BECOMING IX: ESSENCE UP TO GROUND The unity "contains in it being and all its forms absorbed" (112).

Again, regarding quality and quantity, each becomes the other "it already was implicitly: and thus we get Being thrown into abeyance and absorbed, with its several characteristics negatived" (112, Zus.). This absorption seems to be the heart of the transition to Essence. Quite logically, however, it is at this point that transition itself is "absorbed" into "the passage of different into different" that is no passage, in the literal sense, at all but abiding relation or explicit "reference". So Hegel says, the "transition of Essence is therefore at the same time no transition." 1 This is why "being and all its forms" are absorbed into Essence, not left behind like a "somewhat" that vanishes. Being was from the beginning Essence. The immediacy of Being "has turned out to be selfannulling." This is the experience of everyone who thinks, that things are not as they first seem, or need not be so, are not self-evidently so. The unity, of quality and quantity in measure, to follow Hegel's route to this point, is "simple relation-to-self” and not, for example, relation to our minds or thinking. In this sense, Being as something which "falls into the mind" (cadit in mente), i.e. the immediate for us (and so not immediate), "by the negation of itself is a mediation with self and a reference to self". It "cancels itself" into the truer or more fundamental immediacy which is Essence, is thus "absorbed". Central to this advance is the primacy of Mind or infinite consciousness. This is the same as Possibility. In an infinite time, Aquinas had said, whatever can happen does happen. The possible, Hegel will later say, is the actual and, in reverse, "Actuality is first of all Possibility" (143). This is the connection of Essence with indifference, the Substrate. The web of relations becomes here relations of relations and so no web, no relations. The possible worlds are no worlds at all, ultimately. "World" was a construct, a finite concept. This is "the true infinity of coincidence with self in another." We might even say "we", as differentiated infinity into infinities again, "beget one another" in a mutuality annulling substance. We approach, verge upon, the further wisdom of silence, whereof, after all, "one cannot speak", although it has to be the supreme Rationality. There is no need to deny the title Philosophy, or Wisdom, to it, the Notion as "pure play". This, surely, is the positive significance of "post-modernism", as people are pleased to call it. Well, you may say I am having some difficulty negotiating this transition which is not a transition. I am aware that the order of approach for this section, of the Encyclopaedia, is somewhat altered from that of Hegel's "Greater Logic" but, again, the textual or exegetical interest is here subordinated to the res, the matter in hand. It follows from the nature of the dialectic as set up that each one's approach to it must be one’s own, since it is a call to actual thinking. It thus makes explicit what I have urged above as the nature of reading in general. What the dialectic thus sets out to show is that "all roads lead to Rome". Thought, consistently pursued, has to find itself thinking itself. In thought’s thus “becoming the path”, however, the change and movement of categories, the “advance” itself, becomes or is absorbed in it, not finally as Essence but as the Notion. For "in essence the actual unity of the notion is not realised, but only postulated by reflection." We might say, essence as a concept in itself is not yet for itself.2 Postulation, of course, is possibility. In Being we have the illusion, the impression, of going beyond possibility. Yet possibility itself is the first, i.e. the foundational or ground-form of Actuality. This must be so where what is under consideration is Absolute
1

One ought to have the original text to consult (I do not), to see, for example just what preposition or case the German has. Is "the transition of Essence", in Wallace's translation here, the transition to essence, as I am choosing to take it for my own thinking? The exegetical interest I take to be secondary, if one is interested, like Hegel, in philosophical penetration of reality prior to a particular interest in Hegel (an aspect of reality all the same). 2 I am repeating here what seems like an insight of my first Hegel teacher, Joseph Kockelmans.

Mind, i.e. the one and only and final Being which is, it too, "neither one nor many", is not Being as we immediately might understand it. Anima est quodammodo omnia said Aristotle, in the only book of philosophical psychology that Hegel approved. Is it then anything “particular” at all? Essence is self-relatedness "only in so far as it relation to an Other." It is "Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself." That is, in shaking off the false or finite notion of Being as distinguished against our thinking of it we get nearer to true Being here and always mediating itself, under the "veil" of what we have always taken to be thinking. To think, it was anciently said, is to become the other. Or we might say, it has no empirical nature. This though would be to assume as normative, i.e. in so far as we retain any respect at all for "empiricism", the very idea we are in process of subverting, viz. "each thing is itself and not another thing." The transition to, rather, the opening up of Being as Essence, precisely as putting a stop to transitions, from self or same to other, simply is an Identity, where everything, severally or together, is every and anything else. To stop there would of course be to deny all grain to the universe, in the night where all cows or cats or black. What is emerging rather, and being shown, is a set of limitations upon absolute difference, ultimately realised in the Notion as A systematic whole in which each of its constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it (160). This Identity is not the identity of formal logic and “the so-called Laws of Thought” (115), a law itself somehow identical with the law of contradiction, and yet not of course identical, which already somewhat undermines this pinpointing of it as "itself and not another thing". In fact one already finds within scholastic logic, where rational but not yet rationalist, a variety of identities. The identity between subject and predicate, for example, is spoken of as an intentional identity or as an identity of reference, clearly of two expressions or conceptions otherwise disparate. This gets explained in terms of their suppositio, a richer and more varied notion than blanket reference.3 Concept-formation itself, too, results in such an identity, in the form of an “intention”, and hence we are said to become what we know. Mind, let’s say for now, has the capacity to “become the other as other”. Is it then itself anything? Well, it is certainly this capacity. Identity is the logical relation or “relation of reason” (only). In Hegel this thesis is overturned and transformed, though within a continuum. Hegel repeatedly characterises the other view, abstract identity, as unintelligence passing into obstinacy (113). Where everything is identical with itself everything is ipso facto different. This is partly covered by drawing the consequence that identity is a "relation of reason" only, however that is possible. It is not a real relation simply because the putative two terms are really one, i.e. have one reference, like "Cicero" and "Tully". Yet even here we still have and have to have two different names. Even this then is not the A=A of those old logic books. In this form indeed being “equal to” is already confounded with being “the same as”, quantity and quality, just what Leibniz intended to hold apart in his Identity of Indiscernibles, declaring that the totally equal must be identical, i.e. that nothing is totally equal, with another, our rationalist principle again. As Hegel expresses it, "When understanding sets itself to study Identity, it has already passed beyond it, and is looking at difference in the shape of bare Variety" (117, Zus.). Difference
3

See our "The Supposition of the Predicate", The Modern Schoolman, Vol. LXXVII, Number 1, November1999, pp. 73-78; “The Resistance of Thomism to Analytical and Other Patronage”, The Monist, Volume 80, Number 4, October 1997, pp. 611-618. Today I claim that Hegel, who never patronized Thomism, yet completes or accomplishes it, for the time being.

too, that is to say, has to be differentiated, not merely treated as the opposite of the bare identity of formal logic, with which however it is really identical in a reciprocal embrace. In fact we discover features both of likeness and unlikeness in different or diverse things. Such a method of comparison, however, can never be the whole of science. "Its results are indeed indispensable, but they are… only preliminary to truly intelligent cognition." Such "external" comparison only picks out the external or purely quantitative difference which is the matter of mathematics. Even as regards Leibniz's principle, "the maxim of variety" (sic Hegel), "difference must be understood to mean not an external and indifferent diversity merely, but difference essential. Hence the very nature of things implies that they must be different", i.e. each thing in its own proper character, just in so far as it is anything, a "thing". This is the sense in which difference is not "external", not merely observed in a comparison of leaves on trees, as if one might one day find two the same, like a new kind of "four-leafed clover". We look for the specific difference extending up to the individual, the haecceitas. Thus Scotus attempted to conceive even this, "thisness", under a universal form, though it would have had to remain true that this thisness is not that thisness, i.e. thisness becomes indistinguishable from "thatness" and we are returned to abstraction, rather as in "existentialism". Hegel in fact introduces Identity at 113, self-Identity at 115. Are they different, distinct? The latter, again, “becomes an Identity in form only, or of the understanding, if it be held hard and fast, quite aloof from difference.” This is what abstraction is, he says, “the imposition of this Identity of form”. This “form of elementary simplicity” de-forms the “inherently concrete”. His “two ways” of abstraction correspond, perhaps in intention, to the ancient hesitation between separation and, so to say, generalisation merging with induction (epagoge). The “Identity which is inherently concrete... is first discoverable in the Ground, and, with a higher truth, in the Notion”, he advises us. It is not then a category to be superseded. Nor will it be “absolute identity” in any merely abstract sense. The “principles of Essence” are sometimes predicated of a supposed subject, viz. “Everything”, so as to be “stated as universal Laws of Thought.” Yet these cannot be those usually given. Identity and contradiction, A=A, or, negatively, “A cannot at the same time be A and not A”, Hegel interprets as one “maxim”. This, “instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing but the law of abstract understanding” or something finite and limiting. He goes on to assert that “the propositional form itself contradicts it”. There we have, again, a form of “intentional identity” which is precisely not an identity. Hence there is the need to make the identification (of the otherwise disparate). As Hegel puts it, “a proposition always promises a distinction between subject and predicate.” We never say A=A. It would be “silly” to do so. I would add that even here “the same as A” as predicate (in “A is the same as A”) is identified with the subject “A” (i.e. there is no special “is of identity”) and this may be the source of Hegel’s notion of Self-Identity. What is the same as A, this property, is, by virtue of propositional form alone, the same as A again in intentional identity as affirming real identity.4 Real “so-called Laws of Thought”, i.e. if we must use this invidious expression 5, “make laws out of its opposite”, the opposite, he means, of formal identity. He simply means that no one thinks or speaks in accordance with this “law”, “discredited with practical common-sense as well as with the philosophy of reason”.
4

See our “Subject and Predicate Logic”, The Modern Schoolman LXVI, January 1989, pp. 129-139 (esp. 138-9); also “The Interdependence of Semantics, Logic, and Metaphysics as Exemplified in the Aristotelian Tradition”, International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 63-92. The opposition to Hegelianism expressed there had already crumbled by the time of publication, but the interdependence mentioned was only strengthened by that crumbling. 5 It is invidious because we have to see them for themselves, which is the very opposite of our relation to law.

True identity is “an Ideality of what immediately is”. So clearly it approaches, we approach here, to the nerve of Absolute Idealism, where it, where Hegel, touches upon the matter of the Ontological Argument which, and this was precisely Aquinas’s objection to this argument from the standpoint of (moderate) realism, confounds idea and being. Identity “is a high category” (115, Zus.). In this sense God, he says, is to be known as “absolute Identity”, not in any abstract sense of this term. This, again, is one with the knowledge of the nothingness, the untruth, of finite things (83, Zus.). The equation of these two, nothingness and untruth, already identifies the historic approach, of placing thought above being.6 The same Identity “distinguishes man from nature”, as “pure self-contained unity”, in selfcomprehension as “I”. We can ask if the one Identity is identical with the other, the “same” one, God and I. The true Identity “contains Being and its characteristics ideally transfigured in it.” This view ultimately denies the reality of “nature” as more than a moment of selfalienation in the final dialectic. Self-identity, we will find, of notion “and the idea too”, necessarily “involve distinction” within themselves, this difference, he will say, which is intrinsic, as going beyond the “external” difference typified by Quantity. Identity is, in the first place, the repetition of what we had earlier as Being, but as become, through supersession of its character of immediateness. It is therefore Being as ideality (115, Zus.). Hegel is insistently repetitive on this point of Ideality. Here Identity does not exclude Difference. He makes this point central to genuine philosophy, its “touch-stone”. Difference is further characterised in itself characterising Essence as “self-relating negativity” and “selfrepulsion” (116). We encountered the latter category in the first section of the Logic. Finitude or limit, however, is here left behind. This negativity is relation, distinction without separation, “in short,... Relativity, Mediation”. So how does Identity come to Difference (116, Zus.)? In asking this we still, of course, assume independence of the two, though this makes an answer impossible. Hegel here touches on Lewis Carroll’s paradox, that an extra premise is always needed for a valid conclusion taken “absolutely” as “following”. There is always an implicit leap of thought. This is, incidentally, a difficulty for artificial intelligence (AI) and discussed as such in Douglas Hofstadter’s Gödel. Escher, Bach, which owes so much to Carroll. If Identity is viewed as diverse from Difference, all that we have in this way is but Difference; and hence we cannot demonstrate the advance to difference. Hegel implies that the original question is as tendentious as is “Have you stopped beating your wife?” asked of one who never did such a thing. He is a kind of pioneer in the philosophic “technique” (as old as Socrates, however) of dissolving questions as meaningless. We have to ask the questioner what he means by Identity, thus unreflectedly used. It is “an empty name”. Identity, rather, “we have seen”, is “the negation of Being and its characteristics”. It is at the same time, or in the same way rather, “self-relation, and, what is more, negative self-relation;... it draws a distinction between it and itself.” This “it” is of course Identity itself. Coming then to Difference we see it first of all as Diversity or Variety. This is a relation external to the things which thus differ, i.e. they are “indifferent to the difference between
6

It may be that I deface someone else’s picture of Hegel here. I have already indicated my view that to read is to interpret and that to interpret is to change. Such a view is in full accord with the dialectic itself. It implies also, however, that Hegel changes himself. Where then do we get a fast foothold? We get it insofar as we steadfastly picture the whole. No one, anyhow, can be a pure student of philosophy, from outside, in the abstract. This is recognized in the more liberal “idea of a university”, that very finite institution.

them” (117), thus inviting Comparison. Yet Hegel calls this external difference itself an identity of the objects thus “related”, namely Likeness (when they are like), or, in their nonidentity, Unlikeness (when they are unlike). This, which might seem an early form of chaostheory, also touches on the old question whether individuals of a species are alike merely or specifically the same. Species-identity, he implies, is just that kind of identity. The yardstick of abstract or absolute identity is misplaced. Rather, Absolute Identity will turn out both more comprehensive and “tighter”. Still, likeness by itself is identity, unlikeness difference, as viewed, thus far legitimately, by understanding. For it there is a great “gap” despite the one substratum he has just indicated, that different things agree in being different. This predicate reverses the identity it itself attributes, he seems to say. This differentness is based upon assuming that anything at all must per se be identical with itself. But then variety does not belong to it, once again. There is a suspicion of unintelligibility here and so we have, if unlike Schopenhauer we think it is worth it, to search for Hegel’s intention. He claims that the externality of variety makes the sentence “There are no two things completely like each other” not even stateable. Yet if “something itself is as the maxim says diverse” then this “must be in virtue of its own proper character”. But then “the specific difference, and not variety as such, is what is intended. And this is the meaning of the maxim of Leibniz.” “Individual difference” might have seemed closer to Hegel’s intention, though he may well have had reasons for avoiding the phrase. The specific difference, in Aristotle, is what finally (in Metaphysics VII) determines each thing throughout to be what it is. Thus “body” prescinding from soul, lifeprinciple, is an equivocal abstraction. But then, what is “what”? Or, again, are there such “abstract” individuals? Is not the same always the same this or that? Hegel will deal further with this question, of “relative identity”, later on. It is what is at issue here. External comparisons, often called “scientific treatment” (method?), “are still labours only preliminary to truly intelligent cognition”: As regards the principle of Leibniz, difference must be understood to mean not an external and indifferent diversity merely, but difference essential. Hence the very nature of things implies that they must be different. They are not just found to be so inductively. The same, of course, applies to the Leibnizian doctrine of the “best of all possible worlds”. Its sense, if any, even its eventual falsification, must be sought beyond the empirical and fortuitous. *********************************************’ “Difference implicit is essential difference, the Positive and the Negative”. These terms, these categories of thought, are entirely relative and reciprocal. “Instead of Being and Nought we now have the forms of Positive and Negative” as Identity and Difference respectively. Becoming, likewise, will be “represented by the Ground of determinate Being: which itself, when reflected upon the Ground, is Existence” (114). It is, I would say, obvious, as necessarily so, that these homely and common terms are being given a stipulative meaning here, which we try to fathom. The danger in Hegel’s procedure is that we, and he, can slip back into resting in the usual meaning of such terms without noticing it. It is though a Procrustean avoidance of this danger to construct a univocal or “mathematical” system of reference (it would not be a “language”) to avoid the difficulty. This is not being “scientific”, as Hegel has already demonstrated. Rather, the “science” one then retreats to is no longer philosophy and not properly logic either. This is where the difference between identity and equality bites and it is why there is no real prospect of making Aristotelian syllogistic some

kind of “part” of a newly defined “mathematical logic”.7 What is essential to see, however, is that Hegel’s stipulations are by no means univocal and are never intended to be, precisely on account of the transcendent reality and truth with which he deals, transcending, that is, the finite as such, necessarily, since everything finite is false. This is why the dialectic can never stand still, must ultimately take the form, as it were, of an ever-revolving circle. Only the circle is the perfect “figure”. Yet “figure” itself is imperfect representation. Here, in Essence, “the reference of one term to another”, i.e. in respect of their sense, “is explicit” (111, Zus.). Each “has an existence of its own in proportion as it is not the other.” He is not yet (at 119) naming the later dialectical category of Existence. The one “is only in so far as that other is”, viz. its other confronting it. In this way, incidentally, we can see that “performative contradiction” is not even analogously contradiction but mere metaphor rather, such as is anyhow inseparable from language as such as the Identity running through reality as a whole. Such “contradictions” are the way of advance as a whole, again, corresponding in many ways to the role of epieicheia in ethics, the “higher justice”, for Hegel the “concrete” opposed to the abstract as yet more universal, like the “I” of our speech which can forbid us to say what we might wish to mean. One may of course still wonder if it is helpful to speak of performative contradictions. It is very deep-rooted, however, as when we say without thinking that it seems contradictory, or inconsistent, to act in such and such a way. Yet Hegel’s logic intrinsically opens upon or “goes forth” as Action, the method becoming the Idea as itself revealing the Method and, for that matter, disclosing, “creating”, Nature, only “untrue”, however, in abstract difference rather than as the Negative essential to the Positive and vice versa. Thus explained, the point is, Hegel’s system is not contradictory in form. “Either of these two... is stamped with a characteristic of its own only in its relation to the other: the one is reflected into itself only as it is reflected into the other... Either in this way is the other’s own other.” This stunning formula goes further than, but only as in fact explaining, the older position that the soul, consciousness, is only known in knowing what is other than itself. It shows, with the whole dialectic up to this point behind it, why this is so in terms of an analysis of spiritual “being” which is not, in fact, other than the concepts employed, the Concept ultimately. “Of two opposite predicates the one only can be assigned to anything, and there is no third possibility”. Not even their both being false? Hegel is not merely expounding the “square of opposition” and disdains the distinctions usually made there, such as that between contraries and contradictories. He has deeper-going ones of his own, which absorb these. He speaks of a “maxim of Contrast or Opposition” which, expressly controverting self-relation, the maxim of Identity, says that “a thing... must be an opposite, a relation to its other.” Juxtaposition of these two contrary maxims without even comparing them is the “native unintelligence of abstraction”. Thus the “maxim of Excluded Middle” is “the maxim of the definite understanding” which itself “falls into” contradiction (here comes that word) in wanting or trying to avoid it.8 “A must be either + A or – A, it says.” Here he might seem to be anticipating Principia Mathematica, whereas in fact he aims to show up such an alternative as “empty contrast”, though “not without value in such abstractions as number, direction, & co.” One is reminded of the opening of the Phenomenology, analysing “now” and “here”, sense-certainty and the
7

I refer to previous footnotes here concerning my earlier work on this. See, on the present point, “Argument Forms and Argument from Analogy”, ACTA PHILOSOPHICA, Vol. 6 (1997), No. 2 (half-yearly), 303-308. 8 We breathe an Aristotelian air here. Cf. F. Inciarte, First Principles,Substance and Action, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, c.2007.

This, “really... the poorest kind of truth.” This, for him, is rather “what cannot be said” but merely meant, by an “abstract” individual. The maxim “virtually declares in these words a third A”, which it would exclude, “which is neither + nor -, and which at the same time is yet invested with + and – characters.” Is this a reference to the Substrate, to Essence? He continues: If + W mean 6 miles to the West, and – W mean 6 miles to the East, and if the + and the – cancel each other, then 6 miles of way or space remain what they were with and without the contrast. To rub it in he adds that “Even the mere plus and minus of numbers or abstract direction have, if we like, zero, for their third...” We have come so far with him; we must bear with him. Zero is indeed a third possibility, neither plus nor minus, in the number system, between +1 and – 1.9 Here he overcomes, as “abstract... inanity”, “the doctrine of contradictory concepts” (note that he says concepts, not statements, as we may wish to comfort ourselves). Here “the one notion is, say, blue” and Hegel rather objects to calling “even the sensuous generalised image of a colour” a notion, “the other not-blue”. In fact it might be yellow but it is “kept at the abstract negative”. Yet such a Negative “in its own nature is quite as much Positive” as “what is opposite to another is its other”, again. “The inanity of the opposition between what are called contradictory notions is fully exhibited in what we may call the grandiose formula of a general law”. In this way, he adds, “mind(!) is either white or not-white, yellow or notyellow” ad infinitum, for “everything has the one and not the other of all predicates... in such opposition.” He puts it this way, perhaps, as wanting finally himself to say rather that each contains all, all each: “each of its constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it” (160), which is not to say that, say, colour is such a constituent function. Aquinas had said that sensus est quaedam ratio, a certain Reason, a certain proportion (ratio) even. Yes, says Hegel, but Reason as alienated from itself, in what is yet a proper “moment”, viz. Nature. Aquinas seems to agree in saying that nature, viz. plants and animals, do not qualify for resurrection or timeless spiritual life. All their beauty is taken up into “the bodies of the redeemed”. We may note this background in passing, as the chessmaster must always survey the whole board, if he wants to win. These bodies, as the human form or, Aristotle had argued (Met. VII), ultimate difference specifying the whole, are not the abstract “bodies” we so often imagine. Hegel’s thought, after all, is quite clearly a sustained attempt to see things absolutely or as God sees them. He has zero tolerance for any “ontological discontinuity”. He would maintain it even if there should, impossibly, be ontic discontinuity, the finite notion of transcendence too often invoked by religious positivism and displayed in a certain trans-logical notion of analogy, as if Being is not merely “said in many ways” (Aristotle) but is in many ways, which seems non-abstractly self-contradictory. Hegel will conclude: Both Positive and Negative are therefore explicit contradiction; both are potentially the same. Both are so actually (i.e. each for itself) also; since either is the abrogation of the other and of itself. Thus they fall to the Ground (120, my parenthesis, my emphasis). “Identity and Opposition are themselves opposed.” So, if more obscurely, “the maxim of Opposition was taken even for that of Identity, in the shape of the principle of Contradiction”. Contraries should be compared and the Excluded Middle doctrine or maxim falls into contradiction in, within “the definite understanding” (each thing is itself and not another
9

Compare the Buddhist “No birth, no death”, the actual position, as it seems, of McTaggart.

thing), avoiding it. A quadrangular circle, a rectilinear arc, are as notions “held to be logically false”. Yet “geometers never hesitate to treat the circle as a polygon with rectilineal sides.” Still, anything like a circle “is still no notion”. This, by the way, is the built-in error or contradiction of representing the identities of the syllogism spatially as in the Venn diagrams. When Hegel adds that in the notion of a circle, although centre and circumference are equally essential they “yet are opposite and contradictory to each other” he is not being merely clumsy about opposites and contradictions and their difference but showing that these very notions are infected with, are not free from, the materialistic illusions of the abstractive or “splitting” Understanding. Hegel indeed anticipates Melanie Klein here, whose term I borrow, in showing up biological roots of the Reason which it is called upon to transcend, if it wishes to make sustainable truth-claims, about biology or anything else.10 He appeals to the conception of Polarity as a “more correct” approach to Opposition, to Positive and Negative. This would only fall under the stricture of “logical Manicheism” (Peter Geach, referring though to the True and the False in Frege’s “system”) if the Negative were still regarded as Negative in the old, negative sense, as if the Evil which became Milton’s Satan’s Good could remain evil even for him, as it does not, clearly, in the old Eartha Kitt song, “I want to be evil; I want to be bad.” The good, after all, is just what everyone and anyone strives after just as such, declares Aristotle at least, and it seems logically (i.e. not “intuitively”) clear that this is so. So it is with the Negative once found to be a positive relation within Essence, which has truly superseded Being. This is to “work out the conception of Polarity”. A transposed difference between Positive and Negative must of course remain, whatever was the case between Being and Nothing. The Positive is “understood to be independent” (yet not “unaffected by its relation to its other”); the Negative, “no less independently”, “is to be... negative self-relating, self-subsistent”, and yet have this its Positive “only in the other”. Both then are (in themselves?) explicit contradiction, both “potentially the same”. The “selfrelating difference” is “virtually enunciated as the self-identical”, certainly when discussing Positive and Negative, while the opposite in general includes itself and its opposite. “The immanence of Essence thus defined is the Ground.”

10

I would refer the reader here to some articles by the philosophical psychologist Axel Randrup to be found on the Internet, also to analyses of Hegel by another psychologist, Jon Mills, who discusses Klein (Internet). Randrup finds contradiction in a biologically evolved mind establishing its own evolution and thereby feels forced into Idealism. At the same time Freud’s materialistic “Theory of the Mind”, an early MS, has, to my mind, great philosophical merit.

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