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Novl Dec 1986

DOCI(ET CALL
EDITOR
Isbel l
GENERAL MANAGER
Robert Pelton
  PRODucnON
Donna K. Kles zcz
DOCKET CALL is published
monthly by the Harris County
Criminal Lawyers AssO Cia tion, a
non-profit, tax exempt
professional Association of
criminal defense lawyers.
ADVERTISING RATES;
fULL PAGE .•.•.........•. $200.00
1/2 Page ..••..... . . . ..• 100.00
!/4 Page.. . ............ 50.00
DISTRIBUTION: 500 copies
monthly. Articles and other
edit o ri a l contributiolln should
be se nt to HCCLA, P.O. Box
22773, Hou ston , Texfls 77027 or
the Associ a tion office at 70S
Ha i n St. 1400, Houston, 77002.
TELEPHONE:(7!3) 226-2404.
Board or Directors
1986-87
PrClicieat
Cande lario Elizondo
Pnsicicat-[/cet
Allim C. Isbell
Yice -Pnsiciell t
Fe lix Cantu
Eecrlfary
G. Mac Secrest
Tnuurcr
Ma:ry Moore
Chir.a.
Randy McDonald
Roger Bridgwater
Walter Boyd
Mary E. Conn
Benjamin Durant
Michael Essmyer
Jan Woodward Fox
Ruben Guerrero
Jim Lavine
Harry Loftus, Jr.
Garland MoInnis
DarJid Mitcham
Wi n autraz.J
Robert Pe Hon
Riohard Trevathan
Gary Triohter
Kristine C. Woldy
Nov/ Dec 1986
CONT£NTS 
FROM THE PRESIDENT'S DESK ... ,.
CANDELARIO ELIZONDO 2
DWI AND THE LATE NIGHT TELEPHONE CALL ..... .
J. GARY TRICHTER 5
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGS ON WEEKENDS ....... .
RICHARD ANDERSON 19
SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS ........ .
HENRY L. BURKHOL
CATHERINE GREENE
DER, III
BURNETT
SDl-28
HEARSAy ........ .
ALLEN C. ISBELL
23
COMMENTS ON THE RECENT ELECTION .... ALLEN C. ISBELL
SOMETIMES THEY DO WEAR THE WHITE HAT 24
COURT TALES ....
JUDGE SHELLY HANCOCK 28
LETTERS ............. .
COLIN B. AMANN 32
THE CHAIRMAN SPEAKS ..
RANDY MC DONALD 33
ATTA GIRL/ATTA BOY ...
MARY E. CONN 33
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS ................................. . . 38
UARRIS COUNTY CRIMINAL LAWY[RS ASS OCIATION
Past Presidents 197f -1985
J. Anthony Friloux 1972-1973
Stuart Kinard 1973-1974
Geor'ge Luquette 1974-1975
MaY'Vin O. Teague 1975-1976
Dick DeGuer'in 1976-1977
W.B, "Bennie" House, Jr'. 1977-1978
David Bir'es 1978-1979
Wo ody Densen 1979-J980
Will Gr>ay 1980-1981
Ech,)ar>d Mallett 1981-1982
Carolyn Gar'cia 1982-1983
Jack B. Zimmer>mann 1983-1984
Clyde Williams 1984-1985
Rober't Pelton 1985-1986
rrom the President's Desk ...
By   EZizondo
Our organization is doing well. We are getting the brief
bank together. I encourage everyone to submit his or her appel-
late briefs so that all of our members can benefit.
Thanks to Allen Isbell, Editor, Robert Pelton, General Mana-
ger, and Donna Kleszcz, Administrative Assistant in charge of
production, Docket Call has continued to improve. It is now a
publication we can be proud of. We have added a new column in
Docket Call entitled "The Chairman Speaks." This column will be
edited by Randy McDonald, Chairman of the Board.
For years we have talked about getting a computer/word
processor for our association but economics would not allow it.
I'm proud to say that HCCLA has now purchased a computer/word
processor. It is hoped it will alleviate much of the paperwork
that needs to be performed. I am surprised that we were able to
function without a computer/word processor for so long. My next
goal is to connect the computer with West Law so that it will
benefit all the members.
Our Board has met with the Officers and Directors of the
Black Women Lawyers Association, the Houston Lawyers Associa-
tion, the Mexican American Bar Association, the Houston Trial
Lawyers Association and the Criminal Law Section of the Houston
Bar Association. We primarily discussed the Harris County Commi-
ssioners Court ordering the Harris County Criminal District Jud-
ges to not pay court appointed counsel above a certain set fee
schedule.
3
HCCLA  decided  that  any  order  created  by  a  County  Commis-
sioners  Court  which  tends  to  violate  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
Article  26.05  of  the  Texas  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  should  by 
rescinded.  To  that  effect  we  have  enacted  the  following  resolu-
RESOLUTION 
BE  IT  RESOLVED: 
That  the  Harris  County  Criminal  Lawyers  Association,  the 
Black  Women  Lawyers  Association,  the  Houston  Lawyers 
Association,  the  Mexican  American  Bar  Association,  the  Houston 
'rrial  Lawyers  Association,  and  the  Criminal  Law  Section  of  the 
Houston  Bar  Association  do  hereby  adhere  and  subscribe  to  the 
following  proposition: 
We  propose  that  the  District  court  Judges  of  the  State 
District  Courts  trying  criminal  cases  in  Harris  County,  Texas 
follow  the  Law  as  set  forth  in  Article  26.05  of  the  Texas  Code  of 
Criminal  Procedure  entitled  "Compensation  of  Counsel  to  Defend." 
We  propose  that  the  fee  schedule  approved  by  the  Board  of 
Judges  and  adopted  by  order  of  the  Harris  County  Commissioners' 
Court  be  rescinded.  Said  fee  schedule  and  order  violates  the 
terms  and  conditions  of  Article  26.05. 
We  do  hereby  encourage  each  and  every  District  Court  Judge 
trying  criminal  cases  to  fairly  compensate  attorneys  on  a  case  by 
case  evaluation  of  the  legal  services  rendered  within  the 
perimeter  of  Article  26.05. 
We  do  hereby  urge  each  of  the  District  Judges  trying 
criminal  cases  to  follow  the  law,  evaluate  the  specific  situation 
irlvolved  in  respective    ~ s e and  compensate  counsel  accordingly. 
P.S. 

DWI  AND  THE  LATE  NIGHT  TELEPHONE  CALL--PROTEGrING 
THE  CLIENT  AND  THE  ATTORNEY-CLIENT  PRIVILEGE 
BY J. GARY TRICHTER
I  •  I NTRODUCr ION. 
It  is  eleven  o'clock  p.m.,  the  house  lights  are  all  off, 
your  young  children  are  already  asleep,  and  you  and  your  spouse 
have  just  crawled  under  your  bed's  covers,  and,  the  telephone 
rings.  One  ring,  two  rings,  three  rings,  you  reach  for  the 
phone  and  pick  it  up.  As  you  hold  it  to  your  ear,  you  wonder 
who  would  be  calling  at  such  a  late  hour--you  say  "hello." 
Surpise!  It's  your  answering  service  or  it's  a  direct  call 
from  someone  personally  important  to  you  who  knows  your  unlisted 
number.  Indeed,  it  is  your  oldest  son  or  daughter,  your  brother 
or  your  sister,  your  law  partner,  or,  it's  your  most  valued 
c lie n t  c a I ling  for  h i ms elf  0  r  for  some0  n e  per sona I I Y c los e  to 
him. 
I rnne d i ate I y,  you r  bra i n  trys  tore act i vat e  its elf  from  its 
sleep  mode  and  you  as k  "Wha t  's  wr ong?"  The  answer,  says  the 
caller  in  a  distress  voice,  "I'm  under  arrest  for  driving  while 
intoxicated"  or  "My  child  has  been  arrested  for  driving  while 
intoxicated."  Then  asks  the  caller,  "What  do  I  do?"  Your 
sleepy  brain  responds:  "S  t"  and  "that's  a  good  question, 
what  do  I  do?" 
If  you  continue  reading  this  article,  you  will  know  exactly 
wha t  to  do.  However,  if  you  do  not,  and  you  do  not  know  the 
answer  to  your  question,  then  it  is  advised  you  never  divulge  to 
your  late  night  caller  this  article  was  in  your  hands  and  that 
you  failed  to  read  it  as  they  will  be  somewhat  upset  with  you. 

-----------------------....        .. ---
I I.  UNDERSTANDING  THE  PENALTIES  OF  THE  CRIMINAL  OFFENSE  OF 
DRIVING  WHILE  INTOXICATED. 
Driving  while  intoxicated  (OWl)  is  a  serious  crime  in 
Texas.  A  conviction  for  a  plain  manilla  OWl  carries  with  it, 
for  first-time  offenders  unless  it  is  probated,  a  minimum  of 
three  days  in  jail  and  a  $100  fine.  It  also  mandates  a  minimum 
sus pens ion  0  f  the  0  f fen d e r  's  d r i ve r  's  1 icen s e  for  90  day s  •  On 
the  other  side  of  the  punishment  coin,  the  maximum  punishment 
could  be  two  years  in  jail,  a  $2,000  fine,  and,  a  one  year's 
driver's  license  suspension. 
Political  action  groups  such  as  "Mother's  Against  Drunk 
Drivers"  and  a  growing  awareness  by  our  society  of  the  problems 
created  by  OWl  offenders  have  caused  the  OWl  penalty  anty  to  go 
up.  Once  found  guilty  of  a  DWI,  the  conviction  always  remains 
on  the  offender's  record.  No  longer  can  the  DWI  offender  be 
placed  on  deferred  adjudication  probation  where  the  case  is 
dismiss e d  up0  n  suec e s s f u 1  c omp 1 e t  ion  0  f  his  probat iona r y  t e r ms 
and  cond i t  ions.  In  fact,  all  OWl  convictions,  whether  probated 
or  not,  are  now  final  convictions.  And  by  the  way,  don't  forget 
that  upon  conviction,  the  DWI  offender  is  also  required  to  pay 
an  automobile  insurance  surcharge. 
III.  WHAT  IS  OWl? 
The  offense  of  OWl  occurs  where  a  person  drives  a  motor 
vehicle  while  "intoxicated"  in  a  public  place.  Sou n d s  simp Ie, 
it's  not!  Fir s t  0  f  a I I,  you  s h 0  u I d  not e  t hat  nomen tal  s tat e , 
i.e.,  intentionally,  knowingly,  recklessly  or  negligently,  is 
required  for  a  person  to  commit  a  OWl  offense. 
6
-------------------------------_....
Generally, the key focal point in a OWl case centers upon
the element "intoxication." It is very important to understand
that "intoxication" does not equate to "drunk." For examp 1e,
one can be intoxicated but not drunk. Further, for one to be
drunk he has to be intoxicated.
"Intoxicated" has been statutorily define in two ways.
First, a person can be intoxicated where he had lost the "normal
use of his mental and physical faculties" while he was driving.
Second, a person can be intoxicated where he had an "alcohol
concentration of .10 or more" in his blood, breath or urine
while he was driving. Note also that .10 at the time of driving
is conclusive of intoxication even if there was no impairment.
Here, too, it is important to note that a person can be
intoxicated from the use of alcohol, drugs, a controlled
substance or any combination thereof.
IV. THE DILEMMA OF THE SUSPECT CALLER.
Don't feel sorry for yourself that you were about to doze
off to dream heaven just prior to the telephone ringing. Your
call e r i s go i n g t h r 0 ugh he 11. He i sala yma n, and, i f he i s the
suspect, is facing both electronic and human agents of the
prosecution. Indeed, absent you, he is faced with all the law
enforcement power of our organized society and is inmersed in
the intricacies of substantive and procedural statutory and
constitutional law. Absent you, he wi 11 be compelled to go it
alone and make critical decisions. These decisions are ones
that by their very nature affect trial tactics and strategies--
once made, they are irreversible. Accordingly, you must act as
your caller's guiding hand and lead him through this criminal
law mine field.
7
A.  The  Defendant  Caller:  Understanding  What  Has  Already 
Happened  to  Him. 
If  you  are  talking  directly  to  the  DWI  suspect,  you  can 
rest  assured  that  he  is  already  down  at  the  arresting  officer'S 
headquarters  and  his  captors  are  continuing  in  their  attempts  to 
gat her  inc rimina ting  e v iden c e  from  him.  For  your  information, 
he  probably,  upon  being  stopped  while  driving  and  thereafter 
taken  into  custody,  has  already  made  an  oral  admission  (not 
electronic/audio  recorded)  that  he  had  been  drinking  an 
alcoholic  beverage  earlier  (usually  two  beers),  and,  already 
performed  some  motor  skill  demonstrations  (not  electronic/video 
recorded).  Further,  he  probably  watched  his  vehicle  get  towed 
away  by  a  wreCker,  and,  he  h ims elf  had  his  hands  handcuffed 
behind  his  back  and  was  also  towed  away  by  his  arresting 
officer. 
Moreove r,  he  has  most  likely  been  told  by  his  arresting 
officer  that,  upon  his  arrival  at  the  station  house,  he  wi 11 
again  be  requested  to:  1)  make  admisisions  and  perform  a  motor 
skills  demonstration  while  being  audio/video  electronically 
recorded,  and,  2)  submit  to  a  chemical  test  to  determine  his 
alcohol  concentration.  Lastly,  he  wi  11  also  probably  be  told 
t hat,  s h 0  u 1 d  her e f use  to  s u bmitt0  chern i c a I  t est i n g ,  i  • e .  , 
breath  or  blood,  his  driver's  license  will  automatically  be 
suspended  for  90  days  and  that  his  refusal  wi 11  be  used  against 
him  in  the  subsequent  OWl  criminal  prosecution. 
Accordingly,  now  you  (the  guiding  hand),  too,  understand 
some  of  those  irreversible  decisions.  Should  the  caller  consent 
to:  rna king  a dm iss ion s  0  f d r  i v i n g  0  r  d r  ink i n g ;  per for m  mo tor 
ski lis  demo n s t rat ionS;  0  r,  s u bmitt0  a  chern i cal  t est?  Wha tis 
. 1 0 ?  A r g u end0  ,  i f  he  consen t s  t 0  cherni cal  t est i n g ,  s h 0  u 1 d  he 
prov ide a b rea t h, b I 00d 0 r uri n e s p e c i me n ? On the 0 the r hand ,
if he does not, how should he refuse? Should he provide the
State with possibly incriminating evidence? How can he preserve
exculpatory evidence? How can he get out of jai I and avoid a
conviction and a possible driver's license suspension? Good
questions! I know! Please read on.
B. The Defendant Caller: What Is Presently Happening to Him?
1. Protecting the attorney/client privilege
Having the OWl suspect on the phone, you can both avoid the
first trap set by the prosecution and the malpractice suit your
caller will subsequently file against you for inadvertently
waiving his attorney/client privilege by simply telling him to
stop talking and listen. "Crazy," you think! "How can
provide the caller advice if I first don't find out the
background fact s?" Fur the r, you t h ink " c omno n sen set ell s me
that one must first hear what the client has to say before I can
advise him what to do, otherwise I will comnit malpractice."
My response to these two thoughts is" right" and "wrong"
respectively. Note that you, as the receiver of the call,
cannot see if officers are present with the caller. Note also,
t hat tel e ph0 n e s for DWI sus p e c t sin mo s t s tat ion h0 use s h a v e
been purposely placed inside rooms where everything said and
done is audio/video recorded. Therefore, in either a situation
where officers are present with the accused or his half of the
call is being electronically recorded, or both, there is no
attorney/client privilege.
This lack of privacy presents a cruel dilemna for the
novice attorney. Especially so, since our State Bar Ethical
Considerations 4-1 and 4-4 require that we vigorously protect
9
I
the  privi lege.  Of  course,  now  the  "stop  talking  and  listen" 
instruction  makes  more  sense.  Accordingly,  your  first  two 
questions  to  your  caller  ought  to  be  "Are  officers  or  other 
persons  present  with  you?"  and  "Are  you  ina  v ideo  room?" 
Again,  if  he  is  calling  you  from  the  station  house,  he  probably, 
as  he  talks,  is  confronted  with  both  police  officers  and  an 
electronic  audio/video  recorder. 
2.  The  Isolated  Suspect 
Should  the  caller  say  "no"  to  both  your  inquiries  then  feel 
free  to  have  him  speak  to  you--unless,  you  hear  an  electronic 
beep  every  30  seconds  or  so,  which  of  course  means,  the  entire 
conversation,  both  his  and  yours,  is  being  electronically 
recorded.  Also,  begin  your  talk  with  the  caller  by  instructing 
him  t 0  i mne d i ate 1y  tel 1  you  i fanyoneel s e  s h 0  u 1dent e r  his 
room. 
3.  The  "I've  got  Company"  Suspect 
S h 0  u I d  the  caller  say  " yes"  toe i the r  i n qui r y ,  i mne d i ate 1y 
advise  him  that  anything  he  says  can  be  used  against  him  (you're 
saved!).  Thereafter,  the  following  is  suggested: 
A)  Ha vet he  sus p e c t  say  tot he  0  f f ice r  "I  am  i n v 0  king  my 
right  to  have  counsel  present;" 
B)  Havet he  sus p e c t  say  tot he  0  f f ice r s  "I  am  requesting 
privacy  to  speak  to  my  lawyer."  No t e ,  t ha t  the 
ordinary  practice  of  the  police  is  to  refuse  such  a 
request; 
C)  Next,  have  the  suspect  say  "Wou I d  you  please  turn  off 
the  aud i 0  /  v ide0  came r a  so  I  can  talk  mo repr  i vat ely 
with  my  lawyer?"  Note  here,  too,  that  officers 
generally  do  not  honor  such  requests. 
Having  had  your  caller  make  these  statements,  on 
audio/videotape,  you  probably  have  protected  your  record  for  a 
claim  that  he  was  denied  his  right  to  counsel. 
After  all,  the 
10 
officer's  failure  to  afford  the  OWl  suspect  privacy  equates  to  a 
direct  intrusion  not  only  into  the  attorney/client  privilege, 
but  also,  the  constitutional  and  statutory  rights  to  assistance 
of  counsel.  C I ear 1 y ,  the  Frame r s  0 f  0 u r  con s tit uti 0 n a I  and 
statutorily  rights  to  counsel  invisioned  more  than  just  a  warm 
body  wi th  a  bar  card  as  ass i stance  of  counsel.  Rather,  their 
guarantees  embodied  the  promise  that  counsel  would  render 
effective  assistance,  and,  that  assistance  would  be  premised 
upon  the  free  flow  of  information  between  the  attorney  and  the 
cl ient. 
v .  YOUR  D I LFJ'tlNA • 
At  the  next  stage  of  the  proceeding  you,  have  some  very 
difficult  decisions  to  make.  However,  to  do  so,  the  good  lawyer 
needs  to  know  the  following: 
1)  Your  caller  will  most  likely  be  requested  to  submit  to 
a  breath  test.  The  breath  test  device  used  in  Texas 
is  called  the  Intoxilyzer.  Note  that  this  machine: 
a)  Is  premised  upon  the  average  person  and,  if 
your  caller  is  not  exactly  average  it  could 
unjustly  convict  him; 
b )  Doe s  not  pre s e r vet he  brea t h  s amp 1 e  t hat  i t 
tests.  Hence,  if  it  was  wrong,  there  is  no  way 
to  prove  its  error.  Note  also,  that  this 
device  is  capable  of  preserving  the  exact 
breath  specimen  tested  (so  there  could  be  a 
second  laboratory  analysis)  but  our  Texas  law 
does  not  require  the  preservation--this  is  so 
even  though  it  could  be  done  for  approximately 
fifty  cents. 
c)  Is  supposedly  effected  by  radio  frequency 
interference  (RFI)  or  as  it  is  sometimes 
c a I led,  e I e c t r 0 ma gnet icenergy •  RF I  can  a Iso 
cause  an  erroneously  high  breath  test  result 
which  could  unjustly  convict  your  caller.  For 
example,  there  is  some  evidence  that  the 
Intoxilyzer  is  effected  by  RFI  in  much  the  same 
1 1 
way  as  television/radio  reception  is  effected 
when  either  a  hair  dryer  or  vacuum  cleaner  is 
t urn e don.  For  you r  i n for rna ti 0 n ,  c omp ute r s , 
their  terminals,  photocopiers,  police  radar 
doppie r  de vice s  ,  and  pol ice  r a d i 0  s  em i t  RF 1. 
Note  also,  that  the  newest  model  Intoxi lzyer 
has  a  RFI  detector.  However,  our  Texas  models 
do  not. 
2.  A  Blood  Test  is  thought  to  be  the  most  accurate  means 
of  determining  a  person's  degree  of  intoxication.  A 
uri net est  i s  tho ugh t  to  bet he  I e as t  a c cur ate  me a n s  • 
Both  means,  however,  would  allow  for  subsequent  re-
analysis  by  both  the  prosecution  and  the  defense . 
3 •  • I 0    a p p liesat  the  time  0  f  d r  i v i ng .  A. 10 , 
thirty  minutes  after  driving  does  not  automatically 
equate  with  guilt--but,  it  could. 
4 .  Ape r son  i sonI y  de erne d  to  h a v e  con sen ted  toe i the r  a 
breath  or  blood  test  if  he  has  driven  on  a  public  road 
or  highway.  There  is  no  deemed  consent  where  one 
drives  elsewhere  in  a  public  place,  e.g.,  a  parking 
lot  or  a  beach.  Therefore,  if  the  person  was  not 
arrested  for  OWl  on  a  publ ic  road  or  highway  and  he 
refuses  all  chemical  testing,  his  driver's  license 
will  not  be  suspended. 
5 .  De erne d  consen tis  0  n 1 y  val i d  i f  the  0  f f  ice r  r e que s ted 
the  chemical  test  according  to  the  law.  The  officer 
must  inform  the  suspect,  both  orally  and  in  writing, 
be for e  her e que s t s  the  sus p e c t  ' s  s u bm iss ion  tot h e 
test,  that  upon  refusal:  1)  his  driver's  license 
will  be  automatically  suspended,  2)  that  he  has  a 
right  to  a  hearing  on  the  suspension,  and,  3)  that  his 
refusal  can  be  used  against  him  in  any  subsequent  DWI 
prosecution.  Hence,  where  the  law  is  not  followed,  it 
may  be  that  the  suspect's  license  will  not  be 
suspended  if  he  refuses.  On  the  other  hand,  where  the 
sus p e c t  s u bm its  to  chern i cal  t est i n g ,  but  the  0  f f icer 
has  not  followed  the  law,  the  test  resul ts  may  be 
excluded  from  evidence  (as  per  Art.  38.23,  Tex.Code 
Crim.Pro.).  6.Every  OWl  suspect,  who  submits  to  the 
prosecuti 0  n 's  chern i cal  t est,  has  a  s tat u tor y  righ t  t 0 
his  own  second  i ndependen t  blood  t est.  However,  the 
second  test  is  conditioned  on  it  being  performed 
wit h i n  two  h0  u r s  0  f  his  a r res t  .  Fur the r,  the  right  i s 
additionally  conditioned  upon  the  suspect's  ability  to 
pay  and  arrange  for  the  test.  Moreover,  the  statutory 
right  can  be  deliberately  denied  by  the  officer 
without  any  real  penalty  to  the  prosecution.  Note 
also,  that  a  suspect  may  have  a  constitutional  and 
statutory  due  process  of  law  right  to  his  own  test 
notwithstanding  he  has  refused  the  prosecution's  test. 
7 •  An  I n t 0  xiI Yz e r  t est  wi lIn0  t  reve a 1  the  pre senceof 
drugs  or  a  controlled  substance.  However,  a  blood  or 
urine  will  do  so. 
8.  Opinions  by  the  Texas  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  and  by 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  are  suggestive  that  a 
DWI  suspect  at  this  stage  of  the  proceeding  has  no 
right  under  the---s-ixth  amendement  of  the  Federal 
Constitution  to  assistance  of  counsel.  However,  our 
high  state  criminal  court  has  expressly  left  open  the 
questions  as  to  whether  or  not  the  right  to  counsel, 
at  this  stage,  exists  under  Art.  I,  SlO  (Right  to 
Counsel),  and  Art.  I,  519  (Due  Course  of  Law)  of  the 
Texas  Constitution,  and  under  Art.  1.04  (Due  Course  of 
Law),  Art.  1.05  (Right  to  Counsel),  Art.  15.17  (Right 
to  Have  Counsel  Present  at  Any  Police  Interview),  Art. 
38.22  (Right  to  Have  Counsel  Present  at  Any  Police 
Questioning)  of  the  Texas  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure. 
9.  Ordinari ly,  an  arrested  OWl  suspect  wi 11  be  held  in 
custody  unless  bail  is  made.  For  example,  in  Harris 
Co un t y ,  a  DW I  sus p e c t  will  r ema i n  i n  j a i I  un til  his 
t ria 1  un 1 e s s  abondin  the  amo u n t  0  f  $8 0 0  i s  a r rang e d 
with  the  Sheriff. 
10.  That  you,  since  you  had  the  opportunity  to  hear  and 
speak  to  the  accused,  i. e .  ,  observe  his  mental 
faculties,  might  be  a  witness  in  any  subsequent 
criminal  prosecution.  Hopefully,  i t  wi 11  be  as  a 
defense  witness. 
Okay,  so  now  you  know  almost  as  much  as  I  know.  The 
questions  then  become  "What  do  you  do?"  and  "What  do  you  tell 
the  caller?" 
My  answer  is  that  I  don't  know  because  it  depends  upon  the 
facts  of  each  case.  You  might  want  to  try  to  communicate  with 
the  caller  by  having  him  respond  to  your  quest ions  wi th  only 
13
"yes"  or  "no"  answers.  For  example,  you  might  count  upwards 
u n til  the  sus p e c t  s aid  " yes"  tot henumbe r  0  f  d r  ink she 
consumed,  or,  you  might  recite  the  various  types  of  alcohol 
until  he  said  "yes"  to  the  one  he  consumed.  However,  I  do  no t 
recommend  this  approach  because  it  forces  you  to  provide  advice 
when  you  have  very  inadequate  information.  In  addition,  I  can 
promise  you  that  this  method  of  attorney/client  communication  is 
slow  and,  because  it  is,  will  be  cut-off  quickly  by  the  officer. 
If  your  caller  sounds  great,  then  you  might  want  to  tell 
him  to  both  perform  a  motor  skills  demonstration  before  the 
v ide0  came r a  and  s u bmitt0  a n  I n tox i I Y  z e r  t est •  However,  I  do 
not  recorrmend  it  unless  you  don't  mind  saying  !loops!" 
VI.  MY  ADVICE. 
Jus t  1 ike  you riaw  s c h 00 1  e v iden c e  pro f e s so r  sa i d  "DonIt 
ask  a  cross-examination  question  unless  you  already  know  the 
answer,"  your  advice  to  the  suspect/caller  ought  to  follow  the 
same  rationale.  Therefore,  I  recommend  you  tell  your  caller  to 
respond  in  the  following  fashion: 
1)  Tell  the  off icer  he  wi 11  take  the  intoxi lyzer  test  if 
the  officer  will  save  the  breath  specimen  tested. 
This  the  officer  will  not  do,  but,  since  the  statement 
appears  on  videotape,  a  subsequent  fact  finder  will 
determine  the  suspect  was  neither  unreasonable  nor  had 
a  g u i I t Y  mind ,  i . e • ,  he  tho ugh the  wa sinn0  c e n t 
otherwise  he  would  not  have  agreed  to  submit  to  a 
reasonable  test; 
14 
2 ) Tel I the 0 f f ice r hewill s u bmitt0 a b I 00d t est i f a
licensed physician will perform the extraction. Note,
that ordinarily the officer will refuse this overture.
This action, too, wi 11 be preserved on audio/videotape
and will not appear unreasonable. Nor will it show
the suspect had a guilty mind. However, should the
caller actually have a sample about to be withdrawn,
then it is my advice that he refuse unless his own
personal physician actually draws the specimen;
3) Tell the officer he is not refusing either the
specific breath or blood test the prosecution is
offering, rather, he is not deciding unt i I he gets an
opportunity to discuss the facts of the case and his
decision, in private, with his lawyer. Again, as a
historical matter, this action will cause the
requesting officer to state on tape that he deems such
act ion a s aref usa 1 to s u bmitt0 cherni c a I t est i n g •
Note that if this should occur, then the officer is
e qua tingare que s t for cou n s e Ito bet he s arne a s
h a v i n g a !t g u i I t Y mind • If 0 f imp0 r therei s the fa c t
that such a conclusion is constitutionally
impermissible. In this regard, our new Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Reinquist, has
said that no rationale person could equate a request
for aid of counsel with a guilty mind;
4) Provide you with the full name and telephone number of
a f r i end 0 r rei a t i ve who w i I I ass i s tin rna king bond
for his release; and,
5) Tell the officer he is temporarily terminating the
i n t e r view un til you a r r i ve and s peak p r i vat ely wit h
him, and t hat aft e r s u c h con sui tat ion, he rna y s u bmi t
to a motor skills demonstration and their chemical
test. Note: It is very important that your client
understand he is to have no further communication with
his arresting officers about the facts of the case.
It is also suggested that you speak to the arresting
officer--if he will talk'to you, and he probably will not--and
tell him not to further interview your client until you or other
counsel you retain is present. As k the 0 f f ice r i f hew ill tel I
you why he arrested the caller. I f he doe s so, his s tat erne nt,
15
prior to him being polished by a prosecutor, will be preserved
on the audio/videotape. Also, inform the officer that your
client is not to be further questioned or interviewed by him or
other officers. Fur the r, de t e r mine from the 0  f f ice r the e x act
location of the suspect and the specific charges he intends to
fi Ie against him. This informat ion wi 11 assist you in having
your client bonded out as soon as possible.
I n add i ti 0  n , i f you are gut s y , a g amb 1 e r, and, extremely
lucky, you too should ask the officer for a private conversation
with the suspect. He will refuse. You should also tell the
officer that your client is not refusing to testing, rather, the
problem is that you cannot advise him what to do until you can
privately speak to him. Again, if history continues to repeat
itself, he will refuse you such an opportunity. Finally, you
should ask the officer, again, knowing he is on audio/videotape
if the suspect's waiting for you to physicially come to his side
will be deemed a refusal. Historically, this has also been
de erne d by the 0 f f ice r to be ref usa I • S h 0 u 1 d the proc e e ding
occur, then you probably will make a wonderful witness for your
client.
16 
--........  ..  
VI I. YOU'VE GOO' TO KNOW WHEN TO HOLD THEM AND KNOW WHEN TO FOLD
THEM.
1.  On  the  Caller/Suspect 
If you  got  this  far  and  followed  my  advice,  then  your 
caller  ought  to  put  you  in  his  will.  The  very  next  calls  you 
make  should  be  a  bondsman  and  a  physician.  Provide  them  with  as 
much  background  information  about  your  caller/suspect  as  you 
can.  In  regard  to  the  bondsman,  provide  him  with  the  caller's 
location  and  bonding  information.  In  regard  to  the  physician, 
ask  him  to  call  the  station  and  attempt  to  arrange  for  a  blood 
test.  Hewi I I  rna k e  a  val u a b lewi t n e s s  for  the  De fendan t  when 
the  police  refuse  him  access  to  your  client.  Hopefully,  this 
doctor  will  be  someone  you  have  already  prearranged  this  action 
with.  In  addition,  have  your  doctor  attempt  to  actually  get  the 
cl ient  on  the  telephone  by  call ing  the  stat ion  to  determine  if 
he  s h 0 u I d  be  chern i c a I I Y  t est e d .  If  he  is  successful,  then  he 
could  be  a  valuable  and  critical  witness  for  the  defendant  as  to 
him  not  los i n g  the  norma Iuse  0 f  his  me n t a I  f a cui ties  •  Note, 
however,  that  the  physician  should  be  careful  to  not  make  the 
defendant  inadvertently  make  admissions  on  the  latter  end  of  the 
call.  Note,  too,  that  the  physician,  as  your  agent,  is  covered 
by  the  attorney-client  privilege. 
In  regard  to  you  as  the  attorney,  attempt  to  arrange  bond 
for  you r  c lien t.  Fur the r,  you  s h 0  u 1 d  rna k e  a  de t e r mina ti 0  n  i fit 
would  be  fruitful  for  you  to  imnediately  visit  your  client  or 
17 
attempt  to  gather  other  eXCUlpatory  evidence,  e.g.,  witness 
names  and  statements  from  persons  that  defendant  was  recently  in 
the i r  company.  Remember  each  case  turns  on  its  own  merits  here 
and  this  is  one  decision  I  leave  to  your  good  judgment. 
2.  On  the  Suspect  Who  I s  Personally  Close  to  the 
Caller 
Just  as  noted  above,  get  as  much  information  from  the 
caller  about  the  arrestee  as  possible.  Determine,  if  you  can, 
the  suspect's  location  and  all  relevant  bond  information.  Don't 
forget  to  get  the  caller's  phone  nwnber.  Armed  with  this 
information,  again,  you  should  call  the  station  house  and 
attempt  to  speak  with  your  client  as  noted  above.  Aga in,  the 
aforementioned  advice  is  wholly  applicable  here  too! 
VIII. OONCLUS ION. 
DWI  is  not  only  a  serious  criminal  offense,  but  also,  it  is 
a  highly  complicated  one.  Guilt  and  innocence  is  .both 
determined  on  the  basis  of  subjective  and  quasi-scientific 
evidence.  I tis  an  0  f fen sewh0  sede fen seca 11 s  for  i rrrne d i ate 
and  knowledgeable  action  by  learned  defense  counsel.  Indeed,  it 
is  another  example  of  the  type  of  offense  that  lends  itself  to 
the  layman  and  novice  lawyer  easily,  by  their  lack  of  knowledge 
in  convicting  a  person  who  is  not  really  guilty.  Accordingly, 
the  lawyer  is  cautioned  to  walk  slowly  through  this  criminal  law 
mine  field.  I n  do i n g  sot he  I a wy e r  doe s  g rea t  s e r vice  for  the 
caller/suspect. 
ABOUT  THE AUTHOR
J.  Gary  Trichter  is  a  partner  in  the  law  firm  of  Mallett, 
Trichter  &  Brann  in  Houston,  Texas.  He  is  co-author  of  the  text 
entitled  "TEXAS  DRUNK  DRIVING  LAW"  and  also  writes  the  monthly 
colwnn  entitled  nDWI  Practice  Gems"  in  the  Voice  for  the 
Defense.  In  addition,  he  was  the  topic  speaker  for  DWI  for  the 
1986  Advanced  Criminal  Law  Course.  Mr.  Trichter  has  also 
written  many  journal  articles  and  has  taught  as  an  adjunct 
professor  of  law  at  South  Texas  College  of  Law  and  at  the 
University  of  Houston  Law  Center. 
18 
--...... -----------------
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGS
ON WEEKENDS FOR MISDEMEANORS
By Richard AndBrson
On 15 November 1986 the Harris County Criminal Court at Law
Judges began weekend hearings for all defendants detained on
misdemeanor charges in the Harr is County Jail. These hearings
were initiated to comply with Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975) and Bernard v. Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023 (1993). The
Judges are currently de ndants in a federal class action suit,
pending before Judge Bue, wherein the plaintiff's are alleging
that the failure to provide a prompt determination of probable
cause (in misdemeanors) for further detention is a violation of
due process. Therefore, these hearings have been initiated to
accomplish several narrow objectives:
1) Determine Probable Cause
detention:
for further
2) Give the defendant his statutory
warnings pursuant to Article
15.17 V.A.C.C.P.;
3) Set bail according to the
adopted by the Judges;
schedule
4) Review eligibility for and grant
Pre-trial Release Bonds where appropriate.
The defendant will not be appointed counsel at these hearings, nor
will any plea be entered.
An Assistant district attorney will be present to offer a
factual recitation of probable cause for further detention.
Obviously, defense counsel is welcome to appear and be heard on
behalf of a client.
19
Under the authority of Section 75.403, Government Code, the
Judges have appointed Mr. Jim Garrett as a special judge to con-
duct the weekend hearings. Mr. Garrett is a former assistant
district attorney and had a general practice of law for over ten
years in Harris County. The past year Mr. Garrett worked for the
Harris County Commissioners Court as the Criminal Justice
Coordinator. He is appointed under the same statutory authority
used by the County Criminal Courts to appoint special judges (i.e.
Candy Elizondo, Rick Trevathan, Ray Montgomery, etc.) to call the
regular docket of a Court when the presiding judge is ill, on
vacation or otherwise unable to preside. While Mr. Garrett is
empm.,rered under the same statute, he wi 11 not appoint counsel,
take pleas, conduct trials, sign evidentiary search warrants, or
issue arrest warrants.
Mr. Garrett will also conduct emergency mental coromi tment
hearings on behalf of the Justices of the Peace and the Harris
County Probate Judges.
The prohable cause hearings are conducted in a newly con-
structed hearing room in the hasement of the Harris County Jail.
Only defendants who have been booked into the county jail will
appear before Mr. Garrett. Defendants ylho have bonded out prior
to booking will not be required to appear. Currently, Mr. Garrett
conducts the hearings between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. each
Saturday and Sunday. The time of the hearings has not been
permanently arranged as the Judges are attempting, in cooperation
with the Sheriff, to standardize the time consistent with the flow
of prisoners from the outlying jails. Additionally, hearings will
20
CffJit;ni/ican!  O<J)ecisions 
FIRST COURT OF APP(ALS
By L.   III
Decisions 10/1/86 through 11/6/86
JAMES MONROW LUCAS V. STATE, No. 01-85-921-Cr, 11/6/86 J. Cohen
WHEN REPEAT PROPERTY OFFENSES ARE JOINED IN ONE INDICTMENT
PUR S U ]'I. N T TOON E C R I I N ALEPIS0 D F. , A. U THO R I Z I 1'1 G i'-1 U L TIP L E
CONVICTIONS, AND THE DEFENDANT fvl0VES TO SERVER, SEPARATE
JUDGMENTS MAY BE ENTERED ON EACH COUNT.
As a general rule, only one conviction per indictment. However,
repeated property offenses may be joined in one indictment or
information, and separate convictions obtained for each count.
TPC 3.01. Where the defendant moves to sever each count, does the
trial judge enter one judgment at the end of all t:he trials on
all the counts, or instead, enter a judgment on each count at the
end of each count. We are now told: a judgment on each count is
OK (and why would anybody think otherwise?)
This case is illustrative of the sort of low level harrassment
experienced by underpaid, overworked, but ot.herwised highly
motivated court appointed appellate counsel s. Dur ing oral
argument in the above noted case, the (unnamed but well thought.
of) counsel for appellant argued long and hard and with great
sinceri ty that the only just and right. rule would be one judgment.
only per indictment. Counsel was half way through his allotted
t.ime, synthesizing various cases and statutes, when Justice
Cohen inquired: "Now counsel, this isn't: one of the burning legal
issues of the day, now is it?" The observation was well t.aken,
but beside the point. This sort of stuff would be more palatable
if there wasn't a $1500 cap on court appointed appellate work.
WILLIAM R. PABST V. STATE, No. 01-85-437-Cr, 10/30/86 J. Dunn
GETTING IT IN THE DA'S OFFICE IS OK.
Defendant complained that he was denied discovery of truck loads
of records. The opinion points out that counsel and client were
able to see the documents in a conference room. The procedure
satisfied CCP 39.14.
MARY TOWNSEND MURPHY V. STATE, No. 01-85-912-Cr, 10/30/86. J.
Evans
APPLICATION OF NEW JURY INSTRUCTION ON PAROLE LAWS TO TRIAL
AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE OF NEW RULE, BUT TO OFFENSE OCCURRING PRIOR
,... TO EFFECTIVE DATE I HELD NOT TO BE EX POST FACTO.
I f you haven't heard by now, juries are being inst.ructed on (1)
how t.he parole laws work, (2) some adjustment in t.he particular
charge given to conform to how the parole laws work to the
so NOV/DEC 1986 1
offense charged, and (3) not to try to apply (1) and (2) to
the accused before them. CCP 37.07 section 4. In t-his case, t.he
offense occurred before the effective date ofthis legislative
change, but the trial occurred afterwards. Since Article 37.07
section 4 did not change the elements of the offense, or increase
the range of punishment, the application of the new procedural
rule was not constitutionally prohibited as an ex post facto law.
MICHAEL RAY DREW V. STATE, No. 01-85-908-Cr, 10/16/86 J. Dunn
EXTRANEOUS UNADJUDICATED OFFENSES NOT ADMISSIBLE IN JURY
PUNISHMENT.
The general rule is that unajudicated extraneous offenses are not
admissible at the punishment phase of a jury. Ct is careful to
note that a million exceptions exist to this rule, such as to
rebut a defensive issue or a false impression of being good.
fOURT((NTU COURT Of APP(ALS
Decisions 10/1/86 through 11/6/86
KEVIN GERFORD ANDERSON V. STATE, No. 14-85-S76-Cr, J. Robertson,
9/25/86
A NEGOTIATED DEFERRED ADJUDICATION PLEA DOES NOT BAR THE LATER
APPEAL AFTER THE GUILT IS ADJUDICATED.
Basic rule is that when a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to an
agreed rec, and the trial court assesses within the rec, no right
of appeal except for pretrial matters raised in writing, or with
the trial court I s permission. Where the defendant gets deferred
as his plea bargain, there is no right to appeal then and there.
However, once his guilt is adjudicated, his first right of appeal
attaches. An agreed plea bargain to be placed on deferred does
not bar the later appeal. However, where the defendant enters
into a second agreed plea, at the motion to adjudicate guilt
hearing, he is barred generally from appealing, except as noted
above.
UNDER THE NEW RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, AN AGREED PLEA DOES
NOT BAR AN APPEAL FRm1 THE GUILTY PLEA OR MATTERS OCCURRING AFTER
THE PLEA.
Now is a good time to mention this. Rule 40(b) Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure is written differently from the former
Article 44.02 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The new rule
states:
Notice of appeal shall be given in writing. Such notice
shall be sufficient if it shows the desire of the
defendant_ to appeal but if the judgment was
rendered upon his plea of guilty and his
punishment assessed does not execeed the punishment
recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the
so NOV/DEC 1986 2
defendant and his attorney, in order to prosecute an
appeal for a non jurisdictional defect or   r r ~ r which
occurred prior to the entry of ~ plea the notlce shall
state . • ."
The language suggests that jurisdictional error may be raised
regardless of t.he plea, t.hat the guilty plea hearing itself can
always be appealed, and matters after the plea (such as a motion
for new trial) can be raised, all without permission of the trial
court. NOTE THAT RULE 40(B) HAS A SPECIAL PROVISION FOR HOW THE
NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE DRAFTED. READ IT REFORE YOU GIVE YOUR
NEXT APPEAL.
MISANALYZED COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
By Henry L. Burkholder III
RANDALL HAIGE JAMAIL V. STATE, No. 14-85-019-Cr, 7/10/86, opinion
by Sears, J.
(This is my second attempt to get it right).
REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO CHEMICAL TEST OF BLOOD OR RREATH
INADMISSIBLE, WHERE REFUSAL WAS MADE DURING PERSISTENT
INTERROGATION OF DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF EDWARDS V. ARIZONA.
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) the Court held that
once an accused invokes his Miranda right to counsel, all
interrogation must as a general rule cease. In McCambridge v.
State, No., 1086-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 5/14/86) the Court held t.hat
there is no constitutional right to counsel (under the 5th or 6th
Amendments) at the time an accused charged with DWI must decide
whether to submit to or refuse a chemical test of his blood or
breath. McCambridge left open the door ever so slightly on the
issue of counsel, however, by holding:
n[WJe do not imply that a rememdy will never be
available to a suspect who is confused when faced with
Miranda warnings and a breat.h testing decision without
the benefit of requested counsel."
In Jamail the Court recognized just such a problem. The defendant
in that case was given Miranda warnings. Apparently the defendant
was not t.otally wasted, and sensing that things were not going
his way through t.act and diplomacy, got nasty and demanded
counsel. Interrogation continued unabated, and somewhere in t.he
waive after waive of Edward violat.ions, t.he defendant. was asked
to submit to a chemical test. Naturally, t.he defendant refused.
Justice Sears wrote: "Under the facts of this case, we are
unable to separate the wrongful custodial interrogation from the
consent for a breath or blood sample. Both are fruits of the
poisonous tree." The defendant in Jamail was not. necessarily
confused by the Miranda warnings .-However, when the pol ice
continued to question in violation of the defendant's rights, the
Court found that the violation of Miranda carried over to the
defendant's decision as to whether to consent or not to the
chemical test.
SD NOV/DEC 1986 3
Last time this aut.hor analyzed this case, praises were sung to
the poor and wretched (but not under paid in this case) defense
counsel, who after a record book shat.tering defeat at the HCCLA
election polls, nevertheless managed to win this case on appeal.
However, even more praises should be sung to the real man behind
the case-Justice Ross A. Sears, who wrote the majority opinion in
Jamail. His decision to reverse a conviction in an area of law
where the appellate courts are straining to find more ways to
affirm convictions is both refreshing and courageous.
COURT OF CRIMINAL APP[ALS By Catherine Greene Burnett
fx__par:t€l No. 69.574 -- Writ of Corpus.
Rei ieF Granted --Judge Onion; Judge White concurs in result
November S, 1986
FUNDAMENTALLY DEFECTIVE INDICTMENT RENDERED VOID A PRIOR ROBBERY
CASE USED AT PENALTY STAGE. NOTWITHSTANDING LACK OF PROPER
OBJECTION -- ERROR NOT HARMLESS: The rule seems to be that if
thf' pr i or conv i ct. i on was based upon a fundaments 1 I y defect i ve
indictment. which in turn would mean that the trial court aid not
have jurisdiction, the Judgment In said prior conviction and for
enhancement is subject to attack, even an 11.07 attack. Perhaps
a diFFerent situatIon exists If the defendant attacks a prior
used For enhancement on the ground that It is void
because the defendant ws I nd I gent and wi thout. counse I. Ex
Wrlit.q, 659 S.W.2d 434.
The court next assessed harm and found that this robbery
conviction was one of Five prior convictions but that the others
involved - two for possession of marijuana, one for attempted
burglary and one For burglary; and that durinq jury arquments.
prominence was gIven to the prior robbery conviction and the
prosecutor urqed t.he "ascending scale of vj()lence" type arqument.
Trle jury set punishment at 50 TDC. TeA found that there was a
reasonable plnsibillty that the evidence complained of
contributed to the punishment.
AS TO ALLEGATION THAT PROSECUTOR SUPPRESSED MATERIAL EVIDENCE
DURING THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY TRIAL: Where app] icant acutally
knew the facts which were allegedly withheld. he cannot seek
rei jef on the basis of the state's al leqed fal lure to disclose
those same Facts.   429 S.W.2d 490. Obviously,
upon retrial. this suppression of evidence claim wi I 1 present no
problem.
* * * * ..
SO NOV/DEC 1986 4
  .•  No.  69,463  -- Capital  Murder  [Death]  Reversed 
Judqe  Teague;  Concurring  in  result:  Judges  Onion,  Davis.  Davis, 
Cl  inton,  McCormick  and  Campbell;  not-participating:  Judqe  White 
November  5,  1986 
DEFENDANT'S  CONFESSION  INVOLUNTARY  AS  A  MATTER  OF  LAW  BECAUSE  OF 
IMPROPER  WARNING:  Investigating  pol  ice  oFFicer  real ized  that  he 
needed  a  conFession  From  D  to  make  the  case.  D's  confession  and 
a  tape  recording  of an  Interview  with  him  were  admitted  into 
evidence.  The  record  apparently  is  replete  with  reFerences  to 
the  fact  that  iF  D  conFessed  his  chances  of  not  gettinq  the  death 
penalty  increased.  etc. 
However,  the  back-breaker  is  Found  in  the  warning  given  by  the 
oFficer  to  the  defendant  that  his  confession  could  be  used  "For 
Hnd  against  him".  To  warn  an  accused  that  his  conFession  might 
he  used  for'  hi rn  ho 1ds  out  an  i nclucement  For  mak I ng  the  i on 
and  r-fmders  it  inadmissible  as  a  matter  of  law. 
!4-j  S.W.2d  1035;  141S.W.2d  613; 
187  S.W.2d  555.  This  one  Fact  was  not  controverted  in  any 
way  in  the  record.  The  Court  concluded  that  the  oFFicer's 
to  the  deFendant  caused  the  conFession  to  become 
involuntary  and  thus  inadmissible.      458  S.W.2d 
(. j n .
* * * * *
No.  1103-85  Sexual  At)use  of  Chil(j 
Conviction  Remanded  -- Per  Curiam  Opinion.  Judges  Onion  and  Teague 
dissenting  November  12,  1986 
NOTE:  CA  decision  reversing  conviction  reported  at  696 
S.W.Zd  457 
TCA  REFUSES  TO  RECONSIDER  ITS  RULING  THAT  DEFENSE  OF 
"PROMISCUITY"  IS  UNAVAILABLE  TO  SAME  SEX  DEFENDANT  AND  VICTIM: 
CA  r,e 1 d  that,  D  was  improper I y  den i ed  the  def'ense  of'  "prom i sell i ty" 
under  the  now  repealed  V.T.C.A.,  Penal  Code,  Section  21.IO(b). 
That  statute  spiclf'ically  limited  Its  appl  ication  to  ofFenses 
where  the  victim  was  of'  the  oposite  sex  f'rom  the  acu5sed.  CA 
held  that  such  I imiting  provision  was  an  unconstitutional 
violation  of'  the  right  to  equal  protection.  and  struck  the 
I  imiting  provision. 
TCA  had  previously  held  that  Sec.  21.10(b)  was  not  a  violation  of
equal  protection  in  an  opfnion  deliver'ec1  In  April  1985. 
v.  S. W.  2d  (Tex. Cr i m. App.  No.  71  1-83.  de 1 I verecJ 
April  24,  1985.  opinion  on  rehearing  delivered  on  September  24. 
19861 Boutwell  did  not  address  the  constitutional lty  of'  the 
statute  again.  TCA  declines  to  do  so  in  this  case  and  remands  to 
CA  for  f'urther  consideration  in  light  of  Boutwel  I. 
* * * * *
SO  NOV/DEC  1986  5 
      No. 1302-85 -- Opinion on
Appe I 1 ant I s
PDR: aggravated rape conviction aFFirmed -- Judge Tom Davis:
Judges Clinton. Teague and Campbell concur November 12, 1986
NOTE: Th i sis the or i gina I AJrr:v:?n?_<'1 Jury
charge case. PDR Fol lows the remand.
CA decision is Found at 696 S.W.2d 282
JURY CHARGE -- OBJECTION INSUFFICIANT TO PUT TIC ON NOTICE AS TO
ALLEGED DEFECT: On remand CA Found harm to D was "not eqreqiou-;;".
PDR was granted to determine whether the CA applied the proper
standard For harm and whether D had properly otljected at trial.
o was on trial on two counts of agqravated rape; the aggravatinq
element in each count was that submission was compel led by threat
of death to imminently infl icted. The first count alleged the
trlreat of death was direct.ed toward complainant; second count
alleged the threat had aimed at complainant's husband. T/C
submitted both to jury and D was convicted on second count.
Error in charge occured because the aggravating element in each
count was charged in the dis junci: i ve -- i. e., jury was instruct ed
to Find D guilty of aggravated rape iF they Found he compel led
submission by force [rape] iF they found he compel led
submission by threat of death [the aggravating elementl. Witt,
this charge D could have been convicted of aqgravated rape if the
Jury bel ieved he was guilty only of rape.
On remand D contended he made a timely and specific object.ic'n to
the er ror and that the "some harm" test shou I d be app I led rathel-
than "egregious harm". D's trial objection was "ioor'ce" sr)ould
not have been defined. TCA held that objection bore no
relationship to the objection which should have been made -- that
the charqe al lowed conviction for aggravated rape in
circumstances that showed only guilt for rape. In addition TeA
held that these trial objections based on the incorrect
premise that the word "force" did not appear in the Indictment,
which it did. D agrued to TCA that if tic had sustained his
incorrect objection, tic   have also removed any reference to
the term Force in other parts of the jury Instruction. In
absence of a specific objection CAc correctly utilized the
egregious harm test.
.. * * * *
WHITSITT v. Honorable LannY_fiamsax. No. 69,636
Writ of Mandamus Granted -- Judge White; Judge Campbell concurs
in results. Judge Teague dissents. Concurring Opinions by Judges
Onion and Miller November 12. 1986
MANDAMUS -- WHAT ACTION CAN TIC TAKE WHEN D WAIVES RIGHT TO
APPEAL AS PART OF RECOMMENDED SENTENCE? TeA ORDERS THAT TIC
VACATE ITS ORDER INSTRUCTING THE DISTRICT CLERK TO "HOLDt! THE
NOT I CE OF APPEAL AND SCHEDULl NG A "SHOW CAUSE
tt
HEARING TO
DETERMINE WHETHER D SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO APPEAL.
SO NOV/DEC 1986 6
F.. Jury  conv i cted  Din  two  cases  of  h 1 nder i nq  secured 
creditor.  In  exchange  for  recommended  sentence  by  state.  D 
aqreed  to  waive  jury  assessed  punishment  and  right  to  appeal.  D 
waived  right  to  appeal  prior  to  assessment  of  punishment  and  then 
orally  after  probation  was  granted.  TIC followed  recommended 
However.  D  proceeded  to  fi Ie  timely  notice  of  appeal. 
TIC directed  dIstrict  clerk  to  hold  notice  of  appeal  In  abeyance. 
TCA  agreed  that  tIc's  action  was  improper.  The  plain  language  of 
Article  44.08  V.A.C.C.P.  shows  that  fording  a  notice  of  appeal  is 
a  procedura I  matter  that.  sha 11  "be  done  by  the  clerk".  Therefore 
neither  tIc or  clerk  had  any  discretion.  Mandamus  was  proper 
remedy  -- D  had  no  other  adequate  remedy  because  his  attempt  to 
appeal  had  been  blocked  by  tIc and  habeas  corpus  was  not 
available  because  D  did  not  have  "final  conviction"  by 
Article  11.07. 
CONCURRING  OPINION  [ONION]:  It  is  beyond 
dispute  that  TCA  has  jurisdiction  to  issue 
writ  of  mandamus.  However.  cause  would  be 
best  left  to  CIA to  whom  appeal  was  taken  and 
whose  juridlction  Is  involved. 
CONCURRING  OPINION  [MILLER1:  Is  concerned 
that  parties  may  not  real ize  question  of  0'5 
waiver  of  right  to  appeal  might  be  contested 
in  CA  before  it  receives  the  entire  record. 
Miller  views  State  as  able  to  file  a  motion 
to  dismiss  in  CA  bringing  up  only  that 
portion  of  testimony  and  statement  of  facts 
germane  to  queslton  of  appeal  waiver. 
.. .. * * ..
R.  No.  629-82  -- Possession  of  Cocainf:' 
Conviction  Reversed:  Opinion  on  Appel  lent's  PDR  on  Motion  for 
Rehearing  -- Judge  Cl  inton;  Judges  Onion  and  Tom  Davis  concurring 
In  result.  Judges  W.  C.  Davis  and  Whfte  dissenting  November  19, 
1986 
NOTE:  TeA's  original  opinion  on  D'S  PDR 
affirmed  conviction. 
WARRANT  AFFIDAVIT  -- ALTHOUGH  REASONABLE  INFERENCES  CAN  BE 
DRAWN  FROM  INFORMATION  CLEARLY  SET  OUT  IN  AFFIDAVIT.  REVIEWING 
COURT  CAN  NOT  READ  IN  MATERIAL  THAT  DOES  NOT  APPEAR  ON  ITS  FACE: 
D  argued  that  affidavit  In  support  of  search  warrant  was 
insufficient  under  state  and  federal  constitutions.  Conviction 
was  affirmed  by  El  Paso  CA  in  unpublished  opinion  delivered  in 
,June  of  1982.  one  year  before  dec f s  ion  in  .UJ.LnLQ.?_'I-!_§£tl?_s,  462 
U.S.  213  (1983)  using  two-prong  test  of    378 
U.S.  723  (1964)  The  CA  concluded  that  "cumulative  import"  of  al I 
the  al  legations  in  the  affidavit  was  sufficient. 
SO  NOV/DEC  1986  7 
Relevant parts of the affidavit alleged that:
"A conf I dent I a I i nfor'mant. who is we I I known
In the community. a reputable person and who
is galnfUllYf employed and who affaint "'"
has known or many years to be re lab e
person. Affaint [sic] has checked cr'iminal
history on people Involved and shows
evidence the two people involved show the
most recent arrest. as Dec. 1979, arrest made
for a dangerous drug and possession of stolen
property. Surveil lance has been set up and
activity is taking place in the garage area.
where these people back their car all the way
Into the garage, where a storage is visiblv
seen directly In back of the garage area.
When Keith Henderson was observed by Affaint
[sic] on 4-2-80 carrying brick type packages
believed to be marijuana. A plastic tub with
plastic tubeing [sic] was also observed being
carried Into the back yard by one Keith
Hendel-son. I nformant has a I so ,-evea Ied that
Keith Henderson fr-equents tr',e piace on a
da I I y tJases. Th f 5 I nformat Ion has been check
out by Affalnt [sic] and surveil lance began
since March 31, 1980. bv Affaint f:::.icl. /O,f-
Main point of contention during Jury argument was Identified by
State as a credibility of D's claim he had been stabbed. To
support of this argument State stressed no knife was found. that
all the blood found at the scene was deceased's rare blood type.
that deceased was so intoxicated [.36%] as to have been virtually
defenseless, and that there was no evidence deceased was violent.
Circumstantially State highlighted evidence Inconsistent with D's
claim of ignorance of amount of blood and number of wounds
inflicted. Defense counsel rebutted state's argument. Defense
agreed that the paramount issue for Jury determination was
whether D had told the truth in claiming he had been (or at least
reasonably believed he had been) stabbed first.
A 1 though vo I untary mans I augtlter was not. necessar I 1 y an tlaft.er'
thought" as ft was in     700 S.W.2d 208. 213 the
issue of "sudden passion" was in the TCA's view "quite obviously
the least of D's priorities, Judging from his presentation of the
evidence and his argument. both of which emphasize the
Justification of his conduct under the law of self defense".
CONCURRING OPINION [ONION]: Does not believe issue of
"sudden passion" was raised.
DISSENTING OPINION [CLINTON]: Dissents for same reason
stated in Lawrence. Also takes issue with conclusion
of CA that issue of "sudden passion" was not raised.
Good discussion of evidence for what raises sudden
passion when 0 testifies he is "scared".
* * * * *
SD NOV/DEC 1986 8
Opinion on State's PDR: Competency
  No. 404-84--
Hearing Upheld -- Judge W.
C. Davis; Judge Teague concurs in
by Judge Onion joined by Judge
result, Concurring Opinion
McCormick, Dissenting Opinion
by Judge CI inton November 19, 1986
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE WHAT IS THE CORRECT STANDARU FOR
REVIEW OF JURY FINDING AT D'S COMPETENCY HEARING? TCA says that
standard of proof in competency hearing is that Incompetency must
be proved by proponderance of evidence. Because standard Imposed
identical where 0 seeks to avoid criminal conviction by asserting
affirmative defense of insanity [P.C. Sec. 8.01(a)] standard of
review establ ished in Guilder, No. 899-84, del ivered November
6. 1985 should be used. When appel late court reviews sufficiency
of evidence in competency hearing, it may only ask whether the
evidence presented was legally sufficient to support jury
rlnding. CA must look at all evidence on competency in I ight most
favorable to jury finding. then determine if any rational trier
Gf fact could have found that 0 failed to prove his defense by
faint [sic] has also observed
several
narcotic users in and out of 724
Del Mar,
staying for brief periods of time."
Also contained in affidavit was statement that D was seen unlaw-
fully possessing marijuana and cocaine by the Informant within
past 24 hours, and that Affiant had good reason to believe that
drug was now concealed by 0 at 724 Del Mar Street.
TCA recognized that search warrant affidavit must be read in
common sense and realistic manner. and that any reasonable
Inferences could be drawn from facts and circumstances contained
within Its four corners.
However, this affidavit was not sufficient for the fol lowing
reasons:
1. The only information provided by the confidential Informant
in affidavit is that sometime wi·thin 24 hours of the morninq of
4-4-80 rwhen affidavit was sworn to) he had seen marIjuana and
cocaine "'!PE,!,=_en!.L2:': in DIs possession at an undisclosed location.
tlad case been dec i ded under Aqu i 1ar tt1ere wou 1 d have been a
Pl'ob 1em with the "verae i ty" it was not asserted that
informant lacked any criminal record or shown he had given
information in the past that had proved accurate. Even if total
trustworthiness were assumed on Informantls part, his information
alone fails to show contraband could be Found at 724 Del Mar
Street neither 0 nor drugs were In any way connected witt,
that address.
NOTE: Assert i on that "prem I ses are in the   5 I on
and under the control of 0" Is not attributed to
informant. It is purely conclusory '3tatement; a source
1s not qiven for it.
SO NOV/DEC 1986 9
2. Affiant stated he "checked criminal history on two people
involved" and found "the most recent arrest as Dec. 1979". for
possession of dangerous drugs and stolen drugs. The identity of
the "2 people involved" is not disclosed nor is what they are
81legedly involved In. Neutral reader is not told by what means
cr i m ina I h I story of these peop I e was checl<ed and whether "most
recent arrest" was for one or both people. Lastly, neither of
the two people Is connected in any way with the home at 724
Del Mar Street -- unless, one of them happens to be Keith
Henderson, a fact not disclosed by the affidavit.
3. A I though aff i ant st.ates that "surve I 1 1 ance was set uo" he
does not say where. While it is not totally unreasonable to
bel ieve that it was the home at 724 Del Mar that fact is "by no
means selfevident".
4. Fact that "these people" [TCA says presumably may be "two
people" alluded to above, although this is not definite) drive
their cars all the way into the garage Is not conduct which is
unusual on its face. Neither is presence of storage in a garage.
Affidavit does not state that "activity" in the garage area some-
how Involves storage faci 1 Ity.
S. Affiant states that on 4-2-80 he observed Keith Henderson
carrring "brick type packages bel ieved to be Marihuana".
Affidavit does not state how affiant can identify Henderson; does
not state where Henderson was seen earrIng the packages; cloes not
say who believed the packages to be marijuana or the basis for
th is be lief [other than the fact that they were br i ck type 1 .  
TeA says significance of plastic tub and tubing Henderson was
seen carrying to the back yard "escapes us". Common knowledge
does not suggest that sale or ingestion of marijuana or cocaine
cal Is for the use of these ftems and affidavit does not set out
information to justify such conclusion as a matter of special ized
knowledge.
6. Affiant's observation of "several narcotics users in and out
of 724 Del Mar, staying for brief periods of time" was not
supported by statements of how affiant came by this information
or the basis for his bel ief that these "several" people were
narcotics users. No showing that marijuana or cocaine are amo ng
the narcotics these people are known to use. TCA notes that
although the fact that known narcotic users frequent a place For
brief stretches of time may be enough to corrobot'ate an
informant's tip, so as to combine to estab\ ish probable cause, it
does not by }t?J2.Jf provide more than a t'easonable suspicion that
contraband may be found there.
NOTE: This case is not one in which TCA was primari ly
concerned with evaluating reI iabil Ity of inFormation
that was hearsay as to the afFiant; rather focus was on
whether under the "totality of the circumstances" the
information in affidavit provided "substantial basis"
to support magistrate's findinq. """
* * * * *
SO NOV/DEC 1986 10
Jackie GOFF, No. 656-83 -- Murder Conviction Opinion or.
PDR - Per Curiam, Concurring Opinion by Judge Onion,
Dissenting Opinions by Judges CI inton and Teague November 19.
1986
NOTE: CA's opinion reported at 681 S.W.2d 619
JURY INSTRUCTION VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER -- FAILURE TO PLACE
BURDEN ON STATE OF NEGATING SUDDEN PASSION IN THE APPLICATION
PARAGRAPH APPLYING LAW OF MURDER TO FACTS WAS NOT FUNDAMENTAL
ERROR REFLECTING "EGREGIOUS HARM": Jury charge here
from same I i rm i ty as I ve charge i n 0, 675 S. W. 2d
749 it to place on State the burden negating sudden
passion when charge applying law murder to the As a
result there exists a "decided I ikel ihood" the jury may have
dispossed of D's case without ever having to consider the sudden
passion issue which, raised by the evidence, must be
by State beyond reasonable doubt.
TeA t.hat any 1 " error incase was harm less
because evidence led to support the charge given on voluntary
manslaughter. D sought PDR on theory that when TeA has a
fundamental in charge, no determination harm need be
made as a prerequ is i te to reversa I . Then a I on9 comes  
686 S.W.2d 157 t!.ELQ: because no object. ion to charge was made at
trial. failure to give Jury instruction authorizing conviction
for' murder I n accordance with i must create "egreg i ous
harm" reversal warranted.
TeA record and concluded that, even assuming issue of
"sudden passion arrising an adequate cause" was raised bv
evidence, voluntary manslaughter was an "incidental" theory
defense, so that the "subtle deletion" t.he State's tJUf'den
on the absence sudden passion could not "real IsticaJ Iy
be construed to Inure to D's egregious harm. evidence
here consist.ed entirely D'S testimony.
Facts show that both D and deceased had been drinking heavi Iv
all day. They initially encountered each other at a pool hal I.
where deceased was bel I igerent. Later that evening 0 went to
pick up roommate's at bar were she danced. Deceased
was there, making a pest Deceased made statement
indicating he intended to "kill" D and jabbed D in ribs with
unspec i i ed blunt obJect. Deceased then suggest.ed t.hey 00 out--
side and fight. 0 stated he intended to hit deceased with door
as they went through it, but he could do so, deceased
stabbed him In the leg. Once outside deceased with D
companion and D stabbed him. Deceased then "took running".
D's brother joined him at the door and the two of them followed
the deceased and D's out into a They found the
friend kicking deceased, who was on the ground. D and his friend
then carried the deceased to a ditch across the road. LAter,
when he learned deceased's death, 0 feared deceased rlad bled
to death from the wounds wh 1ch he had i nf I I cted, so he l'an
away. 0 never saw his friend w1th a knife and testified he never
saw a knIfe In deceased's hand. He was equally persisteant in
his test. i mony that, once stabbed, he became "scared". I n the
nature of rebuttal evidence State showed that deceased's b100rl
so NOV/DEC 1986 11
could  be  on  the  porch,  In  the  in  a  stripe  across  the 
road.  and  In  the  ditch.  State  also  presented  testimony 
deceased's  sister  that  she  had  never  known  him  to  carry  or  own  3 
No  was  at  the  scene  or  on  deceased's  body. 
preponderance  evidence. 
Doctor  testified  that  in  his  opinion  D  was  not  competent 
to  stand  trial  because  she  could  not  help  her  trial  lawyer 
conduct  her  case;  he  dlagnosee]  D  as  having  "paranoid 
schizophrenia".  D's  attorney  related  that  week  hearing. 
while  he  was  interviewing  D  in  jai 1.  she  began  to  scream  that  he 
was  insane.  Doctor  that  this  behavior  was  consistent 
with  his  diagnosis.  Two  jat I  matrons  corToborated  the  occur'ence. 
Against  wishes  trial  counsel.  D  during  competency 
hearing  -- her  testimony  was  mostly  lucid  and  articulate  In  view 
TeA.  Primarily  D  expressed  frustration  that  her  case  had  not 
gone  to  tr I a  I  and  that  she  had  not  been  ali e  cjetector 
test  to  prove  her  innocence  the  charge  that  she  killed  her 
mother.  Our i ng  jury  argument  counse 1  stat,ed  that  j ur y 
did  not  need  to  believe  what  doctor  said  or  what  matron  said  and 
that  they  could  conclude  D  was  merely  upset. 
Reviewing  evidence  el icited  at  competency  hearing  TeA  could  not 
say  that  jury's  that  0  was  competent  was  irrational. 
Considering  D's  testimony  and  jury  argument  her  attorney,  TeA 
concluded  it  was  "very  easy"  to  see  that  rational  trier  of  fact 
could  given  D  exactly  what  she  asked  -- a  criminal  trial 
In  which  she  could  have  an  opportunity  to  establish  her 
innocence. 
CONCURRING  OPINION  [ONION]:  T8rming  the  Van 
§ullder  test  the    defense  rationality  test" 
Onion  rjoined  by  McCormlckl  can  not  agree  with  its 
extension  to  competency  hearinqs.  However  both  would 
agree  that  evidence  was  to  support  judgment. 
DISSENTING  OPINION  [CLINTON]:  Unl  Ike  insanity,  penal 
code  does  not  Incompetence  as  a  or 
defense.  To  utilize  the  test  urged  by  the 
maJority.  Article  46.02  V.A.C.C.P.  must  place  the 
burden  of  at  Incompetency  hearing  on  D  to  prove 
incompentency  by  proponderance;  it  does  not. 
* * * * *
,James  Benton  No.  714-84  OW  I  Conv I ct Ion  i rmed: 
Opinion  on  State's  PDR  -- Judge  Clinton;  Judge  Mil  jer  disserts, 
Dissenting  Opinion  by  Judge  Teague  November  19.  1986 
NOTE:  Simi lar  issues  also  addressed  in  and 
both  of  which  were  delivered  on  same  date. 
EVIDENCE  OF  D'S  REFUSAL  TO  TAKE  A  BREATH  TEST  ADMISSIBLE  IN  PRE-
1984  DWI  CASES?  TCA  ANSWERS  YES.  First  CA  reversed  D's 
SO  NOV/DEC  1986  12 
convictions holding that tic erred in admitting evidence of his
refusal to submIt to breathalyzer test. CA ruled that state law
applicable at the time prohibited this admission and rei ied on
state author i ty independent of Fifth Amendment.
548 S.W.2d 706.
NOTE: Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., Art. 6701L-5, Sec. 3(g)
presently allows such evidence to be admitted effective
January 1. 1984.
TCA concluded that neither Article 1, Sec. 10 of the Texas
Constitution or Article 38.22, V.A.C.C.P. afforded Qreater
protection regarding admissibility of reFusal evidence than did
FiFth Amendment.
NOTE: At least four other CAs have held there is no
independent basis in state law for excluding evidence
of refusal to submit to breath test. They Include
Dallas. Texarkana. Houston [1st], El Paso. and Corpus
Christi r opinIon for cItatIon to specific cases in
each jurisdiction.
Over 0' s object Ion. ofF I cer test i f i ed that. aFter
initially agreeing to take a test. D changed his mind and reFused
to submit. and did not thereaFter request that any test be
administered.
TCA concluded that any reI lance on Article 38.22 is
currently untenable -- reFusal of 0 to submit to breathal izer
test did not come about as a r'esult of "custodial interrogation"
For purposes of Article 38.22. Article 1, Sec. 10 of the Texas
Constitution is not violated because reFusal to submit to a
chern I ca I breath test For i ntox i cat i on I s not a f.2.!!lpeL
communication.
NOTE: JUDGE CLINTON, who authored majority opinion
In F I I ed a dissent I ng op In ion in de I I vel-ee!
the same day.
DISSENTING OPINION [TEAGUE]: In addition to reasons
stated in .Thomas. Judge Teague takes
position that "any jury would draw From a reFusal the
adverse inFerence of consciousness of quilt. i.e., that
o reFused to submit to a chemical test because he knew
the results would reFlect the many drinks he had
taken." equating taking of blood or breath From an
accused to the   to give or take such a test is
nonsencical because reFusal is, by deFinition.
communication.
SO NOV/OEC 1986 13
*  *  *  *  * 
tLLt;J:OEe I McG I NTY , No. 1058-84 -- DW I Conv I c-t i  on Aff i  rmed: on
Appellant's PDR -- Judge White; Judge Mi 1 ler dissents, Dissenting
Opini0ns by Judges CI fnton and Teague November 19, 1986
JURY CHARGE -- TRIAL COURT ACTION IN DEFINING "REASONABLE DOUBT"
OVER OBJECTION WAS WRONG BUT NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR: TcA held that
tic erred when it instructed the jury on its definition of
reasonable doubt. The charge given reads:
"A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on
reason and cornmon sense. A reasont::lb Ie  doutJt
is the kfnd of doubt that would make a
reasonable person hesitate to act in the
conduct of their more serious and important
personal affairs. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt must, therefore, be of such a
convincing character that YOU  would be
wil ling to rely and act upon unhesitantly in
those most I mportant of your own affa i  1'5. ' fI 
D objected to charge. TCA reviewed under to determine if 
there was "some harm" to D. TCA concluded that there was no harm
because erroneous instruct i on favored D by i mpos I ng a qreatF:r
burden of proof on state.
PRE-1984 OWl D'S REFUSAL TO TAKE BREATHALIZER TEST ADMISSIBLE:
Like the 0 In   above, 0 here at f i r-st agt· t?ed to take test
but then refused once he was at the booking desk. D was clearly
in custody at time he refused to take blood alcohol test. but at
time he made this refusal, he had not been warned of his rights.
TCA concludes once again that Art. 38.22. Sec. 3(a)(2) Is
inapllcable since 0 did not receive the warning of Art. 38.22.
Sec. 2(a). In addition, officer's irlQuiry if 0 would take blood
a I coho I test was not an i  nterrogat i on as "po lice words ancj
actions normally attendant to arrest and custody do not consti--
tut.e i nterrogat I on. "   712 S. W. 2d 499. TCA conc 1uded
that D may not. avo i d mak i ng dec i s i on by i nvok i ng Fifth Amendment
pr i  v i  I ege or prophy I act i c safeguards of M.i!::9D.9_9.  Refusa I to
submit to breath test was not result of custodial interrogation.
DISSENTING OPINION [CLINTON1: Wrlile reFusal to submit
to taking a blood or breath sample is not a product of
"custodial interrogat ion" under Ar-t. 38. ,Judqe
Cl inton reviews refusal to comply with an oFFicial
request. to subml t to such a test a product of f:2rne.':!.i:--
s i on and a     F01- purposes of the Texas
Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 10. Reader is refered to
dissenting opinion In FI led the same clay.
SO NOV/DEC 1986 14
II
DISSENTING OPINION [TEAGUE): Unl ike D's in and
Bass D here was never given   warn i ngs after he
was arrested or advised of the DWI Sec. 2(2) warnings.
Major i ty re 1 i ed heav i I y on 59
U.S. 553 (1983) as it did in the majority opinion in
Quipping that majority has a "Freudian love for
decisions by the Supreme Court". Judge Teague asks why
majority does not discuss opinion in __
v. McCarty. 14 S. Ct.. 3138 (1984) -- !il warn i ngs
apply to even misdemeanor tl'affic offenses.
Judge Teague would also have OWl law declared unconsti-
tutional because when accused has refused a request to
give specimen of breath or blood. that act may be
introduced into evidence at his trial; however. there
is no provision providing for jury instruction on that
issue.
Evidence of refusal is not per se probative of the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to
determination of D's guilt. Thus. refusal evidence is
not properly part of State's case in chief. It should
become admissible only where it can qual ify or disprove
contentions made by D.
Refusal to take a breath test constitutes testimonial
compulsion protected by Art. 1, Sec. 10 of the Texas
Constitution TCA should adhere to action of Supreme
Court of South Dakota on remand and   and fi nd a
violation of state law.
Dissent stresses that "it is clearly coersive to grant
a suspect a right to refuse while fai I ing also to
inform him that his refusal can be used for all
practical purposes. as evidence of his intoxication.
* * * * *
M..aL\lin_{.... -1iLbJ=-AI3Q. No. 99-85 -- Murder Conviction Reversed:
Opinion on Appellant's POR Judge Onion; Dissenting Opinion by
Judge White joined by Judges W. C. Davis and McCormick Novmet>er
I'), 1986
NOTE: CA opinion reported at 682 S.W.2d 686.
WIFE WAS INCOMPETENT WITNESS AGAINST HUSBAND IN PROSECUTION FOR
MURDER OF HER ADULT DAUGHTER: FactS: At the time of the offense
Jean Willard was D's wife although divorce proceeding had already
been instituted; divorce was stil I pending one year after the
offense on day of trial. D was charged with murder of Lynn
SD NOV/DEC 1986 15
Pinyozy,  Jean  Willard's  adult.  37  year  old  daughter  by  previous 
marriage.  On  he  date  o¥  he  o¥¥ense  Jean  Wil  lard  and  her  daughter 
went  to  D's  farm  house  to  remove  some  of  Mrs.  Wi  1lard's 
belongings.  She  testified  that  after  she  arrived.  D  took  a  tea 
kettle  away  from  her.  hit  her  and  broke  her  glasses,  and  then  hit 
her  and  Lynn  with  his  fist.  The  two  women  retreated  to  their 
vehicle  in  the  yard.  Actfng  on  D's  pleas  they  returned  to  house 
but  D  once  again  attacked  them.  He  got  a  gun  and  shot  Lynn  who 
was  in  the  yard  near  her  vehicle.  Jean  Willard  also  testified 
that  D  forced  her  to  accompany  him  to  New  Braunfels,  and  then  to 
Austin  where  she  was  released  later  that  night.  0  asserted  self 
defense  although  there  was  some  evidence  that  his  relatives 
altered  the  crIme  scene.  0  objected  to  Jean  Wi  I lard's  trial 
testimony  on  the  basis  that  she  was  his  wife  and  disqualified  as 
witness  for  State. 
There  I s  no  conf I i ct  between  Q.9TC   573  S. W.  2d 
12  and  Young  v.  State,  603  S.W.2d  581.  did  not  hold  that 
wl¥e  is  a  competent  witnesses  in  any  offense  involving  0  where 
she.  although  not  the  alleged  victim  in  the  charging  instr'urnent, 
is  shown  to  have  been  subject  to  an  act  of  assault  or  violence  by 
D  during  the  course  o¥  the  charged  offense.  Wife  in  was  a 
competent  witness  under  the  "minor  child"  exception  of  Art. 
38.11.  V.A.C.C.P.  Young  involved  a  different  exception  to  the 
article;  there  State  attempted  to  claim  that  although  wife  was 
not  the  named  injured  party,  she  was  Injured  when  Appellant 
rammed  the  complainant's  car  in  which  she  was  a  passenger.  Art. 
38.11  exception  allowing  one  spouse  to  testify  against  the  other 
"in  any  case  where  an  offense  involving  any  grade  of  assault  or 
violence  committed  by  one  against  the  other"  has  no  appj  ication 
where  "the  wife  was  not  the  injured  party  in  the  case  being 
tried." 
Trammel  v.  United  ,  445  U.S.  40  (1980)  does  not  effect  this 
case  because  it  dealt  with  the  judicial  evaluation  o¥  a  court-
made  priv! lege,  and  did  not  deal  with  a  specific  statut.e.  As  the 
Supreme  Court  noted  in  footnote  9,  Texas  was  one  of  eight  states 
that  by  statut.e  makes  one  spouse  incompetent  to  test I fy  aga I nst 
the  other. 
TCA  also  noted  that  under  the  new  Texas  Rules  o¥  Criminal 
Ev'dence.  Rule  504,  effective  September  1.  1986,  one  spouse  may 
testIfy  against  another.  This  new  rule  however  has  no 
appl  Icabll Ity  to  D's  case  because  Art.  38.11  was  In  effect  at 
time  of  trial.  Had  that  rule  been  properly  appl  ied.  there  may 
have  been  no  conviction  and  hence  no  appeal.  Even  though  in 
event  of  a  retrial  Jean  Willard  would  be  permitted  to  testiFy 
against  D  under  Rule  104,  this  fact  does  not  call  for  affirmance. 
DISSENTING  OPINION  [WHITE]:  While  agreeing  with  the 
majority  that  the  recent  promulgation  of  rule  104  is  no 
justification  for  affirming  D's  conviction  and  should 
SO  NOV/DEC  1986  16 
not  be  used  before  Its  effective  date,  dissent  would 
hold  that  when  the  legislature  revised  the  husband-wife 
prIvilege  tn  1965  [enactment  date  of  Art.  38.111  it 
abandoned  the  language  which  mandated  that  the  witness 
spouse  be  alleged  as  a  victim  in  an  indictment  or 
information. 
* * * * *
  No.  267-85  -- OWl  Conviction  Affirmed: 
Opinion  on  Appellant's  PDR  - Judge  Campbell;  Judge  Miller 
dissents,  Dissenting  Opinions  by  Judges  Cl  inton  and  Teague 
November  19,  1986 
PRE-1984  REFUSAL  TO  TAKE  BREATH  TEST  ADMISSIBLE  IN  OWl 
PROSECUTION:  Although  the  Issues  here  are  similar  to  those 
n:lised  in  Bass  andtls-Q.ion  discussed  above,  vdth  each  new  author 
of  the  majority  opinion,  different  considerations  are  brought.  to 
t)ear  I n  add i t  Ion.  un I Ike  and    the  record  here  shows 
that  0  was  'nformed  of  his  M   rights  and  of  some  of  the 
consequences  of  his  refusal  to  take  a  breath  test  [although  he 
was  not  told  that  evidence  of  his  refusal  might  be  used  against 
t) I m  at  his  tr- i a  11  .  I n  one  ground  of  error  D  charged  that 
admission  into  evidence  of  his  refusal  to  provide  a  breath  sample 
violated  state  law. 
NOTE:  0  asserted  the  evidence  violated  Art. 
38.22,  V.A.C.C.P.  and  V.A.C.S .•  Art.  6701L-5  (1977);  It 
violated  his  privilege  against  self  IncrimInation  under 
Art.  1,  Sec.  10  of  the  Texas  Constitution  and  Art. 
1.05,  V.A.C.C.P.;  and  lastly  that  it  violated  hfs  right 
to  counsel  under  Art.  \,  Sec.  10  of  the  Texas 
Constitution  and  Arts.  1.05  and  38.22.  V.A.C.C.P.  TCA 
noted  that  while  these  arguments  all  Involve  state  law, 
they  present  at  least  three  different  legal  theories  in 
a  single  ground  of  error.  Here  D's  arguments  are 
sufficiently  clear  for  court  to  address;  however  by 
combining  more  than  one  legal  theory  in  a  single 
ground,  0  risks  rejection  on  ground  that  nothing  is 
presented  for  review.  642  S.W.2d  791 
TCA  found  that  claims  admission  of  evidence  violated  Art.  38.22 
and  OWl  law  not  preserved  for  review  because  they  were  not  the 
basis  of  a  trial  objection.  TCA  did  agree  that  objection  to 
evidence  as  violation  of  state  constitutional  privilege  against 
self  incrimination  was  preserved. 
CAUTION:  D  filed  a  trial  objection  prior  to 
trial  in  which  he  stated  his  reliance  on  Art.  1,  Sec. 
10.  During  trial  he  made  objection  by  reference  to  the 
SO  NOV/DEC  1986  17 
trial  objection.  a  copy  of  which  is  appended  to 
opinion.  Because  tIc accepted  the  objection  in  that 
form  and  overruled  It.  and  later  gave  0  a  contlnlng 
objection  on  that  ground,  t/judge  was  obviously  aware 
of  the  substance  of  the  pre-trial  objection.  Use  of 
written  trial  level  objections  are  very  much  in  vogue 
since  they  enable  defense  lawyer  to  direct  the  court's 
attention  to  substance  of  complaint  without  informing 
jury  of  its  legal  foundation.  But  be  advised  under  the 
majority  opinion  there  may  be  circumstances  where  this 
practice  does  not  sufficiently  preserve  error  for 
review. 
Majority  notes  that  Art.  1.  Sec.  10  has  been  found  to  be  more 
protective  than  the  Fifth  Amendment.    707  S.W.2d  ')75 
Thus.  while  the  Texas  constitutional  protection  may  sometimes  "be 
comparable  in  scope  to  the  Fifth  Amendment,  an  independent 
examination  of  the  history,  the  polley,  and  precedent  surrounding 
relevant  state  law  is  necessary  before  such  a  conclusion  can  be 
reached."  Nevertheless  TCA  rejects  D's  claim  that  Texas  ConstI-
tution  provIdes  a  broader  scope  than  Fifth  Amendment  based  on 
difference  in  language  -- Fifth  Amendment  is  phrased  "to  be  a 
witness  against  himself"  whereas  Texas  Constitution  uses  phrase 
"to  give  evidence  against  himself". 
TCA  rejects  argument  that  OWl  statute  compels  D  to  refuse  a 
breath  sample  in  violation  of  Art.  1,  Sec.  10.  Central  to 
majority's  view  is  that  State  could  have  legitimately  "relieved  0 
of  the  relative  benefit  of  making  such  a  choice  by  compel  1 ing  him 
to  provide  physical  evidence".  Instead,  Stat.e  at.tempted  to 
influence  0  into  providing  such  evIdence  with  a  threat  of  penalty 
for  refusing. 
Majority  found  that  issue  of  whether  refusal  to  provide  breath 
sample  violated  the  right  to  counsel  provision  of  Art.  1.  Sec.  10 
was  not  preserved  for  review.  Even  though  0  cited  to  that 
Section  of  the  Texas  Constitution  in  his  written  trial  objection 
TCA  concluded  that  the  citation,  given  the  obvious  relevance  of 
the  self  incrimination  clause  in  the  context  of  the  surroundlnq 
testimony  and  pre-trial  motions,  was  enough  to  direct.  TIC's
attention  to  the  Self  Incrimination  Clause  of  Article  I,  Sec.  10 
but  did  not  suggest  to  tIc or  O.A.  that  0  was  also  raising  the 
Right  to  Counsel  Clause  of  Art.  1,  Sec.  10. 
TCA  found  that  claim  admission  of  evidence  of refusal  to  provide 
breath  sample  violated  D's  right  to  counsel  under  Art.  38.22, 
V.A.C.C.P.  was  not  preserved  because  not  raised  in  court  below. 
NOT  ERROR  TO  REFUSE  INSTRUCTION  TO  JURY  ON  FACT  ISSUE  RELATING  TO 
0'5  REQUEST  FOR  COUNSEL  BEING  INTERPRETED  AS  REFUSAL  TO  PROVIDE 
BREATH  SAMPLE:  Apparently  relying  on  Art.  38.23  V.A.C.C.P.  0 
SO  NOV/DEC  1986  18 
------------------_......._--. 
sought  an  instruction  from  TIC which  would  have  ordered  jury  to 
disregard  any  evidence  of  his  refusal  to  provide  a  breath  sample. 
Such  an  Instruct fon  wou I d  have  removed  the  fact.  quest. i on  from 
jury's  consideration  and  so  did  not  fal  I  under  Art.  38.23.  There 
was  no  dispute  regarrding  the  facts  surrounding  D's  refusal  to 
give  a  breath  sample. 
NOTE:  Because  TCA  affirmed  on  statutory  grounds. 
majority  express  no  opinion  whether  Right  to  Counsel 
under  Art.  1,  Sec.  10  of  the  Texas  Constitution 
attaches  prior  to  D  being  formally  charged. 
DISSENTING  OPINION  [CLINTON]:  Although  D's  refusal  to 
take  breath  test.  even  if  by  silence,  is  not  an 
exercfse  of  the  right  to  remain  silent,  it  is  an 
involuntary  expression  of  a  consciousness  of  guilt. 
Judge  Clinton  would  find  refusal  to  submit  to  a  breath 
test  a  violation  of  Art.  I,  Sec.  10  because  it  is  the 
"compelled  communication"  of  a  consciousness  of  guilt 
and  thus  violates  D's  constitutional  right  to  be  free 
of  compulsion  to  "give  evidence  against  himself". 
* * * * *
9avt9  Wayne  LABELLE.  No.  1239-85  -- Revocation  of  Probation 
Affirmed:  Opinion  on  State's  PDR  -- Judge  Miller;  Concurring 
Opinion  by  Judge  CI  intion.  Dissenting  Opinion  by  Judge  Onion 
joined  by  Judge  Teague  November  19.  1986 
NOTE:  On  original  appeal  case  was  reversed  by  EI  Paso 
CA  at  670  S.W.2d  755.  TCA  reversed  decision  and 
remanded  for  consideration  of  other  grounds  at  692 
S.W.2d  102.  On  remand  El  Paso  CA  once  again  reversed 
at  698  S.W.2d  738. 
MOTION  TO  REVOKE  PROBATION  -- TCA  ENGRAFTS  INDICTMENT  RULE  OF 
~ Q ~   S 707  S.W.2D  900  TO  THE  ADEQUACY  OF  MOTION  TO  REVOKE  PROBA-
TION  PLEADINGS,  AND  REQUIRES  THAT  THERE  BE  A  HARM  ANALYSIS:  D 
was  originally  charged  and  convicted  of  burglary  of  a  habitation 
and  punishment  was  assesed  at  10  years  probation.  Four  years 
later  State  moved  to  revoke  D's  probation  alleging  that  he  had 
removed  and  destroyed  a  government  record;  TIC revoked  and 
sentenced  D  to  five  years.  Prior  to  hearing  D  objected  to  Motion 
to  Revoke  Probation  stating  that  it  failed  to  provide  adequate 
notice.  TCA  agreed  that  reference  in  Motion  to  Revoke  Probation 
to _fla  government  record"  was  not  merely  an  inadequate  discription 
but  constituted  no  dlscription  at  all. 
However.  even  though  the  motion  was  inadequate,  D  lost.  TCA 
adopted  the  new  rule  of  Adams  707  S.W.2d  900  and  applied  It  to 
SO  NOV/DEC  1986  19 
motion to revoke probation In order to determine whether
reversible error has occured. D won on Issue that motion to
revoke failed to convey some requisite item of "notice". D lost
on issue of whether motion provided adequate notice upon which he
COLI 1 d prepare a defense. As In TCA rev i ewed ent i I-e record
for prejudice to D's substantial rights. Testimony showed that
counsel at residential treatment center spoke with D about the
government document, which turned out to be D's file. From this
TCA concluded that It is uncontroverted that the identity of the
government record in question was clear to D. Also of importance
-- D fai led to produce any witnesses or evidence on his behalf,
D's attorney did not argue that the act had not occured, but
rather stressed that D had been Influenced by peers; and in his
brief D failed to suggest any way in which his ability to prepare
a defense was hampered.
* * * * *
Bernard BECKNELL. No . .59,827 Murder Conviction Affirmed
-- Panel Opinion by Judge McCormick, Concurrinq and Dissenting
Opinion by Judge Teague November 19, 1986
NOTE: This is a penal opinion on direct appeal.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER FACTS OF CASE D'S FATHER COULD NOT
CONSENT TO SEARCH OF ADULT SON'S ROOM IN FA"rHER'S HOUSE: D's
father was the home owner; however he testified he was al lowed to
go Into D's room only when 0 was there. The door to D's bedroom
was padlocked and D had only key to the lock for past two or
three year's. In adcJitlon, he would eat and cook his meals
separate from the rest of family. Under these facts TCA agreed
t rlat "the th i rd party here did not exerc i se equa I contro lover
anD equal use of the premises being searched". Because D's
father lacked capacity under these facts to effectively consent
to a search, the search of D's locked bedroom was improper.
Evidence seized was gun dealer's business cards and records
showing D's purchase of two hand guns and ammunition. TCA held
that error in admitting this evidence was harmless because of
overwhelming evidence of guilt.
* * * * *
  No. 551 -as Burq Iar y Convi ct jon
Remanded: Opinion on Appellant's POR -- Judge W. C. Davis; Judges
Onion and Teague dissenting to remand November 26, 1986
NOTE: CA opinion reported at 688 S.W.2d 698
JURY CHARGE -- PRESUMPTIONS -- NIGHTTIME ENTRY IN BURGLARY PROSE
CUTION: CA failed to address issue of whether tic
SO NOV/DEC 1986 20
fundamental error In giving jury charge that law presums an
attempt to commit theft if one enters a habitation at night time.
TCA relies on recent opinion in .i?rg.\'mjD...9. No. 245-85. del ivered
September 17, 1986 finding such Instruction to be error. Case
remanded to CA for review of "egregious harm
fl
under Almanza.
* * * * *
    No. 632-85 -- Murder Convict.ion Affirmed:
Opinion on Appellant's PDR -- Judge W. C. Davis with Judge Tom
Davis concurring In result and Judges Onion, Clinton and Teague
dissenting November 26, 1986
NOTE: CA opinion reported at 691 S.W.2d 739
CONFESSION -- CONFE ION NOT INVOLUNTARY'BECAUSE "PROMISE" D
RECEIVED FROM POLICE WAS NOT CONDITIONED ON HIS GIVING
CONFESSION: D murdered deceased acting with deceased's
wife. Three days later he was arrested in Tennessee. He was
arraigned and an attorney was appointed for him in Tennessee.
Fa] lowing day Texas investigator went to interview D. After
meeting with out of state Investigator, Texas officer talked with
D who told him D understood his rights and that he had an attor-
ney. Officer explained to D that he was investigating deceased's
murder and that he knew what had taken place during He
also told D that deceased's wife had given statements and asked
if D wanted to talk about offense. D stated several times that
even though he wanted to talk about it. he was too young to die
and did not want to get death penalty. Officer showed D the
murder statute and capital murder statute in penal code. He read
both statutes and explained the differences to D. Officer testi-
fied that when he talked to D. based on what he knew about the
facts of the case, he considered it a murder case and not a
capital murder case. 0 told officer he wanted to talk to him but
that he wanted to see his attorney. D consulted with Tennessee
lawyer. Officer then spoke with lawyer who told officer D wanted
to talk about offense but was afraid he would get death penalty.
Officer called Texas and discussed scenario. On advice of D.A.
conclusion was reached that cases were not capital murders and
would not be accepted as such by D.A. office. If D initiated the
subject. officer was authorized to tel I him pol ice would not file
capital murder charges.
At this point Tennessee officer returned and said D wanted to
talk to Texas officer. When 0 reentered room he stated he still
had reservations about death penalty and officer asked if he
would feel better about it if officer stated In writing that a
murder charge would be filed rather than a capital murder charge.
D said he would feel better if that were done, Texas officer
executed affidavit. If was officer's position at trial that his
SO NOV/DEC 1986 21
written affidavit would hopefully lead 0 to confess. He stated
he repeatedly told 0 he could have his attorney with him or could
waive counsel.
TCA did not find this to be a classic case of confession induced
by "promise". Here "promise" was unconditional. Although
officer hoped his statement would ease D's mind so that D would
confess. it was not contingent on 0 making a statement. Decision
not to charge 0 with capital murder was not made In response to
D's w I shes or to accomodate D; I t was a ctlO ice made by the D. A.
after considering the evidence police had.
HELD: D's statements were self-motivated and voluntarily made
after D's anxiety about death penalty was shown to be ground
less. "Promise" Is made when D expresses fear prosecution for
seme offense for which he actually cannot be prosecuted. and
State explains he cannot be prosecuted for the feared offence.
fol lowing whIch D confesses.
CONFESSION NO V. PROBLEM WHERE D
INITIATES CONVERSATION ABOUT OFFENSE IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRY IF
HE WERE HUNGRY: D alleged there had been an  
451 U.S. 477 (1981) violation because pol ice initiated the
conversation with him that led to his confession after he had
Invoked his right to counsel.
At his request 0 spoke with his attorney in room in
kitchen area of sherrif's office. He remained there while his
attorney went to talk to Texas officer. Tennessee officer went
into kitchen. fixed himself a cup of coffee and asked if D wanted
one. The two of them started t.a I king about var I ous th I nqs ot her """
than case. During this conversation Tennessee officer asked D if
he was hungry and D said he was but he had been unable to eat or
sleep since "it happened." He stated that he had to talk about
"this thing" to get it off his chest because he could not eat or
sleep. Tennessee officer testified that 0 told him that he had
tr I ed to exp I a I n to his Iawyer that he wanted to ta 1 k about. I
and that he knew he would have to go back to Texas but that his
attorney had not I f stened to him. At th I s po i nt
officer left kitchen and told Texas officer D wanted to talk to
him. Although told that he could have attorney with him, D
indicated that he wanted to talk to Texas officer. It was at
this point that officer gave written statement concerning capital
murder charges and 0 confessed.
TCA notes that Edwards does not forbid all conversation between
pol ice and accused. Record of facts and circumstances in ttlis
case show that D Initiated the re-interrogation about the
offense.
* * .. * *
SO NOV/DEC 1986 22
----
  Blaine  JON..ES.  No.  759-85  -- Murder  Conviction  Remanded: 
Opinion  on  Appellant's  PDR  -- Judge  Campbell;  Dissenting  Opinion 
by Judge  Oinion  joined  by  Judge  Teague  November  26.  1986 
,JURY  1NSTRUCT I ON  -- FA I LURE  TO  I NCLUDE  I SSUE  OF  SUDDEN  PASS I ON  IN 
MURDER  APPL  ICATION  PARAGRAPH  WAS  ERROR  --- CAUSE  REMANDED  FOR  HARM 
DETERMINATION:  Relying  on  Cobarrubio  675  S.W.2d  749  TCA  ffnds 
jury  charge  error  for  fail ing  to  include  Issue  of  sudden  passion 
in the  paragraph  applying  the  law  of  murder  to  the  facts.  There 
was  no  trial  objection.  Test  on  reveiw  under  will  be 
whether  error  created  harm  so  egregious  as  to  deny  D  fair  trial. 
Case  was  remanded  to  CA  because  two  significant  decisions  had 
been  ded ded  since  CA  op i n i on  was  de I i vel-ed.  In  CastLLl2= 
707  S.W.2d  559  TCA  concluded  that  where  voluntary 
manslaughter  was  the  primary  defense,  then  Cobarrubio  error  was 
egreqious  enough  to  require  reversal.  In  constrast. 
700  S.W.2d  208  holds  that  where  voluntary  manslaughter  was  Inci-
dental  defense.  the  main  thrust  of  D's  case  being  self  defense, 
harm  is  not  so  egregious  as  to  require  reversal. 
DISSENTING  OPINION:  CA  had  determined  that  error,  If 
any,  was  waived  by  failure  to  object.  That  was  the 
ground  on  which  D's  PDR  was  granted.  Dissenters  would 
not  send  this  case  back  to  CA  for  harm  analysis  because 
the  issues  have  been  clearly  joined  and  can  be  1 itl-
gated  by  TCA.  Dissenters  also  note  that  case  has  been 
in  system  for  over  six  years. 
* * * * *
Q.<2E'!ald  WaynE!_GOOQ,  No.  773-85  -- Burglary  of  Habit.atlon 
Conviction  Reversed:  Opinion  on  Appellant's  PDR  -- Judge 
Campbell;  Judge  W.  C.  Davis  concurring  in  results  and  Concurring 
Opinions  by  Judge  Onion  (joined  by  Judge  White),  Clinton  and 
Teague  November  26,  1986 
,JURY  ARGUMENT  REVERSIBLE  ERROR  FOR  STATE  TO  ARGUE  THAT  D'S 
NON-TESTIMONIAL  DEMEANOR  WAS  A  INFERENCE  OF  GUILT:  Facts:  o 
burgled  complainant's  house  and  restrained  both  complainant  and 
her  eight  year  old  daughter  by  threatening  them  with  knife.  D 
subjected  complainant  to  various  forms  of  sexual  abuse,  took 
money  from  her  purse  and  fled.  Both  complainant  and  daughter 
identified  D  as  intruder.  D  t.estified  and  presented  alibi 
defense  that  he  was  at  his  sister's  apartment;  D's  sister 
corroborated  this  alibi.  Durfng  closing  argument  at  guilt,  D.A. 
said: 
"Another  thIng,  it  fs  not  a  contest  of 
backgrounds.  We  don't  want  you  to  convict 

SO  NOV/DEC  1986  23 
anybody because he [0] hasn't got a doctor's
degree or something. That doesn't matter.
But I tell you one thing: you don't have to
go to one day of school to sit over hear
[sic] and listen to [the complainant] up here
talking about all the brutal ities and
indignities she went through. You don't have
to go through one day of school to show a
I fttle bit of concern and emotion. You
observed his demeanor in this courtroom and I
submit to you It is a reasonable deduction
that he would have reacted in some way, shown
some concern. He's just sat there cold,
unnerved, uncaring, just like he was I ike
t.hat morn I ng. That te 1 I s you a great dea 1
about him. That has nothing to do with
articulation or being able to speak or
education. No, that has to do with the fact
that he is guilty and he could care less this
week that he is guIlty and he could less back
on June 9th, 1983."
[Defense counsel objected that State was
using D's orderly demeanor in courtroom as
evidence against him, and this was outside
the record. TIC overruled objection. Later.
D.A. once again focused on D's demeanor:]
"You have heard from the evidence in
this case your [sic] are deal ing with, and,
you know, it was interesting that Mr. Parks
[Defense Counsel] got up here and talked
about, 'it Is terrible, it is tragic. it is
brutal and we al I feel sorry for her [the
complainant]. Anybody who would be able to
sympathize. would be able to have some
concern for what she went through.' Why in
the world dfdn't we see any of that in his
[D's] demeanor over here? I mean he is
conceding __II
[Once again   e ~ e n s e Counsel objected and
tic overruled.]
"You know. you can be order I y and yet. st II I
show something on your face."
CA had held D.A. had properly stated his impression
demeanor on witness stand. D agreed that jury was
observe his demeanor when he was testifying as an aid in
his credfbility. But 0 argued that to al low State to
of D's
free to
Judging
attach
SO NOV/DEC 1986 24
probative  force  at  guilt-innocence  to  D's  orderly  demeanor  and 
conduct  wh i  I e  the  comp I a  i test i f  i es  is  as  harmfu 1  as 
commenting  on  a  failure  to  testify.  TCA  agreed. 
Majority  cites  493  S.W.2d  230  as  listing  the  4 
acceptable  areas  of  jury  argument  and  demonstrated  how  none  of  4 
categor i es  app 1 i ed  here.  A I  low i ng  State  t.o  summar i ze  0' s 
nontestimonial  demeanor  impermissibly  placed  D's  demeanor  before 
jury  through  D.A.'a  unsworn  Jury  argument.  This  was  not  a 
summary  of  evidence.  Likewise,  argument  was  not  reasonable 
deduction  from  evidence  because  nontestimonlal  demeanor  is 
it-relevant  to  the  issue  of  his  guilt.  TCA  asks,  "What  logical 
connect i on  ex I sts  between  absence  of  overt  sympat.hy  and  presence 
of  guilt,  particularly  in  view  of  Appellant's  plea  of  not  guilty 
and  his  presentation  of  an  alibi  defense."  D's  neutral  conduct 
was  entirely  consistent  with  his  trial  defense. 
*' * * * *
        I NT,  No.  227-86  Burg I ary  Conv I ct i on 
Affirmed:  Opinion  on  State's  PDR  Judge  Onion,  Concurring  and 
Dissenting  Opinion  by  Judge  Teague  Joined  by  Judges  McCormick  and 
Campbel  I  November  26,  1986 
NOTE:  Co-D's  conviction  reversed  at  695  S.W.2d  754 
JURY  CHARGE  ERROR  TO  INSTRUCT  JURY  ON  PRESUMPTION  OF  THEFT 
f"ROM  NIGHTTIME  ENTRY  IN  BURGLARY  CASE:  Facts:  D  was  convicted
._---
of  burglary  as  a  co-D.  He  stayed  In  van  while  co-D  was  seen  by 
cops  entering  store.  TIC charged  jury  on  presumption  that: 
"Our  law  prov I des  trlat  the  act  of  break i ng 
and  entering  a  building  at  nighttime  raises  a 
presumption  that  the  act  was  done  with  the 
intent  to  commit  theft.  Such  a  presumption  is 
rebuttable" 
T/judge  then  charged  on  general  law  of  presumptions  under  Sec. 
2.05,  P.C.  Held:  Nothing  in  burglary  statutes  or  other  statutes 
indicates  that  a  presumption  from  evidence  arises  re:  proof  of 
Intent  as  an  essential  element  of  burglary.  D.A.  as 
deduct Ion  from  ev I dence  that  intent  t.o  comm it  theft  can  be 
inferred  from  nighttime  entry  without  consent.  BUT,  "The  eviden-
tiary  'presumption'  or  permissive  inference  was  never  Intended  to 
I-elieve  the  prosecution  of  proving  every  elements  of  a  crime 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  or  to  be  used  in  a  jury  charge  for  that 
purpose."  Presumption  also  OK  for  appel  late  review  purposes,  but 
not  as  jury  instruction.  0  suffered  "some  harm"  under  Almanza. 
SO  NOV/DEC  1986  25 
Members
M
Woody S. MONICA
J. Michael MONKS
Gerald P. MONKS
Connie MOORE
Mary MOORE
Richard L. MOORE
Robert MORROW III
Robert MOST
Cynthia MULKEY
David MURRAY
Vincent MUSACHIA
N
Gabriel NAHAS
Howard NATIONS
Jay S. NEDELL
Carol A. NEELLEY
Steven NELSON
Lawrence T. NEWMAN
Jeffrey R. NEWPORT
Allan S. NIGHT
o
Douglas O'BRIEN
Michael A. OLSEN
Charles ORSBURN
Will OUTLAW
P
James L. PALMER
Robert J. PANDAK
George PARNHAI1
SO NOV/DEC 1986 26
14005 Luthe Road Houston
4189 Bellaire #200 Houston
4189 Bellaire #200 Houston
P.O. Box 300788 Houston
202 Travis #208 Houston
2100 Travis #1212 Houston
2611 F.M.1960 W.#A-10l Houston
3120 S.W. Fwy. #406 Houston
2711 Main #203 Houston
1235 No. Loop W.#1100 Houston
708 Main #1035 Houston
411 Fannin #302 Houston
3000 So. Post Oak #1400 Houston
6700 Belmont #9 Houston
2134 Richmond Houston
801 Congress #225 Houston
2600 Lazy Hollow #1012 Houston
9039 Katy Fwy. #203 Houston
2502 Fannin #100 Houston
3100 Weslayan #369 Houston
200 Lyric Centre Houston
320 Main St., #200 Houston
1314 Texas Ave. #1201 Houston
2323 So.Shepherd #1100 Houston
1118 E. Brown Deer Park
2100 Travis #1200 Houston
77039 590-9009
77025 661-7400
77025 669-0248
77230 622-6223
77002 225-3100
77002 224-6843
77068 444-7279
77098 526-9269
77002 650-0598
77008 863-8766
77002 228-5197
77002 227-7273
77056 960-9690
77005 439-1680
77098 520-9119
77002 222-0862
77063 622-1060
77024 468-8850
77002 659-6666
77027 877-8886
77002 223-8411
77002 227-8201
77002 222-1581
77019 520-0404
77536 446-1027
77002 224-3967
------------------...  
Jerry  PATCHEN  1400  Congress  Houston  77002  228-4888 
William  M.  PAVLOV  1221  Lamar  #1220 
Houston  77010  650-3500 
Vic  PECORINO  650  North  Belt  E.#105  Houston  77060  445-5777 
Robert  PELTON  1610  Richmond  Houston  77006  524-8471 
Joel  PERALEZ  2701  Louisiana  Houston  77006  520-6056 
Alan  PERCELY  9801  Westheimer  #345  Houston  77042  468-7940 
Ira  PERZ  502  Caroline  #200  Houston  77002  224-7640 
John  F.  PHILLIPS  7326  Tall  Pines  Houston  77088 
Margaret  POISSANT  3000  Post  Oak  Blvd.#130Houston  77056  621-1810 
Kenneth  R.  POLAND  2255  Braeswood  Park  Dr.Houston  77030  797-1848 
Gary  POLLAND  1600  Summit  Tower  Houston  77046  621-6310 
William  B.  PORTIS  1001  Texas  #230  Houston  77002  224-6873 
Charles  PORTZ  609  Fannin  #1000  Houston  77002  223-5299 
Patricia  A.  POWELL  723  Main  St.#232  Houston  77002  224-1161 
Rick  PRINZ  333  Clay  St.#2323  Houston  77002  651-9111 
Terry  PROCTOR  630  Uvalde  Houston  77015  453-8338 
Carl  R.  PRUETT  202  Travis  #306  Houston  77002  228-6050 
Q
Mary  K.  QUINN  320  Main  St.  100  Houston  77002  237-9100 
R
Leon  RADINSKY,JR.  P.O.  Box  1306  Houston  77001  663-7701 
Scott  RAMSEY  3000  Smith  Houston  77006  520-1620 
Steven  C.  ~   P O P O R T 3620  Broadway  Houston  77017  645-5225 
Clayton  RAWLINGS  1927  Norfolk  Houston  77098  520-7701 
Mary  M.  RAlvLINS  1800  Lyric  Centre  Houston  77002  222-6464 
T.M.  REARDON  2701  Louisiana  Houston  77006  524-3537 
Leonard  REINA  3303  Louisiana  #140  Houston  77006  520-5535 
Frumencio  REYES  3702  N.  Main  Houston  77009  869-5977 
Willie  J.  RHODES  1314  Texas  Ave.  #401  Houston  77002  228-9903 
Jesus  C.  RIOS  13700  Stuebner  Air.  Houston  77014  586-7580 
SO  NOV/DEC  1986  27 
"'" 
Herb  H.  RITCHIE  3407  Montrose  #205  Houston  77006  521-9216 
Tom  ROBERSON  467  Clingham  Drive  Houston  77024  464-6035 
Sylvia  ROBERTSON  2700  Post  Oak  Blvd#1520Houston  77056  621-7878 
Robert  RODRIGUEZ  2640  Fountainview  #100  Houston  77057  977-1481 
Roy  T.  ROGERS  4001  Leeland  Houston  77023  224-2415 
William  G.  ROSCH  707  Travis  #2100  Houston  77002  222-9595 
James  ROSE  506  Caroline  #300  Houston  77002  228-2346 
Marian  S.  ROSEN  1800  Lyric  Centre  Houston  77002  222-6464 
Steven  R.  ROSEN  2502  Fannin  #100  Houston  77002  659-6666 
Robert  ROSENBERG  1914  Memorial  Way  Houston  77007  861-9271 
Leonard  ROTH  3401  Louisiana  #220  Houston  77002  520-8155 
Lawrence  ROTHENBERG  1800  W.  Loop  S.#1310  Houston  77027  961-0841 
Roy  E.  ROWLAND  720  Bayland  Houston  77009  861-0782 
 
Joseph  II. RUMBAUT  1001  Texas  Ave.#500  Houston  77002  227-0130 
R.S.  RUTHERFORD  1812  Lubbock  Houston  77007  880-8310 
SD  NOV/DEC  1986  28 
eventually be held each weekday evening from 10: 00 p.m. to 2: 00
a.m. in order that no misdemeanor defendant will ever be held in
the County Jail over 24 hours before seeing a magistrate.
Spanish speaking bailiffs are provided by the Sheriff's
offjce to assist with Spanish American prisoners and a videotape
library of the statutory warnings in a variety of foreign langu-
aqes is in the works to assist in handling all foreign defend-
ants.
The Harris County Pre-trial Services Agency has expanded to
i_nterview each defennant appear ing for a hearing. Except that
Pre-Trial Services will not interview nor assist in the release of
any defendant who is in the process of being released on a surety
hondo The hearing officer will be kept abreast of the status of
any surety hondo Likewise, these interviewers are fluent in
Spanish to assist Mexican American defendants. The interview is
completen before the defendant appears for his hearing and the
interview sheet is completed and hefore the hearing officer at the
time of the hearing. Therefore, a timely determination for
release on personal bond may be made.
Long range plans include a closed circuit television system
so that defendants held in outlying city and county jails may be
promptly brought before the hearing officer via a telecommunica-
tions network. Finally, the judges hope to continue refining the
process to provide for the eff icient but fair hand ling of all
misdeMeanor detainees. If you have any questions, comments or
suggestions please contact Judge Sherman Ross.
21
Charles  Freeman  has  written  the  following 
motion  which  he  files  when  he  is  shipped  to  the 
newly  created  "Impact  Courts". 
MOTION  CHALLENGING  JURISDICTION  OF 
THE  COURT,  JUDICIAL  POWER  OF  THE  COURT, 
ASSIGNMENT  OF  THE  JUDGE,  AND  POWER  OF  THE  JUDGE 
TO  THE  HONORABLE  JUDGE  OF  SAID  COURT: 
COMES  NOW  the  accused  in  the  above-entitled 
and  numbered  cause,  and  moves  this  Court  to 
decline  to  try  said  cause  herein,  and  in  support 
hereof  would  show  this  Court  as  follows: 
I. 
That  the  174th  Judicial  District  Court  of 
Harris  County,  Texas,  does  not  have  jurisdiction 
over  said  cause. 
II. 
That  implementation  of  so-called  "impact 
courts"  in  Harris  County,  Texas,  one  of  which  is 
this  Court,  violates  the  Division  of  Powers 
Doctrine,  nullifying  and  voiding  such  implemen-
tation  thereof. 
III. 
That  neither  the  Constitution,  nor  the 
Legislature,  of  this  State  has  established  this 
Court. 
IV. 
That  there  is  no  judicial  power  vested  in 
this  Court1  and  no  jurisdiction  for  this  Court  to 
exercise  and  that  there  are  no  lawful  orders  for 
this  Court  to  enforce  thereby. 
V. 
That  the  Honorable  Judge  ,  was  neither 
elected  by  the  qualified  voters  nor  validly 
assigned  to  the  174th  or  the  Judicial  District 
Courts  of  Harris  County,  Texas. 
VI. 
That  the  Honorable  Judge  ____,  has  none  of 
the  powers  of  a  district  judge. 
VII. 
That  no  rule  authorizes  any  district  court 
judge  to  act  in  a  cause  over  which  said  district 
court  judge's  own  court  does  not  have  jurisdiction 
under  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  this  State. 
VIII. 
That  for  this  Court  to  try  said  cause 
violates  said  Accused's  substantive  rights  under 
the  Fifth,  Sixth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  to  the 
United  States  Constitution;  under  Article  I, 
Sections  3,  3a,  10,  15,  19  and  29,  Article  II, 
Section  I,  Article  V,  Sections  lr  2,  7,  8  and  11, 
and  Article  XVII,  Sections  1  and  2,  of  the  Texas 
Constitution;  under  Sections  1.001(bl,  21.001(a), 
24.007,  24.008,  74.031,  74.033,  74.034,  74.036(a), 
74.061  and  75.011  of  the  Texas  Government  Code; 
under  Articles  1.03(5),  1.04,  1.05,  1.27  and  21.30 
of  the  Texas  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure i under 
Section  1.02(6)  of  the  Texas  Penal  Code;  and, 
under  applicable  federal  and  state  law. 
WHEREFORE,  PREMISES  CONSIDERED,  Accused  prays 
this  Court  (1)  conduct  a  pre-trial  evidentiary 
hearing  as  to  the  foregoing  allegations;  (2)  make 
written  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law 
attendant  theret01  and,  (3)  grant  Accused's  Motion 
Challenging  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  Judicial 
Power  of  the  Court,  Assignment,  of  the  Judge,  and 
Power  of  the  Judge,  and  decline  to  try  said  cause 
herein. 
Respectfully  submitted, 
let's  ~ e   r From  You! 
We  want  to  hear  from  youl  Please 
send  us  your  ideas  or  comments  regard-
ing  issues  of  interest  to  the  criminal 
defense  practioner  and  please  let  us 
know  changes  in  address  and  telephone. 
We  welcome  your  participation I
22 
leads  the  "Texas  Throwdown  Band",  an  outstanding
Hearsay... By AUen C. IsbeU
If  you  passed  Judge  Mary  Bacon's  courtroom  local  Country  and  Western  Band.  They  recently 
P
erformed  at  the  Cattleg  ard  f  J  d  '1 
an

saw  Wa
1
ter  Boyd  making  an  impassioned  jury  u  or  u  ge  BJ.  1 
argument,  with  no  one  present  but  Walter  and  the  Ragan's  benefit.  The  band  appears  at  area  clubs 
Court  Reporter,  you  may  have  thought  that  Walter  and  is  the  opening  act  for  many  famous  singers.  If
had  finally  cracked.  Story  is  that  visiting  Judge  the  man  in  front  of  the  band,  under  the  cowboy 
Frank  Pr'ce  limJ.·ted  h  .  hat,  seems  vaguely  familiar,  that  is  Louie.
•  •  t  e  Jury  argument  to  15 
minutes  on  an  habitual  case,  and  Walter  thought  he  Congratulations  to  Jim  Steele,  who  persuaded 
needed  more  time.  So,  he  made  his  bill  of  a  jury  to  give  his  client  probation  after 
exception  containing  what  he  would  have  said,  if  convicting  him  of  aggravated  sexual  assault. 
given  more  time.  Maybe  the  Court  of  Appeals  will  is  our  expert  on  STA. 
find  it  more  interesting  than  who  Clyde  Williams  and  Denise  Collins  are  on  a 
left,  saying,  "I've  heard  one  jury  argument  by  roll.  Three  Not  Guilty's  in  a  month.  In  another 
Walter;  I'm  not  going  to  listen  to  another  one  case,  client  got  a  5  year  probation  for  aggravated 
twice  as  long."  robbery  and  one  of  the  jurors  offered  the  client  a 
Jerri  L;ttle,  .  .  job  after  the  trial I
•  J.S  now  an  assJ.stant  Attorney 
General  with  the  highway  division.  In  Rockport,  that  "famous  Houston  lawyer"  is 
Mac  McInnis,  Professor  Peter  Murphy,  Gayla  Walter  Boyd I, who  returned  for  a  second  murder 
Sims,  and  Walter  Boyd  were  among  those  attending  trial  that  brought  T.V.  and  front-page  coverage. 
the  new  Houston  House  Theatre IS,  opening  play  Becoming  an  "Habitual"  in  marriage  Walter  and 
about  an  English  barrister.  This  new  theatre  Virginia  Boyd  married  each  other  for  the  third 
.  t  1  )  time  November  1  1986  .  G  1 
(F
annJ.n  a  Lee  and  in  downtown  area,  promoted  by  "  J.n  aveston.  Congratu-
Marty  & Lois  Fleck,  also  has  a  happy  hour,  4: 00  lations  to  Walter  and  best  wishes  to  Virginia. 
p.m.,  Thursday,  Friday,  and  Saturday,  serving  Gary  Trichter  has  met  with  appropriate 
wine,  beer  and  popcorn.  authorities  conerning  police  officers  impersona-
Ms.  Cynthia  Gaskin  Mulkey  is  our  resident  ting  lawyers.  He  has  shown  them  the  "light",  and 
expert  on  Tate  v.  Short  writs.  Got  one  granted  in  they  promise  not  to  do  it  again.  Rumor  is  that 
Judge  Pruett's  Court  _  one  of  our  reporters  ran  threatened  that  defense  lawyers  will  start 
into  Cynthia's  very  satisfied  hot  check  client.  impersonating  policemen  (under  the  legal  theory  of 
Mary  Conn  has  also  been  successful  in  this  area.  "what's  good  for  the  goose  is  good  for  the 
As  if  Jim  Skelton  and  Walter  Boyd  aren't  already  gander")  and  to  protect  the  image  of  the  police, 
fighting  over  enough  already,  both  are  bidding  for  they  agreed  to  stop •••• 
the  affections  of  Cynthia.  It's  a  draw  so  far,  One  Defendant  wanted  his  case  transferred  out 
since  neither  has  been  the  least  bit  successful.  of  the  l76th  because  he  heard  the  Judge  was  "the 
Ask  Skelton  about  his  recent  date,  who  ended  up  meanest"  in  the  courthouse,  and  that  he  put  his 
wai ting  for  him  outside  Fort  Bend  jail  for  two  own  wife  on  probation,  and  had  convicted  his  own 
hours  in  very  cold  weather  while  Jim  talked  with  a  son.  Judge  Hatten  denies  this  is  true  - at  this 
client.  As  for  Boyd, 
no  one  w ~
'II 
a
d'
mJ.t  ever  having 
time.
The  Honorable  Angel  Fraga  held  an  Appreciation 
a  date  with  him. 
Reception  at  Primo's  on  November  25.  Over  100  sup-
Harold  Metts,  president  of  Houston  Bar 
Association,  and  Board  of  Directors  for  the  porters  and  friends  attended  the  fajitas  fare.Judge 
Felix  Salazar  did  a  yeoman  job  as  MC.  In  attendance 
Houston  Bar  Association  hosted  a  luncheon  for  the 
were  HCCLA  president,  Candy  Elizondo,  M.A.B.A.  Pres-
directors  and  officers  of  the  H.C.C.L.A.  in 
ident,  Berta  Mejia;  J.e.  Castillo, 
conjunction  with  the  jointly  sponsored  criminal 
Ruben  Guerrero,  Frumencio  Reyes,  and  Judges  Robert 
law  seminar  October  31st.  It  was  a  first  step  in 
Lowry,  Eric  Andell,  Al  Leal,  Bonnie  Fitch,  Francis 
bringing  better  communications  between  the  two 
W i l l ~ ~   and  Carolyn  Day  Hobson.  Past-President,
associations. 
Robert  Pelton  chaired  the  event.
For  us  who  watch  Cybil  Shep  ard:  Marilyn 
Joseph  M.  Rumbaut  ended  an  agonizing  trial  on
Turboff's  sister  wrote  the  script  for  a  recent 
a  drug  case  in  Federal  Court  with  a  mistrial  for
"Moonlighting"  episode. 
In  the  "criminal  defense  lawyers  are  really  his  client  on  all  counts  after  everyone  else  in 
interesting  people  department,"  Louie  Crapitto  the  conspiracy  pled  or  was  found  guilty. 
23 
commENTS  ON  THE  RECENT  ELECTION 
By AZZen C. IsbeZZ
Congratulations  to  the  newly  elected  Judges,  Some  races  were  extremely  close.  The  difference 
who  faced  contested  races.  oetween  victory  and  defeat  in  the  C.C.C.L.#13  race 
Chief  Justice  Frank  Evans  (1st  Court  of  Appeal)  was  .4%;  in  the  C.C.C.L.#4  race  1.2%.  Incumbents 
Justice  James  (Bud)  Warren  (1st  Court  of  Appeal)  (whether  Democrat  or  Republican)  fared  better. 
Judge  Pat  Lykos  (180th) 
None  of  the  races  was  a  runaway.  Money  given  by 
Judge  Don  Shipley  (182nd)  the  defense  bar  may  have  made  a  decisive 
Judge  Jay  Burnett  (183rd) 
difference  between  victory  and  defeat.  The  voting 
Judge  Bob  Burdette  (184th) 
public  crossed  party  lines  and  voted  for  the 
Judge  Carl  Walker  (185th) 
judicial  races  independently,  despite  the  very 
Judge  Michael  McSpadden  (209th) 
offensive  T.V.  ads  by  one  party  to  vote  a  straight 
Judge  A.D.  Azios  (232nd) 
ticket  because  that  party  was  tough  on  criminals, 
Judge  Woody  Densen  (248th) 
whereas  the  other  party  was  soft  on  criminals. 
Judge  Bill  Ragan  (C.C.C.L.#l) 
That  straight  slate  involved  a  large  number  of 
Judge  Don  Hendrix  (C.C.C.L.#2) 
judges  who  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  criminal 
Judge  Jimmie  Duncan  (C.C.C.L.#3) 
justice  system.  Judge  Michael  McSpadden  is  to  be 
Judge  J.  Anderson  (C.C.C.L.#4) 
commended  for  resisting  pressure  to  be  a  part  of 
Judge  Hannah  Chow  (C.C.C.L.#5) 
such  a  blatantly  deceptive  appeal.  The  voting 
Judge  J.  Musslewhite  (C.C.C.L.#6) 
public  rejected  this  appeal.  Hopefully,  such 
Judge  Alfred  Leal  (C.C.C.L.#9) 
tactics,  having  been  ineffective,  will  not  be  used 
Judge  David  Mendoza  (C.C.C.L.#ll) 
in  1988. 
Judge  Mark  Atkinson  (C.C.C.L.#13) 
Judge  Jim  Barkley  (C.C.C.L.#14) 
somETimES  THEY DO  WEAR  THE  WHITE  HAT 
By Allen C. Isbell
The  following  story  is  from  the  October  1986  issue  1985  convenience  store  robbery  and  murder. 
of  The  Texas  Prosecutor:  Prosecutors  refused  to  acknowledge  at  first  that 
they  had  the  wrong  man  but  Lipe  persisted,  did 
"I  ain't  no  hero" ,  said  Gene  Lipe,  further  investigation,  and  finally  went  to  a  State 
Investigator  for  the  Van  Zandt  County  District  District  Judge  in  Canton  with  his  story.  The 
Attorney,  in  response  to  questions  asked  him  about  Canton  Judge  contacted  the  judge  who  was  trying 
his  role  in  freeing  a  22  year  old  murder  suspect  the  case  and  the  trial  was  stopped.  The  innocent 
who  had  been  incorrectly  charged.  Lipe  was  suspect  was  freed  on  September  12th  - eight  months 
instrumental  in  investigating  information  offered  after  being  taken  into  custody. 
by  a  prisoner  in  the  Van  Zandt  county  jail  which  Lipe  spent  25  years  as  a  Dallas  police 
indicated  that  the  Carrol ton  District  Attorney's  officer  before  retiring  and  taking  the  position 
Office  was  trying  the  wrong  man  for  a  November,  with  Van  Zandt  County. 
24 
______ _
WHATISTHEHARRISCOUNTY WHATDOES HCCLA DO FOR WHAT DOES A MEMBER DO?
CRIMINALLAWYERS
ASSOCIATION?
The HCClAis a non-
profit, tax exempt,
professional Association
made up oflawyers from
Harris County,Texas, who
are working to promote
excellence and high ideals in
the practiceofCriminal
Law.
Any lawyer in good
standing with the State Bar
ofTexas, who is endorsed
by a member of
HCCLAis eligible to join.
Theendorsement recom-
mends the applicant as a
person ofprofessional
competency, integrity and
good moral character who is
actively engaged in the
defense ofcriminal cases.
THEDEFENSEBAR?
•  Referrals throughour Lawyer Referral Ser-
vice and throughour membership direc-
tory.
•  HCCLA publications including DOCKET
CALL, a monthly newsletter summarizing
significant decisions ofthe Texas CoW1 of
Criminal Appeals and Texas COW1S ofAp-
peals and topics oflocal interest tothe
criminal defense bar.
•  Regular Monthly Luncheon geileral
membership meetings featuring speakers
on subjectsoftopical interest.
•  Provides a responsive local forum for
lawyers activelyengaged in the practice
ofcriminal law.
•  Opposes legislation and local rules which
infringeonindividual rights protected by
constitutionalguarantees.
•  Promotesa productiveexchange ofideas
andencourages better communication
with prosecutorsand the judiciary.
•  Provides continuinglegal education pro-
grams for improving advocacy skills and
Imowledge.
•  Promotes a just application ofthe CoW1
appointed lawyer system for indigent per-
sons charged with a criminal offense.
FIles Amicus Curiae Briefs where ap-
propriate.
•  Participateandexchange infonnation and
skiU in ourCLEprograms.
Contributetoour Brief Bank Service.
•  Perform agreed Pro Bono services.
•  Bring to the Association's attention proper
grievances in the practice which merit
response and action.
•  Sharein thecommaraderie atour monthly
luncheons and annual social "vents.
•  Takecalls onourReferral Service.
Justice
Duty 
Freedom 
FeUowship
-
66 
Applicant:______________________________
Professional Organizations in which your are a member in good
standing: ___________________
MWling Address: ______________________________
Telephone:___________________
Haveyoueverbeendisbarredordisciplined byanybarassociation
orareyouthesubjectofdisciplinaryactionnowpendin6-g___
FumName:
DateadmittedtoBar:___LawSChool 
ForRegular Membershipenclose $100.00annual fee.
Date,Degreefrom LawSchOO'Ll_____________
TYPE MEMBERSHIP Student
(Expected graduation date.____
date signatureofapplicant
Advisory
Honorary EndorsementonreversemustbesignedbyHCCLAMEMBERIN
Regular OOOD STANDING
ENDORSEMENT
I, a member in good standingofHCCLA believe this applicant to be a person ofprofessional competency, integrity and good
moral character. The applicant is actively engaged in the defense ofcriminal cases.
MAILTHISAPPLICATIONTO:
HarrisCountyCriminal
Lawyers Association
signatureofmember
P.O. Box 22773
Houston, Texas 77fJ27
713/227·2404
BLACKWOOD
BAIL BOlDS
~ 8 6   ~   6 5 5
LET US PLAB YOUR JAIL BIU:!K.
26 
Wednesday  Deaember 17
Inns of Court II
50a Carto tine
5  - 7  pm
a free aoaktails per
person - hors'd'oeuvres
CASH BAR
  PLEASE .JOIN USI
27 
Court Tales
By Judge SheZZy Hancock
THE FAT LADY HAS SUNG •••• FINALLY
The election is over. Election anxiety of judges and lawyers
began long before the first Monday in February, 1986 (the filing
deadline) and didn't end even for a minute until November 4th.
Most of the sitting judges will stay on the bench.
Congratulations to them. And congratulations also to those who will
take the bench for the first time on January first. Hopefully, the
newly-elected judges will be around a few years before some young
attorney decides to roll the dice by paying a filing fee to run
against them.
No local judge, civil or criminal, won by more than 57% of the
vote. That was Judge Ann Cochran of the 270th civil district court
who tallied 57% of the votes in her re-election bid. Most of the
margins in the judicial races were about 53-55%. This is another
manifestation Harris County is about equally divided between
Republicans and Democrats.
Lawyers, judges and other courthouse observers believe the voter
was better educated for the judicial races this election than for
those in the past. But what about the next judicial race?
This election gave us another argument for reform in the way we
elect judges. There were 522,635 ballots cast in the election. The
"big lever" was pulled by 39% or 202,258 of these voters. Of the
"lever pullers", 57% or 114,774 were Democrats, 43% or 86,258 were
Republicans and 1% or 1226 were Libertarians.
Many of the straight ticket punchers punched for the wrong reason.
When writing the election law, the legislature allowed "lever" voting
for one who wanted to vote his or her party. It was not done so a
voter might avoid the confusion and time consumption of the ballot.
What caused confusion and time consumption on the November, 1986
ballot was the judicial races. Many "lever pullers" punched to end
the confusion of the judicial contests. A voter will cast a more
educated vote if the judicial races are on a different ballot.
THE WEEK END HEARING OFFICER
The county criminal court judges have launched a new featur into
the Harris County criminal justice system. Now, there is a hearing
officer on duty week-ends.
The judges have selected Jim Garrett as the hearing officer.
Hearing Officer Garrett brings 15 years of legal experience to the
position. After graduating from the University of Houston Law School
in 1971, Garrett became an assistant district attorney for Harris
County where he served for 3 years. While serving as an assistant DA,
he returned to college where he earned a Masters Degree from Sam
Houston University in Criminology and Corrections. After leaving the
DA's office, Garrett opened a law practice in Humble where he
practiced for 11 years. Garrett was appointed by the Commissioner's
Court in 1985 as Criminal Justice Coordinator for Harris County
concerned with jail population. Garrett and his wife and family
reside in north Harris County.
28
Staff counsel for the county criminal court judges, Richard
Anderson, has prepared an article on this new procedure that can be
found in this edition of Docket Call. Simply stated, the hearing
officer will deternmine if probable cause exists to continue detention
of defendants. He will administer legal warnings to defendant. He
will set bond and review backgrounds to determine if a defendant is
qualified for a pre-trial release bond. The hearing officer will
follow guidelines established by the judge of the particular court
where the case is pending. He will not hold trials, accept pleas, or
sign arrest or search warrants. Hearing Officer Garrett has another
responsibility, however, he will review applications for mental
health committments.
WEEK-END SIGHTSEEING ••• AND A CRIME
Every attorney knows the "sightseeing quotient" found in Austin is
high. After all, it's our state capitol. There's the Capitol
Building at the foot of Congress Avenue, the Governor's Mansion, Lake
Travis and Barton Springs to name just a few sights to visit. But
did you know about the 1930 motorcycle that is on display in the
Department of Public Safety's Training Academy? I didn't think you
did.
The Texas Department of Public Safety began in 1930 as the
enforcement arm of the Texas Highway Department. They didn't use
patrol cars then. Forty-seven men rode Harley Davidson and Indian
motorcycles.
History's first highway patrolmen to die by the hands of
desperado's were motorcycle riders. They were H.D. Murphy and Edward
B. Wheeler who rode motorcycles like the one parked in the DPS
academy. On April I, 1934 a farmer who lived on a major highway
between Dallas and Grapevine sat on his front porch. He casually
watched a parked car with a man and a woman sitting in it. A whisky
bottle was thrown from the car's window. Later, Patrolman Murphy and
Patrolman Wheeler investigated the suspicious car. As Patrolman
Murphy, the more experienced of the two oficers, dismounted his cycle
and approached the vehicle, a shotgun protruded from the car's window
and fired twice. Both patrolmen were shot.
As the farmer watched in horror, a woman got out of the car and
walked over to one of the dying lawmen. She turned one over with her
foot and shot him again in the head. Laughing, she jumped back into
the car. She and the man sped away. Both officers were dead.
Fingerprints taken from the whiskey bottle and photo
identification proved the couple was Bonnie Parker and Clyde
Barrow•••• two outlaws who terrorized the Southwestern United States in
the 1930's.
Patrolman Murphy and Wheeler became a part of DPS history as the
first highway patrolmen to die in the line of duty during criminal
activity. But, they weren't the first to die in the line of duty.
Several were killed before them while riding those two-wheeled
machines on the early Texas rural roads. The safety record of the
motorcycles, or the lack thereof, and the advantages of the
automobiles contributed to the demise of the motorcycle patrolmen in
DPS history.
Those early motorcycle riding highway patrolmen had to be rugged
individuals because all the motorcycles had wooden seats and no
windshields. There was a hand-painted state seal on the front fender
and a tool kit on the forks. On the luggage rack is a crude first aid
kit and there is a fire extinguisher strapped to the rear fender.
The motorcycle mounted highway patrolmen totally disappeared from
Texas highways in 1957. A bold experiment briefly returned the cycles
to Texas highways from 1978 to 1982.
Today, the old 1930 vintage-condition motorcycle sits on front and
rear wheel stands atop a redwood platform. It appears cocked and
ready for recall. Besides the old motorcycle, the DPS has on display,
some guns and other law enforcement artifacts from days gone by. The
headquarters of the Texas Department of Public Safety is located at
5805 North Lamar in Austin.
That's all for this edition of Court Tales; see you in the next
edition of the DOCKET CALL.
30
BLACKWOOD  BAIL  BONDS 
Mr.  Edd  C.  Blackwood  Jr. 
Harris  County  License  #  74145 
713-862-2655 
September  7,  1986 
It  is  with  this  writing  that  I  wish  to  notify  you  of  my  dissociation 
with  ABO,  Burns  &  Blackwood  Bail  Bonds.  From  this  day  forward,  I  am: 
BLACKWOOD  BAIL  BONDS. 
Please  do  not  be  alarmed  or  overly  concerned.  Due  to  a  succession  of 
inappropriate  situations,  the  staff  and  I  have  decided  it  would  be  in 
our  best  interest  to  separate.  And,  since  this  decision  was  one  of 
significant  importance,  and  critical  to  my  prior  commitments  to  you, 
to  provide  excellent  service  that  I  have  made  this  decision.  It  is  by 
doing  this  that  I  will  be  able  to  continue  to  promise  you  prompt,  pro-
fessional  24-hour  service. 
Sincerely  Looking  Ahead, 
~ : :   i ~ ~ , f ~
cw/E.B.JR. 
Letters 
The 1st Amendment guarantees an individual's
right to freely and openly express his views and
to have ideas compete for acceptance in an open
market place of thought. Inasmuch as the press is
a viable medium for proliferating the free
exchange of ideas, the editor of "Hearsay" is
obligated to allow the exposition of other
gossipmongers: even when distressingly, he may
himself be the object of trivial observations.
This having been said, I now relate those matters
which acutely focused my attention on the
Honorable Allen C. Isbell, while at the victory
party for Judge Evans and Judge Warren on November
4, 1986.
The atmosphere of the party and the attire of
those who attended was less formal than that to be
found at a similar Republican function. Isbell,
clad in blue jeans and a rapidly fading Levis
jacket, went seemingly unnoticed through the
relaxed, albeit politically concerned crowd. He
did, in fact, suggest that a group of us might
consider displaying our swank democratic fashions
at some of the republican soirees which were by
then in full swing.
It was not, this suggestion that drew
attention to the otherwise unobtrusive editor.
Rather, it was a flickering glare from a metal
object emanating from under his 501 Blues jacket.
Further investigation revealed that his front
shirt pocket contained a full set of stainless
steel silverware, which he intended to use. Even
I, a left-wing defender of the downtrodden, found
it unusual for a person to carry his own eating
utensils out to dinner. It could be that Isbell
has an irrational fear of communicable diseases
and is unwilling to trust the Health Department's
inspection of the Cattle Guard's facility. Or, it
could be that Allen was afraid that the fajitas
would be served frontier fashion and that, absent
a knife and fork, he would be forced to eat his
dinner by hand. To avoid this potential
embarrassment, and in a somewhat republican move,
Allen came fully prepared not to eat with his
fingers. Most likely though, Allen's behavior was
simply due to that type of eccentricity which
allows him to walk his own path while at the same
time endearing himself to all of us. It is the
best of all possible worlds when a bit of humor
can be obtained from a person's individualism.
Keep it up Allen.
HOUSTON/GALLERIA AREA
Solo Practitioner has prestigious
executive office space for one or
5 attorneys. Library, conference
room, telephone, secretarial and
word processing available. Type
of arrangement negotiable. Call
(713) 621-7878 or (713) 944-2312.
Free Parking $300.00 + per month.
Referral  Service 
FELONY CALLS RECEIVED
OCT
16
NOV
22
FELONY CASES RETAINED o 1
MISDEMEANOR CALLS RECEIVED 20 46
MISDEMEANOR CASES RETAINED 2 7
TOTAL SURVEYS MAILED 24 12
SURVEYS RETURNED 13 29
let's  Hear  From  YOU!
We want to hear from youl Please
send us your ideas or comments regard-
ing issues of interest to the criminal
defense practioner and please let us
know changes in address and telephone.
We WeLcome your participationl
Colin B. Amann
32
THE  CHRIRmRN  SPERKS 
RTTR IGil1 RTTR/Boy 
By Randy McDonaZd
Past-President,  Robert  Pelton,  has  asked  me 
to  get  our  members  to  contribute  information  about 
witnesses  used  by  the  State.  Many  of  us  run  into 
the  same  police  officer,  chemist,  or  other  experts 
called  to  testify  by  the  State.  Sometimes  the 
testimony  in  one  case  differs  from  the  testimony 
in  another  case.  HCCLA  proposes  to  collect  and 
record  the  names  of  these  witnesses  and  styles  of 
cases  in  which  they  testified.  If  an  attorney  has 
the  same  witness  in  a  case,  he/she  can  call  HCCLA 
and  obtain  this  information.  With  this  informa-
tion,  the  attorney  can  contact  the  court  and 
obtain  a  transcript.  Another  source  is  Appellate 
attorneys  who  have  access  to  transcripts  of  the 
testimony.  With  cooperation  and  accurate 
reporting,  HCCLA  members  can  enjoy  having  advanced 
testimony  of  certain  witnesses  for  purposes  of 
impeachment  or  settling  the  case. 
The  Federal  public  defender  has  such 
information  about  many  Federal  witnesses.  If  you 
have  a  Federal  case,  you  may  want  to  contact  them. 
To  report  this  information,  call  the  HCCLA 
office  (Donna).  Give  her  complete  and  accurate 
information,  including,  but  not  limited  to,  style 
and  number  of  case,  type  of  testimony  (i. e.  HPD 
chemist,  arresting  officer),  his  name  and  badge 
number,  the  area  of  relevant  testimony  or  the  area 
of  expertise. 
COURTHOUSE  TRIVIR 
Allen C.  Isbell
1.  What  Judge  was  the  last  person  to  deliver 
ice  in  Houston  from  a  wagon  drawn  by  two  mules, 
and  who  has  a  picture  to  prove  it? 
2.  Only  one  Criminal  District  Court  chambers 
has  a  shower,  can  you  name  the  Court  and  the  judge 
who  had  enough  stroke  with  the  County  Commis-
sioners  to  have  it  installed? 
By Mary E. Conn
On  09/30/86,  HCCLA  member  Sandra  Smith  and 
HCCLA  Board  member  Ben  Durant  convinced  a  jury  to 
give  their  client,  Cheryl  LaRue  Davis,  probation 
in  the  tragic  case  in  which  Ms.  Davis'  three 
children  died  when  their  home  caught  fire. 
Ms.  Davis  admitted  that  she  left  the  children 
at  home  alone,  but  by  the  excellent  work  of 
Defense  Counsel,  the  jury  was  convinced  that  the 
mother' s  act  was  not  intentional,  and  that  the 
appropriate  punishment  for  the  tragedy  was 
probation  for  the  mother,  who  had  pleaded  guilty 
to  involuntary  manslaughter. 
Congratulations  to  you  both  on  fine  work! 
Suggestion  for  this  month' s  award  submitted 
by  Gloria  V.  Smith. 
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Call Bill Curtis - 713-223-8592
Or Your Broker
35
DISTRICT  COURTS  TRYING  CRIMINAL  CASES 
Bldg.  Clerk 
Court  Judge  Rm/Fl.  Ext.  No.  Coordinator  Court  Rep::>rter 
174th  Jon N.  Hughes  Cr-520  6324  7840  Samy  Jefferson 
176th  William  Hatten  Cr-507  6328  7822  Kay  Arrlerson  Sherry  Gentry 
177th  Miron  Love  Cr-700  6332  7841  Les  Oliver  Tamra  Parks 
178th  William  T.  Harmon  Fi-5th  6336  7843  Lima  Hanson  Gail  Williams 
179th  1. D.  McMaster  Cr-500  6340  7848  Judy  Shaver    a r l e ~ Swope 
180th  Patricia  R.  Lykos  Cr-306  6344  7847  Ted  Jaynes  Kathleene  O'COnner 
182m  Donald  K.  Shipley  Cr-608  6350  7846  Carolyn  Hamilton  Valdeane  Coe
183rd  Joseph  Guarioo  Cr-823  6354  7853  Jinmy  Pillow  Marilyn  See 
184th  Bob  Burdette  Fi-5th  6358  7852  Ron  Story  Debbie  Traylor-Zann 
185th  George  L.  walker  Cr-532  6362  7852  Carolyn  Madeksho  Jennifer  Slessinger 
208th  Thanas  !butt  Cr-514  6374  7826  Mary  Alcoba  Phyllis  Thibodeaux 
209th  Michael  T.  McSpadden  Cr-424  6378  7854  Kathy  Norman  Janet  Samers 
228th  Ted  Poe  Cr-806  6650  7827  Elaine  Stolte 
230th  Joe  Kegans  Cr-628  678.2  7823  David  Als....orth  Bella  Joe  Fisher 
23200  A.  D.  Azios  Cr-800  6778  7821  Doug  Harvey  Brema  Palmer 
248th  W:::x:X3y  R.  Densen  Cr-631  7094  7825  Doug  Pettit 
262m  Doug  Shaver  Cr-708  6961  7828  Lanelle  Roberts  Pat  Ranirez 
263rd  Charles  J.  Hearn  Cr-719  6944  7842  Carolyn  Graham  Sharon  Cook 
337th  Johnny  KoleOOa  Fi-2m  7746  7851  Charlie  Brossman  Darlene  Hulka 
338th  Mary  Bacon  Cr-600  7775  7838  Betsy  Clerrmer  &lna  Hipp 
339th  Norman  Lanford  Fi-2m  7787  7838  Mona  Freed  Marilyn  Skinner 
351st  Albert  Pruett  Cr-829  5620  7845  Mona  Zinmerman  Myrna  Hargis 
Impact  Court-Family  Law  Ctr-6th  Fl.  5021 
AJ:MlN ISTRATIVE  OFFICES  - IbCJn  100 
Hon.  Jon N.  Hughes,  Admin.Judge •• 6324,  6575  JURY  CHARGE  BlNK  - IbCJn  100  5653 
Jack  Thanpson,  Court  Administrator •••••  6575  Barbara  Samford •••••••••••••••••••  5653 
Patty  Caoo,  Fiscal/Admin.  Secretary••••  5396 
Maria  Cruz,  Secretary••••••••••••••••••  6579  (X)MPtrrER  AIDED  ".I'R.1NSCRIPTIGJ  CENTER.  7768 
Ted  Doebbler,  Staff  Attorney•••••••••••  6575  - 3rd  Floor  -
&l  Erwin,  Operations  Coordinator •••••••  5704  Helyn  Guerry,  CAT  Coordinator •••••  5598 
Leslie  Gay,  Project  Analyst ••••••••••••  6859  &6740 
Joyce  Metoyer,  Alternate  Coordinator •••  6575  Cherrie  L.  Bowen, 
Nancy  Pulido,  Admin.Asst/Exec.Sec••••••  6576  &litor  Terminal  Operator •••••••  5598 
Susan  Schmitz,  Research&Dev.Analyst ••••  5703  &6740 
Joan  Taliaferro,  Alternate  Coord•••••••  6575  Judy  Fox, 
Peggy  Witt,  Alternate  Coor.i.dnator ••••••  6575  &litor  Terminal  Operator •••••••  5598 
&6740 
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UR GUARANTEE
Educational Programs SCheduled
MEMBERS CHRISTMAS PARTY, "ed.
esd
",December 17,
________....... 
noon,
19 6, 5,00-7'00, I••, of
Administration Bldg.
COurt II, 502 Caroline.
8
JUSTICE IN ACTION - ASeries of Forums
NEW DRUGS, NEW PROBLEMS, NEW PROGRAMS
PRESENTERS:  JOHN CLEVELAND, D;rector - Alter.,ti.e Dr" Abuse Tre'tment Pro,.
LARRY ANDERSON, Director _ I.hale.t AbuBe Pro,r,m,
DATE:
PLACE:  ASSOC;'tio. for .the erican,
the Advancement of Am
Friday, J"u,ry 9, 198, . De art.e.t
TIME
Harr;s County JUvenile Room
3540 West D,ll,s, Upst"r. 0  Te"s Ju.enile ,.d
hours of  
the
Three
' 9:00 ,m - 12,00 pm. bee••ppro.ed by
• " credit has
Adult Probation CommIttee.
INSTITUTES
AND COURSES - TCDLA
January 30-
31

1987
FOR
THE NONSPECIALIST
LITIGATION Antonio
BA
Four  
NKRUPTCY FOR Beaumont Plaza Houston
February 12
Holi
d
a
Y
1nn-College 0 fLaw,
South Texas
13
HOUSTON  SINCE  1936" 
A ACTION FEDERAL
BAIL BOND
BILL  PELLERIN 
co. 
SOUTHWEST 
GERALD  P.  MONKS.  PhD 
L1C.  1/ 74108
EXECUTIVE  DIRECTOR 

MEMBER  P.D.H.  &  P.D.T. 
CHARLES  CIPOLLA 
ASK ABOUT OUR GUARANTEE
661-7400
24  HOUR  SERVICE  - (DOWNTOWN) 
"OUTSTANDING  PROFESSIONAL  BONDSMAN  OF  THE  YEAR  1984" 
TERMS  AVAILABLE 
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• WE  WORK  WITH  ALL  ATTORNEYS 
"BONDS OF  ALL  KINDS" 
JAIL  RELEASE  MADE  BY  PHONE
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SE HABLA  ESPANOL 
4189  BELLAIRE  BLVD.,  SUITE  242 
YOU  MUST  NOTIfY  US  Of  YOUR  LAIIIYER'S  NAME.  ADDRESS,  AND  PHONE:  ,'UMBER.  If  yovr 
made  arrangftmenu  for  your  bond,  you  must  r'ftport  back  to  htm  ,..ltI"tU"l  24  MOrt.  that 
a  p.!id  in  tun  6uorot'y  before  you  10  to  COurt  is  your  best  d.fense.  It  always  pays.  \\Ie  do  not 
rt'commend  an),  paflicular  attorney.  family  attornt'y. It  is  ,cod  to  have 
MEMBER:  Houston  Chamber  of  Commerce 
Better  Business  Bureau  of 
$800.00 Bonds - $115.00. 10% plus  $35.00 on Metropolitan  Houston.  Inc. 
PvbllC  bad    not  rf'dvcf'  lad  popu1atton)., 
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...----- Educational Programs Scheduled ----....
BOARD MEETING Thursday, December 11, 1986, 12:00 noon, Administration Bldg.
MEMBERS CHRISTMAS PARTY, Wednesday, December 17, 1986, 5:00-7:00, Inns of
Court II, 502 Caroline.
JUSTICE IN ACTION - A Series of Forums
NEW DRUGS, NEW PROBLEMS, NEW PROGRAMS
PRESENTERS: JOHN CLEVELAND, Director - Alternative Drug Abuse Treatment Prog,
LARRY ANDERSON, Director - Inhalent Abuse Program,
Association for the
the Advancement of Mexican Americans
DATE: Friday, January 9, 1987 
PLACE: Harris County Juvenile Probation Department 
3540 West Dallas, Upstairs Conference Room 
TIME: 9:00 am - 12:00 pm.
Three hours of training credit has been approved by the Texas Juvenile and
Adult Probation Committee.
INSTITUTES AND COURSES TCDLA
January 30-31, 1987 LITIGATION FOR THE NONSPECIALIST
Four Seasons, San Antonio
BANKRUPTCY FOR THE NONSPECIALIST
February 12
Holiday Inn- Beaumont Plaza
13 South Texas College of Law, Houston
PRIVATE
**CRlmE LABORATORY**
ProvIding forensIc a.na.lysls,
a.nd expert testImony In the
following a.rea.s;
drug a.na.lysls
blood a.lcohol o.na.lysls
urIne drug a.na.lysls
a.lcohol toxIcology
a.nonymous drug testing
dwl consultatIon
clandestine labs
a.rson debris analysis
Private InvestigatIons
CONSULTATlON
FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
OPPOSING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS.
713-331-2655
1600 EAST HWY. SIX, SUITE 350
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77511
FORMER DPS CHEMISTS
DEA #RMOIOSOOS STATE #:Foo63235
mICRO FORENSICS &-
INVESTIGATIONS
WQnt To l ~ n o w The Truth?
Polygro.ph &- Investigo.tions
WiUio.m W. "Bill" Fisher
Kelly B. Hendricks
EXPERIENCED - LICENSED
BONDED-INSURED
Houston 224-5892
Humble 446-7410
'We (>.Ie here to serve your needs'
38 ~                                                                     ~
_____________________ ___
WHATISTHEHARRISCOUNTY WHATDOES HCCLA DO FOR WHAT DOES A MEMBERDO?
CRIMINALLAWYERS
ASSOCIAnON?
The HCCLAis a non-
profit, taxexempt,
professional Association
made upoflawyers from
HarrisCounty,Texas. who
are working to promote
excellenceandhigh ideals in
thepracticeofCriminal
Law.
Anylawyer in good
standingwith the StateBar
ofTexas. who is endorsed
bya memberof
HCCLAis eligible tojoin.
Theendorsement recom-
mends theapplicant as a
person ofprofessional
competency. integrity and
good moral character who is
actively engaged in the
defense ofcriminal cases.
THEDEFENSEBAR?
•  Referrals through our lawyerReferral Ser-
vice and throughour membershipdirec·
tory.
•  HCCLA publications including D<X:KET
CALL,a monthly newsletter summarizing
signiftcant decisions ofthe TexasCourtof
Criminal AppealsandTexasCourtsofAp-
peals and topicsoflocal interest tothe
criminaldefense bar.
•  Regular Monthly Luncheon general
membership meetings featuring speakers
onsubjectsoftopical interest.
•  Provides a responsive local forum for
lawyers activelyengagedin the practice
ofcriminal law.
• Opposeslegislation and local rules which
infringeonindividual rights protected by
constitutionalguarantees.
•  Promotesa productiveexchangeofideas
andencourages bettercommunication
with prosecutorsand the judiciary.
•  Providescontinuinglegal educationpro-
grams for improving advocacyskiDs and
knowledge.
•  Promotes a just application ofthe Court
appointed lawyer system for indigent per-
sonscharged with a criminal offense.
•  HIes Amicus Curiae Briefs where ap-
propriate.
•  Participateand exchange information and
skiD inourCLE programs.
•  Contributetoour Brief Bank Service.
•  Perform agreed Pro Bonoservices.
•  Bringtothe Association's attention proper
grievances in the practice which merit
response and action.
•  Sharein thecommaraderieatour monthly
luncheons andannual social events.
•  Takecalls onourReferral Service.
Justice
Duty
Freedom
FeUowship

66
Applicant:_________________
Professional Organizationsin which your are a member in good
~ d i n g  
Mailing Admess: ___________________________
Telephone:___________________
Haveyoueverbeendisbarredordisciplined byanybarassociation
orareyouthesubjectofdisciplinaryactionnowpendin.l>-g____
FIrmName:
DateadmittedtoBar:____LawSChool_______For Regular Membershipenclose $100.00annual fee.
Date,Degreefrom LawSchoo'LI___________
TYPEMEMBERSHIP_
_
_
_
Student
(Expected graduation date ____)
Advisory
Honorary
Regular
Sustaining Membership $200.00
_-:--_
date signatureofapplicant
EndorsementonreversemustbesignedbyHCCLAMEMBERIN
GOODSTANDING
ENDORSEMENT
I, a member ingood standingofHCCLAbelieve this applicant to bea personofprofessional competency, integrity and good
moral character. Theapplicant is activelyengaged in thedefenseofcriminal cases.
MAILTHISAPPLICATIONTO:
HarrisCountyCriminal
LawyersAssociation
signatureofmember
P.O. Box22773
Houston,Texas7702.7
713/227·2A04