DEFENDANT RILEY’S MEMORANDUM NOW COMES the accused, Daniel Riley, by and through counsel, and, pursuant to this Court’s directive, presents the following: QUESTION PRESENTED At the outset, counsel for the accused must admit that he is unable to fully comprehend what question is presented by the court. The accused must also OBJECT to being compelled to preview his closing argument, if that is the matter under discussion here. Notwithstanding that objection, the accused submits that the Government is on notice that the subjects of self-defense and defense of others has been raised by him previously, both while he was attempting to act as his own counsel, and in the time since he reluctantly abandoned that attempt, shortly before trial. As far as counsel for the accused can comprehend, with lack of sleep and the stress attendant under the circumstances, the Court is asking the accused to defend and support a decision which he has not made. The Government suggests, in another straw man argument, that Mr. Riley intends to rely on the defenses of self-defense or defense of others in his closing argument. This is incorrect. To the contrary, the accused has not given notice of any such intent. Rather, he intends, in part, to assert the failure of the Government to meet its burden to prove all essential elements of all charges presented, a burden that is on the governments alone. The accused does not, and has not, relied on these defenses, since no force of any kind was used by him in defense of himself or in defense of others during the time period covered by the indictment. That does not mean that the subject is foreclosed, especially in light of the evidence presented at trial and the suggestions made by the Government regarding that evidence (suggestions and inferences contained in the Government’s opening statement, arguments on objections, and examination of

its own witnesses and cross-examination of other witnesses). These suggestions and inferences include, but are not limited to, the supposed impropriety of carrying weapons and purported negative connotations of statements attributed to the defendants and other individuals.


It should be obvious at this point in trial that a central issue in dispute is the accused’s state of mind and the state of mind attributable to other individuals, including the other defendants. These defendants do not stand accused of having committed the substantive offenses referenced in the conspiracy counts. The only accusation of action (other than the purported action of agreeing to the conspiracies) is the aiding and abetting count. The government has not alleged, as a separate offense, that the accused actually committed the supposed crime of violence which was supposedly the purpose of the conspiracy (to prevent the United States Marshals Service from arresting Edward Brown and Elaine Brown). There has been suggestion that these individuals actually used force to prevent any action by the Government agents. Consequently, the defenses of self defense and/or defense of others (which actions are protected by the constitutions and laws of both the state and federal governments), do not apply and cannot be asserted. However, the issues related to these defenses (as well as the issue of the right to keep and bear arms) are relevant and have been raised by the Government’s own case and evidence. If the accused is foreclosed from discussing those issues he will be deprived of fair trial by an impartial jury, due process, and full confrontation, since the Government has suggested and raised negative inferences from the evidence, seeking to have the jury conclude that buying, carrying, and using perfectly legal weapons, ammunition, and targets are, in and of themselves, improper, illegal, or inculpatory.

The purpose of the actions of the accused during the time period covered in the indictment is a central issue of contention in this trial. The Government has alleged conspiracies and those allegations subsume two separate, but related, states of mind - knowingly and purposely. The Government must establish that their was an agreement by the alleged

conspirators, that it was knowingly and wilfully entered into by the accused, and that the agreement had a purpose that included the intention to commit a crime of violence. As the Court knows, evidence presented by the Government’s own witnesses supports the conclusion that there was no such agreement and that the accused had contrary purposes.

The accused expects the Court to give a mens rea instruction similar to the following:

2.16 Definition of “Willfully”

To act “willfully” means to act voluntarily and intelligently and with the specific intent that the underlying crime be committed—that is to say, with bad purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law—not to act by ignorance, accident or mistake.

As the comment to this model instruction states, this definition of “willfully” comes from United States v. Monteiro, 871 F.2d 204, 208-09 (1st Cir. 1989). For alternate definitions see United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1985), and United States v. Drape, 668 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1992). Specific intent is preferred. United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 899 (1st Cir. 1993). The alleged crime of violence contains a specific intent, as outlined in the instruction. If the accused had any other state of mind, especially a contradictory one, then the Government’s case for the conspiracies fails. This is a matter for the jury to decide, based on the evidence presented. It is not the burden of the defendant to prove inferences contrary to those urged upon the jury by the Government. If there is any rational conclusion consistent with innocence which is not fully excluded by the Government’s evidence, then the jury must acquit.

This is consistent with the definitions of presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt which the accused expects the Court to present to the jury:

3.02 Presumption of Innocence; Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

It is a cardinal principle of our system of justice that every person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent unless and until his or her guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption is not a mere formality. It is a matter of the most important substance.

The presumption of innocence alone may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt and to require the acquittal of a defendant. The defendant before you, [__________], has the benefit of that presumption throughout the trial, and you are not to convict [him/her] of a particular charge unless you are persuaded of [his/her] guilt of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The presumption of innocence until proven guilty means that the burden of proof is always on the government to satisfy you that [defendant] is guilty of the crime with which [he/she] is charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The law does not require that the government prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict. This burden never shifts to [defendant]. It is always the government’s burden to prove each of the elements of the crime[s] charged beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. [Defendant] has the right to rely upon the failure or inability of the government to establish beyond a reasonable doubt any essential element of a crime charged against [him/her].

If, after fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to [defendant]’s guilt of a particular crime, it is your duty to acquit [him/her] of that crime. On the other hand, if, after fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of [defendant]’s guilt of a particular crime, you should vote to convict [him/her]. (Emphasis added).

The accused also expects the Court to give further instruction on this subject along the lines of the approved instruction by Judge Keeton referenced in the notes to the above instruction in Judge D. Brock Hornby’s 2007 Revisions to Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the First Circuit, at pages 51-52:

As I have said, the burden is upon the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of the charge made against the defendant. It is a strict and heavy burden, but it does not mean that a defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond all possible doubt. It does require

that the evidence exclude any reasonable doubt concerning a defendant’s guilt.

A reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence produced but also from a lack of evidence. Reasonable doubt exists when, after weighing and considering all the evidence, using reason and common sense, jurors cannot say that they have a settled conviction of the truth of the charge.

Of course, a defendant is never to be convicted on suspicion or conjecture. If, for example, you view the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions—one that a defendant is guilty as charged, the other that the defendant is not guilty— you will find the defendant not guilty.

It is not sufficient for the Government to establish a probability, though a strong one, that a fact charged is more likely to be true than not true. That is not enough to meet the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, there are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt.

Concluding my instructions on the burden, then, I instruct you that what the Government must do to meet its heavy burden is to establish the truth of each part of each offense charged by proof that convinces you and leaves you with no reasonable doubt, and thus satisfies you that you can, consistently with your oath as jurors, base your verdict upon it. If you so find as to a particular charge against a defendant, you will return a verdict of guilty on that charge. If, on the other hand, you think there is a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is guilty of a particular offense, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find the defendant not guilty of that offense. (Emphasis added).

The accused submits that there are many possible inferences to be drawn from the evidence submitted thus far, and the accused has the absolute right to argue based on those inferences and that evidence.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Sven D. Wiberg

NH Bar No. 8238

Wiberg Law Office, PLLC 2456 Lafayette Road, Suite 7 Portsmouth, NH 03801 (603) 686-5454


I hereby certify that a copy of this pleading will be served upon the Government and counsel for the other parties by ECF filing on this 3rd day of April, 2008. Due to the nature of this pleading, assent is unnecessary /s/ Sven D. Wiberg