oak, teak and cedar. The propulsive power was the wind and a 74 gun ship of the line should set up to some 4.500 square meters of canvas in favourable weather. When pitted against each other, ships of the line would form a single file, called “line ahead” and try to batter their opponent into submission via sheer weight of fire while sailing on parallel courses. Success thus relied to the rapidity and accuracy of fire which required a constant drill, discipline and integrity of the crew. By 1815, the undisputed command of the seas was at the hands of British. Honed to perfection by constant warfare on every part of the world oceans from 1793 to 1815; the Royal Navy was quantitatively and qualicatively the unsurpassed master of naval warfare. It’s no coincidence that 19th century was called “Pax Brittanica”, guarded by the wooden walls of the Royal Navy. Besides the huge battleships, there were frigates, corvettes and sloops; collectively called “cruisers”. These carried between 28-54 medium calibre cannons and were used to patrol far flung seas, trade routes and colonies. In 19th century, the last surge of piracy which followed the Napoleonic Wars was suppressed by ardent patrols of British and American frigates. In times of war, frigates also proved to be excellent craft to raid and disrupt the opponent’s trade. Most of the second or third rank navies opted to acquire frigates as the backbone of their navies instead of costly ships of the line, which would not be versatile either. By 1820’s and ‘30s first practical naval steamers also start to appear. The steam power was in succesful use at sea since 1807 (American inventor Robert Fulton’s North River Steamer in Albany being the first example) but it took nearly two decades to refine the new technology and adapt it into the open sea. Even then, steamships were not considered successful first line warships as they were propulsed by large, unwieldy and vulnerable paddles which occupied the space necessary to carry enough ordinance. Instead, they proved valuable as tugs to ships of the line, helping to free commanders from vagaries of the wind. Perhaps their most valuable area of operation was the colonial waters, where their shallow draught and ability to carry troops proved indispensable for expeditions to areas previously considered unassailable due to navigational difficulties and inhospitability. In 1840’s, a new and effective solution to the problem of suitable steam propulsion was introduced in form of the screw propellor. Situated underwater abaft of the ship, the screw did not interfere with the space of guns, was incomparably more effective than the paddle in terms of hydrodynamic aspects and should be detached and hoisted into a well when the ship was to move by sail. After some experimental small scale craft, leading naval powers started to fit screws into their existing ships of the line or built them outright from keel up. Britain and France took the lead, followed by United States, altough the last was focused to large cruisers rather than battleships. Most of the second rank naval powers (Russia, Austria, Italian kingdoms and Ottoman Empire) also did acquire at least one steam ship of the line. During the Crimean War (1854-55), fleets of steam powered ships proved decisive in paralysing the Russian forces and bringing the allied victory. However, the vulnerability of wooden ships to fire starting shell guns was demonstrated more than once during that conflict; the most famous example being that of Ottoman fleet’s destruction at the battle of Sinope by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Towards the end of the war, Emperor Napoleon III of France ordered floating armored batteries to assail the russian fortifications in Crimea. Upon their successes, master engineer Dupuy de Lôme built an armored steam frigate, La Gloire, in 1858. Perceiving the threat to their naval supremacy and already well worried by the re-

waking ambitions of France, British navy answered la Gloire with the first modern battleship: HMS Warrior. Contrary to the Gloire which possessed a wooden hull and relatively limited endurance, Warrior was built entirely of iron and was fully capable of cruising in high seas. Soon, a race of armored warships started between the two leading powers. The maritime world was in the age of ironclad. Along with those advances in shipbuilding and propulsion, there was an equally important transformation in artillery. After Napoleonic Wars, the french fully abandoned all hopes to match the Royal Navy either in numbers of ships or in crew quality. To offset those two critical deficiencies, they turned to technology. As a result of the advances in metallurgy, it was now possible to cast long and heavy guns which could resist to heavier charges of explosives, thus providing a longer range for heavy projectiles. French should have fewer ships but if they could arm these with improved guns, they would shorten the firepower gap. In 1822, Colonel Henri Paixhans from artillery produced a new 68 pounder gun which fired an explosive shell that was able to doom any wooden warship. However, the great hopes tied to this new weapon were dashed when it was discovered that the gun was slow to load, inaccurate and possessed only half the range of lighter conventional guns. Nevertheless, the possibility of a lucky hit which can destroy a battleship in the close range mêlée was attractive enough to naval staffs and it became customary to load a few of those pieces to battleships, frigates, and especially to auxiliary paddle warships. Heavy long guns came to their own with the advent of steel casting and rifling, which put them on a par with conventional guns in both range and accuracy. The new improvements were introduced in 1850’s and half of Warrior’s inital 40 guns were such new weapons. Effectiveness was not without a cost tough. As the calibre and the size of the guns increased, it was only possible to mount fewer of them in a hull. The problem of how to mount a limited number of guns most effectively into a hull was solved with the invention of the turret. Captain Cowper Coles of the Royal Navy and the brilliant Swedish marine architect John Ericsson designed and introduced the first examples of turrets. Especially during the American Civil War (1861-65), Union navy demostrated the effectiveness of the turret with the succes of its armored turreted batteries designed by Ericsson, called “monitors”. The first high seas turret battleship was built in 1870 for the Royal Navy. The Warrior and most of the broadside armed early ironclads were still carrying masts and sails but with the introduction of the turret, the need for all round fire united with the dangerous instability caused by the weight of masts spelled the end of sail in naval history. By 1900, a typical battleship carried four 305 mm guns in two turrets along with a dozen smaller calibre secondary guns (generally 105 to 150 mm) and was capable of 16-18 knots. Along with the battleship, the cruising ship was also transformed. Until 1880’s, cruiser class was the last remnant of wooden era. Britain and France were building iron hulled but unarmored frigates along with ironclads but the rest of the world preferred cheaper wooden ships which were able to sail as well as steam. Then in 1884, the fabled British shipbuilding company Armstrong of Elswick produced a lightweight steel hulled warship armed with two heavy calibre guns as well as smaller pieces and furnished with a powerful machinery. Christened as the protected cruiser, it became the open seas patroller, commerce raider par excellence and primary naval weapon of weaker nations along with monitors. Perhaps the most innovative new naval weapons of 19th century were the mine and the locomotive torpedo, which brought the second dimension (underwater) to naval warfare. Prototype mines were first used as early as the Crimean war by Russians but they came into their own in the American Civil War, where dozens of Union warships and transports fell victim to Confederate mines. In 1869, the British naval engineer Robert Whitehead who worked for the Austro-Hungarian navy in Pola, invented a new weapon by uniting a mine with a cigar shaped hull propulsed by compressed air. Called a torpedo, this new weapon

along with the mine, created a revolution in naval tactics. The slow battleships were extremely vulnerable to flotillas of small but speedy craft launching torpedoes, more so in night actions. Close blockade of an opponent’s ports, as practiced during past conflicts, became extremely risky due to the great threat posed by minefields and torpedoboat flotillas guarding the harbours. The blockade had now to be conducted on the open sea and must include every merchant proceeding to the enemy ports, be it neutral or not. In a way, it can be said that mine and torpedo played a most critical role in bringing the concept of total war from theory to practice. Ironclads in the East By the dawn of Ironclad era, apparently there were only two non-western states which could afford to buy, repair and operate any numbers of modern warships. These two states were Ottoman and Chinese empires.Both two were among the great powers until recently and in pre-industrial revolution era, they were technologically self sufficent and equal to the west. Their natural resources and income seemed to offer great potential for modernization, which would include a modern and efficient navy. By the end of the 19th century, both two were considered failed states and a very unexpected eastern country, Japan, took their place as the exemple of successful transformation. The manifest of Japan’s success was her navy which single handedly annihilated the third greatest naval power in the globe, Russia, in the most decisive naval battle of the modern era: Tsushima in 1905. It was certainly not foreseen in 1850s, when Japan was virtually a feudal realm closed to the western eyes. Both China and the Ottoman Empire had to keep one feet in the sea if they wished to be safe. It’s undeniable that they were essentially territorial empires, who extracted the bulk of their state revenues from taxed peasantry and having their most dangereous enemies on their land frontiers. But the vastness of their realms with huge coastlines imposed a natural imperative of linking the territories apart together via sea lanes. Palmira Brummet’s description “swimming elephant” for the Ottoman Empire of 16th century was still valid in 19th century. We can well include China to this category. Indeed, both two empires shared an interesting geographical position. Ottoman Empire was situated in the Levant, with a coastline starting from Georgia in the Black Sea and ending in Tripoli, South of Sicily. There was also a partial coastline in the Adriatic. The imperial capital, Istanbul, was situated at the junction of all Levantine trade routes and the Straits were the most critical waterways in the western Eurasia. İstanbul was among the most populous cities in the Mediterranean and its supply was dependent to grain from Black Sea. The richest provinces, Syria and Egypt sent their annual tax tally along with great quantities of grain in convoys called Alexandria Caravan. Southern Balkan Peninsula (Greece), Crete and Cyprus combines to create a virtual narrow sea with hundreds thousands of coves, inlets and bays. Similarly, China has a coastline of 2.000 miles from Korea to Vietnam and the Korean peninsula, Japanese Islands, Formosa and Hainan form a narrow seas from which a critical maritime artery to Beijing passes. Until 1930’s, there was no railway connection between South and North areas of the Yangtze river and all the vital rice needed to feed the capital was carried via the sea. Moreover, while the Ottomans had only the peripheral Danube as a major navigable river (Tigris and Euphrates were marginally suitable to be effective inland waterways while the Antolian rivers were unnavigable at all), China had the Yangtze, which was the jugular vein of the empire; providing access into the deepest westernmost provinces. In short, both empires had to have an adequate navy if they would not get economically strangled in a war against an opponent of naval might. Ottoman Empire was naturally the first to react against steamships due to her proximity to the West and her immediate experiences with steam warships during the Greek War of Independence. The Greek paddle raider Karteria, commanded by ex-Captain Warren Hastings

of Royal Navy proved to be a formidable opponent when encountered during engagements in the calm waters of Aegean; setting many immobilised wooden ships afire with red hot solid shot. After the disaster of Navarino, where the cream of the Ottoman naval power was destroyed, Sultan’s navy was in shambles. Owing to the bad relations with western powers in the wake of Navarino, Ottoman Empire hired American shipwrights to rebuild its fleet. The most influential of them, Foster Rhodes was a proponent of steam power and he had the support of Kapudan Pasha Çengeloğlu Tahir who had first hand combat experience. The first Ottoman naval steamer Sür’at was in fact a converted british sailing packet, bought and presented to Mahmud II as a gift by prominent armenian merchants of İstanbul in 1828. She was used an imperial yacht and possessed nothing but two salute guns. A more warlike steamer was Sagir, ex-british packet Hilton Joliffe which was bought by Kapudan Pasha and used operationally in the war with Russia (1828-29). Sultan Mahmud was at first indifferent towards the new invention as “he perceived them little more than amusing toys” according to an observation by Foster Rhodes. However, when in 1837 during a storm, a british and an austrian steamer took to tow the frigate Feyziye in which the Sultan was returning from Izmit to İstanbul and thus possibly saved his life, steam power took full sanction from the top of the state. The first Ottoman built steamers Eser-i Hayır and Eser-i Cedid were designed by American shipwright Charles Ross and were completed with imported british machinery; between 1838 and 1840. Until the end of the Crimean War, Ottoman navy obtained about a dozen paddle steamers. In 1864, the frigates Ertuğrul and Hüdavendigar along with the battleship Kosova were converted to screw in Britain. Same year, two more screw ships of the line were laid down in the imperial navy yard of İstanbul. By that time however, the new ironclad revolution was in full swing and the navy obsessed Sultan Abdulaziz was eager to obtain the latest technology for his fleet. In 1866, four large armored frigates of Osmaniye class and three smaller armored warships were ordered from British yards. By 1870, this roll had arisen to a respectable fourteen armored ships, ranging from coast defense monitors to the powerful ironclad Mesudiye, then considered the best battleship of the world. However, this formidable looking fleet proved to be a financial disaster and an institutional fiasco during the Russian war of 1877. Having a navy is one thing but being able to support it is another. Along with the ironclads, the imperial navy yard was also seemingly modernized with most modern machine tools. Yet there was no organization in this modernization, with many unnecessary or overcomplex machinery bought for pure enthusiasm. In the two decades folowing the war of 1877, most of that technological accumulation quickly rotted away and those which could not be turned to the needs of army production were either sold or scrapped. Nevertheless, some basic infrastructure was kept and this helped to revitalize the naval industry in the last years of Sultan Abdulhamid II’s reign and beyond. Perhaps the most damaging legacy of Azizian navy was its financial burden to the empire. In fact, the ironclad fleet was built with borrowed money of long term interest, obtained in the cheerful aftermath of the victorious Crimean War. As a result, like an old mammoth which fell because of his overgrown tusks, the antiquated and clumsy Ottoman revenue system was crushed under the weight of assymetrical naval spending increase. The contribution of the Azizian naval programme to the great state bankruptcy of 1876 is undeniable. Another critical point in the crashdown of this first Ottoman naval programme is missing the importance of personel. In 1840’s, when the steam power was a relatively new invention, there were some conscious attempts to send cadets to Britain in order to train cadres about the new technology. Inexplicably, these first attempts were considered unsuccesful and instead of training its own cadres, Ottomans turned to european mercenaries to run their steamships. This trend reached to a peak in the Azizian era, where there even were some warships fully manned by foreign personel and mercenary officers becoming full offical

commanders of squadrons. The renowned British officer Charles Augustus Hobart became the first foreigner to hold the rank of müşhir (marshall) when he became commander in chief of the Ottoman navy in 1869. Naturally enough, such heterogenity, lack of quality and discipline of crews reduced the actual value of the fleet to nought. After the Crimean War, the peace treaty of Paris forbid Russia to maintain any warships in the Black Sea. Thus when the war of 1877 did start, Ottoman navy had de-facto command of the sea. By contrast, Russians made a most bold use of small improvised steamers armed with torpedoes and mines to bottle the uncoordinated, ill-disciplined and low morale Ottoman navy in its various ports. Such was the state of unpreparedess that Ottomans did not even tought about threatening the vital danubian logistic line of the advancing Russian army with the sheer mass of their navy. If they did, the war would have a very different course. After this most crushing defeat, the new Sultan, Abdulhamid II, anchored the bulk of the navy to Golden Horn with minimal crews. Besides the lack of money and resources, the navy was also politically suspect in the eyes of Sultan, as it played a leading role in the overthrowing of Sultan Abdulaziz. Yet, the popular mythos about how the fleet rotted away in its moorings just because Abdulhamid feared from his fleet seems like an overblown propaganda. To be sure, the navy was not among Abdulhamid’s top priorities during his reign and it’s well known that he was a pro-railway ruler. Nevertheless, he took care of modernising the suitable ships of the previous era and built up very effective coast defences; especially around the straits. Abdulhamid’s naval policy was in good accord with that of the rest of his contemporaries. 1880’s are called the “era of uncertainity” in the history of naval technology as the warship designs changed with an astonishing speed. In fact, even the formidable Royal British Navy was looking like a museum of weird prototypes which quickly became obsolete. Many second rank navies gave up the idea of having battlefleets; focusing instead to cheaper and much more versatile cruisers and torpedo craft. Indeed, there was a new school of naval strategy championed by Admiral Aube of the French navy which caused great sensation. Aube argued that fast cruisers armed with big calibre guns operating along with squadrons of torpedoboats should easily overwhelm slow battleships, or could operate in open seas to raid enemy commerce. Aube’s adversary in his mind was clearly Britain, but he found a worldwide audience.It looks like this new strategy, called the “Jeune Ecole”, was thoroughly investigated by the Ottoman navy, and at least the torpedo doctrin seems to be adopted. Abdulhamid disposed most of the old coast defense ships and replaced them with torpedo craft; some of which were built in İstanbul navy yard. The most radical elements of his policy doubtlessly are the early submarines Abdulaziz and Abdulmecid, bought in 1888. However, the technology was still too inefficient and it was not adopted. The Greek war of 1897 witnessed an attempt of intercepting the Greek navy on open sea but it ended with a fiasco, which showed the poor state of repair and attack inefficiency of the personnel. In the second wave of naval modernization which followed the Greek war, the soundest ships of the Azizian navy were selected and rebuilt to modern standards while two fast and modern cruisers were bought to bolster the long range operational capability of the navy. One of them, the legendary Hamidiye, showed the wisdom of this plan during the Balkan war, when she raided Greek shores and gave serious headaches to the Greek high command. Perhaps the most important naval activity during the Hamidian era is the revamp of officer corps. The navy was a popular institution and many scions of important Ottoman families were volunteering for a career in the navy. Recognizing the mistake of Azizian asymmetric modernization, Abdulhamid instead chose to invest into the human infrastructure rather than technology. Selected groups of Ottoman naval cadets were sent to British naval schools and many gained practical seamanship experience aboard british warships. Technical instruction schools were opened to train junior engineering officers. A new, confident officer

class slowly emerged. Those men did their utmost during the ten years of disastrous wars (1912-22) and gained respect of their foes despite being so inferior in material. On the other side of the world, China also built a steam navy and for a short time, became a force to be reckoned with. Yet the story of the Chinese steam navy looks more straightforward than the Ottoman experience. The apparence of the modern navy is directly related to the apparence of the modern centralist state, as only such a polity can afford the most complex, costly and professional institution of all. Chinese empire of 19th century however, was, in terms of military institutions, like a mirror of old steppe empires. According to the eight banner system of the Quing dynasty, China was divided into tribal territories upon each a semi-autonomous manchu lord sat, each being independent in dealing with the details of gathering a military force. This was the description of feudalistic decentralisation. What is remarkable is that China was able to build up a respectable navy and two well furnished naval bases despite the archaic nature of its state apparatus, between 1885 and 1894. This is no doubt a testimony to the talents of Quing court in controlling and co-ordinating its vassal bannermen as well as the statesmanship ethic of chinese mandarins. China’s first test of fire with the western naval technology came during the First Opium War, when the steam gunboats of Royal Navy severed Yangtze traffic and the ships of the line bombarded the city ports to submission up to Nanjing, one by one. The first of the unequal treaties signed at the end of the conflict sent shockwaves throughout the empire. One of the clauses of the treaty was the founding of a customs office under british supervision to regulate China’s trade with Europe. It was for that customs office that the first modern Chinese warships were bought, from Britain. The responsible official for the customs office was the formidable Governor of Shanghai Li Hung-Chang. Chang was to prove to be a major figure in the modernization movement of China. The catastrophical Tai-Ping rebellion which endured for almost 20 years (1850-1867) ruled out any possibility to follow a coherent naval policy until the empire should be pacified once more. When the Quing court re-established some sort of order, the southern port of Foochow (Fuzhou), Shanghai and Wei-Hai-Wei in the North (Yellow Sea) were started to be modernized. Foreign reports about the degree of success vary but almost all praise it. Indeed, the shipyard at Foochow proved to be capable of building even small ironclad gunboats as well as larger wooden frigates and corvettes. Meanwhile, cruisers are ordered from British yards and the only battleships ever possessed by a non-Japanese east asian country, Ting-Yuen and Chen-Yuan, are ordered from Germany. By 1885, China had 11 armored gunboats, 4 cruisers and 2 battleships; along with wooden auxiliaries. In 1884-85, a war with France erupted because of the question of dominance over Vietnam. A powerful French squadron advanced up the river Min and reached Foochow. The shipyard and all the warships stationed there (all wooden) were destroyed. French did not suffer a single casuality. Only pressure from Britain stopped them from entering Yantgtze and cutting off the rice traffic. The northern fleet, prepared by Li Hung-Chang chose to remain in its base of Wei-Hai-Wei rather than confronting the French. That short war showed all the deficiencies of the new Chinese navy. There were ships but practically no crew with enough knowledge to run them. After an armistice was signed with the French, Chang recruited foreign mercenaries to train the Chinese navy. The course of events is a good and sad picture of failed institutionalisation’s effects. Under Chang’s close supervision, Captain Lang from Royal Navy had increased the training of Chinese navy, gaining very favourable reports of foreign observers. However, when Chang was dead, the navy lost its patron and most of the the foreign instructors lost their jobs, taking the efficiency of the navy away with them. Corruption and nepotism was also eating away the little remaining professional fabric of the navy. True, the same problems did also plague the Ottoman navy, but the Ottomans possessed

an institutional backbone which was able to conserve the professional ethic of the navy. Thus, when China confronted the young nation of reformed Japan and her numerically mediocre navy in the struggle for Korea in 1894, her navy went to war under the command of a cavalry general and with shells filled with sawdust or even concrete instead of explosives. The result was the total annihilation of a fleet carefully built in three decades. The economic collapse as a result of the huge indemnity paid to Japan, closely followed by internal turmoil, revolution and political division of the realm decisively ruled out the possibility of rebuilding a credible fleet in a foreseeable future. It had to pass nearly a century for China should once again set out to build herself a navy. Conclusion The “long” 19th century witnessed an unprecedented change of the globe. Politically, empire building and national competitions made their mark to the century. Some of the older empires lagged behind while new ones arose. The most notable examples of the former are Ottoman Empire and Quing China.These two great powers of past ages fell victim to the predatory imperalistic attacks of the western powers. Perhaps the key tool, or machine of that imperalist surge was the naval power. Benefiting from the frogleap of Industrial Revolution, naval powers of the west built up navies composed from iron and steel warships, possessing unseen potential for destruction and range of power projection. The only way to counter them effectively was building ironclad navies of their own but without major socio-political and economic reforms to create an effective centralist modern state,indispensable for an efficient armed force, it would not be possible to imitate them. Ottoman Empire was more successful in quelling the internal decentralist powers and creating a modern institutional network which could at least support, conserve and re-create the know-how to run a modern navy. There would or would not be enough material avaliable, but as an institution, Ottoman Navy succeeded in transforming itself into one which could make effective use of avaliable equipment. Chinese, on the other hand, failed to develop necessary institutional framework to support a modern navy and as a result, they lost the fine fleet they built up with so much effort without being able to exploit its potential. BIBLIOGRAPHY General Naval History Ed. Gardiner, Robert; “Steam, Steel and Shellfire: The Steam Warship 1816-1905”, London 1992 Sondhaus, Lawrence; “Naval Warfare 1815-1914”, London 2001 Wilson, Herbert Wrigley; “Battleships in Action vol I 1850-1914”, London 1997 Ottoman and Chinese Histories Georgeon, François; “Sultan II. Abdülhamid”, İstanbul 2006 Langensiepen, Bernd & Güleryüz, Ahmet; “Ottoman Steam Navy 1828-1922” London 1995 Wright, Richard N.J.;”The Chinese Steam Navy 1862-1945”,London 2000 ,