HPS1000H Week Five Reading Response

Quinn Harrington
10/06/2014

To open his discussion of knowledge and probability, Hume identifies seven
philosophical relations[:]resemblance, identity, relations of time and place,
proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, and
causation (Hume 1739, 42). Three of these relations identity, causation, relations
of time and place are characterized by Hume to be accidental and incapable of
being the grounds of certain knowledge (Hume 1739, 42), while the other four can
be the objects of knowledge and certainty (Hume 1739, 42). He suggests that we
know resemblance, contrariety, and degree of quality intuitively, and use geometry,
which excelsthe loose judgments of the senses and the imagination to grasp
proportion (Hume 1739, 43). In Humes view, geometrys first principles are still
drawn from the general appearance of the objects; and that appearance can never
afford us any security because of the minuteness of nature (Hume 1739, 43).
Hume argues that nature is complex enough that our impressions of it do not
capture it with enough accuracy to form certain knowledge from them.
The second section of this book considers the three accidental relations,
and focuses in particular on causation. Although identity and situation in place and
time are not determined by the properties of objects, they can be grasped from what
is immediately present to the senses causation, however, cannot (Hume 1739,
44). As a result, Hume sets out to examine the objects cause and effect to search
for some impression that could produce the idea of necessary connection associated
with causal relationships something beyond the mere regularity of their occurring
together. It is important to note that Hume believes that all ideas are either the
direct product of impressions, or the product of reflecting on impressions. He
suggests there are two things that underlie causation: contiguity in time and space,
and the priority of time in the cause before the effect, or more simply, succession
(Hume, 1739, 45-6). However, Hume is skeptical of attempts identify a productive
aspect of causes. He argues that while we can observe succession and contiguity in
all cases of supposed cause-effect events, we cannot pinpoint a distinct productive
relation between of these events (Hume 1739, 46). Recall that for Hume, ideas can
be separated, making this a significant problem.
Hume asks two questions: why we think causation is necessary in the first
place, (i.e., why things that have a beginning must also have a cause), and why we
think certain causes must have certain effects (Hume 1739, 47). In particular, he
aims to identify and investigate the method of reasoning used to infer effect from
cause (Hume 1739, 47). He argues that it is taken for granted in philosophy that
things that begin to exist, must have a cause of existence (Hume 1739, 47). This
doesnt cut it for Hume all ideas come from impression, and we have no clear
impression of causation.
Instead of assuming that causation is a real phenomenon and searching for a
more suitable explanation of it, Hume looks to identify the reasoning and methods
produce the idea of causation in the first place, presumably to see if these are
suitable methods in the first place. The objects of judgment, for Hume, are
ultimately ideas or memories of ideas that should be distinguishable from the
imagination. Ideas from the memory present themselves with more force and
vivacity, he argues, than those from the imagination (Hume 1739, 50). Belief, then,
is frequently a product of the vivacity of ideas and not necessarily of the believers
having rational grounds for belief (Hume 1739, 51). Turning to consider how we get
from memories of impressions to beliefs about cause and effect, Hume suggests that
we only arrive at these beliefs through an inferential process. We experience what
he says appears to be a constant conjunction of events over time, and call that
conjunction to mind when we consider like events. In fact, the only relation that
connects these events is that of constant conjunction, and this relation is not one of
the seven identified early as true philosophical relations. We have, he argues, no
demonstrative arguments to prove the necessity of the cause-effect relations in
question, and thus no reason to consider our beliefs about them to be certain. In
support of this point, he points out that we can easily imagine counterexamples to
supposed cause-effect relations, demonstrably possible but yet unobserved (Hume
1739, 52). This argument rests on his assertion that the formation of clear ideas is
only possible if the states of affairs they picture are possible (Hume 1739, 52).
Hume goes on to discuss the notion of chance and probability, in relation to
the notion of cause as discussed above. This large discussion does a good job of
illuminating the epistemological aspects of Humes conception of causality. He does
not do away with the notion of cause entirely in the this section, but discusses in
relation to the probabilities we assign to certain events. Cases of chance in which
outcomes thought to be necessary consequences of certain states of affairs are, he
argues, situations where certain causes failed to manifest themselves. Ultimately, he
argues, probability of chances only serves to explain[] the probability of causes
(Hume 1739, 73). Hume suggests here that the knowledge we think we have of
causes is really a knowledge of how often supposed causes had expected effects.

Discussion Questions

How can we relate Humes notion of empirical knowledge to the observation,
experimentum? Does his statistical interpretation of the knowledge of causes
present problems for either method of inquiry?

How would Hobbes/Bolye react to Humes arguments?