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ZOSIMA INC.

VS LILIA SALIMABAGAT
G.R. NO. 174376 - September 12, 2012

FACTS:

In 1993, Zosima Inc. entered into a contract with Lilia Salimbagat for the lease of office building
on a yearly basis that is subject to annual increase. In March 2000, no monthly fee was paid because the
contract of lease was allegedly not renewed.

On June 20, 2003, Zosima, through counsel, sent a formal letter of demand to Salimbagat,
requiring her to pay her arrears and to vacate the property. However, Salimbagat refused to vacate and to
pay her alleged rental obligation.

On November 5, 2003, Zosima filed a case for unlawful detainer a against Salimbagat alleging
that from Aprill 2000 to October 2003, Salilmbagat had accumulated arrears in her rental payments
amounting to 628,703.00. In her answer, she alleged that although she was using the same address, she
was not occupying the property of Zosima but a warehouse that she bought for P300,000 on a dried estero
located at the back of the office building that Zosima owned. She further argued that the office building
which belonged to Zosima was demolished to pave the way for the construction of the Light Rail Transit
(LRT) Line II Project.

On May 4, 2005, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Zosima. On appeal, the RTC fully
affirmed the decision of the MTC. Salimbagat elevated the case to the CA which reversed the RTC
decision and dismissed the case for unlawful detainer on the ground that the court was not convinced that
Salimbagat had unlawfully possessed the property from April 2000 to June 2003. Zosima moved for
reconsideration however it was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON there is implied new lease or tacita reconduccion.

RULING:

The Supreme Court said the plaintiff failed to prove its case by preponderance of evidence.
Although the lease contract had already expired, the principle of implied new lease or tacita reconduccion
existed by operation of law is not correct. An implied new lease will set in if it is shown that (a) the term
of the original contract of lease has expired; (b) the lessor has not given the lessee a demand to vacate;
and (c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor.
This acquiescence may be inferred from the failure of the lessor to serve notice to vacate upon the lessee
as provided for in Article 1670 which provides:

Article 1670. If at the end of the contract of lease the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for
15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a contrary by either party has previously been
given, it is understood that there is implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for
the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.

The cited Article 1687, on the other hand, provides:

Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the
rent is to be paid annual; from month to month if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly;
and from day to day, if the rent id to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no
period for the lease has been set, the courts ,ay fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied
the premises for over one year. If the rent id weekly, the court may likewise determine a longer period
after the lessee has been in possession for over 6 months. In case of daily rent, the courts may fix a longer
period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.

Since Zosima failed to adduce any additional evidence to rebut the allegation that by April 2000,
no office building stood to be leased because it has been demolished to pave way for the construction of
the LRT Line II Project, and that Salimbagat was able to produce tax declarations and a copy of the Deed
of Conditional Sale as proof of her right to possess the warehouse adjoining the demolished building she
used to lease.

Wherefore, the court denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of CA.

VIEGELY SAMELO vs MANOTOK SERVICES, INC.
G.R. NO. 170509 June 27, 2012

FACTS:

On January 31, 1997, the respondent entered into a contract with the petitioner for the lease of a
portion of the lot for a period of 1 year. Upon the expiration of the lease contract on December 31, 1997,
the petitioner continued occupying the subject premises without paying the rent. On August 5, 1998, the
respondent sent a letter to the petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises and pay
compensation for its use and occupancy however, petitioner refused to heed these demands.

On November 18, 1998, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
petitioner befor the MeTC praying that the petitioner be ordered to vacate the subject premises and to pay
compensation for its use and occupancy.

In her answer, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had no right to collect rentals because the
subject premises are located inside the property of the Philippine national Railways (PNR). She also
added that the petitioner had no certificate of title over the subject premises and further claimed that her
signature in the contract of lease was obtained through respondents misrepresentation and likewise
maintained that she is now the owner of the subject premises as she had been in possession since 1944.

The MeTC decided in favor of the respondent and held that the only issue to be resolved in an
unlawful detainer case is physical possession or possession de facto, and that the respondent had
established its right of possession over the subject premises. It added that the petitioners right under the
lease contract already ceased upon the expiration of the said contract. It further ruled that the petitioner is
already stopped from questioning the right of the respondent over the subject premises when she entered
into a contract of lease with the respondent.

On appeal, the RTC set aside the decision of the MeTC and dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer. The RTC held that the respondent had no right to collect rentals as it failed to show that it had
authority to administer subject premises and to enter into a contract of lease with the petitioner.

Aggrieved by the reversal, the respondent filed a petition for review with the CA which reversed
and set aside the RTC decision and reinstated the MeTC judgment. The CA held that the petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the right of the respondent over the subject property. It explained that in an
action involving the possession of the subject premises, a tenant cannot controvert the title of his landlord
or assert any right adverse to that title, without first delivering to the landlord the premises acquired by
virtue of the agreement between themselves. It further held that the only issue in an ejectment suit is
physical or material possession. The issue of ownership is not required to determine the issue of
possession since the petitioner tacitly admitted that she is a lessee of the subject premises.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her in its motion, hence this petition.

RULING:

The SC held that an action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds
possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved. Thus, any
attempt of the parties to inject the question pf ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it might
throw light on the right of possession.

In the instant case, the lease contract was for the period of one year with a monthly rental of
P3,960 commencing on January 31, 1997 and expiring on December 31, 1997. It bears emphasis that it
was only on August 5, 1998 that a notice to vacate was sent and the petitioner continued enjoying the
subject premises for more than 15 days, without objection from the respondent. By the inaction of the
respondent as lessor, there can be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract therefore,
an implied new lease was therefore created pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 1670. If at the end of the contract of lease the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for
15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a contrary by either party has previously been
given, it is understood that there is implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for
the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.

An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following requisites are found to exist:
(a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired;
(b) the lessor has not given the lessee a demand to vacate; and
(c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor.

Article 1687 of the CC on implied new lease provides:

Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the
rent is to be paid annual; from month to month if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly;
and from day to day, if the rent id to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no
period for the lease has been set, the courts ,ay fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied
the premises for over one year. If the rent id weekly, the court may likewise determine a longer period
after the lessee has been in possession for over 6 months. In case of daily rent, the courts may fix a longer
period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.

Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered to be from month to
month. A lease from month to month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the
end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor. When the respondent sent a letter to vacate to
the petitioner on August 5, 1998, the tacita reconduccion was aborted, and the contract of lease is deemed
to have expired at the end of that month. A notice to vacate constitutes an express act on the part of the
lessor that it no longer consents to the continued occupation by the lessee of its property. After such
notice, lessees right to continue in possession ceases and her possession becomes one of detainer.

Wherefore, petition was denied and the decisions of CA were affirmed with modification on the
unpaid rentals due.

JOVEN YUKI, JR. VS WELLINGTON CO.
G.R. NO. 178527 November 27, 2009