## Are you sure?

This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?

**andruiman, andruiman@gmail.com
**

∗

October 17, 2014

Abstract

In this paper we investigate properties of the forging algorithm

used in PoS crypto-currencies networks such as Nxt. The approach

we are using is statistical modeling and simulation. We analyzed the

current implemented algorithm and found some weaknesses of it. We

have found that time for block generation depends on balance dis-

tribution over network accounts and even in the simplest case with

one node it cannot converge to speciﬁed value of 1 minute per block.

We also present some newer regulation techniques which help to avoid

those issues and allow adapt nodes to generate a block in the speciﬁed

average time interval independent on balance distribution for static

and dynamic cases.

Keywords: PoS crypto-currencies, forging, statistical simulation

1 Pre-introduction

We begin series of papers concentrated on the PoS algorithms themselves

and their implementations in the Nxt. Our ﬁnal goal is to develop a work-

ing model which can simulate diﬀerent algorithms and approaches fast and

with analyzable data. That model we plan to implement based on a mix

of mathematical statistical simulations (like this paper), formal logic proof

(with the help of the COQ system, http://coq.inria.fr/) and a fast pro-

totyping language (haskell, http://www.haskell.org/ at the moment).

∗

To support this work please use Nxt address: NXT-L892-ZKXZ-2JJY-AD9JV

1

While we do not care yet much about performance that would be a rea-

sonable choice as we believe. Please see details of our plans in the pre-

ceding papers at

1

and

2

. To simulate something we need that it should

be predictable, measurable and modiﬁable. We start with some basic en-

tities of the model and come close to the forging algorithm which we’d

like to be investigated so we can play with params and see what happens

in the simulating. So this paper considers the forging algorithm from dif-

ferent sides. Author must note the outstanding work of mthcl at http:

//www.docdroid.net/ecmz/forging0-5-2.pdf.html and his precise inves-

tigation of the probabilistic properties of the forging algo. In our paper we

observed some of the same results as he did using statistical simulation and

propose some diﬀerent correcting procedures. We’d like to note that this

paper doesn’t belong to strict math papers. We skip some details, don’t

try to prove theorems, don’t describe the numerical experiments with super-

accuracy and however some of the data is of course available, our goal is to

make an impression of diﬀerent regulative procedures and results to realize

what worth and what worthless (at least yet) to include in the simulating

system, which parameter is important or even critical and which is less im-

portant for the network excellence.

2 Introduction

The forging process considered as opposite to the mining is used in the Proof-

of-Stake (PoS) crypto-currencies networks to build a blockchain, which is the

block sequence, containing all the network speciﬁc data in a structured type-

class. For details see https://wiki.nxtcrypto.org. However an algorithm

of forging can be examined from the mathematical point of view, following

the goal to construct an optimal and eﬀective core network clients, whose

collective work leads to the speciﬁed network behavior. We divide our paper

in some sections moving from the easiest case to more realistic, discovering

necessary properties of the forging process to be implemented.

Let us consider a network of N nodes, where each node corresponds to

some user account, but not vice versa (we think of sleeping accounts). Each

account corresponds to some balance value V

n

, which are not together exceed

the total system balance:

V

n

= V . So for live accounts (in nodes) we have

1

http://chepurnoy.org/blog/2014/10/inside-a-proof-of-stake-cryptocurrency-part-1/

2

http://chepurnoy.org/blog/2014/10/inside-a-proof-of-stake-cryptocurrency-part-2/

2

inequality

V

n

≤ V . In the Nxt network V = 10

9

. Further, we denote

the blockchain sequence as B

m

and deﬁne some time interval within which

we’d like to have the block to be generated in average: Et

m

= τ where t

m

is interval between m and (m − 1) blocks. In the Nxt τ = 60 (measured

in seconds). We also have the zero block B

0

which is called genesis block.

Each block has a special measure which is called base target H

m

. To add

a non-deterministic entity we suggest that each node can generate pseudo-

random (natural) numbers p

nm

somehow distributed between 0 and enough

big number, say P. They are called hits. In the p

nm

numbers n stands for

the node number and m for the current block. Hereafter we suggest the

uniform distribution with inﬁnitesimal measure dp/P (we may think that p

is continuous as P is very big). In the Nxt P = 2

64

− 1. The starting base

target is deﬁned so that the estimation Et

1

= τ

3

and is equal to H

0

=

P

2V τ

. In

the Nxt H

0

=

2

64

2·10

9

·60

= 153722867. We also yet suggest the static blockchain

which means B

nm

= B

n

m

≡ B

m

through all the paper.

The algorithm which is examined and currently implemented in the Nxt

is the following (we’ll refer it as original):

t

nm

= p

nm

/(V

n

H

m−1

);

H

max

= min(V H

0

, 2H

m−1

);

H

min

= max(1, H

m−1

/2);

H

c

= t

nm

H

m−1

/τ;

H

m

= min(H

max

, max(H

min

, H

c

)).

Rewrite the latter equations as follows substituting t

nm

, max’s and min’s:

H

c

= p

nm

/(V

n

τ);

H

m

= min(V H

0

, 2H

m−1

, max(1, H

m−1

/2, H

c

)).

In the next sections we consider the following cases: (1) one node - per-

manent balance, (2) one node - changing balance, (3) multi-node - permanent

balance, (4) multi-node - changing balance.

Another important question we’d like to investigate is what we expect

from the perfect algorithm. At the moment our expectations are: (1) per-

fect algorithm should be immune to the total balance distribution that is no

matter how forging coins are distributed between accounts (2) it should be

3

Hereafter we calculate the mean value as an average within the series and denote

Ex

k

≡ lim

K→∞

1/K

i≤K

x

i

3

immune to sudden forging balance change (due to transactions or just turn-

ing machines oﬀ) (3) it should be proportional to account’s forging balance

that is with total amount of blocks generated we expect that estimation of

contribution of each node is proportional to it’s forging balance.

3 One node - permanent balance

So we start our examination with the simplest case: N = 1, V

1

= V . Rewrit-

ing the algorithm we have:

H

c

= p

m

/(V τ);

H

m

= min(V H

0

, 2H

m−1

, max(1, H

m−1

/2, p

m

/(V τ))).

Let us further normalize all the calculated stuﬀ by 2H

0

to simplify notes.

So, let p ∈ U[ε; 1] and set

H

0

= 0.5; H

m

= min(V/2, 2H

m−1

, max(H

m−1

/2, p

m

))

where we introduce ε = 1/P > 0 small enough. Analytical solution for

EH

m

≡ lim

M→∞

1

M

m≤M

H

m

is not straightforward so we will use numerical

results sometimes to demonstrate the properties. To get fast simulation

results we use Excel and Gnumeric (maybe not excellent choice but sometimes

it works). The distribution of H

m

we got looks like on the ﬁgure below.

4

The distribution of H

m

looks pretty smooth and we’ve got the mean value

of around 0.5. However for one node with permanent balance we may try

not to tune H

m

at all, setting H

m

≡ 0.5 for all m with expectable result of

E[p

m

/H

m

] = Ep

m

/H

0

= 0.5/0.5 = 1. As we can see later, keeping H

m

close

to constant is a good idea while dealing with permanent overall balance.

But what happened with the mean time interval τ

1

. Although EH

m

=

0.5, τ

1

didn’t converged to unit and is about 1.3 −1.4. Here is a distribution

for t

m

:

Again we will not yet try to prove it analytically and consider much more

easier task, i.e. what is E[p

1

/p

2

] with both p

1,2

∈ U[1; P]? We believe it is

E[p

1

/p

2

] =

1

P

2

P

_

1

P

_

1

p

1

/p

2

dp

1

dp

2

=

1

P

2

_

P

2

2

−0.5

_

ln P ≈

ln P

2

where we neglect a value of 1 P

2

in the brackets.

This example answered us what we’ll get if we regulate H

m

naively setting

H

m

= p

m

; t

m

= p

m

/H

m−1

: Et

m

converges to ln P/2 with P big enough

rather than to unit, although

Epm

EHm

= 1. The given original algorithm is

much more complex to solve analytically but what we demonstrated is that

obviously E[A/B] = EA/EB even for statistically independent variables.

This question goes further to theoretical equation of the kernel functions

5

f(x), g(x) which play here roles of probability density functions:

E

g

xE

f

_

1

x

_

=

_

(1/x)f(x)dx

_

xg(x)dx = 1.

So playing with the simplest case we have realized that tuning of H

m

should be not so rough and we’ll try some methods to overcome the problem

of one-node time convergence with more interesting methods, than merely

constanting H

m

, in the next section. Main goal is to ﬁnd a good way for

probability propagation from p

m

to t

m

through H

m

caring about rather Et

m

but maybe not EH

m

as mean time interval is more valuable property than

mean base target of the block. The latter will play a role when we’ll come to

dynamic blockchain and even blocktree where we’ll be looking for the longest

and therefore most trustful chain.

4 One node - changing balance

To see how we can regulate H

m

when account’s balance changes from block

to block let us introduce a new random entity, say k

m

. The distribution

of k

m

is not important to our goal so let k

m

= k

0

+ αq with q ∈ U[0; 1]

for further simulations (the latter is the case when Ek

m

exists but we may

also be in principle interesting when it doesn’t). With the given k

m

we

set t

m

= p

m

/H

m−1

k

m

. Start with the naive approach and let H

m

= H

m−1

t

m

supposing than we regulate H

m

depending on the last time of block. We have

H

m

= p

m

k

m

and t

m

=

pm

p

m−1

km

k

m−1

. And that is not very good and although

we know that K

p

= E

_

pm

p

m−1

_

≈

ln P

2

and we can add this coeﬃcient directly

to H

m

: H

m

= p

m

k

m

K

p

(which in fact perfectly works) but we don’t know

anything a priori about the distribution of k

m

and the correspondent value

of E

_

km

k

m−1

_

, because it depends on user actions.

So we need some more elegant method to regulate H

m

. There is no proper

way to expect user actions but we can try to calculate some mean values on

the ﬂy to achieve our goal. Doing this we pursue two aims of estimating

the mean value of account balance and get it relatively local, that is we

won’t wait for decades to calculate the correct mean value because generally

speaking the balance distribution might have no mean value at all. So we

try to use some moving average value as a local estimation of the mean. For

6

that we choose some window within which we calculate the average value of

forging balance and use this for local regulating of H

m

. We have

R

m

=

1

r

m

i=m−r+1

k

i

; H

m

= H

0

R

m

where r is the window size. And actually we have rather good results with

Et

m

close to unit and with the distribution like:

Now it’s important to notice that the latter results are not so excellent

as they could seem due to following reasons: (1) we still probably don’t

want to know anything about current forging balance (because it’s not easily

convertible to the case of multi node) and (2) the distribution of t

m

has a long

tail and high values below the unit. It would be more preferable if it looks

like gaussian distribution around the unit. So we proceed our investigation

with other types of regulation.

What if we tune H

m

directly based on the time of block measurements

and deﬁne:

R

m

=

1

r

m

i=m−r+1

t

i

; H

m

= H

0

R

m

.

In this case we have Et

m

< 1 with distribution like

7

We see that the distribution is better as it has shorter tail but we have

over-regulated H

m

and got mean time less than the goal. Also the mean

value of block time depends on the k

m

distribution what is unacceptable.

That is because we don’t let t

m

to relax between H

m

changes. So let it relax:

R

m

=

1

r

m

i=m−r+1

t

i

, if mod (m, r) = 0; R

m

= 1 otherwise; H

m

= H

m−1

R

m

.

And after this we actually have Et

m

a bit more than unit, relatively

smooth H

m

(it’s getting constant between changes) and the distribution of

t

m

looking like

8

with short tail and almost uniform distribution before the tail. Not bad for

now. Let’s go to the multi-node case.

5 Multi node - permanent balance

The only thing we need from this case is to realize the mean time of a block

dependence on the forging balance distribution between nodes. So for some

regulations it actually depends. Suppose nodes to be not concurrent that is

the ﬁrst found block is acceptable by the system and instantly redistributed

between nodes. So the winner is the node which ﬁnds a block in shorter

time. In the uniform and permanent balance case this time is proportional

to a random number generated by each node, so t

nm

∼ p

nm

where p

nm

are

still uniformly distributed. So

t

m

= min

n

t

nm

.

Let’s calculate the estimation E min p

nm

. It is

N

1

_

0

pdp

_

_

1

_

p

dq

_

_

N−1

= N

1

_

0

p(1 −p)

N−1

dp = −

1

_

0

p d[(1 −p)

N

] =

=

1

_

0

(1 −p)

N

dp =

1

N + 1

=

2Ep

N + 1

.

So if we naively put Et

nm

= N (which is the case when H ≈ H

0

) to be pro-

portional to account’s balance we have Et

m

=

2N

N+1

→2(N →∞). Also it’s

important that the resulting mean value depends on the balance distribution

if we don’t tune H

m

carefully. Actually we already have a method to do this

even in the case of changing balance.

By the way we notice that for the original algorithm of forging we observe

the mean time of ∼ τ

1

· β where β ∈ [1; 2] and depends on the forging balance

distribution. In the real Nxt network the ﬁnal block time value is around 1.9

at the moment.

9

6 Multi node - changing balance

We use the regulation method of the section 4 for each node supposing that

nodes immediately share the solved block and the correspondent H values.

So

H

nm

≡ H

m

= R

m

H

0

;

R

0

= 1; R

m

=

R

m−1

r

m

i=m−r+1

t

i

, if mod (m, r) = 0; R

m

= R

m−1

otherwise;

t

nm

= p

nm

/(H

nm

V

n

);

t

m

= min

n

t

nm

.

We get the mean value of t

m

close to unit and the following simulated

distribution:

We see that the latter distribution decreases while argument goes more

positive from zero but it has almost nothing common with the gaussian which

we believe is one of the best when talking about some value more likely to

be a constant. Let’s try to get it more concentrated around the goal value

of the unit. To do this we present some simple method which we called

pool-in-nodes.

7 mthcl’s algorithm

Here at https://nxtforum.org/proof-of-stake-algorithm/forging-2088/

40/ a new forging algo with two extra regulating parameters had been pro-

posed. We shall investigate it also to reveal its statistical properties. The

10

main idea was that it should be a bit more diﬃcult to decrease the BaseTarget

than to increase it. Here, the parameter bias is a number between 0 and 1,

e.g. 1/2. This should dramatically decrease the probability of long times be-

tween blocks. Now, the constant K is chosen in such a way that the expected

time between blocks is 1 minute (so, K is a function of bias). It is diﬃcult to

calculate K exactly, because the balance equation for the stationary measure

of the system is too complicated. So it was proposed to simulate the process

and get parameter K numerically.

However we can ﬁnd in mthcl’s paper

4

the adapted algorithm with one

extra parameter, namely γ and the second β deﬁned by γ. We will use the

latter version of the algorithm as it described in the paper (see pages 21–22):

H

0

= 1;

t

nm

= −ln p/(H

m

V

n

), p ∈ U[0; 1];

t

m

= min

n

t

nm

;

H

m+1

= H

m

·

_

¸

¸

_

¸

¸

_

ift

m

≥ 2 =⇒ 2;

ift

m

∈ (1; 2) =⇒ t

m

;

ift

m

∈ (1/2; 1] =⇒ (1 −γ(1 −t

m

));

ift

m

≤ 1/2 =⇒ 1/β

β = (1 −γ/2)

−1

.

The simulation results for H

m

give the following distribution:

4

http://www.docdroid.net/ecmz/forging0-5-2.pdf.html

11

which seems very good and is also presented in the paper as a numerical

solution for PDF of the base target H. Also the algorithm is highly adapting

for distribution of the stake between nodes even in a case of the ﬂuctuating

node’s balance. The number of generated blocks is quite well proportional

to the stake portion of the generating node. For the block time distribution

we have the picture like (it was intentionally broken at 3):

with mean value around the unit for γ ≈ 0.5. This distribution is a little

similar to what we got in the section 6 but with more descending shape be-

cause of the Exp distribution for the hits. However the distribution above

allows small intervals more likely and sometimes allows large intervals. For

our simulation the interval for t

m

was up to 20. We suggest that the distri-

bution of the block time should be more concentrated around the unit and

never (or almost never) run out a reasonable neighborhood and that is the

main reason to proceed our investigation. Nevertheless the examined algo-

rithm is better than original due to high stability to the immediate balance

distribution, better proportionality and good mean value. The regulating

parameter γ taken from the neighborhood of 0.5 works well in wide limits of

modiﬁed stake distribution. So for the given network it can be chosen once

for a long run.

12

8 Pool-in-nodes

Recall that a mean value of uniformly distributed numbers is asymptotically

normally distributed. Previously we calculated a node internal block time

as t

nm

= p

nm

/(H

m

V

n

). Now suppose that we distinguish between block and

sub-block, or maybe one likes to call them super-block and just block. Each

sub-block is generated with less diﬃculty, so the normal base target is roughly

multiplied by some predeﬁned number (say 16 or 32) which is equivalent to

dividing the hit by the same number. Let us denote is like w. Then the

procedure is the same. Nodes build the sequence of sub-blocks and after

w sub-blocks built the real block is generated. The remained questions of

what information to be included in the ﬁnal block and how fee should be

distributed between contributing nodes we’ll analyze in the next paper. The

simple idea is to behave like a pool and distribute the cumulative fee between

nodes, which generated at least one sub-block proportional to number of sub-

blocks generated.

Each sub-block time is distributed like in the section 6 within [0; P/(wH

m

(max V

n

))]

and while we have been before regulating H

m

to have Et

m

close to unit now

we believe that the mean value of a sum of such w t-values goes to unit more

gaussian-like. So we deﬁne

t

m

=

w

≤w

t

w

m

; t

w

m

= min

n

t

w

nm

; t

w

nm

= p

w

nm

/(H

w

nm

V

n

); H

w

nm

= H

nm

w ≡ H

m

w.

And actually we’ve got what we hoped. The distribution looks like much

more gaussian and concentrated around the unit:

13

Now we ﬁnished our examination and proceed it in future works.

9 Conclusion and future work

What we realize from our investigation are the following: (1) the original

algorithm of forging is not immune to the balance distribution and even for

one node converges to the mean block time more than unit (2) there is an

adapting algorithm which solves both the issues and oﬀer the regulation con-

vergent to unit and immune to changing balance distribution. The number

of found blocks is proportional to node’s forging balance as the local node’s

time is inverse proportional to it, hits are uniformly distributed and nodes

share blocks immediately after they have been generated.

Future work includes: (1) concurrent nodes model that is nodes may

choose the blocks sequence on which forge based on its cumulative base tar-

get (2) model for asynchronous and delayed process of blocks exchange (3)

analyzing of attacks opportunities in the diﬀerent forging models.

14

- What are the economic parameters of Nxt?uploaded byPetr
- NXT - A Cybernetics Perspective v 0.1uploaded byReid Douthat
- Decentralized Internet and Nxt Solutionsuploaded bySalsacz Nxt
- Cunicula's game theory primer.pdfuploaded bycuncicula
- Multibranch forginguploaded byandruiman
- Multibranch forging algorithms: tails switching effect and chain measuresuploaded byandruiman
- Consensus-as-a-service: a brief report on the emergence of permissioned, distributed ledger systemsuploaded byTim Swanson
- NXT Brochure 4uploaded byPetr
- Nxt Myths: What should we know about Nxt generation PoS Cryptocurrencyuploaded bySalsacz Nxt
- Hop System for Store of USD Valueuploaded bycuncicula
- PoS forging algorithms: multi-strategy forging and related security issuesuploaded byandruiman
- Nxt Innovationsuploaded byPetr
- The math of Nxt forginguploaded byPetr
- Why Nx Tought to Be Taken Seriouslyuploaded byReid Douthat
- Nxt Network: Energy and Cost Efficiency Analysisuploaded byPetr
- Consistent Hashinguploaded bypsephis
- Bretton Woods 2015 White Paperuploaded byConsumers' Research
- Crypto Review of Curve25519.java & Crypto.javauploaded byPetr
- Topsim Overview eBookuploaded byPsycsen
- Positive Result Action researchuploaded byireneyutuc
- KROEHNERT, G.uploaded byRadulescu Alina
- sim1process simulationuploaded byashitshahg
- applied epidemiologyuploaded byTamminana Rajasekharam
- Blockchain Understanding the Potentialuploaded byDom DeSicilia
- Psycho-Oncology 2010 Bonnaud_Videotaped Simulated Interviews to Improve Medical Students' Skills in Disclosing a Diagnosis of Canceruploaded bydelap05
- First Guide C_rev2uploaded bySuraj Pathak
- SWARM Working Paper, Distributed Networks and the Lawuploaded byCoinDesk
- Decoupling the Partition Table From the Producer-Consumer Problem in 16 Bit Architecturesuploaded bydjclocks
- A-Extensions in HYSYSuploaded bySyed Muzamil Ahmed
- A Virtual Laboratory for Teaching Power System Dynamics and Control at Undergraduate Level in Developing Nationsuploaded byJarnawi

Read Free for 30 Days

Cancel anytime.

Close Dialog## Are you sure?

This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?

Loading