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JR. respondent.
FACTS: The plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the land located in Barangay Sasa, Davao City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72594, owned by Reta; that the land has been converted by Reta into a commercial center;
and that Reta is threatening to eject them from the land. They assert that they have the right of first refusal to purchase the
land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.
They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void ab initio for being
violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.
On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is beyond the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since it has not been
proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone; that the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to pay
the rentals for the use of the land; and that the amicable settlement between him and Ricardo Roble was translated to the
latter and fully explained in his own dialect.
ISSUE: WON personal easement exist?
HELD: YES.Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186
from where he gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct gives
a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides.

Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering
of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code
Art.614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community. Or of one or more persons
to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.

FACTS: It appears that the petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of
the private respondent corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784.
The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement
of way.
As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's title, as follows:
Entry No. 7712/T-5000 CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ALLEY It is hereby made of record that a
construction of private alley has been undertaken on the lot covered by this title from Concepcion Street to
the interior of the aforesaid property with the plan and specification duly approved by the City Engineer
subject to the following conditions to wit: (1) That the private alley shall be at least three (3) meters in width;
(2) That the alley shall not be closed so long as there's a building exists thereon (sic); (3) That the alley shall
be open to the sky; (4) That the owner of the lot on which this private alley has been constituted shall
construct the said alley and provide same with concrete canals as per specification of the City Engineer; (5)
That the maintenance and upkeep of the alley shall be at the expense of the registered owner; (6) That the
alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the
owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the
City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof;
and (8) That he shall impose upon the vendee or new owner of the property the conditions abovementioned.
The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the above private
alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private
respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to have the gates removed
and to allow full access to the easement.
The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. Subsequently, the latter
moved to have the order lifted, on the grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same
person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the petitioner has
another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not shown that the
right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
ISSUE: whether or not CA erred in holding that an easement had been extinguished by merger.
HELD :YES. It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed
of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.

Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part.
Although they are possessed of a separate
juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not, however, be alienated
from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.

The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the
petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate,
specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property including the disputed
alley as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon
and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a
consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when
ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person.
Merger then, as can be seen, requires
full ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not
in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to
whom the encumbered estate does not belong.

In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to
persons without a dominant estate,
in this case, the public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that
relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public if that is possible no
genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.
14. G.R. No. L-23818 January 21, 1976
EMILIO PURUGGANAN, plaintiff-appellee,
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellee Emilio Purugganan is the owner of a piece of a residential lot subdivided as Lot 1 and Lot 2, situated
at the poblacion of Bangued, Abra and technically described under Torrens Title No. R-6 in his name, adjacent to and bounded
on the North by the lot of defendant-appellant Felisa Paredes. The lots of the plaintiff-appellee are subject to an easement of
drainage in favor of the defendants-appellants fully quoted in the Decree of Registration of the Court of First Instance of Abra,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3256 to wit:
That the oppositor (Felisa Paredes) withdraws her opposition to the registration of the lots Nos. 1 and 2 of
the applicant, and in compensation to said withdrawal by the oppositor of her opposition, the applicant
agrees to respect an easement or servitude over a portion of the lots Nos. 1 and 2 which is EIGHT AND ONE
HALF (8-) meters in length commencing from point 4 of Lot No. 2 and stretching towards Lot No. 1 going
Eastward, and the width is ONE (1) meter, in order that the rain water coming from the roofing of a house to
be constructed by the oppositor over the ruins of her brick wall now standing along the Northeastern
boundary of Lot 1 shall fall into the land of the applicant.
In or about the month of March 1951, the defendants-appellants constructed a house on their lot adjacent to Lots 1 and 2 of
plaintiff-appellee in such a manner that the southern side of their house is exactly on the brick wall, the southern side of which
is the demarcation line between the plaintiff-appellee and the defendants-appellants, demolishing said brick wall and built
thereon the southern wall of their house with 3 windows. The house constructed by the defendants-appellants is 2- meters
longer than the length of roofing allowed in the abovequoted Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20
meters, protruding over the property of the plaintiff-appellee which is .20 meters wider than that allowed in the same Decree
of Registration, and the rain water from the GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside Lots 1 and 2 of the plaintiff-appellee. The
defendants-appellants also placed 3 windows each on the first and second floors of their house on the side facing Lots 1 and 2
of plaintiff-appellee. From the time the defendants-appellants started to construct their house, the plaintiff-appellee has
repeatedly and continuously been demanding from the defendants-appellants that the construction of their house be in
accordance with the easement, but the defendants-appellants refused to observe the easement and to close their windows.
They also prohibited the plaintiff-appellee from constructing a party wall between points 1 and 2 of Lot 2 and between points
2 and 3 and 4 of Lot 1.
In their answer, defendants-appellants admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the complaint with respect to the existence
of an "Amicable Settlement" with the plaintiff-appellee but interposing a denial of the rest and alleging that the ruined brick
wall which stands between the properties of the plaintiff-appellee and their properties solely and exclusively belongs to them
to the exclusion of the plaintiff-appellee, the same having been inherited by defendant-appellant Felisa Paredes from her
ascendants from time immemorial, possessing them, peacefully, continuously and adversely against any other party for so
many years up to the present; they also admitted having constructed a house on the very lot owned by them, with windows on
the side facing the south, the same as the house which turned into ruins by reason of the bombing of Bangued in March 1945,
but they denied that the same was constructed in or about March 1951, as said house was reconstructed and re-erected on the
ruins of a Spanish-built house sometime in later months of 1950. They further alleged that the house standing on the dominant
estate pertaining to Felisa Paredes was constructed long before the issuance of the Decree of Registration alluded to in the
complaint and that they have not violated the terms of the Decree of Registration referred to in paragraph 4 the complaint; had
long existed before the Decree of Registration in question was issued, in the same way that said windows existed long before
the bombing of Bangued in March 1945 and therefore, plaintiff-appellee, as owner of the servient estate, is estopped from
questioning the existence of said windows; that since time immemorial, the house bombed in March 1945, on which ruins
stands the present house, had windows facing Lot No. 1, in the same way the windows of the present house are so constructed
facing same lot No. 1 a long time with notice, knowledge and acquiescence of the plaintiff-appellee as owner of the servient
estate. Defendants-appellants prayed that plaintiff-appellee be ordered to respect all existing construction on their lot and to
refrain from constructing a party wall to obstruct the easement of light, and view; that the easement of light and view be
inscribed on the title of plaintiff-appellee's lots as well as to pay the actual moral and consequential damages.
ISSUE:WON there was a violation in the easement of drainage:
HELD:YES. They failed to comprehend the meaning of the phrase "servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados" constitutes on the
land of plaintiff. Translated, it means the easement of receiving water falling from the roof which is an encumbrance imposed
on the land of the plaintiff-appellee. Consequently, the distances prescribed in the Decree of Registration should not
correspond to the width and length of the roof of the defendants-appellants' house but to the distance of the rain water falling
inside the land of the plaintiff-appellee because the encumbrance is not the roof itself but the rain water falling inside the
property of the plaintiff-appellee.
15. G.R. No. L-23810 December 18, 1925
CATALINO VALDERRAMA, plaintiff-appellee,
THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
FACTS: As appears from the record, on November 17, 1916, several hacienda owners Manapla, Occidental Negros entered into
a contract with Miguel J. Osorio, known as milling contract, wherein Osorio agreed to install in Manapla a sugar central of a
minimum capacity of 300 tons, for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners, who in turn
bound themselves to furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for thirty years from the
execution of the contract, all in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
Later on, the defendant North Negros Sugar Co., Inc., acquired the rights and interest of Miguel J. Osorio in the milling contract
Two years thereafter, that is to say, on January 29, 1919 Catalino Valderrama (case No. 23810) and on February 1st of the
same year, Emilio Rodriguez (case No. 23811) and Santos Urra, Ignacio Benito Huarte, Adolfo Huarte and Pedro Auzmendi
(case No. 23812) made with the appellant other milling contracts identical with the first one of November 17, 1916, with some
new conditions which are specified in detail in the aforesaid documents Exhibit A and 1. Santos Urra thereafter transferred to
Pedro Auzmendi, and the latter to Lorenzo Echarri, their interest in the milling contract executed by them.
In view of the fact that the hacienda owners, who were up to that time customers of the central, could not furnish sufficient
cane for milling, as required by the capacity of said central, the defendant made other milling contracts with
various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros, in order to obtain sufficient cane to sustain the central; and this gave rise
to the plaintiffs filing their complaint, alleging that the easement of way, which each of them has established in his
respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof, while the
defendant maintains that it had the right to transport to its central upon the railroad passing through the haciendas of the
plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
ISSUE:WON defendant had no right, under the easement or otherwise, to cause its locomotives and wagons to run across the
estates of the plaintiffs for the purpose of transporting sugar cane of any agriculturist of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
HELD:No. It is against the nature of the easement to pretend that it was established in favor of the servient estates, because it
is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of easement.
Once the road is constructed, the easement is apparent because it is continuously exposed to view by the rails which reveal the
use and enjoyment of said easement. It is evident, as above stated, that the cane of the plaintiffs if to be transported to the
central by means of wagons passing upon the railroad; but as the easement was created for the benefit of the corporation,
owner of the central, it may cause its wagons to pass upon the road as many times as it may deem fit, according to the needs of
the central. If the plaintiffs do not produce sufficient cane to cover the capacity of the central, it would be unjust to impose
upon the defendant corporation the burden of maintaining a central, prohibiting it to obtain from another source sufficient
cane with which to maintain its business; this is specially true here, because in the milling contract with the plaintiffs, there is
nothing to prohibit the defendant from making milling contracts with other planters, and obtain in that way all cane necessary
to cover the capacity of the central.
It is true that the owner of the dominant estate, in making on the servient estate the necessary works for the use and
preservation of the easement, cannot alter it, nor make it more burdensome (art. 543 of the Civil Code); but this does not mean
that the defendant cannot transport in the wagons passing upon the railroad other cane that of the plaintiffs. What is
prohibited by the legal provision above cited is that the defendant, in excavations or building materials outside of the area of 7
meters, because in the first case, the easement will be altered, and in the second it would become more burdensome. But
nothing of the kind happens when the defendant transport on the railroad, crossing the servient estates, the cane of the
planters of Cadiz; the railroad continues to occupy the same area on the servient estates, and the incumbrance resulting from
the easement continues to be the same, whether the tractors traverse the line 10, 20 or 30 times a day transporting cane for
At the time of the execution of the milling contracts above referred to, there was no intention of the part of the contracting
parties to limit the use of the railroad to the transportation of cane grown by the plaintiffs in their respective haciendas,
and that is because, while the duration of the milling contracts is fixed at thirty years, that of the easement is at fifty. So
that if at the end of thirty years the plaintiffs or their successors should no longer desire to furnish canes for milling in
the central of the defendant, the latter shall still have the right to the easement for the remaining period, but without
transporting on the railroad any cane for the central.

16. G.R. No. 72837 April 17, 1989
SR., respondents.
FACTS: plaintiff Marsal & Co., Inc., is presently the owner of the parcel of land adjoining the Iloilo River up to and adjacent the
lot where the L. Borres Elementary School is located at Barangay Navais Mandurriao, Iloilo; (2) that in 1961, when Marcelino
Florete, Sr. was still the owner of said Marsal property having acquired the same by purchase from its former owners
sometime in 1959, there existed a main canal from the Iloilo River cutting across said property towards the lot where the said
school is located and thru a canal that traverses the school premises going towards Lot 2344; (3) that sometime in July 1978,
plaintiffs closed the dike entrance of the main canal to the canal running across the L. Borres Elementary School premises to
Lot 2344; (4) that on petition of school P.T.A. officials of Barangay Navais, an ocular inspection of the premises was made; (5)
that before 1971, there were no houses standing within the school compound and premises of L. Borres Elementary School;
(6) that at present, there are 15 to 16 houses in the said school compound one of which is the house of the barangay captain of
Barangay Navais; (7) that some of those who signed the petition are not residents or occupants of the houses within the school
compound; (8) that the photograph is the aerial photograph of the premises in question showing the location of the L. Borres
Elementary School, the properties of the plaintiffs, the Iloilo River and the Borres property; (9) that the plaintiffs had
demolished the dike connecting the main canal in plaintiffs' property with the canal running thru the school premises toward
2344; and (10) that defendant Director Jose C. Hernani had invited plaintiff Marcelino Florete, Sr. for conference concerning
the complaint of the residents of Barangay Navais.
Defendants' closure of the dike's entrance connecting the main canal with the canal running thru the school
premises, therefore, caused the flooding of the premises of the L. Borres Elementary School and its vicinity.
This is so because during rainy season, said canal also serves as outlet of rain or flood waters that empties to
the Iloilo River. Witnesses Ignacio Gencianeo, Francisco Regacho, Severo Maranon and Barangay Captain
Antonio Sison were unanimous in declaring so.
ISSUE: whether or not an easement or servitude of water-right-of-way was constituted on the property of the plaintiffs as
servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School land and nearby lands as dominant estates
HELD: YES. , the main canal had long been in existence even before plaintiff Marcelino Florete Sr. acquired ownership of the
fishpond of the Maranons thru which the same passes. This canal served as passage of salt water from Iloilo River to the school
fishpond and at the same time, as outlet and drainage canal or channel of rainwater from the school premises and adjacent
lands that empties to the Iloilo River. An easement or servitude of water-right of way had thus been constituted on the
property of the plaintiffs as the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School land and the nearby lands as the
dominant estates.
Even on the assumption that it was plaintiff Florete Sr. who constructed the subject canal in 1961, an easement or servitude of
water-right-of-way had nonetheless been constituted on subject property because since then the same had been in continuous
use for no less than fifteen (15) years by the school fishpond as well as by the adjacent lands. A positive easement (Art 616,
New Civil Code) had thereby been created and plaintiffs have no right to terminate it unilaterally without violating Art. 629 of
the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 629: The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.

17. August 19, 1908
G.R. No. 4223
NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Nicolas Lunod, Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez, Fernando Marcelo, Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura
Hernandez, and Casimiro Pantanilla, residents of the town of Bulacan, province of the same name, filed a written complaint
against Higino Meneses, alleging that they each owned and possessed farm lands, situated in the places known as Maytunas
and Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran; that the defendant is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land situated in
Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the other; that from time immemorial, and
consequently for more than twenty years before 1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a
statutory easement permitting the flow of water over the said land in Paraanan, which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed
until the year 1901 and consisted in that the water collected upon their lands and in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan
into the Taliptip River. From that year however, the defendant, without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan
into a fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water through said place into the
Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters, there being
no outlet except through the land in Paraanan; that their plantation were destroyed, causing the loss and damages to the
extent of about P1,000, which loss and damage will continue if the obstructions to the flow of the water are allowed to remain,
preventing its passage through said land and injuring the rice plantations of the plaintiffs. They therefore asked that judgment
be entered against the defendant, declaring that the said tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting
the flow of water from the property of the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to the issuing of a preliminary injunction, the
defendant be ordered to remove and destroy the obstructions that impede the passage of the waters through Paraanan, and
that in future, and forever, he abstain from closing in any manner the aforesaid tract of land.

ISSUE: WON statutory easement existed.
HELD:YES. According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed upon one estate for the benefit of another
estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant
estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement of receiving and giving passage to the waters proceeding
from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by agreement between the interested
parties; it is of a statutory nature, and the law had imposed it for the common public utility in view of the difference in the
altitude of the lands in the barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates,
as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this easement, nor the one of the higher estate works
increasing the burden.
Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of waters to which this section refers shall be governed by
the special law relating thereto in everything not provided for in this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating of natural easements relating to
waters, provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow naturally, without the work of man, from the higher
lands together with the stone or earth which they carry with them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not erect works that will impede or prevent such an easement or charge, constituted
and imposed by the law upon his estate for the benefit of the higher lands belonging to different owners; neither can the latter
do anything to increase or extend the easement.
According to the provisions of law above referred to, the defendant, Meneses, had no right to construct the works, nor the dam
which blocks the passage, through his lands and the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters which flood the higher lands of
the plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law which
protects and guarantees the respective rights and regulates the duties of the owners of the fields in Calalaran and Paraanan.