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(3) Comparison paper between the energy profiles of the Philippines vis-a-vis the country you reported on during

the early part of the


semester. (Note: Comparison should cover not only the existing profile but a projection of where each country is headed if each adopts a
business-as-usual approach to the respective energy policy).
RULES:
(a) Your should stick to your group in class (grouping on the reporting of countries during early part of semester); no changing of group
members.
(b) Please email me by October 4, Friday, if your group is opting to submit the extra work and which topic you have chosen to cover.
(c) Written work should be limited to 10 pages, double-spaced, 11 or 12 point-font size. You can also opt to submit in power point (PPT)
format, limited to 30 slides.
(d) BE CREATIVE. LET YOUR IMAGINATION WORK.

Renewable energy subsidies: lessons from Spain
Jacob Cosman - 1st June 2012
http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/06/2012/renewable-energy-subsidies-lessons-spain

In January, the cash-strapped Spanish government stopped subsidies for new renewable-energy projects. Previously, the subsidies had led to the country becoming
a world leader in wind and solar energy, with up to half the national energy requirements met by wind and solar. What's been happening since the subsidies were
cut?
Unsurprisingly, renewable energy capital is fleeing the country. As Bloomberg notes, investment in solar energy is forecast to fall from $1.5 billion (US) last year to
$107 million in 2014 and investment in wind is headed from $2 billion this year to $244 million in 2014. These are massive and sudden capital reductions by any
standards. Moreover, the solar projects that are still in the pipeline in Spain are predominantly headed for installation elsewhere. What preliminary inferences
about subsidies and renewable energy development can be drawn from Spain's recent dismal experience?
1. Renewable energy manufacturing is still dependent on subsidies. Despite sunny predictions of impending cost-competitiveness the industry still requires
government support; its ability to attract capital from the private sector has largely stagnated in recent years. While they are expensive, these subsidies (hopefully)
provide incentives for the development of lower-cost new technology which will obviate government intervention in renewable energy. However, we're not quite
there yet, and revocation of subsidies will lead to dramatic capital flight.
2. In wealthy industrialized democracies, it appears continued economic growth is key togovernment willingness to commit to environmental policy.
Indications of the connection between economic growth and environmental policy have been provided in the economic literature by Antweiler, Copeland, and
Taylor (2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) along with many others - but Spain's experience is a clear illustration that the converse relationship (between
economic contraction and reduced willingness to spend on environmental policy) also holds.
3. The sharp reduction in government spending in "peripheral" eurozone states is engendering rapid cutbacks in investment. In comparatively research-
intensive sectors like energy technology, this means a corresponding reduction in the number of skills-intensive research jobs. As the chart below shows, Spain has
seen a dramatic rise in technical employment over the past decade relative to industrialized peers. The rapid reduction in energy technology investment will almost
certainly reverse this trend.

In Spain's case, the subsidy cuts were almost certainly inevitable; the national economy is burdened by persistently high unemployment and a gradually collapsing
banking sector. However, the end of these subsidies likely means the end of significant positive spillovers to technology and the environment. This is likely
suboptimal.
(Image: Wind turbines in Granada, Andalusia from orangebrompton's flickr. Licensed via Creative Commons.)

For further reading please see the special section on Policy Agendas for the Future of Global Energy in the May 2012 edition of Global Policy Journal.


Spanish solar industry demands national referendum on energy policy
http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/spanish-solar-industry-demands-national-referendum-on-energy-
policy_100014097/#axzz3FRuJRtdR
03. FEBRUARY 2014 | GLOBAL PV MARKETS, INDUSTRY & SUPPLIERS, MARKETS & TRENDS | BY: VLADIMIR PEKIC
The country's PV trade association is mobilizing the public for a series of demonstrations across the
country this spring in a call to arms against the current government.

Spain's National Association of Photovoltaic Energy Producers (ANPIER) is demanding that central authorities in Madrid
hold a consultative national referendum about the chosen energy model for the country.
The association appealed to the Spanish government to abandon its current "neo-despotism" in the energy sector that has
resulted in the unilateral imposition of an energy policy without social, political or territorial consensus.
Spain's government last year approved measures to limit and tax solar power generation, including ending the country's
feed-in tariff program.
"Although Spain has the highest renewable potential in the EU and an obsolete nuclear infrastructure, the government
proposes to extend the life of these [nuclear] installations, a move that will profit three private companies," said ANPIER
on Jan. 27, adding that 81% of Spaniards are demanding a new energy model based on the use of renewable energies.
For example, electricity generated by Spain's 460 MW nuclear plant Santa Mara de Garoa could be replaced with a total
photovoltaic surface area equal to the size of Madrids Barajas airport, said the association. Such a large photovoltaic
complex would create 2,146 new jobs and generate clean, safe and sustainable energy at a cost of around 50 ($67.56) per
megawatt hour, while the price of nuclear energy tops 100 ($135) per megawatt hour if all nuclear generation costs are
internalized.
ANPIER maintains that photovoltaic generation clearly has an advantage for Spain when [all] nuclear generation costs are
factored in, including costs of disposing of radioactive waste for hundreds of years and construction of necessary civilian
infrastructure to avoid nuclear catastrophes akin to the one in Fukushima, Japan.
In addition to insisting on a new green energy policy for today's Spain, ANPIER also wants to the government to respect
prior commitments made to 55,000 families that generate electricity via small photovoltaic systems. In order to meet this
goal, ANPIER will help organize public demonstrations starting in March to put pressure on the government.
"These families invested their savings and mortgaged their homes for the development and production of photovoltaic
solar energy that was promoted by the Spanish authorities who considered installation of renewable energy capacity to be
essential and even appealed for this goal to be achieved through the savings of tens of thousands of Spanish families," the
association argued in Jan. 24 statement.
ANPIER will hold the first three regional public gatherings in Murcia, Mrida and Pamplona starting next month. Similar
demonstrations across other Spanish cities will ensue until the process culminates with a large mobilization in Madrid,
tentatively scheduled for mid-May.
"Spain has abandoned its global leadership in renewable energy in exchange for the post of world leader in the number of
litigation cases against the state. The biggest victims of this perverse change are the thousands of honest families who
believed in legal security that our democratic framework seemed to guarantee, said ANPIER President Miguel ngel
Martnez-Aroca.
According to electricity grid operator Red Elctrica de Espaa (REE), solar photovoltaic accounted for 3.1% of total energy
demand in the country last year, with wind covering 20.9%, followed by nuclear power, which met 20.8%. of total
demand.



Spain: Overall Summary
http://www.res-legal.eu/search-by-country/spain/tools-list/c/spain/s/res-e/t/policy/sum/196/lpid/195/
In Spain, the main support scheme (the Rgimen Especial) operated until the end of 2011 and was suspended at the beginning of 2012. As
of now, no other support schemes for RES-E are in place. A tax regulation system for investments related to RES-E plants is in place.

RES-E operators are entitled to grid connection, priority dispatch against the grid operator. Furthermore, a plant operator is entitled against
the grid operator to an expansion of the grid, if the expansion is required for his plant to be connected to the grid.

There is a tax credit for solar thermal and for biofuels in transport. Furthermore a quota system for biofuels is in place. Policies for training
and certification of solar panel installers are in place. Buildings should satisfy a minimal solar contribution of warm sanitary water. An
overarching RD&D plan is in place that directs support to RES-E, RES-H&C and RES-T.
Support schemes
In Spain, the generation of electricity from renewable sources is mainly promoted through a price regulation system. Plant operators may
choose between two options: a guaranteed feed-in tariff and a guaranteed bonus (premium) paid on top of the electricity price achieved on
the wholesale market. The price regulation system is currently phased out through Real Decreto-ley 9/2013. The reason for this
suspension is traced in the preamble of RDL 1/2012. A different regulation that had previously suspended the support schemes, before their
final phasing out: RD 6/2009 established that by 2013 a part of the consumers electricity bill (the peajes the acceso) should be able to fully
balance the costs incurred by the State arising from the support scheme. It was deemed, however, that the situation would not have allowed
this goal to be reached by 2013. For this reason, and together with the high growth of RES-E in the past years, even beyond the set goals, all
support schemes for RES-E were blocked.
Premium tariff (Rgimen retributivo especifico)
Updated: 14.07.2014
Author: Edoardo Binda Zane
The Specific scheme is not technically defined as a support scheme, but as a complementary retribution to allow renewable technologies to
compete with traditional technologies in the energy market.
The specific amounts will be based on a number of parameters, each calculated for a set of standard installations. The rationale behind the
scheme is to provide developers an amount based on the reasonable rentability that a well-managed renewable plant would have. In order
to determine such costs and values, a set of theoretical standard installations has been developed and their values calculated. Furthermore,
these values are linked to the reasonable rentability, defined as the average yield of the State obligations to ten years in the secondary
market for the 24 months prior to the month of May of the year preceding the start of the regulatory period increased by a spread (art. 19 RD
413/2014). On the basis of these results, an actual plant would receive the amount that its correspondent well-managed theoretical standard
installation would receive.
At the time of writing, a specific order establishing the value of the different parameters was not available.
All technologies participating in the electricity market are eligible (Art. 11.1 RD 413/2014)
Wind energy
Eligible (Art. 2, RDL 413/2014) group b.2
Solar energy
Eligible (Art. 2, RDL 413/2014) group b.1
Geothermal energy Eligible (Art. 2, RD 413/2014) group b.3
Biogas
Eligible (Art. 2, RD 413/2014) group b.7
Hydro-power
Eligible (Art. 2, RD 413/2014) groups b3, b.4 and b.5
Biomass
Eligible (Art. 2, RD 413/2014) groups b.6 and b.8

Amount
Independently of the technology, the amount will be based on a number of parameters, the main ones being:
Return on investment
Return on operation
Incentive for investment due to the increase of the generation costs
Regulatory useful life
Minimum number of operating hours
Operation threshold
Maximum numbers of operating hours for the purpose of receiving the return on operation;
Top and bottom limits of market prices
Average yearly price of daily and intra-daily markets.
The parameters are listed in Art. 13 RD 413/2014. Details for each parameter will be further specified by a new act (not avai lable at the time
of writing), which will allow specific differentiation (Art. 13.1 RD 413/2014). Formulas for the calculation of some of the above parameters are
however listed in the following articles or RD 413/2014:
Return on investment - Art. 16
Return on operation - Art. 18
Addressees
Entitled party. Plant operators
Obligated party. Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism (Art. 35.1 RD 413/2014)
Procedure
Process flow
Developers will have to firstly present a guarantee in the form of a sum of money to the General Bank of Deposits
(Art. 44 RD 413/2014).
Following the deposit of a guarantee, developers must request to the General Direction of Energy Policy and
Mines to be inscribed in the pre-assignation registry. The General Directorate has three months to process the
application (Art. 45 RD 413/2014).
Following the registration in the pre-assignation registry, a developer has maximum one month to request to the
General Direction of Energy Policy and Mines to be inscribed in the benefit registry. The General Directorate has
three months to process the application (Art. 47.1 RD 413/2014).
The amounts will start to be granted from the latter one between the first day of the month following the date of
final approval of the installation and the first day of the month following the date of enlisting in the registry of the
scheme (Art. 28.1 RD 413/2014).
Competent
authority
Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism (Art. 35.1 RD 413/2014)
Degression
No degression is formally set, however it will be possible to review the parameters listed for calculating the value of the incentive
every three years (Art. 15.2 RD 413/2014).
Cap
No cap is set.
Eligibility period
Plants will continue benefiting of this scheme for the full time of their useful regulatory life, which will be defined by a specific act
for each type of installation (Art. 28.1 RD 413/2014). At the time of writing this act was not available.
Distribution of costs
State
Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism (6th final disposition RD 413/2014)
Distribution
mechanism
The cost of the support scheme for electricity from renewable sources is first borne by the Ministry of Industry,
Energy and Tourism (6th final disposition RD 413/2014)

Statutory provisions
Ley 24/2013 (Ley del Sector Elctrico Law on the Electricity Sector)
RD 1955/2000 (Real Decreto 1955/2000, de 1 de diciembre, por el que se regulan las actividades de transporte, distribucin,
comercializacin, suministro y procedimientos de autorizacin de instalaciones de energa elctrica Royal Decree on the Distribution
and Transmission of Electricity)
Real Decreto 2017/1997 (Real Decreto 2017/1997, de 26 de diciembre, por el que se organiza y regula el procedimiento de liqui dacin
de los costes de transporte, distribucin y comercializacin a tarifa, de los costes permanentes del sistema y de los costes de
diversificacin y seguridad de abastecimiento - Royal Decree No. 2017/1997 of 26th December 1997 Organising and Regulating the
Procedures for the Liquidation of Costs related to Transport, Distribution and Commercialisation, of Permanent System Costs, and of
Costs related to Diversification and Security of Supply.)
RDL 6/2009 (Real Decreto-ley 6/2009, de 30 de abril, por el que se adoptan determinadas medidas en el sector energtico y se aprueba
el bono social - Royal legislative decree 6/2009 of 30 April 2009, approving specific measures in the energy sector and the social bonus)
RDL 2/2013 (Real Decreto-ley 2/2013, de 1 de febrero, de medidas urgentes en el sistema elctrico y en el sector financiero. - Royal
decree-law 2/2013 of 1st of February, for urgent measures in the electric system and in the financial sector)
RDL 9/2013 (Real Decreto-ley 9/2013, de 12 de julio, por el que se adoptan medidas urgentes para garantizar la estabilidad financiera
del sistema elctrico. - Royal Decree-law 9/2013 of 12 July, adopting urgent measures to ensure the financial stability of the electricity
system.)
RD 413/2014 (Real Decreto 413/2014, de 6 de junio, por el que se regula la actividad de produccin de energa elctrica a partir de
fuentes de energa renovables, cogeneracin y residuos - Royal Decree 413/2014 of 6 June, regulating the activity of electricity
production from renewable energy, cogeneration and waste).
Grid issues
In Spain, renewable energy plants are statutorily entitled to priority access to, connection to and use of the grid. Renewabl e electricity is
granted priority dispatch in the electricity markets at no cost, provided the stability and security of the grid infrastructure can be maintained.
Renewable energy plants operate under the so-called Special Regime. Real Decreto 1/2012 partially modified and suspended parts of this
regime, however exclusively in economic terms (support schemes). As regards connection, use and development of the grid with respect to
RES-E, Real Decreto 1/2012 has no effect, as confirmed by the National Energy Commission (CNE).

Plant operators may be contractually entitled to the expansion of the grid. If the expansion is required for a plant to be connected to the grid,
the operator of the plant shall bear the costs of the expansion works (deep connection charges). Apart from that, the grid operator is
obligated to expand his grid in compliance with the general legislation on energy.
Summary of grid issues
Connection to
the grid
Plant operators are contractually entitled against the grid operator to priority access and connection of their plants to
the grid.
Use of the grid
Plant operators are contractually entitled to priority use of the grids export and transmit electricity until grid capacity
is used up and as long as stability is maintained.
Grid
development
Plant operators may be contractually entitled to the expansion of the grid. If the expansion is required for a plant to
be connected to the grid, the grid operator shall bear the costs of the expansion works. Apart from that, the grid
operator is obliged to expand his grid in compliance with the general legislation on energy.
Statutory
provisions
RD 1955/2000 (Real Decreto 1955/2000, de 1 de diciembre, por el que se regulan las actividades de transporte,
distribucin, comercializacin, suministro y procedimientos de autorizacin de instalaciones de energa elctrica
Royal Decree on the Distribution and Transmission of Electricity)
RD 1669/2011 (Real Decreto por el que se regula la conexin a red de instalaciones de produccin de energa elctrica
de pequea potencia Royal Decree setting the conditions regulating grid connection of small capacity electricity
production plants)
RD 6/2009 (Real Decreto-ley 6/2009, de 30 de abril, por el que se adoptan determinadas medidas en el sector
energtico y se aprueba el bono social Royal Decree establishing new regulations for the energy sector)
PO 3.7 (Procedimiento Operativo 3.7 - Programacin de la generacin de origen renovable no gestionable -
Programming of variable RES-E generation)
L 24/2013 (Ley 24/2013, de 27 de diciembre, del Sector Elctrico, Law No. 24/2013 of 27 December on the Electricity
Sector)
PO 3.7 (Procedimiento Operativo 3.7 - Programacin de la generacin de origen renovable no gestionable - Operation
procedure 3.7 Programming of variable RES-E generation)
Summary of policies
Training programmes for installers. The national system of qualification and professional formation (NSQPF) provides a structured
framework for the provision of vocational training also for energy.

Certification Programmes for RES installations. As regards certification, an obligation to be certified is in place for solar thermal panels
to comply with international standards.

RD&D Policies. National plan of scientific research, development and technological innovation 2013 2016 is the programming instrument
that establishes goals and priorities of the national research policy in the mid-term. The plan covers very different areas and topics. One of its
strategic actions is Energy and Climate Change.

Building obligations. With respect to buildings and RES, it is stated in the technical building code that all new buildings or buildings
undergoing major renovation in which there is demand for warm sanitary water / air conditioning of a covered swimming pool must satisfy
some of this demand through solar thermal installations.
Technologies
All policies apply to solar thermal. The NSQPF also applies to PV installations and wind power plants. The national plans of R&D do not specify
technologies, but only types of projects. It is possible that technologies are specified in the single calls under the R&D plan.
Statutory provisions
L 5/2002 (Ley 5/2002, de 19 de junio, de las Cualificaciones y de la Formacin Profesional -Law 5/2002 of June 19 of qualifications and
professional formation)
ORDEN 28/07/1980 (Orden de 28 de julio de 1980 por la que se aprueban las normas e instrucciones tcnicas complementarias para la
homologacin de los paneles solares.. - Order of 28 july 1980 that approves rules and technical instructions for homologation of PV
installations).
Plan Nacional de Investigacin Cientfica, Desarrollo e Innovacin Tecnolgica (2013 2016) - National plan of scientific research,
development and technological innovation 2013 2016
CTE (Cdigo Tcnico de la Edificacin - National building code)

The Lesson in Renewable Energy Development from Spain
Toby D. Couture, IFOK GmbH
July 30, 2013
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/07/a-lesson-in-renewable-energy-development-from-spain
The most recent energy sector reforms passed in Spain represent the fourth time that a sweeping set of retroactive changes has rocked the
countrys renewable energy (RE) industry. This new Royal Decree Law modifies billions of Euros worth of renewable energy contracts in a
move that, when added to previous retroactive measures, will almost undoubtedly trigger insolvencies across the sector.
Instead of looking at the new Law in detail, this article takes a step back, and looks at the key lessons that policymakers around the world
should draw from the Spanish experience.
As highlighted in previous analyses, the underlying problem that legislators in Spain are trying to address is the rapid growth of the
electricity system deficit, which now stands at 26 billion.
This deficit has been created over the last fifteen years as the costs of generating electricity have risen faster than what utilities can lawfully
recover from rates. The root cause of this is ultimately that Spain limits the amount by which electricity prices can increase.
While most commentators have attributed the deficit to the growth of renewable energy, the origins of the tariff deficit pre-date the rise of
renewable energy in Spain. In the early 2000s, and again between 2005 and 2008, rising natural gas costs also contributed significantly to
its growth, as utilities were not allowed to fully pass on the rising cost of fuel.
Second, despite countless articles and commentaries to the contrary, the problems in Spains electricity system are not caused solely by its
feed-in tariff (FIT) policy.
To understand why, an analogy is instructive: to attribute Spains electricity system deficit to its FIT is similar to blaming an airlines
bankruptcy on its latest purchase of airplanes. A firms bankruptcy is always and everywhere driven by the failure to keep revenues ahead
of costs. Buying planes is fine, as long as you have customers to fill them.
In Spains case, it is not the investment in wind turbines and solar power that represent the root of the problem: like many of its European
partners, Spain encouraged private investment in wind and solar power partly to meet binding EU climate and energy targets, partly to
improve its energy security, and partly to encourage the development of new economic sectors.
Moreover, numerous studies from major research institutes and think tanks around the world continue to find that FITs are the most cost-
effective means of accelerating investment in renewable energy.
The problem is therefore not with wind and solar per se, nor with the policy that encouraged investment in them (though Spains FIT policy
had a number of important design flaws): it is that the government, through regulations dating back decades, prevented utilities from
recovering the true costs of the electricity system through rates.
In other words, Spain tried to have it both ways: it set out to transform its electricity system, but failed to establish a credible mechanism to
pay for it.
Which brings us to the core lesson for policymakers:
FITs are a powerful mechanism to attract investment in renewable energy, and to accelerate the transition to a cleaner and lower carbon
power sector. They do this by providing long term, performance based contracts for electricity generated from renewable energy sources.
This helps attract private investment, and engages citizens, farmers, businesses and investors directly in the transformation of the
electricity system. They have been implemented in over 80 jurisdictions around the world, and despite all the criticism they have received
over the years, they remain one of the most widely used renewable energy policies.
However, if one is going to launch a comprehensive policy to scale-up privately financed renewable energy investment, one needs to
establish a credible, long-term mechanism to ensure that those costs will be recovered over time. This includes ensuring that the overall
framework has the broad support of citizens and that it will be robust to changes in governments, and overall economic conditions.
A fundamental transition in the energy system can only be sustained if it is built on a sound financial footing, and if it has the broad support
of the population. This consensus is now being tested even here in Germany, as parties fine-tune their positions ahead of national elections
in September.
It is one of the tragedies of the Spanish situation that a policy mechanism that is premised on providing long-term investment certainty, and
that has proven uniquely successful at scaling-up renewable energy investment worldwide has become associated with policy and
regulatory uncertainty, and with imposing unsustainable costs on ratepayers.
As highlighted here, it is not the policy that is the problem, nor is it the desire to transition to a more sustainable and lower carbon energy
system: it is attempting to accomplish this without introducing credible mechanisms to ensure that these investments will be paid for in time.

Country Analysis Note
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=sp
Spain is the fifth largest energy consumer in Europe and has virtually no domestic production of liquid fuels or natural gas. Government regulation limits the percent of total
oil and gas imports any single country may sell to Spain to ensure diversity of supply. Liquid fuels are still the largest source of Spain's total energy consumption, mostly in
the transportation sector. The country had nine refineries with a total crude oil refining capacity of almost 1.3 million barrels per day as of January 2014, according to Oil &
Gas Journal. However, Spain is still a net importer of petroleum product. Up until the 2008 financial crisis, Spain was one of the fastest-growing natural gas markets in
Europe. Although growth has slowed since then, Spain still accounted for nearly two-thirds of LNG imports to OECD Europe in 2013. Spain fell to 6th largest global importer
of LNG in 2013, as India, China, and Taiwan surpassed it, and Spanish imports have declined, according to IHS Energy. Spain also receives significant natural gas supplies
from Algeria through the undersea Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline, which came on line in 2011 after a number of delays. In 2013, Algeria supplied 39% of Spain's natural gas,
according to BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014.
Spain generates a significant amount of power from wind energy, the most of any country in Europe as of 2012. The Spanish government authorized offshore electricity
generating facilities in 2007 to promote the development of offshore wind energy. Renewable energy, including hydroelectric generation, accounted for 30% of Spains power
generation in 2012.
Up until the 2008 recession, Spain was slowly phasing out its coal production subsidies. However, coal production and consumption increased in 2011 after the Spanish
government introduced domestic coal production subsidies and gave preferential access to the wholesale power market to coal-powered generators in an attempt to reduce the
country's dependence on imported coal. This has caused electricity producers to substitute away from renewables to coal. In 2012, fossil fuels accounted for 49% of Spains
electricity generation. According to the Framework Plan for Coal Mines and Mining Communities 2013-2018, production subsidies will end after 2018.
There are eight operating nuclear reactors in Spain, which supplied about 21% of the country's electricity generation in 2012.
Analysis Last Updated: July 2014

Overview data for Spain
+ EXPAND ALL
Petroleum (Thousand Barrels per Day) Previous Year Latest Year
History Spain Europe OECD World Rank Spain
Total Oil Production

(1980-2013) 29.29 3,979 22,543 89,755 68 33.63
Petroleum (Thousand Barrels per Day) Previous Year Latest Year
Crude Oil Production

(1980-2013) 3.00 3,116 15,672 75,956 82 7.34
Consumption

(1980-2013) 1,300.93 14,447 45,822 89,128 17 1,205.01
Estimated Petroleum Net
Exports

(1980-2013) -
1,271.64
-
10,467
-23,279 -- 207 -1,171.39
Refinery Capacity

(1980-2012) 1,272 16,787 45,873 88,097 19 1,272
Proved Reserves(Billion
Barrels)

(1980-2014) 0.15 12 227 1,646 60 0.15
Natural Gas (Billion Cubic Feet) Previous Year Latest Year
History Spain Europe World Rank Spain
Production

(1980-2013) 2.15 10,183 118,866 84 1.98
Consumption

(1980-2013) 1,147.60 18,684 120,017 28 1,058.78
Net Export/Imports(-)

(1990-2013) -
1,139.51
-8,275 -- 13 -1,044.19
Proved Reserves
(Trillion Cubic Feet)

(1980-2014) 0.09 146 6,846 86 0.09
Coal (Million Short Tons) Previous Year Latest Year
History Spain Europe World Rank Spain
Production

(1980-2012) 7.298 779 8,444 31 6.774
Consumption

(1980-2012) 26.374 1,023 8,285 29 31.635
Net Export/Imports(-)

(1980-2012) -16.280 -239 -- 14 -22.333
Electricity (Billion Kilowatthours) Previous Year Latest Year
History Spain Europe World Rank Spain
Net Generation

(1980-2012) 276.78 3,558 21,081 14 276.53
Net Consumption

(1980-2011) 249.57 3,351 18,501 13 243.90
Installed Capacity (GWe)

(1980-2011) 101.79 986 5,086 11 101.84
Total Primary Energy (Quadrillion Btu) Previous Year Latest Year
History Spain Europe World Rank Spain
Production

(1980-2012) 1.538 44 518 43 1.508
Consumption

(1980-2012) 6.043 82 520 18 5.967
Petroleum (Thousand Barrels per Day) Previous Year Latest Year
Energy Intensity
(Btu per 2005 U.S. Dollars)

(1980-2011) 5,261 5,497 7,401 103 5,060
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric Tons of CO) Previous Year Latest Year
-- = Not applicable; NA = Not available; E = Estimate value
Sources: EIA. For more detailed data, see International Energy Statistics.
Data last updated: May 30, 2013

ENERGY
Spain Table of Contents
http://countrystudies.us/spain/67.htm
Spain is poor in energy resources, with the exception of coal. Rapid industrial growth has
intensified the problems caused by insufficient oil reserves, dwindling supplies of easily
accessible high-quality coal, and inadequate water for power generation. Until the early
1980s, Spain increasingly depended upon imported petroleum, and overall energy
consumption continued to grow in the 1973-79 period. Following adjustment to a slower
rate of economic growth and to the changed energy market of the 1970s, Spanish energy
consumption declined in the early 1980s.
The National Energy Plan (Plan Energetico Nacional--PEN), the basic statement of official
energy policy, was first formulated in 1978. Revised in 1983 to cover the 1984-93 period,
the new PEN aimed at a rationalization of energy consumption and a reduction in Spain's
dependence on imported energy. It pressed, in addition, for a reorganization of the oil
industry and for a financial reorganization of the electricity industry. In contrast to the
1978-87 plan, it reduced the role of nuclear energy.
Petroleum
Although oil continued to be Spain's major source of energy, it had diminished in
importance significantly since 1973. Oil consumption grew steadily between 1973 and
1979, reaching 50 million tons in that last year, but by 1985 it had declined to 39 million
tons. Oil accounted for two-thirds of the country's primary energy requirements throughout
the 1970s, but by the mid1980s the figure had dropped to just over half. In 1985 alone,
Spanish industry saved 40 billion pesetas (US$260 million) by replacing 500,00 tons of oil
consumption with coal and natural gas.
In 1985 Mexico, responsible for 19.7 percent of Spain's petroleum imports, was the largest
single supplier of Spain's energy needs, and in the mid-1980s Latin American countries
provided Spain with about one-quarter of its imported oil. Africa's share--Nigeria being the
most important supplier-- dropped from 36.5 percent in 1985 to 29.3 percent in 1987.
Middle Eastern countries provided 27.4 percent in 1985 and 29.6 percent in 1987. Western
Europe's share rose from 10.6 percent in 1985 to 16.5 percent in 1987. Efforts were under
way to lessen Spain's dependence on Middle Eastern oil and to increase imports from
Mexico.
In the 1980s, imported petroleum entered Spain via eight ports. The three largest, in terms
of vessel capacity, were Algeciras (330,000 deadweight tons), Malaga (330,000 tons), and
Cartagena (260,000 tons).
Spain possessed a small domestic oil production capability that yielded only 1.6 million
tons in 1987. Despite a sizable exploration effort, only a few small fields and two medium-
sized ones were discovered. The Casablanca oil field, discovered in 1983, yielded 90
percent of Spain's domestic oil production in 1987, but it was not large enough to offset an
overall decline in Spanish production. The fall in oil prices in the 1980s further reduced the
country's exploration efforts.
The Spanish oil industry imported and refined foreign crude petroleum; it distributed
petrochemical products within Spain; and, in the mid-1980s, it exported about 10 million
tons of finished petroleum products per year.
As with some other sectors of the Spanish economy, the domestic oil industry had been
brought under state control. Distribution of petroleum products had been in the hands of
the state monopoly, Compania Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petroleos (CAMPSA), since
1927, and large portions of the shipping and refining system were state owned. To
rationalize the petroleum industry and to make it able to withstand foreign competition, the
National Institute for Hydrocarbons (Instituto Nacional de Hidrocarburos--INH) was
formed in 1981 in order to direct CAMPSA and those parts of the oil, gas, and
petrochemical industry supervised by INI. By the mid-1980s, INH was responsible for
more than 1 percent of the Spanish GDP, and it claimed 20,000 employees. To prepare for
Spain's entry into the EC, after which state monopolies were required to be phased out, all
of INH's holdings, with the exception of the state gas company, Empresa Nacional del Gas
(ENAGAS), were placed under a new holding company in the late 1980s. The company,
Repsol, which had a stock market listing, was gradually to allow a greater role for private
capital in the petroleum industry. By 1988 Repsol had become Western Europe's seventh
largest petroleum company, and its management planned to continue to control about half
of the Spanish market once that market was fully opened to foreign firms in 1992. EC
membership rendered CAMPSA's future uncertain, for it would no longer be allowed its
distribution monopoly. The Treaty of Accession that brought Spain into the EC stipulated
that specific amounts of nine groups of petroleum products from foreign suppliers would
have access to the Spanish market. In 1986 these products were to have a 5 percent share
of the domestic market--a share that was to increase by 20 percent (of this 5 percent) each
year thereafter.
Coal
Spain's coal reserves are found primarily in Asturias, with smaller deposits located near
southwestern Seville, Cordoba, and Badajoz, and in northeastern Catalonia and Aragon
(Spanish, Aragon). Most of the country's lignite is located in Galicia. Domestic coal is
generally of poor quality, and, because of the structure of Spanish deposits, it is more
expensive than imported coal. In 1967 HUNOSA, a state holding company under the
control of INI, was founded to direct most of Spain's coal mining, and it gradually took
over the larger coal companies.
Higher oil prices have spurred domestic coal production. Annual production in the early
1970s amounted to about 10 million tons of coal and 3 million tons of lignite. By the mid-
1980s, the industry produced 15 million tons of coal and 23 million tons of lignite
annually. This higher rate of production was insufficient to meet domestic needs because
coal had come to supply about 25 percent of Spain's needed energy, compared with about
16 percent in the early 1970s. About 5 million tons of foreign coal were imported per
annum.
Over the years, there had been little change in patterns of coal consumption. Hard coal,
used mainly for the generation of electricity, accounted for 65 percent of total demand. The
steel and cement industries were the two next-largest consumers.
In line with the energy rationalization policies set by PEN, the government sought to
increase the efficiency of the coalmining sector by closing down high-cost mines and by
providing financial aid for the industry's modernization. To encourage the cement and
other industries to convert from oil to coal, the government allowed them to import duty-
free coal. The government also made efforts to substitute the use of oil for coal in urban
areas.
Natural Gas
In order to reduce Spain's dependence on imported oil, PEN encouraged natural gas
consumption. Efforts to redirect the use of fuels were successful, and in the 1980s the
consumption of natural gas increased faster than that of any other fuel. Total natural gas
demand doubled between 1973 and 1984, and in 1987 it accounted for 3.85 percent of all
energy consumption. Energy planners hoped to increase this share to 7 percent by 1992.
Domestic production of natural gas began in 1984 with the development of the Serrablo
field; two years later the Gaviota field went into operation. In 1987 domestic production
supplied about one-sixth of Spain's natural gas consumption, and observers anticipated that
its share might rise to as much as one-third by 1990. Domestic production shortfalls were
taken up by imports from Algeria and Libya under long-term contracts. In 1988 it was
agreed that Spain's gradually expanding gas pipeline network would be connected to the
European network, and Norwegian gas was scheduled to begin arriving in Spain in 1992.
Electricity
Although Spain's mountainous terrain would appear to be wellsuited to hydroelectric
power production, the scarcity of water limited such potential and was the principal reason
for Spain's heavy dependence on thermal power. In 1986 only 27.2 percent of the country's
electricity came from hydroelectric plants, while 50.6 percent came from conventional
thermal plants, and 22.2 percent came from nuclear plants. The most important fuel for the
production of electricity was coal, which generated about 40 percent of the total. In 1987
the production of electricity amounted to 132,000 million kilowatt hours--about six times
the amount produced in 1960 and twice the production level of 1970. The total installed
capacity of the predominantly privately owned electrical system was about 40 gigawatts--
an amount large enough to meet the country's needs and to allow some exports. In the
second half of the 1980s, the growth of the demand for electrical power was less than
anticipated, and Spain had a supply adequate to last until the mid-1990s. The Spanish level
of per capita electrical power consumption was among the lowest in Western Europe,
surpassing only those of Greece and Portugal.
A key element in the future of Spain's electrical power industry was the role to be assigned
to nuclear power. Nuclear power was an important factor because of scarce petroleum
reserves, the limited potential for hydroelectric power production, and the presence of
significant uranium deposits. The first PEN, drawn up in 1978, emphasized the role that
nuclear power would play in meeting the nation's ever-increasing need for electricity. The
revised PEN of 1984 postponed the opening of the Lemoniz Nuclear Power Plant for
political reasons, and it continued the mothballing of three other nuclear plants. The
government decided, nonetheless, that if the demand for electricity increased by more than
3 percent, work on one of the plants might be restarted. The new PEN also emphasized the
benefits of increased natural gas consumption.


IN SPAIN, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF A SUBSIDY-
BASED ENERGY POLICY
24 July 2012
By Patrick Donnelly-Shores
http://berc.berkeley.edu/in-spain-unintended-consequences-of-subsidybased-energy-policy/
This week, Spain was rocked by protesting coal minersobjecting to the Spanish
governments plan to slash 65bn in spending, including a two-thirds reduction in support to the heavily subsidized domestic coal mining industry.
These protests should be of note to energy-watchers because they reveal the fragility of Spains energy policy: a teetering house of cards, heavily
reliant on unsustainable subsidies driven by broader socio-political factors.
Following the financial turmoil of the Great Recession, protest movements have been on the rise globally. From the Arab Spring to
the Occupy Movement, protesters have been periodically dominating the headlines as they take to the streets. Spain has had its share of protests,
largely against EU-imposed austerity measures, designed to reduce the nations debt. Spains symbolic center, Puerta del Sol in Madrid,
was occupied by protestors (los indignados) for months last summer.
The current round of protests are driven by coal miners from the northern province of Austurias, whose industry relies on lavish government
subsidies to stay afloat against cheaper, imported coal. A quickcheck of the statistics reveals that Spain generates about 13% of its electricity from
coal, but over two-thirds of that coal is imported from elsewhere, primarily Russia, South Africa, and Indonesia. Thus it is clear that these
subsidies are not intended to provide affordable energy to the nation, but rather to provide jobs to those who are still coal mining, even though
most of their jobs have essentially been sent abroad. (Incidentally, their numbers are estimated at around 8,000-9,000).
This is an ironic state of affairs indeed: Spain is also one of Europes leading lights when it comes to renewable energy, which has grown primarily
through the largesse of government subsidies. While its southern states, where sun and wind are abundant, have been using government subsidies to
support the transformation of an agricultural landscape to a renewable energy landscape, the northern states have been using government
subsidies to prop up an industry that is one of the leading contributors to global climate change: coal.
Now, however, with EU central bankers demanding austerity measures to release new bailout money for Spanish banks, all of the energy industry
subsidies are coming to an end. While Spain has been phasing out subsidies to solar energy since the financial collapse in 2008, it announced the
end of almost all remaining renewable energy subsidies earlier this year. (I wrote a piece on this blog a few weeks ago about Germany terminating its
own renewable energy subsidies). With the pending cuts to coal mining subsidies, some very important questions are presented: how much will
the cost of energy rise in Spain? And how will they meet renewable energy targets and obligations, under both domestic and EU policies?
Meanwhile, the sirens are blaring in Madrid, as protests, like so many in recent years, turn violent. Ultimately, these protests are not about a failing
industry which supplies a heavily polluting energy source. They are about an economy which has been fundamentally altered by globalization and
whose governmental policies have prevented needed structural adjustments from occurring.
Readers from outside Spain, however, would be wise to consider the broader implications. Government subsidies that prioritize certain forms of
energy production in order to meet broader political goals can have unintended consequences, and chaos may ensue when these subsidies are
withdrawn. The UScurrently subsidizes both fossil fuel and renewable energy sources, compromising its own ability to pursue a coherent energy
policy. What unintended consequences may lurk in the future of such policies?

The cost del sol
Sustainable energy meets unsustainable costs
Jul 20th 2013 | MADRID | From the print edition
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21582018-sustainable-energy-meets-unsustainable-costs-cost-del-sol



The drain in Spain
NGEL MIRALDA was proud of his 320 solar panels in a field near Benabarre, in northern Spain. They added 56 kilowatts of clean-energy
capacity to a country that depended on oil imports. The panels cost 500,000 ($735,000): 150,000 from an early-retirement pay-off from
IBMs Barcelona office, the rest from a bank loan. The government promised a 10% annual return on such projects. That was in 2008. Five
years later, after subsidies were cut on July 12th for the third time since 2012, his income is down by 40% and he is struggling to repay the
loan. There is no legal security in Spain, he complains.
Mr Miralda is the victim of a bungled, overambitious renewables programme. Governments everywhere want to turn green and create
environmentally friendly jobs. But as Spain shows, good intentions are not enough. If the policies are wrong, the benefits are wasted, the
jobs disappear, the costs remainand business investors bear the brunt.
In this section
The attack of the MOOCs
Joint highs
Bitter pill
The cost del sol
Drug deal
Congestion on the line
The travel channels
Crazy diamonds
Reprints
Related topics
Technology
Science and technology
Spain
Energy technology
Alternative energy
In 2007 Spain had just 690 megawatts (MW) of installed capacity of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels. That was the year global PV prices
started to fall, thanks to booming production in China. Hoping to stimulate a new green industry, for which sunny Spain seems ideal, the
government increased the prices it paid for solar power to 12 times the market price for electricity.
In a sense, it worked spectacularly. According to research by CF Partners, a carbon-trading firm, solar PV capacity rose fivefold in 2008
alone. Another technology for capturing the energy of sunlight, solar thermal, also grew hugely, albeit more slowly because it takes longer
to deploy. Its installed capacity rose from 11MW in 2007 to 1,950MW now. Renewable-energy output doubled between 2006 and 2012. At
that point, Spain had the fourth-largest such industry in the world.
But costs exploded, too. Subsidies to solar energy rose from 190m in 2007 to 3.5 billion in 2012 (an 18-fold increase). Total subsidies to
all renewables reached 8.1 billion in 2012, see chart. Since the government was unwilling to pass the full costs on to consumers, the
cumulative tariff deficit (the cost of the system minus revenues from consumers) reached 26 billion, having risen by about 5 billion a year.
This would have been unaffordable at the best of times: 8 billion is almost 1% of GDP. But as the euro crisis overwhelmed Spains
finances, reform of the renewable-energy bonanza became inevitable. On July 12th the government unveiled its latest cuts. It lopped 2.7
billion off the overall bill, of which 1.4 billion were cuts to subsidies for rewnable energy and 1.3 billion cuts to other revenues of utility
companies. That was on top of the 5.6 billion cuts that (reckons Acciona, a construction firm) it has already imposed in 2011-13.

The changes have turned renewable energy into a fully-regulated business. Companies used to be able to choose between getting market
prices plus a premium, or to agree on long-term contracts that guaranteed a set margin above their costs. The government scrapped the
first option earlier this year and has now scrapped the second. Instead, it will estimate the value of companies assets and cap their pre-tax
profits at three percentage points above ten-year Spanish government-bond yields. (How this will work in practice has not been
announced.)
The changes have infuriated everyone. They are retroactiveaffecting current operations as well as new onesso there will be a deluge of
lawsuits challenging their legality. Some firms will face problems servicing their debts and the government is in talks with banks to forestall
bankruptcies. Outstanding loans for renewable energy are reckoned to be 30 billion. Five of the biggest utilities estimate that the reforms
will jointly cost them 1 billion a year. The share prices of companies most affectedIberdrola, EDP Renewables and Accionanosedived.
It has been a chastening experience. The government failed to cut subsidies when renewables were booming, so the cuts have had to be
draconian. It imposed no cap on new capacity and stood by while that grew uncontrollably (this also happened in Germany). The promised
jobs have vanished. The solar-energy business has lost tens of thousands of jobs from its peak. And after repeated retroactive cuts no one
is willing to invest in renewable energy any more. Yet because projects often receive subsidies for 20 years, the costs remain. Even after
the cuts, renewables subsidies are running at 7 billion-8 billion a year. It is not hard to think of better ways of spending such large sums of
taxpayers money.
CORRECTION: Some of the numbers in the original version of this story were wrong. They were corrected on July 23rd

Spain's Green Disaster a Lesson for America
By Dale Hurd
CBN News Sr. Reporter
Monday, December 26, 2011
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/finance/2011/november/spains-green-disaster-a-lesson-for-america/
BARCELONA, Spain -- It was just last year that President Obama was touring
Solyndra headquarters and telling us green technology was the future:
"The future is here. We are poised to transform the ways we power our homes and our
cars and our businesses," Obama said.
The president said America had better get on board or else fall behind the rest of the
world in the growth of renewable or "green" technology.
Spain's Colossal Failure
One the nations he held up as an example for America's green technology effort was
Spain.
However, President Obama may like Spain's green technology program, but the
Spanish -- not so much. One study has declared it a colossal failure.
The Spanish recently threw out their socialist government over their terrible economy
and a 22 percent unemployment rate.
Green technology was supposed to be Spain's path to more jobs and a cleaner more
prosperous future. It wasn't.
"Politicians told us some years ago that they found a new way of investing or doing
public investing in a new sector, in the renewable energies, that would create a sort of
new economy with new jobs, green jobs, so called green jobs," Dr. Gabriel Calzada
lvarez, with King Juan Carlos University in Madrid, said.
But what the Spanish got was a big helping of a Solyndra style business debacle: a lot
of taxpayer money down the drain and jobs that cost a fortune to create.
A Job Killer
Calzada, an economist, studied Spain's green technology program and found that
each green job created in Spain cost Spanish taxpayers $770,000. Each Wind
Industry job cost $1.3 million to create.
"President Zapatero, for example, when he came in to power, said he knew, 'he knew'
that solar energy was the future," Calzada said. "He 'knew' this, so he put all the public
money and investment into this model."
But Calzada's study found that for every four jobs created by Spain's expensive green
technology program, nine jobs were lost.
Electricity generated was so expensive that each "green" megawatt installed in the
power grid destroyed five jobs elsewhere in the economy by raising business costs.
Unsafe Conditions
Marta Sabina lives on the outskirts of Barcelona in one of Spain's new green
technology apartment buildings.
It has been a nightmare for this mother of three young children. Her toilet uses
recycled water with chemicals in it.
She said it's unsafe for her children and often looks no different from toilet water that
hasn't been flushed.
"A lot of times I am coming to the bathroom and I am pushing all the time because the
water is dirty and I don't know if it's the kids because they have not pushed or if
because it's the water," Sabina said. "Sometimes it smells very bad and it's very dirty
and it's not for kids."
Sabina has also had to heat her family's hot water on the stove because the building's
solar water heater didn't work for three years.
Breaking the Bank
Spain's green technology dream was costing the nation more than $15 billion a year
before the government had to slash it because it had failed and Spain was going
broke.
The Obama Administration's 2007 stimulus package included $80 billion for green
jobs.
"Green energy is not ready for prime time," Seton Motley, president ofLess
Government, said. "It's not ready for private sector production."
"Everything that requires government money means there's no market for it," he
explained. "Because if there was a market for it, there'd be plenty of private capital to
invest in it and people saying, 'Let's go forward.' "
The market didn't like General Motors, which faced bankruptcy. Then Washington
came to the rescue. Uncle Sam bought 500-million shares of General Motors, which
have since lost $15 billion in value.
"I can't think of, off the top of my head, a bigger loser than GM, as far as most money
in one place that's going down the tubes," Motley said.
Environmental Dream Buster
The Spanish could have taught the Americans a thing or two about government
money down the tubes.
Spain spent billions on an environmental dream that helped make their economy
worse and added to the nation's already crushing government debt.
And now Spain's future is looking more like what Greece is facing.

Spains Green Economy: Skyrocketing Power Prices And Higher CO2 Emissions
3:54 PM 08/28/2014
http://dailycaller.com/2014/08/28/spains-green-economy-skyrocketing-power-prices-and-higher-co2-emissions/
President Obama once frequently touted Spains green energy economy. No longer. Thats no surprise given how things
have worked out for the economically beleaguered country.
According to a new report by the free-market Institute for Energy Research, Spains green energy policies have resulted in
skyrocketing electricity prices, billions of euros in debt and rising carbon dioxide emissions.
For years, President Obama has pointed to Europes energy policies as an example that the United States should follow,
said IER in a statement on their new study. However, those policies have been disastrous for countries like Spain, where
electricity prices have skyrocketed, unemployment is over 25 percent, and youth unemployment is over 50 percent.
Spain began heavily subsidizing green energy sources, like wind and solar, in the early 2000s with itsPromotion Plan for
Renewable Energies. The country used a combination of generous feed-in tariffs, green energy generation quotas and
green power subsidies to boost renewable energy development in the country and lower its carbon dioxide emissions.
By 2009, Spain had greatly expanded its green energy industry, earning praise from international leaders, including
President Obama.
And think of whats happening in countries like Spain, Germany and Japan, where theyre making real investments in
renewable energy, Obama said in 2009. Theyre surging ahead of us, poised to take the lead in these new industries
There is no reason we cant do the same thing right here in America.
But what seemed like a booming green energy economy on the surface was really becoming a costly way to help drive
Spain into economic recession. By 2011, Spains electricity prices stood at 29.46 U.S. /kilowatt-hour two and a half
times what electricity cost in the U.S. at the time.
It was also becoming apparent that Spain was not going to be able to keep paying for its green energy agenda. The
country racked up a $41 billion rate deficit the difference between what utilities pay and what they can charge for
consumers. In the face of high rate debt, about $850 per person, the government has had to raise power prices and
energy taxes to cover the costs.
Higher taxes and costs aside, Spanish household electricity prices rose 92 percent between 2005 and 2011. Spanish
industrial electricity costs grew by 78 percent during this time as well.
Spain has actually been scaling back its costly green energy agenda the past year or two in the face of high debt and
unemployment. The country cut wind subsidies to major wind farms back in February and, in June, Spanish officials
announced a new electricity rate schedule that effectively ended green energy feed-in tariffs.
The IER study also notes that Spains green agenda was not able to keep its carbon footprint from rising. Between 1994
and 2011, Spains carbon dioxide emissions grew 34.5 percent, despite the countrys green push which began in the
1990s.
While the renewable policies themselves were likely not the cause of the emissions increase, the upward trend does
prove that renewable energy policies were insufficient to reduce CO2 emissions over a roughly twenty-year period,
according to IER.
is anything but the model for American energy policy, reads the IER study. The countrys expensive feed-in tariff
system, subsidies, and renewable energy quotas have plunged a sizable portion of Spaniards into fuel poverty, raised
electricity bills, all while having almost no meaningful impact on curtailing carbon dioxide emissions.

Spain close to approving new renewable energy rules:
minister
MADRID Thu May 29, 2014 10:38am
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/29/us-spain-energy-idUSKBN0E91JA20140529
(Reuters) - The Spanish cabinet could approve on Friday a law that will cut renewable energy subsidies as part of a drive to
reduce a 30 billion euro ($41 billion) power tariff deficit, built up during years of keeping prices below regulated costs.
The new law, the thrust of which was announced by the government in July last year, set the rate of return for existing
renewable energy facilities at 7.4 percent and at 7.5 percent for future operations.
Many renewable energy companies have made double-digit returns on investment under hefty subsidies. Spain has passed a
series of measures over the past two years cutting, and in some cases eliminating, renewable energy subsidies and a number of
investors have filed international legal complaints.
"(The decree) is ready to go," Industry Minister Jose Manuel Soria told reporters on Thursday, adding that the decision to
approve it at Friday's weekly cabinet meeting would be taken later on Thursday.
The minister acknowledged the reform was bad news for companies that invested expected higher returns.
According to documents annexed to the reform, to which Reuters had access last week, the government plans to cut renewable
energy subsidies by 15 percent this year to 7.63 billion euros.
The new rules will be retroactive to July 2013 and many companies have already made massive provisions and writedowns in
their 2013 financial results, anticipating the impact of the decree.
The regulation includes variations for a range of technologies - including wind, thermosolar, photovoltaic and biomass - and the
year the assets were installed.
For example, assets installed before 2005 will receive no subsidy and will only be awarded with the wholesale power price,
while newer assets will receive the wholesale price plus a separate remuneration

Spain
http://www.worldenergy.org/data/sustainability-index/country/spain/2013/
INDEX COMMENTARY
This year, Spain improves its already excellent performance by breaking into the top 10 in the overall Index rankings. Spain balances the
competing dimensions of the energy trilemma well, with equally strong performance on all three. Although Spain is one of the worlds larger energy
importers, it still performs fairly well on the energy security dimension by maintaining a diversified electricity mix, low distribution losses of
electricity, and moderate oil reserves. Spain improves its energy equity ranking this year by continuing to offer high-quality electricity to all of its
citizens at reasonable prices. Like many of its fellow EU members, Spain performs well on the environmental sustainability dimension, with 20% of
its energy coming from nuclear power, 15% from hydro power, and 19% from other renewables such as wind. Spains contextual indicators remain
relatively constant, apart from a small drop in economic strength due to the adverse macroeconomic conditions.
TRENDS AND OUTLOOK
The Spanish administration keeps its commitment to renewable and low-carbon energy. In doing so, the country pursues a more efficient way of
reducing CO2 emissions, becoming a more environmental-friendly producer and consumer of energy.
As for the energy equity aspects, the country has been dragging on a tariff deficit since 1997. In order to put an end to this situation, the Spanish
government approved several regulatory measures during the last years that concluded in July 2013 with the approval of an energy reform in
order to reach tariff adequacy during this year and to guarantee budgetary stability in the future.
Additionally, the Spanish administrations indicative energy plan for 2011-2020 has maintained its commitment with the triple goal of improving the
security of supply, increasing competitiveness and guaranteeing the environmental sustainability. Spain is a net oil and gas importer with an
energy mix mainly based on hydrocarbons. It produces little energy of its own, and must minimise the risks associated with this. Therefore, Spain
is decreasing its energy dependence rate with a policy of energy savings, efficiency, and renewable energy sources. The exploration and
production of indigenous hydrocarbons should also be strengthened. All these factors will reduce dependence on imported energy sources and
improve the balance of payment.
Policymakers need to continue focusing on several challenges such as the need for a higher electricity interconnection power grid capacity with
other European member states, its ageing nuclear system, and the upcoming rises in the cost of electricity related to Spains tariff deficit reduction
objective.
KEY METRICS
Industrial sector (% of GDP) 24.2
TPEP / TPEC (net energy importer) 0.28
Emission intensity (kg CO
2
per USD) 0.22
Energy affordability (USD per kWh) 0.19
GDP / capita (PPP, USD); GDP Group 30,478 (II)
Energy intensity (million BTU per USD) 0.10
CO
2
emissions (metric tons CO
2
per capita) 5.83
Population Access to Electricity (%) 100.0