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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION

Rule 65, Section 2, Rules of Court



Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.
When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46.

Requisites for a writ of prohibition (Riano, 2012)
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites:
a) The impugned act must be that of a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions;
b) The tribunal, corporation, board or person must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
c) There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; and
d) Like apetition for certiorari, the petition for prohibition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment or order subject of the petition, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forumshopping as provided in Sec.3 of Rule 46.

Hon. Eduardo Ermita vs Hon. Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino, G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011

FACTS
Executive Secretary Ermita assailed by certiorari with writ of preliminary injunction granted by
Judge Delorino in favor of Association of Petrochemical Manufactures of the Philippines
denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss and enjoining the government from implementing E.O.
No. 486 (Lifting The Suspension Of The Application Of The Tariff Reduction Schedule On
Petrochemicals And Certain Plastic Products Under The Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(Cept) Scheme For The Asean Free Trade Area (Afta).
Petitioner contends that public respondent gravely abused her discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition and granting the writ of preliminary injunction as
the exercise of the quasi-legislative functions of the President cannot be enjoined. He avers
that writs of prohibition lie only against those persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.

ISSUE: Is the remedy of prohibition available in this case?

RULING:
No. The remedy of prohibition is not available in this case.
In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor
[4]
expounds on prohibition as a remedy to
assail executive issuances:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued
in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary
writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or
in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial
or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court
within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there
is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such
relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR,
petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to
perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately
be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary
restraining order. (emphasis supplied)

EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA vs HON. MARIANO M. MALONES, G. R. No.
182065, October 27, 2009

FACTS
Ongsuco and Salaya are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market, which had just been
newly renovated. They were informed by the Office of the Municipal Mayor of a meeting and
in the said meeting the new rate of rentals was discussed.
On 17 August 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Municipal Ordinance
No. 98-01, entitled The Municipal Revised Revenue Code. The Code contained a provision for
increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount of P20,000.00
and P15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second floors of the municipal public market,
respectively. The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said
market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the
municipal public market.
Only a month later, on 18 September 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved
Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, moving to have the meeting dated 11 August 1998 declared
inoperative as a public hearing, because majority of the persons affected by the imposition of
the goodwill fee failed to agree to the said measure. However, Resolution No. 68, series of
1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin was vetoed by respondent on 30 September 1998.
After Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was approved on 17 August 1998, another
purported public hearing was held on 22 January 1999.
On 9 June 1999, respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were
occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public market without any lease contract, as
a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and
interested applicants.
This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders at the
municipal public market, to file before the RTC on 25 June 1999 a Petition
forProhibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent. The Petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
25843.
The RTC found that petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy
of mandamus or prohibition. It reasoned that mandamus would not lie in this case where
petitioners failed to show a clear legal right to the use of the market stalls without paying the
goodwill fees imposed by the municipal government. Prohibition likewise would not apply to
the present case where respondents acts, sought to be enjoined, did not involve the exercise
of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

ISSUE: Is the RTC correct in ruling that the remedy of mandamus and prohibition would not lie
in this case?

RULING
The Court ruled that the remedy is proper in this case.
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person --
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions -- who has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be
rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or
matter specified in the petition. On the other hand, the remedy of mandamus lies to
compel performance of a ministerial duty. The petitioner for such a writ should have a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act, and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.

In this case, petitioners primary intention is to prevent respondent from implementing
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the goodwill fees from petitioners and barring
them from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ petitioners
seek is more in the nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than mandamus
(compelling performance).

For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine what the law is and
what the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties. The term quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of public
administrative officers or bodies that are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. In implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01,
respondent is not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties or to exercise, in
any manner, discretion of a judicial nature.

A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given
set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.

The Court holds that respondent herein is performing a ministerial function.


PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
Rule 65, Section 3, Rules of Court
Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus.
When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

Requisites for Mandamus to be Available (Riano, 2012)
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with:
a. The plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded;
b. It must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law;
c. The defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law;
d. The act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and
e. There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

UY KIAO ENG vs NIXON LEE, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010

FACTS
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic
will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee
filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
01100939, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the
will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly,
respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and
to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without
any justifiable reason.

ISSUE: Is mandamus the proper remedy in this case?

RULING
Mandamus is not the proper remedy in this case.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to
some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified,
which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from
operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of
duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to
enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when
the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs,
mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which
is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere
technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a
rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or
station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On
the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have
a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private
contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of
a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right
against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when,
otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public
and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating
to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should
be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy
of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the
usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although
classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally
controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound
discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a
private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

SPOUSES JESSE CACHOPERO AND BEMA CACHOPERO VS RACHEL CELESTIAL
G.R. No. 146754, March 21, 2012

FACTS
Spouses Cachopero lived in the house owned by Celestial. Celestial claimed that when
the condition of the old house had become uninhabitable, she decided to have it
demolished. However, the spouses Cachopero refused to vacate the premises.
Celestial filed an Ejectment case against the spouses Cachopero before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Midsayap but to resolve the issue, they entered into a Compromise
Agreement. In the said agreement, Spouses Cachopero agreed to vacate the premises. But,
because there is a portion of the lot not covered in the agreement that Celestial still wanted to
use, she filed a motion for the issuance of am Alias Writ of Execution. MTC denied said motion
for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, Celestial filed with the RTC petition for mandamus against the
MTC.
On February 3, 1999, the RTC rendered a Resolution, again dismissing Celestials
petition for mandamus, but on the ground that the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution in
Civil Case No. 711 depended on the outcome of Special Civil Case No. 070, which involved the
subject land that Jesse Cachopero had applied for. The RTC said that the foregoing
circumstance is a supervening cause necessitating refusal to issue an alias writ of execution.
On September 4, 2000, the Court of Appeals came out with its Decision in favor
of Celestial. In finding merit in Celestials appeal, the Court of Appeals said that a
compromise judgment is immediately executory and once judicially approved, has the
force of res judicata between the parties, which should not be disturbed except for the
vices of consent or perjury.

ISSUE: Will Mandamus lie to compel the Regional Trial Court to issue an alias Writ of
Execution to execute a compromise agreement which the Provincial Sheriff, the
Municipal Trial Court, and the Regional Trial Court ruled to have been properly
executed?

RULING
The Court ruled that the writ of mandamus is aimed to compel a respondent, who failed
to execute his/her legal duty, or unlawfully excluded another from the enjoyment of an entitled
right or office, to perform the act needed to be done in order to protect the rights of the
petitioner.
[31]
Simply put, mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial, as opposed to a discretionary, duty.
In Tay v. Court of Appeals, this Court elucidated on when a writ of mandamus may
issue, to wit:
In order that a writ of mandamus may issue, it is essential that the person petitioning
for the same has a clear legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
the respondent to perform the act required. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties and
is never issued in doubtful cases. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
and to perform a duty already imposed.
In addition, mandamus applies as a remedy when the petitioners right is founded
clearly in law and is not doubtful.
In the case at bar, Celestials petition for mandamus is anchored on her rights
emanating from the Compromise Agreement she executed with the spouses Cachopero.

PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO
Rule 66, Rules of Court

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes
a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (1a)
Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. The Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when
upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action. (3a)
Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of
court. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in
which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation
of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the
expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by
the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought. (4a)
Section 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action. Upon
application for permission to commence such action in accordance with the next preceding
section, the court shall direct that notice be given to the respondent so that he may be heard in
opposition thereto; and if permission is granted, the court shall issue an order to that effect,
copies of which shall be served on all interested parties, and the petition shall then be filed
within the period ordered by the court. (5a)
Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. A person claiming to be
entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may
bring an action therefor in his own name. (6)
Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation. When the action is against a
person for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set forth the name of
the person who claim to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same
and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be
entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made parties, and their respective
rights to such public office, position or franchise determined, in the same action. (7a)
Section 7. Venue. An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over
the territorial area where the respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when the
Solicitor General commences the action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial Court in the City
of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. (8a)
Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given precedence.
The court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing pleadings and for all other
proceedings in the action in order to secure the most expeditious determination of the matters
involved therein consistent with the rights of the parties. Such action may be given precedence
over any other civil matter pending in the court. (9a)
Section 9. Judgment where usurpation found. When the respondent is found guilty of
usurping into, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or
franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded
therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further
judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the public office,
position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. (10a)
Section 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and
papers; damages. If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the complaint to
be entitled to the public office he may, after taking the oath of office and executing any official
bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of the office, and may immediately
thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and papers in the respondent's custody or
control appertaining to the office to which the judgment relates. If the respondent refuses or
neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to such demand, he may be punished for
contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person adjudged entitled to the
office may also bring action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by such
person by reason of the usurpation. (15a)
Section 11. Limitations. Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an
action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to
hold such office or position, arose, nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with
the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year
after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. (16a)
Section 12. Judgment for costs. In an action brought in accordance with the provisions of this
Rule, the court may render judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the relator, or the
respondent, or the person or persons claiming to be a corporation, or may apportion the costs,
as justice requires. (17a)

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO vs ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
GREGORY SANTOS ONG and THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, G.R. No. 179895,
December 18, 2008

FACTS
Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the main,
to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint[4] of September 5, 2007, implored
respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding
against Ong in the latters capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking
paragraph 1, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution in conjunction with the Courts Decision in
Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, petitioner points out that natural-born citizenship is also a
qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the
citizenship requirement from the time of his appointment as such in October 1998.
Petitioner thus contends that Ong should immediately desist from holding the position of Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the basis of citizenship, whether gauged from his
birth certificate which indicates him to be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen, as declared in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita.
Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita did not annul or declare null his
appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely enjoined him from accepting his appointment,
and that there is no definitive pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born Filipino. He informs
that he, nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of judicial
statesmanship.
ISSUE: Is the remedy of quo warranto proper in this case?
RULING
While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of
the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare
null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being
unconstitutional. While the petition professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition,
petitioner even adverts to a quo warranto aspect of the petition.
Being a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition must be dismissed.
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to
annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, the Court ruled that prohibition does
not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer.
x x x [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as
judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo
warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ.
If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to
act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a
judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of
prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial
acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by which to
determine the title to an office.
Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition is, just the same,
dismissible.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to
the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, It is brought against the
person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public
office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may
be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another.
Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v.
Flor, reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, that for a quo warranto petition
to be successful, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In
fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal
ground to proceed with the action.
In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable
franchise to the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that
he was never entitled to assume the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is filed by an individual in
his own name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled to the controverted
public office, position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a right
to the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo Warranto to
determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be sufficient in form, must
show that the plaintiff is entitled to the office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled
that the person instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is
entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment or evidence of such
right, the action may be dismissed at any stage.
The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial functions, cannot
be questioned by any merely private suitor, or by any other, except in the form especially
provided by law. To uphold such action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to
the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the
governmental machine.
Clearly then, it becomes entirely unwarranted at this time to pass upon the citizenship of
Ong. The Court cannot, upon the authority of the present petition, determine said question
without encroaching on and preempting the proceedings emanating from the RTC case. Even
petitioner clarifies that he is not presently seeking a resolution on Ongs citizenship, even while
he acknowledges the uncertainty of Ongs natural-born citizenship.

AM. No. 07-4-15-SC
RULES OF PROCEDURE IN ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE THE COURTS INVOLVING ELECTIVE
MUNICIPAL AND BARANGAY OFFICIALS
SEC. 6. Quo Warranto. - A petition for quo warranto against an elective municipal or barangay
official shall be filed with the proper regional trial court or municipal trial court by any
registered voter who has voted in the election concerned. The party filing the petition shall be
designated as the petitioner; the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
SEC. 7. Petition must be verified and accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping. - An
election protest or a petition for quo warranto shall be verified by an affidavit stating that the
affiant has read the petition and that the allegations therein are true and correct of affiant's
own knowledge or based on authentic records. A verification based on "information and belief"
or upon the "knowledge, information and belief" is not a sufficient verification.
The protestant or petitioner shall sign personally the certificate of non-forum shopping which
must be annexed to the election protest or petition for quo warranto.
An unverified petition or one with insufficient verification or unaccompanied by a certificate of
non-forum shopping shall be dismissed outright and shall not suspend the running of the
reglementary period to file an election protest or petition for quo warranto.
SEC. 8. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. - The election protest or petition
for quo warrantoshall be filed within the non-extendible period of ten days following the date
of proclamation.
SEC. 9. Pendency of pre-proclamation controversy. - The pendency of a pre-proclamation
controversy involving the validity of the proclamation as defined by law shall suspend the
running of the period to file an election protest or petition for quo warranto.
SEC. 10. COMELEC judgment in disqualification case. - A decision of the Commission on
Elections, either in division or en banc, in a disqualification case shall not bar the filing of a
petition for quo warranto based on the same ground, except when the Supreme Court has
affirmed the COMELEC decision.
SEC. 11. Contents of the protest or petition. - An election protest or petition for quo
warranto shall specifically state the following facts:
(a) the position involved;
(b) the date of proclamation; and
(c) the number of votes credited to the parties per proclamation.
An election protest shall also state:
(d) the total number of precincts of the municipality or the barangay concerned;
(e) the protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the
Statement of Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified, an
explanation why the votes are not specified; and
(f) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral
frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts.

FRANCIS KING L. MARQUEZ vs HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. NOLI C. DIAZ
[G.R. No. 127318. August 25, 1999]

FACTS
During the May 6, 1996 SK elections, Francis King L. Marquez and Liberty Santos ran as
candidates for the position of SK Chairman of Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City. Marquez
garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed SK Chairman on Election Day, May
6, 1996.
On May 16, 1996, private respondent filed an election protest before the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Br. 80, Muntinlupa City. Private respondent (then protestant) impugned the
election of petitioner (then protestee) on the ground that the latter is disqualified by age to the
office of SK Chairman.

ISSUE: Is the remedy of quo warranto available in this case?
RULING
It is also argued that Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution applies only to election protests,
and does not include quo warranto suits. As already stated, quo warranto suits are now
cognizable by the MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs pursuant to Art. 253 of the OEC and RA
7808. Section 49 of Resolution 2824 must be understood to cover both election protests
and quo warranto cases, otherwise, to limit it only to election protests would leave parties in an
SK election to file their quo warranto cases in the Regional Trial Court because of the absence
of a specific provision.
First, quo warranto proceedings involving elective barangay officials, such as the Barangay
Chairman and seven [7] members, are cognizable by the MTC, MCTC or MeTC. To contend
that quo warranto proceedings involving an SK Chairman should be brought in the Regional
Trial Court would, in effect, make the SK Chairman, who is just an ex-officio member of the
Sangguniang Barangay, more important than the Chairman and elective members of the same
Sangguniang Barangay.
Second, if election protests involving SK officers are cognizable by the MTCs, there is no
reason why quo warranto proceedings involving the same officers should not be cognizable by
the same courts. If the objection to the election of an SK Chairman involves a question both as
to his eligibility for the office and of fraud in his election, two petitions would have to be filed in
different fora - one in the RTC (for the quo warranto suit) and another one in the MTC (for the
election protest). The same objection to the splitting of jurisdiction which has led to a reform in
our law of procedure can thus be made to this interpretation.
Mindful of the jurisprudence aforecited, and after a careful study and examination of the
records on hand, we are therefore led to the conclusion that the Commission on Elections
correctly upheld the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City over private
respondents petition for quo warranto in Civil Case No. SP 3255. The following disquisition of
respondent Commission on Elections is noteworthy:
We are in accord with the trial courts interpretation that cases involving the
eligibility or qualification of candidates refer to those cases filed before the SK
elections and do not cover those that are filed after the election of SK
candidates. The disqualification case having been filed after the election and
proclamation of the winning candidate, the governing law therefore is second
paragraph of Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code which confers upon the
respondent court the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the disqualification case
filed against Marquez. Corollarily, while Sec. 49 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824
speaks of finality of the proclamation of the winning SK candidates, it does not
prevent the herein respondent court from exercising original jurisdiction in the
event an election protest is filed which in our opinion includes matters which
could be raised in a quo warranto proceedings against a proclaimed SK
candidate.