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NOTES AND CASES

IN POLITICAL LAW

Volume II
July, 2009 Edition
(For the September 2009 Bar Examinations)
(BILL OF RIGHTS)

Prepared by:

ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN
Professor of Law
(Constitutional Law Review, Constitutional Law 1 & 2))
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS-BCF, BAGUIO CITY

Pre-Bar Reviewer
COSMOPOLITAN LAW REVIEW CENTER (CRC)
(Political Law)
Baguio City
UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER
Dagupan City
LEX REVIEW CENTER
Zamboanga City

BAGUIO POWER-HAUS BAR REVIEW CENTER
(Political Law)
Baguio City, Santiago City, Isabela and Dipolog City

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CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
(Police Power)
1. Define:
A. police power---is the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to
make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws for
the good and welfare of the State and its people. (ERMITA MALATE
HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)
The basic purposes of police power are:

a. to promote the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people;
(ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175
SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85
b. to promote and preserve public health; (VILLANUEVA VS.
CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987; DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180
SCRA 533 [NMAT]; LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, 50
Phil. 595—apprehend and confine lepers in a leprosarium)
PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE
GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21, 2004

THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION
Facts:
After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC)
released the names of successful examinees in the Medical
Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines observed that the
grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful examinees
were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult
subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and
Gynecology.
The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the
registration as physicians of all the examinees from Fatima College
of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools, the
results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but
unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation
found that the “Fatima examinees gained early access to the test
questions.”
Held:
It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a
profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the

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State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner. However, the
regulating body has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution, their exercise may be regulated pursuant to the police
power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As such, mandamus
will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the
respondents to practice medicine.
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to
the practice of medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for the
board examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the
grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physician’s license, or
revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the
examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the
conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing
authority to be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short,
he shall have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
The petition is therefore granted.
c. to promote and protect public safety; (AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88
SCRA 195; TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. JUINIO, 119 SCRA
897 )
d. to maintain and safeguard peace and order; (GUAZON VS. DE
VILLA)
e. to protect public morals; (CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE
LAGUIO, JR., 455 SCRA 308; WHITE LIGHT
CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, January 20, 2009;
DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569; ERMITA MALATE
HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967; VILLAVICENCIO
VS. MAYOR LUKBAN OF MANILA, 39 Phil. 778; JMM
PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA 319; VELASCO VS.
VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983)
WHITE
LIGHT
CORPORATION,
TITANIUM
CORPORATION
and
STA.
MESA
TOURIST
&
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA,
represented by MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, G.R. No. 122846,
January 20, 2009
TINGA, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally
involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew
with the incessant clash between government power and
individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between
law and morality.

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In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1[1] the Court affirmed the
nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and
inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area.
The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that
prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time
admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates for such
abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance
against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and
equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present
petition.
This Petition challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance
No. 7774 entitled, “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor
Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.2[4] The Ordinance is reproduced
in full, hereunder:
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission
and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are
hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall
mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12)
hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice
a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or
managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would
bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall
violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof
be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or
imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both
such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided,
That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the
persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided,
further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense,
1

[1]G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308.
2
[4]

Id. at 46.

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the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be
cancelled.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development
Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (
TRO)3[5] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent
City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. 4[6] MTDC
prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as
among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the
Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as
well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three
hours.
They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise
of police power.
II.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to
mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967
decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association,
Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.5[40] Ermita-Malate concerned the
City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating
personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address
and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or
lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A
purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which
sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in
the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the
ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the
case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered
under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted
with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit
activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described
as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and
hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been
severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent
3
[5]

Id. at 62-69.

4
[6]

Id. at 45-46.

5

[40]127 Phil. 306 (1967).

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to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its
citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line
of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.6
[41]

A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room
for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. 7[42]
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and
its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. 8[43] Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions
by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, 9[44]
movie theaters,10[45] gas stations11[46] and cockpits.12[47] The awesome
scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its
hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use
has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police
power of the State.
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[41]City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA
157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas v.
Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255, 268-267.
7

[42]Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306 (1967).
8
[43]

JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 94 (1996) citing Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).
9[44]

U.S. v. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 759.

10[45]

People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938).

11[46]

Javier v. Earnshaw, 64 Phil. 626 (1937).

12
[47]

Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 123 (1931).

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B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of
due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. 13[48] The
purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals.
The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are
protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as
imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government,
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural
due process refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.14[49]
Procedural due process concerns itself with government action
adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into
the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to
the level of formality of a hearing.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned
by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property.15[50]
The question of substantive due process, more so than most
other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal
thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental
freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now
confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be
upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not
been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to
achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should
sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due
process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated
methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and
bounds for its application.
C.
13

[48]See U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104 (1908); Insular Government v. Ling Su Fan, 15 Phil. 58 (1910).
14

[49]Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32 (1924).
15
[50]
See City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 330 citing CHEMERINSKY, ERWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 2nd Ed. 523 (2002).

" 23[58] Central Bank Employee’s Association v. but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 190 (1976). rather than substantial. 429 U. 20 [55] 429 U. 71 (1971). 24[59] Applying strict scrutiny.S. In Ermita-Malate. two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process.S.S. A third standard. Supreme Court in U. the standard for the validity of government acts is much more rigorous and exacting. 19 [54] Clark v. and 79777. Carolene Products. Boren. 456 (1988). supra note 1 at 324. governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.”17[52] Consequently.S. and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. Jeter. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender18[53] and legitimacy.16[51] Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a “discrete and insular” minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.S. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. 190 (1976). Nos. 175 SCRA 343. 79310. v. 17 [52] Id.R.S. 79744.20[55] after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Supreme Court in Craig. was later adopted by the U.S. the Court in fact noted: “if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person. 24[59] Id.8 The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U. it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well. at 152. 1989. 18[53] Craig v.S. 531 (2004). 486 U. Reed.19[54] Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U. denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny. July 14. 78742. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances.23[58] Under intermediate review. 22 [57] Central Bank Employee’s Association v. . 21 [56] 404 U. G. strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the 16 [51] 304 U. supra note 57. 487 Phil. 22[57] Using the rational basis examination. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v.S.21[56] While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis. the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider. governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. 144 (1938). the focus is on the presence of compelling.

an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. No.25[60] Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech. 2002). G. 401 U. 148560. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. J. It has been opined by Chemerinsky that the use of the equal protection clause was to avoid the use of substantive due process since the latter fell into disfavor in the United States. gender. 28[63] Boddie v.R. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. D. Connecticut. 19 November 2001. 30 [68] Rollo.M. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception. 29[64] Shapiro v. if it is to be a repository of freedom. it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected31[69] will be curtailed 25 [60] Mendoza. 258. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments “have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution. 31 [69] “Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises — be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.’”30[68] Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate. P-02-1564. Gore. Yet as earlier stated. Sandiganbayan. 394 U. Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint.29[64] If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar. as long as they do not run afoul of the law.S. p. Thompson. 98 (2000).27[62] judicial access28[63] and interstate travel. 23 November 2004) Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. 371 (1971).S.9 amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. (See Concerned Employee v. 26[61] Id. 27[62] Bush v. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2nd ed. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry. presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. 369 SCRA 394. it must include privacy as well. then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. No. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. 618 (1969).S. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom — it is the most comprehensive of . A.. or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.26[61] The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage. Concurring Opinion in Estrada v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor. 531 U.

10 as well. are founded on age-old moral traditions. drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila. WHEREFORE. as it was in the City of Manila case. CITY OF MANILA. E. since as explained by Calabresi. supra note 1 at 337-338. LAGUIO. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. HON. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. for one. Moreover. that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. Hon. it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. HON.” City of Manila v. Manila and MALATE TOURIST rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Laguio. RTC. they will remain so oriented. the Petition is GRANTED. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. Ordinance No. JR. PERFECTO A. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes: We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Jr. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. et al vs. as Presiding Judge. . the oft-quoted American maxim that “you cannot legislate morality” is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.S.. Our penal laws. ALFREDO S. To be candid about it. and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong. Further.

such as but not limited to: 1. 2 The City Mayor.: Enacted by the City Council[9] on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in. ENTERTAINMENT. Night Clubs 6. any business providing certain forms of amusement. Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West. hereunder: SECTION 1. Taft Avenue in the East. the said Ordinance is entitled– AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT. Street in the North. Discotheques 9. April 12.[10] The Ordinance is reproduced in full. annoy the inhabitants. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Karaoke Bars 4. Super Clubs 8. Massage Parlors 3. Motels 12. partnership.D. temporary or otherwise. in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. J. pursuant to P. the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from issuing permits. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding. Kalaw Sr. entertainment. Sauna Parlors 2.11 DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. 118127. Cabarets 10. 2005 TINGA. services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community. PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF. Beerhouses 5. Day Clubs 7. or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section. . Inns SEC. corporation or entity shall. GR No. no person. Dance Halls 11. SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. with welldefined activities for wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila. 11. art exhibitions. Records and music shops 6. and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.[43] In the case at bar. stage and theatrical plays. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants. the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. Handicrafts display centers 4. (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid. dock or yard. 3. Restaurants 7. such as but not limited to: 1. Art galleries 5. light industry with any machinery.12 SEC. or funeral establishments. Coffee shops 8. or devoted to. motor repair shop.[37] The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution The police power of the City Council. and (6) must not be unreasonable. except new warehouse or open-storage depot. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. concerts and the like. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. The relevant constitutional provisions are the following: . (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. 10. however broad and farreaching. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. Flower shops 9. gasoline service station. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon. not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows. the businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. Souvenir Shops 3. Theaters engaged in the exhibition. Curio or antique shop 2.

The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building. The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat “(N)o person shall be deprived of life. usually called “procedural due process” and “substantive due process.” Procedural due process. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. liberty. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. the protection of life. 14. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life. . to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments. in each appropriate case. as the phrase implies. . 1. and property.[49] and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. 9. and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. liberty and property of individuals. liberty or property.[47] A. . and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure. unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice. and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. liberty or property without due process of law. liberty. from seizure.[44] SEC. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of . The maintenance of peace and order. to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government. be valid. and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. or property. 5. obedience to the dictates of justice. liberty or property without due process of law. and private corporations and partnerships are “persons” within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.[45] SEC.”[48] There is no controlling and precise definition of due process.[52] This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government. forfeiture.[50] The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life. refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life.[51] The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation.13 SEC.[46] Sec. No person shall be deprived of life.

[56] The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally. then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.[59] Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance. Individual rights. require an interference with private rights.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.[53] Substantive due process. if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied. and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity. asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life.[58] Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment.[60] It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law. may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. it bears emphasis. substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government’s action. liberty. as that phrase connotes. In other words.14 hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used. such as for protecting fundamental rights. as distinguished from those of a particular class. or property.[55] For example. personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.[54] Case law in the United States (U.[61] .S. arbitrarily or despotically [57] as its exercise is subject to a qualification. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically. for even under the guise of protecting the public interest. liberty and property.

karaoke bars. operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. City Mayor of Manila [63] had already taken judicial notice of the “alarming increase in the rate of prostitution. there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights. In other words. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council’s police powers. v. personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning. the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause. they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of “wholesome. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality. The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate. premiums and blessings of democracy. cocktail lounges. While petitioners’ earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable. bars. adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels. In the instant case. hotels and motels.”[64] The object of the Ordinance was. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants. it is in the hearts of men. fornication and other social ills. which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry.15 Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites. Means employed are .” “innocent” establishments. the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. accordingly. a building or establishment. girlie houses. Inc. it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments. the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits.[67] and it may even impose increased license fees. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association. there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing. presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. licensed and tax-paying nightclubs.

infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and property. discotheques. karaoke bars. The principal purpose of the guarantee is “to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which. it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance. owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which “to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the ErmitaMalate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. day clubs. In part too. [78] It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. super clubs. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. should be borne by the public as a whole.[77] The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses.” Further. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. beerhouses.[79] The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. then society should pay. that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. night clubs. If the government takes away a person’s property to benefit society. the “premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently. cabarets.16 constitutionally infirm The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors. the governmental interference itself. dance halls. massage parlors. Section 9. in all fairness and justice. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.” It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes. In Section 3 thereof. it is about loss spreading. In every . motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. The Constitution expressly provides in Article III. Modality employed is unlawful taking In addition.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of law. the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. as an indispensable requisite. . in other words. Not only is this impractical. we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property. These lawful establishments may be regulated. it is unreasonable. so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.[99] The “equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. should not be treated differently. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. onerous and oppressive. it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the “problem. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade. The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens.[98] The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. but not prevented from carrying on their business. To be valid. even without compensation. If the classification is reasonable. both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[103] The classification must. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. even under the guise of exercising police power. B. it cannot. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. Similar subjects. nay. be upheld as valid.”[100] It limits governmental discrimination. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. not be arbitrary.[101] Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation.” it merely relocates it. In this regard.17 sense. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop.

SO ORDERED. lodging houses or other similar establishments. (ICHONG VS. PARAS. HERNANDEZ.18 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. Differences and similarities . 11155) Not a valid exercise of police power: a. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. POWER OF TAXATION 2. IAC. YNOT VS. By definition. This is oppressive and unreasonable since the owner of the animals is denied due process of law and the Director of Animal Industry or Chairman of the National Meat Commission is given so much discretion as the law is not complete in itself nor is there a standard to guide the official. 148 SCRA 659. 122 SCRA 759. hotels. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 3. there are no substantial distinctions between motels. hotels. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. lodging houses or other similar establishments. 101 Phil. inns. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. (6%) b. all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated. ERICTA. both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.[104] In the Court’s view. DE LA CRUZ VS. 123 SCRA 569 B. pension houses. the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman if the National Meat Commission “may dispose of the carabaos or carabeef” confiscated for violating the executive order prohibiting the inter-provincial transport of said animals without prior permit issued by the government “to charitable agencies as he may deem fit”. c. to promote the economic security of the people. f. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC VS.

safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime. 149 SCRA 305) and initial determinations on just compensation by the executive department and Congress cannot prevail over the court’s findings. an imposition of burden over a private property through easement (by the government) is considered taking. The determination of just compensation. material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended such as the establishment of an easement. property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort. Taking may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner. 3. 3. Dulay. this time. DENR SEC. ET AL. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to condemn or to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation while police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property without compensation. ELISEA GOZU. hence. J. in the exercise of police power. In such case. 1. While the power of eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of property. Finally. it need not always be the case. 2. subject to the full control and supervision of the State. As such. Otherwise. Properties condemned under police power are usually noxious or intended for noxious purpose. enjoyment of a property is restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare. no compensation shall be paid. In the exercise of police power. Tests for a valid exercise of police power . service contracts with foreign corporations is not prohibited under the 1987 Philippine Constitution with foreign corporations or contractors would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises.19 DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS MULTI PURPOSE ASSOCIATION VS. there should be compensable taking if it would result to public use. 485 SCRA 586 Chico-Nazario. health and prosperity of the state.. is a judicial function (EPZA vs. Limitations in the exercise of said powers 4. however. there is no compensable taking provided none of the property interests is appropriated for the use or for the benefit of the public. payment of just compensation is required. however. hence . Likewise.

HERNANDEZ. 2. no carabaos regardless of age. in the case of carabaos. sex physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. the means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive to individuals. . ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS. POMAR. Ynot transported six carabaos by using a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo. 1987 Cruz.R. 24 Phil. July 31. YNOT VS. ILOILO ICE & COLD STORAGE VS. AGUSTIN VS. US VS. 32 Phil. not mere particular class. 626-A which prohibits the inter-provincial transporting of carabaos and carabeefs which does not comply with the provisions of Executive No.626. THE ITERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. That Section 1 of the said law provides that "henceforth. 1155 d. In short. 471 i. Read: a. 74457. CA.20 a. confiscated by the Police Station Commander of Baratoc Nuevo. ICHONG VS. 580 e. 447 f. The six carabaos. 5. 1984. MAYOR OF MANILA. 1983 h. were. the end does not justify the means. require the exercise of police power. J. EDU. TORIBIO. 46 Phil. JMM Promotions vs. 88 SCRA 195 j. 260 SCRA 319 b. 15 Phil. VELASCO VS. c. 13. and to deserving farmers through the dispersal of the Director of Animal Industry. (LAWFUL MEANS). 148 SCRA 659 RESTITUTO YNOT VS. Facts: 1. (LAWFUL SUBJECT) b. No. VILLEGAS. 101 Phil. On January. however.March 20. IAC. RAFFERTY. PEOPLE VS. Iloilo for alleged violation of Executive Order No. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of the said law shall be subjected to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed to charitable institution and similar institutions as the Chairman of the National meat inspection Commission may see fit in the case of the carabeef. G. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL. the interests of the public. February 13. 1967. 85 g. CHURCHILL VS.

626-A constitutional? Sub-issues under this are: a. of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has the power to "review. 4. Issues: 1. the Judge upheld the validity of the act of the Police Station Commander in confiscating the carabaos. Was there an undue delegation of legislative power? Held: 1. May a lower court (like the MTC.21 3. Was it a valid police power measure? b. VIII. subject only to review by the supreme court. 5. the subject must be lawful. RTC. While the lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional question. Hence this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court where YNOT claimed that the penalty of confiscation is INVALID the same was imposed without according the owner the right to be heard before a competent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed by due process. it must meet two tests: a.[2(a)]. 2. final judgements and orders of the lower courts in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. the court ordered the confiscation of the bond. In order that a measure or law may be justified under the police power of the state. Ynot filed a suit for recovery and the carabao were returned to him upon the issuance of a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond in the amount of P12. Art. This is so because under Section 5.00. Ynot was ordered to returned the carabaos but since he could not do so. The court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the said Executive Order on the ground of lack of authority to do so and also because of its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed to the IAC but the said court upheld the decision of the Trial Court. Is Executive Order No. After trial of the case.000. reverse. revise. of the Court of Appeals) declare a law unconstitutional? 2. THEY ARE NOT PREVENTED FROM RESOLVING THE SAME WHENEVER WARRANTED. This simply means that lower courts may declare whether or not a law is constitutional. modify or affirm on appeal" or certiorari as the rules of court may provide. and .

Since the Executive Order in question is a penal law. The law is unconstitutional because it struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard.22 b. with no less difficulty in one province than in the other. The Executive Order is. thus denying him the centuries-old guarantee of elementary fair play. invalid and unconstitutional and not a valid police power measure because the METHOD EMPLOYED TO CONSERVE CARABAOS IS NOT REASONABLY NECESSARY TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AND.it has lawful subject. Also. AND ONLY AFTER TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED. it is conceded that the Executive Order meets the first test---. and even graft and corruption. there is no reasonable guidelines or bases of the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman of the NATIONAL Meat Inspection Commission in the disposition of the carabaos or carabeef other than what "they may see fit" which is very dangerous and could result to opportunities for partiality and abuse. physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. But does the law meets the second requisite or test which is lawful method? Executive Order No. then violation thereof should be pronounce not by the police BUT BY A COURT OF JUSTICE. the means employed is lawful. Obviously." The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question measure is missing. retaining a carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. sex. Since the prohibition of the slaughtering of carabaos except where they are at least 7 years old when male and at least 11 years old when female is in furtherance of the public interest since said carabaos are very useful to the work at the farm. providing that "no carabao regardless of age. WORSE IS UNDULY OPPRESSIVE. any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughtering of carabaos BUT ON THIER MOVEMENT. DUE PROCESS IS . We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter considering that they can be killed any where. therefore. WHICH ALONE WOULD HAVE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE THE PRESCRIBED PENALTY.

DPL--Diplomatic.m. 39 imposing "the penalties of fine. Bautista is questioning the constitutionality of the LOI and the Implementing Circular on the grounds that: . TC---Tourist Cars 2. 119 SCRA 597 l. the then Commissioner of Land Transportation. ROMEO EDU issued Circular No. BOT. CC---Consular Corps. 2. 127 SCRA 329 Fernando. Saturday morning to 5:00 a. 4. 1979. President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. JUINIO.m. BAUTISTA VS. T----Truck. On May 31. and 5. confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified found violating such letter of Instructions". Facts: 1. exempted: 1. THE CONFERMENT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES (like the police) OF THE POWER TO ADJUDGE THE GUILT OF THE SUPPOSED OFFENDER IS A CLEAR ENCROACHMENT OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS AND MILITATES AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATIION OF POWERS. 1979. ALFREDO JUINIO. or 1:00 a.m. On June 11. S----service. ET AL. C. 127 SCRA 329 MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS. 869 prohibiting the use of private motor vehicles with H (Heavy Vehicles) and EH (Extra Heavy Vehicles) on week-ends and holidays from 12:00 a. 3. there is undue delegation of legislative power to the officers mentioned therein (Director of Animal Industry and Head of the National Meat Commission) because they were given unlimited discretion in the distribution of the property confiscated.23 VIOLATED BECAUSE THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY CONFISCATED IS DENIED THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD IN HIS DEFENSE AND IS IMMEDIATELY CONDEMNED AND PUNISHED. of the holiday to 5:00 a. Also. Monday morning. Motor vehicles of the following classifications are however.J.m. k. 3. of the day after the holiday. TAXICAB OPERATORS VS.

Not a valid exercise of police power . m. Therefore. If all the owner of H and EH vehicles are treated in the same fashion. September 21. c. The banning of H and EH vehicles is unfair. In the interplay of Bautista's right to due process and the exercise of police power by the State. This is so because there is a valid classification in this case. Heavy and Extra-Heavy vehicles consume more gasoline that the other kinds of vehicles and it is but proper to regulate the use of those which consumes more gasoline. CASTANEDA. The penalty of "impounding" the vehicle as embodied in Circular No. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM. VILLANUEVA VS. public safety and general welfare. The petitioners' claim that their right to equal protection was violated is without basis. outings on week-ends and holidays.24 a. and b. or whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is held equally binding on the rest. HELD: 1. there is no violation of the equal protection clause. 39 has no statutory basis. public morals. The police power is intended to promote public health. the latter must be given leeway. it is not valid being an "ultra vires". 175 SCRA 343 n. and arbitrary and thus contravenes the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. while those not included in the prohibition are enjoying unrestricted freedom. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. 3. Definitely. 180 SCRA 533 o. The Circular violates the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power because the LOI does not impose the penalty of confiscation. discriminatory. SAN DIEGO. 2. 1987 5-a. reunions. more specifically of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings. It was therefore a valid police power measure to ensures the country's economy as a result of spiralling fuel prices. DECS VS. The LOI denies the owners of H and EH vehicles of due process. It must be pointed out that the LOI was promulgated to solve the oil crisis which was besetting the country at that time.

3. IMELDA MARCOS VS. Procedural due process---one which hears before it condemns as pointed out by Daniel Webster. ERICTA. a. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. SANDIGANBAYAN. 122 SCRA 759 CHAPTER II—DUE PROCESS Section 1---NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE. PAMARAN (the 1st case) b. No. Kinds of Due Process: a. 2.25 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. October 6. 921 Requisites: 1. b. . Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing. GALMAN VS. In short. it is to determine whether it has a valid governmental objective like for the interest of the public as against mere particular class. substantive due process---requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to life. 1998 IMELDA R. G.R. NOR SHALL ANY PERSON BE DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. PALANCA. liberty or property. a. J. SANDIGANBAYAN. which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial (Per Daniel Webster in the DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE) 1. BANCO ESPANOL VS. 126995. Requisites of “judicial due process”. October 6. 4. LIBERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 1998 Purisima. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. Due process is a law which hears before it condemns. 37 Phil. MARCOS VS. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.

760. 1998. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of law. was violated: a.1984. she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019. On the same date. the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734.000. and b. the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. On June 27. On September 24. 3 [g] of RA 3019. Justice Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario. On June 8. 1984. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez. a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. however. 7. On September 21. 2. After petitioner’s husband was deposed as President of the Philippines. Thereafter. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario. 1993.00 per month for 25 years. 9. 3. the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS. Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his Manifestation. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation. On June 29. as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102. 1993. The said meeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that . Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. After trial .26 Facts: 1. 6. 5. 4. the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them. IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS. both substantive and procedural. 8.

Jr. COMELEC. Said number of questions could no longer be described as “clarificatory questions”. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by the petitioner (P102. 144 SCRA 194 . e.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of P102. Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. 262 SCRA 452 JAVIER VS. CUERVO. January 29. This is one reason why the case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. CA. Held: The petitioner is hereby acquitted.) c. DBP VS. f.760. misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F.27 sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations. Romero. 1999 MATUGUINA VS. d. There is therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court. (NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734. Davide.. CA. and Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice Vitug was the only Justice who voted for the return of the case to the Sandiganbayan “to allow the corrections of the perceived ‘irregularities’ in the proceedings below. As such. witness for the petitioner. the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt. Justices Regalado. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor who crossexamined the witness which was 73. 263 SCRA 490 PEOPLE VS.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement is indeed very low.000. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading. CJ Narvasa. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES. CA.760. 1.. 2.

COMELEC G." "Section 3. the Second Division of the COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23.R.day period of appeal. 5. 1986 FACTS: 1. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns.C. 6. 2 and 3. On certiorari with the S. The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent Arturo Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa election in May 1984. On June 7. 1984 the Second Division itself proclaimed Pacificador the elected assemblyman of Antique. 2. secs.68379-812. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. having been made before the lapse of the 5 . the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petition filed by Javier with the COMELEC. the proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers was set aside as premature. All election cases may be heard and decided by . September 22. On July 23. 1984. returns and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. On May 18. 3. which the petitioner seasonably made. 1984 proclaiming Pacificador the winner in the election ? APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSITUTION: The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution are Art. 4. which provide: "Section 2.28 JAVIER VS. 1984.L. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. XIIC. ISSUE: Was the Second Division of the COMELEC. No. Javier went to the COMELEC to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival.

29 divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa. The issue at that stage was still administrative and could be resolved by a division. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to law. HELD: a. The S. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared. all other cases can be . should be . as in this case.C. though gone. and even if Javier had already died in the meantime. There is a difference between "contests" and "cases" and also a difference between "pre-proclamation controversies" and "election protests". it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. decided to resolve the case even if the Batasang Pambansa had already been abolished by the Aquino government.C. The pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at the time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on elections. Unless otherwise provided by law. which shall be heard and decided en banc. Thus it said: "The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. Justice demands that we act. held on the main issue that in making the COMELEC the sole judge of all contests involving the election. then.in fact. all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision. but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and . The S. consonant with Sec. The two are not always the same. 3.filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions." b. not only for the vindication of the outraged right. Respondents: Only "contests" need to be heard and decided en banc. This was because of its desire for this case to serve as a guidance for the future." CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES: Petitioner: The proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc.

CLAVE. j. the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matter related thereto. MAYOR ALONTE VS. 175 of the 1978 Election Code. CAYETANO. i. 133 SCRA 271 PADERANGA VS. To bolster that requirement we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 287 SCRA 245 . whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. 78 SCRA 485 (respondent was not a party to the ejectment case) so to enforce the decision on her violates her right to due process of law k.30 elective provincial and city officials. g. CA. JUDGE SAVELLANO. The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning. 94 SCRA 707 LORENZANA VS. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING VS. The case should have been decided en banc. 119 SCRA 353 m.SINGSON VS. One of the members of the Second Division. As employed in the 1973 Constitution. AZUL VS. AQUILIZAN. The Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. Commissioner Jaime Opinion was a law partner of Pacificador. it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. ANZALDO VS. ANZALDO VS. The decision rendered by the Second Division alone was therefore set aside as violative of the Constitution. AZURA. made before or after the proclamation of the winner. 119 SCRA 353 o. on the contrary. NLRC. c. d. The 1973 Constitution could not have therefore been intended to have divided contests between pre and post proclamation when that Constitution was written in 1973. including those arising before the proclamation of the winners. CASTRO. 273 SCRA 258 n. e. He denied the motion to disqualify him from hearing the case. There was also a denial of due process. the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office. 136 SCRA 266 DAVID VS. CLAVE. 94 SCRA 261 l. Pre-proclamation controversies became known and designated as such only because of Sec. h.

the court or tribunal trying the case is clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it. the prosecution submitted an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE signed by the private complainant JUVIE-LYN PUNONGBAYAN where she prayed for the withdrawal of the case because she is no longer interested in pursuing the same with no intention of re-filing the said case in the future. as a result of a petition for a transfer of venue filed by the prosecution and granted by the SC. However. received a notice from the respondent judge notifying him of the promulgation of the decision in this case despite the fact that the prosecution and the defense have not presented their evidence in court. JUDGE SAVELLANO. that jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused. The same was not resolved despite several motions filed by the petitioner to resolve the same.31 MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE VS. Laguna was charged of rape before Branch 25. . his case was transferred to RTC Branch 53. Pending resolution of the said motion to withdraw. counsel for the petitioner. After the petitioner’s arraignment. PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN. the respondent judge issued a Decision convicting the petitioner of rape and sentenced to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Held: In order that an accused in a criminal proceedings is deemed to have been given the right to due process of law. Mayor Alonte of Binan. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to due process of law. Manila. 2. 1997. ATTY. On December 18. RTC of Laguna. presided over by the respondent judge. 1997. the following requisites must be complied with before a decision is rendered: 1. 287 SCRA 245 Vitug. the petitioner filed a motion for bail. J. On December 17.

197 SCRA 378) The act of the respondent judge in rendering a decision without even giving the petitioner the right to adduce evidence in his behalf is a gross violation of his right to due process of law. b. the decision must be based on the evidence presented during the hearing. 1986 If an accused was represented by a non-lawyer during the trial (though he thought that he was a lawyer). Procedural due process before administrative bodies a. that the accused is given the opportunity to be heard. HON. The Decision rendered is NULL AND VOID for want of due process. the board or body shall in all controversial questions. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36. the evidence must be substantial. CA. Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against students Academic freedom. DBP VS. d. NLRC. e. his right to due process was violated and therefore entitled to a new trial. render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved. AMERICAN TOBACCO VS. that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing (PEOPLE VS. . January 29. p.32 3. 635 Requisites: a. COURT OF APPEALS. due process in disciplinary actions involving students DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. f. 67 SCRA 287 c. DIRECTOR. 1999 2. TIBAY VS. DAPITAN.WILFREDO D. THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS. CIR. 3. g. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. CA. 263 SCRA 531 d. the right to a hearing which includes the right to present evidence. November 10. Regional Trial Court of Manila. DELGADO VS. the tribunal or body must act on its own independent consideration of the law or facts. REYES. b. 69 Phil. the decision must have something to support itself. and 4. c.

are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. and Michael Perez. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG.” Similar complaints were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar. (BS-BS-APM/9235086). J. 127980. The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. No. Jr. Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes.. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity. RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES. March 30. Jr. Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes.” while the alleged assailants. JR. Alvin Aguilar (ABBSM/9152105). private respondents Alvin Aguilar.R. 1995.” a rival fraternity. James Paul Bungubung. Robert R. namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual. Benilde v. 9495-325121.T. Private respondents filed their respective answers. The victims. The next day. Papio (ABMGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A.: THE FACTS: PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar. Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows: Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge . petitioner Yap lodged a complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault. Ericson Cano. Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325). Thus. G. R. Jr..33 ALVIN AGUILAR. Jr. cases entitled “De La Salle University and College of St. James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403). December 19. 2007 REYES. Bungubung and Valdes. James Paul Bungubung. Valdes. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer.

m. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403). the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105). ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. was not In administrative cases. The dispositive part of the resolution reads: WHEREFORE. (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges . 4. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses. private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19. 1995 at 9:00 a. the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion pursuant to CHED Order No. No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. considering all the foregoing. such as investigations of students found violating school discipline. and Ericson Y. the Board acquits him of the charge. Cano. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion. 1995. “[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf.34 against you for violation of CHED Order No. In the case of respondent MALVIN A. During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap. Dennis C. Pascual. On May 3. 1995. REVERENTE (ABMGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. at the Bro. PAPIO (ABMGT/9251227). I SSUE Were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown hearing nor were they allowed to crossexamine the witnesses against them? H E L D: Private respondents’ right to due process of law violated.

They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course. 9495-3-25121. in fact. (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf. . This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. A formal trial-type hearing is not. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded. at all times and in all instances. private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. or as applied to administrative proceedings. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. National University] where this Court held that “x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. submitted their respective answers. Moreover. Lastly.35 against them and with the assistance if counsel. (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them. an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings.” Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so. it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process. Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. there is no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. if desired. essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales.

It has already been held in Berina vs. b. x x x an essential part thereof. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing. all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its rules. Under the Education Act of 1982. The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that: . EXCEPT in case of academic deficiency. the fact is that it had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises. 117 SCRA 581. In fact the maintenance of good school discipline is a duty specifically enjoined on every private school.R. Of course. students have the right "to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation.” GUZMAN VS.36 The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary. that disturbed or disrupted classes therein". It is apparent that despite the accusations of alleged violations hurled by the school against the petitioners. L-68288. that it is illegal of a school to impose sanctions on students without conducting due investigation. HELD: a. 1986 FACTS: Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred from enrolment. No. in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that "no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in *** (the) Manuel and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted." The petitioner were denied of this right. Philippine Maritime Institute. or violation of disciplinary regulations. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY G. July 11. and were being disciplined without due process. c. conducted without prior permit from school authorities. and cross examination is not. The school claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they have been involved in activities that have disrupted classes and had conducted mass actions without the required permits.

need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in court of justice. a. 1982 Due process in the dismissal of employees Requisites of Due Process before the NLRC 1. cross-examination is not an essential part thereof. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students : a. BERINA VS. 2. PMI. and 2. b." d. But the S. said that the following minimum standards must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process: 1. with the assistance of counsel. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified. 3. 5.37 "* * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians. Hearing . September 30. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them. the proceedings may be summary. 4. c. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. they shall be informed of the evidence against them.C. Notice.

CORDENILLO VS. and that he certified that he did not use any government vehicle. NLRC.38 a. 261 SCRA 409 RAYCOR AIR CONTROL VS. NLRC. . which provides that a respondent in an administrative case should be assisted by counsel in order that the proceedings therein is considered valid.. whose office is located in San Fernando City. 263 SCRA 174 SAMILLANO VS. 166809. ROMEO ERECE VS. Respondent filed his answer denying the allegations against him. No. NLRC. d. April 22. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. MGG Marine Services vs. LYN MACALINGAY.R. e. NLRC. 259 SCRA 664 Philippine Savings Bank vs. does due process require that [1] a party be assisted by counsel and [2] be able to cross-examine the witnesses? LUMIQUED VS. b. In administrative proceedings. NLRC. NLRC. c. whether the Civil Service Act or the Administrative Code of 1987. CASUELA VS. ET AL. 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office vehicle assigned to petitioner. G. Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an Affidavit-Complaint dated October 2. that. 264 SCRA 261 4. Administrative Due Process before the Civil Service Commission ATTY. 264 SCRA 307 GARCIA VS. Effect of a Motion for Reconsideration to violation of the right to due process a. in order to collect transportation allowance. 2008 THE FACTS: Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Region I. 276 SCRA 635 b. f. when in fact he did. EXENEA. petitioner herein was given the opportunity several times to engage the services of a lawyer to assist him but he confidently informed the investigators that he could protect himself. 261 SCRA 589 WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES VS. Not only. g. 282 SCRA 125 There is no law. NLRC. 265 SCRA 788 STOLT-NIELSEN VS. 276 SCRA 652 5. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. La Union. that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance even if he was using the said vehicle.

39

After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC Proper in CSC
Resolution No. 99-1360 dated July 1, 1999 charged petitioner with
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle in
spite of his receipt of the monthly transportation allowance and for
certifying that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact,
he did, in order to receive the transportation allowance.
Pertinent portions of the formal charge read:
1.
That despite the regular receipt of Erece of his monthly
Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the amount
of P4,000.00, he still prioritizes himself in the use of the office
vehicle (Tamaraw FX) in spite of the directive from the Central
Office that he cannot use the service vehicle for official purposes
and at the same time receive his transportation allowance;
2.
That Erece did not comply with the directive of the
Central Office addressed to all Regional Human Rights Directors, as
follows: ‘to regularize your receipt of the transportation allowance
component of the RATA to which you are entitled monthly, you are
hereby directed to immediately transfer to any of your staff,
preferably one of your lawyers, the memorandum receipt of the
vehicle(s) now still in your name;’
3.
That he certified in his monthly liquidation of his RATA
that he did not use any government vehicle for the corresponding
month, which is not true because he is the regular user of the
government vehicle issued to CHR-Region I.
The foregoing facts and circumstances indicate
government service has been prejudiced by the acts of Erece.

that

WHEREFORE, Romeo L. Erece is hereby formally charged
with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. Accordingly, he is given
five (5) days from receipt hereof to submit his Answer under oath
and affidavits of his witnesses, if any, to the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). On his
Answer, he should indicate whether he elects a formal investigation
or waives his right thereto. Any Motion to Dismiss, request for
clarification or Bills of Particulars shall not be entertained by the
Commission. Any of these pleadings interposed by the respondent
shall be considered as an Answer and shall be evaluated as such.
Likewise, he is advised of his right to the assistance of counsel of
his choice.32[4]

32[4]

Id. at 35-36.

40

After a formal investigation of the case, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 020124, dated January 24. 2002, finding petitioner
guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and penalizing him with dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution
with the CA.
In the Decision promulgated on January 7, 2005, the CA
upheld the CSC Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED and the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.
Hence, this petition.
I S S U E:
Petitioner raised the issue of violation of his right to due
process because he was denied the right to cross-examine the
respondents on their affidavit-complaint.
H E L D:
Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was
not afforded the right to cross-examine his accusers and their
witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in
the disposition of the case, he was allowed to present evidence first
to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he rested
his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to
submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence, which
motion was granted by the CSC over his (petitioner’s) objection.
Respondents then submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer
of Exhibits.
Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present
evidence first, it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to
cross-examine the complainants. Although the order of presentation
of evidence was not in conformity with the procedure, still petitioner
should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine his
accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he
expressly waived said right.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied
due process when he failed to cross-examine the complainants and
their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and

41

present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.
Velez v. De Vera it was held that :
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with
“judicial process” for a trial in court is not always essential to due
process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they
rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no
particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical.
Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to
a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing
before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is
not essential that hearings be had before the making of a
determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before
which all objections and defenses to the making of such
determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing
is all that due process requires. . . .
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of
due process. Nor is an actual hearing always essential. . . .
The dismissal of the petitioner from the government is valid.
DATUPAX
MANGUDADATU
VS.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),
G.R. No. 179813, December 18, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu (petitioner) and Angelo O.
Montilla (private respondent) were congressional candidates for the
First District of Sultan Kudarat during the May 14, 2007 national
elections. Petitioner won by 17,451 votes and was proclaimed on
May 22, 2007 by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly
elected Representative of the said congressional district. On May 31,
2007, respondent filed with the HRET a Petition of Protest (Ad
Cautelam)33[4] contesting the results of the elections and the
proclamation of petitioner.
On June 14, 2007, the Secretary of the HRET caused the
service of summons34[5] upon petitioner through registered mail at
33

[4]

34

[5]

Id., pp. 41-76.
Id., p. 77.

42
35[6]

Purok Losaria,
Tamnag (Poblacion), Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat,
requiring petitioner to file an Answer to the protest within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof.
On July 11, 2007, the HRET received the Registry Return
Receipt Card,36[7] showing that a certain Aileen R. Baldenas37[8]
(Baldenas) received the summons on June 27, 2007.
On August 16, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07179
which noted the aforementioned Registry Return Receipt
Card and that despite the fact that 43 days from June 27, 2007 had
passed since Baldenas received the summons, petitioner had not
filed an answer in accordance with Rule 27 39[10] of the 2004 HRET
Rules. In the same Resolution, the HRET considered petitioner to
have entered a general denial of the allegations of the protest.
38[9]

In an Order dated August 17, 2007, the HRET set the
preliminary conference on September 27, 2007 at 11:00 a.m.
Meanwhile, petitioner informally learned of respondent’s
protest, prompting petitioner to request his lawyers to verify the
same from the records of the HRET. Thereafter, his lawyers entered
their appearance on September 4, 2007 and requested that they be
furnished with copies of the petition of protest as well as notices,
orders and resolutions pertaining to the protest.
On September 10, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion to
Reconsider40[11] Resolution No. 07-179 and Motion to Admit Answer
with Counter-Protest, alleging that he never received the summons
issued by the HRET. In his affidavit 41[12] attached to the motion,
petitioner denied that Baldenas was a member of his household or
his employee. He further claimed that she was not authorized to
receive any important documents addressed to him. And assuming
that he had authorized her, the summons received by her was never
brought to his attention.

35

36
37

38
39

40
41

[6]

The assailed Resolutions state “Loria” but the Summons and Registry Return Receipt Card correctly state
“Losaria.”
[7]
Rollo, p. 78.
[8]
The assailed Resolutions state “Baldena”; it should be “Baldenas” based on the Registry Return Receipt
Card.
[9]
See Note 2.
[10]
RULE 27. Failure to Answer; Effect. – If no answer is filed to the protest, counter-protest, or the petition for
quo warranto within the period fixed in these Rules, a general denial shall be deemed to have been entered.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 26-37.
[12]
Id., p. 30.

43

On September 19, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07300
denying for lack of merit.
42[13]

Hence, this petition.
Petitioner filed the instant petition imputing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET
for issuing Resolution Nos. 07-179 and 07-300. He also prayed for
a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
for this Court to enjoin the HRET from further proceeding with
HRET Case No.07-021. Petitioner contended that the HRET never
acquired jurisdiction over his person because of the absence of a
valid service of summons. He argued that a substitute service of
summons is made only “when the defendant cannot be served
personally at a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have
failed.”43[14] In his case, since the process server’s return failed to
show on its face the impossibility of personal service, then the
substituted service was improper and invalid.
In his comment, respondent countered that the HRET did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 07-179
dated August 16, 2007 and 07-300 dated September 19, 2007. He
argued that Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules merely states that “the
Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons to
the protestee or respondent, as the case may be.” He posited then
that the intent of the HRET in not expressly specifying personal
service of summons on the protestee or respondent was to give it a
reasonable discretion or leeway in serving the summons by other
means such as registered mail. Thus, service of summons on
petitioner through registered mail did not violate Rule 22 of the
2004 HRET Rules. Further, respondent claimed that Rule 14,
Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court were inconsistent with Rule
22 of the 2004 HRET Rules and therefore should not be given
suppletory application to HRET proceedings.
HELD:
Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules provides:
RULE 22. Summons. – If the petition is not summarily dismissed in
accordance with Rule 21 of these Rules, the Secretary of the
Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons to the protestee or
42
43[14]

[13]

See Note 3.
Rollo, p.12.

44

respondent, as the case may be, together with a copy of the petition,
requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file his
answer.
The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the
summons should be served on the protestee. Significantly, Rule
8044[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules provides that the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure applies by analogy or suppletorily in so far as the
latter may be applicable and not inconsistent therewith as well as
with the orders, resolutions and decisions of the HRET. In view of
the failure of the HRET Rules to specify the authorized modes of
service of summons, resort then is necessary to Sections 6 and 7,
Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which state:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served handling a copy thereof to the defendant
in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it
to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made
through registered mail, which is not among the allowed modes of
service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, if in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private
and proprietary interests) personal service of summons is preferred
and service by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and
due process grounds, with more reason should election cases (which
involve public interest and the will of the electorate) strictly follow
the hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of
Court.
44

[15]

RULE 80. Applicability. – The following shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and
effect in so far as they may be applicable and are not inconsistent with these Rules and with the orders,
resolutions and decisions of the Tribunal, namely:
(1) The Rules of Court;
(2) Decisions of the Supreme Court;
(3) Decisions of the Electoral Tribunals.

45

The Court sees no reason why the HRET cannot make use of
its own process servers to personally serve the summons, or
alternatively, delegate the matter to the process server of a court with
territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the
respondent/protestee in the election case, at the expense of the
petitioner/protestant. Considering that the proper service of
summons on the respondent/protestee is a jurisdictional
requirement and goes to heart of due process, we cannot allow
service of summons by a method not sanctioned by the HRET Rules
in relation to the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion in considering petitioner to have entered a
general denial of the allegations in respondent’s petition of protest
and in denying his motion to reconsider as well as his motion to
admit answer with counter-protest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. HRET is directed to admit the Answer with CounterProtest of petitioner Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. GODOFREDO
CUANAN, G.R. No. 169013, December 16, 2008
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 11, 1996, Luzviminda Borja and Juliana Castro, on
behalf of their respective minor daughters, Lily Borja and Charo Castro,
filed before the Department of Education, Culture and Sports - Regional
Office No. III (DECS-RO No. III), Cabanatuan City, two separate
administrative complaints45[3] for Sexual Harassment and Conduct
Unbecoming a Public Officer against Cuanan, then Principal of Lawang
Kupang Elementary School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Acting on the complaints, DECS-RO No. III Regional Director
Vilma L. Labrador constituted an Investigating Committee, composed of
three DepEd officials from the province, to conduct a formal
investigation. Following the investigation, the Investigating Committee
submitted its Investigation Report46[4] dated December 14, 1999, finding
Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment and recommending his forced
resignation without prejudice to benefits. In a Decision47[5] dated January
28, 2000, Regional Director Labrador concurred in the findings of the

45
46
47

On January 20. Regional Director Ricardo T. DepEd Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. In an Order48[6] dated April 13.56[14] In a Letter57[15] dated February 10. 2003. then DepEd Secretary Andrew Gonzales affirmed the Decision of Regional Director Labrador. 2000. 2003. Cuanan elevated his case to the CSC.46 Investigating Committee and meted out the penalty of forced resignation to Cuanan without prejudice to benefits. Gascon sent a letter to the CSC requesting a copy of CSC Resolution No. 2003. including the DepEd.59[17] On April 11. On January 23. Schools Division Superintendent Dioscorides D.55[13] In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 4. 2003. 030069. 030069 dated January 20. 2003. In a Letter58[16] dated March 25. Lusung (Superintendent) recommended that Cuanan be reinstated to duty as School Principal of San Antonio District upon finality of the decision of the CSC. Sibug informed the Superintendent that Cuanan could not be immediately reinstated to the service until an order of implementation was received from the Department Secretary. 2000. the District Supervisor recommended appropriate action. copies of the resolution were duly sent to the parties. then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. On May 30. but the same was denied for lack of merit by Secretary Gonzales in a Resolution50[8] dated June 19.53[11] In a Letter dated February 3. de Jesus filed a 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 . 2003.51[9] which set aside the June 19. 2003. 2003.54[12] In a 1st Indorsement. the CSC informed the DepEd that a copy of the requested resolution was duly sent to it on January 23. 2003. Sometime in March 2003. the CSC issued Resolution No. the CSC sent another copy of the resolution to the DepEd for its reference. Nonetheless. 2003. 2000 Resolution of Secretary Gonzales and exonerated Cuanan from the charge of sexual harassment. 2000.52[10] Cuanan received a copy of Resolution No. 2003. Cuanan filed a Petition for Reconsideration 49[7] thereof. 030069 on January 31. Cuanan requested his reinstatement as Elementary School Principal I. The DepEd received said reference copy on March 28.

The DepEd sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper remedy. 2003. that the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time.63[21] Based thereon. 2004. 041147 dated October 12.62[20] In Division Special Order No. Cuanan was directed to return to duty. On May 16. Subsequently. The CA held that while a motion for 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 .64[22] However.47 Petition for Review/Reconsideration pleading was served upon Cuanan. 2003. It found Cuanan guilty of Sexual Harassment. or on November 22. 2004. 001 series of 2003 dated June 18. Cuanan filed a petition for certiorari67[25] with the CA seeking to annul Resolution No. 041147. cancellation of his service eligibility. Again. 2003. 285. which the Division School Superintendent of Nueva Ecija duly endorsed on November 7. Secretary De Jesus filed a Supplemental Petition for Review/Reconsideration61[19] reiterating the prayer for reversal of the resolution. the mode of review from a decision of the CSC being a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. on October 22. Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits. 2003.66[24] Thirteen days later. 2004. 2003. Cuanan received a copy of the Resolution on November 9. Cuanan requested payment of salaries and his inclusion in the payroll. 2004. 04114765[23] setting aside CSC Resolution No. alleging that the CSC should not have entertained the petition for review/reconsideration since the DepEd was not the complainant or the party adversely affected by the resolution. No copy of the On July 29. no copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan. the CSC issued Resolution No. 2003. 030069 dated January 20. and that Cuanan was not furnished copies of the pleadings filed by the DepEd in violation of procedural due process. the CA rendered a Decision 68[26] granting the petition for certiorari and setting aside CSC Resolution No. 2005. Cuanan was reinstated to his former position as school principal effective April 30. series of 2003 dated July 8. pursuant to Division Special Order No. 60[18] with the CSC. and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

69[27] but the CA denied the same in its Resolution70[28] dated July 18. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ADJUDGING CSC AS HAVING COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING RESOLUTION NO. THE SAME NOT BEING THE PROPER REMEDY IN ASSAILING CSC RESOLUTION NO. 041147 DATED OCTOBER 22. contends that the DepEd cannot file a motion for reconsideration from the CSC Resolution exonerating him. Cuanan. 2004. 87499. nor was he required by the CSC to file a comment thereon. II WITH DUE RESPECT. that even if Cuanan was not served a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd. 041147 DATED OCTOBER 22. even if not the complainant. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION IN CA-G. SP NO. since he was not duly notified of the petition for review/reconsideration. given a copy of the said petition. that the CSC gravely abused its discretion in granting the petition for review/reconsideration filed by the DepEd without regard for Cuanan's fundamental right to due process. Hence. that the DepEd. since it is not the complainant in the administrative case and therefore not a party adversely affected by the decision therein.48 reconsideration and a petition for review under Rule 43 were available remedies. on the other hand. 2004.71 [29] DepEd contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for certiorari because CSC decisions are appealable to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43. the petition for 69 70 71 . Cuanan's recourse to a petition for certiorari was warranted. that the filing of a motion for reconsideration was a precondition to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. 2005. much less. that Cuanan failed to prove that the CSC's petition for review/reconsideration was not seasonably filed. the CSC was not bound by procedural rules. since the act complained of was patently illegal. the present petition on the following grounds: I WITH DUE RESPECT. may question the resolution of the CSC. that even if DepEd may seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution. that the DepEd failed to establish that the resolution was not yet final and executory when it filed its petition for review/reconsideration.R. DepEd filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 4375[33] of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution.49 review/reconsideration was filed out of time. (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires. exception (c) applies to the present case.76[34] As will be shown forthwith. (Emphasis supplied) Hence. The Court finds it necessary. Furthermore. Jr. to first resolve the question of whether the DepEd can seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan. thus: Section 2. 030069 may be subject to a motion for reconsideration by the DepEd which. CSC Resolution No. Nonetheless. or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is warranted where the order is a 72 73 74 75 76 . Dacoycoy. In a long line of cases. as to the merits of DepEd's arguments. and that Cuanan’s right to due process was violated when he was not given a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd or given the opportunity to comment thereon. who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case. beginning with Civil Service Commission v. (c) when the writs issued are null and void. while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari.. to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates. before delving on the grounds relied upon by the DepEd in support of the petition. there are exceptions to this rule. 02160074[32] allows the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision exonerating an erring employee. – x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee. Cuanan's exoneration under CSC Resolution No. is a real party in interest. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. as the appointing and disciplining authority. Now.73 [31] the Court has maintained that the disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected by the judgment. Coverage and Definition of Terms. Garcia. the Court finds none.72[30] and reiterated in Philippine National Bank v.

where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process. 041147.78[36] Such move would be in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice. Gallardo.is on the part of the DepEd. final orders or resolutions. it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. non-receipt of the duly sent copy of CSC Resolution No. or thirteen (13) days from receipt on November 9. 030069 were duly sent to the parties. more than two months later. In Gallardo-Corro v. It is elementary that once judgment has become final and executory. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief. 030069 dated January 20. Under the Rules of Evidence. which in the present case clearly failed to discharge the same. as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction.84[42] this Court held: Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. 2003. it becomes immutable and can no longer be amended or modified.that is. 2003. the burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct -. 030069 -. Consequently. on January 23. or about two months later. 2003 had already become final and executory when the DepEd filed its Petition for Review/Reconsideration on April 11. and 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 . 2003. 2004. the petition having been filed on November 22. At any rate.50 patent nullity. clearly within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review. Cuanan's petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a petition for review. It may no longer be modified in any respect. 030069 has long become final and executory.82[40] This presumption includes that of regularity of service of judgments.81[39] while the DepEd requested a copy sometime in March 2003. It must be noted that the records show that copies of CSC Resolution No.80[38] Cuanan received a copy thereof on January 31. 2004 of CSC Resolution No. including DepEd. CSC Resolution No.77[35] These exceptions find application to Cuanan's petition for certiorari in the CA. where the proceeding was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object. the presumption stands that CSC Resolution No.83[41] Thus. unless contradicted.79[37] Furthermore.

the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law. shall be copy furnished the other party with proof of service filed with the Commission. Considering that pleadings filed by the DepEd were not served upon Cuanan. . otherwise.A. since no copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd were served upon him or his counsel.51 regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.86[44] The relative freedom of the CSC from the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade what was clearly emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. and that. Furthermore. Filing of Supplemental Pleadings.(Emphasis supplied) Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. nor was he even required by the CSC to file his comments thereon.88[46] of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides: Section 43. The said motion should be submitted within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the original pleading and it is discretionary upon the Commission to allow the same or not or even to consider the averments therein.A. Section 43. they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. He had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings for the petition for review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd. Any supplemental pleading to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading but which should not entirely substitute the latter can be filed only upon a favorable action by the Commission on the motion of a party to the case. while it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period. there would be no end to litigations. Court of Industrial Relations:87[45] that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. at the risk of occasional errors. they may be 85 86 87 88 . The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice.85[43] Moreover.All pleadings filed by the parties with the Commission.

The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. vs. Vera. HIMAGAN VS. 65 Phil. 1989 4. b. 278 SCRA 843 4. The scope of the equal protection clause. SP No. Cayat. October 7. 301 SCRA 278 (There is real and substantial distinction between business inside the Subic Special Economic Zone and outside wherein those inside are exempt from other taxes as a result of the policy of the government to accelerate the development of the portion of Subic left by the Americans) 3.R. 87499 are AFFIRMED. 12 a.THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE Sec. 2. PEOPLE. July 14. Requisites for a valid classificationRead: 1.52 treated as mere scraps of paper which should not have merited the attention or consideration of the CSC. 56 2. It must not be limited to existing conditions only. People vs. c. Read again. and It must apply equally to all members of the same class. CA. 1994 The fact that policemen charged with a criminal offense punishable by more than 6 years are to be suspended during the . 1. 1…nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. TIU VS. 68 Phil. Equal protection of the law. There must be real and substantial distinctions. d. of Agrarian reform. Equal protection in generalRead: 1. IMELDA MARCOS VS. 95 SCRA 420 2. the petition is DENIED. CHAPTER III . 13 SCRA 266 3. Sec. CA. P. Association of Small Landowners vs. It must be germane tot he purposes of the law. WHEREFORE.

HON. PAGCOR. PETRON. Director of Prisons. RA 8180 seeks to end 26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Loss of revenue is not a valid ground unless it would be withdrawn to all government offices. FRANCISCO VIRAY. FRANCISCO TATAD vs.R. WIGBERTO TANADA. There were four (4) refining companies at that time. No. THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. 37 SCRA 420 2-b. 2-A Gumabon vs. 1993 There is no valid distinction for a law removing the franking privilege of the judiciary while leaving the same to the Executive and Legislative despite the fact that there is considerable volume of mails from the courts. no government agency was regulating the oil industry. January 20. BATAAN REFINING COMPANY and FILOIL MARKETING and six (6) petroleum marketing . November 11. PRADO.53 entire duration of the case unlike other government employees is valid since it rests on valid classification because policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. The facts: 1. G. 1997 EDCEL LAGMAN. 124360. SANDIGANBAYAN. G. May 14. November 5. PUNO. 1997. JOKER ARROYO. BASCO VS. 1991 No violation of the equal protection clause if Congress would legalize cock-fighting and horse racing since police power could regulate gambling. R. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and for Other Purposes”. J. 127867. SHELL. CALTEX. RUBEN TORRES. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. Prior to 1971. 3. PANFILO LACSON VS. HON. New players were free to enter the oil market without any government interference. FILIPINAS SHELL and CALTEX PHILIPPINES. No. November 5. FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION vs. ENRIQUE GARCIA. These petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1999 2-b-1.

The Board was empowered to “fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products and other related merchandise. 1996. By 1985. b. there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market. Corazon Aquino signed Executive Order No. 7. exporting. processing. only three (3) oil companies were left operating in the country. companies: ESSO. it runs counter to the objective of the law “to foster a truly competitive market”. 5 [b] providing for tariff differential violates Section 26 [1] of Art. 6. shall as far as practicable be made at a time WHEN THE PRICES OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE WORLD ARE DECLINING AND WHEN THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE PESO IN RELATION TO THE US DOLLAR. marketing and distributing energy resources “WHEN WARRANTED AND ONLY WHEN PUBLIC NECESSITY REQUIRES”. the country was driven to its knees by the crippling oil crisis and in order to remedy the same. then President Marcos created the Philippine national Oil Corporation (PNOC) t break the control of the foreigners to the oil industry. 172 creating the ENERGY REULATORY BOARD to regulate the business of importing. On November 9. It acquired ownership of ESSO Philippines and Filoil and likewise bought controlling shares of the Bataan Refining Corporation. transporting. FILOIL. In March. 1997. a. FILIPINAS SHELL and PNOC. 1973. 1997. Congress enacted RA 8180 deregulating the Oil Industry not later than March. In 1971. Marcos through section 8 of PD 1956 created the OIL PRICE STABILIZATION FUND (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by the exchange rate adjustments or increase of the world market prices crude oil and imported petroleum products. 9. 1987. Thus. Pres. refining. In May. 372 was issued by President Fidel Ramos implementing full deregulation ON THE GROUND THAT THE OPSF FUND HAS BEEN DEPLETED. Pres. PNOC then operated under the business name PETRON CORPORATION and for the first time. VI of the 1987 Constitution which requires .54 2. The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 8180 on the following grounds: Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. CALTEX. GETTY. shipping. In 1984. On February 8. The law requires that the implementation of the regulation. These are: CALTEX. The imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the oil industry and even bars the entry of other players in the oil industry but instead effectively protects the interest of the oil companies with existing refineries. IS STABLE. 4. 5. The inclusion of Sec. MOBIL and SHELL. the OIL INDUSTRY COMMISSION ACT was enacted REGULATING the oil industry . 3. 8. Executive Order No.

the DOE. c. 392 are unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy. Provided. The provisions of the law being questioned as unconstitutional are Section 5 [b] and Section 15 which provide: “Section 5 [b] Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act. Pursuant to Section 5 [e] of RA 7638. except fuel oil and LPG. 1997. e. the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same. combination in restraint of trade and unfair competition.55 every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in the title thereof. implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March. Implementation of full deregulation. the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. . Whether or not the petitions raise justiciable controversy.” xxx “Section 15. 2004. and b. As far as practicable. Provided. 8180. further. upon approval of the President. that beginning on January 1. that this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress. the rate for which shall be the same.” The issues are: Procedural Issues: a. Section 15 of RA 8180 and EO No. tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of 3% and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven (7%) percent. EO 392 implementing the full deregulation of the oil industry is unconstitutional since it is arbitrary and unreasonable since it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund. Section 15 of RA 8180 is unconstitutional for it allows the formation of a de facto cartel among three existing oil companies in violation of the Constitution prohibiting against monopolies. a condition which is not found in RA No. d. Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to question the validity of the subject law and executive order.

as guardians of the Constitution. INC. When the statute violates the Constitution. d. THE COURT HAS BRUSHED ASIDE TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE AND HAS TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF THESE PETITIONS. VS. Whether or not EO 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable. Whether section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power. c. however. or interest are . . there is no good sense in being hyper-technical on the standing of the petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution. The courts. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle controversies involving rights but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any agency or branch of the government. in the main procedural matters. As held in KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. it was held that: “Objections to taxpayer’s suit for lack of sufficient personality. combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. The question of locus standi must likewise fall . 2. it is not only the right of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. HELD: 1. and e. TAN. AND IN KEEPING WITH THE COURT’S DUTY TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE OTHER BRANCHEDS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE KEPT THEMSELVES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS AND THAT THEY HAVE NOT ABUSE THE DISCRETION GIVEN TO THEM. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the one title—one subject requirement of the Constitution.” There is no disagreement on the part of the parties as to the farreaching importance of the validity of RA 8180. Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. standing. b.56 Substantive Issues: a. Thus. CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CASES TO THE PUBLIC.

so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject. We hold that Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. viz: the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test.” Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. Under the sufficient standard test. The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court in 1916 in the case of COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINA VS. As a policy. no matter how diverse they may be. to the latter. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in EASTERM SHIPPING LINES VS. The contention that there is undue delegation of legislative power when it authorized the President to determine when deregulation starts is without merit. “decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent. the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate. which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain a number of provisions. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS WHERE IT WAS HELD THAT: “The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law . POEA. there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the . no valid objection can be made. and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.57 3. fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. 4. The first cannot be done. and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution. the only thing he will do is enforce it. It is contended that Section 5[b[ of RA 8180 on tariff differentials violates the Constitutional prohibition requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. thus: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power . We do not concur with this contention. the Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title---one subject rule. unclear and inconcrete in meaning and could not therefore provide the “determinate or determinable standards” which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the oil industry. to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Under the first test. The petitioners claim that the phrases “as far as practicable”. We have consistently ruled that the title need not mirror.

a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons. FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY. monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity. manufacture a particular article or control the sale or the whole market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or service.” A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies. trust. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution provides: “The state shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interests so requires. To cede to the executive the power to make laws would invite tyranny and to transgress the separation of powers. 392 failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF Fund. EO No. UNITED STATES. holding company.” The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape because such has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government.58 delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. On the other hand. controlling its production. the Supreme Court through Justice ISAGANI CRUZ held that “even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard. WHO IS NOT ALLOWED TO STEP INTO THE SHOES OF THE LEGISLATURE AND EXERCISE A POWER ESSENTIALLY LEGISLATIVE. The executive is bereft of any right to alter either by addition or subtraction the standards set by RA 8180 for it has no power to make laws.” 5. in HIRABAYASHI VS. BOTH TESTS ARE INTENDED TO PREVENT A TOTAL TRANSFERENCE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE DELEGATE. consisting of the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade. THE COURTS WILL BEND BACKWARD TO LOCATE THE SAME ELSEWHERE IN ORDER TO SPARE THE STATUTE. in the form of contract. . Combination in restraint of trade refers to means while monopoly refers to the end. 6. IF IT CAN. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. In fact. pool. for the purpose of unduly restricting competition. distribution and price or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of the agency. The misapplication of this extra factor cannot be justified.

The three (3) could easily comply with the inventory requirement in view of their numerous storage facilities. a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for all. The validity of the assailed provisions of RA 8180 has to be decided in the light of the letter and spirit of Section 19. They also claim that the prohibition against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants. As the dominant players. . predatory pricing and inventory requirement blocks the entry of other players and give undue advantage to the 3 oil companies resulting to monopolies or unfair competition. IT ERECTS HIGH BARRIERS TO NE PLAYERS. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. The tariff differential of 4% works to their immense advantage.They will be competing on an uneven field. Yet. In the case at bar. SHELL. CALTEX & PETRON boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The net effect would be to effectively prohibit the entrance of new players. especially the underprivileged . THE OTHER EDGE CUTS AND CUTS DEEP IN THE HEART OF THEIR COMPETITORS. While the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed. New players in order to equalize must build their refineries worth billions of pesos. this is only one edge on tariff differential. however. This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our national economy as defined under Section 1. Art. XII of the Constitution. The provision on inventory widens the advantage of PETRON. and to have big inventories. This would effectively prevent new players. The provisions on 4% tariff differential. This is so because it would take billions for new players to construct refineries. XII of the Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities. be regulated in the public interest. it cannot be denied that our oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly (dominated by a handful of players) and a foreign oligopoly at that. SHELL AND CALTEX against prospective new players. Those without refineries had to compete with a higher cost of 4%. It also calls for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair and trades practices. Art. it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can. Prospective competitors again find compliance oft his requirement difficult because of prohibitive cost in constructing new storage facilities. income and wealth.59 Respondents aver that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries.

The raiding team seized several imported medicines. the predatory pricing is a significant barrier which discourage new players to enter the oil market thereby promoting unfair competition. The seized medicines. private respondent in this case.” Coupled with the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement.) capsules and Ampiclox (500mg.) tablets. which were manufactured by SmithKline. G. Branch 57. RTC OF GUAGUA. . Angeles City. 149907. Orbenin (500mg. a duly registered sole proprietorship of petitioner Romeo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) operating a drug store located at San Matias. however. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry. BFAD & GLAXO. Amoxil (250mg. a duly registered corporation which is the local distributor of pharmaceutical products manufactured by its parent London-based corporation. Pampanga vs. J. ROMA DRUG and ROMEO RODRIGUEZ vs. a team composed of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) operatives and inspectors of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) conducted a raid on petitioner Roma Drug. if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. PAMPANGA. Pampanga. According to HOVENKAMP: “The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. Guagua. the authorized Philippine distributor of these products. including Augmentin (375mg.) capsules.R. the Regional trial Court of Guagua. It appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around the same time upon the request of SmithKline Beecham Research Limited (SmithKline).). April 16. monopoly and restraint of trade which are prohibited by the Constitution. The monopoly profits will never materialize. Inc to form Glaxo SmithKline. were imported directly from abroad and not purchased through the local SmithKline.: On 14 August 2000. No. 2009 TINGA. & THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF PAMPANGA.60 Now comes the prohibition on predatory pricing or “selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of the competitors”. The local SmithKline has since merged with Glaxo Wellcome Phil. The raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

the latter in behalf of public respondents RTC.” Through its Resolution dated 15 October 2001. The first is the equal protection clause of the Bill of Rights. Article XIII “are not self-executing provisions. Article II and Section 11. the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.” The term “unregistered” signifies the lack of registration with the Bureau of Patent. Provincial Prosecutor and Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD). There is no claim that they were adulterated in any way or mislabeled at least. arguing that both Section 15. The section prohibits the sale of counterfeit drugs. Rodriguez asserts that the challenged provisions contravene three provisions of the Constitution. the present Petition for Prohibition questing the RTCGuagua Pampanga and the Provincial Prosecutor to desist from further prosecuting Rodriguez. and that Sections 3(b)(3). On the constitutional issue. which states that it is the policy of the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. 4 and 5 of the SLCD be declared unconstitutional.” and Section 15. The two other provisions are Section 11. which mandates that the State make “essential goods. Hence. also known as the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD).61 The NBI subsequently filed a complaint against Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 (in relation to Sections 3 and 5) of Republic Act No. the process of which is governed under Part III of the Intellectual Property Code. the NBI and Glaxo Smithkline from prosecuting the petitioners. Glaxo Smithkline asserts the rule that the SLCD is presumed constitutional. the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the trial against Rodriguez. Article II. Their classification as “counterfeit” is based solely on the fact that they were imported from abroad and not purchased from the Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the drugs. In gist. 8203. with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando. Pampanga. Glaxo Smithkline and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) have opposed the petition. tradename or other identification mark of a drug in the name of a natural or juridical person. Trademark and Technology Transfer of a trademark. includes “an unregistered imported drug product. Article XIII in particular cannot be work “to the oppression and unlawful of the . health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. there is no doubt that the subject seized drugs are identical in content with their Philippine-registered counterparts.” It adds that Section 11. Article XIII. which under Section 3(b)(3). and the BFAD. In this case.

with regard to drugs and medicines. such questions have in fact been mooted with the passage in 2008 of Republic Act No.” Glaxo Smithkline further claims that the SLCD does not in fact conflict with the aforementioned constitutional provisions and in fact are in accord with constitutional precepts in favor of the people’s right to health. Using a patented product which has been put on the market in the Philippines by the owner of the product.62 property rights of the legitimate manufacturers. who take pains in having imported drug products registered before the BFAD. Act No. That. or with his express consent.1. The unqualified right of private third parties such as petitioner to import or possess “unregistered imported drugs” in the Philippines is further confirmed by the “Implementing Rules to Republic Act No. 9502. the limitation on patent rights shall apply after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the Philippines or anywhere else in the world by the patent owner. That the right to import the drugs and medicines contemplated in this section shall be available to any government agency or any private third party. The relevant provisions thereof read: Rule 9. insofar as such use is performed after that product has been . insofar as such use is performed after that product has been so put on the said market: Provided. The constitutional aspect of this petition raises obviously interesting questions. importers or distributors. 9502” promulgated on 4 November 2008. further. The owner of a patent has no right to prevent third parties from performing. Limitations on Patent Rights. 9502 amends Section 72 of the Intellectual Property Code in that the later law unequivocally grants third persons the right to import drugs or medicines whose patent were registered in the Philippines by the owner of the product: “72. II. also known as the “Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008”. without his authorization. or by any party authorized to use the invention: Provided. Section 7 of Rep. the acts referred to in Section 71 of the IP Code as enumerated hereunder: (i) Introduction in the Philippines or Anywhere Else in the World. Using a patented product which has been put on the market in the Philippines by the owner of the product. or with his express consent. However.

the prosecution of petitioner is no longer warranted and the quested writ of prohibition should accordingly be issued. (72. That. further. the limitation on patent rights shall apply after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the Philippines or anywhere else in the world by the patent owner. Had the Court proceeded to directly confront the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the SLCD.1) The drugs and medicines are deemed introduced when they have been sold or offered for sale anywhere else in the world. As written. with regard to drugs and medicines. For the reasons above-stated. or by any party authorized to use the invention: Provided. 9502. However. It does not allow husbands. siblings. That the right to import the drugs and medicines contemplated in this section shall be available to any government agency or any private third party. such as Rep. Act No. so that the latter loses all meaning and function. parents to import the drug in behalf of their loved ones too physically ill to . 9502 did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD. Legis posteriors priores contrarias abrogant. (n) It may be that Rep. it is apparent that it would have at least placed in doubt the validity of the provisions. the law makes a criminal of any person who imports an unregistered drug regardless of the purpose. Irreconcilable inconsistency between two laws embracing the same subject may exist when the later law nullifies the reason or purpose of the earlier act. Act No. It does not accommodate the situation where the drug is out of stock in the Philippines. Where a statute of later date. clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that intention must be given effect. 9502 since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unqualified right to import or otherwise use such drugs. beyond the reach of a patient who urgently depends on it. wives. When a subsequent enactment covering a field of operation coterminus with a prior statute cannot by any reasonable construction be given effect while the prior law remains in operative existence because of irreconcilable conflict between the two acts.63 so put on the said market: Provided. even if the medicine can spell life or death for someone in the Philippines. the latest legislative expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict. children. it is clear that the SLCO’s classification of “unregistered imported drugs” as “counterfeit drugs. III.” and of corresponding criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conflict with Rep. Act No.

Nunez vs. Hawaiian-Phil. Peralta vs. Dumlao vs. It discriminates. and other like-minded groups who necessarily bring their own pharmaceutical drugs when they embark on their missions of mercy. The absurd results from this far-reaching ban extends to implications that deny the basic decencies of humanity. 104 SCRA 38 9.127 SCRA 329 5. soulless legislative piece. COMELEC. vs. 82 SCRA 30 13. Asociacion. Less urgently perhaps. at civil costs. 151 SCRA 306 14. 111 SCRA 433(Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar 10. it deprives Filipinos to choose a less expensive regime for their health care by denying them a plausible and safe means of purchasing medicines at a cheaper cost. 184 SCRA 484 . Co. COMELEC.LACSON VS. 95 SCRA 763 8. with the malevolents who would alter or counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs for reasons of profit at the expense of public safety. the importation of unregistered drugs. Sison vs. Medicin Sans Frontieres. and the traditional treatment of penal provisions of special laws is that of malum prohibitum–or punishable regardless of motive or criminal intent. Villegas vs. September 30. The law would make criminals of doctors from abroad on medical missions of such humanitarian organizations such as the International Red Cross. Citizens Surety vs. the International Red Crescent. Flores vs. Puno. SANDIGANBAYAN. After all. BOT. the SLCD has revealed itself as a heartless. Sandiganbayan. Note that the SLCD is a special law. at the expense of health. Bautista vs. 95 SCRA 392 6. 119 SCRA 216 12. 130 SCRA 654 11. Ormoc City. COMELEC. It equates the importers of such drugs. 2-d. they are disabled from invoking the bare “personal use” exemption afforded by the SLCD. 22 SCRA 603 15. 1999 3.64 travel and avail of the meager personal use exemption allotted by the law. Ceniza vs. Even worse is the fact that the law is not content with simply banning. UNIDO vs. many of whom motivated to do so out of altruism or basic human love. For a law that is intended to help save lives. COMELEC. January 20. but still within the range of constitutionally protected behavior. Ancheta. 86 SCRA 270 7. Juinio. vs.l982 4. against poor Filipinos without means to travel abroad to purchase less expensive medicines in favor of their wealthier brethren able to do so. Ormoc Sugar Co. Taxicab Operators vs. Hiu. COMELEC.

WITHOUT INCURRING ANY CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES. 9372. who. any police or law enforcement personnel. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Approved on March 6. present him or her before any judge at the latter’s residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. among other things. That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 pf this Act.65 CHAPTER IV . 18.THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION Section 2. notwithstanding. NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/AntiTerrorism Law. The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall. Republic Act No.The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. and taken into custody by the said police. DELIVER SAID CHARGED OR SUSPECTED PERSON TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE (3) DAYS counted from the moment said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested. Period of detention without judicial warrant of arrest. 2007 and effective on July 15. houses. to ascertain the identity of the . papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. having been duly authorized in writing by the AntiTerrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall. before detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism. or law enforcement personnel: Provided. detained. It shall be the duty of the judge. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) Sec. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The right of the people to be secure in their persons.

The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph. the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of arrest.66 police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her. regional trial court.. moral or psychological torture by whom and why. the arresting police of law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. Sundays or holidays. holidays or after office hours. Sundays. or judge of the municipal. . Period of Detention in the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned. the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested. to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the subject has been subjected to any physical..In the vent of an actual or imminent terrorist attack. If the arrest is made during Saturdays. That where the arrest is made during Saturdays. provided. The judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission. however. or after office hours. city. shall be released immediately. Section 19. suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the written approval of a municipal. That within three days after the detention the suspects whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established. the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest. Provided.

sequestered and frozen bank deposits…shall be deemed property held in trust by the bank or financial institution and that their use or disposition while the case is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases are pending. the seizure…shall be lifted by the investigating body or the competent court and restored to him without delay. sequestered. Section 40. and frozen in order to prevent their use. businesses. -shall be seized. and property of whatever kind and nature belonging:  To any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. moneys. The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are reasonably needed by his family including the services of his counsel and his family’s medical needs upon approval of the court. placements.67 Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong —can be:  Detained under house arrest. If the person suspected as terrorist is acquitted after arraignment or his case dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court.  to a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. computers.. Section 41. association or group of persons.The deposits and their outstanding balances. Seizure and Sequestration.  to a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. and records in any bank or financial institution. and/or  Prohibited from using any cellular phones. transfer or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State. He or she may also use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate reason. Section 39. transportation and communication equipment.  Restricted from traveling. assets. or other means of communications with people outside their residence. The seized. trust accounts. supplies and other implements. The filing of an appeal or motion for .

Requisites of a valid search warrant Read: a. As such. OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS THEY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT. any evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding. what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind. If convicted. WHAT IS MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE WARRANT ITSELF. it was not just a case of “obvious typographical error”. said seized. Essentials of a valid search warrant. c. sequestered and frozen assets shall automatically forfeited in favor of the government. This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched---although not that specified in the search warrant---is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.68 reconsideration shall not stay the release of said funds from seizure. sequestration and freezing. CA. the police officers had in their mind the first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search. however. Validity of a search warrant and the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation thereof. NOT WHAT THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS. As such. CJ In applying for a search warrant. The place to be searched as indicated in the warrant is controlling PEOPLE VS.145 SCRA 739 b. The same was not. 291 SCRA 400 Narvasa. but a clear case of a search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. .

IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A MOTION TO QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE FILED ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURT---SUCH A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IS PENDING. she was pointed to by the informer. The above exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. 288 SCRA 626 On December 13.5 kilos of marijuana. When the accused got off. PEOPLE VS. search incidental to a lawful arrest. 5. After trial. 2. Abello of the Olongapo PNP was tipped off by an informer that Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. ARUTA. P/Lt. The bag allegedly contained 8. Note the two (2) conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court. She was arrested without a warrant. 1988. Issue: Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken from the accused is admissible in evidence. 3. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be . she was convicted and imposed a penalty of life imprisonment. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informer’s tip.69 NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action base don the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court. customs searches. should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon the conditionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. the policemen waited for a Victory Bus from Baguio City near the PNB Olongapo. She was carrying a traveling bag at that time. She was not acting suspiciously. Held: Warrantless search is allowed in the following instances: 1. 4. searches of moving vehicle. d. and stop and frisk measures. near Rizal Ave. consented searches. however. 6. seizure of evidence in plain view. As a result of the tip.

d. 1994. both such search and arrest would be unlawful. ENCINADA. The informer likewise informed them that he could recognize said person. Dasmarinas. with an undetermined amount of marijuana. the appellant was arrested by the above-named police officers while alighting from a passenger jeepney near a waiting shed in Salitran. it must be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. there was no legal basis for the police to effect a warrantless search of the accused’s bag. it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. the accused was not acting suspiciously. Cavite. The arresting officers do not have personal knowledge that the accused was committing a crime at that time. Dasmarinas. In order that the information received by the police officers may be sufficient to be the basis of probable cause. b. The marijuana obtained as a result of a warrantless search is inadmissible as evidence for the following reasons: a. the accused in this case was searched while innocently crossing a street Consequently. The arrest was made only after the accused was pointed to by the informant at a time when she was not doing anything suspicious. and PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN. Since there was no valid warrantless arrest. from Baguio City. At about 4 in the morning of June 20. the accused’s identity was previously ascertained so applying for a warrant should have been easy.70 satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. PEOPLE VS. 284 SCRA 703 On June 19. at about 2 p. SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin of the Dasmarinas. there being no probable cause and the accused’s not having been legally arrested. c. MONTILLA.m. it logically follows that the subsequent search is similarly illegal. the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search warrant but they failed to do so. Cavite PNP were informed by an INFORMER that a drug courier would be arriving in Barangay Salitran.. . for being contrary to law. This case is similar tot he case of PEOPLE VS. 1994. and an arrest effected based on the evidence produced by the search. This is so because if a search is first undertaken.

On bare information. upon being pointed to by the informer as the drug courier. customs searches. searches of moving vehicle. An arresting officer has the right to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons.71 Cavite. 3. Hence the arrest. 1994 and therefore. the police could not have secured a warrant from a judge. they could have applied for a search warrant. 2. The arrest was without warrant. . The said contention is without merit considering that the information given by the informer is too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. the records do not show that he knew his name. 4. and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. consented searches. 6. the subsequent search on his person is justified. it was found out that it contains marijuana. the policemen requested the accused to open and show them the contents of his bag and the cartoon he was carrying and he voluntarily opened the same and upon cursory inspection. search incidental to a lawful arrest. upon being pointed to by the informer. Furthermore. and stop and frisk measures. 5. In the case at bar. warrantless search is allowed in the following instances: 1. seizure of evidence in plain view. Since the accused was arrested for transporting marijuana. Issue: Was the warrantless arrest valid? Held: The accused claims that the warrantless search and seizure is illegal because the alleged information was received by the police on June 19. The policemen recovered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. While there is indication that the informer knows the courier. The trial court convicted the appellant for transporting marijuana based on the testimonies of the Above-named police officers without presenting the alleged informer.

AMINNUDIN. MATILLANO. (PEOPLE VS. Mission Order does not authorize an illegal search. (NOTE: The SC held that the non-presentation of the informer does not affect the case for the prosecution because he is not even the best witness. BURGOS. ENCINADA. The said contention was considered without merit by the Supreme Court considering the fact that he consented to the search as well as the fact that the informer was a reliable one who had supplied similar information to the police in the past which proved positive. Thereafter. The search yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. 144 SCRA 1. the SC reversed the decision of conviction and held that Encinada did not manifest any suspicious behavior that would necessarily and reasonably invite the attention of the police. 2004 Right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1997. MENGOTE. May 27. October 2. In short. 163 SCRA 402. the residence of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into the house. there was no probable cause for this policemen to think that he was committing a crime. The case is similar to the case of People vs. PEOPLE VS. ET AL. Encimada where the appellant was searched without a warrant while disembarking from a ship on the strength of a tip from an informer received by the police the previous afternoon that the appellant would be transporting prohibited drugs. PEOPLE VS. ELI LUI. 220 SCRA). He is merely a corroborative witness to the arresting officers. PEOPLE VS. VS. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and seizure. On Appeal.00 owned by the employer. In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45.000. they confiscated different personal properties therein which were allegedly part of those stolen . ) JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: To say that “reliable tips” from informers constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND PLACES IN GREAT JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN MANY DECISIONS MADE BY THIS COURT.72 The accused insists that it is normal for a person traveling with a bag and cartoon which should not elicit the slightest suspicion that he was committing a crime.

c. the waiver must be made voluntarily. that the person involved had knowledge. The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs.1967 Concepcion. Stonehill vs. balance sheets and profit and loss statements" . to wit: "Books of accounts. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. journals. The petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42 search warrants issued on different dates against them and the corporations in which they are officers. ledgers. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. either constructive or actual.73 from the employer. They were in possession of a mission order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search. Are the things admissible in evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless search and seizure? Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. financial records. knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is to be valid. typewriters and other documents or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts.J. correspondence. C. vouchers. Diokno. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs. warehouses and to seize and take possession of the following personal property. that the right exists. Finally. There must be proof of the following: a. CA.June 19. directing the peace officer to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices. of the existence of said right. General or roving warrants Read: 1. b. receipts. e.

TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS. The search warrants did not particularly describe the documents. d. CONSEQUENTLY. the same may not be used in evidence against them because the warrants issued were in the nature of a general warrant for failure to comply with the constitutional requirement that: . The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the deportation cases against them. The petitioners claim that the search warrants are void being violative of the Constitutional provision on search and seizure on the ground that: a. cash money not mentioned in the warrant were actually seized. TO WHOM THE SEIZED EFFECTS BELONG. the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner. THE PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY OBJECT TO THE USE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM OF THE DOCUMENTS.74 since they are the subject of the offense of violating the CENTRAL BANK LAWS. b. As to the documents seized in the residences of the petitioners. b. they could not question the same in their personal capacities because the corporations have a personality separate and distinct with its officers. e. As to the searches made on their offices. Issue: Were the searches and seizures made in the offices and residences of the petitioners valid? a. AND MAY NOT BE INVOKED BY THE CORPORATE OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY. the things seized were not delivered to the court to be disposed of in a manner provided for by law. c. books and things to be seized. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND THE REVISED PENAL CODE. PAPERS AND THINGS SEIZED FROM THE OFFICES AND PREMISES OF THE CORPORATIONS. An objection to an unlawful search and seizure IS PURELY PERSONAL AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY THIRD PARTIES.

CA. Herrera. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause. They were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a violation of Central bank Laws. 76 SCRA 301 4. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE WARRANTS TO HAVE FOUND THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 254 SCRA 307 b. FELIX (G. AS A CONSEQUENCE. 2. to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision. 48 Phil. and 2. Define probable cause.SR. VIOLATING A GIVEN PROVISION OF OUR CRIMINAL LAWS. 1995. 99054-57) EN BANC . Collector vs. AND MAYOR SUSANA LIM VS. Internal revenue Code and Revised Penal Code. PEOPLE VS. April 30. DE LOS SANTOS VS. “A SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT is a search warrant issued for more than one specific offense like one for estafa. N. theft and qualified theft”) f. CA. NO SPECIFIC OFFENSE HAD BEEN ALLEGED IN SAID APPLICATIONS. THE AVERMENTS THEREOF WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WERE ABSTRACT. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Who determines probable cause? a. Ruiz. robbery. IN OTHER WORDS. TAMBASEN VS. MONTESA. Asian Surety vs.HON. Secretary vs. July 14. Veloso. ROBERTS VS. 1985 9. 247 SCRA 85 VICENTE LIM. NO. Dizon vs. Castro vs. tax evasion and insurance fraud is a general warrant and therefore not valid) 6. PEOPLE.R. Marcos. Verdiago. OR COMMITTED SPECIFIC OMISSIONS. 54 SCRA 312 (A search warrant for estafa. 169 10. April 12. 37 SCRA 823 3.75 1.l976 5. 216 SCRA 101. People vs. Pabalan.1976 7. 73 SCRA 553 8. Castro. Villaluz. falsification. Tariff and Customs Laws. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Viduya vs. June 18. Bache vs. FOR THE SAME PRESUPPOSES THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETENT PROOF THAT THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM IT IS SOUGHT HAS PERFORMED PARTICULAR ACTS.

1989. Petitioners then moved that another hearing ba conducted to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents showing recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. informations were complete in form in substance . JR. 1989. It ordered that the case may be transferred from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati. a motion for change of venue.000. J. ISSUE: ---------Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists? Held: ----1. and there was no defect on its face. Facts: -------Petitioners are suspects of the slaying of Congressman Moises Espinosa. 1989. They likewise filed a motion to order the transmittal of initial records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge of Barsaga of Masbate. a warrant of arrest was issued on July 31. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion. with three others. Sr. Bail was fixed at P200. Hence it found it just and proper to rely on the prosecutors certification in each information. They were initially charged. Thereafter. and three of his security escorts and the wounding of another. four separate informations to that effect were filed with the RTC of Masbate with no bail recommended.76 GUTIERREZ. Fiscal Alfane. with the crime of multiple murder with frustrated murder. On September 22. designated to review the case. After conducting a preliminary investigation. . issued a Resolution affirming the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but ruled that a case of Murder for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the survivor be filled instead against the suspects. These motions were however denied by the court because the prosecution had declared the existence of probable cause. On November 21. filed by the petitioners was granted by the SC.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. Only the judge alone makes this detemination. he shall: (1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and. the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. the Court noted that the addition of the word personally after the word determined and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to other respondent officers as to may be authorized by law does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The case of People vs. Under this provision. Villanueva. he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witness to aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. Abbas. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor's present to him. 2. In the case of Soliven vs. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. the sc ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis thereof. If on the face of information. This decision interpreted the "search and seizure" provision of the 1973 Constitution. on the basis thereof. the judge finds no probable cause. issue a warrant of arrest. 3. the prosecutor's certification . However. (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. Ocampo and Amarga vs. the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of order of arrest. Inting reiterates the following doctrines: (1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. decided under the 1987 Constitution. Honorable Enrique B. Following established doctrine and procedures.77 In the case of Placer vs. This has been the rule since U. issue a warrant of arrest. It merely assist him to make the determination of probable cause.S vs. Makasiar. (2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge. By itself.

the court ruled that judges of RTC no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations: This authority was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. While the former seeks to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. March 16. Considering that all the records of the investigation are in Masbate. Villaluz. the affidavits. 5. Although the judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can perform the same functions as commissioner for taking of evidence) there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. 98 Phil. The determination was made by the provincial prosecutor. CA. the respondent judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor. 164 SCRA 655 1-b. NBI. 1. In the present case. 20th Century Fox vs. 4.78 of probable cause is ineffectual. MAKASIAR. Amarga vs. 167 SCRA 393 The word “personally” after the word determined does not necessarily mean that the judge should examine the complainant and . 4. Quintero vs. The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrant of arrest against the petitioners. 162 SCRA 467 1-c. He could not have possibly known what has transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. the transcripts of stenographic notes. effective on January 1. GR No. Abbas. The constitutional requirement had not been satisfied. (3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the preliminary investigation proper. The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. he has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. All of these should be before the judge. and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge to make his determination. 1989 SOLIVEN VS. In the case of Castillo vs. the latter ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. CA. It is the report. 739 1-a. 1985. 83578. There was no basis for the respondent judge to make his personal determination regarding the existence of probable cause from the issuance of warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution.

vs. 85289. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by NBI Director Alfredo Lim on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the respondent judge. 1989 2-a. On February 27. 1990. Regional trial Court. As such. Branch 103. Villanueva. Villanueva. 136 SCRA 435 JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. Cruz vs. Ramos. right to bail. Inting.. 92163.NO. WITHOUT BAIL. the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio. 155 SCRA 486 7. Manila. vs. Ramos. July 9. P. P. and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10. 1990 Due process. Placer vs.. GR No. 1990 1-f. Villaluz. Umil vs.. J. 1991 1-h. P. Gatan. Nov. Olaes vs. February 20.R. 126 SCRA 463 (Only a judge has the power to determine probable insofar as the issuance of a warrant of arrest is concerned) 3. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR. NONE HAVING BEEN RECOMMENDED IN . June 5.July 27. Sy Chi Siong. 1990. The warrant was issued on an information signed and filed earlier in the day by Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE charging Senator Enrile. Drilon. there is no need to examine the complainant and his witnesses face to face.. 90-10941. 16. July 25. HON. 1991 2. CA. 1990 with the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in November. Department of Health vs. 110 SCRA 465 2-b. 74 SCRA 226 5. G. It is sufficient if the judge is convinced of the existence of probable cause upon reading the affidavits or deposition of the complainant and his witnesses. et al. April 19. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI Headquarters on Taft Ave.. 1-e. Geronimo vs.79 his witnesses personally before issuing the search warrant or warrant of arrest but the exclusive responsibility on the part of said judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. ET AL. 1990 1-g. JAIME SALAZAR. Pendon vs. Quezon City in Criminal Case No.1987 4. Tolentino vs. Inc. probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest (Note: This might be useful also in your Criminal Law) Narvasa. Paderanga vs.

Hold Hernandez Doctrine applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance. petitioner through counsel filed a petition for Habeas Corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being. ITS SUBSTANTIVE AND LEGAL BASES HAVE WITHSTOOD ALL SUBSEQUENT CHALLENGES AND NO NEW ONES ARE PRESENTED HERE PERSUASIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A COMPLETE REVERSAL. c. In view of the majority. THE RULING REMAINS GOOD LAW. 1. HELD: The parties' oral and written arguments presented the following options: 1. BUT NOT TO ACTS COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A REBELLION WHICH ALSO CONSTITUTE COMMON CRIMES OF GRAVE OR LESS GRAVE CHARACTER. hence. On the first option. 11 justices voted AGAINST abandoning Hernandez. arrested or detained on the strength of warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 1990. On February 28. b. of rebellion. whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof. Abandon the Hernandez Doctrine and adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice Montemayor that "rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes". charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted. held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books. he was denied due process. Two members felt that the doctrine should be reexamined. denied the right to bail. 3. or having been: a. 2. This is so because of the fact that the incumbent President (exercising legislative powers . Maintain Hernandez Doctrine as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course. or as necessary means for the commission. and d.80 THE INFORMATION AND NONE FIXED IN THE WARRANT OF ARREST.

Read in the context of Hernandez. the Court ruled that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense despite the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. WHILE TECHNICALLY CORRECT SO FAR AS THE COURT RULED THAT REBELLION MAY NOT BE COMPLEXED WITH OTHER OFFENSES COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION THEREOF. that indictment is to be read as charging SIMPLE REBELLION. the President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated the Hernandez as a binding doctrine with the effect of law. In thus acting. MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED AS A MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC. 942 which added a new provision of the Revised Penal Code. the Supreme Court was unanimous in voting to reject the same though four justices believe that the arguments in support thereof is not entirely devoid of merit.81 under the 1986 Freedom Constitution) repealed PD No. 142-A which sought to nullify if not repealed the Hernandez Doctrine. On the issues raised by the petitioner: a. the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: SIMPLE REBELLION. . With the rejection of the first two options. 3. absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing. particularly Art. the Hernandez Doctrine remains a binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY IRREGULAR OR CONTRARY TO LAW IN FILING AGAINST A RESPONDENT AN INDUCTMENT FOR AN OFFENSE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS CHARGED IN THE INITIATORY COMPLAINT. On the second option. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows that a complaint for simple rebellion against petitioner was filed by the NBI Director and that based on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors culminating in the filing of the questioned information. The petitioner's contention that he was charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books. IF WARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE DEVELOPED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. either as a means necessary to its commission or as unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. By a vote of 11-3. 2. b.

Also. GIVES NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT. of the Constitution. III. In the light of the Court's affirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case. NOT WITHOUT . NOR DOES THAT SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED. The correct course was for the petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail. Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The Supreme Court held that the criminal case before the respondent judge is the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. SO COMPLIED. ONLY AFTER THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD THE REVIEW JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT BE INVOKED. This Court has already ruled that it is not unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination. and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion which is bailable before conviction. OR COULD NOT HAVE.82 c. AND EVEN THEN. d. it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT AND THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTOR. THAT MUST NOW BE ACCEPTED AS A CORRECT PROPOSITION. the petitioner claims that the respondent judge issued the warrant for his arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses. Section 2. Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his constitutional right to bail. NOTES: This might be useful also in your Remedial Law. in violation of Art. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because it was issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled to the respondent judge which could hardly gave him sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. MEREBY BECAUSE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD WHAT SOME MIGHT CONSIDER ONLY A RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH THAT DUTY .

4. Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the principal evidence.. After their arrest. When the surveilance team arrived therein. On August 8. they were unable to escape. After trial. IF Even assuming that the petitioner's premise that the information charges a non-existent crime would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. they saw the accused "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen". Issue: ------ . g. J. an information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against him. MENGOTE. G. 2.R. 3. in Tondo. Is "Operation Kapkap" valid? Read: PEOPLE VS. a . Facts| -----1. Under either hypothesis. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid or not. No. Manila. 210 SCRA 174 Warrantless search and seizure Cruz. 1992. Hence this automatic appeal. the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspiciouslooking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Blvd. June. 1987.83 FIRST APPLYING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO AVAILABLE THERE.38 cal. 87059. They approched these persons and identified themselves as policement that is why they tried to ran away because of the other lawmen. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated from the accused and several days later. the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent judge.

Par. which itself controls the seizing officials. without warrant. the person to be arrested has committed. (a) or Par.84 Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure? Held: ----There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. when lawful. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense. Section 3 [2]. is actually committing. of the Constitution. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. (b) of this Section. Arrest without warrant. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par." Section 5. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. or is attempting to commit an offense. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. Article 113 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Justice Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution. x x x We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we we can agree with the prosecution. Par. knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed.A peace officer or private person may. (2) in the presence of the arresting officer. . in his presence. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. arrest a person: (a) When. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III. 5.. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

These are certainly not sinister acts. the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen. He was not even acting suspiciously. The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that accused-appellant had committed it". There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed. AMMINUIDIN. it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. 163 SCRA 402 where the Court held that a warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. And the setting of the arrest made them less so. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers. xxx The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. all of them innoent. At the time of the arrest in question. as the prosecution suggests. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in thie presence. What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in aplace not exactly forsaken. if at all." according to the arresting officers themselves. In short. why hiseyes were darting from side to sideand he was holding his abdomen.85 These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. He had not committed nor was actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. On the other hand. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. This is similar to PEOPLE vs. The question is.He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. . to all appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. This was effected while he was coming down the vessel. It might have been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an unholy hour and in a place where he had no reason to be. there could have been a number of reasons. or was at least being attempted in their presence. or was actually being committed. like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning.

144 SCRA 1. Burgos. or just committed. dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller. however. it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113. This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs. 151 SCRA 279. or is about to commit an offense must have personalknowledge of that fact. CHIEF OF POLICE. this Court declared: Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. Par. Theprosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowldge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. the officer arresting a person who has just committed. 80 Phil. Section 5(b). Parenthetically. as the prosecution incorrectly suggested. of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed. is committing. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. and about a crime that had yet to bem committed. what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a falsification. (SAYO vs. xxx In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b).86 there was no probable cause that. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. 859). it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his . indeed. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People vs. thus: If the arrest was made under Rule 113.. Section 5. Castro. Burgos. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It would be a sad day. xxx In the landmark case of People vs. being committed.

When illegal arrest is deemed waived. his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified. personal malice on the part ofthe arresting officer may be justified in the name of security. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or. Indeed. the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant when the latter was taken into custody. even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache. This simply cannot be done in a free society. 355 SCRA 246 Mendoza. no personal knowledge of the arresting officer PEOPLE VS. the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. escaping the clutches of the law. because. the accused-appellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. This should be a lesson to other peace officers.87 abdomen. by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment. xxx The court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. worse. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST . resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the evidence they had invalidly seized. they allowed their over zealousness to get the better of them. GALVEZ. As it happened. J. ironically enough. However. Considering that the accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a crime. Warrantless arrest. The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted. it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it. or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act is actually committing or attempting it.

THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. J. the respondents filed a case for Malicious Prosecution against the petitioner for violation of Art. (Valid since the constitutional provision is not applicable to him. In the morning of January 11. and prostitution. ROGELIO SOLUTA. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person. the Regional Trial Court held that petitioners are liable for damages as a result of an illegal search. Once inside the union office they started to make searches which resulted in the confiscation of a plastic bag of marijuana.88 BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA. 482 SCRA 660 Carpio-Morales. security officers of the plaintiff entered the union office despite objections thereto by forcibly opening the same. INC. Issue: . ET AL. They arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL. g-1. PEOPLE VS. OTHERWISE. After trial. when it is not valid) Read: 1. An information for violation of the dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the RTC of Manila which acquitted them on the ground that the search conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and without consent by the respondents. After their acquittal. THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. VS. 1988. 301 SCRA 66 Warrantless searches and seizures by private individuals 2.. MENDOZA. while the respondent union officer was opening the Union Office. dollar smuggling. 32 of the Civil Code. The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the Silahis International Hotel Union were using the Union Office located inside the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana.

he felt and saw a dried leaves inside the box. In other words. The ruling in People vs. NO. Switzerland. Reyes opened the box and . Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to Zurich. before delivering it to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts. Andre Marti is not applicable here because in Marti. is admissible. a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was supposed to contain gloves. FACTS: Andre Marti and his common-law wife. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. allegedly in violation of one’s constitutional rights may be invoked against the State. Held: The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art.R. ANDRE MARTI G. January 18. Upon opening. owner of the place (no relation to Shirley). The fact that the union office is part of the hotel owned by the petitioners does not justify the warrantless search. a criminal case. In the presence of the NBI agents. J. However later.89 Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners (private individual and corporation) on the union office of the private respondents is valid. following standard operating procedure. Upon further perusal. Job Reyes. the issue was whether an act of a private individual. co-owner and husband of Anita opened the boxes for final inspection. If indeed there was surveillance made. 32 of the Civil Code. Job Reyes then brought samples to the NBI. Marti refused. then they should have applied for a search warrant. 81561. the issue in Marti is whether the evidence obtained by a private person acting in his private capacity without the participation of the State. 1991 Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person Bidin. 3. The alleged reports that the said union office is being used by the union officers for illegal activities does not justify their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of the union officers and without a search warrant. he told them that the boxes to be shipped were still in his office. Anita Reyes. received said goods and asked if she could examine and inspect it.

Did the search conducted by a private person. . If a search was initiated by a private person the provision does not apply since it only proscribes government action.2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim from the United States constitution.90 discovered that the odor came from the fact that the dried leaves were actually those of the marijuana flowering tops. ISSUES: -----------1. Thereafter an information was filed against the appellant for violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that perpetrated the search.21(b) of said RA. in US cases. The Special Criminal Court of Manila convicted accused Marti of violating sec. the SC may consider US Fed. the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts comitted by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion. Hence. constitutional protection on search and seizure is imposable only against the state and not to private persons. No.marked as containing books and tabacalera cigars. violate accused's right against unreasonable searches seizures and invocable against the state? 2. Since Art. He opened the packages and took the samples to NBI. the constitutional provision against unreasomable searches and seizure was intended as a restraint upon the activities of the sovereign authority and NOT intended against private persons. This view is supported by the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. This did not convert it to a search as contemplated by the constitution. Two other boxes. All the NBI agents did was to observe and look in plain sight. III. Was the evidence procured from the search admissible? Held: -------1. In short. SC cases as likewise doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the dried leaves. also revealed bricks or case-like marijuana leaves and dried marijuana leaves respectively.

if accused was arrested while inside a jeepney. state (429 s. Figueroa. there is no valid search incidental to a valid arrest if she will be brought to her residence and thereafter search the said place) f. no search warrant is necessary and in the absence of any license for said firearm. ESPANO VS. the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was . 251 SCRA 660 PEOPLE VS. Chadwick v. As such. Rule 126. us (373 F 2d 517 [1967]). Barnes v. e. 139 SCRA 541 (A search incidental to a valid arrest must be done at the place where the accused is arrested. In fact. PANO. Search made incidental to a valid arrest a.III [2]. since the search was valid.S. No warrant is necessary in such a situation. likewise applies only to the government and its agencies and not to private persons.w 2d 121 [1969]). 248 SCRA 679 NOLASCO VS. 354 SCRA 338 Where the gun tucked in a person’s waist is plainly visible to the police. GO. CA. the search of his house nearby is not a valid search incidental to a valid arrest) PEOPLE VS.91 2. ANG CHUN KIT. it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules. state v. Bryan (457 p 2d 661 [1968]. (U. Walker v. the evidence from therein is admissible evidence. c. 256 SCRA 539 PEOPLE VS. 439 PEOPLE VS. on the admissibility of evidence in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 1. McDowell (256 us 465 [1921]. Art. he may be arrested at once as he is in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. As a consequence of the accused’s valid warrantless arrest inside the nightclub. without a search warrant in accordance with Section 12. 12 Phil. b. This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. cases cited: Burdeau v. state (329 sw 2d 135). 288 SCRA 588 (If the accused was arrested in the street during a buy-bust operation. Ago Chi. LUA. Moreno vs. d. Yes. he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

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committed [after he requested that he will bring his car to the Police
Station after his warrantless arrest) , of a drug paraphernalia and
shabu, CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE DURING AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH. As such, the items do not fall under the
exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms, drug paraphernalia
and the shabu, can be used as evidence against the accused.
2. Search of moving vehicles
a. Carrol vs. US, 267 US 132
b. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, et al.
(G. R. No. 88017) January 21, 1991
c. MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430
d. PEOPLE VS. CFI, 101 SCRA 86
e. PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT198 SCRA 401
f. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 193 SCRA 122
FACTS:
----------In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS
received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group
engaged in importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband
items. To infiltrate the crime syndicate, they recruited confidential
men and "deep penetration agents" under OPLAN SHARON 887.
One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As an
agent, he submitted regular reports of undercover activities of
suspected syndicates. CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of oplan sharon
887, in turned informed the Dan
gerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by
another agent named George. Lim wanted a male travelling
companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered his services and
was hired by Lim. Later, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of
accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing), the later turning out to be Tia's
intended companion.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October
4, 1987. Tia telephoned Capt. Palmera that they would return to the
Philippines on October 6. From Hongkong, the two proceeded to
Guangzhou in mainland China. There, appeallant Lo Ho Wing
bought six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they were
opened for examination. That evening, they went to Lo Ho Wing's
room and he saw two other men with him. One was fixing the tea
bags, while the other was burning a substance on a piece of

93

aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the
second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance.
When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would bring to
Manila, the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese drugs.
The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected
the bags containing the tin cans of tea. Since the bags were not
closely examined, appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In
Manila, They were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing
and Tia boarded a taxi from the airport and loaded their luggage in
the taxi's compartment. Lim Cheng Huat followed them in another
taxi.
Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned
themselves in strategic areas around the airport. The CIS men who
first saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the
CIS car overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia , forcing
the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The CIS team asked the taxi
driver to open the baggage compartment. The CIS team asked
permission to search their luggage.
A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt.
Cayabyab of the CIS pried the lid open and pressed it in the middle
to pull out the contents. Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed
alum came out. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous
drug, he had the three travelling bags opened for inspection. All the
bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia and appellant were taken
to the CIS headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the second taxi
carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to escape. However, they
were later captured.
Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The
three suspects were indicted for violating Art. III, sec.15 of the
Dangerous Drug Act. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat
were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. The
trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of government
agents since the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties were in their favor.
ISSUES:
---------1. Was the warrantless search valid?
2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?
HELD:
-----

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1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of
the well-known exceptions to the valid warrantless search and
seizure. To stilol get a search warrant from a judge would allow the
accused go scot-free.
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained
is admissible as evidence in any proceeding.
3. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (Valid)
a.
b.
c.
d.

Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857
Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16
HIZON VS. CA, 265 SCRA 517
PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265 SCRA 721

4. Seize of evidence in plain view
a.
b.
c.
d.

Harris vs. US, 390 US 234
PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547
PEOPLE VS. VELOSO, 252 SCRA 135
PEOPLE VS. LESANGIN, 252 SCRA 213

5.
a.
b.
c.

When there is waiver of right or gives his consent;
De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689
Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 SCRA 336
PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA (In order that there is a valid
waiver to a warrantless search, the waiver or consent should be
given by the person affected, not just anybody. Example: The
landlady could not give a valid consent to the search of a room
occupied by a tenant. Said tenant himself should give the consent in
order to be valid. The doctrine in Lopez vs. Commissioner to the
effect that it could be given by any occupant of a hotel room being
rented by the respondent is deemed abandoned)
d. VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97. (If the owner of the house
allowed the policemen to enter his house because they are searching
for rebel soldiers but when inside the house, they instead seized an
unlicensed firearm, there is no consent to a warrantless search)
6.
a.
b.
c.

STOP AND FRISK.
People vs. Mengote, June, 1992
PEOPLE VS. POSADAS, 188 SCRA 288
MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997. (The policemen saw
several suspicious looking men at dawn who ran when they went
near them. As the policemen ran after them, an unlicensed firearm
was confiscated. The search is valid)

95

d. MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159. (Mere suspicions not
sufficient to validate warrantless arrest)
6. EDDIE GUAZON, ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE
VILLA, ET AL., GR NO. 80508, January 30, 1990
Warrantless searches;
"zonings" and "saturation drives"
Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
This is a petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction to
prohibit military and police officers from conducting "Areal target
zonings" or "saturation drive" in Metro Manila particularly in places
where they suspect that the subversives are hiding. The 41
petitioners claim that the saturation drives conducted by the military
is in violation of their human rights because with no specific target
house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours,
police and military officers without any search warrant cordon an
area of more than one residence and sometimes the whole barangay.
Most of them are in civilian clothes and w/o nameplates or
identification cards; that the raiders rudely rouse residents from their
sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their homes,
shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some) and ordering
the residents to come out; the residents are herded like cows at the
point of high powered guns, ordered to strip down to their briefs and
examined for tattoo marks; that while examination of the bodies of
the men are being conducted, the other military men conduct search
and seizures to each and every house without civilian witnesses
from the neighbors; some victims complained that their money and
other valuables were lost as a result of these illegal operations.
The respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct
saturation drives under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution which
provides:
The respondents would want to justify said military operation on
the following constitutional provisions:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion x x x
xxxx

96

The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.
Held:
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the
police action of the nature described by the petitioners would be
illegal and blatantly violative of the Bill of Rights. If the military
wants to flush out subversive and criminal elements, the same must
be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of the
people. However, nowhere in the Constitution can we see a
provision which prohibits the Chief Executive from ordering the
military to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness and
alarming communist activities. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The government
cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian
systems both of the right and of the left. This is so because Art. III,
Section 3 of the Constitution is very clear as explained in Roan vs.
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 and Century Fox vs. Court of Appeals,
164 SCRA 655. Also, it must be pointed out that police actions
should not be characterized by methods that offend one's sense of
justice (Rochin vs. California, 342 US 165).
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were
actually committed. But the remedy is not to stop all police actions,
including the essential and legitimate ones. A show of force is
sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected
and not violated. However, the remedy of the petitioners is not an
original action for prohibition since not one victim complains and
not one violator is properly charged. It is basically for the executive
department and the trial courts. The problem is appropriate for the
Commission of Human Rights.
The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional Trial Courts
of Manila, Malabon and Pasay City where the petitioners may
present evidence supporting their allegations so that the erring
parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted. In the meantime, the acts
violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed
during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as
permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
********************
Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ. , Dissenting

97

The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper
parties is a specious pretext for inaction. We have held that technical
objections may be brushed aside where there are constitutional
questions that must be met (RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 PHIL.
603; TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702; PHILCONSA
VS. JIMENEZ, 65 SCRA 479; EDU VS. ERICTA, 35 SCRA 481;
GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835; LAGUNZAD VS.
CA, 154 SCRA 199; DEMETRIA VS. ALBA,148 SCRA 208).
Lozada was in fact an aberration.
Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if
he may not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect
liberty and that alone makes him a proper party. It is not only the
owner of a burning house who has the right to call the firemen.
Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is very clear: Unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose
is prohibited.
Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE ACCEPTED
INSTANCES WHEN A SEARCH OR AN ARREST MAY BE
MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT. THEY COME UNDER THE
CONCEPT OF THE FISHING EXPEDITIONS STIGMATIZED
BY LAW AND DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court should
instead categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives
are violative of human rights and individual liberty and should be
stopped immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual
theater of military operations against the insurgents, the Court
should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a
battleground.
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA UMIL and NICANOR
DURAL, FELICITAS SESE VS. FIDEL RAMOS, ET AL. and
companion cases, G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990 (An NPA may be
arrested without warrant while sleeping or being treated in a hospital
because his being a communist rebel is a continuing crime)
h. If the judge finds that there's probable cause, must he issue a
warrant of arrest
as a matter of course? See the distinctions.
Read:
1. SAMULDE VS. SALVANI, SEPTEMBER 26, 1988 (No because
a warrant is issued in order to have jurisdiction of the court over the
person of an accused and to assure the court of his presence
whenever his case is called in court. As such, if the court believes

98

that the presence of the accused could be had even without a warrant
of arrest, then he may not issue said warrant. Note: This case
involves a minor offense)
2. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265. If the offense committed is
a serious one like that obtaining in this case for murder, the Judge
must issue a warrant of arrest after determining the existence of
probable cause)
i. Searching questions
Read:
DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE
JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC 33, Manila & People of
the Philippines, GR No. 82870, December 14, 1989 (En Banc)
Search and seizure; requirements/requisites of a valid search
warrant; searching questions
Padilla, J.
This is a petition to annul and set aside the Order of respondent
Judge DENYING the motion of the petitioner to quash Search
Warrant No. 87-14 as well as its Order denying the petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.
Facts:
1. On October 31, 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the
Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police
District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 33, presided by the respondent Judge, an application for the
issuance of a Search Warrant for violation of PD 1866 against the
petitioner;
2. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Dimagmaliw
alleged that:
"1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to
believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines x x x has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives, hand grenades and ammunition
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense x x x;
"2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a
fact x x x ".

On November 2. On November 1. and d. the respondent judge denied the motion to quash and on April 20. 1986. 1987. On March 9. a Sunday and All Saints Day. P/Lt. before issuing the . Hence this petition. 5. which is to be determined by the judge. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with three live fragmentation hand grenades separately with old newspapers. b. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must. Lt. On November 6. Ricardo Abando. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 1987. 4. Florencio Angeles executed a "Deposition of Witness dated October 31.99 In support of said application. 6. there must be probable cause. 1987. the search warrant was a general warrant. For a valid search warrant to issue. 1988. for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense. a member of the searching team executed an affidavit alleging that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Angeles had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. Issue: Was the Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge valid? Was there probable cause? Held: a. Edgar Dula Torre and Major Maganto. 3. the petitioner moved to quash the search warrant on the grounds that: a. 1987 . the examination of said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers. c. the warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. the complainant's lone witness. the same judge denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by Col.

VS. 33. It is clear from the foregoing that the applicant and his witness HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant. YET THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW OR INDICATE HOW AND WHEN SAID APPLICANT VERIFIED THE EARLIER INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY HIM AS TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSION. they "gathered information’s from verified sources" that the holders of said firearms and explosives are not licensed t possess them. NBI. Major Dimagmaliw declared that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosivees described therein. In his affidavit. 64 PHIL. (Quintero vs. ALVAREZ VS. and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact. 33. Angeles declared that as a result of continuous surveillance for several days. on facts personally known to them attach to the record their sworn statements together with affidavits submitted. 566). 667. June 23. in writing and under oath. the records yield no questions and answers. US VS. the complainant and witnesses he may produce. CFI. and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched". (P. vis-a-vis the said applicant. 64 PHIL. personally examine in the form of searching questions answers. In fact. 1988). SY JUCO. has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. 28 PHIL. whether searching or not. In ALVAREZ VS. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons." On the other hand. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers. CFI. Despite the fact that Major Dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit that "he verified the information he had earlier received and found it to be a fact. and the and any The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant. ADDISON. it was held that the following test must be complied with in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition based on personal knowledge or not"The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held . but there were none.100 warrant. 64 PHIL. Lt.

Gonzales. Nemesio Prudente. the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. the warrant described the place to be searched as the premises of the PUP. Angeles." Tested by the above standards. Besides. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant and conducting of examination in a general manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant.101 liable for damage caused. True." b. 1988. In the case at bar. the allegation of the witness. "the questions propounded are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable. June 23. "mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus insufficient. There is also no violation of the "one specific offense" requirement considering that the application for a search warrant . There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent judge because as shown by the record. As held in Quintero vs. NBI. 48 PHIL. respondent judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of Court. his questions were too brief and short and did not examine the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. do not come up to the level of facts based on his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant. On the contrary. The rule is. more particularly the offices of the Department of Science and Tactics as well as the Office of the President. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses." The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of probable cause in the valid issuance of a search warrant as enunciated in earlier cases. c. VELOSO. The examining judge has to take the depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. this requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective. 180). Lt. As held in Roan vs. that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended (P VS. 145 SCRA 694.

102 explicitly described the offense: illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under PD 1866. 137 SCRA 541 8. Burgos. 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the applicants and witnesses should be attached to the record of the case) 7. the same is not valid since there could have been no searching questions) j. 133 SCRA 800 10. and not positive statements of particular acts. Luna vs. Chief of Staff. vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni. Aberca vs. 159 SCRA 599 3. Lising. vs. 147 SCRA 509 9. departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of the search warrant provided the constitutional requirements are complied with. Nolasco vs Pano. a. Corro vs. Ponsica vs. validity of checkpoints . CFI. Mata vs. 83988. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid or not. GEN RENATO DE VILLA. 19 OF THE SUPREME COURT merely provides for a guideline. Gonzales. CA. April 15. Burgos vs. 33 (When the applicant is basing his knowledge from an informant. De Mulata vs. November 16. DE LEON. Ignalaga. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. Irizari. July 31. the warrant is not valid) 13.1988 2. 64 Phil. September 14. July 6. Ver. 26 SCRA 313 3. September 29. HUBERT WEBB VS. 145 687 6. 1989 Warrantless searches and seizures. 1990. 62 SCRA 210 4. 104 SCRA 423 5. Bayona. (When the questions asked to the applicant for a search warrant was pre-typed. the same is not valid) 2.1988 12. CIRCULAR NO. GR No. Roan vs. Siochi. Panganiban vs. P.1986 11. 247 SCRA 650 Read also: 1. Plaza.1987 (When the statements in the affidavits of witnesses are mere generalities. mere conclusions of law. P. PENDON VS. Cesar. Read: 1. Alvarez vs. d. Marinas vs.

capricious and whimsical disposition of the military authorities manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. On July 9. 1987. the supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela was gunned down in cold blood by the military men manning the checkpoints for ignoring or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspite of several warning shots fired in the air. Metro Manila. 259 SW 33). Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela. 1988 at dawn. Case. Issue: Whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as well as the periodic searches and seizures made by the military authorities without search warrant valid? Held: Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining peace and order. 190 MW 289). the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on a public fair grounds (People vs. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. On January 20. for example. the apprehensions of the residents of Valenzuela increased because Benjamin Parpon. Facts: 1. 2. or simply looks into a vehicle (State vs. Commonwealth. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order.103 Padilla. especially at night or dawn. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. these do not constitute unreasonable search. 97 SE 62). the residents of Valenzuela. without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Where. . MM are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. or flashes a light therein (Rowland vs. Gaina. J.

Finally. BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROTECT ITS EXISTENCE AND PROMOTE PUBLIC WELFARE AND AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT AGAINST A WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH IS HOWEVER REASONABLY CONDUCTED. the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement. in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse.. THE FORMER SHALL PREVAIL. AT THE COST OF OCCASIONAL INCONVENIENCE. the manning of these checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform. 1990 Very Important: The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 15 June. True. 1990. the military checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints upon order of the NCRDC Chief. held that military and police checkpoints are not illegal as these measures to protect the government and safeguards the lives of the people. so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA's "sparrow units. The checkpoints are legal as where the survival of the organized government is on the . BUT . DISCOMFORT AND EVEN IRRITATION TO THE CITIZEN. Metro Manila may be considered as security measure to effectively maintain peace and order and to thwart plots to destabilize the government. 1988. RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. JJ. THE CHECKPOINTS DURING THESE ABNORMAL TIMES ARE PART OF THE PRICE WE PAY FOR AN ORDERLY SOCIETY AND PEACEFUL COMMUNITY. it must be emphasized that on July 17. dissenting: The bland declaration by the majority that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. In this connection. JUNE 15." not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms.104 The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela. Cruz and Sarmiento.

P vs. Roldan vs. an unlicensed firearm was seized instead. NO. P. 3. P. 1990 (En banc) 5. there is a probable cause since he was personal knowledge due to his expertise on drugs) 11.1987 1-b. June 23. said gun is inadmissible in evidence. 1990 1-c. G. or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril. 1994. 160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless search if a NARCOM officer arrests the person who owns a bag which contains marijuana which he found out when he smelled the same. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (NO) Read: 1. Presidential Anti_Dollar Salting Task Force vs.105 balance. 4. March 16. Papa vs. July 30. 1990 1-d. Mago. (After the informant was given by the police the amount of P100. 66 SCRA 299 HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS. Ponce de Leon. 1990. 101 SCRA 86 5. Read also the RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15. 165 SCRA 135 8. he went to buy marijuana from the accused then return to the police headquarters with said article.R. June 26. 56 SCRA 16 6. 65 SCRA 336 4. Properties subject to seizure . P. Rizal Alih vs. P vs. the policemen went to arrest the accused without warrant. Claudio. Cruz. August 6. Arca. 65 SCRA 336 7. NOT BODILY SEARCH. Pamaran. October 17. 81510. Miriam Defensor-Santiago. HON TOMAS ACHACOSO. 1989 l. 147 SCRA 509 & 139 SCRA 152 9. Nolasco vs. Here . 2.1988 Moreno vs. Castiller. Thereafter. Olaes. Cendana. However. Pacis vs. DEL ROSARIO. Lopez vs. 185 SCRA 665 Read also: 1-a. Gen. March 14. Castro. 20 SCRA 562 Lim vs. 22 SCRA 857 3. vs. vs.00. CFI. vs. Vivo. 1990 2. P s. PEOPLE VS. The arrest is not valid since it does not fall under Section 5 Rule 113) Likewise. the Supreme Court held further that the military officers manning the checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY. July 10. after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu and its paraphernalia and instead. Harvey vs. CA. k. Commisioner. Pano.

People vs. Manuel et al. Board. CA. . 1990 1-e. (The alleged illegality of the arrest is deemed waived upon posting of the bond by the accused) PEOPLE VS. Morales vs. Aug. Sec. P. March 18. February 9. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the arraignment. Sec. 258 SCRA 188 2-i. August 27. Feb. Rolito Go vs. 1990 1-g. SOLAYAO.106 Read:  1.. ortiz. P vs. DAMASO. 1990 1-a. Warrantless searches and arrests Read: 1. JUATAN. vs. July 6. 2. PEOPLE VS. J. Gatchalian vs. People vs. Posadas vs. 1991 2-d. Maspil. August 20. 262 SCRA 255 2-f. People vs. 2. 84666. 144 SCRA 1 2-b. Aminnudin. 1992 1-h. Jr. Bati. Rule 126. CA. vs. 256 SCRA 325 2-g. Judge Tirso Velasco. OPOSADAS VS. May 31. as amended 2. vs. P.. 11. 1989 1-b. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. PEOPLE VS. PEOPLE VS. ESPANO VS. Dec. 6. de la Cruz. PEOPLE VS. De la Cruz 1-f. 184 SCRA 416 2-c. Enrile. 1990 (Compare with P. vs. CA. CA. vs. P. Ponce Enrile. if the arrest was illegal. as amended n. Mati. Burgos.1985 Rules on Crimial Procedure. Garcia-Padilla vs. 212 SCRA 547 2-h. GR No. 1991 2-e. 3. 355 SCRA 246 Mendoza. vs. supra) 1-d. 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust operation) 3. P. 121 SCRA 538 2-a. 1991 2. 288 SCRA 558 m. Rule 113. January 18. CUISON. Sucro.121 SCRA 47 & 137 SCRA 647 1-c. GALVEZ. 1988.

NAPOLCOM. 4. LAPURA. SANDIGANBAYAN. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified. 1989 p.107 The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him. Judicial pronouncements on illegally seized SCRA 336 evidence. 106 q. 260 SCRA 256 PEOPLE VS. 6. 5. 3. However. by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment. NAZARENO. the accused-appellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. 2. Callanta vs. 77 SCRA 377 PEOPLE VS. The exclusionary rule. Villanueva. Indeed. OTHERWISE. 255 SCRA 85 PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO. May 28. 263 SCRA 222 PEOPLE VS. 254 SCRA 491 o . 260 SCRA 256 FILOTEO VS. Considering that the accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a crime. Read: 1. Penalty for illegal arrest Read: Palon vs. the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant when the latter was taken into custody. THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED.155 SCRA 494 n. SILAN. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA. What is the status of a document obtained through subpoena? Read: .

341 SCRA 25 The protection against unreasonable search and seizure covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforces. with reasonable effort. CA. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can. AND THOSE ITEMS NOT PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED MAY BE CUT OFF WITHOUT DESTROYING THE WHOLE WARRANT. ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE AGAINST . The “plain view” doctrine. In this case. 3. 344 SCRA 36 The following are the requisites of a valid search warrant: 1. the judge must examine under oath and affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. and 4. vague or doubtful basis of fact. Nov.. In determining probable cause.108 Dianalan vs. 27. especially since the witness had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. Pros. VALDEZ. 1990 r. The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by applicant or any other person. 164 SCRA 655 (The master copy of the allegedly pirated tape should be presented before the judge in order to convince him of the existence of probable cause) 2. PEOPLE VS. nor on mere suspicion or belief. Office of the Tanodbayan. The warrant must be issued upon probable cause. CA. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. BIR. Search warrants are not issued on loose. which may justify a search without warrant. 2. THE SEARCH WARRANT IS SEPARABLE. 261 SCRA 144 LATEST CASES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURES UY VS. most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity. Search warrant for pirated video tapes 1. Century Fox vs. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.

IT MUST APPEAR THAT THE RIGHT EXISTS. 344 SCRA 663 In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches. (PEOPLE VS. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is the immunity of one’s person. CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL. or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. 9372. Approved on March 6. Read: Read: NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/AntiTerrorism Law. July 6. PEOPLE VS. For a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures. which includes his residence. Republic Act No. of the existence of such right. AND ZEAL IN THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINALS CANNOT ENNOBLE THE USE OF ARBITRARY METHODS THAT THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF ABHORS. The third condition did not exist in the instant case. 2000) An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does nor prevent the appellant from invoking the protection afforded by the Constitution. BAULA. papers and other possessions. 2007 . CHAPTER IV THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY Section 3. FIFUEROA. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court. within a fenced yard or private place. it is fundamental that to constitute waiver. BUT INADVERTENTLY COMES ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING OBJECT. Neither was the search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest. EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE. THE PERSONS INVOLVED HAD KNOWLEDGE. he need not be in his home or office. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. THE PRESUMPTION BY ITSELF.109 THE ACCUSED.

conversation. upon a written order of the Court of Appeals. message. Surveillance of suspects and interception and recording of communications. discussion. association. listen to. intercept and record. Section 8. tap. any communication. listen.The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down. not found in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. doctors and patients. form or kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices. a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may.. shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals UPON AN EX-PARTE written application of a police or law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex-parte application. Provided. SURVEILLANCE OF SUSPECTS AND INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING OF COMMUNICATIONS OF SUSPECTS OR CHARGED OF TERRORISM Section 7. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. conversations. interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients. The provisions of RA 4200 (AntiWiretapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding. intercept. or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism. and record communications. and upon examination under oath and affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses who may produce to establish:  That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or .110 and effective on July 15. discussions. or with the use of any other suitable ways or means for that purpose. with the use of any mode. or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) Please observe the procedure in obtaining the “The Warrant [or Order] of Surveillance”. journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized. That surveillance. or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. messages.

if he or she intends to do so. and  The length of time which the authorization shall be used or carried out. including his application to extend or renew. messages. messages. in case of radio.  That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that evidence which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for. or telephone (whether wireless or otherwise) communications.  The identity (name and address. bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge. the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down. letters. of the charged of suspected persons whose communications.  The offense or offenses committed. listened to. tapped. conversations. conversations. That the person being surveilled or whose communications. if any. or to the solution or prevention of any such crimes. and recorded and their locations if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known. or is about to be committed. and  That there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence. discussions. or sought to be prevented. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. conversations. papers. or is being committed. discussions.111 conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed. listened to. messages. the original application of the applicant. messages. electronic. such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is reasonable ground to do so. listen to. Sec. or being committed. and record the communications. The written order of the authorizing division of the court of Appeals shall specify the following:  The identity. or spoken or written words. the legality of the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued said written order. if any. intercepted or recorded and. discussions. to extend or renew the same. and the written authorizations of the AntiTerrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided. spoken or written words and effects have been monitored. . tap. intercept. listened to. tapped. or spoken or written words. The written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order. will be obtained. 9. and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team judicially authorized to track down. such as name and address. or spoken or written words are to be tracked down. discussions. conversations. if known. intercepted.

JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO EXAMINE BANK DEPOSITS. [Penalty to be imposed on the police official who fails to inform the person subject of surveillance of the termination of the surveillance. If no case is filed within the 30-day period. intercepted. interception. ACCOUNTS. LEGISLATIVE. which shall not exceed 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official. 10. accounts and records.112 Section. PROCEEDING. QUASIJUDICIAL. Section 15. Any listened to. the applicant police or law enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance. OR ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. conversations…WHICH HAVE BEEN SECURED IN VIOLATION OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT. and recording of the termination of the said surveillance. The CA may extend or renew the said authorization for another non-extendible period. interception and recording. interception and recording shall be penalized to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. monitoring. SHALL ABSOLUTELY NOT BE ADMISSIBLE AND USABLE AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ANYBODY IN ANY JUDICIAL. AND RECORDS OF SUSPECTED OR CHARGED TERRORISTS Section 27. Any authorization granted by the authorizing division of the court of Appeals…shall only be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals. messages. judicial authorization required to examine bank deposits. The justices of CA designated as special court to handle antiterrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that:  A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. OR HEARING. . which shall not exceed 30 days from the expiration of the original period…The ex-parte application for renewal has been duly authorized by the Anti-terrorism Council in writing. INQUIRY. and recorded communications.

association or group of persons. The bank or financial institution shall not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired information. and records in a bank or financial institution. placements. trust accounts. accounts and records.  Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the members of his team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to: 1. association or group of persons. assets. Sec. and 2. trust accounts. assets. placements. . gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits.  Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. assets and records:  A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. in a bank or financial institution-SHALL ONLY BE GRANTED BY THE AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF THE CA UPON AN EX-PARTE APPLICATION TO THAT EFFECT OF A POLICE OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL who has been duly authorized by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file such ex-parte application and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits. The written order of the CA authorizing the examination of bank deposits. trust accounts. placements. Application to examine deposits.  Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. 28. and records from a bank or financial institution. association or group of persons. assets and records:  Of A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. placements.113  Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons.  Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. when so ordered by and served with the written order of the Court of Appeals. examine or cause the examination of.  Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. the deposits. trust accounts.

quasi-judicial. work sheets. CA. then President FIDEL V. summaries. checks and greeting cards of his alleged paramours. 2006.  Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. Evidentiary value of deposited bank materials. reports or documents acquired from the examination of the bank deposits. 1996. CABALQUINTO. trust accounts. association or group of persons. 1998 Puno. Thereafter. shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial. September 19.Any information. assets and records of:  A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.114 Section 35. 3. This is so because the intimacies of husband and wife does not justify the breaking of cabinets to determine marital infidelity. Facts: On December 12. ZULUETA VS. February 10. data. placements. The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY . 1996 The wife forcibly opened the drawers at the clinic of her doctor-husband and took diaries. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”. memoranda. proceeding or hearing. legislative or administrative investigation. OPLE VS.  Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. 502 SCRA 419 2. notes. she used the same in their legal separation case. -which have been secured in violation of the provisions of this Act. excerpts. J. Said documents are inadmissible in evidence. 1. TORRES. The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds: . RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. July 23. PEOPLE VS. inquiry.

The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power. and 3. not by an Administrative Order issued by the President. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a “common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 2. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts. but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse. a mathematical analysis of a biological data. Through the PRN.115 1. It is the confirmation of an individual’s identity through a fingerprint. Held: 1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. the government offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The AO establishes a system of identification that is allencompassing in scope. Further. the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these informations gathered shall be handled. may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes. hand geometry or facial features. which is supposed to be exercised by the President. is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure. retinal scan. 2. however. it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it. affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore. It does not . Administrative Power. AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. The data. The AO violates the citizen’s right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts.

and b. AN INTRUDER. MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN. April 19. ET AL. Multi-purpose Identification System by all Government Agencies in the Executive Department. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA. 2006 Carpio.. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizen’s right to privacy. AO No. WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA. 2006 & June 20. 420 is unconstitutional on two (2) grounds: a.116 provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. the petitioners claimed that Proclamation No. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. 420 that mandates the Adoption of a Unified. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES Administrative Order No. where none existed before”. J. THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. Ramos that the same is unconstitutional because “a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system. 2006 & June 20. YET. it infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy .. 308[National computerized Identification Reference System] issued by then President Fidel V. The Supreme Court likewise held that EO 308 as unconstitutional for it violates the citizen’s right to privacy. ET AL. This is so despite the fact that the Supreme Court held in an En Banc decision in 1998 OPLE VS. Based on the Ople ruling. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE. usurpation of legislative powers. 2006 BAYAN MUNA VS. April 19. OR WORSE.

at around 10:45 a. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT). 2006. 2006. 2006. Annex “F” of the Petition in G.R. October 17. 89[4] 90[6] 91[7] Annex “E” of the Petition in G. Sabio of the PCGG. . SABIO vs.O. 1 earlier quoted. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. Only those dealing or employed with the said government entities who are required to provide the required information for the issuance of the said ID. 174340. J.” On May 8.90[6] On May 9.R. 420 does not violate the citizen’s right to privacy since it does not require all the citizens to be issued a national ID as what happened in AO 308. Chairman Sabio and other commissioners of the PCGG declined the invitation because of prior commitment. and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.89[4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). 2006. GORDON. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. Inocencio. No. No. On September 12. No.117 Held: The said Executive Order No. 2006. Gordon. No. 455. 504 SCRA 704 Sandoval-Gutierrez. 455). 91[7] At the same time. 174318. Chief of Staff Rio C. 455 (Senate Res. No. The Facts: On February 20.R.. under the authority of Senator Richard J. 174318. Annex “G” of the Petition in G. 174318. wrote Chairman Camilo L.m. Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building. No.R. CAMILO L. they invoked Section 4(b) of E. G. inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. No. No. one of the herein petitioners.

2001. to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed. Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.”94[48] Our Bill of Rights. Cortes. L-20387. “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 1968. Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained. any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. 359 SCRA 772. See also Article 17 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. how much. I S S U E S: Is the investigation conducted on the petitioners violative of their right to privacy? H E L D: The claim of immunity is without merit. The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy.R. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. 93[47] See Morfe v. 135882. enshrined in Article III of the Constitution. . Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries. Arroyo and Members. June 27. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men.”95[49] Section 2 guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons. Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Desierto.” Section 3 renders inviolable the “privacy of communication and correspondence” and further 92[46] Marquez v. Academy of ASEAN Law and Jurisprudence. Hence.92[46] Within these zones. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. citing I. No.118 82 EDSA. 94 [48] 95 [49] Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 7 (1970). Mutuc No. 22 SCRA 424. 1990. G. It highlights a person’s “right to be let alone” or the “right to determine what. at 221.”93[47] but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that. January 31.R. provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. their Chairmen. Sison. houses.

Certainly.96[50] Applying this determination to these cases.97[51] the Court. Rptr. they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. 13 Cal.S. Rptr. 507. 486 P.e.S. p. particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. In Morfe v. 98[52] 429 U. 88 S. 19 L. a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and.98[52] employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose. i. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT).100[54] the Court remarked that as public figures. 8 Cal.105 Cal. if so. 589 (1977).” In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy. 350-352.. People v. Belmonte. and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors. 96 Cal. 2d 1262. such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information. in line with Whalen v. and second. 62.119 cautions that “any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. . the inquiry focus on petitioners’ acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations. 347. See Katz v. 3d 238. Mutuc. Consequently. 3d 623-624. 504 P. Ed. 100[54] 170 SCRA 256 (1989) Burrows v. INSERT Herrera’s Handbook on Arrest. particularly “on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). Ct. and promote morality in public administration. 2d 457. United states (1967). 389 U. did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?. the important inquiries are: first. 529 P 2d 590 (1974). No. the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as 96 [50] 97[51] Supra. Superior Court of San Bernardino County. maintain a standard of honesty in public service. Petitioners were invited in the Senate’s public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. 364. 60. 521. 99[53] Justice Puno. did the government violate such expectation? The answers are in the negative. This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official corruption. 3d 357. Roe. 455.99[53] In Valmonte v.” Obviously. Search and Seizure. whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. Lecture on Legislative Inquiry and Right to Privacy. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal. 2d 576.

In fine. will be respected by respondent Senate Committees. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae. PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Narciso Nario. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses. 455. No. Taking this into consideration. PHC and POTC. must comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. etc. as well as its directors and officers. EXPRESSION. and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni.FREEDOM OF SPEECH. the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT. it their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. Section 4. 455. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for the redress of their grievances. the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions. PRESS. CHAPTER V . it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees. ranging in millions of pesos. . Nicasio Conti. as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGG’s efficacy. of expression. to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees. and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. Under the present circumstances. PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede. and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations.120 compared to ordinary individuals. like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners. and Tereso Javier. or of the press.

2004] Freedom of Expression. Perez. Rule on criticisms against acts of public officers Read: 1. CFI. Labo has the most imponderables about him.  Restricted from traveling. Cecille Afable. 45 Phil. vs.121 NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/AntiTerrorism Law. moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office. FACTS: 1. 1. 37 Phil. 599 4. in general Read: BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER & CECILLE AFABLE VS. The interest of the government and the society demands full discussion of public affairs) 3. JR. 444 SCRA 28 [November 25. 2007 and effective on July 15. 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier (BMC). 90 Phil.. 9372. or other means of communications with people outside their residence. Espuelas vs. US vs. 731 (A public official should not be onion-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts. COURT OF APPEALS & RAMON LABO. 116 SCRA 93 2. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be:  Detained under house arrest. In the January 3. and/or  Prohibited from using any cellular phones. computers. Bustos. the public has the right to be informed on the mental. the Editor-in-Chief. Mercado vs. Republic Act No. 524 2. P. Approved on March 6. People. People would ask: “can he read and . Freedom of the press. in her column “In and Out of Baguio” made the following comments: “Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City).

000 only. 5. in its Decision dated June 14.00 for the ads placed by his campaigners for the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections. Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice because he was allegedly described as “Dumpty in the Egg” or one “who is a failure in his business” which is false because he is a very successful businessman or to mean “zero or a big lie”.” 2. On January 7. Since he is donating millions he should also settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of P27. Jr. 4. and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio. If he wins. Jr. Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo because he has not also paid their medical services with them. 1988 column at the Courier: “I heard that the ‘Dumpty in the Egg’ is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair. We will accept all advertisements for him if he pays his old account first.000. As a result of the above articles.” 3. Baguio City. The petitioners. In the same column. damages in the total amount of P350. Cecille Afable wrote the following comments in her January 10. several teachers were signifying to resign and leave Baguio forever.122 write”? Why is he always talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanes Senator or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18M aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. filed a complaint for Damages before the regional trial Court of Baguio City as he claimed said articles were libelous. however. the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and ordered the petitioners to pay Ramon Labo. The Regional Trial Court. 7. . 6. Branch 6. were able to prove that Labo has an unpaid obligation to the Courier in the amount of P27. reputation and honesty of private respondent Labo who was a candidate for Mayor of Baguio City. Ramon Labor.00 after concluding that the “Dumpty in the Egg” refers to no one but Labo himself.415. that he is a “balasubas” due to his alleged failure to pay his medical expenses. 1990 dismissed Labo’s complaint for damages on the ground that the article of petitioner Afable was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity. 1992. He likewise filed a separate criminal complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio but was dismissed.

This argument is without merit since he was already a candidate for City mayor of Baguio. the case should be dismissed since Labo utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility. it is contrary to common human experience. and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare. 338 [1909] and the case of NEW YORK TIMES VS. CA. The public benefit from publicity . WAS LABO THE “DUMPTY IN THE EGG” DESCRIBED IN THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE/ B. it is doubtful whether he could have won as City Mayor of Baguio in the 1988 elections.S. which he actually did. ISSUES: A. and the advantages derived so great. SULLIVAN. The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the “Dumpty in the Egg” in the questioned article. the Petition to the Supreme Court. In line with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. the article is still within the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provided in the Constitution since it is the public’s right to be informed of the mental. It is unbelievable that Labo campaigned for his opponent and against himself. 376 U. that ‘it is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed. but it must be shown that at least a 3 rd person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication’. As such. had he done that. This was recognized as early as the case of US VS. 254 where the US Supreme Court held: “…it is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. another candidate for mayor and opponent of Labo himself. that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved. This is so because the article stated that “The Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for Cortes”. Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke “public interest” to justify the publication since he was not yet a public official at that time. 14 Phil. 310 SCRA 1. 2. SEDANO. The importance to the State and to society of such discussions is so vast. As pointed out by the petitioners. Although such gracious attitude on the part of Labo would have been commendable. although at times such injury may be great. WERE THE ARTICLES SUBJECT LIBELOUS OR PRIVILEGED/ OF THE CASE HELD: 1. moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office.123 Hence.

Prohibition on columnist. 1989 but was reset to January 30. on the day before and on plebiscite day. 1990 specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said act. J. NO.. a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras. 2167. entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. COMELEC. petitioner PABLITO V. January 29. 1989. the Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. Section 19 of which provides: "Section 19. commentators or announcers. that such discussion must be privileged. commentator. “ Clearly. Mt. 2167. no mass media columnist. filed a petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the Comelec to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. G. 3. the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of the private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at that time. RA 6766. 2. 1990 Freedom of expression and of the press (Note: Unanimous en banc decision) Medialdea. Abra. Province. Facts: 1. all comprising the autonomous region shall take part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27. 90878. 2.During the plebiscite campaign period. SANIDAD who is a columnist ("OVERVIEW") for the Baguio Midland Courier." 4. 1989. Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao. SANIDAD VS. announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. PABLITO V. the City of Baguio and Provinces of Benguet.124 is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small.R. Petitioner claims that the said provision is violative of his constitutional freedom of expression and . On October 23. On November 20. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881). Pursuant to said law.

permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity. This is so because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW. In fact. 5. commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate. 6. Comelec Resolution No. including reasonable. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises. 2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner from expressing his views because under Section 90 and 92 of BP 881. the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from enforcing Section 19 of Resolution No.125 of the press and it also constitutes a prior restraint because it imposes subsequent punishment for those who violate the same. HOWEVER. for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are insured. there are no candidates in a plebiscite. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising time and space. . Held: What is granted by Art. equal rates therefor. 1989. time and space. On January 9. 2167. Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its Comment and moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of Resolution No. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during the plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. 1990. On November 28. This is also the reason why a columnist. and the right to reply. While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B). said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity of Section 19. 2167. he may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime. OF RA 6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIODS. 2ND PAR.

NIB. In re: Ramon Tulfo.126 Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. Lacsa vs. 137 SCRA 448 Babst vs. 79 SCRA 372 9. 1988 . Sullivan. Elizalde vs. the same must be [a] a true and fair report of the actual proceedings. Lising. Real also the dissenting and separate opinions of the justices. and [c] no comments nor remarks shall be made by the writer. Camara Shoes. IN RE: Atty. Tipon. 1992. IAC. TV and newspapers is valid in order to even the playing field between rich and poor candidates) 4.1988 10.S. Adiong vs. ACCORDINGLY. 7. New York Times vs. CA. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec. IAC. 4. Kapisanan vs. 2167 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 11 SCRA 477 8. ARROYO. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues. GR No. (Preventing campaigns through radio. May 3. Dans. Gonzales.254 10.76 SCRA 448 (In order that any news item relating to a judicial proceeding will not be actionable. De Villa. 199 In re: Atty.376 U. Zaldivar vs. April 15. Manila Times.137 SCRA 628 6. Freedom of expression in general Read: 1. GR No. Read also: 1. May 23.March 19. Policarpio vs. March 31. National Press Club vs. 142 SCRA 171 7. Liwayway Publishing vs. 5 SCRA 148 8. Eastern Broadcasting vs. 2006. 5. 34 SCRA 116 9. 1989 5. 7960-707 & Zaldivar vs. 2. Lopez vs. 132 SCRA 316 6. Chief of Staff. Emil Jurado. February 1. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 133 SCRA 800 Corro vs. RANDY DAVID VS. 489 SCRA 160. 1990 Burgos vs. March 5. Comelec. [b] must be done in good faith. 80578. Newsweek vs. 1992 (putting of decals and stickers in one’s car is within the protected freedom of expression) 3. Gutierrez.l988 3. Sandiganbayan. 3. PCGG. December 6. July 12. 2. INCLUDING THE FORUM. Kapunan vs.

Not within the protection of the freedom of of the Constitution expression clause 1. P vs. Alarcon. prosecutor and judge at the same time. California. b. August 8. 265 5. Freedom of assembly and to petition the government redress of grievances GESITE et al. GO PIN. 352 b. vs. 37 L. Cases undersub-judice Read: a. Kottinger. vs. P. Whether the average person applying to contemporary community standards would find the work appeals to prurient interest.127 4. vs. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive sexual conduct. test of Read: a. Miller vs. 45 Phil. 510 3. P. Pita vs. Ginsberg vs. artistic. test ofRead: a.390 U. Lopez and Manila Times cases. political or scientific value. New York. 69 Phil. 2d 419 d. 629 e. He should obtain a search warrant from a judge) 2. 178 SCRA 362 (A City Mayor may not order the warrantless seizure of magazines which he believes to be obscene. Lopez.S. Ed. Obscenity. Quisumbing vs. he will become the complainant. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary . 1955 Tests: a. c. CA. c. 444 SCRA 51 for . otherwise. COURT OF APPEALS. supra b. Libel or slander. 96 Phil.

they may not be penalized administratively. or absence from. work which it was the teachers’ duty to perform.” It is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. LAGUIO. they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of. 1990 which temporarily disrupted classes in Metro Manila but they claimed that they were not on strike. CA. undertaken for essentially economic reasons. SINCE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SITUATION. right of public school teachers to form union. Thus. HELD: The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the period from September up to the 1st half of October. 276 SCRA 619) The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension because the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any service. . 1990 was a strike or not has been decided in the case of MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION VS. Despite the constitutional right to form associations under the Constitution. The right of government employees to organize IS LIMITED TO THE FORMATIONS OF UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS ONLY. (Bangalisan vs. The petitioners admitted that they participated in concerted mass actions in Metro Manila from September to the first half of October. They claimed that they were merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential.128 Freedom of public school teachers to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. WITHOUT INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. WILL BE DEEMED CONTROLLING. 200 SCRA 323 where it was held that “these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike. AND NOT ITS APPEARANCE. walkouts and other forms of mass actions that will lead to temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. mass leaves.

2006 AZCUNA. claim that on October 4. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). in his capacity as Executive Secretary.M. in G. J. KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP). and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries. put the country under an “undeclared” martial rule.. who allege that they were injured. Jess del Prado. 2005. Gen. EDUARDO ERMITA. VIDAL QUEROL. 2005. a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them. a rally KMU cosponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. LOMIBAO. et al. They were then . in G.R. 169848. arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26. allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6..: The Facts: Petitioners come in three groups. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners. They further allege that on October 6. They further assert that on October 5. Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA. KMU. they claim. 169881. No.) No.. Gen. Chief of the Philippine National Police. KARAPATAN. allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens. and Western Police District Chief Gen. No. Bayan.R. are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880. NCRPO Chief Maj. 169838. et al. ARTURO M. No. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. G. The first petitioners. et al.R.P. 169848. 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. specifically the right to peaceful assembly. and GABRIELA vs.129 BAYAN. a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. May. causing injuries to several of their members. 2005. No. et al. 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B. The third group. petitioners in G.R. PEDRO BULAONG.

12. B. boulevard. and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access. plaza square.” SEC. street. and 14(a). 880. Definition of terms.A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. SEC. in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Three other rallyists were arrested. Title . 880 An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled: SECTION 1. To this end. causing injuries on one of them. police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. – This Act shall be known as “The Public Assembly Act of 1985. “The Public Assembly Act of 1985. However. 880. avenue. – For purposes of this Act: (b) “Public place” shall include any highway. liberty and equal protection of the law. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit. Permit when required and when not required. 2. road.-. no rally” policy and the CPR policy recently announced. or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall . No. no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property. the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life. Declaration of policy. as well as the policy of CPR. 4. (c) “Maximum tolerance” means the highest degree of restraint that the military. 3. – The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. 6. 13(a). bridge or other thoroughfare. some of them in toto and others only Sections 4.” provides: Batas Pambansa Blg. 5. park.P.130 forcibly dispersed. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. SEC.

Upon receipt of the application. 6. time and duration thereof. public convenience. . It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: 1. If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit. the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. 4. the duty and 3. Application requirements. 5. public morals or public health. at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. which must be duly acknowledged in writing. SEC. the purpose of such public assembly.-. he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. SEC. Action to be taken on the application. – 1. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit. and the probable number of persons participating. public safety. the permit shall be deemed granted. The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held.131 be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. failing which. the date. The application shall incorporate responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. 2. 2. 3. the transport and the public address systems to be used. The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers. The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed. and place or streets to be used for the intended activity. said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. no rally” policy. 2005 STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA On Unlawful Mass Actions In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation. the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. 6. disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations. thus: Malacañang Manila. The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours. in his absence. A decision granting such permit or modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory. In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court. All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. shown in Annex “A” to the Petition in G. 7.132 4. on the other hand. In all cases. 169848. No. the Municipal Trial Court. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit. 2 Official NEWS September 21. we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a “no permit. to the next in rank. 8.R. sow disorder and incite people against the duty constituted authorities. . any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. 2005. Philippines Release No. or the Intermediate Appellate court. 5. its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within fortyeight (48) hours after receipt of the same. the Regional Trial Court. is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated September 21. CPR. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or.

880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent. Furthermore. No.P. contend that Batas Pambansa No. The words “lawful cause. Finally.133 The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force. And even . and the peace of mind of the national community. No.P. 880. We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society. They argue that B.. aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The majority of lawabiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government. Petitioners Bayan. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government.” “opinion. As a content-based legislation.P. based on the rule of law. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.. The President’s call for unity and reconciliation stands. petitioners KMU. it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B. et al. Regarding the CPR policy. in lieu of maximum tolerance. Also. Furthermore. No.” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. et al. Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness? Is it void for lack of publication? Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4. on the other hand. in fact. Second. 7160: 1. No. it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B. allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof. and that no law.P. 2. 3. is directly affected by B. 5 and 6. As to the CPR policy. No. 1. I s s u e s: 4. 2005? H e l d: Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. specifically Sections 4. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. 2. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. 3. 5. 4. Respondents. Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations? Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? Do they constitute prior restraint? Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 5.134 assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right. the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly. ordinance or executive order supports the policy. 6. they argue that it is preemptive. Furthermore. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR): 1. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. as guaranteed by the Constitution. the limits provided are unreasonable: First. and Republic Act No.P. that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act. 880. have challenged such action as . They have.

As stated in Jacinto v. if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights. vs. and of the press. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.135 contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit. the less perfect. Apurado already upheld the right to assembly and petition. because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. as early as the onset of this century. as follows: There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and. and Section 3 of Article XIII. as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides: SEC. Apurado. v. As early as the onset of this century.S. this Court in U. for that matter. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights. and the greater. the grievance and the more intense the feeling. CA. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities. then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment. together with freedom of speech. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity. without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor. Section 2(5) of Article IX. the Court. of expression. already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge: “It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary. or of the press. in U. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions. but the utmost discretion must be . The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is. 4. of expression.S. to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law. a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities.

It is . arising from the denial of a permit. it must be remembered that the right. this Court said: The right to freedom of speech. while sacrosanct. Bagatsing further expounded on the right and its limits. In Primicias. may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. or action for damages. or contempt proceedings unless there be a “clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.” Free speech. like free press. Fugoso. morals.” Again. prosecution for sedition. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights. is not absolute. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights. such as towns. and it may be delegated to political subdivisions. municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose Reyes v. peace. are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly. nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.” Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. as follows: 1. however. good order or safety. the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.136 exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. or of the press. to promote the health. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits. and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. and general welfare of the people. Next. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech.” which is the power to prescribe regulations. in Primicias v. education.

Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. much less preach rebellion . of a serious evil to public safety. even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. however. so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions. of a character both grave and imminent. therefore. much less denied. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge. is the danger. the utterance. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: “It must never be forgotten. public health. It is not to be limited. In every case. resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment.137 entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. being in a context of violence. where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right. Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. except on a showing. it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. or any other legitimate public interest. Collins. are inseparable. of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. as is the case with freedom of expression. allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views. There are. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. of course. All these rights. while not identical. whether verbal or printed. 2. the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation.” What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason. public morals. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. well-defined limits. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest.

Fugoso has resolved any lurking . but must not. there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta. penned in 1907 to be precise. injury to property. and acts of vandalism must be avoided. as a rule. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion. and discussing public questions. Rojas. from ancient times. Apurado: “It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary. As pointed out in an early Philippine case. but relative. There can be no legal objection. 4. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all. will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. Fugoso. and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience. be abridged or denied. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy. a 1915 decision. Such use of the streets and public places has. United States v. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and. and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling. it is not absolute. riotous conduct. have been used for purposes of assembly. immunities. rights and liberties of citizens.” The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. the less perfect. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. and in consonance with peace and good order. been a part of the privileges. hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Primicias v. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values. communicating thoughts between citizens.” It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked.138 under the cloak of dissent. in the guise of respondents. of 1939 vintage of. Justice Roberts in Hague v. The utmost calm though is not required.” which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat. time out of mind. Reference was made to such plaza “being a promenade for public use. CIO: “Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest.

That would . this Court categorically declared: “Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court. the statute of New Hampshire P. it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. 312 U. providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon. not as to the relations of the speakers. * * *. shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee. and manner of the parade or procession. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: “The question. chap.139 doubt on the matter. 145. as the statute is construed by the state courts. is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose. And the Supreme Court of the United States. if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved. but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing. place. “Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: “Civil liberties.. as guaranteed by the Constitution. 569. where. and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.” There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses.L. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all.S. in the issuance of licenses. to a consideration of the time. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo. In that case. section 2.’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. held that ‘a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press.” xxx 6. and held valid. the licensing authorities are strictly limited. State of New Hampshire.

his decision. the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights. they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Thus if so minded. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil. No verbal formula. the public place where and the time when it will take place. of course. By way of a summary.” Nonetheless. The provisions of B. B. enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.140 deprive it of its peaceful character. is not to be “abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. Thereafter. unfettered discretion. here respondent Mayor. If it were a private place. The exercise of such a right.even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. It is true that the licensing official. in the language of Justice Roberts. It is not. is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. along with the other intellectual freedoms. x x x. -. Free speech and peaceable assembly. however. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.P.” xxx 8. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes: . are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. the applicants must be heard on the matter. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. given all the relevant circumstances. No. whether favorable or adverse.P. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary. no sanctifying phrase can. speaking for the American Supreme Court. dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes “as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes.

in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property.P. . 1983. the public place where and the time when it will take place. only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.R. November 9. 125 SCRA 553. By way of a summary. L-65366. 880 SEC. No. 4. However. Permit when required and when not required.-A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. the applicants must be B. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil. or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Bagatsing (G. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.141 Reyes v. No. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If it were a private place. 569) 8.

whether favorable or adverse. at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers. and the probable number of persons participating. must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held. the transport and the public address systems to be used. the date. his decision. (d) Upon receipt of the application. (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. SEC. they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. 5. Application requirements.142 heard on the matter. the purpose of such public assembly. and place or streets to be used for the intended activity. time and duration thereof. Thereafter.-. which must be duly . Thus if so minded.

143 acknowledged in writing. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed. the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. 6. – (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order. public convenience. the permit shall be deemed granted. failing which. Action to be taken on the application. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit. said . public morals or public health. public safety. SEC.

he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court. the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. or the Intermediate . the Municipal Trial Court. the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit.144 application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit. the Regional Trial Court.

P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time. (g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. It is very clear. No. 1998. 132231. any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. 288 SCRA 447. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. (h) In all cases. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or.R. . No. therefore. Comelec. that B. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. to the next in rank.145 Appellate Court. place and manner of the assemblies. its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same.101 where the Court referred to it as a 101 G. March 31. in his absence.

7160104 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings. 102 103 104 Ibid. Specifically. Finally. 880). As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. maintain peace and order. since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. so its use cannot be avoided. and manner of holding public assemblies. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted. 6(a). General Welfare. 4 of B. . as well as powers necessary. (Sec. public morals or public health. place. Neither is the law overbroad. since they can refer to any subject. or incidental for its efficient and effective governance.P. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies103 that would use public places. and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. which are governed by the Labor Code and other labor laws. No. No. The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec. The Local Government Code. encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities. Neither are the words “opinion. 478. which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. public convenience. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes. otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. thus: SEC. and public assemblies in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution.102 A fair and impartial reading of B. the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. Except picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute. Section 16 stating the general welfare clause. the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. 3[a] and Sec. and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments. promote health and safety. maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. political meeting or rallies held during any election campaign period. public safety. no prior restraint.” “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly content based. appropriate. enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor. promote full employment among their residents. those necessarily implied therefrom. likewise. which are governed by the Election Code and other election related laws. The words “petitioning the government for redress of grievances” come from the wording of the Constitution. local government units shall ensure and support among other things. improve public morals. Furthermore.P.146 “content-neutral” regulation of the time. 16. the preservation and enrichment of culture. There is. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions. enhance economic prosperity and social justice. p.

880. This could only mean that “maximum tolerance” is not in conflict with a “no permit.” Unfortunately. 2 The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita. which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit. submitted by the Solicitor General. other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this would be “tolerated. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. thus: The truth of the matter is the policy of “calibrated preemptive response” is in consonance with the legal definition of “maximum tolerance” under Section 3 (c) of B. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila. the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act. no rally policy” or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under certain circumstances for . No.P.” Clearly. shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued. Blg. which is the “highest degree of restraint that the military. Blg. the popular connotation of “maximum tolerance” has departed from its real essence under B. police and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. More so. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable “freedom park” or mall in their respective jurisdictions which. for those who cannot wait. As stated earlier. since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B. however. Freedom parks. 15. as far as practicable. Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time: SEC.147 Finally. 880. and which recognizes certain instances when water cannons may be used. 880.P. the phrase “maximum tolerance” has acquired a different meaning over the years.P. It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit.

I only wanted to disabuse the minds of the public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of keeping the peace even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard. Read: 1. Far from being insidious. B. It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to violate any law.P. arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . I wanted to send a message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter. not the government. when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of maximum tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted and much abused definition that it has now acquired. Primicias vs. insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance. Thus I said. . 71 . it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms. . Our law enforcers should calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with the view to preempting the outbreak of violence. In sum. Thus. “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists. For this reason. and Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR).31 SCRA 734 and 742 2. . 880. Fuguso. is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. . the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people. 80 Phil. WHEREFORE. Right of assembly. especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. No. the maximum amount of tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. “we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit.. unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. no rally policy . it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time. the petitions are GRANTED in part. 57 Phil 255 3. On the other hand. Evangelista vs. Earnshaw.148 indeed.” None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. place and manner of assemblies.

HON. 346 5. The service areas of DZNC and Star FM extend from the province of Isabela to throughout Region II and the Cordillera region. 105[6] THE ONLY OTHER STATION OPERATING IN CAUAYAN CITY. BAGNOS MAXIMO. INC. 106 SCRA 685 12. RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY OF CAUAYAN. (“CBS”). Ruiz vs. Araneta University Foundation. April 2. Arreza vs. runs Star FM DWIT Cauayan (“Star FM”). 179411).R.: Bombo Radyo Philippines (“Bombo Radyo”) operates several radio stations under the AM and FM band throughout the Philippines. Ramento. Isabela. 170270 &179411.51 SCRA 189 7. 13. These stations are operated by corporations organized and incorporated by Bombo Radyo. ISABELA. an affiliate corporation under the Bombo Radyo network which holds title over the properties used by Bombo Radyo stations throughout the country. CEASAR G. vs. particularly petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network. is owned by the family of respondent Mayor Dy. The property is owned by CBS Development Corporation (CDC). G. Among the stations run by Newsounds is Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC). Cauayan City.149 4. 154 SCRA 542 13. Gordon.R. 129 SCRA 359 11. 99 Phil. In 1996. Reyes vs. airing on the FM band. Navarro vs. No. MEER. Freedom from prior restraint Closing a radio station is definitely prior restraint NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. Inc. (“Newsounds”) and Consolidated Broadcasting System. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM. Villegas. Nestle' Phils. 106 . J. an AM radio broadcast station operating out of Cauayan City. Malabanan vs. Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting stations. TIP. also operating out of Cauayan City. Villar vs. Isabela. 137 SCRA 94 6. Nos. Guevara. 126 SCRA 233 9. Sanchez. DY. 2009 TINGA. Carpio vs. in turn. De la Cruz vs. 31 SCRA 731 6. Ela. Philippine Blooming Mills Case. management office and transmitters on property located in Minante 2. FELICISIMO G. Bagatsing. Inc.106[7] On 28 June 105 [6] Rollo (G. 135 SCRA 705 10. [7] Id.see guidelines 8. p. 125 SCRA 553. CBS.

108[9] That same day. On 15 January of that year.”115[16] Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers before. and from 1996 to 2001. at 92.111[12] During that period. [13] Id.114[15] Maximo. noting as well that the location “is classified as a Commercial area. petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayor’s permit. at 91. [14] Id. the 107 [8] Id. 111 [12] Id. [15] Id.112[13] All that changed beginning in 2002. Both stations successfully secured all necessary operating documents. representatives of petitioners formally requested then City Zoning Administrator-Designate Bagnos Maximo (Maximo) to issue a zoning clearance for the property. at 90. DZNC and Star FM operated as radio stations.107[8] On 5 July 1996. the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a Zoning Decision certifying the property as commercial. CDC’s property was classified as “commercial. The following day. 108[9] Id. or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to commercial land.150 1996. and therefrom. . the City Assessor’s Office in Cauayan City noted on CDC’s Declaration of Real Property filed for 2002 confirmed that based on the existing file. at 103-110.”113[14] On 28 January. at 111. CDC was issued by the then municipal government of Cauayan a building permit authorizing the construction of a commercial establishment on the property. 112 113 114 115 [16] Id.”109[10] Similar certifications would be issued by OMPDC from 1997 to 2001. however. at 98-102. 110 [11] Id. the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) of Cauayan affirmed that the commercial structure to be constructed by CDC conformed to local zoning regulations. including mayor’s permits from 1997 to 2001. 109 [10] Id.110[11] A building was consequently erected on the property. at 103. CDC paid real property taxes on the property based on the classification of the land as commercial. at 93-97. at 18-19. required petitioners to submit “either an approved land conversion papers from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land.

I S S U E: Is the closure of the petitioners’ radio stations constitutional? HELD: The closure constitutes prior restraint. 4. 471. THEREAFTER. COMELEC.151 OMPDC had consistently certified that the property had been classified as commercial. 137 Phil. The fundamental constitutional principle that informs our analysis of both petitions is the freedom of speech. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits. They admit that in 2001. of expression or the press. Branch 20 to compel the municipality to allow the radio stations to operate. Bombo Radyo “was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored 116 [32] Article 3. with the RTC of Cauayan City. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus.116[32] Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. Sec. The petition was accompanied by an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. or action for damages. 492 (1969). or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. both provisional reliefs being denied by the RTC through an Order dated 20 April 2004. Thereafter. there is undeniable political color. 20-171. [33] Gonzales v. docketed as SCA No. prosecution for sedition. 117 . this case before the Supreme Court. Hence. In their tale. THE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS PADLOCKED THE RADIO STATIONS BASED ON THE GROUND THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO SUBMIT THE requisite zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the mayor’s permit because there was allegedly no DAR Decision converting said land from agricultural to commercial.117[33] Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the right to free speech and of the press. the petition was dismissed by the RTC as well as the Court of Appeals.

the weight of government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary school child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech animates these cases. that have impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast. “Isabela gov who ended a dynasty wins RM prize. Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents. at http://opinion. 15 February 2008. No. p. 121 122 123 [39] Social Weather Stations. 585 (2001).net/inquireropinion/letterstotheeditor/view /20080801-151950/Isabela-gov-who-ended-a-dynasty-winsRM-prize 120 [36] Rollo (G. governor of Isabela from 2001 until he was defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca. we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech. 491.123[39] not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. 170270).120 [36] Petitioners likewise direct our attention to a 20 February 2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending “to file disenfranchisement proceedings against DZNCAM. United States. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely. Gonzales. 29 L.”121[37] The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Jr. 15 February 2008. [37] Rollo (G. 713. if not broadcast at all. 179411). 17. 409 Phil. 142.inquirer. Gonzales. whatever may be the motive. No. 571. v. respondents in their official capacities have taken actions. Beginning in 2002. p.R. 119 [35] See TJ Burgonio. a former assistant station manager at petitioners’ own DZNC Bombo Radyo. 545 SCRA 441. 124 [40] Chavez v. G. Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.R. No. .R. 824 (1971).122[38] While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality. 492. Inc. and had been doing so for some years undisturbed by local authorities. G. DWDY.152 118[34] respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.R.” Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy. Ed.119[35] A rival AM radio station in Cauayan City. 714. COMELEC.” Philippine Daily Inquirer (1 August 2008). 2d 822. 170270). expression or of the press. 27. No. p. is owned and operated by the Dy family. 545 SCRA 441. [38] Chavez v. 168338. 168335. 403 U.R. citing New York Times v.. These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those stations under color of legal authority.S.124[40] That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who happen to 118 [34] Rollo (G. No.

among others.. supra note 44. 2001).e.’ There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation. 15 February 2008. Indeed. With specific reference to DZNC.1. and a contentbased restraint or censorship. 129 . et al. supra note 39. jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation.128[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech. No. 545 SCRA 441. meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior. at 957. place or manner.. the conduct of public officials that are detrimental to the constituents of Isabela. the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. 127[43] Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression. 126 [42] SWS v..” 126[42] At the same time. Gonzales. or one that merely controls the time. is engaged in discussing public issues that include. However. G. the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a content-based restraint. at 964.R. 493. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (14th ed. . to this date. merely concerned with the incidents of the speech.129[45] Ostensibly.. COMELEC: “Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech.. ‘any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. petitioners make the following relevant allegations: 6. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech. including Cauayan City.125[41] We had said in SWS v. [43] Chavez v. In their petition for mandamus filed with the RTC. 168338. COMELEC. et al. i. . as content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or business enterprise within the LGU. In view of its wide 125 [41] GUNTHER. . 127 128 [44] GUNTHER. such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. and under well defined standards. i. are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny. Newsounds. and the press.e.153 be members of the press is clear enough. when applied to a radio station. the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued. [45] Id. expression. The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.

Corollarily.” Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents’ denial of petitioners’ renewal applications on the ground that the Property is commercial is merely a pretext and that their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. [47] Id. No.2. Such timing emphasizes the ill motives of respondents. al. supra note 44. is owned and operated by the family of respondent Dy. 170.130[46] xxxx 35. This is a blatant violation of the petitioners’ constitutional right to press freedom.1. Respondents closure of petitioners’ radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. 179411). The closure comes at a most critical time when the people are set to exercise their right of suffrage. Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.3. expression and petition the government for redress of grievances.. The United States Supreme Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm violation of the First Amendment. 131 132 . 35. [53] GUNTHER et. 35.154 coverage. 132[53] 130 [46] Rollo (G. respondent Dy was quoted as saying that he will “disenfranchise the radio station. It is just too coincidental that it was only after the 2001 elections (i. p.R. 6. It must be pointed out that in the 2001 elections. The timing of respondents’ closure of petitioners’ radio stations is also very telling. and the people’s corollary right to freedom of speech. DZNC has always been at the forefront of the struggle to maintain and uphold freedom of the press. 35.. at 178-179. Newsound’s only rival AM station in Cauayan and the rest of Isabela.e.2. In an article found in the Philippine Daily inquirer dated 20 February 2004. DZNC has been a primary medium for the exercise of the people of Isabela of their constitutional right to free speech.131[47] All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut down petitioner’s radio station were ultimately content-based. 2002) that the Mayor’s Office started questioning petitioners’ applications for renewal of their mayor’s permits. DWDY.

which provides: Art. 20 January 2009. the right to damages from respondents is squarely assured by Article 32 (2) of the Civil Code. Any public officer or employee. 122846. gender. No. No evidence to that effect was presented by the respondents either to the petitioners. violates or 133 [54] See White Light v. of laws dealing with the regulation of speech. G. should only obtain upon clear proof that the property from where the business would operate was classified as agricultural under the LGU’s land use plan or zoning ordinances and other relevant laws. P1 Million in exemplary damages. or to the courts. 711 (1998). let us now turn to the appropriate reliefs that should be granted.134[55] the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression. or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 32. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason. We turn to the issue of damages. or any private individual. Court of Appeals. 692.155 The facts confronting us now could have easily been drawn up by a constitutional law professor eager to provide a plain example on how free speech may be violated. COMELEC. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure “approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land. 351 Phil. who directly or indirectly obstructs. Given respondents’ clear violation of petitioners’ constitutional guarantee of free expression.133[54] The immediate implication of the application of the “strict scrutiny” test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners’ constitutional rights. The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court. [55] Osmeña v. Petitioners had sought to recover from respondents P8 Million in temperate damages.” That requirement. and P1 Million in attorney’s fees. Having established that respondents had violated petitioners’ legal and constitutional rights.R. as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process. 134 . the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech. assuming that it can be demanded by a local government in the context of approving mayor’s permits. defeats.

P8 Million. No. We noted in Lim v. 991. 236 SCRA 227.156 in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x (2) Freedom of speech. 137 138 [88] According to an article posted on the official website of Bombo Radyo. 183. from the nature of the case.R. 2225. 6 March 2009) 139 [89] 140 See CIVIL CODE. 86720.bomboradyo. 1001 (1975). the amount of which nevertheless being difficult to prove. 2224. . p. by purposely denying the commercial character of the property in order to deny 135 [85] 160 Phil. petitioners have maintained before this Court the same amount.htm (last visited.138[88] The lost potential income during that one and a half year of closure can only be presumed as substantial enough.”139[89] Exemplary damages can be awarded herein. Still. but the actions of respondents led to the closure of their radio stations from June 2004 until this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction in January 2006. No. DZNC accordingly resumed broadcast on 8 February 2006. The present prayer for temperate damages is premised on the existence of pecuniary injury to petitioner due to the actions of respondents. v. [87] See CIVIL CODE. 2 September 1994. be proved with certainty..R. See also MHP Garments. Ponce de Leon that “[p]ublic officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties… [and] the object of [Article 32 of the Civil Code] is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith.137[87] The existence of pecuniary injury at bar cannot be denied.136[86] Temperate damages avail when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not. 136 [86] Rollo (G. possibly unanticipated when the original amount for claimed temperate damages was calculated.”140[90] Respondents.com/archive/ new/stationprofile /bombocauayan/index. The said amount is “reasonable under the circumstances.”135[85] The application of Article 32 not only serves as a measure of pecuniary recovery to mitigate the injury to constitutional rights. Petitioners had no way of knowing it when they filed their petition. Art. despite that fact. for temperate damages. G. Public officers who violate the Constitution they are sworn to uphold embody “a poison of wickedness that may not run through the body politic. since temperate damages are available. Court of Appeals. 235. it likewise serves notice to public officers and employees that any violation on their part of any person’s guarantees under the Bill of Rights will meet with final reckoning. Art. See http://www. 179411). Inc.

Respondent Michael M. petitioner. fraudulent. CA. 82 (1982). made the following remarks: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo. are hereby reversed and set aside. masahol pa sa putang babae yan. APRIL 29. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD. Prior restraint on a TV Program BRO. G. separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. 2009 VELASCO.. 76.141[91] The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages. Id.. Leviste. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. sinungaling. 142 [92] 143 [3] Patricio v. [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas.. L-51832. fraudulent. NO. as host of the program Ang Dating Daan. 2004. We likewise deem the prayer for P1 Million in attorney’s fees as suitable under the circumstances.. at around 10:00 p.142[92] and the sought for amount of P1 Million is more than appropriate.m. o di ba! O. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.” Octot v. 141 [91] “[The award of exemplary damages] would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton. . oppressive or malevolent manner. WHEREFORE. citing Ong Yiu v. oppressive and malevolent manner. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba. before the MTRCB. 91 SCRA 223. Ybañez. etc. Branch 24. JR. at 924. supra note 87.: On August 10. who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark. at 85. 2004 in relation [90] [Exemplary damages] are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic. et al. J. Private Respondents’ Memorandum. Sandoval. Galapon and seven other private respondents. reckless. manifested bad faith in a wanton. aired on UNTV 37. against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. 26 April 1989.143[3] Forthwith. masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba.” Octot v. all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC). Ybañez.R. No. was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. ELISEO SORIANO VS. 197 Phil. G. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City. the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16. Gago ka talaga Michael. Two days after. Hon.157 petitioners’ the exercise of their constitutional rights and their business.R. 164785. the petitions are GRANTED.

a Decision is hereby rendered. No. Id. 164785.144[4] After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared. “Ang Dating Daan”. . in relation to Sec. [9] Id. followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. at 141-151. in Adm. docketed as G.148[8] docketed as G. SO ORDERED. at 110.146[6] Two days after. the MTRCB. at 378. In G. 165636. at 112-113. preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days. Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. [6] Id. Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Hearing for Violations of PD 1986 and the IRR. [7] Id. 2004. at 166-252.149[9] Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief. 01-04. No. by Order of August 16. however. [8] Id. 164785. in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order.158 to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10.R. 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan.R. 145[5] The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation. 3. 7. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case. (PD) 1986.R. 2004. finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program. in view of all the foregoing. No. at 152-154. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. The following day. On September 27. the MTRCB issued a decision. petitioner raises the following issues: THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION 144 [4] 145 [5] 146 147 148 149 Id. petitioner sought to withdraw147[7] his motion for reconsideration. creating the MTRCB. to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued. Case No.

petitioner relies on the following grounds: SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986. THE [IRR].R. AND (E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION. ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH. CONSEQUENTLY. . UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW. I. CONSEQUENTLY. 165636. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004. UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION.E. RULES OF PROCEDURE. II SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986. ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH. (D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION. at 182. (C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004. SPEECH. RULES OF PROCEDURE. I. IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT: I SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS. AND III [PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE 150 [10] Id. AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO. AND EXPRESSION AS IT PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT CURTAILING THE SAME. AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER.159 (A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS.. (B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH.150[10] In G. AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO. No. AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER.

powers and duties: BOARD shall xxxx 151 [11] 152 [12] 153 154 1. [13] Pimentel v. and is necessary for the exercise of. 116033.—The have the following functions. It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension. although its implementability had already been overtaken and veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed September 27. Powers and Functions. 101 SCRA 769. quasi-legislative. No. the authority given should be liberally construed. L-53581-83.R. 1980. February 26.154[14] A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority. No. Petitioner’s contention is untenable. by law. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004. Abellera. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2005). its power of regulation and supervision. or a mix of the five. or quasi-judicial.153[13] And in determining whether an agency has certain powers. 2004 decision. 164785 We shall first dispose of the issues in G. CONSEQUENTLY. regulatory. G. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following: Section 3. to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH151[11] G. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative. But once ascertained as existing. investigatory. 164785. No. regarding the assailed order of preventive suspension. No. THE [IRR]. December 19. citing Matienzon v. [14] Agpalo. June 8. albeit impliedly. AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO.160 DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY REASON THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS. Azarcon v. 1988. COMELEC. at 46. 77632. 162 SCRA . as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute.R. expressly or impliedly. RULES OF PROCEDURE.R. G. And this authority stems naturally from. Nos. Id. 1997. Sec.R. 268 SCRA 747. Sandiganbayan.152[12] They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated. the inquiry should be from the law itself. I.E.

television programs and publicity materials. distributed. exhibition. in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard. and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures. which. permits for the x x x production. to the end that no such pictures. as quoted above. (Emphasis added. exhibited and/or broadcast by television. and grant. regulate. programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x produced. regulate. television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph. injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people. are objectionable for being immoral. xxxx (d) To supervise. leased. to the end that no such pictures.161 c) To approve or disapprove. and grant.) The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986. distribution. the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or . delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the x x x production. deny or cancel. deny or cancel. contrary to law and/or good customs. whether living or dead. reproduced. and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures. which empowers the MTRCB to “supervise. permits for the x x x exhibition. x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures. indecent. xxxx k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television. more particularly under its Sec. 3(d). sold. copying.” Surely. lease. sale. copied. or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to: xxxx vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person. television programs and publicity materials.

207 SCRA 689.155[15] And the power to discipline and impose penalties. among others. 3. and/or closure of the x x x television network.R.R. it ought to be noted. No. . 1995. Chapter XIII of the IRR provides: Sec. No. 155 [15] 156 [16] Lastimoso v. 1992. outrun its authority under the law. Alonzo v. and in order to prevent or stop further violations or for the interest and welfare of the public. PREVENTION SUSPENSION ORDER. to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or supervising television programs. supervise. preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986. Court of Appeals. Vasquez. cable TV station x x x provided that the temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have a life of not more than twenty (20) days from the date of issuance. the aforequoted Sec. Any other construal would render its power to regulate. empower itself to impose preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986.R. by imposing the assailed preventive suspension.162 implied from such mandate. May 10. Sec. indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and. March 31. But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986. such as preventive suspension. Neither did the MTRCB. the Chairman of the Board may issue a Preventive Suspension Order mandating the preventive x x x suspension of the permit/permits involved. to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.––Any time during the pendency of the case. Preventive suspension. imposed pursuant. during such investigation. G. Sec. is not a penalty by itself.156[16] To reiterate. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of. pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. No. 110590. G. 1995. without more. 97149. to repeat. carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and. It is true that the matter of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. or discipline illusory. Far from it. Capulong. as petitioner insinuates. Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed. The MTRCB did not. 243 SCRA 497. on MTRCB. to prevent further violations as it investigates. being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool. albeit impliedly. In the final analysis. 3. if granted. 3. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion. corollarily. 116801. 244 SCRA 80. G. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. April 6. Beja v.

the power to impose preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of MTRCB. appeared before that Board for a hearing on private respondents’ complaint. 1974. Electoral Commission.R. would give the agency little leeway to operate.163 Sec. Under Sec. 3. 2007. 3(k). the suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure that can be undertaken. What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as much. citing Azarcon. limiting the MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the law. the MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner. at 761. National Housing Authority. 157[17] As we held in Angara v.R. August 21. . Just as untenable is petitioner’s argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of hearing. 177 (1936). the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages. 159 [19] Rollo (G. L-29236 & 29247. 58 SCRA 493. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends to grant the MTRCB a wide room for flexibility in its operation. As it were. it was done after MTRCB duly 157 [17] Chavez v. Santiago. 139. implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling act. every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case. 295-296. No. Nos. And while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a television network. G.” Indeed. supra note 12. in response to a written notice. 158 [18] 63 Phil. Petitioner’s restrictive reading of PD 1986.” In this particular case. stifling and rendering it inutile. Radio Communications of the Philippines. August 15.158[18] Clearly. We cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable only to motion pictures and publicity materials. when Sec. the power to impose preventive suspension pending investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB. we reiterate.159[19] proving that he had already appeared before the MTRCB. Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986. sufficient to authorize the MTRCB’s assailed action. 530 SCRA 235. preventive suspension shall issue “[a]ny time during the pendency of the case. when a general grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined. Inc. “To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. 164785). 497. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was issued after the adjournment of the hearing. with the purpose of stopping further violations of PD 1986. provides. As distinguished from express powers. The scope of the MTRCB’s authority extends beyond motion pictures. No. Sec. Again. v. 12. p. 164527.

on the other. January 20. The Court need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner. owing to the preventive suspension order. Hernandez. 206 SCRA 256. Petitioner’s position does not persuade. use language similar to that which he used in his own. and the INC ministers.161[21] At any event. For another. 1992. 301 SCRA 278. in their TV programs.164[24] Surely. citing Ichong v. The equal protection clause demands that “all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike. No.”163[23] It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. 127410. Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. 1155 (1957) and other cases. at 95. Melgar. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics. under the premises. place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers. under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. February 13. this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The section reads as follows: 160 [20] 161 [21] Id. Id.R. are. as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan. No. 163 [23] 1 De Leon. he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. Espiritu v. adding that words like “putang babae” were said in exercise of his religious freedom. arguing that. at 94. on one hand. 164 [24] Tiu v.R. are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. 1999. Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom. supra note 16. as host of Ang Dating Daan. necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. . within the purview of this case. who. G. The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. submitting that what he uttered was religious speech.162[22] Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of the law. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 274 (2003). 5. for one. Guingona. petitioner cannot. The argument has no merit. G. that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing. he offers no proof that the said ministers. 101 Phil. 162 [22] Beja.164 160[20] apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation. 100874. simply too different to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.

apart from his religious freedom. No. his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Sec.165[25] Each method though. because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and accessibility to children. tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech protection. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance. Jr. . The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. 1985. citing FCC v. 166 [26] Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. 438 U. with broadcast media.R. and motion pictures come within the broad protection of the free speech and expression clause. or subsequent liability. No.S. supra note 25. 1985. judicial injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise.. Paramount Pictures. L-69500. Kalaw Katigbak. July 22. 165636 Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on the main ground that the decision violates. 137 SCRA 628. shall forever be allowed. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief. Pacifica Foundation. 334 U. unconstitutional for reasons articulated in this petition. Dans. nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. or of the press. are anathema to the freedom of expression. prosecution for sedition. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. enjoying a lesser degree of protection. Gonzales v. without discrimination or preference. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. television. Jr. No. He would also have the Court declare PD 1986. which reads: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. e. III of the Constitution. July 19.. radio. of expression.S. of all forms of communication. 4. be it in the form of prior restraint. its Sec.165 No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion. 166[26] Just as settled is the rule that restrictions. whether in libel and damage suits. Art. 137 SCRA 717.g. 3(c) in particular. It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in 165[25] US v. 726. Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. or contempt proceedings.. G. 131. Dans. L-59329.

S.171[31] “there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech that are harmful. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements. at 248. State of New Hampshire. with like effect. i.. supra note 31. 167 [27] J. Bernas. Trohwerk v. not absolute. [29] . as noted in Chaplinsky v. 568 (1942). 490. however. those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security. some forms of speech not being protected. 92 SCRA 476. 168 169 170 [28] Lagunsad v. October 30. United States. the constitutional guarantee “obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of language. supra note 27. S. Soto vda.R. The freedom of expression. [30] G. Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358 (2006). 344 SCRA 481. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests. 2000. meaning that restrictions on unprotected speech may be decreed without running afoul of the freedom of speech clause. 173[33] Chaplinsky.. supra at 218. obscenity or pornography. as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others. some forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution. at 248. false or misleading advertisement. The Court rules otherwise. cited in Bernas. L-32066.168[28] In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes.”170[30] Indeed. 1979. 204 (1919). 136185. cited in Bernas.e.166 167[27] advance of actual publication or dissemination. and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. No.” In net effect.”173[33] Being of little or no value. supra note 27. insulting or “fighting words”. De Gonzales. they being essentially modes of weighing competing values. determining which of the clashing interests should be advanced.”169[29] From Lucas v. there is. August 6. 171[31] 315 U. No.174[34] or. the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. no imperative call for the application of the clear and present danger rule or the balancing-of-interest test. 172[32] Agpalo. in dealing with or regulating them. Royo comes this line: “[T]he freedom to express one’s sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. As has been held. 174[34] Bernas.G. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 205 (1996).S. is. the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems. 249 U. 172[32] A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.J.

167

The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as
obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in
that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of Appeals,
the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition of
obscenity that would apply to all cases, but nonetheless stated the
ensuing observations on the matter:
There is no perfect definition of “obscenity” but the latest
word is that of Miller v. California which established basic
guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude
that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining
what is “patently offensive.” x x x What remains clear is that
obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion. 175
[35]

Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v.
California,176[36] a patently offensive utterance would come within
the pale of the term obscenity should it appeal to the prurient interest
of an average listener applying contemporary standards.
A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and
the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average adult, the
utterances “Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae x
x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito]
kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!” may not constitute
obscene but merely indecent utterances. They can be viewed as
figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they
were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult.
The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered
in a TV program that is rated “G” or for general viewership, and in a
time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children.
While adults may have understood that the terms thus used
were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be expected to
have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the
unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television
broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. The term
“putang babae” means “a female prostitute,” a term wholly
175

[35]

176

[36]

G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 351, 360-361.
413 U.S. 15.

168

inappropriate for children, who could look it up in a dictionary and
just get the literal meaning, missing the context within which it was
used. Petitioner further used the terms, “ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba,” making reference to the female sexual organ and how a
female prostitute uses it in her trade, then stating that Sandoval was
worse than that by using his mouth in a similar manner. Children
could be motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what
petitioner said, also without placing the phrase in context. They
may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female
prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon learning
the meanings of the words used, young minds, without the guidance
of an adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent speech
as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in their
own speech or form their own ideas on the matter. In this particular
case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioner’s words,
when speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity, we are
speaking of the average child, not the average adult. The average
child may not have the adult’s grasp of figures of speech, and may
lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and words
may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject
speech is very suggestive of a female sexual organ and its function
as such. In this sense, we find petitioner’s utterances obscene and
not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.
Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene
but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that petitioner
cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech.
Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to
children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be
treated as unprotected speech.
No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive
utterances. But while a jurisprudential pattern involving certain
offensive utterances conveyed in different mediums has emerged,
this case is veritably one of first impression, it being the first time
that indecent speech communicated via television and the applicable
norm for its regulation are, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point.
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica
Foundation,177[37] a 1978 American landmark case cited in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr.178[38] and Chavez v.
Gonzales,179[39] is a rich source of persuasive lessons. Foremost of
these relates to indecent speech without prurient appeal component
coming under the category of protected speech depending on the
context within which it was made, irresistibly suggesting that, within

177

[37]

178

[38]

179

438 U.S. 726.
Supra note 25.
[39]
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.

169

a particular context, such indecent speech may validly be
categorized as unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction.
In FCC, seven of what were considered “filthy” words 180[40]
earlier recorded in a monologue by a satiric humorist later aired in
the afternoon over a radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation.
Upon the complaint of a man who heard the pre-recorded
monologue while driving with his son, FCC declared the language
used as “patently offensive” and “indecent” under a prohibiting
law, though not necessarily obscene. FCC added, however, that its
declaratory order was issued in a “special factual context,” referring,
in gist, to an afternoon radio broadcast when children were
undoubtedly in the audience. Acting on the question of whether the
FCC could regulate the subject utterance, the US Supreme Court
ruled in the affirmative, owing to two special features of the
broadcast medium, to wit: (1) radio is a pervasive medium and (2)
broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. The US Court,
however, hastened to add that the monologue would be protected
speech in other contexts, albeit it did not expound and identify a
compelling state interest in putting FCC’s content-based regulatory
action under scrutiny.
The Court in Chavez181[41] elucidated on the distinction between
regulation or restriction of protected speech that is content-based
and that which is content-neutral. A content-based restraint is aimed
at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a content-neutral
restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the
expression under well-defined standards tailored to serve a
compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of the
expression. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny.
With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB
imposed under the premises was, in one perspective, permissible
restriction. We make this disposition against the backdrop of the
following interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made
via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v.
Kalaw Katigbak,182[42] easily “reaches every home where there is a
set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid viewers of
the programs therein shown”; second, the broadcast was aired at the
time of the day when there was a reasonable risk that children might
be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a “G”
or “for general patronage” rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of
Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage
is “[s]uitable for all ages,” meaning that the “material for television
x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain anything
180

[40]

181

[41]

182

“Shit, piss, fuck, tits, etc.”
Supra note 39.
[42]
Supra note 26.

170

unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult
guidance or supervision.” The words petitioner used were, by any
civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language
is categorized as indecent, as in petitioner’s utterances on a generalpatronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech.
A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only
to pornography,183[43] false or misleading advertisement, 184[44]
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and expression endangering
national security. But this list is not, as some members of the Court
would submit, exclusive or carved in stone. Without going into
specifics, it may be stated without fear of contradiction that US
decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As the
Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against
censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet another
exception, another instance of unprotected speech, created by the
necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. As unprotected
speech, petitioner’s utterances can be subjected to restraint or
regulation.
Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained
undisturbed since 1978, petitioner asserts that his utterances must
present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive
evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and such danger must
be grave and imminent.185[45]
Petitioner’s invocation of the clear and present danger
doctrine, arguably the most permissive of speech tests, would not
avail him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for
under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated by Justice
Holmes, accords protection for utterances so that the printed or
spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint or subsequent
punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present danger
of bringing about a substantial evil which the government has the
power to prohibit.186[46] Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and
of press is susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary
to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
government may lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved
in the context of prosecutions for rebellion and other crimes
involving the overthrow of government.187[47] It was originally
designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech
that espouses anti-government action, or to have serious and
183[43]

Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, supra.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque III, G.R.
No. 173034, October 9, 2007, 535 SCRA 265.
185
[45]
Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 226.
186[46]
16A Am Jur. 2d Constitutional Law Sec. 493; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47.
187[47]
Bernas, supra note 27, at 219-220.
184[44]

171

substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public
order of the community.188[48] The clear and present danger rule has
been applied to this jurisdiction.189[49] As a standard of limitation on
free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger test is
not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away
with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims
to free speech and which compels a court to release a defendant
from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of
imminent catastrophic disaster.190[50] As we observed in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation, the clear and present danger test “does
not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.”191[51]
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only
test which has been applied by the courts. Generally, said doctrine
is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and
even other evils which do not clearly undermine national security.
Since not all evils can be measured in terms of “proximity and
degree” the Court, however, in several cases—Ayer Productions v.
Capulong192[52] and Gonzales v. COMELEC,193[53] applied the
balancing of interests test. Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
in Gonzales v. COMELEC, elucidated in his Separate Opinion that
“where the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the
freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way and
where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the
probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even
of impressionistic calculation,”194[54] then the “balancing of interests”
test can be applied.
The Court explained also in Gonzales v. COMELEC the
“balancing of interests” test:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public
order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of
the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under
the particular circumstances presented. x x x We must, therefore,
undertake the “delicate and difficult task x x x to weigh the
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights
x x x.
188[48]

Gonzales v. COMELEC, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 811; Adiong v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712.
190[50]
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707 & 80578, February 1, 1989, 170 SCRA 1.
191[51]
Supra note 25, at 635.
192[52]
No. L-82380, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861.
193
[53]
Supra note 48.
194
[54]
Supra at 898.
189[49]

172

In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the
conflicting social values and individual interests competing for
ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the court in
Douds laid the basis for what has been called the “balancing-ofinterests” test which has found application in more recent decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the “balancing” test
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation.
xxxx
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be
secured by Congressional power restricting the individual’s
freedom, and the social importance and value of the freedom so
restricted, “are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of
abstractions,” a wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in
ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are (a) the
social value and importance of the specific aspect of the particular
freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific thrust of the
restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether
or not the persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of
the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation––the
reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which
Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the specific restriction
decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the
protection of such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary
safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by
some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom. 195[55]
This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor
Kauper,196[56] rests on the theory that it is the court’s function in a
case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation, on
the one hand, and the free expression clause affected by it, on the
other, to balance one against the other and arrive at a judgment
where the greater weight shall be placed. If, on balance, it appears
that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such
nature that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the court
will find the legislation valid. In short, the balance-of-interests
theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not
absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and expression
clause, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve
appropriate and important interests.197[57] To the mind of the Court,
195[55]

Supra at 899-900.
Kauper, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 113 (1966); cited in Gonzales v. COMELEC, supra
note 48; also cited in J.G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY (2003).
197
[57]
Id.
196[56]

173

the balancing of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to
follow.
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene
language and a three (3)-month suspension was slapped on him for
breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion by petitioner
of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against the duty
of the government to protect and promote the development and
welfare of the youth.
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the
arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to free speech,
the Court rules that the government’s interest to protect and promote
the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the
reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner’s prayer to
continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension
period.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted
to citizens of a State is the freedom of speech or expression, for
without the enjoyment of such right, a free, stable, effective, and
progressive democratic state would be difficult to attain. Arrayed
against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social being which the State is
constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State
is also mandated to recognize and support the vital role of the youth
in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation
and responsibility on the State to provide protection to the youth
against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice their
general well-being. The Article on youth, approved on second
reading by the Constitutional Commission, explained that the State
shall “extend social protection to minors against all forms of neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and practices which may foster
racial, religious or other forms of discrimination.”198[58]
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending
social protection to minors against all forms of neglect, exploitation,
and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a
compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory
mechanisms, protect their children’s minds from exposure to
undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. The Constitution,
no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and
protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social wellbeing of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field
198

[58]

Bernas, supra note 27, at 81.

because of age or interest capacity. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank. [61] Id. for example. a less liberal approach calls for observance. It cannot be denied though 199 [59] 200 [60] 201 CONSTITUTION. FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the children who. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. even those too young to read. New York that the government’s interest in the “well-being of its youth” and in supporting “parents’ claim to authority in their own household” justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by offensive language.201[61] constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. . as parens patriae.. amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting. was easily accessible to the children. may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children. might have been incomprehensible to a first grader. Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material. the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them. it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. Gonzales v. id. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to attend to the welfare of the young: x x x It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned. thus: [B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Art.. Moreover. Sec. 13.200[60] Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast. Sec. Id. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way. television reaches every home where there is a set. II. 12. In the same way.174 199[59] of nation-building. Although Cohen’s written message. without doubt. coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its source. As such. the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character. Bookstores and motion picture theaters. [“Fuck the Draft”]. We held in Ginsberg v.

like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. in conclusion. x x x The [FFC’s] decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all important.202[62] The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action MTRCB took in the narrow confines of the case.) There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. to regulate and prevent should such action served and further compelling state interests. or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. nay duty. at 729. The time of day was emphasized by the [FFC]. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers. the court takes stock of and cites with approval the following excerpts from FCC: It is appropriate. insulting.’ We simply hold that when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor. The content of the program in which the language is used will affect the composition of the audience x x x.” Ergo. To reiterate. As Mr. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction. And in agreeing with MTRCB. 202 [62] Supra note 26. to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or subsequent punishment that. or offensive words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is. (Citation omitted. . as a medium of broadcast of a patently offensive speech.” Public interest would be served if the “pig” is reasonably restrained or even removed from the “parlor. includes prior restraint. One who utters indecent.175 that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young. the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene. This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher. a “pig in the parlor. albeit indirectly. and (3) the “G” rating of the Ang Dating Daan program. in the graphic language of FCC. Justice Sutherland wrote a ‘nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place. (2) the time of broadcast. It is the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative. however. petitioner’s offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint. FCC justified the restraint on the TV broadcast grounded on the following considerations: (1) the use of television with its unique accessibility to children.

The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and television shows. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Puno. serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health. television. public morals.R. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S.e. we are not ready to hold that [PD 1986] is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. i. 552. July 26.176 After a review of the facts. we upheld this setup in Sotto vs.. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies. xxx xxxx While the thesis has a lot to commend itself. regardless of its character. The Board can classify movies and television programs and can cancel permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast. 259 SCRA 529.”203[63] 203 [63] G. was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent. Ruiz. 544. the Court wrote: We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. To clarify. 1996. or public welfare. As far back as 1921. including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene language in Ang Dating Daan. viz: “The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program. even religious programs. No. Court of Appeals. 119673. . and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people. statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech.

R.177 Bernas adds: Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what movies and television programs or parts of either are fit for public consumption.204[64] Moreover. rebellion or sedition. injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people.” or “tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government and/or duly constituted authorities. among others. indecent. 448 SCRA 575. The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. As lucidly explained by Justice Dante O. In this scheme. otherwise. chaos would result in the television broadcast industry as competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each other’s signals.” and what “tend to incite subversion. As FCC teaches. like suspension or cancellation of permit.205[65] it was held that the power of review and prior approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation. at 235. contrary to law and/or good customs.” etc. 155282. their right to enjoy their freedom of speech is subject to that requirement. It decides what movies are “immoral. Ang Dating Daan. government regulations through the MTRCB became “a necessary evil” with the government taking the role of assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. 3(i) of PD 1986 and the remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel or tort. the suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered on the evening of August 10. its decisions are executory unless stopped by a court. Rather. And the imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec. January 17. Moreover. in MTRCB v. 2004 in his television program. Consequently. station owners and broadcasters in effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom of speech in radio and television programs and impliedly agreed that said right may be subject to prior restraint— denial of permit or subsequent punishment. Tinga. No. It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. 2005. the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in profane or 204 [64] 205 [65] Supra note 56. insurrection. Thus. if applicable. . all broadcast networks are regulated by the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit before they air their television programs. G. The stations explicitly agreed to this regulatory scheme.

It behooves the Court to 206 [66] Supra note 65. As made clear in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation. 7 of PD 1986. in MTRCB. Television broadcasts should be subject to some form of regulation. must have the wherewithal to enforce its mandate. the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. the Court. Viewed in its proper context. it is a permissible subsequent administrative sanction. as a regulatory agency. Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. . Any simplistic suggestion. The prevention of the broadcast of petitioner’s television program is justified. considering the ease with which they can be accessed. and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry. which would not be effective if its punitive actions would be limited to mere fines. the suspension sought to penalize past speech made on prime-time “G” rated TV program. The suspension of a violating television program would be a sufficient punishment and serve as a deterrent for those responsible.206[66] sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. More importantly. program producers. that the MTRCB would be crossing the limits of its authority were it to regulate and even restrain the prime-time television broadcast of indecent or obscene speech in a “G” rated program is not acceptable. and violations of the regulations must be met with appropriate and proportional disciplinary action. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. While not on all fours. it does not bar future speech of petitioner in other television programs. but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.” The MTRCB. petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners. it should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. In fine. and does not constitute prohibited prior restraint. “the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech. Lest it be overlooked. however. the sanction imposed is not per se for petitioner’s exercise of his freedom of speech via television.178 indecent broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. For viewed in its proper perspective.

It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation. L-32096. which constitutionally may not be done. as PD 1986 does not provide for the range of imposable penalties that may be applied with respect to violations of the provisions of the law. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power.179 respond to the needs of the changing times. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.207[67] 207 [67] No. A standard thus defines legislative policy. the Court discussed the matter of undue delegation of legislative power in the following wise: It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government. to which no valid objection can be made. the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. 496-497. October 24. the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. Thereafter. In Edu v. and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. and what is the scope of his authority. marks its limits. Finally. . and craft jurisprudence to reflect these times. subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. The argument is without merit. Ericta. 1970. the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. there must be a standard. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. who is to do it. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power. For a complex economy. 35 SCRA 481. Otherwise.

penalties for violators of PD 1986. or authorize the MTRCB to impose.208[68] Given the foregoing perspective. v. it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the exhibition of TV programs carries with it or necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action for violation of the law sought to be enforced. or canceling permits for the exhibition and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures. petitioner’s protestation about undue delegation of legislative power for the sole reason that PD 1986 does not provide for a range of penalties for violation of the law is untenable. Electoral Commission. television programs. and proved. . by express and direct conferment of power and functions.180 Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing the law in question. said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its function. and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed. however. G. the MTRCB. went beyond the terms of the law. 63 Phil. every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. As the Court said in Chavez v. 1994. prescribing a schedule of penalties for violation of the provisions of the decree. 3(a) which. programs. the investiture of supervisory. citing Angara v. for reference. regulatory. March 28. No. 139 (1936). Batario. and publicity materials to the end that no such objectionable pictures. x x x [W]hen the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law. and materials shall be exhibited and/or broadcast by television. provides that agency with the 208 [68] Supra note 17.R.. denying. in promulgating the IRR of PD 1986. the first assumption being that PD 1986 does not prescribe the imposition of. 3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB “to exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose and objectives of [the law]. Jr. granting.” As earlier explained. His thesis is that MTRCB. National Housing Authority: x x x [W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined. As earlier indicated. Petitioner’s posture is flawed by the erroneous assumptions holding it together. And would it not be logical too to say that the power to deny or cancel a permit for the exhibition of a TV program or broadcast necessarily includes the lesser power to suspend? The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 231 SCRA 463. Complementing this provision is Sec. Provident Tree Farms. charged. Inc. is charged with supervising and regulating. 92285.

the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations. determine whether these audio and video materials “are objectionable for being immoral. Maceren.181 power “[to] promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of this Act. VIOLATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS. television programs.––Without prejudice to the immediate filing of the appropriate criminal action and the immediate seizure of the pertinent articles pursuant to Section 13. indecent. the IRR does not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the law or partake of the nature of an unauthorized administrative legislation.” And Chapter XIII. and related promotional materials shall be penalized with suspension or cancellation of permits and/or licenses issued by the Board and/or with the imposition of fines and other administrative penalty/penalties. in the final analysis.” and. along with the standards to be applied to determine whether there have been statutory breaches. 209[69] The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers. Id. Sec. October 18. The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to regulate the public airwaves and employ such means as it can as a guardian of the public. 458. and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives x x x. and the increased difficulty of administering the law. 3(d) and (k). In Sec. [etc. 1 of the IRR providing: Section 1. 3(c). 1977. The Board recognizes the existing Table of Administrative Penalties attached without prejudice to the power of the Board to amend it when the need arises. from there. L-32166. any violation of PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations governing motion pictures. television programs. 79 SCRA 450. and publicity materials “applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard. . In the meantime the existing revised Table of Administrative Penalties shall be enforced. contrary to law and/or good customs. no more than a measure to specifically implement the aforequoted provisions of Sec.210[70] Administrative regulations or “subordinate legislation” calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of “the growing complexity of modern life. (Emphasis added. [71] Id. The MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures.”211[71] Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room in its 209 [69] 210 [70] 211 People v.] x x x” and apply the sanctions it deems proper. No. Contrary to what petitioner implies. The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute. one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB.) This is.

may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition. the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. which sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call for. But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986. according it ample latitude in fixing. in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions. 01-04 dated September 27. The suspension should cover only the television program on which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language. for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. 01-04 dated September 27. to be sure. As thus modified. the fallo of the MTRCB shall read as follows: . offenses. 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of limiting the suspension to the program Ang Dating Daan. under the guise of free speech. the MTRCB’s decision in Administrative Case No. but it may not suspend television personalities. And when it exists.182 operations and. particularly the power-defining Sec. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond what the law provides. Only persons. and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech. To say “any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows” is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or expression is per se invalid. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute freedoms. Petitioner’s flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on television without adverse consequences. what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which absolute permissiveness is the norm. The MTRCB. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January 1. its decision to suspend petitioner must be modified. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression. administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Thus. for nowhere in that issuance. the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating the statute and for whom the penalty is sought. Case No. does not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. In ending. 2004 and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. and penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the decree’s penal or disciplinary operation. would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television industry. as the case may be. 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program host or even to prevent certain people from appearing in television programs. by way of an appropriate issuance. WHEREFORE.

a Decision is hereby rendered. Ang Dating Daan. or of the press x x x. subject of the instant petition. 213 [2] Article 353-359. Constitution. in view of all the foregoing. of expression. Such suspension is the censorship that the Constitution outlaws when it states that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. 214 [3] Article 26. Civil Code.213[2] Our tort laws also allow recovery of damages for tortious speech already uttered or published. our libel and tort laws do not allow the filing of a suit to enjoin or punish an expression that has yet to be uttered or written. or even saying “hello” to viewers. imprisonment or damages libelous language already uttered or published. many of the radio and TV political 212 [1] Section 4. Otherwise. Our libels laws punish with fine. there can never be a prior restraint on future expression. Revised Penal Code.214[3] However. Indeed. Civil Code. or as a punishment for past libelous utterance or publication. Article 33. wishes to discuss in petitioner’s TV program.183 WHEREFORE. Thus. imposing a penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the television program. Justice Antonio Carpio. both our libel and tort laws never impose a gag order on future expression because that will constitute prior restraint or censorship.”212[1] The remedy of any aggrieved person is to file a libel or tort case after the utterance or publication of such cusswords. I dissent because the three-month suspension of petitioner’s TV program Ang Dating Daan constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of expression. The suspension bars the public airing of petitioner’s TV program regardless of whatever subject matter petitioner. whether for fear of possible libelous utterance or publication. Article III. This is like suspending the publication of the Philippine Daily Inquirer for three months if its editorial describes a private person as “masahol pa sa putang babae. or anyone else.” This is also similar to suspending for three months the column of a newspaper columnist for using the expletive “putang ina mo” in his column. The suspension prevents petitioner from even reciting the Lord’s Prayer. . in his TV program. DISSENTING OPINION.

the three-month preventive suspension of petitioner’s TV program bars petitioner from talking about the weather. No. namely: pornography. 222 Phil. in his TV program. Minnesota215[4] teaches us that the primordial purpose of the Free Expression Clause is to prevent prior restraint on expression. All other expression is not subject to prior restraint. human and political rights possible. because politicians often use cusswords and other profanities during political rallies. advocacy of imminent lawless action. Duque III. Dans. In this jurisdiction. The public airing of the entire TV program.184 programs will have to be banned for the frequent use of cusswords and other libelous language. Prior Restraint on Expression The well-settled rule is there can be no prior restraint on expression. is totally suppressed for three months. 218 [7] Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. 173034. 216 [5] Gonzales v. 9 October 2007. 217 [6] Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. 697 (1931). which has been described as the one basic right that makes all other civil. 222 Phil. 225 (1985).217[6] advocacy of imminent lawless action. or the rallies themselves will have to be banned. No. The leading American case of Near v. Although pornography.218[7] and danger to national security. 219 [8] Id. In the present case. G. or of the press x x x. regardless of its content.R. The Government has no power under the Constitution to so brazenly suppress freedom of expression.S.” The history of freedom of expression has been a constant struggle against the censor’s prior restraint on expression. of expression. and expression endangering 215 [4] 283 U. Kalaw-Katigbak. is subject to exceptions narrowly carved out by courts over time because of necessity. 151 (1985).216[5] false or misleading advertisement. This well-settled rule. 535 SCRA 265. .219[8] Only in these instances may expression be subject to prior restraint. we recognize only four exceptions. Even politicians will have to be barred from addressing political rallies. or even from talking about nothingness. false or misleading advertisement. however. This rule emanates from the constitutional command that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. or from talking about the birds and the bees. This Court should never give its imprimatur to such a blatant violation of a fundamental constitutional right.

Article XVI. If a certain expression is subject to prior restraint. G. place or manner of expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the expression.185 national security may be subject to prior restraint. its utterance or publication in violation of the lawful restraint naturally subjects the person responsible to subsequent 220 [9] Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) v.220[9] The test to determine the constitutionality of prior restraint on pornography. Content-based prior restraint is aimed at suppressing the message or idea contained in the expression. of expression. G. The expression subject to prior restraint must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent. 26 July 1996. courts again have carved out narrow exceptions to this rule out of necessity. or of the press x x x.S. Subsequent Punishment of Expression The rule is also well-settled that expression cannot be subject to subsequent punishment. the government bears a heavy burden of justifying such prior restraint. such prior restraint must hurdle a high barrier. Second. and shall be regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general welfare. 169838. 222 [11] Section 11(2). advocacy of imminent lawless action. New York Times v. Court of Appeals.” However. 221 [10] Bayan v. First. United States.R.R. Content-neutral restraint on expression is restraint that regulates the time.221[10] The power of Congress to impose prior restraint on false or misleading advertisements emanates from the constitutional provision that the “advertising industry is impressed with public interest. Constitution. No. 713 (1971). 259 SCRA 529.”222[11] Prior restraint on expression may be either content-based or content-neutral. and expression endangering national security is the clear and present danger test. This rule also emanates from the constitutional command that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. 169848 and 169881. 25 April 2006. Courts subject content-neutral restraint to intermediate scrutiny. Nos. 488 SCRA 226. 403 U. The exceptions start with the four types of expression that may be subject to prior restraint. . such prior restraint is strongly presumed as unconstitutional. 119673. and such danger must be grave and imminent. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny. Ermita.

Defamation and tortious conduct. Two other exceptions are defamation. 231 [20] Id. an expression cannot be subject to prior restraint because such expression is not unlawful or illegal. civilly or criminally. Once defamatory or tortuous speech rises to the level of advocacy of imminent lawless action. 226 [15] Article 138. 229 [18] Articles 138 and 142.S.227[16] which includes libel and slander. Revised Penal Code. may be subject to subsequent punishment. Prior restraint is more deleterious to freedom of expression than subsequent punishment. ethnic or religious group. Profane or vulgar words like “Fuck the draft. per se.” when not directed at any particular person. then it may be subject to prior restraint because it is seditious 229[18] but not because it is defamatory or tortious. 225 [14] Article 142. 223 [12] Article 201. are not subject to subsequent punishment. advocacy of imminent lawless action. 15 (1971).228[17] Defamatory and tortious speech. false or misleading 224[13] advertisement.230[19] As aptly stated.”231[20] If profane or vulgar language like “Fuck the draft” is not subject to subsequent punishment. Revised Penal Code. 227 [16] See note 2. 225[14] and endangering national security. acts of pornography. Revised Penal Code. California. 403 U. . Milk Code. Fighting words refer to profane or vulgar words that are likely to provoke a violent response from an audience. 230 [19] Cohen v. Although subsequent punishment also deters expression. Thus.186 223[12] punishment. “one man’s vulgarity may be another man’s lyric. Fighting words are not subject to subsequent punishment unless they are defamatory or tortious. Without a law punishing the actual utterance or publication of an expression. 224 [13] Section 6(a). Revised Penal Code. then with more reason it cannot be subject to prior restraint.226[15] are all punishable under the law. and tortious speech. still the ideas are disseminated to the public. however. are not subject to prior restraint because by definition they do not constitute a clear and present danger to the State that is grave and imminent. 228 [17] See note 3.

Thus. A prior restraint may be justified only if the expression falls under any of the four types of expression that may be subject to prior restraint. namely. false or misleading advertisement. advocacy of imminent lawless action. petitioner’s offensive. 232 [21] See note 9. profane or vulgar petitioner’s words may be. [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas. petitioner cannot utter a single word in his TV program because the program is totally suppressed. Gago ka talaga Michael. and danger to national security. The respondents have not presented any credible justification to overcome the strong presumption of unconstitutionality accorded to the three-month suspension order. has far graver ramifications than any possible subsequent punishment of petitioner. Thus. being a prior restraint on expression.232[21] Such prior restraint must pass the clear and present danger test. pornography. o di ba! O. sinungaling. masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba.187 Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. During the three-month suspension. masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Three-Month Suspension is a Prohibited Prior Restraint The three-month suspension of petitioner’s TV program is indisputably a prior restraint on expression. What respondents assail is the following ranting of petitioner: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo. Any prior restraint is strongly presumed to be unconstitutional and the government bears a heavy burden of justifying such prior restraint. Obviously. advocacy of imminent lawless action. the three-month suspension of petitioner’s TV program. profane or vulgar language cannot be subject to prior restraint but may be subject to subsequent punishment if defamatory or tortious. which imposes a prior restraint on expression. false or misleading advertisement. or danger to national security. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito… No matter how offensive. they do not constitute pornography. what petitioner uttered does not fall under any of the four types of expression that may be subject to prior restraint. is totally bereft of any discussion that petitioner’s ranting poses a clear and present danger to the State that is grave and imminent. The majority opinion. .

S. February 1. 403 U. such law would be “abridging the freedom of speech.S. neither can respondent MTRCB promulgate a rule or a decision suspending for three months petitioner’s constitutional right to freedom of expression.S. 152 2. or of the press. 43 5. 283 U. Congress may punish such offensive or vulgar language. 51 8. Even Congress cannot validly pass a law imposing a three-month preventive suspension on freedom of expression for offensive or vulgar language uttered in the past. after their utterance.S. of expression. Minnesota. New York Times vs. Read again the Reyes and Ruiz cases. Fernandez. GR No. Gonzales.. The actual and real effect of the three-month suspension is a prior restraint on expression in violation of a fundamental constitutional right. Otherwise. 7960707& Zaldivar vs. 80578. then such words are punishable) Read: 1. Times Film vs. Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule (whether the words used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State has the right to prevent) 7-a. Near vs. 713 (Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity) 3. Congress may pass a law punishing defamation or tortious speech but the punishment cannot be the suspension or suppression of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. U. with damages. fine or imprisonment but Congress has no power to suspend or suppress the people’s right to speak freely because of such past utterances. Kalaw Katigbak. Gonzales vs.S. Read again Zaldivar vs. Dangerous tendency rule (If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the State has the right to prevent. City of Chicago. 697 4. supra 3. And of course. 365 U. 102 Phil.188 The three-month suspension cannot be passed off merely as a preventive suspension that does not partake of a penalty. Freedman vs. 1989 .” If Congress cannot pass such a law. Maryland. Sandiganbayan. 380 U. Read: 1. neither can this Court give its stamp of imprimatur to such an unconstitutional MTRCB rule or decision. GR No. Cabansag vs. In short. 137 SCRA 717 2.

Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253.189 8. New York. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. No law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR. 492 SCRA 1 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration). 408 SCRA 1 Puno.. the duty of the courts is to determine which of the 2 conflicting interests demand greater protection under the circumstances presented. See also Zaldivar case above the CHAPTER VI . Gitlow vs. Lagunzad vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE.) Read: AYER PRODUCTION VS. 652. JUDGE CAPULONG. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. J. and the regulation results in an indirect. more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive but .THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE Section 5. 160 SCRA 861 Read also: 1. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio. 268 U. including criticism on this test by Justice Holmes 3. thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Complainant requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary. partial abridgment of speech.S. 92 SCRA 476 2. The balancing-of-interest test (When a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of the public order. Las Pinas City. ESTRADA VS. Jr. Gonzales. conditional. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. ET AL. without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed.

MAN STANDS ACCOUNTABLE TO AN AUTHORITY HIGHER THAN THE STATE. HELD: Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. FREEDOM OF RELIGION -any specific system of belief. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a “DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS” in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovah’s witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations.  That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because:  She is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society. often involving a code of ethics and philosophy. Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.  That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists. . IN THE AREA OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AS A PREFERRED FREEDOM.190 living with another woman. The existence of a Divine being is not necessarily inherent in religion. worship or conduct. and so the stateinterest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. -A profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator. the Buddhists espouses a way of life without reference to an omnipotent God. man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. HOWEVER. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms---including religious freedom---may be enjoyed.

aid all religion. Insulation from political process—growth through voluntary support of its members will not take place if there is intervention from the State. VITALE. SCHOOL PRAYER CASE (ENGEL VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION. NON-STABLISHMENT CLAUSE: It simply means “that the State cannot set up a church. “It is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American People. or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will. nor pass laws which aids one religion. 370 US 421) It is unconstitutional for a school to require the students to recite a prayer composed by the Board of Regents at the starts of the day’s class.” . The doctrine cuts both ways. or force him to profess a belief or disbelief. and it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. “All” here applies both to the believer and the non-believer. (LEMON VS. 403 US 602) The government is neutral and while protecting all.191 “Strong fences make good neighbors”. There will be no violation of the non-establishment clause if: the statute has a secular legislative purpose. It is not only the State that is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs. The idea is to delineate the boundaries between two institutions and prevent encroachments by one against the other. the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters. its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 330 US 1) This clause seeks to protect: Voluntarism---must come into existence through the voluntary support of its members. it prefers none and disparages none. that the State cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa” (EVERSON VS. THE RIGHT TO WORHIP INCLUDES THE RIGHT NOT TO WORSHIP. FREEDOM OF RELIGION INCLUDES FREEDOM FROM RELIGION. KURTZMAN.

RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP HAS TWO ASPECTS: a. BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. PEOPLE VS. or none at all. 38 O. This is constitutional since it is not the parochial school which gets the benefits but the parents. 374 US 203 It is unconstitutional for a law to require that at least 10 verses from the Holy Bible be read daily without comment because the same constitute a religious exercise which violates the nonestablishment clause. Article II—The state is the protector of the people and it is the prime duty of the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment of this duty. . He may not be punished even if he cannot prove what he believes. 392 US 236 A law requiring the Board of Education to lend textbooks free of charge to all students from grades 7-12 of parochial school. 330 US 1 The law authorizing reimbursement of transportation expenses of school children going to and from parochial schools is not violative of the non-establishment clause because it will be the parents who get benefits. such freedom is absolute. not the parochial school. Freedom to believe. IN the first. his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State.G. the State may call all citizens to render military or civil service. if the individual externalizes what he believes. SCHEMPP. This is so because religious freedom can be exercised only with due regard to the rights of others. EVERSON VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 1676 Avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not allowed in the Philippines because of Section 4. Example: “Go forth and multiply--cannot marry several times just to comply. and b. In the second. LAGMAN & ZOSA. worship any god he chooses. Freedom to act. He may indulge in his own theories about life and death. ALLEN.192 SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON VS.

INK vs. 135 SCRA 514 Phil. 1993 Grino--Aquino. 104 SCRA 510 3. 1. 59 SCRA 54 7. 106 Phil. 106 SCRA 1 4.36 SCRA 445 contracts 2. November 20. Ruiz. Elizalde Rope. 2. Aglipay vs. City of Manila. of Education. Gironella. That because of their refusal to perform the foregoing acts as required by RA 1265 of July 11. That they rrefused to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing by a band or singing the Philippine National Anthem. March 1. Sec. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU. 201 2. 11 6. Facts: -----1. Barangan. 8 dated July 21. ET AL VS. Victoriano vs. Gerona vs. 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony . Read: 1. German vs. 1955 and by Department Order No. Estenzo. 398 ROEL EBRALINAG. saluting the Philippine Flag and reciting the patriotic pledge because they considered the flag as an image and they should not worship it except GOD.193 IN RE SUMMERS. 325 US 561 The act of the Illinois Supreme Court denying admission to the bar because of his refusal to take in good faith an oath to support the Constitution of the State of Illinois which requires mandatory service in the military in times of war was reversed by the US Supreme Court stating that this constitutes a violation of the 1 st Amendment which guarantees religious freedom. J. Garces vs. 64 Phil. Pamil vs. 101 5. 3. Religious freedom in relation to impairment of and the right to join associations. 1978 7. The petitioners are high school and grade schools students enrolled in the different public schools of the Province of Cebu and who belong to the religious group known as the Jehovah's Witnesses. American Bible Society vs. Teleron.

they were expelled by the respondent school authorities. . during flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or be expelled in school. The law. and recite the patriotic pledge. III. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag. recite the patriotic pledge or sing the national anthem in order to follow their religious beliefs? Held: The same issue was raised in Gerona vs. 297. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the government. Secretary of Education. Art. 1988. RA 1265 was likewise incorporated in Executive Order No. 106 Phil. 135 SCRA 530). Secretary of Education. is not lightly to be trifled with. Hence this petition. 1987 Constitution). Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights. IS ALIEN TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE PRESENT GENERATION OF FILIPINOS WHO CUT THEIR TEETH ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS WHICH GUARANTEES THEIR RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP (Section 5. for it involves the relationship of man and his Creator (Chief Justice Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. 110 Phil. the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. an emblem of national sovereignty. Our task is extremely difficult for the 30-year old decision of this Court in GERONA upholding the salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it. Barangan. September 21. 2 (1959) and Balbuna vs. of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect.194 compulsory in all educational institutions. Issue: -----May the petitioners be expelled for refusing to salute the flag. sing the national anthem. 150 (1960) where the SC held that: The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines.

of a serious evil to public safety.THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL Section 6. public safety. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according the Former Chief justice Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. public morals.195 The right to religious profession has a two-fold aspect. 59 SCRA 54. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. In Victoriano vs. they just quietly stand at attention to show their respect for the rights of others who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. Absent such a threat to public safety. the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified since they are not doing anything that could warrant their expulsion since during flag ceremonies. Elizalde Rope Workers Union. NOTE: THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT ON THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be: . We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect to their religious beliefs. we upheld the exemption of the members of the Iglesia ni Kristo from the coverage of the closed-shop agreement between the labor union and the company because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor group. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of the thought. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security. or public health. however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others CHAPTER VII . The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. that the State has the right and duty to presvent. public health or any other legitimate public interest. vis. as may be provided by law. Baranagan) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent..

Upon application of the prosecutor. Travel outside of said municipality or city. the suspect’s right to travel shall be limited to the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending. and/or  Prohibited from using any cellular phones. VS. nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. 1. 1989 right to travel. in the interest of national security and public safety. These restrictions shall be terminated upon acquittal of the accused. No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law. ET AL. shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of the bail which shall then be forfeited as provided in the Rules of Court. The case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the following provisions of the Constitution: Section 1. This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Supreme Court to Order the respondents to issue travel documents to the petitioners and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The constitutional as well as human right to travel. 1989 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated October 27. or earlier upon the discretion of the court or upon motion of the prosecutor. J. liberty of abode and "right to return" En banc Cortes. or other means of communications with people outside their residence.R. Read: FERDINAND MARCOS. G.196  Detained under house arrest. 88211. ET AL. HON.. 129 SCRA 2. RAUL MANGLAPUS. without the authorization of the court. September 15. or the dismissal of the case filed against him. . NO. computers.  Restricted from traveling.

particularly the Universal Declaration of Humjan Rights guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. Furthermore. citing Section 4. in the exercise of the powers granted in the Constitution.197 Section 6. public safety or public health. Likewise. The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only the Courts may do so "within the limits prescribed by law". provides: Art. they argue that the right of the state to national security prevails over individual rights. including his own. The sub-issues. Does the President have the power to bar the Marcoses to return to the Philippines? a. Is this a political question? . II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Art. 12 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country. The respondents argue that the issue in this case involves a political question which is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. are: 1. which had been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not. Nor may the President impair the right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. the petitioners claim that under international law. Thus: Art. as may be provided by law. the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security. which could help in the determination of the main issue. Also. AND TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY.

The court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged by the insurgency. public safety or public health. These are what the right to travel connote. rightist conspiracies to grab power. The power involved is the President's RESIDUAL POWER to protect the general welfare of the people. THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY IS NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS. the issue involved in the case at bar is not political in nature since under Section 1. in the interest of national security. With these before her. UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION. independent from. And if she has made that finding. the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former Pres. the right to return to one's country. To the President. VIII of the Constitution. have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding? Has there been prior notice to the petitioners? Held: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. has the President made a finding that the return of the petitioners to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security. a totally distinct right under international law.198 2. though related to the right to travel. Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines. IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. judicial power now includes the duty to "determine whether or not there has . Art. public welfare or public health. the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily. Essentially. BUT IT IS OUR WELL-CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO RETURN MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. WHICH TREATS ONLY OF THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. separatist movement in Mindanao. even the Universal declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of the state. etc. Thus. capriciously and whimsically. the right to leave a country and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. Lastly.

Amazingly. Kwong vs. CA. Manotoc vs. Feliciano. Narvasa. PCGG. 82 Phil. Jr. 2. CA. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions.. . 142 SCRA 149 . Salazar. 851 2. Padilla. Silverio vs. April 8. December 7. *********************** Gutierrez. With all due respect for the majority in the Court that the main issue in this case is not one of power but one on RIGHTS. Grino-Aquino. Seven justices filed separate dissenting opinions (Gutierrez. the government has the power to arrest and punish him but does it have the power to deny him his right to come home and die among familiar surroundings? x x x The government has more than ample powers under existing laws to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public safety. Medialdea and Regalado) or a total of 8 justices in voting in favor of DISMISSING the petition.. Jr. Cruz. If he comes home. THERE IS NO LAW PRESCRIBING EXILE IN FOREIGN LAND AS THE PENALTY FOR HURTING THE NATION. Caunca vs. J." NOTE: The main opinion was concurred in by 7 justices (CJ Fernan. BUT THE DENIAL OF TRAVEL PAPERS IS NOT ONE OF THOSE POWERS BECAUSE THE BILL OF RIGHTS SAY SO. Melencio-Herrera. however. 1991 Read also: 1. the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist "factual bases for the President's decision" to bar Marcos's return. That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court after the hearing. Bidin and Sarmiento).. dissenting. Gancayco. Paras.199 been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.l987 3.

2. The same was granted by the Commissioner. 23505-R. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. No. 61 Phil.R.A.200 1. because. To allow the petitioner to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason would place him beyond the reach of the courts. and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. claiming his constitutional right to travel and also contending that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right. Feb."(People vs. In said cases he was admitted to bail with the FGU Insurance Corporation as surety.C. The SEC requested the Commissioner on Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure pending disposition of the case involving him. He is also involved in a case pending before the Securities and Exchange Commission. 3. "relative to his business transactions and opportunities". Petitioner subsequently filed before the trial courts a motion entitled "motion for permission to leave the country" stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States. Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc. 13. Uy Tuising. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals case of People vs. The motion was denied by the lower courts and the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals which also denied the same.-G. neither the courts which granted him bail nor the SEC would have jurisdiction over his liberty. a. has 6 criminal cases for estafa pending against him. Jr. d. 4. was to prohibit the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines. otherwise. said orders and processes will be nugatory. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. 1980) as authority for his claim . b. Petitioner brings the matter to the S. "x x x the result of the obligation assumed by appellee to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court. HELD: Petition denied. 404 (l935) c. Shepherd (C.

G. No. 504 SCRA 704 Sandoval-Gutierrez. J. 1989 & CHAPTER VIII .THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION Section 7.201 that he could travel. concern. 174318. Salonga vs. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. The S. 2006. Access to official records… shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. SABIO vs. Read: Right to Privacy. petitioner has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency of his travel. Read also the Ferdinand Marcos Cases of August October. Unlike the Shepherd case. No. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a criminal case is pending against an accused does not automatically bar him from travelling abroad. 4. and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their 233[4] Annex “E” of the Petition in G.R. Roan vs. Lukban. the duration thereof. 6. GORDON. 2006. Gonzales. right to information on matters of public CAMILO L. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT). October 17. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. No. 455). 778 5. 39 Phil. 97 SCRA 121 7. 174340. and that his sureties are willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing him to travel. e. Hermoso.C. Villavicencio vs. as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel. 1. He must however convince the courts of the urgency of his travel. .R. 455 (Senate Res. the duration thereof.233[4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). supra. held however that said case is not squarely on all fours with the case at bar. The Facts: On February 20.

174318. 82 EDSA. 174318. over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT. Sabio of the PCGG. wrote Chairman Camilo L. subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.3 million. the Philippine Star. No.m. be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation. and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors.25 million in 2004. inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.234[6] On May 9. No. 2006. as compared to the previous year’s mere P106 thousand. Gordon. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT). No. Chief of Staff Rio C. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. 2006. Inocencio. the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. under the authority of Senator Richard J. 455. in 18 months.. 2006. Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court 234[6] Annex “F” of the Petition in G. Hence. Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building. to date there have been no payments given. On May 8.202 operations by their respective Board of Directors. Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained. on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). . 1 earlier quoted.R. (TCI). WHEREAS. in the last quarter of 2005. 235[7] Annex “G” of the Petition in G. Inc.235[7] At the same time. No. he invoked Section 4(b) of E. in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee member. some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center.O. one of the herein petitioners.” portions of the Resolution read: The pertinent WHEREAS. WHEREAS. On September 12. No. WHEREFORE.R. where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned. at around 10:45 a.

No. such list of nominees is confidential and should not be published. thus: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial. legislative or administrative proceeding.1 which was invoked by the petitioners in support of their refusal to testify in the Senate limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial. No.203 a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. I S S U E S: Is the refusal of the petitioners to testify in Congress by virtue of EO No. MAY 4 . 1 is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional provision ensuring the people’s access to information on matters of public 1-A.O. Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Such provision of EO No. their Chairmen. The case was docketed as G. Section 4(b) of E. Section 4 [b] violates the constitutional provision on information on matters of public concern? H E L D: Yes. 523 SCRA 1 The petitioner requested the COMELEC to publish the individual nominees of all the party-list groups in order that they will be guided on what party-list group shall be supported by them.R. 174340. Held: . BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT VS. 2007. 1. COMELEC. legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. The COMELEC held that under the Party-list Act. Arroyo and Members.

Issues: 1. respondent through counsel refused to give the petitioner a list of said lawmakers who obtained "clean loans" from the GSIS on the ground that there is a confidential relationship between the GSIS and its borrowers and it would be proper for them to preserve the same. 1989 in relation to the Right to Privacy Cortes. On June 17. (Pascual vs. 2. the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable when only questions of law is involved. the decision of the General Manager of the GSIS is appealable/reviewable by the GSIS Board of Trustees. Petitioners did not ask the Board of Trustees to review the decision of the respondent. 1986 elections. Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies? 2. In the case at bar. On July 19. FEBRUARY 13. 1986. 3. BELMONTE. This is in accordance with the right to information on matters of public concern which shall be accorded to every citizen. However. 1986. the petitioners filed this instant petition. .204 The COMELEC should publish the list of nominees of all the party-list groups. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts. 74930. J. 1986. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the documents sought in accordance with their constitutional right to information? Held: 1. he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. VALMONTE VS. GR NO. On June 4. petitioner Valmonte wrote the respondent asking the latter to furnish him copies of former members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a "clean loan" from the GSIS prior to the February 7. Facts: 1.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 7. Yet. 40 SCRA 210. Art. Aguilar vs. Ramento. 1. transactions x x x shall be afforded the citizen. would certainly be empty words if access to information of public concern is denied except under limitations prescribed by law. III which provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. 466. In Tanada vs. Malabanan vs. Art. they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of the information they disseminate x x x The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. 136 SCRA 27. Tuvera. As such. 150 SCRA 530 and ordered the government officers involved to act as prayed for by the petitioners. Similarly. we upheld the citizen's right to information as well as in Legaspi vs.205 Provincial Board. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press. . 106 Phil. It is subject to limitations provided for by law and the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern". The postulate of public office is a public trust as institutionalized in the Constitution (Sec. 129 SCRA 359. and papers pertaining to official acts. CSC. This is not the first time that the court is confronted with a case involving the right to information. like all the constitutional guarantees. The funds of the GSIS assume a public character and that its obligations are guaranteed by the government. the right to information is not absolute. and to documents. XI) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power. Petitioners are members of the media. Valencia. Far from it. subject to such limitations as may be provided for by law. the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest" and subject to "reasonable conditions prescribed by law." The information sought to be obtained by the petitioners affect public interest since the GSIS is the trustee of contributions from the government and its employees. Access to official records. The right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of "full public disclosure" and "honesty in the public service".

summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi vs. abstracts..: The Facts: In the exercise of its legislative power. inter alia. and the Philippine National Police (PNP).206 The petitioners are entitled to access to documents sought subject to reasonable regulations that the respondent may impose relating to manner and hours of examination. 2006 CARPIO MORALES. J. This is so because access to public records does not include the right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists. subject to reasonable rules and regulations as the GSIS may deem necessary. bureaus. 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). Marcos and the First Lady. EXEC. supra. as petitioners may specify. 80 Phil. the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Ozaeta. No. and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations. The respondent is therefore ordered to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to members of the Batasang Pambansa. the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29. to the end that damage or loss of the records may be avoided. 383] he petitioners.R. ET AL. VS. 16977. are not entitled to be furnished copies of list of alleged members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure clean loans through the intercessions of Pres. Subido vs. G. conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for. represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON. ET AL. however. The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and . CSC. EDUARDO ERMITA. the Senate of the Philippines. the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department. On September 21 to 23.. SEC. April 20. through its various Senate Committees. 2005.

2. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing.The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. – The following are covered by this executive order: 1. Nature.R. Vasquez. . Republic Act No. took effect immediately. – In accordance with Article VI. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. 2005. pursuant to Section 6 thereof.207 other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege. Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SECTION. ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege. 464. all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows: SECTION 1. 95367. Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government. – (a) Nature and Scope.” which. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. On September 28. the President of the Philippines issued E. . (b) Who are covered. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. G. Further.O. 23 May 1995). No. 2. “ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS.

Only when the participants in the discussion are . For one. There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. being presumed to be in aid of legislation. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Such other officers as may be determined by the President. I S S U E S: 1. this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. is presumed to be a matter of public concern.208 3. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public. the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Thus holds Valmonte v. Yet. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege. 4. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. Belmonte: It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Whether E. and H E L D: E.O.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information on matters of public concern. any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. however. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege. and 5.

therefore. CSC.THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 236 G. Ozaeta. Brilliantes vs. Manuel Morato. Tanada vs. 108 SCRA 381 4. P. Villar vs. July 3.108 SCRA 390 3. 71 SCRA 14 4. 84 SCRA 554 2.O. Ferrer. Canlas vs. Vazquez.209 aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. Noriel. Ferrer. just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry. In re: ATTY. 1990 1-d. Tuvera. 80 Phil. societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Aquino-Sarmiento vs. associations. 100 SCRA 100 2. No. 108 SCRA 502 5. Samahan ng Manggagawa vs. 1990 1-c. 100 SCRA 93 3. Tarnate vs. Noriel. Inciong. 170 SCRA 256.l983 5. The right of self-organization of managerial SCRA 434 employees. 150 SCRA 530 1-b. including those employed in the public and private sectors. The right of the people. Read: 1. 14. 74930. 1989.R. P.THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN ASSOCIATIONS Section 8. vs. 1-a. November 13.47 4. 48 SCRA 382 6. EDILLON. 56 SCRA 793 (Read the dissenting opinion of Justice FERNANDO in both cases) CHAPTER X . 464 is. Legaspi vs. in the sense explained above. April 20. Lllamas. 1. Dimaano. February 13. Baldoza vs. Freedom of Association.236 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E. 383 CHAPTER IX . to form unions. Chang. . Lantaco vs. Aug. vs. 146 SCRA 44 3. The fundamental right of self-organization. 1991 2. Subido vs.

On Motion for Reconsideration (420 SCRA 420). For the government to take over the said facility. Read: 1. (PIATCO) as well as the amendments thereto is void for being contrary to law and public policy. J. the Supreme Court held that: “This Court. JUDGE GINGOYON. 478 SCRA 474 Tinga. full payment of just compensation before government takes over. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. Value of property expropriated for national projects. Procedure for the exercise of said power.210 Section 9.. PIATCO. Barangay Matictic vs. IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES. is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. when Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and when RA 8974 shall apply. Who may exercise it? How about a barangay? Yes with the President’s approval. 402 SCRA 612 that the CONCESSION AGREEMENT FOR THE BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT OF THE NINOY AQUINO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PASSENGER TERMINAL II between the Philippine Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation 1.93 SCRA 663 2. The inherent power of eminent domain. Inc. Writ of possession when it shall be issued by the court. the Supreme Court held in AGAN VS. THE COMPENSATION MUST BE JUST AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND EQUITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICH . Extent of payment to be made before writ of possession shall be issued in favor of the government. Facts: In 2003. 148 SCRA 83 2. however. Elbinias.

IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES”.77 be released to PIATCO instead of the amount in the December 21. What law is applicable in this expropriation case: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or RA 8974? 2. If RA 8974 will be used. Both Orders were questioned by the government as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Rule 67 when what should be applicable is RA 8974 and therefore ordered that the amount of US$62. Judge Gingoyon issued another Order directing the appointment of three (3) Commissioners to determine just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex.0B in cash with Land Bank of the Philippines representing the assessed value of the terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. Rule 67 will be applied. 2005. However. If Section 2.175. PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving the just . 2005. It pointed out that the earlier orderas to the amount to be deposited by the government was based on Section 2. on January 4. Judge Gingoyon issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the government to “take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities”. It held that it is the ministerial duty of the government to issue writ of possession upon deposit of the assessed value of the property subject of expropriation. Application of Rule 67 would violate the AGAN Doctrine which provides that “for the government to take over the said NAIA 3 facility.” EXPENSE OF PIATCO AND ITS On December 21. Judge Gingoyon issued another Order supplementing the December 21. 2004 Order. the Government filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasay City seeking a writ of possession authorizing to take immediate possession and control over NAIA 3 facilities and deposited the amount of P3.211 ITSELF AT THE INVESTORS. 2004. HELD: 1.343. ISSUES: 1. On January 7. On the same day. 2004 Order. may the court used the provision of Rule 67 on the 3 commissioners to determine just compensation.

Just Compensation. Differences between the two laws on expropriation: a. It would violate the proscription in the AGAN Decision that the government must pay first the just compensation before taking over the facilities. Under Rule 67. Amount to be deposited in court before a Writ of Possession may be issued by the court in favor of the government. When to apply Rule 67 and when to apply RA No. it could already exercise acts of ownership over the NAIA 3 facilities. Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the government. like those covered by the “Build-OperateTransfer”. Writ of Possession may not be issued in favor of the government UNTIL ACTUAL RECEIPT by PIATCO of the proferred value of just compensation. the government “merely deposits” the assessed value of the property subject of expropriation and can have a writ of possession over the same while under RA 8974. 8974. Who owns the interest of the initial amount deposited for the purpose of issuing writ of possession . as in this case. there can be writ of possession even if the owner of the property has not received a single centavo while under RA 8974. Under Rule 67.212 compensation even if the government takes over the NAIA 3 facility. It is sufficient that the government deposits the amount equal to the assessed value of the facilities. So when shall Rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when shall RA 8974 be used? In all “National government projects” or “national infrastructure projects”. The rest. b. 2 Rule 67 on the appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine just compensation may be used since RA 8974 does not provide for such procedure. Rule 67 shall apply. the scheme of immediate payment (100%) shall be followed. RA 8974 shall be followed. The just compensation to be paid by the government shall be determined within 60 days from the finality of the decision based on Section 4. however. RA 8974.

Bulacan.406. rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway. the RTC allowed the release of the principal amount together with the interest to the respondent but on Motion for Reconsideration of the TRB. Thereafter. an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. TRB maintained that since it had already complied with the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.700.00. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. that is. represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). April 14. manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties. the determination of just compensation. it disallowed the withdrawal of the interest reasoning out that the said issue will be included in the second stage of expropriation.213 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. On 3 March 2003.700.968. The RTC issued. TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit. including the interest which accrued thereon. filed with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose properties would be affected by the construction.000. 8974237[5] in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. on 19 March 2002. in the total amount of P28. 237 . No.00 with LBP-South Harbor. praying that the respondent or its duly authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of P22.R. 172410. the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC. petitioner Republic of the Philippines. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85. Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners. with the Land Bank of the Philippines. out of TRB’s advance deposit of P28. On 18 March 2002. South Harbor Branch (LBPSouth Harbor). G. 2008 THE FACTS: On 29 December 2000. an authorized government depository.00. Malolos.406. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No.

The TRB argues that it is only during the second stage when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitlement to interest. but of DPWH. 869-M2000.241[14] we held: There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. and does not exclusively belong to respondent. citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. with the former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. The said argument is without merit because it failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures. Republic Act No. Thus. Hence. in Republic v. Act No. the 238 239 240 241 . Under the statute.240[13] The TRB further points out that the expropriation account with LBP-South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC. the determination of the authority to exercise eminent domain and the determination of just compensation. this petition of the government before the Supreme Court. the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession. Wycoco 239[12] and National Power Corporation v.214 The private respondent elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the respondent is entitled to the interest by way of accession. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. the said expropriation account includes the compensation for the other landowners named defendants in Civil Case No. Thus. 8974 and Rule 67. whereas in Rule 67. Gingoyon. I S S U E: Who has the right over the interest of the amount deposited representing the zonal value of the property sought to be expropriated? The expropriator or the landowner? HELD: The petition is without merit. The TRB claims that there are two stages238[11] in expropriation proceedings. Angas.

the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).215 Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects. but as to the ownership of the interest that had since accrued on the deposited amount. inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property “for national government infrastructure projects. Act No. and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method. Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. . For example. There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties intended for a national government infrastructure project.” Thus. 8974 which provides. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. The controversy. arises not from the amount of the deposit. which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67. hinges on the determination of who actually owns the deposited amount. xxxx Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. unlike Rep. 8974. Rep. Act No. 8974. Act No. whichever is higher. Therefore. Moreover. by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic. the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No. though. the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. as the relevant standard for initial compensation. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession. And then there is Rep. 8974. since.

determined to be P22. Thus. the interest yield. The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act is the actual intention to deliver on the part of the party making such delivery. Such amount. as accession. conversely.242[15] Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the deposited amount. which requires nothing less than the immediate payment of 100% of the value of the property. was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized representative.968.244[17] The intention of the 242 243 244 . The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act No. Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and undisputably the owner of the principal amount deposited by [herein petitioner] TRB.216 under Article 440 of the Civil Code.00 of the P28.00 total deposit. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby. 440. 8974. Gingoyon243[16]: It is the plain intent of Rep. either naturally or artificially. it is deemed to be a “constructive delivery” of the amount corresponding to the 100% zonal valuation of the expropriated property. the right of accession is conferred by ownership of the principal property: Art. based on the current zonal valuation of the BIR. The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the expropriation account of DPWH which pertains particularly to HTRDC.700. to the property owner. then the latter should also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon. going back to our ruling in Republic v.406. Act No. or which is incorporated or attached thereto. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. The Court of Appeals further recognized that the deposit of the amount was already deemed a constructive delivery thereof to HTRDC: When the [herein petitioner] TRB deposited the money as advance payment for the expropriated property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession.000. in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited.

TRB is already considered to have paid the same to HTRDC. Since the respondent is the owner of P22. the interest should pertain to the owner of the principal who is already determined as HTRDC. and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it is required to do so by law. in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands. By depositing the said amount. The interest is paid by LBP-South Harbor on the deposit. and HTRDC became the owner thereof.” We agree in TRB’s statement since it is exactly how the amount of the immediate payment shall be determined in accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. TRB only asserts that HTRDC is “entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property. i. However.000. nothing more and nothing less.245[18] A close scrutiny of TRB’s arguments would further reveal that it does not directly challenge the Court of Appeals’ determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account accrues to HTRDC by virtue of accession. hence.. the applicable law is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate. The issue in Angas is whether or not. an amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the expropriated properties.00. Wycoco.968. Angas and Land Bank of the Philippines v. it is entitled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only. 8974. TRB did not object to HTRDC’s Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC. so that it could already secure a writ of possession over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence implementation of the project. We find that neither case is applicable herein.217 TRB in depositing such amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate payment in Republic Act No. 8974. or Central Bank Circular No. for as long as HTRDC shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that respondent is the absolute owner thereof. In fact. The amount earned interest after the deposit.e. We are not persuaded by TRB’s citation of National Power Corporation v. 416 which fixed 245 . in support of its argument that the issue on interest is merely part and parcel of the determination of just compensation which should be determined in the second stage of the proceedings only. TRB already complied therewith by depositing the required amount in the expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-South Harbor.

” Hence. Article 1187248[22] of the Civil Code provides that the “effects of a conditional obligation to give. TRB does not object to HTRDC’s withdrawal of the amount of P22. Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. the implementing agency of the government pays just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint. JUDGE BACALLA. 8974.00 from the expropriation account. on the other hand. does not involve interest as damages for delay in payment of just compensation. however.218 the legal rate at 12% per annum. once the condition has been fulfilled. provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof. we clarified that interests in the form of damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation. when HTRDC complied with the given conditions. BIGLANG-AWA VS.246 [19] As a final note. and not as earnings from loans or forbearances of money. and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and executory. where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment). where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).968. 247 [21] The said conditions do not put in abeyance the constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith. 354 SCRA 562 PURSUANT TO SECTION 2. shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. In Wycoco. Article 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest shall apply. The case at bar.000. the effects of the constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH. We ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by way of damages for delay in the payment thereof. RULE 67 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE DOCTRINE 246 247 248 249 . It concerns interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account. as determined by the RTC in its Order249[23] dated 21 April 2003.

and 2.219 LAID DOWN IN THE ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CASE. 444 SCRA 269 Requisites before the expropriator is allowed immediate entry on the property subject of expropriation if the expropriator is a local government unit. THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. and 2. and b. involving local government units as the expropriating agency: 1. The owners of the expropriated land are entitled to legal interest on the compensation eventually adjudged from the date the condemnor takes possession of the land until the full compensation is paid to them or deposited in court. . THE ONLY REQUISITES FOR THE IMMEDIATE ENTRY BY THE GOVERNMENT IN EXPROPRIATION CASES ARE: a. The expropriator may immediately enter the property subject of expropriation proceedings if the following requisites are present: 1. the complaint for expropriation filed in court is sufficient in form and substance. the making of a deposit equivalent to the ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EXPROPRIATION. RTC 22. GABATIN VS. 444 SCRA 176 What is the basis of the just compensation for expropriation proceedings in connection with the agrarian reform program of the government. Requisites before immediate possession or writ of possession may be issued in expropriation cases. Complaint sufficient in form and substance. the expropriator must deposit the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES. the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance. ILOILO CITY. Payment of 15% of the Market value as appearing in the latest Tax Declaration. JUDGE LEGASPI.

not at the time of the rendition of the judgment. 182 SCRA 281 Read also: 1. Mun. value of the property when? Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. which should be taken into consideration. GSIS. Ramirez. NPC vs. of Talisay vs. IAC. 3. Reublic vs. 441 SCRA 637 Just compensation in expropriation cases. but the owner’s loss. it is the value of the land at the time of the taking. 1. would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore. 129 SCRA 665 f. As such. Mun. COURT OF APPEALS. CA. CA. Aug. The just compensation is determined as of the date of taking of the property or the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Maddumba vs. February 25. Meaning of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings. 185 SCRA 572 d. 1992 a-1. 29 SCRA 868 Basis of just compensation (Exceptional case) . Oct. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy. and an owner willing but not compelled to sell. 1990 c. Tantuico. of Makati vs. 183 SCRA 528 e. 1990 b. in computing the just compensation. WHICHEVER COMES FIRST. Ansaldo vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. Jocson. NPC vs.220 Held: The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program of the government partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceedings. The measure is not the taker’s gain. 4. Basis of just compensation Read: a.

VS. Vicente Viray. December 14. 7. 1992 Cruz. Viray then requested the Office of the Provincial Assessor of the Province of Batangas to appraise the land and the latter fixed its market value at P32.221 BERKENKOTTER. 6. 3. The petitioner.00 per square meter. . the panel of commissioners submitted its report to the trial court and pegged the market value at P85. Facts: -----1. Later on. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but later abandoned this objection and concentrated only on what it called the "underappraisal" of the subject land. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. The RTC then appointed a panel of commissioners in accordance with Rule 67.00 per square meter. 5. 4. On October 28. Viray then wrote the petitioner and expressed willingness to buy the latter's property at P32. The government likewise sought immediate possession of the property upon deposit of 10% of the total assessment in accordance with PD 48. On September 23. J. 1983. On June 18.00 per square meter in its reply. then President of Apolinario Apacible School of Fisheries. the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for the expropriation of the petitioner's property and invoked the assessment made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas in the amount of P32. sent the petitioner a written offer to buy the property of the latter with an area of 10. a government institution in Nasugbu. INC.00. Batangas. 1985. 2.640 square meters for its 5-year expansion program. 8. however. stuck to its original valuation. to determine the just compensation to be paid for the land.00 per square meter.00 per square meter. That the petitioner expressed willingness to sell at P50. it said that its property had in fact appreciated to as much as P100. 1982. ection 5. of the Rules of Court.

P100. M. m. 10.00/SQ. 11. The government appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION and declaring that the fair market value which should be the basis in computing the amount to be paid by the government to the petitioner shall be P19. OR P19.00 per square meter.M. M.222 9. the market value according set by the petitioner if we follow the three (3) deeds of sale it executed in favor of three (3) different individuals.18 per square meter should be the basis of the computation for the just compensation of its property because: a.18 PER SQUARE METER WHICH WAS THE SELLING PRICE IN AN ADJACENT LOT . the panel reiterated its original recommendation of P85.00/sq. The Republic of the Philippines objected and pointed to three (3) contracts of sale executed by the petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three (3) tracts of land similar in topography and adjacent to the property in question for the unit price of only P19. P85. AS RECOMMENDED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE COURT TO EVALUATE THE SAME. However.00/SQ. in its second report dated April 1. The court directed the commissioners to convene anew and to receive additional evidence.00 per square meter was the appraised value made by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas. 1987. or a total of P904.18 per square meter. AS CLAIMED BY THE OWNER. Issue: -----WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE JUST COMPENSATION: P32.400.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated. and c.00/SQ. The trial court acting on this recommendation rendered judgment requiring the Republic to pay the petitioner the amount of P904. 12.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated.400.00 per squaremeter as the fair market value. Viray even offered the amount of P32. IN ACCORANCE WITH THE APPRAISAL OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR. the complaint itself prays that the market value be pegged at P32.18. b. that P32. The petitioner was therefore constrained to file this instant petition claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that P19.

PETITIONER TO THREE PRIVATE Held. FOR IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM ITS OWN DECEPTION AND CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SHOULD BE ASSESSED AT THE HIGHER RATE IT CLANDESTINELY AGREED UPON WITH THE BUYERS. If this was the purpose of the petitioner when it executed the 3 deeds of sale. it impliedly admitted that the price for the latter should be the same as the former. The . This rule of consistency is best expressed in the familiar saying. surely not unknown to the petitioner. The Court is disappointed that the petitioner should demand a higher price from the republic. then IT IS SURELY HOIST NOW BY ITS OWN PETARD. they were ordinary buyers who bought the land for their own private purposes only and not for the public purpose invoked by the government. AND RIGHTLY SO. THAT WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS ALSO SAUCE FOR THE GANDER.223 SOLD BY THE INDIVIDUALS. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. which needs the land for a public purpose. The petitioner's claim that the value as appearing in the deeds of sale in the three other parcels is not a reliable index of just compensation "because owners usually undervalue the selling price of the property to lower the expenses they would have to pay for capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax" is practically an admission that it did not indicate the actual consideration in the three transactions where it was made to appear that the price per square meter was only P19. The fact that the petitioner sold the 3 other parcels of land at P19.18 per square meter or the price which the petitioner sold its other lots to other individuals. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty sought to be expropriated (Association of Small Landowners vs.18 per square meter which are admittedly of the same topography as that subject of this case. This is so because there is no showing that the petitioner had any special reason for granting each of the individual vendees the extraordinary discount amounting to as much as 75% of its claimed real value of the land. To all appearances. when it was willing to accept less from the three individual buyers who had only their private interests to serve.18. 175 SCRA 378). ----The basis in the computation of just compensation shall be P19.

Lagunzad vs. the expropriator must enter the property. CA. Reyes. their size. CA. Castellvi. 58 SCRA 336 Requisites of taking: a. vs. Requisite of "taking" in eminent domain cases Read: 1. Republic vs. EPZA vs. Guererro. 141 SCRA 30. b. CA. Rep. 154 SCRA 461 7. Finally. Dulay. 5.224 measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. location. he compensation. its actual or potential uses. to be just. the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property. shape.Cosculluela vs. 4.1987 4. to which should be added the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. cost of acquisition.l987 5. the entrance must not be for just a momentary period. April 29. 3. 2. 154 SCRA 199 When it is considered for "public use": 6. note that as held in the case of Republic vs. the tax declarations thereon. To determine just compensation. 2. 154 SCRA 428 8. particular case of lands. and 6. 123 SCRA 245 3. The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by the parties willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale. the market value as recommended by the board of commissioners appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS FINAL OR BINDING. must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Sumulong vs. May 21. the current value of like proerties. Santos. NHA vs. CA. Manotok vs. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value are: 1. 164 SCRA 393 5. .

CA. City of Manila vs. Facts: 1. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS. among them Cristina de Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus. the Lower Court issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into the properties condemned and created a committee to determine just compensation.) 2. 1979. the owner must be ousted from beneficial use of his land. Chinese Community. 2. Garcia vs. 87335. 40 Phil. 1979 order of the lower court. Bautista. the Rep. On July 16. the entry must be under warrant of color or title. the Republic of the Philippines prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on the ground that it had already deposited with the PNB 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the complaint. d.R. 3. De Knecht went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition directed against the June 14. . 1979. 1979. 1979. February 12. and e. G.225 c. that on June 14. 1989 Expropriation Gancayco. 100 SCRA 660 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. the property must be devoted for public use. De Knecht vs. 7001-P. and some other fifteen defendants in Civil Case No. 349 ( A private property which is devoted to public use may not be expropriated for another public purpose. 2. 150 SCRA 369 3. Guererro. J. NO. of the Philippines initiated an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets. Ignacio vs. In June. Not a valid exercise of eminent domain Read: 1. On February 20. 102 SCRA 597 6.

However. 1979 be SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7. On the same date. 7001-P. the defendants in Civil Case No. 1981. the Supreme Court rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition and directing that the Order of the respondent Judge dated June 14.226 4. The defendants moved for a reconsideration which the Court denied. 1983. 1983. When on February 17. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court. the Republic moved for the dismissal of the case due to the encatment of BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. On August 8. 1980. On October 30. On September 2. IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS BASED ON SUPERVENING EVENTS THAT OCCURRED after the decision of the SC in De Knecht vs. the Court dismissed the case. Issue: Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the lots of the private respondents despite the existence of a final decision of the Supreme Court which held that choice of their lot to be used as an extension of EDSA is arbitrary? Held: It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension has disappeared because of the fact that the residents of the area have . De Knecht appealed the Order dismissing the case to the Court of Appeals who on December 28. 8. it is equally true that the Constitution and our laws may expropriate private properties after the payment of just compensation. 1988 issued its decision setting aside the Order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court on the ground that the choice of the above-mentioned streets as the line through which the EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. 7001moved for the dismissal of said case since the decision of the Supreme Court is already final. 5. 6. the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. Bautista in 1980.

3. Limitations of the power of expropriation. When shall we base the computation of the value of the property expropriated: at the time of taking or at the time of the institution of the expropriation proceedings? 8. in general Read: 1. J. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. 46 SCRA 734 5. 106 Phil. 1976 . Eminent domain cases. 3 SCRA 706 7. ************************ Cruz. 27. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS. concurring Supervening events have changed the factual basis of the SC's decision to justify the subsequent enactment of the statute.. THUS THE ANTERIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT MUST YIELD TO THIS SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE FIAT. City of Baguio vs. 1989 3-a. CA. CA. NO. BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDED THE AFORESAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. 93 SCRA 503 4. Jarencio. Genito. 102 SCRA 620 3. 144 2. the present expropriation is no longer arbitrary. Feb. X x x THE COURT AGREES IN THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF ENACTING BP 340.R. The Republic could continue it expropriation proceedings considering the supervening events after the decision was rendered. It is simply because we ourselves have found that under the changed situation. Arce vs. February 12. Garcia vs. Municipality of Daet vs. I MUST ADD THAT THIS DECISION IS NOT A REVERSAL OF THE ORIGINAL DE KNECHT CASE. WHICH WAS DECIDED UNDER A DIFFERENT SET OF FACTS. If we are sustaining the legislation. NAWASA.227 been relocated and duly compensated and only DE KNECHT now is left while her property is only about 5% of the area to be expropriated. Salas vs. it is not because we concede that the lawmakers can nullify the findings of the Court in the exercise of its discretion. G. 87335.

he must be provided with one. vs. Valdellon. Co vs. RPA. Read: 1. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. PVB. threat. Juan.1980 13. Guido vs. Del Rosario vs. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 80 SCRA 305 10. Martinez. vs. 1968 10. 84 Phil. 152 SCRA 140 11.. Rep. Lozano vs. Heirs of Ardona vs. 42 Phil. Commissioner vs. March 31. Esteban. Section 12. 125 SCRA 220 12. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 17 SCRA 25 7. Abella vs. 461 8. 130 SCRA 30 9. et al. Insierto. Nolting. Clements vs. Ortigas vs. Rutter vs. 702 3. 96 Phil. March 21. Ilusorio vs. NLRC. Kabiling. Mataas na Lupa vs. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Baylosis. Reyes.l987 2. violence. 68 6. CAR. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Burgos.THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE Section 10. San Diego vs.146 SCRA 323 5. 131 SCRA 517 11. Ganzon vs. Feati Bank. 123 SCRA 713 9. (2) No torture. 114 SCRA 842 4.93 Phil. 189 SCRA 14 CHAPTER XII . Secret . De los Santos. 1. NHA.RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION Section 11. PVBEU vs. Republic vs. 92 SCRA 29 CHAPTER XI . Haguisan vs. PNB. December 18. 94 SCRA 533 8. Emilia. 847 7. Dimayuga. force.228 6.

229 detention places. to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest. and 5. Requirement for an official custodial logbook and its contents. Approved on March 6. Rights of a person under “custodial detention” for one suspected or arrested as a terrorist. 9372. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice. allowed freely to avail of the services of a physician or physicians of choice. 2007 and effective on July 15.The police or other law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has been placed under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained official logbook. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. incommunicado.. allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his family or with his nearest relatives and be visited by them. which is .. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) Section 21. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice. the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the Public attorney’s office (PAO). 3. informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel. 2. to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.The moment a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained. allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction. Section 23. Rights of a person under custodial detention. he shall forthwith be informed by the arresting police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought. solitary. 4. of his or her right: 1. Republic Act No. NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/AntiTerrorism Law. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO’s thus contacted to immediately visit the person detained and provide him with legal assistance.

the name and address of the physician/s who examined him physically and medically. or psychological pressure on the detained person which shall vitiate his free will shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation. the date and time of his return to his cell. 6. The summary of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation (from the time of arrest) under the Constitution. 8. names and addresses of the persons who visited him. and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or torment. or mental. The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of: 1. 7. name. Section 24. date and time when the detained person requested to communicate or confer with his lawyer. the date and time of each removal of the detained person from his cell for interrogation or for any purpose. absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence in any judicial. and address of the detained person. 4. 13. intimidation. names and addresses of the members of his family and relatives. the evidence obtained from said detained person …shall be in its entirety. 3. description. 5. legislative. 2. the date and time of visits by his legal counsel and the date and time of departure. and 14. all other important events bearing on all relevant details regarding the treatment of the detained person while under custodial arrest or detention. summary of the physical and medical findings after each interrogation. date and time of such visits. or coercion. laws and jurisprudence. quasi-judicial. 12. otherwise. the state of his health and his physical condition a the time of his initial admission for custodial detention. 11. inquiry. . or administrative investigation. name and address of the physician who examined him physically and medically. 9. No torture or coercion in Investigation and interrogation. date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial arrest and detention. 10. moral. No threat. proceeding or hearing.230 hereby declared as public document and opened and made available for inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of the person under custody or any member of his family or relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or his physician at any time of the day without any form of restriction.

the Court. or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf. INVITING OR INVESTIGATING OFFICER OR HIS COMPANIONS MUST OBSERVE AT THE TIME OF MAKING THE ARREST AND AGAIN AT AND DURING THE TIME OF THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION OR INTERROGATION IN ACCORDANCE with the Constitution. obligations of the arresting officers and investigators during and after arrest. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer. one will be provided for him. It is high time to educate our law enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the court must update in the light of new legal developments. 3. information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person. preferably of his own choice. Every other warnings. The person arrested. GUIDELINES. AND DUTIES WHICH THE ARRESTING. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer. MAHINAY.231 Rights of the accused during custodial investigation. lays down the PROCEDURE. February 1. effect of non-compliance by the investigators THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. 122485. as guardian of the rights of the people. 4. invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown a copy of the warrant of arrest. No. He must be warned that he has the right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him. 7438.R. 1999 En Banc Per Curiam: Considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means. jurisprudence and Republic Act No. detained. 2. DETAINING. 1. if any. . G. and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf.

7. (NOTE: Any violation of the foregoing rights of the accused shall entitle him to sue for damages against the arresting or investigating officers in accordance with RA7438. at any time. or the interrogation has begun. He must be informed that any statement OR EVIDENCE. In addition. regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some information or statements. 10. . not to mention the possible criminal liability of said persons under existing laws).232 5. he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made. as the case may be. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or state of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with the warning that once he makes such indication. he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak. he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel. SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. 8. any member of his immediate family. 9. The person arrested must be informed that. in whole or in part. the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any other time during the process. 11. letter or messenger---with his lawyer (either retained or appointed). the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer. radio. obtained in violation of any of the foregoing. knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same. LATEST CASES ON THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION . IT SHALL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICER TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED. or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-governmental organization. whether inculpatory or exculpatory. if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer. 6. he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means--telephone. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily. or any medical doctor. otherwise. priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel.

et al. Held: 1. Facts: For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). 103 Phil. when custodial investigation is deemed to have started. While the Information charged the accused of willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of while the Decision found the accused guilty of inexcusable negligence. He was not assisted by counsel nor he was apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit. The “investigation” under said provision refers to “custodial . THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.233 Rights during custodial investigation. 217 and 171 [8] in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.. all accused were convicted by the Sandiganbayan. Even if the information charges willful malversation. Court of appeals. right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. (Diaz vs. JOSE TING LAN UY. Accused Ochoa interposed an appeal and claimed that his conviction was based on his alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with an NPC personnel and the report of the NBI. After trial. J. 302 SCRA 118). conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense. This was the doctrine laid down in the case of Samson vs. JR. 2. He likewise claimed that his constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against and due process were violated. The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with section 12 [1] of the Bill of Rights is not tenable. Sandiganbayan. He maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined a the Philippine heart center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. 277. 475 SCRA 248 Ynares-Santiago.. the accused-appellants were charged of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents as defined and penalized under Arts.

3. a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. 335 SCRA 349 Under Art. informed of his right to remain silent. CA. verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not a part of the investigation (People vs. PEOPLE VS. or even to a Mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity (People vs. 426 SCRA 666). In fact. accused-appellant was given no more than a perfunctory recitation of his rights. Endino. signifying nothing more than a . 2. and that if he is indigent. the confession before a Municipal Mayor was held admissible as wvidence). Jr. the same was not covered by Section 12. a suspect in custodial investigation must be: 1. The protective mantle of section 12. Duenas. 353 SCRA 307). with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners. 232 SCRA 53). Clearly. confession to a private individual (Kimpo vs. 334 SCRA 673). In this case. told that he has the right to counsel. Clearly. FIGUEROA. the confession of the accused was obtained during an administrative investigation by NPC and therefore.. 323 SCRA 589). Art. the rights enumerated by the accused are not available BEFORE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS ENTER THE PICTURE.234 investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and that the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television (People vs. Judge Ayson. article III does not apply to administrative investigations (People vs. Andam. even a videotaped interview where the accused willingly admit his guilt in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the said provision though the trial courts were warned by the supreme Court to take extreme caution in admitting similar confessions because of the distinct possibility that the police. warned that anything he says can be and will be used against him. Succinctly stated. Ordono. therefore. Section 12 [1] of the Constitution. III. custodial investigation refers to the critical pretrial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular person as a suspect (People vs. (NOTE: In People vs. III of the Constitution. Zuela. 175 SCRA 216).

when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. upon their arrest of some of the accused. or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime. whether inculpatory or exculpatory. are inadmissible not only against the DECLARANT but with more so against 3rd persons. THIS IS SO EVEN IF SUCH STATEMENTS ARE GOSPEL TRUTH AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN. This is line with the provisions of RA 7438 which makes it applicable even when a person is merely invited for questioning. even while they were still walking along the highway on their way to the police station. there was custodial investigation when the police authorities. in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with the above constitutional safeguards. made during the custodial investigation. THE PLACE OF INTERROGATION IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BUT THE TONE AND MANNER OF QUESTIONING BY THE POLICE AUTHORITIES. BARIQUIT. prior to in-custody questioning. Art. (People vs. immediately asked them regarding their participation in the commission of the crime . July 31. the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. although not yet in custody. Custodial investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. PEOPLE VS. 341 SCRA 600 When custodial investigation is deemed to have started.. extrajudicial statements.e. i. III of the Constitution begins when a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime. Samolde. The presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Thus.235 feigned compliance with the constitutional requirements. . 2000) It is always incumbent on the prosecution to prove at the trial that. The protection under Section 12 . Hence. Such statements are useless EXCEPT AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE VERY POLICE AUTHORITIES WHO VIOLATED THE SUSPECT’S RIGHTS.

G. SEPT. does not violate appellant’s constitutional rights AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. 336 SCRA 632. 128551. Illinois. 346 SCRA 458. spontaneous statements voluntarily given. 95 SCRA 2 . However. when taken without the assistance of counsel.R. 135405. 117690. 2000. G. 378 US 478 2. Arizona. whether verbal or non-verbal. To be admissible in evidence. NO. DANO. NO. 11. DANO.R. without a valid waiver of such assistance. SEPT. 1. Sept.R. Guidelines for police investigation Read: 1. Duero. an extrajudicial confession must be: (i) voluntary. PEOPLE VS. even without the assistance of a lawyer. as where appellant orally admitted killing the victim before the barangay captain (who is neither a police officer nor a law enforcement agent). 141 SCRA 289 2. A suspect’s confession. Miranda vs. 31. Duties of the Police or Arresting Officers Read: 1. 339 SCRA 515. G. P vs.R. JUL. 339 SCRA 515. (iii) express. 2000. PEOPLE VS. do not fall under custodial investigation. Nicandro. 1990 1-a. Duhan. Such admission. NOVEMBER 29.236 PEOPLE VS. vs. vs. Matos-Viduya. 1. is inadmissible in evidence. even if appellant’s confession were gospel truth. 117690. and (iv) in writing. MAYORGA. NO. P vs. G. P. Caguioa. regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given. PEOPLE VS. P vs. 2. (ii) made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel. 142 SCRA 100 3. 2000. 104 SCRA 379 2-a. SAMOLDE. 384 US 436 3. 2000.Escobedo vs. P. NO.

A lawyer who could just hear the investigation going on while working on another case hardly satisfies the minimum requirements of effective assistance of counsel. J. Then. Dec.No. vigilant and independent.R. 10. while making an extrajudicial confession PEOPLE VS. In fact. 82604. We are inclined to believe that when he was brought to the IBP Office. To be informed of the Right to remain silent. JIMENEZ G. Marcos Jimenez. he was brought to the IBP Office where a lawyer assisted him in his extrajudicial confession. 1991 NARVASA. Not only was the accused subjected to custodial investigation without counsel. Assistance of counsel must be effective. PATUNGAN. The mere presence of a lawyer is not sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement of assistance of counsel. Ramos. 122 SCRA 312 3. PEOPLE V. cases in particular Read: 1. the IBP lawyer was working on an appeal in another case while the extrajudicial confession was being taken. he was likewise denied effective assistance of counsel during the taking of his extrajudicial confession.237 4. 354 SCRA 413 The accused was under coercive and uncounselled custodial investigation by the police without a lawyer for 2 and a half days . his body and his will were in no position to raise any objection much less to complaint to the IBP lawyer about what he has gone through. People vs. Constitutional right to remain silent. P vs. counsel of choice Right to counsel during custodial investigation. December 10.: FACTS: ----------- .104 SCRA 1-a. 1991 391 Extrajudicial confession.

Robert. the son of the deceased Pelagio Jimenez told his mother that his father had not come home the previous night: that the search for the deceased. among others. Both accused contest such ruling. refused to sign his statement. the bathing at the artisian well "as if washing away stains of blood". noting that the unsigned confession is admissible in evidence inasmuch as evidence aliunde corroborated such confession. In an order dated July 21. that deceased Pelagio was finally found dead. Marcos and Robert. 1986. the deceased's violent quarrels with his children and occasions that he had been boxed and hit by his children. police authorities. he must be provided with one. acting upon a report. came upon the corpse of Pelagio Jimenez below a cliff near a balite tree. A draft of the confession was prepared by the investigating officer but Marcos was not able to sign the same due to the absence of the judge before whom it is supposed to be sworn and signed. Marcos agreed to come back and sign his statement. 1986. assisted by a former judge whose presence was requested by the police authorities. (1) to have a competent and independent counsel of his own choice and if he cannot afford the services of counsel. Hence this appeal. Section 12 (1). Subsequently. but upon his return. ISSUE: ---------Is the extrajudicial confession of Marcos admissible in evidence? HELD: --------No.238 On August 13. he. 1985. The police investigators learned that Marcos. They also learned from the persons they interviewed of circumstances that drew their suspicion to the son. Marcos. Article III OF THE 1987 Constitution declares that a person being investigated by the police as a suspect in an offense has the right. 1985. the trial court absolved the widow and Wilkins of any participation in the filling for lack of proof. and that (2) said right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. commenced a day earlier but it was not until the morning of the following day. and Wilkins. Decision reversed. the trial court found Marcos and Robert guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. On December 12. The police had invited the deceased's widow and her sons for questioning about the killing. August 13. . an information for parricide was filed against the widow and her sons. such as. who was living separately from them.

Even if the confession of the accused speaks of the truth. the supposed waiver made therein of his constitutional right to counsel of his own choice. PEOPLE VS. 286 SCRA 207 Melo. she did not ask Marcos if was is willing to have her represent him. exception PEOPLE VS. This is not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance contemplated by the constitution. The typewritten confession is unsigned and was in fact expressly rejected by Marcos. it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it was voluntarily given. not only because it was obtained in violation of the constitution but also because of the principle of res inter alios acta. inadmissible as evidence. In view of the inadmissibility in evidence of the confession. the former judge whose assistance was requested by the police was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own choice. his brother Robert. Furthermore. not only the confession but also any admissible obtained in the course thereof are inadmissible against him or his co accused. not one foisted on him by the police investigators or other parties. Neither can the confession prejudice his co-accused. the former judge was not present when Marcos was being interrogated by the police. J. if it was made without the assistance of counsel. 284 SCRA 199. In this case. the rest of the evidence of the prosecution is inadequate to overcome the presumption of innocence raised by the fundamental law in favor of both the accused. TAN. this is far from being substantial compliance with the constitutional duty of police investigators during custodial interrogation. PANFILO CABILES.239 The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of the latter's own choice. Extrajudicial confession without the assistance of counsel. . While she asked him if he had voluntarily given the statements contained in the typewritten document. she was the police officers' own choice. and no valid waiver of such right to counsel have been made. The interrogation of Marcos Jimenez having been conducted without the assistance of counsel. Hence.

confession which are the product of third degree methods such as torture. BUT GIVEN IN AN ORDINARY MANNER WHEREBY THE ACCUSED ORALLY ADMITTED HAVING COMMITTED THE CRIME. As such. his uncounselled confession is admissible in evidence. b. Section 12 of the Constitution. These are: a. 267 SCRA 608 held that a lawyer applying for a position in the NBI could not validly assist an accused being investigated then by the NBI. 175 SCRA 216 (Confession made to the officials of Philippine Airlines during an investigation is admissible in evidence despite the fact that he was not informed of his rights during custodial investigations since said officials are not bound by the requirements of Section 12. the confession must be express. the confession must be in writing. the SC in the case of PEOPLE VS. 332 SCRA 190 Mendoza. vs. De los Reyes. the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. Judge Ayson. not elicited through questioning by the authorities. The above requirements. March 3. 1990 1-c. those which are given without the benefit of Miranda Warnings.240 In order that a confession is admissible. There are two (2) kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions under Art. In fact. however. Art. J. vs. P. There is no compliance of the constitutional requirement of competent and independent counsel to assist an accused during custodial investigation when the accused was assisted by the Station Commander of the WPD. 1997 when the accused made a voluntary and verbal confession to the Municipal Mayor that he committed the crime imputed to him. and b. November 21. the confession must be voluntary. intimidation. violence. ANDAN. force. JANUARIO. are not applicable when the suspect makes an spontaneous statement. III of the Constitution) 1-d. c. P. Pinlac. and d. threat. while being investigated by other policemen of the same police station because the interest of the police is naturally adverse to the accused. Atty. III. PEOPLE VS. 165 SCRA 675 . Aspili. This was the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE VS. OBRERO. 1-b. People vs. the following requisites must be present: a.

Alegre. PEOPLE VS. (NOTE: In the case of PEOPLE VS. 157 SCRA 261 2. DE LA TORRE VS. Donato. Judge Cruz. How about if the accused gives an spontaneous statement before he could be advised of his right to remain silent? Read: Aballe vs. 162 SCRA 642  3. 183 SCRA 196 3-b. Usman Hassan. People. 94 SCRA 109 4. When shall the constitutional rights of the mentioned above demandable? During police line-up? accused as Read: 1. Judge Cruz. 77116. the SC held that a lawyer who was at the NBI Office applying for a position therein and who was appointed as counsel for a suspect being then investigated by the NBI could not be considered as the competent and independent counsel referred to in . 1989 (Including the duty of Police Officers in connection with said right) 7. 187 SCRA 47 1-f. Gamboa vs. Camalog. 135 SCRA 465 3. P vs. The right to counsel. P vs. P. P vs. 294 SCRA 196 4. vs. Draculan vs. People vs. Waiver of the right to counsel/exceptions/requisites PEOPLE VS. JEREZ. 1997. Gamboa vs. 285 SCRA 393 A lawyer provided by the investigators to the accused during the custodial investigation is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former’s appointment during the course of the investigation AND THE ACCUSED THEREAFTER SUBSCRIBES TO THE VERACITY OF HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THE SWEARING OFFICER. vs. CA.241 1-e. GR No. Borromeo. Loveria. 85 SCRA 266 5. January 31. HATTON 4. Jr. February 7.l983 6. P.. JUANERIO. P vs. Galit. Cui. June 29. 162 SCRA 675 2. 162 SCRA 220 3-a.

Ronald Matthew Yao.m. The accusatory portion of the information reads: The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice hereby accuses Domingo Reyes y Paje. said lawyer was appointed by the NBI as one of its agents. 178300. unlawfully and feloniously. G. San Jose del Monte. 42-43. on July 16. Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5. Cristo. as amended. .. confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together with Juanito Pataray y Cayaban. ET AL. barangay Sto. Bulacan. Yao San.00). by means of force and intimidation and with use of firearms. It diminishes the right to counsel during custodial investigation and makes the work of the investigator easier to make the confession of a suspect admissible as evidence. RIGHT TO A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs in such amount as may be awarded to them by this Honorable Court. 250[4] Records. J. It is obviously a reversal of the People vs. Charlene Yao.: On 11 August 1999. committed as follows: That on or about 11:00 p.242 the Constitution especially so that later on. 2009 CHICO-NAZARIO. at Sitio Lambakin. pp. Federico Pataray y Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes y Acejo.000. the above-named accused conspiring. Lennie Yao. Raymond Yao. did then and there willfully. said accused with intent to kill. an Information 250[4] was filed before the RTC charging appellants with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. carry away and deprive Robert Yao. that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao. Juanerio ruling.R. Chua Ong Ping Sim. who are still at large. DOMINGO REYES. March 17. 1999. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. No. Alvin Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.000.) The next case is very important.

Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left.000. At this juncture. Carlo Uminga (Atty. while Yao San. Thereupon. TSN.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim.254[9] 251[6] 252[7] 253[8] 254[9] TSN. poked their guns at Yao San. Atty. Robert Yao (Robert). Bulacan. appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled. pp. on board a Mazda MVP van.251[6] After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road. all armed with guns. Bulacan. with the other male companion. p. Chua Ong Ping Sim (mother). the Yao family. Florimond Rous (Atty. Cristo.. 26 October 1999. arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. wife of Robert). On 16 July 1999. PO3 Roberto Jabien. Robert. Chua Ong Ping Sim.253[8] Later. 3-7. Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives. San Jose del Monte. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos (P5. Lenny. Rous) and Atty. appellants Arnaldo and Flores.252[7] Appellant Flores. attest to the following: The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father). Raymond and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo. TSN. at about 11:00 p. Records. Pataray and one of their male companions. 2. Raymond and Abagatnan. San Jose del Monte. and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids). p. the van stopped again. TSN. Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and drove the van. Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren). appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached. Yao San. 11 August 2000. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm.000. Uminga). 26 October 1999. Per order of appellants and their cohorts. Robert and Raymond (children). 34. 16-17. the van stopped.m. arrived and immediately boarded the van. pp. taken together. pp. with two male companions. Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto. Their testimonies. and dragged him inside the van. Thereafter. drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family inside the vehicle. The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo. pp. 7.8. Lenny (daughter-in-law. Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. 3-14. 11 August 2000. Id.243 The prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan). TSN. Robert. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape. Matthew. 21 September 2000. .

2-5. but none came. Id. Yao San waited for appellant’s call. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. 16-23. Thus. Id. in the Usan dumpsite. Chua Ong Ping Sim. 7 December 1999. pp. appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. 26 October 1999. Upon arriving therein. Litex Road. Robert found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo. Records. appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao San left. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.. pp. Quezon City. . 11 August 2000.9.255[10] On the morning of the following day. Thus. pp. Upon arriving at the poultry farm. appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao San in the poultry farm. Abagatnan searched for Yao San. 4-7. 7 December 1999. TSN. 11 August 2000. and after 30 minutes of trekking. Robert. Yao San acceded to appellants’ demand. Robert then ran towards the poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion escorted Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. Fairview.259[14] 255[10] 256[11] 257[12] 258[13] 259[14] TSN. but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up.258[13] On the morning of 19 July 1999.257[12] On 18 July 1999. 35. appellants and their cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded. TSN.m. 12-14. but the latter could not be found. 8. pp. appellants abandoned Robert.244 Meanwhile. p. but the latter could not be reached.m.. 10-12. TSN. Robert and appellants left the safe-house. Thereafter. Bulacan where they spent the whole night. pp. pp. TSN. at 7-8.m. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p. Robert also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts. 11 August 2000. appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went back to the safe-house. TSN. appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. at around 4:00 a.256[11] In the safe-house.

262[17] Subsequently. Id. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts. Jr. Sto. Rachel C. pp. TSN. with the assistance of Atty.. Uminga. & 38. Afterwards. Thereafter.261[16] On 26 July 1999. & 24-28. the defense presented the testimonies of appellants. Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident.245 On 23 July 1999. Cristo. at 13-14 & 33. Id. Id. 14-15. 12. Appellants denied any liability and interposed alibis and the defense of frameup. Records. Quezon City. Novaliches. executed a written extra-judicial confession detailing his participation in the incident. 35. appellant Flores. agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan. Cristo.263[18] On 10 August 1999. appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame. as corroborated by their witnesses. Bulacan. the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores. Irene Flores Celestino. 8-9. 11 August 2000. Robert and Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers. Robert and Abagatnan as their kidnappers. Marina Reyes. at 5. Thereupon. Subsequently. appellant Arnaldo. and Isidro Arnaldo. Quezon City. he proceeded to Camp Crame and met therein Colonel Cesar Mancao III (Colonel Mancao) of the 260[15] 261[16] 262[17] 263[18] 264[19] TSN. at 46-48.260[15] Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.264[19] For its part. appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a police line-up by Yao San. Their testimonies. Rous. Wilfredo Celestino. p. Records. San Jose del Monte. Ramos. a police officer named Liwanag of the PAOCTF approached and invited him to go to Camp Crame to shed light on a kidnapping case allegedly committed by a certain Brgy. appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. are as follows: Appellant Arnaldo testified that he was an “asset” of the PAOCTF. Bulacan. 7 December 1999. while he was at the tricycle terminal of Brgy. San Jose del Monte. Captain Ramos and by members of the Aguirre and Bautista families. Appellant Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo. pp. pp. 63-64 & 302-306. 35. Appellant Flores was subsequently identified in a police line-up by Yao San. with the assistance of Atty. He accepted the invitation. Batangas. . 15-17. executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. 8. He narrated that on 25 July 1999. Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident.

Upon failing to remit the proceeds of the drug sale. Colonel Mancao told him that the PAOCTF would arrest Brgy. that he went to her house on 12 July 1999 because it was the 265[31] 266[32] 267[33] 268[34] TSN. 3-10.246 PAOCTF. Yao San promised him that if their kidnappers would be apprehended through his cooperation. of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day. appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sister’s house at Antipolo City from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999. He was not assisted by the latter when he was forced by the PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial confession on the kidnapping of the Yao family. TSN. Colonel Mancao instructed him to identify said persons as responsible for the kidnapping of the Yao family. He implicated appellants Reyes and Flores to get even with them. he was beaten up by PAOCTF agents and thereafter included as accused with appellants Reyes and Flores for the kidnapping of the Yao family. that on the early morning of 26 July 1999.268[34] For his part.00. pp. He accepted Yao San’s offer under the condition that he would identify a different set of suspects. San Jose del Monte. 21 August 2001.m. Ramos and certain persons named Gerry Bautista and Dadie Bautista. pp. Capt. he would give him P500. 6 March 2001. a certain Major Paulino utilized him as a drug pusher. Sto. five policemen barged into his house and arrested him. 3-21. Capt. pp.000. that he had no involvement in the kidnapping of the family. 7 June 2001. Later. at 10-16. Bulacan. The day after. where he was subsequently tortured. that the policemen forcibly brought him to Camp Crame. Colonel Mancao called appellant Arnaldo to his office. pp. 10 July 2001. Cristo.266[32] He denied having met with Atty. Upon arriving thereat. Further. 3-14. He refused to do so because he feared Brgy. that he knew the Yao family because he worked as a carpenter in the family’s poultry farm at Brgy. the latter saw Yao San. appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with his family from 6:00 p. 3-6. TSN. that the policemen told him that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family. Uminga. . Ramos. TSN. since the two had previously mauled him after he sold their fighting cocks and failed to give them the proceeds of the sale. he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in kidnapping the Yao family. Colonel Mancao gave him P30. that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house.265[31] Subsequently. Id.000. he claimed that while he was under the custody of PAOCTF. and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because appellant Arnaldo held a grudge against him.267 [33] On the other hand.00.

24 May 2001. Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family P150. ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA. p. and he used to work therein as a welder. pp. Rous. that he had no participation in the kidnapping of the family. 2-9. .00) as moral damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE. finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE. that after three days of beating.000. that he never met nor did he know Atty.000. 271[37] and (3) pictures allegedly showing appellant Flores working as a carpenter in Antipolo City (Exhibits 1 & 2 for appellant Flores). P500.272[38] After trial. Records.000. they are hereby sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH as mandated by law. that he was arrested in Batangas and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. Records.000.269[35] The defense proffered documentary and object evidence to buttress their foregoing claims.247 birthday of her child. Volume VI. to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150. to wit: (1) prayer booklet of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit 1 for appellant Arnaldo). 270[36] (2) calling card of Colonel Mancao (Exhibit 2 for appellant Arnaldo). including the heirs of the deceased. and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged. he was forced to sign a document which he later found out to be a written extra-judicial confession.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings. that he knew the Yao family because he lived near the family’s poultry farm. 357. the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. and all the private offended parties or victims. Index of Exhibits. subject to the corresponding filing fee as a first lien.00). in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500. that he worked as a construction worker during his stay in his sister’s house. p. Id. 61. and to pay the costs of the proceedings. where he was beaten up by policemen for refusing to admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family. and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because he and appellant Reyes had mauled appellant Arnaldo several years ago. CA rollo.00 as civil indemnity.273[39] 269[35] 270[36] 271[37] 272[38] 273[39] TSN.

000.000. p. 433 SCRA 640. and 3) accused-appellants are further ordered to pay private complainants the amount of P100. 147678-87. 1611-M-99 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double) Homicide. the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos.000. dated February 26.R. Further. One of the main issues raised is: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANT ARNALDO AND APPELLANT FLORES. in Criminal Case No. that said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in 274[40] 275[41] G.00 as exemplary damages.248 By reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants.000. Branch 12. Mateo. Bulacan.00. premises considered. It also decreased the amount of civil indemnity from P150. the instant case was elevated to us for automatic review. The fallo of the Court of Appeals’ decision states: WHEREFORE. 2) the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby reduced to P100. However. the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC Decision.00 to P100. 2002. it directed appellants to pay jointly and severally the Yao family P100. Hence. is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that: 1) accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 34. appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.275 [41] Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision but this was denied.000. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC on each of the appellants from death penalty to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. 7 July 2004. Nos.00 as exemplary damages. . On 14 August 2006. He maintains.274[40] we remanded the instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. however. pursuant to our ruling in People v. Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based solely on the written extrajudicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Rollo.

824. 385 Phil. . Uminga to him. and that Atty. that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice. Rous to his co-appellants. and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through force. Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as evidence. Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. because they were obtained in violation of his coappellants’ constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their own choice during custodial investigation. Thus. had assisted him during the custodial investigation. torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel. we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary. and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF. according to the PAOCTF. Base. Appellant Reyes alleges that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of their own choice. 815 (2000). 803. (3) it must be express. and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty.249 evidence.276[67] The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Rous who. People v. and that he never met or knew Atty.277[69] Such right 276[67] 277[69] People v. that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. 464 Phil. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported confession. Sayaboc. and (4) it must be in writing. that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents. Uminga and Atty. 839 (2004). because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel. as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. Uminga and Atty. Appellant Reyes also asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be utilized against him.

27 June 1988. Olermo. G. 165 (2003). 594. Moreover. 310 Phil. he should be competent and independent. Records. Gamboa v. Velarde. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily. . that is. a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. 637.280[72] The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be.. Cruz. 162 SCRA 642.278[70] The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.279[71] The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation. 147. it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. i.250 contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed. L-56291. 251 SCRA 626. People v. and that the person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights. No. but. the PAOCTF investigators had informed them that the interrogation about to be conducted on them referred 278[70] 279[71] 280[72] 281[73] 282[74] 283[75] 284[76] People v. 312-318. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him. People v.R. People v.281[73] A competent and independent counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession. 612 (1995). To be an effective counsel. People v. supra note 67. The Pasubali284[76] of appellants Arnaldo and Flores’s written extra-judicial confessions clearly shows that before they made their respective confessions. the choice of the accused. No. the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires. but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. 454 Phil. pp.e. 29 December 1995. Base.R. rather. G. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 653. If the lawyer is one furnished in behalf of accused. Deniega. he must be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. 103499. 434 Phil. 282[74] However.283[75] We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations. 102. Agustin. 119 (2002). as far as reasonably possible.

Appellant Arnaldo answered that he would face the consequences because he was bothered by his conscience. while appellant Flores agreed to be represented by Atty. so that they could freely converse. Atty. exercised their fundamental rights after being informed thereof. Uminga told the PAOCTF investigators and agents to give him and appellant Arnaldo space and privacy.285[77] Indeed. Atty. Thereupon. He inquired from appellant Arnaldo if he was harmed or intimidated into giving selfincriminating statements to the PAOCTF investigators. As regards appellant Arnaldo. Appellant Arnaldo answered in the negative. appellant Arnaldo replied that he would be assisted by Atty. Atty. Uminga. Rous attested to the veracity of the afore-cited facts in their respective court testimonies. Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations. Atty. he asked appellant Arnaldo if the latter would accept his assistance as his lawyer for purposes of his confession. He warned appellant Arnaldo that he might be sentenced to death if he confessed involvement in the incident. Uminga and Atty. the language spoken and understood by them. 25 September 2001 and 27 September 2001. Uminga testified that prior to the questioning of appellant Arnaldo about the incident. Appellant Arnaldo agreed. When asked if they had a lawyer of their own. They were also told that they were entitled to a counsel of their own choice. he and appellant Arnaldo went to a cubicle where only the two of them were present. but he found none. and that anything they would say may be used against them in a court of law. they replied in the affirmative. Appellant Arnaldo replied that he wanted to make a confession about his participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family. the PAOCTF agents explained to them that they had a constitutional right to remain silent. when asked if they understood their said rights. Rous. He interviewed appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog language regarding the latter’s personal circumstances and asked him why he was in the PAOCTF office and why he wanted a lawyer. . the appraisal of appellants’ constitutional rights was not merely perfunctory. He requested appellant Arnaldo to remove his shirt for him to check if there were torture marks on his body.251 to the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereafter. The appraisal of their constitutional rights was done in the presence of their respective lawyers and in the Tagalog dialect. Uminga and Atty. Thereafter. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores and their respective counsels. He also observed that appellant 285[77] TSN. Rous. and that they would be provided with one if they had none. also signed and thumbmarked the extrajudicial confessions. in fact. After the PAOCTF investigators and agents left them. because it appeared certain that appellants had understood and.

. His conference with appellant Arnaldo lasted for 15 minutes or more. Again. and he wanted to give a confession regarding his involvement in the said incident. After the taking of appellant Arnaldo’s confession. he permitted the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Flores. 2-14. he read it entirely and thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. Appellant Arnaldo replied in the negative. Rous warned appellant Flores that his confession would be used against him in a court of law. He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the latter could still change his mind. He requested appellant Flores to lift his shirt for the former to verify if there were torture marks or bruises on his body. Atty. Atty. He asked appellant Flores whether he would accept his assistance as his lawyer.252 Arnaldo’s appearance and movements were normal. he and appellant Arnaldo affixed their signatures to the written confession. 286 [78] Further. 25 September 2001. Appellant Arnaldo read his entire written confession and handed it to him. Appellant Flores replied that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family.287[79] With respect to appellant Flores. Rous interviewed him in Tagalog inside a room. Uminga requested the PAOCTF investigators to give him a copy of appellant Arnaldo’s confession. 5-9. pp. he cautioned appellant Flores about the serious consequences of his confession.288[80] Additionally. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was giving statements to the PAOCTF investigators. Thereafter. 27 September 2001. where only the two of them were present. After the 286[78] 287[79] 288[80] TSN. Uminga asked him if he had objections to it. TSN. Later. he allowed the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Arnaldo. Atty. and that he was not being forced to sign. Atty. Rous declared that before the PAOCTF investigators began questioning appellant. Thereafter. Appellant Flores affirmed that he would. but found none. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and listened to the latter’s entire confession. Appellant Flores told him that he wanted to tell the truth and unload the burden on his mind. and that the death penalty might be imposed on him. Atty. Upon obtaining such copy. Atty. but the latter maintained that he wanted to tell the truth. pp. at 9-15. Appellant Flores answered that he was bothered by his conscience. He asked appellant Flores about his personal circumstances. Id. Atty. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would sign his written confession. He instructed appellant Arnaldo to read and comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo to ask him for clarification and comment if he did not agree or understand any part of his written confession. He asked appellant Flores why he wanted to give such confession.

Uminga and Atty. public or private prosecutor. he instructed appellant Flores to read and check his written confession. this does not automatically imply that their right to counsel was violated. Atty. he cannot be a special counsel. Rous had organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. 27 September 2001. was a member of the Free Legal Aid Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Uminga was called by the PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo. Rous. Velarde. Uminga declared under oath that he was a private practitioner when he assisted appellant Arnaldo during the custodial investigation. because he happened to be the lawyer manning the office when the PAOCTF called. What the Constitution requires is the presence of competent and independent counsel. supra note 74. clarified that he had been separated therefrom since 1994291[83] when he went into private practice. pp. and not a lackey of the lawmen. nevertheless.290[82] There was no conflict of interest with regard to the legal assistance rendered by Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Quezon City at the time he rendered legal assistance to appellant Flores.253 taking of appellant Flores’ statements. He also read appellant Flores’ written confession. Fabro. Id. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration. In fact. Atty. he. Id. because Atty.293[85] Part of Atty. Supra note 65 at 726. 5. or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Although Atty. The indelible fact is that he was president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Nor is there any evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. Appellant Flores read the same and made some minor corrections. at 14-19. Nonetheless. he and appellant Flores signed the latter’s written confession.295[87] we stated: The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. 289[81] 290[82] 291[83] 292[84] 293[85] 294[86] 295[87] Id. p. on the other hand. he proceeded to the PAOCTF office to assist appellant Flores. counsel of the police. There was no evidence showing that Atty. Both counsels had no interest adverse to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Rous’ duty as member of the said group was to render legal assistance to the indigents including suspects under custodial investigation.294[86] In People v. TSN. 25 September 2001. People v. at 6. one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest. 4-5. Uminga testified that he was a former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent. respectively. Afterwards. TSN. Atty. thus. .289[81] It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability of Atty. 292[84] It appears that Atty. Uminga’s telephone number was listed on the directory of his former NBI officemates detailed at the PAOCTF.

Prior to their questioning. 954 (2004). 468 Phil. for one reason or another. an accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. 428 SCRA 633. nay. Atty.299[91] In the case at bar. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. respectively. respectively. Fabro. supra note 67. Uminga. during their custodial investigation. supra note 65. Rous. the suspect has the final choice. appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. is not available to protect his interest. . under Section 12(1). Nos. these confessions are admissible. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Rous as their lawyers. Rous. Uminga and Atty. the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores. and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who.297[89] Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. Base. People v. obstruct. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. respectively. as earlier stated. Uminga and Atty. People v. 298[90] Consequently. appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of proving that they were forced or coerced to 296[88] 297[89] 298[90] 299[91] People v. unless prompted by truth and conscience. 651. while appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Mojello. Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees. appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty.296[88] While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged in the police investigators. as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one.R. People v. 20 May 2004. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga and Atty. 944. Hence. 133685-86. Bagnate. the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede.254 Further. G. Otherwise.

On the contrary. (2) where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths. 18.302[94] we held that the following factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons. 577. p. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores averred that they informed their family members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment. Their extra-judicial confessions clearly state how appellants and their cohorts planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before. 229 Phil. thereby ruling out the possibility that these were involuntarily made. Id.300[92] Their physical examination reports certify that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted during their examination. it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused.303[95] With respect to appellant Reyes’s claim that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be used in evidence against him. Bagnate. .255 make their respective confessions. they did not present any plausible proof to substantiate their claims. but the latter did not report such allegations to proper authorities. and that they were not promised or given any award in consideration of the same. They did not submit any medical report showing that their bodies were subjected to violence or torture. (4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies. and (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim. Neither did they file complaints against the persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their respective confessions despite several opportunities to do so. It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores are replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was committed. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language if. Other than their self-serving statements that they were maltreated by the PAOCTF officers/agents. 582 (1986). at 19. People v. upon its face. Records also bear out that they were physically examined by doctors before they made their confessions. appellants Arnaldo and Flores declared in their respective confessions that they were not forced or harmed in giving their sworn statements. the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity. we have ruled that although an extra-judicial 300[92] 301[93] 302[94] 303[95] Records. during and after its occurrence. (3) where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment.301[93] In People v. supra note 90. Pia.

PEOPLE.R. admissible as corroborative and circumstantial evidence to prove appellant Reyes’ guilt. 230 Phil. 304[96] In People v. 88451. therefore. approved by the RTC in its Order 304[96] 305[97] 306[98] Santos v. jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. These statements are. RIGHT TO COUNSEL The person who assisted him in court during his arraignment and pre-trial is not a lawyer. are identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity of the former as early as July 28. In People v. 2000 and subsequently. G.: On the matter of accused-appellant’s claim of having been denied due process. J. 377. Encipido306[98] we elucidated as follows: It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS’ extrajudicial confessions were independently made without collusion. G. February 12. . Reyes. They are.305[97] we ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that appellant Reyes participated in their kidnapping of the Yao family. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others. who “seems not a lawyer. 560. 201 SCRA 364. 2009 CARPIO MORALES.R. Jocelyn P. that confession is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. No. No.256 confession is admissible only against the confessant. 17942. Alvarez. also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime. 5 September 1991. it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. PEDRO CONSULTA VS. 1175. an examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant was represented by Atty.” during the early stages of trial. 400 Phil. 574 (1986). 1206 (2000). They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof. therefore. Sandiganbayan.

Olvis. 181 SCRA 225 2. July 31. who prepared the petition for habeas corpus and the appellant’s brief. 145 SCRA 624 12. P vs. Tawat. Buenaflor. appellant was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys’ Office during the presentation by the prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence. it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. 96 SCRA 624 3. 162 SCRA 422 1-c. albeit unsuccessfully. 150 SCRA 113 7. Paggao from the Public Defender’s (Attorney’s) Office of Makati City. No. 129 SCRA 431 5. 1990 1-d. 2000. vs. 108 SCRA 373 4. Saludar. August 20. 163 SCRA 623 1-b. then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due process. 1989. P vs. People v. 1990 1-f. P. January 17. P vs. Elesterio308[4] enlightens: “As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-lawyer. Sandiganbayan. 57 SCRA 481 1-a. May 9. The right to counsel. P vs. P. vs. Thereafter. P vs. Taylaran. 1990 1-e. P vs. Ampo-an. Rainald C. P vs.” (Underscoring supplied) Read also: 1. he has since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar. Hernandez.R. P. At any rate. 63971. 153 SCRA 700 9. P. 169 G. 148 SCRA 624 307 [3] 308 [4] Rollo. P vs. vs. P vs. p. P vs. Nulla. 154 SCRA 513 10. Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense. P vs. Pecardal. vs. July 4. accused-appellant was represented by Atty. P vs.307[3] (Underscoring supplied) That appellant’s first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding to their destination. 153 SCRA 471 8. decision is . Marquez. 173 SCRA 243. Ladrera. 147 SCRA 204 (Note that this widely criticized by constitutionalists) 6. Marcos. 183 SCRA 12 1-g. Caguioa. 1980 ll. Lasac.257 dated August 4. Tampus. Further. Kidagan. P. Nolasco. Estacio vs. 249.

September 28. 162 SCRA 642 1-b. Hizon. P vs. Decierdo. P vs. Nera vs. P vs. Auditor Genral. P vs. Matos-Viduaya. Ponce Enrile. Velasco. 152 SCRA 123 1-a. 1990 5. vs. Cruz. September 11. The Fiscal is the counsel for the State. P vs. vs. P vs. 80 SCRA 589 14. cases in general/when does these rights demandable? Effect of its non-observance by the investigator Read: 1.258 13. 164 SCRA 1 . not the accused or the suspect. Read: P. Read: P. l987 5. Is the right to counsel indispensable in non-criminal proceedings? Read: 1. 121 SCRA 538 4. Albofera. Gamboa vs. 1990 Could the Fiscal also represent the accused during custodial investigation to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution that the accused is assisted by counsel? No. Rojas. Olvis. 110 SCRA 140 3. P vs. Diokno vs. Morales vs. P vs. January 8. Capitin. Right to remain silent and to counsel and the right to be informed of such rights. Santiago. Alegria. P vs. 110 SCRA 319 2. P vs. 144 SCRA 516 How about if the lawyer who assisted him during custodial investigation is a public attorney who was not chosen by the accused himself but given to him free of charge? The extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as evidence. 152 SCRA 27 1-b. Jara. January 7. Enrile. 165 SCRA 47 1-a. 149 SCRA 496 5-a. Pena. 163 SCRA 760 1-c.1987 6. Lasanas. P vs. 154 SCRA 513 1-c.

accused still held guilty by the Supreme Court. Pangasinan. Jara. P vs. P vs. 125333. 144 SCRA 576 3. Rosita Mangunay saw both persons walking along Ambrosio St. RONNIE GARCIA were drinking gin in a canteen in Urdaneta. Jara. Diokno. 1995. Salig. P vs. 2. in the poblacion and noticed that they smelled liquor when they greeted her. Duero. Abano. Prudente. Inadmissible as evidence a. 133 SCRA 651 8 P vs. P vs. ROLANDO FELIXMINIA y CAMACHO GR No. vs. 1990 8. Presumptions on extrajudicial confessions(that official acts were regularly performed as against the presumption against waiver of constitutional rights) Read: 1. Who can object to the admissibility of an confession? presumption of extrajudicial Read: 1. The doctrine of the "fruit of the poisoned tree" Even if the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as evidence. 144 SCRA 516 3.259 6. . of the same day..m. P vs. P vs. P. July 2. 104 SCRA 379 2. 145 SCRA 597 5. supra 2. 133 SCRA 426 7. 2002 En Banc Facts: 1. At around 10 a. accused-appellant and his cousin. 133 SCRA 59 6. Tolentino. 145 SCRA 555 4. PEOPLE VS. Stonehill vs. In the morning of September 19.. Trinidad. P vs. loveria. when the regularity does not apply 7. Cruz. P vs. 162 SCRA 714. March 20.

6. THE BODY OF TISAY WAS FOUND IN THE PLACE WHICH HE DESCRIBED DURING HIS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. Pangasinan. Upon receipt of the information that the child was last seen with the accused-appellant. 10. proceeded to the house of the accused-appellant. accused-appellant and his cousin went to look for 6-year old Maria Lourdes Galinato. The court admitted as evidence the extrajudicial confession of the accused- . 12. of that same day.260 3. 5. She claimed that she clearly saw the accused-appellant since they were walking towards each other coming from opposite directions. 4. Urdaneta. to 6:30 p. carrying Tisay who was crying and struggling.m. Magno saw accusedappellant walking alone to town coming from the direction of the Macalong River. of the same day. the police together with the Barangay Captains of Camantiles and Bayaoas. killed and buried Maria Lourdes near the Macalong River in Barangay San Vicente. while UNDER INVESTIGATION WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A LAWYER. the accused-appellant jumped out of the window carrying a black bag. After his arrest. 9. The police authorities gave chase and finally caught him after twenty (20) exhausting hours. Urdaneta. 11.m. Mangunay again saw the accused-appellant walking along Ambrosio St. After trial. As they approached the house. At around 2:45 p. INDEED. 7. At about the same time. In the early afternoon of the same day. prosecution witness Natividad Bernardo.. witness Leah Magno saw the accusedappellant carrying a child was seen heading towards the wooded area in the Macalong River.m. also known as Tisay and found her playing inside a jeepney and took her. Meanwhile. Pangasinan.. By 5 p. accused-appellant was brought to the Urdaneta Police Station where he admitted that he raped. 8. the trial court (RTC 45 presided over by JUDGE JOVEN COSTALES) rendered a judgment of conviction and imposing the penalty of death to the accused-appellant. saw accused-appellant pass their house carrying a child who looked about 5-6 years old. the parents of Tisay were frantically searching for their child and when their search proved futile. they reported the matter to the Barangay Captain and to the Police.m. Before 3 to 4 p.

261 appellant and used the same as one of the grounds in support of the judgment of conviction. This is so because [1] the compromising circumstances were duly proven which were consistent with each other and which lead with moral certainty to the conclusion that he was guilty of the crime charged. his conviction by the trial court is correct. Is the extrajudicial confession of the accused –appellant admissible in evidence? 2. the said rights could not be waived except in the presence of counsel. Mahinay. In People vs. in accordance with the doctrine of the ‘fruit of the poisoned tree’. 2 Though the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant is inadmissible as evidence. the same is inadmissible in evidence. Circumstantial evidence is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence and cases have recognized that circumstantial evidence in its weight . Whether the lower court erred in convicting in convicting the accused-appellant? Held: 1 The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused while under custodial investigation and without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence despite the fact that he was allegedly appraised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. As such. This is so because under the 1987 Constitution. I S S U E S 1. The evidence in this case are more than sufficient to prove the accused-appellant’s beyond reasonable doubt. it was held that conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided the following requisites are present: [a] there is more than one circumstance. 1. [b] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. and [2] the totality of such circumstances eliminated beyond doubt the possibility of his innocence. and [c] the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance or an independent counsel should be struck down as inadmissible.

000.00. July 26. 145 SCRA 700 Read: 1. Tan. p. 4.142 SCRA 110 confession in a 2. may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the Supreme Court.1988 3. vs. 162 SCRA 402 2. May 3. not the Read: 1. Bombesa. August 11. Does it also include the confession of a accused? witness. 1990 9.00 to P125. when admissible or inadmissible Read: 1. P vs.1988 2. Gen. The exclusionary rule. Contado vs. Dizon vs. The admissibility of an extrajudicial criminal prosecution. 144 SCRA 516 2. April 15. P vs. P vs. Extrajudicial confession.000. P vs. 12(2) Read: 1.262 and probative force. Burgos. Eduardo. Inadmissibility of an admission obtained by 114 SCRA 234 force. Confession as evidence against the accused. Yutuc.135 3. Eligino. Sec. (NOTE: The indemnification for the death of a person in a rape with Homicide cases was increased from P50. Admissibility of an extrajudicial SCRA 419 and 10 SCRA 520 confession. The said indemnity shall also be applicable where the death penalty is authorized by applicable amendatory laws)) b. Alcaraz.136 SCRA 74 3. 1988 10. 96 SCRA 637 Read: .

Bagano. Pia. 186 SCRA 714 5-o. Arsenio. 164 SCRA 260 5-i. Villanueva. 160 SCRA 533 5-b. P. Marino. P vs. 145 SCRA 565 5-e. P vs. P vs. Abejero. P vs. P vs. 144 SCRA 516 2. P vs. Pizarro. 186 SCRA 303 5-n. Dejaresco. Ramos. 130 SCRA 301 22. 1988 5-c. P vs. P vs. Sanchez. 148 SCRA 60 15. P. Robles. P. Cruz. 160 SCRA 197 5-d. 128 SCRA 488 7. Dino. P. vs. Sabilano. P vs. Eligino. P. 145 SCRA 178 17. P vs. vs. P vs. vs. P vs. Canumay. Lagahan. vs. Jungco. P vs. 145 SCRA 483 24. 132 SCRA 83 14. 130 SCRA 595 23. 1989 5-a. Palo. P vs. Gapasin. 132 SCRA 103 12. 127 SCRA 207 11. 114 SCRA 197 . P vs. P vs. 184 SCRA 205 6. P. January 31. 147 SCRA 178 18. P vs. De La Cruz. 104 SCRA 450 5-h. P vs. P vs. Tuvera. P vs. Maternal. Camalog. 130 SCRA 625 10. 94 SCRA 150 5-e. 146 SCRA 478 21. Quizon. Nilos. 160 SCRA 728 5-d. Magtoto vs. 131 SCRA 418 13. vs. P. 145 SCRA 521 19. Evidence of lack of cvoluntariness Read: 1. P vs. December 8. vs. P vs. Manguera. P vs. De Jesus.263 5. P vs. Capulong.l980 5-j. P vs. P vs. Abano. Enciso. 130 SCRA 169 9. P vs. P vs. Veloso. vs. 186 SCRA 184 5-l. May 17. 181 SCRA 34 5-k. 183 SCRA 763---when confession is inadmissible but accused is still liable 11. Abayon. 186 SCRA 184 5-m. Encipiado. P vs. 145 SCRA 581 20. P vs. 142 SCRA 362 5-f. P. P vs. Jara. 129 SCRA 576 8. Olvis. Natipravat. Caramonte. 63 SCRA 4 16. Flores. 154 SCRA 513 5-g. Estevan. vs. 133 SCRa 426--when confession is valid 25.

He started serving his sentence and subsequently. Bail. Excessive bail shall not be required. JULIANA ADALIM-WHITE VS. He likewise justified the same based on the rule that “bail is discretionary upon conviction by the RTC of an . 1996 and is already entitled to parole. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. The right to be bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. 158 SCRA 111 CHAPTER XIII . he filed an application for release on recognizance. respondent judge ordered the release of Bagaporo upon recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. All persons. Another certification was issued by the Supervising Parole and Probation Officer showing that Bagaporo applied for parole in lieu of the DOJ’s Maagang Paglaya Program. J. SAMAR. Recognizance/bail for a convict ATTY. In support of his application. Facts: Manuel Bagaporo.264 12. was convicted of frustrated murder and was sentenced four years and two months to eight years and one day of imprisonment.THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL Section 13. Dy. By virtue of the above certifications. 475 SCRA 175 Austria-Martinez. Is the testimony of the arresting officer on the confession of the accused admissible? alleged oral Read: 1. 81 SCRA 188 Kinds of bail. when not applicable. RTC 2 BORONGAN. JUDGE ARNULFO BUGTAS. The right to bail. or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. Jr. 1. the Provincial Jail Warden issued a certification that Bagaoporo has been confined at the Provincial Jail since February 9. 104 SCRA 372 2. be bailable by sufficient sureties. shall before conviction. P vs.

Section 24. 66 SCRA 38 3.00 for gross ignorance of the law and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Abano. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON CONVICTED BY FINAL JUSGMENT AND ALREADY SERVING SENTENCE. Villasenor vs. 1991 ***************************************************** 2. 147 SCRA 219 . Villaluz. P. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 21 SCRA 312 5. 3. Marcos vs. Judge Bugtas was therefore fined P40.265 offense not punishable by death. Pestano vs. Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on the different kinds of bail) APPLIES ONLY TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR ON APPEAL. P vs. Judge Velasco. 41 SCRA 1 ***************************************************** 1-a. January 10. July 3. Almeda vs.1987. 1990 ****************************************************** Waiver of the right to bail: 1-b. IAC. Read: ****************************************************** Excessive bail: 1. Held: Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for ordering the release of Bagaporo pending the approval of his application for parole and before the completion of the minimum period of the sentence imposed upon him. June 5. 4. It is patently erroneous to release a convict on recognizance. Enage. 67 and 70 Phil. Donato. Rule 114 provides that there shall no bail for a convict after final judgment. De la Camara vs. vs. The only exception is when the convict applies for Probation before he commences to serve his sentence and that the offense and the penalty for the offense is within the purview of the Probation Law.000. Cruz.

It is a different matter if at first. JUDGE PURUGGANAN & MARK JUMENEZ November. Otherwise. 26 SCRA 522 4. Procedure when prosecutor does not object to the petition for bail in capital offenses: PEOPLE VS. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure  a. the extraditee was allowed bail. Rule 114. RTC 17. Garcia vs. This is so because the constitutional provision on the right to bail under Art. his right to due process of law will be violated. See Section 10. P vs. CA. JUDGE LANTION. May 30. III of the 1987 Constitution applies only to criminal cases. However. 322 SCRA 160 (The Mark Jimenez Case) . the Supreme Court held that the prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing while his case is still under evaluation because this would defeat the purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give warning that respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee but entitled to notice and hearing if the case is already filed in court. 2002 A person facing extradition proceedings is not entitled to bail even if the crime he was charged of in a foreign country is bailable. J. on Motion for Reconsideration in the same case. 52 SCRA 143 8. the Supreme Court on a 9-6 vote held that the extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing even when a request for extradition by another country is still being evaluated. in a 9-6 decision. 284 SCRA 315 Bail in Extradition cases. MANILA. In SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. AGBAYANI. 483 SCRA 290 Quisumbing.1986 7. UNITED STATES VS. not in extradition proceedings. Manotoc vs. THE PRESIDING JUDGE. San Diego.266 6. Domingo. ********************************* Right to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest in extradition case EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ VS. The cancellation of his bail bond may be made only after notice and hearing. .

without being authorized by law. 2 . P vs. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. JR.311[3] (Underscoring supplied) 309 [1] 310 [2] 311 [3] Rollo. Records.: Elpidio Bondad. did then and there willfully. Judge Purugganan.267 (NOTE: In the case of US vs. the Supreme Court held that the extraditee is not entitled to post a bond even if the crime he was charged of abroad is a bailable offense.Information dated February 2. G. J. 2008 CARPIO MORALES.A. in the City of Marikina.R. 173804. No. Terrobias. a dangerous drug. allegedly committed as follows:310[2] That on or about the 29th day of January 2004. p. This is so because of the possibility of flight. 2.) *************************************************** CHAPTER XIV .02 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet. 9165 (R. 2004. paragraph 2(3). . PEOPLE. feloniously and knowingly sell to poseur buyer 0. No. unlawfully. pp. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS ************************************************** 1. Records. Jr. in violation of the above-cited law. 103 SCRA 321 Presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties of the police authorities and Presumption of innocence resulting in acquittal as a result on conflicting and inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses: 1 ELPIDIO BONDAD.. EDecember 10. VS. 73-74. p. 389 SCRA 623). Article II of Republic Act No. the above-named accused. y Burac (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City309[1] for violation of Section 5. In general: 1.

No. allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 29th day of January 2004. to which PO2 Dano answered “piso lang.m. Q487945 to be used as buy-bust money. PO2 Dano was given a one hundred peso bill bearing Serial No. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. PO2 Ramiel Soriano and PO2 Dano who was designated as the poseur-buyer.. On entering the hall. Cruz St. 9165.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets which gave positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). No specification if it was a pocket of the shirt or of the pants. Marikina City. 2004. par.268 He was likewise charged for violation of Section 11. appellant approached PO2 Dano and asked him if he wanted to buy shabu. PO2 Nelson Arribay arrived together with a confidential informant. while PO2 Ferdinand Brubio.” The confidential informant approached appellant and talked to him. The buy-bust team. Philippines. in the City of Marikina. which is a dangerous drug. The Chief of the SAIDSOTF. the above-named accused. Article II also of R. Office of the Marikina City Police Station. proceeded to 3 C’s billiard hall at the corner of M. 2(3). The conduct of a buy-bust operation was recorded in the police blotter and was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) which gave it control number NOC-012904-28. yielded heat-sealed plastic sachets 312 [4] 313 [5] Id. It was agreed that PO2 Dano’s removal of his cap would signal that the buy-bust was consummated. at p. the confidential informant pointed to appellant who was then holding a cue stick beside the billiard table as the alias “Jun. among other things. and PO1 Roberto Muega were at the Station Anti Illegal Drug Special Operations Task Force (SAIDSOTF). at once formed a buy-bust team composed of. did then and there willfully. when opened. Jr. among others. in violation of the above-cited law.312[4] (Underscoring supplied) At around 7:05 p. and Bonifacio Avenue in Barangka. PO1 Christopher Anos. . P/Sr. of January 29. together with the confidential informant. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession direct custody and control 0.A. 6. The confidential informant reported. Barangka. Marikina City and named a certain alias “Jun” as the vendor. Insp.” Appellant at once took out a “Vicks” container from his right front pocket313[5] which. about the rampant sale of shabu in a billiard hall along Bonifacio Avenue. Within minutes. without being authorized by law to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drugs. Ramchrisen Haveria.

and gave his name as Elpidio Burac Bondad. among other things. recorded. Insp. identified himself. Chief Haveria. PO2 Dano grabbed appellant’s arm. PO2 Dano placed the markings “EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04” on the substance-filled sachet sold to him. addressed to the Chief of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office. 2004314[6] was prepared by P/Sr. each containing white crystalline substance with following recorded net weights and markings: A = 0. and apprised appellant of his constitutional rights. At that instant.02 gram “EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04” B = 0.315[7] The following day or on January 30. 01/29/04” on the sachets that remained inside the “Vicks” container. The buy-bust team thereupon brought appellant and the seized items to the Marikina City Police Station where a memorandum dated January 29. who. PO2 Dano removed his cap. upon receipt of three sachets. POS 1 and 2. From the container. and “EBB-ED. D-0094-04E 316[8]. a laboratory examination was conducted thereon by Police Senior Inspector Annalee R. Upon PO2 Dano’s order. 2004. p.269 containing substances suspected to be shabu. p. appellant returned the buy-bust money. at 3:00 P. Forro.. 41 Records. As the back-up police officers were closing-in. Jr. in Physical Science Report No. PO2 Dano also requested that appellant be subjected to a drug test. Jr. the specimen submitted. Still at the place of arrest.02 gram “EBB-ED POSS 2 01/29/04” x-x-x 314 [6] 315 [7] 316 [8] Id. 15 TSN.M. 17 x-x-x x-x-x . requesting for the conduct of laboratory examination on the seized items to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and their weight..02 gram “EBB-ED POSS 1 01/29/04” C = 0. handed the “Vicks” container. at p. appellant drew out one sachet in exchange for which PO2 Dano gave the marked one hundred peso bill. her findings and conclusion as follows: SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings marked as A through C respectively. June 15. 2004. Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office.

2(3). the Court finds the accused ELPIDIO BONDAD.000. PO2 Brubio. 317[9] (Italics and emphasis in the original) Denying the charges against him. 11 par. II 317 [9] 318[10] Exhibit “C”. Mata who was a “spotter” (referee) at the billiard hall at the time appellant was arrested. however. II of R. After greeting PO2 Brubio in Bicolano.” He was then made to board a car and taken to the Office of the SAIDSOTF at the police station. x-x-x x-x-x x-x-x C O N C L U S I O N: Specimens A through C contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.318[10] drawing him to restrain the hand of PO2 Brubio. foregoing premises considered.270 F I N D I N G S: x x x Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.00) as provided for in Sec. a former police officer. whom he knew was a policeman. 9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY and to pay the fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP300. the trial court convicted appellant in both charges. JR. a dangerous drug. he continued playing but PO2 Brubio suddenly handcuffed him and asked him “Sumama ka muna. a dangerous drug. Art. Finding for the prosecution. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. y BURAC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. appellant summoned and handed him his wallet containing P2. Bondad. PO2 Brubio. telling him “pera ko yan!” Aware that his son was inside the billiard hall. appellant. while he was playing inside 3 C’s billiard hall. 11 par. telling him “Huwag ka makialam dito. folder of exhibits. Appellant’s defense was corroborated by his son Christian Jeffrey C. 2 There is also no specification if it was a pocket of the shirt or the pants . p. 2(3). entered the billiard hall. 2004. and Roberto U. claimed that he was framed up and gave the following version: On January 29.A. took the wallet from his son.” Another person who was at his back pushed him out of the billiard hall in the course of which he felt PO2 Brubio reaching his (appellant’s) right front pocket.000. Art.

Par. Tolentino with the concurrence of Justices Portia Aliño Hormachuelos and Vicente S. The white crystalline granules found in his possession. pp. The accused is likewise found guilty of the crime of Violation of Sec. p. p.00). 5 Art.00) pursuant to Sec. as minimum. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. 5. II of RA 9165 the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is ordered confiscated in favor of the government for proper destruction by the proper agency. 124. without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation. upon laboratory examination. . 232-254. were positively identified as 319 [11] 320 [12] 321 CA rollo. (a) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug. There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu was proven beyond reasonable doubt since the accused-appellant knowingly possessed plastic sachets with white crystalline granules. in the light of the foregoing. as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300. Under Section 11.A. SO ORDERED. (b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.000. to thirteen (13) years. SO ORDERED. Art. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day.319[11] (Underscoring supplied) By Decision of February 8. namely.00.320[12] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. the appellate court held: The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for illegal possession of a prohibited drug. [13] Rollo. II of RA 9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP500. the mere act of possessing any dangerous drug consummates the crime.321[13] (Underscoring supplied) Specifically with respect to the charge of possession of shabu. CA rollo.E. 2 [3] of R. 9165. 68. Veloso. 2006. the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Penned by Justice Amelita G.271 of RA 9165.

– The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs. Seized. 9165. plant sources or dangerous drugs. PO2 Dano indeed confirms appellant’s claim. it compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized items. underscoring supplied) Hence. 9165. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. As the resolution of the second assignment of error is determinative of whether there is still necessity of segueing to the first and third assignments of error. . physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized. IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION DESPITE CLEAR VIOLATION OF SECTION 21 (1) OF R. it shall early on be passed upon. controlled precursors and essential chemicals. No. A reading of the testimony of the poseurbuyer. and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof . Appellant claims that there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. viz: Atty. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated. and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs. . . at p. 21 of R.. (Italics in the original. or his/her representative or counsel. 66 (citations omitted). appellant faulting the appellate court: II. . a dangerous drug. hence. 21 of R. Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. seized and or surrendered. Sec. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Appellant claims that no physical inventory and photographing of the drugs took place. immediately after seizure and confiscation.A. Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall. Puentebella: 322 [14] Id. as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated. No 9165 provides: Section 21.272 322[14] methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ). the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.A.A.

Puentebella: Since you did not make any inventory. Witness that at the time you apprehended the accused. an elective official. sir. is it not? Witness: We did not make inventory because we simply brought the evidence confiscated. sir. you did not make an inventory in the presence of the accused nor you did not [sic] make a photograph of the items seized in the presence of the accused. xxxx Atty. Puentebella: You also did not take photographs of the items taken from the accused? Witness: Yes. Puentebella: And you know for a fact that under the new drugs law. Court: Witness may answer the question. or the media. that’s very clear? Witness: Yes. sir. Atty. xxxx Atty. Gapuzan: Counsel is asking for a conclusion of law. Puentebella: So it is very clear now Mr. Atty. it was there that the items taken from him were inventoried. this is a requirement for the apprehending team to do. a representative from the Department of Justice. I will object.273 When you brought him to the police. it follows that you did not require them to sign your inventory as required by law? Witness: . Witness: Yes. is it not? Pros.

2004. unlike in Pringas. Worse. 81-85. By his admission. viz: x x x Provided. however: Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor. shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. sir. . further. emphasis. And the defense raised it again during the offer of evidence by the prosecution. however. No.A. People v. as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Clearly then. the apprehending police officers failed to comply with the above-quoted provision of Section 21 of R. No. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the present case. 2004. pp. 9165. during the cross examination of PO2 Dano. no photograph of the items was taken. italics and underscoring supplied) The Court’s pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations325[18] of R. are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. 175928. There was thus failure to faithfully follow the requirements of the law. June 15. and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items. 9165. August 31.274 323[16] Yes. thus: 323 [16] 324 [17] 325[18] 326 [19] TSN. Pringas holds. 2007. despite PO2 Dano’s awareness of such requirements. Vide TSN. he did not conduct an inventory of the items seized. 531 SCRA 828. G. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. by PO2 Dano’s claim.R. he immediately marked the seized items which were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. 2002.A. pp. Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds. the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and photographing requirements of Section 21 of R. June 15. 80-87. No. 842-843 Took effect on November 27. No. the defense in the present case questioned early on.A. Parenthetically.324[17] (Citation omitted. 9165326[19].

328[21] his acquittal is in order.1. Elpidio Bondad Jr. SAMUEL OBMIRANIS. which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against appellant. 414 Phil. 2008 TINGA. R. y Burac. 2004. 238 SCRA 27 (1994). 9165. No. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant. the said accused. trade. 170 (2001) citing People v. G. 181492. unlawfully and knowingly attempt to sell or 327 [20] 328 [21] 329 330 TSN. 9165. J.327[20] (emphasis supplied) IN FINE.R. Laxa. 21. is ACQUITED of the crimes charged. “B-1”. deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug. Rigodon. pp. People v. 156. Philippines. December 16. The criminal information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. par. Puentebella: xxxx Exhibits “B” which is the brown envelope.. This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the first and third assignments of error. WHEREFORE.A.275 Atty.: This is an appeal filed by Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta (appellant) who was charged with violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26 of Republic Act (R. . as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identity of the items seized. in the City of Manila. not having been authorized by law to sell. did then and there willfully. 6-7. a dangerous drug locally known as shabu.A. 2004.329[1] He was allegedly caught in a buy-bust operation by elements of the Manila Western Police District (MWPD) while offering to sell methylamphetamine hydrochloride. the Petition is GRANTED. “B-2” and “B-3” are objected to for being product of irregular functions of police and therefore fruit of poisonous thinking [sic] and they are not admissible and they were not photographed in the presence of the accused as provided for by Sec. 2 PEOPLE VS. August 10. Branch 2330[2] accused him as follows: That on or about May 18.) No.

.m. Contrary to law.Tuazon Street just before 12 a. of 18 May 2004— the appointed time and date that the confidential informant and appellant had agreed to meet. both parties dispensed with her testimony. Roberto Benitez and one335[7]confidential informant as members.332[4] Appellant was brought to trial after having entered a negative plea.276 offer for sale one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing TWO POINT EIGHT ZERO ZERO (2. Manila. thus.m. a dangerous drug. Velasco was the alleged leader of the raiding team that apprehended appellant on 18 May 2004 at the corner of G. Police Superintendent Marcelino Pedrozo (Pedrozo) of the MWPD organized a buy-bust team on the information of a confidential informant that the latter was able to place an order for half a “bulto” of shabu with appellant.331[3] At the pre-trial.336[8] Pedrozo gave the team a marked 500-peso bill to be used as buy-bust money which was placed on top of a deck of boodle money. and they awaited the arrival of appellant at the corner of G. The prosecution further admitted that the forensic chemist who analyzed the seized the confiscated substance—which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride content—did not have personal knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets in Sampaloc. The informant joined Velasco in his car. The prosecution then proceeded to prove the charge against him through the lone testimony of police officer Jerry Velasco (Velasco). appellant on board a car arrived at the scene and seeing the informant he 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 .334[6] 333[5] The narrative woven by Velasco established the following facts: On 17 May 2004. 339[11] At around 12:30 a. both the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the qualification of Forensic Chemist Elisa Reyes and. with Police Officers Wilfredo Cinco. Edgardo Palabay. Velasco was designated as the team leader and the poseur-buyer.800) grams of white crystalline substance known as “SHABU” containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride. The team informed the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) of the impending operation.337[9] entered the same in the blotter 338[10] and proceeded to Bambang in G.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets.

Appellant went back to his car. The informant introduced Velasco to appellant and said that Velasco would like to buy one-half “bulto” of shabu. Velasco negotiated with appellant to lower the price but the latter refused. He further stated that immediately after the arrest. Velasco then insisted that he must first see the merchandise. Velasco readily recognized the item as a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. he and his team brought the seized item to the police headquarters and there. Sampaloc. “May pulis yata.” At the trial. He claimed that he was taken by Velasco and his team not on 18 May 2004 but rather on 17 May 2004 at 7:00 p.m. in his presence. he was not committing any crime.277 approached the latter. he was the one who effected the arrest but it was Cinco who seized the plastic sachet from appellant. Cinco marked the same with the initials “SOO.342[14] Taking the stand. he admitted on cross-examination that there was no evidence custodian designated and that he could not remember if the seized item had been inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused. 343[15] that he was there to see his girlfriend who was residing in that area. When appellant asked for payment. he was arrested just as he was trying to get back to his car. that when he was arrested by two men in civilian clothes. and strongly denied having transacted the alleged sale of shabu with Velasco and the confidential informant.341[13] The chemistry report issued at the instance of Pedrozo and signed by Forensic Chemical Officer Maritess Mariano of the PNP Crime Laboratory revealed that the specimen supposedly seized from appellant yielded positive of methylamphetamine hydrochloride content.340[12] According to Velasco. appellant boldly asserted that he was merely framed up by the buy-bust team. one of the men pulled out a gun with which he hit his 340 341 342 343 . that he asked them why they were arresting him but neither of them gave an answer and instead one of them grabbed him by his shoulder and ushered him inside a police car. he seemed to have recognized Velasco’s co-officer because he uttered the words. Furthermore. Manila. that once inside the car. he identified the plastic sachet as that seized from appellant as well as the marking made by Cinco on it. took the item and brought it to Velasco.” At that point. that Cinco put the item in his pocket after the same was recovered and did not mark it on the spot and that the markings made on the buy-bust money had not been entered in the blotter. along Santa Teresita Street.

asked if he could give them P200.350[22] 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 .N. that he answered he did not have that much money.000.346[18] Appellant interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals in which he reiterated that the prosecution was unable to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in view of the failure to establish the chain of custody of the illegal drugs and that it was likewise unable to establish the consummation of the alleged sale of drugs.345[17] In its 23 February 2006 Decision. through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). yuko!”. Avenue police headquarters.00 fine without subsidiary imprisonment as well as the costs. that he asked them why they were doing that to him when in fact he merely told them to park their car properly on the street. that they cuffed his hands at the back and the driver. he was taken to the U.348[20] It also maintained that the chain of custody of the seized shabu had been duly established because the requirements in taking custody of seized narcotics provided for in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 344 [16] Olivia Ismael.000. and to pay a P500.000. iyong malakihan ha!”). 1. he was brought to the second floor where the two arresting officers demanded P50. corroborated the material points of appellant’s testimony. the People. series of 2002 349[21] admit of liberal interpretation. that because he said he did not know anyone who was into selling drugs. Velasco.278 neck. the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. that the demand was then reduced to P30. kicked him and uttered.00 from him.00.347[19] For its part. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.000. that they drove the car around and told him that if he could not give them the money then he must just find for them someone who sells drugs in large-scale (“Magturo ka ng nagbebenta ng droga.00 in exchange for the mitigation of his case. posited that the fact that all the essential elements of a consummated sale of dangerous drug had not been completely shown was immaterial because the charge involved a mere attempt or offer to sell which had been duly established by the prosecution. another defense witness who introduced herself as a friend of appellant’s girlfriend and who admitted having witnessed appellant’s arrest. “Makulit ka ha. that he was not detained at the headquarters but rather.

it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place.355[30] It would thus include testimony about every link in the chain. from the moment the item was seized to the time it is offered in court as evidence. The same witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. In criminal prosecutions.353[28] In other words. the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. 1. fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. 356[31] It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.352[27] It is therefore of prime importance that in these cases. the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. such that every person who handled the same would admit how and from whom it was received. 351 352 353 354 355 356 . series of 2002 defines chain of custody as “the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage.” As a method of authenticating evidence. from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.354[29] Board Regulation No.279 In its 4 September 2007 Decision. the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. 351[23] the Court of Appeals The appeal has to be granted. the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession. affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. In prosecutions involving narcotics.

was the one who examined the contents of the plastic sachet at the crime laboratory. Of all the people who came into direct contact with the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from appellant. In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant. who. although testimony about a perfect chain does not always have to be the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain. dispensed with his testimony and admitted that said forensic chemist had no personal knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug submitted for examination. substitution and exchange be inadvertent or 357 358 359 . nevertheless. more importantly. it can be reasonably concluded that the prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect failed to obliterate the hypothesis of appellant’s guiltlessness. 358[33] substitution and exchange—359[34] whether the alteration. tampering. was not even presented in court to directly observe the uniqueness of the specimen and. an unbroken chain of custody indeed becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is a narcotic substance. The same is true with respect to the laboratory personnel who could have but nevertheless failed to testify on the circumstances under which he received the specimen at the laboratory for analysis and testing. tampering.280 The prosecution evidence in the case at bar. Cinco. based on the chemistry report. While indeed the prosecution and the defense had stipulated on the qualification of the forensic chemist. took initial custody of the plastic sachet at the time of arrest and who allegedly marked the same with the initials “SOO” at the police station. only Velasco was able to observe the uniqueness thereof in court. these stipulations and admission pertain only to a certain Elisa G. as well as on the conduct of the examination which was administered on the specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his possession and custody. they are susceptible to alteration. contamination.357[32] And because they cannot be readily and properly distinguished visually from other substances of the same physical and/or chemical nature. however. to acknowledge the marking as his own. it was not reasonably explained why these same witnesses were not able to testify in court. Be that as it may. Reyes and not to Forensic Chemical Officer Maritess Mariano who. contamination. does not suffice to afford such assurance. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances such as shabu is that they are not distinctive and are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. Aside from that. according to Velasco.

it was handled by two police officers who. [2] physically inventory and [3] photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized.363[38] Graham v.281 360[35] otherwise not. Section 21366[41] of R. No. The court in that case pointed out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. State364[39] in fact acknowledged this danger. did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession. however. It thus declared that the state must be able to show by records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition.A. a substance later shown to be heroin was excluded from the prosecution evidence because prior to examination. or his/her representative or counsel. It is by reason of this distinctive quality that the condition of the exhibit at the time of testing and trial is critical. In that case.362[37] The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of substitution. and any elected public official who [4] shall be 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 .365[40] Reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. 361[36] Hence. alteration or contamination—whether intentional or unintentional—of narcotic substances at any of the links in the chain of custody thereof especially because practically such possibility is great where the item of real evidence is small and is similar in form to other substances to which people are familiar in their daily lives. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs to. [1] immediately after seizure and confiscation. in authenticating narcotic specimens. a standard more stringent than that applied to objects which are readily identifiable must be applied—a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or contaminated or tampered with.

himself admitted that as soon as appellant was arrested. 1.371[46] All these aforementioned flaws in the conduct of the postseizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from appellant. The same requirements are also found in Section 2367[42] of its implementing rules368[43] as well as in Section 2369[44] of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.282 required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. What we can fairly assume is that the Court of Appeals had overlooked the significance of these glaring details in the records of the case as it placed blind reliance right away on the credibility of Velasco’s testimony and on the presumption of regularity and thereby it failed to properly account for the missing substantial links in the chain of custody of the evidence. Velasco never even mentioned that the identifying mark on the specimen was placed in appellant’s presence. and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the statutory requirements in handling the evidence. militates against the prosecution’s cause because it not only casts doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti but also tends to discredit. the claim of regularity in the conduct of official police operation. series of 2002. Velasco. as elicited from Velasco himself during his cross-examination. Cinco had placed the initials “SOO” on the specimen. It was at the police station—and not at the place where the item was seized from appellant—where according to him (Velasco). taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court. Even more telling is the fact that. no evidence custodian had been designated by the raiding team to safeguard the identity and integrity of the evidence supposedly seized from appellant. Cinco had taken custody of the plastic sachet of shabu. It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act 367 368 369 370 371 . if not totally negate. he could not even remember whether or not the specimen had been properly inventoried and photographed at least in appellant’s presence. were not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust team.370[45] These guidelines. however. placed it in his pocket and brought the same together with appellant to the police station. the leader of the raiding team.

an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. the presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed their duty. but the theory is correct only where there is no showing that the conduct of police duty was irregular. All told.376[52] Velasco can be reasonably presumed to be adept in and mindful of the proper procedure in apprehending drug offenders. there is no way to presume that the members thereof had performed their duties regularly. A member of the antinarcotics division of the police since 1997. securing and taking custody of the evidence obtained in police operations such as this one and preserving the integrity of the evidence by protecting the chain of custody thereof. the prosecution evidence would fall short of satisfying the quantum of evidence required to arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the evidence chain failed to solidly connect appellant with the seized drug in a way that would establish that the specimen is one and the same as that seized in the first place and offered in court as evidence. where the official act in question is irregular on its face.283 or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. Ganenas374[50] in fact both suggest that the presumption of regularity is disputed where there is deviation from the regular performance of duty. 372[48] There is indeed merit in the contention that where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members of the buy-bust team.377[53] However. in view of the deviation by the buy-bust team from the mandated conduct of taking post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug in this case. for reasons as obvious as intimated above. Dulay373[49] and People v. still. Even granting that we must blindly rely on the credibility of Velasco’s testimony.375[51] It must be emphasized at this juncture that what can reasonably be presumed based on the records of this case is that Velasco is aware of his duties and responsibilities as an agent of the government in its anti-narcotics campaign. Otherwise. People v. obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Suffice it to say at this point that the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. The Court cannot indulge in the presumption of regularity of official duty if only to 372 373 374 375 376 377 . The presumption. even this presumption is unworthy of credit. in other words.

Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) 378 379 . PEOPLE. The team was headed by P/Insp. People. JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. One final word. is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon).379[55] WHEREFORE. In dubio pro reo. we will not hesitate to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present appeal. Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. Branch 52.378[54] we categorically declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer in court the testimony of key witnesses for the basic purpose of establishing a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally offered in court. Branch 2. In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution which must draw strength from its own evidence and not from the weakness of the defense.R. LOPEZ VS.C. The rule. unless he is lawfully confined for another offense. G. the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. materially conflict with every proposition as to the culpability of the accused. The search—conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself.-H. acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right. 02158 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Appellant Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is thus accordingly ordered released immediately from confinement. in a constitutional system like ours. SPO1 Pedro Docot. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance. is invariable regardless of the reputation of the accused because the law presumes his innocence until the contrary is shown. 2008 THE FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City. his wife Sheila and his mother. CR.284 obliterate the obvious infirmity of the evidence advanced to support appellant’s conviction. 172953 . No.R. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos). April 30. In Mallillin v. a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos. For the same plain but consequential reason. No. SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members.

to conduct the search. and four empty sachets containing “shabu” residue. Philippines. Taking the witness stand. CONTRARY TO LAW.285 plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance. 6-9. he admitted that it was he 380 [10] 381 TSN. that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody flees. 9165. that upon entering the premises. .380[10] On cross examination. Bolanos. otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. at about 8:45 in the morning in Barangay Tugos. That on or about the 4th day of February 2003. the leader of the raiding team. Norma. Bolanos admitted that during the search. Petitioner entered a negative plea. the prosecution presented Bolanos. whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the warrant. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11.381[12] On cross. Accordingly. Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found “behind” the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet. the said accused did then and there willfully. Article II of Republic Act No. he was explaining its progress to petitioner’s mother. Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses. testified on the circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant. custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] “shabu” with an aggregate weight of 0. that he then found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked. that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away. Sorsogon City. and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by Esternon—a discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner. that the search conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets. without having been previously authorized by law to possess the same. but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon. 22 April 2003. At the ensuing trial. he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup.0743 gram. pp.

See records. The results of the chemical analysis are embodied in Chemistry Report No. 23 July 2003. he was summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside. Forthwith. 2 December 2003. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand.386[18] Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her children. pp. Sheila. p. 6-10. So. 28 May 2003. 10. a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheila’s body inside the same bedroom. he was told that nothing was found on Sheila’s body. 382[13] Id. 23 July 2003. Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. pp.” then to the trial court383[14] and thereafter to the laboratory. four were positive of containing residue of the same substance. everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer. 6-7. at 16-17. At that point. Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand. it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos that petitioner’s wife. 13-15. at 9. However. pp. In that instant. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside. And as he was doing as told. [18] TSN. 14.384[15] Supt. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets. 383[14] TSN. D-037-03. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo). 386 . the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the seized items. 385 [16] TSN. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory .286 alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing behind him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched. p.] The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by the police operatives.382[13] that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a “true inventory.385[16] She further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Esternon showed him [12] TSN. 384[15] Id. was tucking something inside her underwear. which included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were kept. 18.

00. HELD: Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty. Hence. Esternon. the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. he went out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. It also noted petitioner’s failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges against him. exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets. Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. who was left inside the bedroom. 387[20] Id. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt .287 “sachet of shabu” which according to him came from a pillow on the bed. .387[20] Petitioner’s account in its entirety was corroborated in its material respects by Norma. More than just the fact of possession. The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioner’s animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. Licup for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets. Be that as it may.] On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. at 11-12. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300. this Appeal. barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt.000.

in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received. where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession. 655. from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence. 255 N. that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering. the likelihood of tampering.E2d 652. 389[42] Graham v. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood. It would include testimony about every link in the chain. alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving 388[41] Graham v.390[43] A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. Indeed. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony. State. testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible.E2d 652. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin—was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession—was excluded from the prosecution evidence.E2d 652. Hence. 255 N. in authenticating the same. the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. 655. the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. 255 N. the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition. loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. 388[41] Graham vs. or at least the possibility. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. State. State. State389[42] positively acknowledged this danger. the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. .288 As a method of authenticating evidence. 390 [43] Graham v.

289 objects which are readily identifiable must be applied. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects.392[53] In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner. . The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the 391[52] People v.R. 391[52] Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking. No. The same is true of Garcia who could have. 135378.R. 14 April 2004. G. 14 April 2004. G. the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced. as well as Garcia. the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory. Tan. 427 SCRA 312. Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items. his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. Ambrosio. Gallinera. A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence? The prosecution’s evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Tan. to testify on the circumstances under which she received the items from Esternon. 392[53] People v. 382 SCRA 419 (2002). 318 citing People v. what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis. 427 SCRA 312. only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. 318 citing People v. 135378. Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence. were not presented in court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. No. Ambrosio. 382 SCRA 419 (2002). but nevertheless failed.

The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused. acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right. The records show the following facts: In an Information dated April 7. March 17. 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. 2000.R. G. accused-appellant and three others were charged with violation of Sec. unlawfully and feloniously.: This is an appeal from the Decision dated July 19. 2004 Decision in Criminal Case No. JR. CR-H. in the City of Manila. conspiring. 181494. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance.C. In our constitutional system. for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.R. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CERVANTES. Evidence of guilt and evidence of innocence are about even. id. basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. accused ISIDRO ARGUSON y ARENDELA. III of RA 6425 (selling or distributing a regulated drug). Laxa. MONALYN [CERVANTES] y SOLAR @ Mona. Article III of Republic Act No.290 same were placed under police custody before offered in court. for 393 [54] People v. @ Tisoy. 15. acting in common accord. willfully. as amended. allegedly committed as follows: That. 00181929 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Art. 2009 MONALYN VELASCO. confederating and mutually helping one another.. did then and there. on or about April 5. 00476 which affirmed the April 23. Philippines. (RA) 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. WILSON DEL MONTE @ Wilson and RICHARD REQUIZ @ Richard. No. strongly militates a finding of guilt. No. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. effect of non-presentation of forensic chemist who examined the shabu or marijuana—ground for acquittal. The Equipoise Rule. . Branch 53 in Manila.393[54] In dubio pro reo. The RTC found accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15. J. 2000.

and P/Sr. only to return a few minutes later this time with Arguson. [3] The McDonald’s branch in P. commonly known as shabu. and handed it to PO2 Balosbalos. he instructed the would-be-buyers to follow him to Pasay City. simultaneously showing him a bundle of money. Pasay City. the Regional Special Operations Group IV (RSOG-IV). Tanza. based at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba. Id. Ocampo St. PO3 Reynaldo Ramos of the Philippine National Police Regional Office IV (PNP R-IV). PO3 Ramos 394[1] Rollo. later found to contain 473.291 the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500. sell. a regulated drug. deliver and give away to a poseur-buyer. and Richard Requiz. is as follows: On April 5. as summarized by the CA in the decision now on appeal. Ocampo St.76) GRAMS OF METHAMPHETAMINE [HYDROCHLORIDE]. Since Arguson did not have enough supply of shabu in the premises. who was holding a black plastic bag. Inspector Lorna Tria. Laguna. Wilson Del Monte. At about three o’clock in the afternoon of that day. The People’s version of the incident.396[3] Arguson instructed the would-be-buyers to wait for someone who will come out from the nearby Estrella St. PO3 Ramos. CONTRARY TO LAW. a forensic chemical officer of the same regional office. he hired a vehicle owned by Todavia.76 grams of shabu packed in six small self-sealing transparent bags. 2000. 395[2] 396 . at 5. In the ensuing trial. accused-appellant emerged from Estrella St.394[1] Accused-appellant and her co-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. a team led by SPO2 Geronimo Pastrana. PO3 Ramos and PO2 Balosbalos.00) PESOS. received a tip from a deep penetration agent (DPA) about a group of drug traffickers led by Isidro Arguson operating in Cavite. and PO2 Emerson Balosbalos arranged a buy-bust operation to be conducted at Arguson’s rest house in Barangay Lambingan. 6-7. and approached PO3 Ramos to check if he still had the money.395[2] Upon arriving at the rest house. Very much later. who in turn gave him the bundle of boodle money.000.. the prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of William Todavia. without authority of law or the corresponding license therefor. was later determined to be in Manila. acting as poseur-buyers.000 worth of shabu. Philippine Currency. For the purpose. Acting on this bit of information. accusedappellant left. FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE POINT SEVENTY SIX (473. Finally. in front of the McDonald’s branch in P. After being shown the money bundle. pp. Cavite. were introduced by the DPA to Arguson as the buyers of PhP 500. Arguson then took from Del Monte the bag.

to buy ice cream. They were taken to a cemetery where another vehicle came and took them to Camp Vicente Lim.292 gave the pre-arranged signal to indicate the consummation of the drug deal and introduced himself as policeman. there was a commotion going on in front of the restaurant. offered in evidence the following exhibits. and six (6) self-sealing transparent bags allegedly containing the confiscated shabu. Regional Crime Laboratory Office IV Chief Inspector (C/I) Mary Jean Geronimo then conducted the standard physical and chemical examinations on the specimen referred to her. were objected to by the defense: (a) Exhibit “B” – Chemistry Report No. as may be expected. . in the hearing of March 4. two (2) younger male persons. requesting for qualitative analysis of the contents of the six transparent plastic bags. Accused-appellant and her scampering companions were later arrested and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente Lim. Laboratory Service. 2000. where she allegedly met ARGUSON for the first time. 185-187. D-115800 on the crystalline substance. 2000 to the Chief. the substance tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. to wit: Accused-appellant testified that after she did laundry works at her house in Estrella Street near F. her youngest child asked her to go to [McDonald’s]. 2002. Vito Cruz branch. C/I Geronimo prepared and completed Chemistry Report No. When they arrived thereat at about 4:30 in the afternoon. one of whom [was] an old man boarded her inside the van causing her to lose hold of her child. The black plastic bag containing the six small self-sealing bags of white crystalline substance was likewise taken to Camp Vicente Lim where PO3 Ramos prepared the booking sheets and arrest reports and the request for a qualitative analysis of the seized items. pp. (b) Exhibit “C” – Memorandum of RSOG-IV dated April 5. On April 6. Per her report. 2000. Thereafter. 397 [4] Records.397[4] inclusive of its sub markings. Harrison on April 4. whom she later came to know as DEL MONTE and REQUIZ. D-115800 prepared by C/I Geronimo. the prosecution. Apart from the witnesses’ affidavits and other documents. The CA decision likewise summarized the defense’s account of what purportedly transpired. (c) Exhibits “D” and “D-1” to “D-6” – Black plastic bag with markings. which.B. She then saw a woman who alighted from a nearby van and pointed her out to her companions. and (d) Exhibit “F” – Receipt of property seized signed by PO2 Balosbalos and by Todavia and PO3 Ramos as witnesses. were also boarded into the same van.

00. 8. As he moved backward from where he stood. accused DEL MONTE testified that he was a parking boy around Vito Cruz and that on the day in question. while he was watching a vehicle near [McDonald’s]. Thereafter. and who are hereby ACQUITTED. [7] Rollo.293 On the other hand. saying “pulis ako wag kang aalis dyan[!] ” The man left and when he returned. 7-8. Vito Cruz branch. pp. Alhambra. when he bumped a parked van. For his part. 2004. [8] CA rollo.398[5] While not stated in the CA decision. 30. pp. Finding accused MONALYN CERVANTES Y SOLAR GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 2003. Article III. 6425 as amended. The fallo of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE. Harrison St.400[7] On April 23..000. January 20. wherefrom a man alighted and cursed him. the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and Requiz but finding accused-appellant guilty as charged and meting upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua. he was riding a borrowed bicycle on his way to the Cultural Center. a commotion happened near his post. Del Monte testified. passing by F. Arguson died during the course of the trial resulting in the dismissal of the case against him. p. 10-11. SO ORDERED. p. judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Finding the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of accused WILSON DEL MONTE and RICHARD REQUIZ beyond reasonable doubt. he was boarded into the van together with the other accused. in view of the foregoing. accused REQUIZ testified that on the date and time in question. whom he did not know prior to that incident. he was suddenly approached by a policeman who arrested him and boarded him inside a vehicle together with CERVANTES and REQUIZ. Penned by Judge Reynaldo A. that he was taken to a cemetery somewhere in Cavite where the arresting officers lingered for an hour before bringing him to Camp Vicente Lim.399[6] These testimonies remained uncontroverted. like accused-appellant. and is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine in the amount of Php500. 15.B. accused CERVANTES was with him. of Republic Act No. TSN.401[8] 398 [5] 399 [6] 400 401 Rollo. . and 2.

there was no clear identification of the contents of the confiscated sachets. the CA. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente Q. Conformably with People v. 2007. and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. 404 [11] Rollo.C. C/I Geronimo’s forensic report “carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions [and] the entries thereon x x x are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 405 [12] (a) identity of the buyer and the seller. pp. Bersamin. this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. CA rollo. CR-H.402[9] the Court directed the transfer of the case to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G. must be upheld even if she did not personally testify in court. affirmed her conviction. . pp. accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. As the appellate court stressed. finding the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs 405[12] to have sufficiently been satisfied and the identification of accusedappellant having been established.” particularly stating that the “forensic chemist who actually conducted the laboratory examination on the specimens allegedly recovered from the accused was not presented in court x x x [and] hence. 2008. July 7.R. 2004. accused-appellant urged her acquittal on the ground of “insufficiency of evidence. The CA rejected accused-appellant’s lament about one Inspector Tria testifying on the chemistry report she did not prepare. The parties manifested their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already submitted. the probative value and admissibility of the forensic report prepared by C/I Geronimo. Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. 00476. pursuant to which the RTC forwarded the records of the case to this Court. 81-82. Nos. who had resigned from the service.294 On May 18. Mateo. On March 24.”403[10] By its Decision404[11] dated July 19. 2007. Before the appellate court. which on the part of accused-appellant would be: 402 [9] 403 [10] G.R. Roxas and Lucas P. 147678-87. accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the CA affirmatory decision. On August 17. 4-10.” The CA added the observation that absent any evidence overturning the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. thus veritably reiterating their principal arguments raised in the CA. 2004. No. 433 SCRA 640. the object and the consideration.

sir. asked the operatives to wait. after being told by Arguson to wait for someone who will come out from the street whence Arguson would enter. We start off with the most basic. has identified accused-appellant and her complicity in Arguson’s illegal trade. Cruz: Your honor. the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness. . considering certain circumstances engendering reasonable doubt as to her guilt. Wilson. may we move to strike that out x x x. sir and handed it to Balosbalos. accused-appellant emerged from said street. checked on the purchase money. Q: Wilson? A: Yes. What happened next is captured by the following answers of PO3 Ramos to the prosecutor’s questions: Q: What did you see when Cervantes already returned? A: When Monalyn return the one holding the plastic bag was Wilson. and later re-appeared. 12-16. 2001. counters that the prosecution has established that the buybust transaction took place. what happen[ed]? A: Arguson took the plastic bag from Wilson. pp. Fiscal Formoso: That’s part of the answer x x x now. October 23. Arguson. who identified accused-appellant and described her role in the conspiracy to sell shabu. For its part. PO3 Ramos testified that. The Court’s Ruling After a circumspect study. they were four (4). Balosbalos gave Arguson the boodle money while I flash the signal x x x then we apprehended them. sir. In the witness box. the People. Atty. PO3 Ramos. together with Richard. PO3 Ramos pointed to Del Monte as the one holding the plastic bag allegedly containing the prohibited substance until Arguson took it from him and handed it over to PO2 406 [13] TSN. thru the Office of the Solicitor General. Without hesitation. as evidence. when all these accused here return with Monalyn Cervantes. the Court resolves to acquit accused-appellant.295 THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. and has presented the corpus delicti. PO3 Ramos categorically stated that Del Monte was among the four who emerged with Arguson from a street.406[13] As may be noted.

at 28-29. each testifying that they just happened to be near or passing by McDonald’s at about 4:30 in the afternoon of April 4. carrying the bag would relatively have the more serious implication being in itself a punishable act of possession of regulated drugs. There is no suggestion that accused-appellant. stating: “Clearly. 28. Both offered the defenses of denial and instigation. during the actual buy bust––are being indicted. Any reasonable mind might ask: Why the contrasting treatment? Why consider PO3 Ramos as a highly credible eyewitness as against accused-appellant.408[15] Before us then is a situation where two persons––accusedappellant. 2000 when they were apprehended. in its observation that “it could have been possible that [Del Monte] was merely asked by x x x Arguson to carry the bag. accused Monalyn Cervantes’ complicity with accused Isidro Arguson in the sale of shabu has been established by the testimony of PO3 Ramos. there is no other evidence which can support the charge of conspiracy with Arguson and Cervantes x x x. it could have been possible that he was merely asked by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the bag. while at the crime scene. Yet. On the other hand. but an unreliable one as against Del Monte. Del Monte came accompanying Arguson carrying the drug-containing plastic bag no less. with confederating with each and several others to sell shabu. ever handled the merchandise or its container. if the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more explanations. one consistent with the innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their 407 [14] 408 [15] CA rollo. as indicia of conspiracy. Arguson. but convicted accused-appellant. The court does not find the evidence sufficient to pass the test of moral certainty to find accused Del Monte liable as charged.” extended to Del Monte the “benefit of the doubt. in the company of the ostensible pusher. disappearing from the scene and then coming back with the principal player.” a benevolence denied to accused-appellant without so much of an acceptable explanation. and Del Monte. a car park boy. when both accused are complete strangers to the policeman? To paraphrase an unyielding rule.”407[14] But two paragraphs later. But the trial court. p. the trial court acquitted Requiz and Del Monte. Even if PO3 Ramos saw him to have held the bag for Arguson. As between the two acts performed. consisted of allegedly verifying whether the poseurbuyer still had the purchase money. The overt acts performed by accused-appellant. on the basis alone of the testimony of a witness. . the RTC went on to write: x x x While PO3 Ramos testified that the bag was initially held by accused Del Monte and then taken from him by accused Arguson. a laundry woman.296 Balosbalos. Id.

Controlled Precursors and Essential 409 [16] 410 [17] People v. November 23. the accused. No. or the confiscated cases of blue seal cigarettes in the crime of smuggling. therefore.415[22] Sec. 2004. 632. citing Valdez v.R.” 411 [18] Literally body of the crime. having failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized regulated substance. April 30. this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus410[17] delicti411[18] of the crime of possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug. We refer to the postulate that the prosecution. 2003.R. what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller. a reversal of the appealed decision is indicated on another but more compelling ground. supra. citing American jurisprudence. Sr. 1. . No. citing People v.R. 137348. No. the “chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. at 628-629. the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.R. People.R. in appropriate cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. it does not refer to the actual physical evidence. 173790. is deemed to have also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant’s guilt. supra note 19. then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. No. People. 2007. corpus delicti as referring to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the substance of the crime. Navarro. April 30. G. 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. October 10. G. And as we stressed in Malillin v. G. 172953. coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited substance. June 21. Sanchez. 538 SCRA 611. 402 SCRA 393.297 guilt.409[16] But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule. 412 [19] People v. 535 SCRA 644. 653. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug. G. October 11.412[19] There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist on whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was what was recovered from.”414[21] So it is that in a slew of cases the Court has considered the prosecution’s failure to adequately prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one supposedly seized from the offending seller or possessor as ground for acquittal. such as ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. 415 [22] Valdez. G. v. 170180. 2007. Ong. and the payment for it. 2008. 146481. the cadaver of the person murdered. supra note 20. 432 SCRA 470. 400. Series of 2002. 414 [21] G. in the legal sense. the object and its consideration.413[20] Essential. 2008. the delivery of the thing sold. This means that on top of the key elements of possession or sale. No. Ong. No. We shall explain. See Rimorin. A Latin word which signifies “body. 175832.R. 553 SCRA 619. or the “Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs. People. Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence. 413 [20] Valdez. or sold by.

this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain. the date and time when such transfer of custody [was] made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence. Art.417[24] The need for the punctilious observance of the chain-of-custody process in drug-related cases is explained in Malillin in the following wise: While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain.” defines “chain of custody. contamination and even substitution and exchange. . from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence. and the final disposition. II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in relation to Sec.” thusly: “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals x x x from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration. the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. 21. xxxx A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature.416[23] As a mode of authenticating evidence. alteration or tampering––without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not––dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession. 81(b). IX of RA 9165. In other words. tampering. an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable. 417 [24] Malillin. In context. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item. The Court cannot 416 [23] In accordance with Sec. supra note 21. the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility. or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. Art.298 Chemicals. or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical. the condition in which it was received. and Laboratory Equipment.

”421[28] It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not part of the custodial chain. that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering. Otherwise.) As the Court distinctly notes in this case. 20. And she did not as she could not. PNP R-IV Crime Laboratory Service. p. he did not indicate how he and his companions. Records. . at 490. 2001. [28] Supra note 20. 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the Chief. He did not name the duty desk officer at Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for recording. 33. a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. alteration or substitution of substances from other cases––by accident or otherwise––in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. p. handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. testify on whether or not the specimen turned over for analysis and eventually offered in court as exhibit was the same substance received from Arguson. no one testified on how the specimen was cared after following the chemical analysis.299 reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood. “[T]hese questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way. submitting for qualitative analysis the white crystalline substance confiscated by the buy-bust group. even if she wanted to. Needless to stress. In the witness box. only PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. As the Court observed aptly in People v. Ong. Then. And C/I Geronimo. October 23. a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied. Hence. the analyzing forensic chemist. 418[25] (Emphasis added. at 633-634. is a memorandum419[26] PO3 Ramos prepared420[27] dated April 5. the unnamed person who delivered the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory were no-show in court to testify on the circumstances under which they handled the specimen or whether other persons had access to the specimen before actual testing. 418 [25] 419 [26] 420 421 Id. of the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical custody of the seized regulated items. was not also presented. the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt. [27] TSN. right after the buy bust.” which. What is on record is Exhibit “C. too. in authenticating the same. or at least the possibility. as earlier described. however.

. there is no reasonable assurance that no tampering or substitution occurred between the time the police seized the black bag in P. II of RA 9165. thus: Q. The prosecution cannot. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ). 21(1). shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. what did you do? A. xxxx Q. October 23. Now.422[29] In this case. After informing their rights and the reason why we arrest them we brought them immediately to our office in Canlubang.. and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. PO3 Ramos admitted as much. thus. no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made on the seized articles at the crime scene. when you reach your office. you were able to arrest all the accused here. who was in possession of this Shabu x x x when you left the place and proceeded to Canlubang? A. Ocampo St. Withal. “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds. Now. as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.” 423 [30] TSN. or his/her representative or counsel. rightfully assert that the six sachets seized from Arguson were the very same 422[29] The IRR of RA 9165 provides further.300 Given the foregoing perspective. 18-19. the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall: immediately after seizure and confiscation.e. I made the booking sheet and I requested for their medical/physical examination x x x. Laguna. after their arrest. sir. in Manila until its contents were tested in the laboratory of the PNP R-IV headquarters in Canlubang. as embodied in Sec. a heavy cloud of doubt hangs over the integrity and necessarily the evidentiary value of the seized items. Art. xxxx Q. it is fairly evident that the police operatives trifled with the procedures in the custody of seized prohibited drugs in a buy-bust operation. what did you do there? A. pp. 2001. Now. i. In net effect.423[30] Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not observed. what about this Shabu. physically inventory and photograph the [drug] in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized. PO2 Balosbalos.

No. therefore. While Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo prepared the chemical report in the regular course of her duties. The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the admissibility of certain documents x x x cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (2) there was a compelling reason for not presenting the examining forensic chemist. notably in People v. under Section 44 of Rule 130. his report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duties.. a circumstance not obtaining in this case.) It should be pointed out. the Court.301 objects tested by C/I Geronimo and offered in court in proving the corpus delicti.e. we wrote: x x x In People vs. Bandang. Second. Adding a negative dimension to the prosecution’s case is the non-presentation of C/I Geronimo and the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo prepared. D-1585-00 only now. In it. the accused persons were convicted of illegal sale of shabu even if the forensic chemist who prepared the corresponding laboratory report was not presented. 2004. x x x entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. implying that the identity and integrity of prohibited drug was safeguarded throughout. To be sure. Omero’s reports that the seven sachets of white crystalline substance were “positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride” or shabu are. Inspector Tria. has held that the non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. 430 SCRA 570. conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the contrary. Corollarily.R. . Enriquez raises his objection to the Initial Laboratory Report and Chemistry Report No. the parties stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been 424[31] G. we ruled that a forensic chemist is a public officer and as such. however. the objection shall be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. it must be stressed that Atty. Otherwise. was incompetent to state that the specimen her former colleague analyzed was in fact shabu and was the same specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical analysis. 586-587. Uy. He should have objected to their admissibility at the time they were being offered. June 3. that the Bandang ruling was cast against a different backdrop where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the same item examined and tested positive for shabu and presented in court. she. 151314. as in this case. i.424[31] (Emphasis added. Thus.

R. supra note 19. standing alone. a demand which may be addressed by hewing to the chain-of-custody rule. Judge Balgos. Kimura the Court said that in establishing the corpus delicti. July 31. In this case. the reliance on the presumptive regularity is tenable.425[32] It does not prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the confiscated substance from the time of seizure of the evidence. 167684. Evidently. So it was that in People v. 427 [34] G. the buy bust team committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start of its operation. 130805. the chemistry report in question only established. 428 SCRA 51. 224 (2003). a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with her testimony. however.R. This presumption is.428[35] Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP personnel at Camp Vicente Lim. 217. At any rate. which failure produces a serious doubt as to accused-appellant’s guilt. proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that “unwavering 427[34] exactitude” be observed. at 634. C/I Geronimo’s resignation from the service is not. The Court need not belabor this matter anew. G. did not raise any objection to the chemical report during trial. the existence. citing Mabsucang v. And as earlier discussed. Supra note 21. 70. April 27. 443. 2004. at best. the prosecution has not proved that the substance seized in front of the McDonald’s was the same substance adduced in evidence as an indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime. No. No. the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded. 446 Phil. due execution. To a point. Cardenas.426[33] then the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 425 [32] 426 [33] Sanchez. the Court in effect stated in Malillin that unless the state can show by records or testimony that the integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory.429[36] any taint of irregularity vitiates the performance and negates the presumption. disputable and may be overturned by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.302 identified and examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for shabu. and (3) accused Bandang. 428 [35] Id. In this regard. 429 [36] Sevilla v. 497 SCRA 428. . et al. and authenticity of the results of the chemistry analysis. Inspector Tria’s testimony on. and the presentation of. unlike here where accused-appellant objected to Inspector Tria’s competency to testify on the Geronimo chemical report. 2006.

303

Lest it be overlooked, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty always yields to the presumption of
innocence and does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. 430
[37]
We held in one case:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant’s conviction
because, “[f]irst, the presumption is precisely just that—a mere
presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it]
cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.”431[38]
For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt of
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt, she must perforce be
exonerated from criminal liability. The facts and the law of the case
call for this kind of disposition.
But a final consideration. The Court is cognizant of the
campaign of the police and other drug enforcement agencies
against the growing drug menace in the country. Unfortunately,
their best efforts, particularly successful honest-to-goodness
buy-bust operations, sometimes still end up in the acquittal of
illegal drug manufacturers, distributors, pushers and/or lesser
players, even when nabbed in flagrante, simply because drug
enforcement operatives tend to compromise the integrity and
evidentiary worth of the seized illegal items. This aberration is
oftentimes in turn attributable to the unfamiliarity of police
operatives of extant rules and procedures governing the custody,
control, and handling of seized drugs. This is, thus, an
opportune time to remind all concerned about these rules and
procedures and the guiding jurisprudence. And to put things in
the proper perspective, non-compliance with the legal
prescriptions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is, as we
made abundantly clear in People v. Sanchez, not necessarily fatal
to the prosecution of drug-related cases; that police procedures
may still have some lapses. These lapses, however, must be
recognized, addressed, and explained in terms of their justifiable
grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized must be shown to have been preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.
To be forewarned is to be forearmed.
430

[37]

431

[38]

People v. Cañete, G.R. No. 138400, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 411, 424.
People v. Tan, G.R. No. 129376, May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 419, 444.

304

WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated July 19, 2007 in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476, affirming that of the RTC, Branch 53 in
Manila which found her guilty of violating Sec. 15, Art. III of RA
6425 and imposed upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a
fine of PhP 500,000, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes y Solar is ACQUITTED on
the ground of reasonable doubt and is accordingly immediately
RELEASED from custody unless she is being lawfully held for
some lawful cause.
Presumption of innocence leads to the accused’s acquittal due to
inconsistent testimonies of prosecution’s witnesses
ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
158788, April 30, 2008
FACTS:
On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house
of spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them several valuables, including cash
amounting to P600,000.00.432[3] Forthwith, the spouses reported the
matter to the police, who, in turn, immediately applied for a search
warrant with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur.433
[4]
The MTC issued Search Warrant No. 5-95,434[5] directing a search of the
items stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms used by the
perpetrators. One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner,
named as one of the several suspects in the crime.
On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the
premises of petitioner's house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os,
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and
ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon,
and, consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of
Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented eight witnesses
namely: (1) P/Insp. Anselmo Baldovino435[7] (P/Insp. Baldovino), a police
investigator and the applicant for the search warrant; (2) Rosemarie Gante
(Gante), the victim of the robbery and private complainant; (3) Ignacio
Yabes (Yabes), a Municipal Local Government Operations Officer of the
Department of Interior and Local Government who was the civilian
432
433
434
435

305
436[8]

witness to the search; (4) P/Supt. Bonifacio Abian
(P/Supt. Abian),
Deputy Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police and part of
the search team; (5) SPO4 Marino Peneyra (SPO4 Peneyra); (6) SPO1
Franklin Cabaya (SPO1 Cabaya); (7) SPO1 James Jara (SPO1 Jara); and
(8) SPO2 Florentino Renon (SPO2 Renon).
The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the
enforcement of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver
firearm was found in the latter's house.437[9] In particular, SPO1 Cabaya
testified that while poking at a closed rattan cabinet near the door, he saw
a firearm on the lower shelf.438[10] The gun is a .38 caliber revolver439[11]
with five live ammunitions,440[12] which he immediately turned over to his
superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.441[13]
Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The
petitioner and his wife Lorna assert that petitioner does not own a gun.442
[14]
Lorna testified that she saw a “military” man planting the gun.443[15]
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision444[16] dated July 7, 1999,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which rendered the assailed
Decision445[18] dated January 22, 2003, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, except for the MODIFICATION reducing and
changing the maximum of the prison term imposed to Five (5) Years Four
(4) Months and Twenty (20) Days, the appealed Decision is otherwise
AFFIRMED.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review, on the principal ground that
the CA gravely erred in finding that the guilt of petitioner has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt; and more specifically, in giving weight and
credence to the testimonies of the police officers who searched the house
of the petitioner which are replete with material and irreconcilable
contradictions and in giving SPO1 Cabaya the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duty despite the claim of Lorna that the .38 caliber
revolver was planted.
Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed reversible
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445

306

error in giving little credence to his defense that the firearm found in his
residence was planted by the policemen. He also alleges material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the
prosecution, which amounted to failure by the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The petition has merit.
The paramount issue in the present case is whether the prosecution
established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt; and in the
determination thereof, a factual issue, that is, whether a gun was found in
the house of petitioner, must necessarily be resolved.
It is a well-entrenched rule that appeal in criminal cases opens the
whole case wide open for review.446[20]
In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of
SPO1 Cabaya, who testified that he discovered the subject firearm in a
closed cabinet inside the former's house. The trial court brushed aside
petitioner's defense of denial and protestations of frame-up. The RTC
justified giving full credence to Cabaya's testimony on the principles that
the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties regularly; that
he had no ill motive to frame-up petitioner; and that his affirmative
testimony is stronger than petitioner's negative testimony.447[21]
Weighing these findings of the lower courts against the petitioner's
claim that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt
due to the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of its witnesses, the
Court finds, after a meticulous examination of the records that the lower
courts, indeed, committed a reversible error in finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was charged with. The RTC
and the CA have overlooked certain facts and circumstances that would
have interjected serious apprehensions absolutely impairing the credibility
of the witnesses for the prosecution.
The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who
actually entered the house and conducted the search, who “discovered”
the gun, and who witnessed the “discovery” are material matters because
they relate directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has
been found in the house of petitioner; or to a fact to which, by the process
of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of
a fact in issue.448[24] As held in United States v. Estraña,449[25] a material
446
447
448
449

307

matter is the main fact which is the subject of inquiry or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact or any fact or
circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony
relative to the subject of inquiry or which legitimately affects the
credit of any witness who testifies.
The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several
contradictions in the testimonies of its witnesses. Especially damaged is
the credibility of SPO1 Cabaya, none of whose declarations on material
points jibes with those of the other prosecution witnesses. In the face of
the vehement and consistent protestations of frame-up by petitioner and
his wife, the trial court and the CA erred in overlooking or
misappreciating these inconsistencies. The inconsistencies are material as
they delve into the very bottom of the question of whether or not SPO1
Cabaya really found a firearm in the house of petitioner.
SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other
policemen, among whom were SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Bernabe
Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another one whose name he does not
remember.450[26] While searching, he discovered the firearm in the kitchen,
inside a closed cabinet near the door.451[27] He said that SPO1 Jara was
standing right behind him, at a distance of just one meter, when he
(Cabaya) saw the firearm;452[28] and that he picked up the gun, held it and
showed it to SPO1 Jara.453[29] He asserted that SPO2 Renon was not one
of those who went inside the house.454[30]
However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated
SPO1 Cabaya's testimony, related a different story as to the circumstances
of the firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he merely conducted
perimeter security during the search and did not enter or participate in
searching the house.455[32] SPO1 Jara testified that he remained outside the
house throughout the search, and when SPO1 Cabaya shouted and
showed a gun, he was seven to eight meters away from him. 456[33] He
could not see the inside of the house and could see Cabaya only from his
chest up.457[34] He did not see the firearm at the place where it was found,
but saw it only when Cabaya raised his arm to show the gun, which was a
revolver.458[35] He is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time
the latter discovered the firearm.459[36] He further testified that SPO3
Ocado, who, according to SPO1 Cabaya was one of those near him when
he (Cabaya) discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459

308

search the house.

460[37]

P/Insp. Baldovino testified that only SPO2 Renon conducted the
search and entered the house together with SPO1 Cabaya,461[38] directly
contradicting SPO1 Cabaya's testimony that he, together with SPO1 Jara,
SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Ocado, and another one whose name he cannot
recall, were inside the house when he discovered the gun462[39] and that
SPO2 Renon did not enter the house of petitioner.463[40]
The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses further muddled
the prosecution evidence with more inconsistencies as to matters material
to the determination of whether a gun had in fact been found in the house
of petitioner. SPO4 Peneyra testified that Yabes stayed outside of the
during the search;464[59] whereas SPO1 Jara testified that Yabes was inside,
at the sala, but the latter saw the gun only when SPO1 Cabaya raised it.465
[60]

Although the Court has held that frame-up is inherently one of the
weakest defenses,466[61] as it is both easily concocted and difficult to prove,467[62] in the present case,
the lower courts
seriously erred in ignoring the weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure to prove the
guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. The rule requiring a claim of frame-up to be supported by
clear and convincing evidence468[63] was never intended to shift
to the accused the burden of proof in a criminal
case.
As the Court held in People of the Philippines v. Ambih:469[64]
[W]hile the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frameup is easily fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the
rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember
that the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense
evidence, but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to
convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished.
The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even if
his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to
convict him.470[65] (Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales,471[66] the Court held that
where there was material and unexplained inconsistency between the
testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not to
inconsequential details but to the alleged transaction itself which is subject
of the case, the inherent improbable character of the testimony given by
one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the effect of vitiating
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471

309

the testimony given by the other principal prosecution witness. The Court
ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable testimony of one officer
and adopt the testimony of the other that is more plausible. In such a
situation, both testimonies lose their probative value. The Court further
held:
Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory
descriptions of the same sale transaction, which allegedly took place
before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on the same
occasion? We must conclude that a reasonable doubt was generated as to
whether or not the "buy-bust" operation ever took place.472[69]
In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses generate serious doubt as to whether a
firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution
utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of
illegal possession of firearms beyond reasonable doubt.
The
constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been
demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the crime he
was with.
Read also:
P. vs. Bernardino, January 28, 1991
1-a. P vs. Flores, 165 SCRA 71
1-b. Aguirre vs. P., 155 SCRA 337
1-c. P. vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287
1-d. P. vs. Solis, 182 SCRA 182
1-e. P. vs. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313
2. Alonso vs. IAC, 151 SCRA 552
3. P vs. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205
4. P vs. Quiason, 78 SCRA 513
5. P vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450
6. P vs. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634
7. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392
3. Presumption of innocence in general and in the order of trial
PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, 355 SCRA 415
PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578
What is the EQUIPOISE RULE?
A.

472

If the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scale of justice in
favor of the accused and he should be acquitted from the crime
charged.

wherein the S. ruled that : "It behooved the respondent Judge to have followed the sequence of trial set forth x x x the form of a trial is also a matter of public order and interest. after he was convicted the accused later claims that there was a violation of the order of trial provided for in Sec.C.C.R.July 10. however. 1986 FACTS: 1. since in that case no objection was entered in the Court below to the procedure . In fact in the said Alejandro case. the orderly course of procedure requires that the prosecution should go forward and present all of its proof in the first instance. On appeal with the S. He also cites the case of Alejandro vs.l986 SACAY VS. Sacay vs. and it was held that no substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced. Pepito is not applicable inasmuch as the accused in the case at bar did not object to the procedure followed. The prosecution then moved that the reverse procedure be adopted in view of the admission that the accused shot the deceased. At the initial hearing. 3. Sandiganbayan. then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. No. Pepito.310 Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt. 404 (l910). L-66497-98. 2. 96 SCRA 322 3.S. Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Pepito. vs. There is one radical difference. admitted that he shot the deceased but claimed that it was done in self-defense and fulfillment of duty. Alejandro vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G. 96 SCRA 322." HELD: The case of Alejandro vs. Gaoiran. the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was interrupted when the accused. the Court also stated: "It is true that in the case of U. 17 Phil. No objection was interposed by the accused or his counsel. Read: 1. through counsel. the defense has produced its proofs before the prosecution presented its case. July 10. relied upon by the prosecution and the trial Court.

P vs. P vs. 1985 Rules on Criminal as amended. P vs. September 30. Opida. The right to be heard by himself and counsel during trial Effect of the fact that accused was represented by a NON-LAWYER at the early part of the trial but a full-pledged lawyer took over as his counsel when he presented his evidence. 193 Phil. P vs. Holgado. Fernando. 296 5-a. CA. Filtex. (Also important in your criminal law as to the distinctions between robbery and grave coercion) .1983 7.311 followed in the presentation of proof. COMELEC. 3e).1986 2. the change in the order of trial made by respondent Judge was promptly and timely objected to by the defense. 4. 42 SCRA 59 4. supra 5. Cuison. Right to counsel-during trial 1. the order of trial may be modified accordingly. 145 SCRA 357 3. 145 SCRA 597 6. 145 SCRA 151 5. October 2. P vs. P vs. Procedure ." 3. Dumlao vs. Rule 119 . June 13. Castillo vs. P vs.1986 3.Sec. Tempongko. Delgado vs. when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense." In fact it should be noted that under the newly adopted 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. Tolentino. Drammayo. Obligation of the judge to an accused who court without a lawyer to assist him appears in Read: 1. 3(3). Reason behind the requirement 2. Thus: "However. In this case. Other cases Read: 1. 752 2. Rule 119)the said procedure is now expressly sanctioned.85 Phil.

2009 CARPIO MORALES. kapal ng mukha mo. to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of P3. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. J. appellant filed the present petition. 1. did then and there willfully. Buzon and Lucas P. Appellant and Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia. CA rollo. belonging to said complainant.” Appellant added “Putang ina kang matanda ka.500. papatayin ka namin. saying “Putang ina mong matanda ka. 179462. by Decision of April 23.: The Court of Appeals having. violence and intimidation. Makati City. papatayin kita. 1999. 473 474 [1] Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. G. 166-176.473 [1] affirmed the December 9. the above-named accused.500. 1999. 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.312 PEDRO CONSULTA VS. No.R. 2007. walanghiya ka. steal and carry away complainant’s NELIA R. Silvestre (Nelia). The accusatory portion of the Information against appellant reads: That on or about the 7th day of June. with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marina L. the driver alighted and left.474[2] underscoring supplied) (Emphasis in the original. p. appellant and his brother Edwin Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their threats.00. Upon reaching Ambel Street. . [2] Records. CONTRARY TO LAW. February 12. and by means of force. private complainant Nelia R. in the City of Makati. together with Maria Viovicente (Maria) and Veronica Amar (Veronica). PEOPLE. pp. Perlas-Bernabe.00. according to an “alajera” in the province. sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan. unlawfully and feloniously take. Branch 139 convicting Pedro C. boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo. with intent of gain. From the evidence for the prosecution. Consulta (appellant) of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. the following version is gathered: At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 7. SILVESTRE gold necklace worth P3. wala kang kadala dala. Bersamin.” Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which.

Makati City and reported the incident. approached him while he was at Ambel Street in the company of Michael Fontanilla and Jimmy Sembrano. she would track his whereabouts and cause scandal. told them to go away so as not to cause trouble. Denying the charge. Nine days after the incident or on June 16. They.” . Precinct 8 in Comembo. and asked him (Pacaña) if he knew a bald man who is big/stout with a big tummy and with a sister named Maria. 1999. Nelia is his godmother. Appellant’s witness Darius Pacaña testified that on the date of the alleged robbery. appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his family in light of the following antecedent facts: He and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros. appellant. Hindi niyo kami maipapakulong kahit kailan!” Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall where they were advised to undergo medical examination. As he replied in the affirmative. They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were advised to return in a few days when any injuries they suffered were expected to manifest. anong ipinagmamalaki niyo. however. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelia’s parents with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be remitted. on his (Pacaña’s) call. Nelia’s father even filed a case for maltreatment against him which was dismissed and. her parents disliked his family. kicked the tricycle and left saying “Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang. emerged and on seeing the group.313 was of 18k gold. Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was partial towards her. hindi ko kayo titigilan.500. Nelia submitted a medico-legal report and gave her statement before a police investigator. Kami. repaired to the Police Station. to which he acceded. Appellant went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of residence to avoid Nelia. and which was worth P3. Retorting. Nelia ordered him and his family to move out of their house and filed a case against him for grave threats and another for light threats which were dismissed or in which he was acquitted. mga nurses lang kayo. Nelia uttered “Mga hayop kayo. marami kaming mga abogado. together with her two companions. Nelia at once asked him to accompany them to appellant’s house. As soon as the group reached appellant’s house. Nelia. on learning of the maltreatment charge.

In his present appeal. (Underscoring supplied) The first two issues. to eight (8) years. applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor.314 Another defense witness. which appellant raised before the appellate court only when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration of said court’s decision. The said accused is further ordered to pay unto the complainant Nelia Silvestre the amount of P3. appellant raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not appellant was validly arraigned. paragraph No. this Court finds accused PEDRO C. holding that intent to gain on appellant’s part “is presumed from the unlawful taking” of the necklace. and (4) Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from one (1) year. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. (3) Whether or not appellant has committed the crime of which he was charged. Thelma Vuesa. The trial court. underscoring supplied) The appellate court affirmed appellant’s conviction with modification on the penalty. and brushing aside appellant’s denial and claim of harassment. as maximum. pre-trial and presentation of principal witnesses for the prosecution. as principal of the felony of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and penalized under Article 294.00 representing the value of her necklace taken by him and to pay the costs of this suit. (2) Whether or not appellant was denied due process having been represented by a fake lawyer during arraignment. 5. convicted appellant of Robbery. premises considered.500. there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the said crime. as minimum. SO ORDERED. CONSULTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt. (Italics in the original. were resolved in the negative in this wise: . corroborated Pacaña’s account. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.

169 G. approved by the RTC in its Order dated August 4.” (Underscoring supplied) On the third and fourth issues.315 On the matter of accused-appellant’s claim of having been denied due process. People v. Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense. 173 SCRA 243. Thereafter. accused-appellant was represented by Atty. May 9. 294.” during the early stages of trial. then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due process. Paggao from the Public Defender’s (Attorney’s) Office of Makati City. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code under which appellant was charged provides: Art. Who are guilty of robbery.R.475[3] (Underscoring supplied) That appellant’s first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding to their destination. it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. 249. paragraph 5. albeit unsuccessfully. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity of the former as early as July 28. appellant was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys’ Office during the presentation by the prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence. – Any person who. 293. 1989. or using force upon anything. who “seems not a lawyer. Jocelyn P. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: 475 [3] 476 [4] Rollo. 2000 and subsequently. Rainald C. At any rate. Reyes. 63971. . shall take any personal property belonging to another. by means of violence against or intimidation of any person. p. Further. shall be guilt of robbery. who prepared the petition for habeas corpus and the appellant’s brief. 2000. underscoring supplied) Article 294. No. Elesterio476[4] enlightens: “As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-lawyer. under which appellant was penalized provides: Art. with intent to gain. he has since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar. an examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant was represented by Atty. (Italics in the original.

March 26. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. RULES OF COURT. however. 2003. He is not necessarily scot-free. Exhibit “5” – Grave Threats. Exhibit “4” – Order dismissing the information for Light Threats. folder 1. records. and appellant and family on the other. or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. . just the same. It may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another. x x x (Citations omitted. 135682. G. and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things. unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. underscoring supplied) The elements of robbery are thus: 1) there is a taking of personal property. the taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on appellant’s part. criminally liable. [7] Vide Exhibit “3” – Order granting Supplemental Motion to Quash (Malicious Mischief). the filing of complaints478[6] against him by Nelia and her family which were subsequently dismissed or ended in his acquittal. the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged. pp.479[7] Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant.R. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. 3) the taking is with animus lucrandi. Appellant is. Rule 120. robbery does not lie against him. From the pre-existing sour relations between Nelia and her family on one hand. That intent to gain on appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains light given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings.477[5] The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties. manifested by. Exhibit “4” – Light Threats. 399 SCRA 528 Exhibit “2” – Information for Maltreatment. however. Section 4. italics in the original. appellant’s taking of Nelia’s necklace could not have been animated with animus lucrandi.316 xxxx 5. among other things. and under the circumstances related above attendant to the incidental encounter of the parties. Reyes.”480[8] 477 [5] 478 [6] 479 480[8] People v. and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved. 202-203. 2) the personal property belongs to another. For “[w]hen there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved.

And there was no common robber in the present case. without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then.” (Italics in the original. has violence for one of its elements. is deemed to be the intention of the accused. . Thus Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides: “Art. Villa Abrille. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved. like robbery. shall. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion: “The distinction between the two lines of decisions. constitute the latter. at Section 5 United States v. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. 807. to compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then. Animus furandi was lacking. prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel him to do something against his will. the one holding to robbery and the other to coercion. without authority of law. but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate. When an offense includes or is included in another. conviction for robbery. If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage or for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from exercising such right or from doing such act. 36 Phil. underscoring supplied) 481 482[10] [9] Id. conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion. whether it be right or wrong. threats or intimidation. underscoring supplied) The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act. by means of violence. citations omitted.481[9] (Italics in the original. 809 (1917).”482[10] (Italics in the original. taking the law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. as alleged in the complaint or information. 286. Grave coercions. Was the purpose.317 SEC. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former. 5. the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed. underscoring supplied) Grave coercion.

Branch 76. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Atty. pleaded not guilty. EVEN IF THE DECISION OF CONVICTION IS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY. Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination. Penned by Judge Monina A. 2001. Q-00-91647-48. took over representing petitioner in view of the death of the latter's counsel. Quezon City to which petitioner. as minimum. During trial. the minimum that may be imposed is anywhere from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor. and from two (2) years. Zenarosa. G. together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid). Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 161070. as maximum. Appellant is thus guilty of grave coercion which carries the penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding P6. four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. 36-52.000. the Court SETS ASIDE the challenged Court of Appeals Decision and another is rendered finding appellant. On December 5. was charged with two counts483[3] of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). uttering of invectives. counsel of Alijid. intimidation and violence consisting of. . pp. and kicking of the tricycle. assisted by counsel de parte. rollo. Pedro C. inter alia. WHEREFORE. JOHN HILARIO VS. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. driving away of the tricycle driver. April 14.R. to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional medium as maximum.318 The Court finds that by appellant’s employment of threats. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Coercion and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum. the RTC rendered its Decision484[4] finding petitioner and his co-accused Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of eight 483 [3] 484 [4] Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. the penalty shall be imposed in its medium term. Consulta. 2008 THE FACTS: Petitioner. THE CASE MAY STILL BE REOPENED IF THERE IS GROSS-NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ACCUSED’S COUNSEL THEREBY VIOLATING HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS/COUNSEL.

that he had instructed his lawyer to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal. and that 485 [5] Id. Muntinlupa City and learned from the grapevine of his impending transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony. 2002 and yet the counsel did not inform him of any action taken thereon. . that believing that the notice of appeal filed by his counsel prevented the Decision dated December 5. I S S U E: Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance or failure of the petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal. that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this situation considering that it was a counsel de oficio. he instructed his representative to get a copy of the notice of appeal from the RTC. this time unassisted by counsel. petitioner contended that at the time of the promulgation of the judgment. at 53-60. who broke the fiduciary relationship. constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal? Whether or not pro hac vice. In his petition. and that the RTC Decision showed that it was received by his counsel on February 1. that the assailed CA Resolutions both harped on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of his petition for relief. he was already confined at Quezon City Jail and was directed to be committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. petitioner. 2002. he was already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons. 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer. that on May 2. On May 10. that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in defiance of his clear instructions. 2002. the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of a final and executory judgment? HELD: Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him for the latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship between counselclient and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced. that he had no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus he instructed his lawyer to file it on his behalf. filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief485[5] from the Decision dated December 5. a lawyer from PAO. 2001 together with an affidavit of merit. that he had no choice but to repose his full trust and confidence to his lawyer. Palawan. that reliance on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an affront to the policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it will result to unfairness.319 (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in each count.

the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.487[13] This finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at stake. . and that petitioner's appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an exercise in futility. In his Comment. liberty. A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules of procedure.320 it would have been for the best interest of justice for the CA to have directed the petitioner to complete the records instead of dismissing the petition outright. thus the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's petition for relief from judgment. even if the judgment had become final and executory. Id. that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment sought to be reviewed final and not appealable. the OSG argues that the mere invocation of justice does not warrant the review of an appeal from a final and executory judgment. In criminal cases. there would be a grave denial of due process. Otherwise. 541. No. 202 SCRA 534. and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. October 4. Court of Appeals. G. In fact. 95026. life. or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss. it may still be recalled. even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. specially so when as a consequence.R.486[12] We have held in a civil case that to demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right. We grant the petition. Thus. 1991. xxxx Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. As we held in Telan v. The demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he 486 [12] 487 [13] See Telan v. Court of Appeals: The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases. The OSG further claims that notice to counsel is notice to clients and failure of counsel to notify his client of an adverse judgment would not constitute excusable negligence and therefore binding on the client.

that in criminal cases. there would be a grave denial of due process. the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. in Barnes v. Padilla491[17] we held: However. otherwise. no arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter. the ends of justice would be served better. The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times.R. G. (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules. (c) the merits of the case. this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life. Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses.489[15] It is even more important to note that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he filed his petition for relief from judgment with the RTC. supra note 11. we have on some occasions relaxed this rule. No. More so. as held in Telan. at 541. the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. 2004. at 540-541. and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances.. at 781. in the case of an on-going litigation. Garcia v. which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate 488[14] 489 [15] 490 [16] 491 [17] Id. Invariably. It cannot be overstressed therefore. (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company. Philippine Airlines. 160753. the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. liberty.321 does not know how to establish such right. the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory. it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way.490[16] While as a general rule. Thus.488[14] (Emphasis supplied) To repeat the ruling in Telan. Their strict and rigid application. In that way. rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. September 30. 439 SCRA 675. Id. . rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter. Inc. honor or property.

Thus. shorn of judicial discretion. 351. A strict and rigid application of rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. once it is granted by law. 1245. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals495[27] where we ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every partylitigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. People of the Philippines v. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final. in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal. however. free from the constraints of technicalities. supra note 12. Delgado v. at 686-687. While this right is statutory. the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by law. Sandiganbayan. Court of Appeals. "should give way to the realities of the situation. 756-757 (1950). must always be eschewed. Francisco. Judge Ruiz. and not the other way around. for otherwise. 229 Phil. technicalities. Court of Appeals. the importance of finding out whether 492 [18] 493 [21] 494 495 Id. and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. 85 Phil. had occasion to state: The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it. a right guaranteed by the Constitution. it may still be recalled. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. Flores v. In all criminal prosecutions. 355 (1979). 752. its suppression would be a violation of due process. Cusi-Hernandez v. technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights. 390 Phil. instead of remanding the case to the CA for a decision on the merits. as they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the balance. 1252 (2000). Holgado. 362. freed from the constraints of technicalities.492[18] Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. 366 (1986). courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules. Spouses Diaz.494[22] However. Indeed. this Court. the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause.322 rather than promote substantial justice. Truly then. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been. . 179 Phil.493[21] Even if the judgment had become final and executory. at 540-541. [22] Telan v. we opt to resolve the same so as not to further delay the final disposition of this case. speaking through the late Justice Ricardo J.

NADERA. (NOTE: For your Legal & Judicial Ethics) Atty. For unless proven otherwise to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress. JR. This is where cross-examination becomes essential to test the credibility of the witnesses. no matter how guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. Only the faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and substance to the accused’s right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and safeguard the accused’s fundamental rights. Manolo Brotonel of the PAO cannot go unnoticed. Brotonel as counsel de oficio. Nonetheless. must not be taken lightly. Hence. and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. PEOPLE VS. The performance of this duty was all the more imperative because the life of the accused-appellant . expose falsehoods or half-truths. he had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant’s testimony to ensure that the accused’s constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses against him was not rendered for naught. and [c] his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but to inform the accused of his right to do so. the two being the only persons present during the commission of the crime.323 petitioner's loss of the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to petitioner. the accused is presumed innocent. it is often the words of the complainant against the accused. if he desires. It may be so that the defense counsel really found Oleby’s testimony to be believable. [b] the manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera’s cross-examination. The cavalier attitude of Atty. It bears pointing out that in rape cases. It is discernible in [a] his refusal to crossexamine Oleby Nadera (the complainant for RAPE). J. This is so because the complainant’s testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate credulity without denying the accused’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent. especially that of a defense counsel.. 324 SCRA 490 Mendoza. had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights. a lawyer’s duty.

In another case. 6. G. G. Read: 1. Requisites of double jeopardy. 96 SCRA 957 2. His duty was no less because he was counsel de oficio. Waiver of the defendant's presence in a prosecution. OCT. and without detriment to the community at large. 2000. P vs. 63 SCRA 546 2. the accused-appellant validly waived his right to present evidence. April 21. NO. 125 SCRA 269 3. Denial of due process can be successfully invoked where no valid waiver of rights had been made as in this case. 173637. 132045. 30. AUG.R. 25. Judge. P vs. No. PEOPLE.77 SCRA 430 criminal The right to a speedy trial.R. This is in consonance with the doctrine that everyone has a right to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity. Aquino vs. Dischoso. the non-appearance of counsel for the accused on the scheduled hearing was not construed as waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence for his defense. 339 SCRA 86. The Decision of the RTC convicting the accused is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. The right to be present during trial Read: 1. Military Commission. 343 SCRA 20. G. not a case of. In this case. 2009 . PEOPLE VS.R. if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right. Read also: PEOPLE VS. 2000. DANTE TAN VS. NO. 120350. YAMBOT.324 hangs in the balance. BANIHIT. Right to be Heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense.

[2] Id. SP No. on behalf of the People of the Philippines (People). concurring. Pasig City and Dante Tan. Id. The assailed Resolution denied his Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Inhibit.” The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. at 102-112. two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G.325 CHICO-NAZARIO. Id. In two other related cases. 119832. at 228-230. Regional Trial Court. 119832500[5] involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares.R. . at 233-235. filed a Motion for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No. at 231-232. Briccio C. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. J. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. “People of the Philippines v. Mariano. Villon. 119831499[4] and No. Criminal Cases No. earlier dismissed by the trial court due to an alleged violation of petitioner Dante T. These were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Hon. Ygana. 119828 and No. rollo. 496 497 498[3] 499[4] 500[5] [1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Sesinando E. 119830. The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows: On 19 December 2000. 119831 and No. a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ). 119830498[3] pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares. pp. No. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 153. Tan’s right to speedy trial. 119831 and No. filed three Informations against Dante T.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision 496[1] dated 22 February 2006 and Resolution497[2] dated 17 July 2006 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 83068 entitled. Dante Tan. the DOJ. 119830. Tan (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. all entitled. 90-100. On the other hand. through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. 119830. 119829. “People of the Philippines v.” Criminal Case No. No. On the same day. Id.

presided by Judge Briccio C. Jr. [8] Rollo. 119828 and No. 247-253. nor would the trial court disapprove it. Id. 119830 due to the People’s alleged failure to prosecute. 119832. 119832 on 25 November 2003.326 119832 be consolidated together with Criminal Cases No. and pleaded not guilty to the charges. After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence. among other things. the pre-trial was concluded. entered her appearance for the People. the first date of trial on 27 February 2001. petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. p. and that petitioner would not interpose any objection to its manifestation. 501[6] 502[7] 503 Records. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). . 119831 and No. Ygana. under the direct control and supervision of Public Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro. 119832 were raffled off to the Pasig RTC.501[6] On 6 February 2001. 119829 also went to the same court. No. Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. Sigfrid Fortun for Eduardo Lim. The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial. Thereafter. Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001.. and a pretrial order set. 119830. 194. Rudolf Brittanico for Jimmy Juan. 119828 and No. Atty. the parties agreed that Criminal Cases No.502[7] Atty. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal Case No. On 18 September 2001. at 253-259. Criminal Cases No. On 21 December 2000. the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. Atty. 119831 and No. the prosecution was able to file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. 119829. Branch 153. which the trial court granted. 119831 and No. pp. Agnes Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan. 119830. petitioner faults the People for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or justification for the delay.503[8] On 2 December 2003. and Atty. State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva later on took over as lawyers for the People. the prosecution completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within thirty days.

to the stock exchanges where the security is traded.000. a statement with the Commission and. shall file with the Commission. and if such security is registered on a securities exchange. Finally. any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance. Directors. association or entity responsible for the violation. It shall be unlawful for any person. pp. upon conviction. capricious and oppressive.” Criminal Case No.00) pesos or imprisonment of not less than seven (7) years nor more than twenty one (21) years. because they involved similar offenses of nondisclosure of beneficial ownership of stocks proscribed under Rule 36(a)-1504[9] in relation to Sections 32(a)-1505[10] and 56506[11] of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. in addition to the penalties prescribed. resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial. otherwise known as the “Revised Securities Act. [11] Penalties. partnership. which he had allegedly done on several instances. of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner. 119831119832. 119830) were vexatious. in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. if there has been a change in such ownership during such month. partnership or association or other juridical entity.507[12] in relation to Section 56 of said act. The prosecution opposed the Motion.327 According to petitioner. The RTC ordered508[13] the dismissal of Criminal Case No. – (a) (1) Any person who. [13] Rollo. also with the exchange. within ten days after such acquisition or such reasonable time as fixed by the Commission. and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter. is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten (10%) per centum of such class shall. [12] Section 27. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No. insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. suffer a fine of not less than five thousand (P5. submit to the issuer of the security. 119831-119832. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this Act. 119830 pertains to alleged violation of Section 27 (b). a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month. or both in the discretion of the court. Manipulative and deceptive devices. he shall. by the use of any facility of any exchange – xxxx (b) To use or employ. he was persistent in asserting his right to speedy trial. 119830 DISMISSED.— (a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any class of any equity security which is registered pursuant to this Act. he claimed to have been substantially prejudiced by this delay. after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to this Act. in a registration statement filed under this Act. and to the Commission a sworn statement x x x. shall file. foregoing premises duly considered and finding the motion to dismiss to be meritorious. director. or officer. however. The presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No. Branch 153. if such security is registered on a securities exchange. Judge Briccio C. the Court hereby orders Criminal Case No. Reports. Ygana of the Pasig RTC. 119830. On 22 December 2003. the penalty shall be imposed upon the officer or officers of the corporation. [10] Section 32. shall. 835-855. be deported without further proceedings after service of sentence.00) pesos nor more than five hundred thousand (P500. at the time of the registration of such security on a securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement or within ten days after he becomes such a beneficial owner. 504 505 506 507 508 [9] Section 36. and if such officer is an alien. or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority thereof.000. officers and principal stockholders. directly or indirectly. . or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security. as the presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done separately. ruled that the delays which attended the proceedings of petitioner’s case (Criminal Case No. makes any untrue statement of a material fact of omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. If the offender is a corporation. or any person who. were done simultaneously. shall also file with the exchange.

henceforth. THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT JUDGE HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO THE DEFERMENT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. 119830 PENDING HEARING OF THE TWO OTHER RELATED CASES. 119830. the petition is granted and the assailed Orders dated December 22. raising the following issues: I.328 On motion for reconsideration. 119832 ahead of Criminal Case No. 2003 and January 20. the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to hold separate trials of the BW cases. with petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution of Criminal Cases No. ALBEIT. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in said case immediately. On 17 July 2006. Petitioner Dante Tan. In an Order dated 20 January 2004.509[14] Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for inhibition of the Justices who decided the case. 119830 in this wise: WHEREFORE. the Court of Appeals denied both motions. Criminal Case No. the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari in its Decision dated 22 February 2006. with the People contending that: RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE PEOPLE VIOLATED DANTE TAN’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. the appellate court reinstated Criminal Case No. Setting aside the trial court’s order of dismissal. In resolving the petition. 2004 are set aside. . at 99-100. 119831 and No. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY VALIDLY EXECUTE THE CERTIFICATE OF NONFORUM SHOPPING ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN THOUGH THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A COMPLAINT SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. The RTC’s order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. 509[14] Id.

Gutierrez. which is authorized to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the People of the Philippines. III. We first resolve the preliminary issues. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. paragraph (2) of the Revised Administrative Code. Revised Administrative Code. . Moreover. through its prosecutors. 729. Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt and establishes that criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. p. It is the DOJ. the DOJ is the executive arm of the government mandated to investigate the commission of crimes. the offended party in criminal cases. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED TAN’S RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. petitioner contends that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the People’s appeal before the Court of Appeals should have been signed by the Chairman of the SEC as complainant in the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Petitioner’s argument is futile.510[15] Although the complaint-affidavit was signed by the Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the SEC. Section 2. IV. pursuant to Section 3. prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system. 119830.329 II.511[16] Prosecutors control and 510[15] 511[16] Regalado. 119830 WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF TAN’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping is required to be executed by the plaintiff. In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed. Section 3(2). where the plaintiff or the party instituting the case was the People of the Philippines. REMEDIAL LAW. The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the authority of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas Gutierrez to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari before said court. the petition before the Court of Appeals originated from Criminal Case No.

or based on a misappreciation of facts. contrary to the evidence on record. People..330 direct the prosecution of criminal offenses. In this case. v. 466 SCRA 474. impossible. 83068. the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court of Appeals on the substantial matters at hand. had the authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping for Criminal Case No. 195 SCRA 710. 881. G. v.R. No. The appellate court determined that he “impliedly agreed” that Case No. Jr. Since it is the DOJ which is the government agency tasked to prosecute criminal cases before the trial court. 388 Phil. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. SP No. therefore. [19] Tad-y v. the Court shall proceed to discuss the main issues. Petitioner Dante Tan assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 8 April 1991. Court of Appeals. while conflicting with those of the RTC. 119830. are adequately supported by the evidence on record. the Court may delve into and resolve factual issues.514[19] However. 440 Phil. Viray. 713. It is a basic rule that factual issues are beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review. G. subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. National Labor Relations Commission. Gutierrez.R. 492.512[17] Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. surmises and conjectures. 405 Phil. Busmente. 11 August 2005. Both parties concede that this issue is factual. being the head of the DOJ. At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tan’s right to speedy trial. 119830 would not be tried until after termination of Criminal Cases No. We. which finding was grounded entirely on speculations. including the conduct of preliminary investigation. [20] Palon v. 964. 681 (2001). therefore. No. 512 [17] 513 [18] 514 515 Centeno v. 670. which was filed on behalf of the People of the Philippines. The preliminary issues having been resolved.R. 119831119832. such as in cases where the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are absurd. Inc. 73647.513[18] The reason is that the Court is not a trier of facts. 887 (2002). 148862. 975 (2000). Nino. find no reason to deviate from the jurisprudential holdings and treat the instant case differently. capricious or arbitrary. for it is not our function to review evidence all over again. the rule is subject to several exceptions. 515[20] Under these exceptions. . Romago Electric Co. the DOJ is best suited to attest whether a similar or related case has been filed or is pending in another court of tribunal.

11 November 2004. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial. and public trial” is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial. or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment. if otherwise.00) or both. irrespective of other imposable penalties.” This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes. .331 An accused’s right to “have a speedy. Art. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious. 146 Phil. capricious and oppressive delays. 2. impartial. capricious and oppressive delays. “justice delayed is justice denied. III. set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. its “salutary objective” being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or. 518[23] Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets. The court shall.519[24] In Corpuz v. 38-98. after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused. [24] SEC. 823 (1970).000. the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. Sarmiento. we reiterate the old legal maxim. [23] SECTION 6. otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1998. G. set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. postponements. 442 SCRA 294. after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel. and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. 516[21] Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial. except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. Republic Act No. or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1. Section 2 of Rule 119. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial. Time Limit for Trial. 312-313. – In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime.520[25] the Court had occasion to state – The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied 516 [21] 517 [22] 518 519 520[25] Acebedo v.517[22] Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution. which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure. Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. Continuous trial until terminated. 14(2). No. 8493.—Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION. Sandiganbayan.R.” was enacted. 820. the justice or judge shall. except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3. Sec. 162214.

. four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay. Sandiganbayan. and (d) prejudice to the defendant. It secures rights to the accused. Hence. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003. capricious. 407 Phil. an accused’s right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious. 921. [27] Abardo v. x x x. Also. Dela Pena v. 412 Phil. and oppressive delays. (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it. 929 (2001). The Court emphasized in the same case that: A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. Sandiganbayan.332 such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. expeditious and not mere speed. not weapons. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. the essential ingredient is orderly.522[27] From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No. courts are to give meaning to that intent. it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. 999-1000 (2001). Sandiganbayan. x x x. at 313-314. the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay. both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. for a period of almost two years and eight months.521[26] Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. but deliberate. While justice is administered with dispatch. (b) the reason for the delay. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial. 521[26] 522 Id. 119830. but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. (b) reason therefor. Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. 985. In determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right. (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift. hence.

151. the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat.e. 977 (1999). Sandiganbayan. We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial. 2 December 1993. we apply the four-factor test previously mentioned. Court of Appeals.R. To this.333 the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No. The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious. G. No. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to assert such right. .. and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient.526[31] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the constitutional guarantee. 767 (2001). Tai Lim v. In Defensor-Santiago v. resulting in changes of personnel. Garchitorena. capricious. preliminary jurisdiction. No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case.525[30] the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused. 109266. 221. i. 324 Phil. No. Santiago v. 170 (1996). the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees. the Court. 5 December 1994. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay. considering also the complexity of the cases and the conduct of the parties’ lawyers. 17 March 1993. 220 SCRA 55. and oppressive delay. 119830. 119831-119832. G. Sandiganbayan. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial hearing. TSN. 101689.528[33] Petitioner’s conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. Sandiganbayan. 375 Phil. courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. His failure to object to the 523 [28] 524 [29] 525 [30] 526 [31] 527 [32] 528 [33] Socrates v. Petitioner’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No.R. 27 February 2001. 408 Phil.R. In Cadalin v. 971. Philippine Overseas Employment 527[32] Administration’s Administrator. held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein. 228 SCRA 214.524[29] In Alvizo v. G. 104776.523[28] and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 238 SCRA 721.

SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr.334 prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. herein quoted below: COURT: Atty. mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client. the People manifested in open court that the parties had agreed to the separate trials of the BW Cases: PROSECUTOR LAZARO: May we be allowed to speak. call your witness. 823 (2002). Sandejas) Call your witness. 328 Phil. your Honor. for Violation of RA Rule 36(a)1. ATTY. your Honor. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May we make some manifestation first. 119831 and 119832. First of all. before we continue presenting our witness. SANDEJAS: Yes.530[35] During the same hearing. this witness will only be testifying as to two (2) of the charges: non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of Dante Tan x x x. CA rollo. 3-7. ATTY.529[34] In fact. Wilfredo Baltazar of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 1123. your Honor? 529 530[35] [34] Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Hernandez. 87-91. The acts. Sandejas. pp. 1143 (1996). ATTY. pp. 27 February 2001. 32 (a)-1 of the Revised Securities Act when he failed to disclose his beneficial ownership amounting to more than 10% which requires disclosure of such fact. We are presenting this witness for the purpose of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership case… COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it very clear your purpose in presenting your first witness. Case Nos. SANDEJAS: Crim. your Honor. Court of Appeals. petitioner’s acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the People’s evidence in the five BW cases on 27 February 2001. ATTY. in relation to Sec. 812. . People v. TSN. Can I borrow the file? COURT: Show it to counsel. xxxx COURT: (to Atty. 430 Phil. except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice.

involving different documents. your Honor. id.]: Your Honor. certain 531[36] Id. well.335 Your Honor please. LAZARO: Mr. . your Honor. id. it is clear that the direct examination dealt exclusively with Mr. 532 [37] TSN. although periods for trial have been stipulated.532[37] Moreover. the witness is being presented insofar as 119831 and 119832 as against Dante Tan only x x x. Dante Tan. xxxx PROSECUTOR LAZARO: I was present during the last hearing. at 225-230. then I understand that the testimony of this witness cannot just be adopted insofar as the other accused. Where periods have been set. ATTY. because at that time. these periods are not absolute.531[36] The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001 hearing further clarifies that only the two cases against Dante Tan were being prosecuted: ATTY. there was a clarification made by the parties and counsels after the witness had testified that the hearing in these cases is not a joint trial because it involves separate charges. I believe the testimony x x x mainly [is] on accused Dante Tan. please. As a matter of fact. Atty. Fortun was still representing Mr. your Honor. since x x x particularly since this is already cross. . MARANAN: We confirm that. Fortun. That is why the witness already testified only concerning Dante Tan. involving the 2 (two) cases. 3 April 2001. While the Private Prosecutor stated the purpose of the testimony of the witness. pp. your Honor. 5-10. Dante Tan. may I request clarification from the prosecutors regarding the purpose of the testimony of the witness in the stand. at 71-74. . I was then going over the transcript of this case. this is not a joint trial but a separate trial x x x so as manifested by the SEC lawyer. your Honor. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim. Jr. as we x x x understand. PROS. Lim. at 155-156. Per the query made by Atty. I believe.

Garchitorena. but generally refers to “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.R. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition. People v. Sandiganbayan and Marcos. [40] Republic v. 358-359. G. No 115430. 172. G. Judge How. 184 (2000). petitioner will be acquitted. citing People v. For the reasons above-stated. Baclayon. petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto. In spite of the prescribed time limits. Abellanosa. 119830 is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal was founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. Garcia.R. 598.336 533[38] exclusions are allowed by law. 533 [38] 534 [39] 535 536 537 Solar Team Entertainment. There is also no merit to petitioner’s claim that a reversal of the RTC’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No. complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. 119830 has prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for the defense may no longer be available at this time. 29 March 1994. 393 Phil. [41] People v. suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution. This is true in the instant case. No. the length of delay. 4 November 1992. It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. Id. in failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecution’s manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately. 615 (2003). 94187. one after the other. there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioner’s right to speedy trial. v. the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. 110837.536[41] In the cases involving petitioner.534[39] As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No. 788 (1996). 332 Phil. 215 SCRA 349.535[40] Should the prosecution fail for any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. G. this Court and the law recognize that it is but a fact that judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life. 274-275. No.537[42] More importantly. . 760. 250 SCRA 268. citing People v. 231 SCRA 578. supra note 29. [42] Santiago v. 584.” Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Ganguso. jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the fundamentally recognized principle is that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. 23 November 1995. After all. Inc. 461 Phil.R.

Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. 446 Phil. (c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded. Article III.337 The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second or later prosecution for the same offense. or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. conviction or acquittal. the following elements in the first criminal case must be present: (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal. 641 (2003). Following the above constitutional provision. double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or acquitted. providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance. Former conviction or acquittal. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. (b) The court had jurisdiction. Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate: SEC. 635. as a general rule. Section 7. made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion. will not place the accused in 538[43] Condrada v. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction. For double jeopardy to attach then. This element is crucial since. upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge. and (d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. we are concerned with the fourth element. the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. . or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. People. conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. 7. 538 [43] Among the above-cited elements.

542[47] As this Court ruled in People v. 539[44] Id. Double jeopardy has not attached. 106. 151912. that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused – was not met. however. the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. 537 (1996). Bermoy. 471 SCRA 94.541 [46] as petitioner’s right to speedy trial was not transgressed. 239 SCRA 48. there is no reason to support the initial order of dismissal. x x x.338 539[44] double jeopardy. This rule. 540 [45] 541[46] 542[47] 543[48] 544[49] Id. this exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy – that the defendant was acquitted or convicted.543[48] reiterated in People v. admits of two exceptions. citing People v. 104147. p. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious.540[45] While indeed petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 55. . 35.544[49] where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial – It is true that in an unbroken line of cases. 525. Double jeopardy does not apply to this case. G. Regalado. It must be stressed. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. Following this Court’s ruling in Almario v. however. Court of Appeals.R. as the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal. 279 (2002). it follows that petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy attached when said RTC order was reversed by the Court of Appeals. REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM (Vol. Philippine Savings Bank v. II. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Leviste. 325 Phil. Bans. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated. 119830. certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy. 26 September 2005. namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. Tampal. 2001). From the foregoing. 314 Phil. 8 December 1994. Petitioner’s situation is different. G. such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction. we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should the same charges be revived. which prevents double jeopardy from attaching. No. 45 (1995). considering that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 503. 407 Phil. No..R.

has actually increased the workload of the justice system and unwittingly prolonged the litigation. Dimatulac v. vexatious. . People v. G. 119830 is just one of the many controversial cases involving the BW shares scam where public interest is undoubtedly at stake. WHEREFORE. The assailed 22 February 2006 Decision and 17 July 2006 Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. [52] People v. Criminal Case No.R. p. for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. is entitled to its day in court. 137. Villon. and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. Leviste. 493 SCRA 125. PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW. instead of unclogging dockets. 292. the scales must balance. Subida. The State. 366 (1998).546[51] Evidently. supra note 49. Branch 153.R. Courts are tasked to give meaning to that intent. and no postponements unjustifiably sought. like any other litigant. SP No.545[50] Indeed. the petition is DISMISSED. for justice to prevail. SANDIGANBAYAN. ensuring that all those who appear before or are brought to the bar of justice are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. It was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement that the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy trial and disposition of cases. we concur in the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals. The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court. where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts for years and years and even decades. A hasty dismissal. not weapons.547[52] Finally. May 20. 358 Phil. 119830 with reasonable dispatch. we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields. Pasig City for further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 145945. 27 June 2006. 2004 Right to speedy disposition of case. The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid than in our jurisdiction. JAIME BERNAT VS. 545 [50] 546 [51] 547 Justice Isagani Cruz.339 considering that there is no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial. No. 328. There being no capricious. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals. oppressive delay in the proceedings. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED. the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under the rule of law.

particularly to Justice Godofredo Legaspi and later re-assigned to Justice Ma. SANDIGANBAYAN. The right is violated only if the proceedings were attended by vexatious. this Petition. 3. 1991. certain factors shall be considered and balanced to determine if there is delay. The determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be based on mere mathematical reckoning of time. as follows: 3. Hence. 4. Thereafter. On August 14. 1994 after the presentation of the parties’ evidence. capricious and oppressive delays. Cristina Cortez-Estrada upon her assumption of office on November 3. Particular regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. . the case was unloaded to the newly created 5 th Division. On August 23. otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 2002 to discuss the matter. 5. Reasons for the delay. 5. The Court denied the same as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. the case was deemed submitted for decision before the 2nd Division. Instead of attending the conference. and Prejudiced caused by the delay. Length of the delay. 2002. Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused. 4. 6. petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. As held in the case of DE LA PENA VS. 1993 transcript of stenographic notes. the petitioner and several others were charged of violation of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019. During the 8-year period prior to April 19. which was the cross-examination of the petitioner. In the early part of 2002 while Justice Estrada was writing the decision of the case. was missing so she called the parties for a conference on April 19. she found out that the November 26. petitioner did not complain about the long delay in deciding his case. 1998. Issue: Was there violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case when the same was not decided for almost 8 years from the time it was “deemed submitted for decision?” Held: No.340 Facts: 1. 2. There is no violation of the right to speedy disposition of his case because petitioner failed to assert his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case.

Baladjay. 159 SCRA 70 13. Martin vs. G. Ventura vs. 113 SCRA 284 8. 36 SCRA 247 11. In general Read: 1. P vs. Tatad vs. AUG. Bermisa vs. Circular No. 22. dated 16.341 a. CA. Castillo. Araula. NOS. GEN. July 25. Com. Orsal. 650 3. Caballero vs. 2000. DUTERTE VS.R. Department of Justice Circular No.1976 4. 161 SCRA 327 15. 102 SCRA 56 7. The right to speedy trial. P vs. 140188. NO.. NO. 2000. 289 SCRA 721 18. Mendoza. 4 of the Supreme September 22. 27. SB. ANGCHANGCO VS. 88 SCRA 811 16. Secretary. Regaspi vs. 161 SCRA 249 14. 3. G. 338 SCRA 51. 59 Phil. To what proceedings is this right available Read: 1. Nov. 113 SCRA 226 d. COURT MARTIAL. 92 SCRa 6.108 SCRA 658 12. OMBUDSMAN. 153 SCRA 153 e. P vs. People. BLANCO VS. 2000. Rivera. Luneta vs. 69 SCRA 160 10. When shall this right starts Read: 1. Laya. Nepumuceno vs. 136757 – 58. P vs. SANDIGANBAYAN.R. HOW. 6. Alfonso. CFI of Rizal. Mil. G. 1983 5. 346 SCRA 108. 27. 337 SCRA 227. Speedy Disposition of Cases. Salcedovs.R. . SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT. Ver. HON. 111 SCRA 598 9. P vs. Sarmiento. Conde vs. NOV. 28 SCRA 601 2. 140863. AUG. INC. Acevedo vs. 269 SCRA 301 SUMBANG VS. 1988 Court dated September c. 1988 b. Read Admin. SANDIGANBAYAN.

1980 10. length of delay. P vs. Right to a public trial Read: 1. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the 30-day period prescribed in Sec. 2. Concepcion.R. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NAZARENO. 81 SCRA 120 5. Tampus. Domingo. P vs. P vs. Olaguer vs. 117 SCRA 630 9. 159 SCRA 317 2. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation. Mateo. G. May 22. March 28. such delay did not amount to violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial considering that such delay was not by attributable to the prosecution.1973 2. June 13. Villaluz. Jr. July 25. 167756. Garcia vs. The right to an impartial trial Read: 1. Tuazon. 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. 8.1986 1-a. Dimacuha vs. 2008 THE FACTS: VS.342 (i) The determination of whether an accused had been denied the right to speedy trial depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Chief of Staff. No. April 8. When the same is considered waived. (ii) Speedy Trial Act of 1998. 1987 3. and assertion or failure to assert such rights by the accused and the prejudice caused by the delay. Sendaydiego. JERRY . Opida. Although it took about 8 years before the trial of this case was resumed. 3. Factors to consider in determining whether or not such right has been violated: 1. P vs. reasons for such delay.90 SCRA 16 4. vs.

Thus. H E L D: The argument is specious. Hence. Mateo Doctrine but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. the above-named accused by means of force. feloniously and criminally repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her daughter AAA. 18. and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. this Petition before the Supreme Court. appellant Jerry Nazareno was indicted for violation of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. municipality of San Andres. unlawfully. II. Vol. Municipality of San Andres. violence and intimidation did then and there willfully. the said accused. Verily. feloniously and repeatedly made sexual intercourse with his daughter BBB at the age of 7 through 14 years old against her will. in Barangay Codon. an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. CONTRARY TO LAW. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the People vs. the accused was found guilty of qualified rape in both cases. Philippines. . 1999. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. to ensure that the constitutional right of the 548[18] Records.548[18] After trial . p. I S S U E: Is the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him violated since the information failed to specify with certainty the approximate date of the commission of the offenses for rape which is a fatal defect. An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. Province of Catanduanes. being the father of the complainant. 2638 for the alleged rape of BBB. The Information is worded thus: That from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon.343 On March 17. did then and there willfully. then five years old up to the time when she was 15-years-old against her will. 1998. his daughter. Catanduanes. The information reads: That sometime and between January 1992 up to December 06.

The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein. 372. and the place where the offense has been committed.: (1) by using force or intimidation.344 accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not violated. In accordance with Rule 110. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB transpired “sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6. 11.549[27] Further. 340 SCRA 477. Lizada. 396 SCRA 62.552[30] the Court held that when the time given in the information is not the essence of the offense. 552[30] G. September 15.R. Gianan. Santos. the designation given to the offense by the statute. 550[28] . it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense.553[31] the Court ruled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element of the said crime as it is defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. citing Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000).” an information is sufficient. 388 (1998). Secs. 137969-71. 299 SCRA 528. Nos. Province of Catanduanes. Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000). Rule 110. the time need not be proven as alleged. 390 Phil. 135288-93. the information should state the name of the accused. Sec. so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. 2003. Municipality of San Andres. Nos. Nos. Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. 553[31] G.555[33] In the case under review. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Bugayong. In People v. 2000.R. – It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. 126518. 161 (2000).550[28] However. Id. it must embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused. Salalima554[32] and in People v. 555[33] G. 554[32] G. August 15. as long as it alleges that the offense was committed “at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed. 11 reads: Sec. Rule 110. 551[29] People v. the name of the offended party. and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense. and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. 363 SCRA 192. January 24. (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. 6 and 8. 2001. 150.e. 551[29] In People v.R.R. i. Date of commission of the offense. December 2. No. 143468-71. 354 Phil. a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense. Quitlong. 1998. the information in Criminal Case No.” In Criminal 549[27] People v. 1998 in Barangay Codon. The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in People v.

334 SCRA 655.” 559[37] and “on or about and sometime in the year 1988”560[38] constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110. 556[34] G. Razonable. this Court has ruled that allegations that rapes were committed “before and until October 15. Province of Catanduanes.”558[36] “sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter. Espejon. Bugayong.” AAA was raped by appellant. 128888. Clearly.R. 2002. 1994. To the mind of the Court. the recitals in the informations sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 281 SCRA 463. He did not. G. November 6. 558[36] People v. 131103 & 143472. he slumbered on his rights and awakened too late. 557[35] . Indeed. He could have moved to quash the informations or at least for a bill of particulars. Santos. G.” In Criminal Case No. December 3. Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. 120093. 780 (2000). The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that objections as to matter of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB transpired “sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6. 2650. No. Nos. 377 SCRA 412. 771. Municipality of San Andres. 1994. No.345 Case No.” In the case under review. the information averred that “from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon. 1998 in Barangay Codon. G. 560[38] People v. June 29. Garcia. To the mind of the Court. Municipality of San Andres. Province of Catanduanes. No. In People v. Magbanua. More than that. the Court notes that the matter of particularity of the dates in the information is being raised for the first time on appeal. Province of Catanduanes. 2650. 561[39] People v.” AAA was raped by appellant. 1997. 559[37] People v. 1999. Municipality of San Andres.R. 319 SCRA 719. supra note 30.557[35] the Court found the appellant liable for rape under an information charging that he perpetrated the offense “sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto” and “sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto.” In People v.R.R. the recitals in the informations sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.556[34] the Court upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape based on an Information which alleged that the accused committed multiple rapes “from November 1990 up to July 21. 134767. 2000. the information in Criminal Case No. the information averred that “from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon. 386 Phil. 561[39] Appellant failed to raise the issue of defective informations before the trial court. February 20.

562[88] The Constitution uses the word “shall. Crisologo. and second. A violation of this right prevents the conviction of the accused with the crime charged in the Information. appellant did not object to the presentation of the evidence for the People contending that the offenses were committed “sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6. REASONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES . 2650. Ko Bu Lin vs. P vs. 1998” for Criminal Case No. 157 SCRA 678 1-c. 2008 It is true that in all criminal prosecutions. 118 SCRA 573 4. Labado. 175929. SB. Resavaga. appellant actively participated in the trial. to inform the court of the facts alleged. G. he cannot now be heard to complain that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the recitals in the informations. 159 SCRA 2. the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. P vs. up to December 1998” in Criminal Case No.563[89] Read: 1. 164 SCRA 717 1-a. No. Formilleza vs.” hence. the same is mandatory. P vs. P. 2632 and “sometime in January 1990. On the contrary. CA. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense. to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause. and third. Simply put. Cabale. offering denial and alibi as his defenses. CA. December 16. vs.R. 159 SCRA 426 1-d. The constitutional guaranty has a three-fold purpose: First.346 Too. 185 SCRA 140 562 563 . 98 SCRA 730 3. so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction. Sales vs. P vs. 150 SCRA 653 1-b. Corral.

347 5. Bundalian. Toledo vs. People vs. Talingdan. Fajardo vs. Valero. P vs.1987 5. 100 SCRA 227 13. P vs. Trial in absentia Read: 1. Carredo vs. 64 SCRA 610 7.1978 5. 182 SCRA 81 12. 145 SCRA 640 11. P vs. vs.HABEAS CORPUS ******************************************************* . 98 SCRA 514 ****************************************************** CHAPTER XV . Read: 1. 139 SCRA 502 3. 1990 1-a. Gimenez vs. Garcia. 143 SCRA 163. July 21. 1983 2. vs. Note the purpose of this provision) 4. Mendoza. Judge Prieto. Lacuna. Carredo vs. Talino vs. October 20. 117 SCRA 718 4. Clores. Salas. 112 SCRA 661 3. 183 SCRA 273 13. Enrile. P vs. Nazareno. March 16. Fulgado vs. 99 SCRA 388 9. 9. P. Florendo. April 27. Nolasco vs. 139 SCRA 383 10. Seneris. People. People. Cavili vs. 99 SCRA 92 6. JR. People. P vs. P vs. 1982 11. Borja vs. 160 SCRA 1 6. The right to meet witnesses face to face or the confrontation right of Read: 1. Nov. Sandiganbayan. Villaluz. P vs. Hon. Lufthansa. 154 SCRA 610 2. Sandiganbayan. P vs. 20 SCRA 54 8. Santos. Right to secure witnesses and production of evidence. Bardaje. Regala. 183 SCRA 273 14. 77 SCRA 420 2. Soliman vs. P vs. 87 SCRA 364 12. P vs. Ortigas. CA.

570 5. May 18. Self-incrimination. 145 10. Pamaran. Abadilla vs. 23 Phil. 132045.R. 1989 and August & October. NOS. Otadora. Juan Ponce Enrile. 152 SCRA 263 13. Tang Teng. Ruallo. read including the concurring and dissenting opinions 3. supra 2. . 154 SCRA 513 12. 2000. Cabal vs. PEOPLE VS. Boholst-Amadore. P vs. 152 SCRA 635 15. Rosas. G.02. NO. Chavez vs. Olvis. April 15. Summers. 139 SCRA 1 17. 50 Phil. Macadaeg. P vs. Kapunan. 62 4. 86 Phil. 41 Phil. 2000. 100801. 98 Phil. PCGG. Harvey vs. Bagadiong vs. Villaflor vs. 94 SCRA 906 6. Lumayok.R. Beltran vs. P vs. 148 SCRA 464 14. 158 SCRA 85( Compare with the Rosas & Boholst cases) 16. Cruz vs. Samson. 339 SCRA 86. Gonzales. BASECO vs. AUG. etc. US vs. GR No. 1989. December 1. Galman vs.1988 3. 995 8. Fidel Ramos. G. Maglanoc.348 Read: 1In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ferdinand Marcos. 24 SCRA 663 2. 25. P vs. 431 9. P vs. 88079.1987 ******************************************************* * CHAPTER XVI . 138 SCRA 294. 95 Phil. BANIHIT. 24 SCRA 692 2. December 29. Policarpio. Read 1. 339 SCRA 1. 1-a. 1962 PEOPLE VS. Isabela Sugar vs. CA. P vs. 244 11. CONTINENTE. Santiago. supra 7. Fernando vs. 25. P vs. Jr.THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION ******************************************************* * 1. AUG.

P vs. ******************************************************* * CHAPTER XVII . Is death as a penalty a cruel or unuasual punishment? No. Gavarra. Hence. P vs. September 26. 93 Phil. 170 SCRA 107 b. People vs. Munoz. 647 . Is the Death Penalty already abolished by the Constitution? 1987 Read: 1.349 The essence of this right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion or the giving of evidence against oneself through a testimonial act. Read: 1. Atencio. 156 SCRA 242 4. supra ******************************************************* * CHAPTER XVIII . Caunca vs. Masangkay. P vs. P vs. 64 SCRA 131 2. 155 SCRA 113 3. Salazar. 155 SCRa 327 2. P vs.RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT ******************************************************* * a. Estoista. Intino. Aclaracion vs. 1988 5. an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from a disease that was contracted by his victim without violating this right. Secretary of Justice) Read: 1. Gatmaitan. Death through lethal injection is the most humane way of implementing the death Penalty (Leo Echegaray vs.THE RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE ******************************************************* * 1.

Camano.RIGHT AGAINST NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT ******************************************************* * 1. Requisites present before this right can be invoked PEOPLE VS. [2] before a competent court. Veniegas vs. P vs. Ajeno vs. People. Martinez. 164 SCRA 358 ******************************************************* * CHAPTER XIX . ALMARIO. On the death penalty whether it was abolished or not Read: a. or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Idnay. P vs. [3] after arraignment. 115 SCRA 688 2. . 128 SCRA 488 3. Lozano vs.THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY ******************************************************* * 1. Incierto. and [5] when the defendant was convicted or acquitted. Read: 1. 115 SCRA 79 4.. 355 SCRA 1 There is double jeopardy when there is: [1] valid indictment. 146 SCRA 323 2.350 2. [4] when a valid plea has been entered. P vs. Villanueva. 71 SCRA 166 ******************************************************* ** CHAPTER XX .

charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide. and 2) the motion to dismiss is based on the denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial. 177960. Dumaguete City. ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN. 2009 The case had its origins in the filing of an Information 564[4] on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office. all the requisites of double jeopardy are complete. JEFFREY RESO DAYAP vs. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. However. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG. 32. color blue. the above-named accused. Less Serious Physical Injuries. unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955.351 If the dismissal is through the instance of the accused or with his express consent. Sendiong. Sendiong who was with two female passengers. Maslog. No. less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the abovementioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. 564 [4] Records. G. Weyer of 115 Dr. p. this rule admits of two (2) exceptions: 1) the motion to dismiss is based on insufficiency of evidence. and Damage to Property. This is so because the “dismissal” is actually an “acquittal” and therefore. a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. V. Agueda Pamplona. Sibulan. thereby hitting an automobile. GENESA SENDIONG. Negros Oriental. Negros Oriental. willfully. Philippines. January 29. Sibulan. Negros Oriental. Locsin St. An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.R. .. The pertinent portion of the information reads: That at about 11:55 o’clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. thus causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned. namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy. fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell. there is no double jeopardy and the case could be reinstated. did then and there.

570 [10] Records. the MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn. thus: “The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the victims. 569 [9] Rollo.565[5] On 17 January 2005. pp. before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan. 44. Respondents testified for the prosecution. Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended information. 72-74. 567 [7] Id. at 41. respondents Pretzy-Lou P. pp.569[9] Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded.352 On 10 January 2005. however. . Pertinent portions of the order state: An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said allegations. 566 [6] Records. 34-36. After the prosecution had rested its case. the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn. petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. p. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations 565 [5] Rollo. at 37. 572 [12] Rollo. the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. to which respondents filed a Comment571[11] dated 25 April 2005.”567[7] On 21 January 2005.568[8] On 21 January 2003. p. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence 570[10] dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence. 568 [8] Id. 571 [11] Id. petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Negros Oriental. 55. at 93-94.566[6] They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the victims by petitioner. at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong. he was only extracted from the car by the by-standers. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information. See Order dated 10 January 2005. In the Order572[12] dated 16 May 2005. pp. Sendiong was still alive inside the car. 80-92.

It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2. But sad to say. the prosecution’s [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the accident. xxxx Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who committed the crime as charged. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime. There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Exhibit “7” which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1’s ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the defense. xxxx The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence was also presented to state the damage. its tires busted and pulled .353 charged have not been proven. The mother of the victim testified only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for it. thus hitting the latter’s inner fender and tires. including the damage to the Colt Galant. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it.

11.e. at 72 and 74. 75-81. the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. except 573 [13] Id. pp. 32. pp. the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these two things. 574[14] In the order575[15] dated 23 August 2005. i. Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented. Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. It was this accident that caused the swerving. Br. 575 [15] Rollo. the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. SO ORDERED. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused. not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused. Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. . xxxx WHEREFORE.354 out together with their axle. 11. xxxx Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things—the fact of the crime.. 574 [14] Records. The RTC ruled that the MTC’s recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental. alleging that the MTC’s dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse. and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime.573[13] Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. Sad to say. an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. premises considered. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized representative. 3-11.

The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution.000. 578 [18] No. the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accused’s acquittal is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. As there was no proof of the total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount of P1. which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed P10.500. not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. 23. . SP.00. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. the case falls within the RTC’s 576 [16] Id. It also found support in Sec. 15 April 1998. Rule 119. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. L-46934. at 89-90. Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accused’s civil liability. No costs. at 81. especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged. In so ruling. .000. the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC.R.00 as civil damages. the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are null and void. No. but these were denied for lack of merit in the order 577[17] dated 12 September 2005. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure. the filing of which is allowed under Sec.355 that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence. Garcia)578[18] which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property. the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence. The dispositive portion of the decision states: WHEREFORE. the appellate court cited Tulor v. 01179. docketed as CA-G. 577 [17] Id. Thus.576[16] Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order.

In the present petition for review. the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007. SO ORDERED. Judicial Region. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42. It should be granted. p. Branch 32.582[22] which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R. petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence. 35. 129.) No. unlawful. 581 [21] Supra note 2. 7691. and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec.356 jurisdiction. However. . The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads: WHEREFORE. judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). 580 [20] Id.581[21] It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful. 582 [22] Entitled “AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS. The petition has merit. The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.579[19] Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980. at 90-94. AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.580[20] arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the allegations in the information.” which took effect on 14 April 1994. premises considered. Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence 579 [19] Rollo. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.A. Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.

586[26] When this case was filed 583 [23] See notes 8 and 9. or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies. 102 (1998).585[25] Thus. imprudent. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who. the penalty imposable upon petitioner. with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. would constitute a grave felony. or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. de los Santos. petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating circumstance. When such reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle. the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed. the same to be applied in its maximum period.357 resulting to homicide. 584 [24] People v. The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.584[24] Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. 292 SCRA 87. is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years. 744 (2001. 724 (2001). a complex crime. 2 months and 1 day to 6 years). de los Santos. less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The information filed before the trial court had remained unamended. 407 Phil. citing Reodica v. commits any act which. 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years. by reckless imprudence. 586 . Court of Appeals. it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as “acts or omissions punishable by law” committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa). unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. 585 [25] People v. a complex crime is committed. 583 [23] Thus. had it been intentional. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies. 724. Where a reckless. The Court of Appeals however declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. were he to be found guilty. Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. 407 Phil. It appears from the records however that respondents’ attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw their motion to amend the information. less serious physical injuries and damage to property.

G. 14 July 2008. Justice Garchitorena. 293. 155 (2000) and Escovar v. Sandiganbayan. 14 July 2008.R. the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. People of the Philippines. G. such as the one at bar. 310 (2004). As the records show. the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in [26] Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes v. L-43790. Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R. 158157. No. 471 SCRA 668. Thus. 147406. No. R. 625. 466 Phil.” It follows that criminal cases for reckless imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal. It explicitly states “that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. is “filed after the prosecution had rested its case. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine. 635 (2004).358 on 29 December 2004. 30 September 2005. 143. jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.” and when the same is granted. for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. Uy. Clearly. citing People v.587[27] Consequently.589[29] But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal. committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. in acquitting the accused. 7691. tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. 588 [28] People v.”588[28] Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed. People of the Philippines. Sandiganbayan. resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits. 587 [27] Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes v. 589 [29] Id. 9 December 1976. it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt. No. . in such case. citing Alarilla v. City of Silay. 393 Phil. No.A. and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability.R. G. the MTC of Sibulan. 74 SCRA 247. they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. therefore.A. No. 488 Phil. the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases. thus rendering the assailed judgment void. and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court. 147406.590[30] Accordingly. 590 [30] People v.R. No.

593[33] Thus. 458 Phil. (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil. 593 [33] Salazar v. No. he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC. The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence. Eung Won Choi. G. the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist 592[32] or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused. 165496. at 607. the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. Rule 111. The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. 594[34] This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required. if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court. . People. last par. 12 February 2007. 513. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. 594 [34] Id. 504 (2003). We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect. Sec. 2. 592 [32] RULES OF COURT.359 dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same. and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private 591 [31] Hun Hyung Park v. and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court. 515 SCRA 502. The MTC’s conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution.R. 591[31] However.

the government can no longer charge the accused of the same crime under the Revised Penal Code since double jeopardy has set in. 244 SCRA 202 and PEOPLE VS. since petitioner’s acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.360 complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. RELOVA. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident. clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. at 518-519. Double jeopardy. 104 SCRA 379 595 [35] Id. petitioner’s civil liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. the SC reversed the dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court based on “speedy trial” since the same was not predicated “on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. 102 SCRA 44 and 12 SCRA 561 4. Duero. there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case.” It is only when there is a clear violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial that the dismissal results in double jeopardy. the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case. 148 SCRA 292 If the accused was charged of “theft of electricity” based on the City Ordinance of Batangas and not based on the Revised Penal Code and later on the case is dismissed by the judge due to the fact that the crime has prescribed. that in PEOPLE VS. Read: 1. . the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner. ****************** It must be pointed out. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. Consequently. Thereafter. however. 255 SCRA 238. P vs. hence. LEVISTE. Furthermore.595[35] A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. 3. When the act is punished by both a law and an ordinance: PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL.

Pablo. 117 SCRA 910 14. P vs. 160 SCRA 516 40. Araula. Judge Pogoy. CA. Cruz vs. P vs. 108 SCRA 121 9. 72 SCRA 527 32. Salig. Gloria. 145 SCRA 555 4. 144 SCRA 43 4.154 SCRA 175 3. P vs. P vs. Liwanag. De Guzman vs. 133 SCRA 59 6. 73 SCRA 473 23. P vs. 102 SCRA 39 22. Bustamante vs. P vs. P vs. 144 SCRA 397 5. P vs. 118 SCRA 573 19. Military Commission. P vs. 162 SCRA 714.1968 7. Obania. 1966 2. Mun. P vs. P vs. P vs. Maceren. Jimenez vs. P vs. Consulta. P vs. 98 SCRA 289 37. Baladjay. CA. Prudente. P vs. 131 SCRA 81 6. 97 SCRA 619 36. Tangan vs. Escalona. Pilpa. P vs. 104 SCRA 312 21. 289 SCRA 159 2. December 29. Lazaro vs. Quibate. 115 SCRA 236 17. Esmena vs. 144 SCRA 516 3. 113 SCRA 217 12. City Court of Silay. Galman vs. Jara. Cacdac. P vs. when the presumption of regularity does7. P vs. Judge Hernando. 1977 30. 1075 SCRA 979 20. 113 SCRA 217 11. 133 SCRA 426 7. June 29. 1982 25. 73 SCRA 77 33. 100 SCRA 672 15. Enrile. Quezada. 75 SCRA 193 31. Fuentebella. 74 SCRA 247 28. P vs. 102 SCRA 861 10. CUISON VS. Ledesma. Court. Mazo vs. P vs. Duran. Abano. 79 SCRA 81 29. Tolentino. P vs. Militante. Ko Bu Lin vs. Enrile. P vs. 160 SCRA 700 38. P vs. P vs. 155 SCRA 435 39. CA. 70 SCRA 277 34. 159 SCRA 599 41. Canizano vs. 145 SCRA 597 5. Cruz. CUDIA VS. Sec. Bernarte vs. 1982 24. 133 SCRA 651 8 P vs. 70 SCRA 289 35. .. Cuevo. Cariasco. January 30. 108 SCRA 736 8. Buerano vs. Trinidad.361 2. P. Andres vs. P vs. CA. Dacuycuy. March 30. P vs. P. 115 SCRA 82 13. Dionaldo vs. Flores vs. P vs. Inting. 112 SCRA 430 16. Tacas vs. 284 SCRA 173 3. P. Pamaran. City Court. Molero.116 SCRA 43 18. 48 SCRA 144 . Galano.

The said dismissal did not therefore amount to an acquittal. The motion was granted but was subsequently reconsidered. 1978 6. People vs. 86 Phil.(Jaca vs. Molero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty". 452. Agoncillo.R No. 40 SCRA 579).362 There is no double jeopardy in this case: PEOPLE VS. It is quite clear that the order of the trial court dismissal the original complaint was without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint and/or information charging Molero with the proper offense. it must have the effect of acquittal. The original complaint was dated March 22. 5. the complainant testified that she was raped by her father on February 5.(People vs. but ordered the Fiscal to cause the filing of a new complaint charging the proper offense of rape committed on or before February 5. b. People vs. Mogol. Dismissal of the first case contemplated by the rule against double jeopardy presupposes a definite and unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. Molero claims that the new complaint places him in double jeopardy. A new complaint was therefore filed dated March 30. The Fiscal filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. 1976 and not February 13. During the trial. Blanco. 1976 as alleged in the complaint. HELD: There is no double jeopardy. 1977. The lower court in its order dismissed the original complaint. September 24. L-67842. 4. 2. 5 SCRA 883. 1976. . 3. Manlapas. 1986 FACTS: 1. Molero was charged for having raped his daughter. a. the complainant charged Molero of having raped her on the "13th day of February 1976". 131 SCRA 296) And "for dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause of the Constitution. MOLERO G.

whether it happens at the trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. 2000. Sec. Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court applies when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense. SEPT. 6.363 c. (People vs. as in Galman vs. Appeal by the Government from verdicts of acquittal. VELASCO. 698 is not well-taken. 12. f. an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. held that the amendment that would change the date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form. The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of the offense of rape. 98 Phil. May the government appeal a judgment of acquittal or increase of the penalty imposed? No. The dismissal of the first complaint did not amount to the appellant's acquittal. 127444. As mandated by the Constitution. . the order of dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. 138 SCRA 166) 5. The reliance of the accused on the case of People vs. In fact there was no need for the trial court to have adopted such a cumbersome procedure. statutes and cognate jurisprudence. Evolution of doctrine. In effect. but not when an honest error of a few days is sought to be corrected and the change does not affect the rights of the accused. HON. 1952 to July 1947. It could have merely ordered an amendment of the complaint. Double Jeopardy. Opemia. In the said case the proposed amendment was the changing of the date of the commission of the crime from June 18. d. 340 SCRA 207. G. 1976 . 1976 to February 5. May the appellate court of the Supreme Court increase the pernalty imposed by the trial court on appeal by the accused? Yes. The S. 13. for the PEOPLE VS.C. or a difference of 5 years.R. The amendment of the complaint changing the date of the commission of the crime of rape from February 13. Bocar. Sandiganbayan. a difference of 8 days was only a matter of form under the facts of this case and did not prejudice the rights of the accused. e. NO.

modifying the Decision597[2] dated 13 November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos. On 7 September 2000. Ang ho Kio. Montemayor. 184343. 73 Phil. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Cases No. 1500-M2000. 67 4. On Appeal to the Court of Appeals. with the assistance of counsel. pp. Bulacan. 76 SCRA 469 2. CR No. 95 Phil. 11-23. Jr. No. The "Supervening Fact Doctrine. Cruz and Apolinario D. it could increase the penalty. P vs. appellant. attempted murder in Criminal Cases No. March 2. CA rollo. at 13. Soriano. 30511. and frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. P vs. pre-trial conference was held. rollo.364 PEOPLE VS. 1969. Penned by Presiding Judge Andres B. 2009 Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision 596[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G. Yam Tung Way. Read: 1. 21 Phil. pp. March 8. DOMINGO. P vs. January 30. instead of Murder. GR No. was arraigned and he entered separate pleas of “Not Guilty” to the crimes charged. Thereafter. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1497-M-2000. Tarok.R. 687 6. P vs.81 SCRA 455 3. 475 41859. Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Id. . 26 SCRA 2. Is increase in the penalty valid? Yes because it was the accused who interposed the appeal making the court review the evidence. and trial ensued accordingly.598[4] The accused was convicted of Homicide. 1499-M-2000. frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. US vs. 1501-M-2000. 1989 1-a.R. concurring. Ruiz. And it it finds the evidence sufficient for conviction of the crime of Murder. Bruselas. G. 260 596 597[2] 598[4] [1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Edgardo P. 1496-M-2000 and No. CA." Read: 1. the CA held that the crime proven by the prosecution is Murder and therefore increased the penalty from Homicide to Murder. 2-25..

1985 Rules on Procedure Criminal ******************************************************* CHAPTER XXI RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW.” However. a Motion for Reconsideration was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman who AMENDED the 11 . ET AL. Tac-an. Upon motion by the petitioner and his co-police officers with leave from the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. City Court of Manila. ETC. P vs. 7. 1999 PANFILO M. 111 SCRA 433 2-LACSON VS.365 3. LACSON VS. 107 Phil. 85 Phil. JR. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs resulted in the dismissal of the cases after finding that the incident was “a legitimate police operation. PetitionersIntervenors G. Quezon City. Read also Sec. Rule 117. SANDIGANBAYAN. 76 SCRA 462 5-b. P vs. 268 4. Villasis. THE SANDIGANBAYAN. ROMEO ACOP & FRANCISCO ZUBIA. Nunez vs. Adil. P.G. BILL OF ATTAINER. The police officers claimed that it was a shoot-out between them and the Kuratong Baleleng Members while SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes claimed it was a summary execution or rub-out. January 20. 182 SCRA 601 6. P vs. vs. January 20. Buling.. 766 5. 1999 The petitioner seeks to stop the Sandiganbayan from trying the multiple murder case against him and 26 other police officers for the death of 11 Kuratong Baleleng members in the early morning of May 18. 712 5-a. the Review Board led by Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa resulted in the filing of multiple murder cases against the petitioner and his companion where he was indicted as a principal.R. ******************************************************* Read: 1. 46 O. 121 SCRA 637 7. P vs. People. No. 128096. Melo vs. 1995 at Commonwealth Avenue.

JR. On the same day. the accused questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the 11 criminal cases since under Republic Act No. AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE PD 1606. The new law further provides that it shall be applicable to all cases which are pending in court before the passage of the same provided trial has not begun at the time of its approval.. however. the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a Reconsideration and insisted that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan which was opposed by the petitioner and his coaccused.366 information’s on March 1. On May 8. paragraphs [a] and [c] of RA 7975 thereby giving jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan criminal cases involving police generals like the petitioners even though they are not charged as principals but merely accessories or accomplices. “the court admitted the amended information’s in these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting. Congress passed into law Republic Act No. 1997 entitled “AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN. While the Motions for Reconsideration were pending before the Sandiganbayan. 1996. particularly Section 2. as mere accessories. On March 5. On March 5-6. retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases”. 1997. the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction to try and decide the same. AS AMENDED. the said court has jurisdiction only if one or more of the principal accused has a rank of Brigadier General (Chief Superintendent) or higher and since the highest PNP officer charged as a principal accused is merely Chief Inspector. paragraphs [a] and [c]. ROMEO ACOP and FRANCISCO ZUBIA. The petitioner questioned the said Resolution of the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court on the following grounds: . 1996 charging the petitioner . the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5. the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution transferring the case to the RTC of Quezon City which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the cases under RA 7975. On May 17. the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Special Prosecutor and ruled that it “stands pat in its Resolution dated May 8. 8249 which was approved by the President on February 5. 1997 Resolution where it that with the passage of RA 8249. 7975. 1996. PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR” which deleted the word “PRINCIPAL” in Section 2. 1996” ordering the transfer of the 11 criminal cases to the RTC of Quezon City.1996.

they will be deprived of their “two-tiered” appeal to the Sandiganbayan which they acquire under RA 7975 before recourse to the Supreme Court could be made. the title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law thereby violating the one title one subject requirement of Section 26 [1] Article VI of the Constitution. b. d. the retroactive application of the new law violates their constitutional right against ex-post facto law. and must apply equally to all members of the same classall of which are present in this case. Held: 1. The contention that the law violates petitioner’s right to due process and equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. as against those whose . namely: a. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements. The classification between those pending cases involving concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under RA 8249.367 1. must not be limited to existing conditions only. if their case will be tried by the Sandiganbayan. it is in fact a class legislation and an ex-post facto law statute intended specifically to apply to all the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. their right to due process of law and equal protection of the law was violated as a result of the application of the new law by which restored to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their cases especially so that the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for 9 months the resolution of the pending incident involving the transfer of these cases to the RTC of Quezon City and waited for the passage of the law to overtake such resolution and thereby rendering their vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law moot. 3. Finally. 2. c. it must rest on real and substantial distinctions. The petitioners-intervenors claimed that while the law (Sections 4 and 7) innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. it must be germane to the purposes of the law.

The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court”. Moreover. f. TAN VS. b. 35 SCRA 429. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed. and punishes such action. MEJIA VS. e. the same must be one— a. . It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. PEOPLE VS. every law which. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required a the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. SANDIGANBAYAN. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled. which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction necessarily affect pending cases. The petitioners’ argument that the retroactive application of the new law to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under RA 7975 is without merit. those cases where trial has already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). 2. which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed. g. whereas in the latter the parties have already submitted their respective proofs. evidence against them were not yet presented. examined witnesses and presented documents. c. in relation to the offense or its consequences. PAMARAN. In the 1 st instance. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of the courts.368 cases where trial has already started as of the approval of the law rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In order that a law is an ex post facto law. such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal. 190 SCRA 686. BARRIOS. 160 SCRA 457. d. or a proclamation of amnesty (KAY VILLEGAS KAMI. 211 SCRA 241). that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful. alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.

SANDIGANBAYAN. sometime in May. acted within its power since Section 2. The contention that the new Sandiganbayan law violates the one title-one subject provision of the Constitution is without merit. SANDIGANBAYAN. the Quezon City RTC to whom the said cases were raffled DISMISSED the 11 murder cases as a result of the retraction made by the eyewitnesses. The petitioners claim that the new does not define the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but expands the same. The same contention had been rejected by the court several times in the cases of RODRIGUEZ VS. PEOPLE. 567. they got what they want in the end because it was held that the 11 criminal information’s failed to alleged that they committed the crimes in relation to their public office which is a jurisdictional requirement in order that the same be tried by the Sandiganbayan. 3. But even assuming that that is true. SANDIGANBAYAN. 1999. 137 SCRA 63. The same was returned to the QC RTC to determine if the 2-year provisional rule under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure is applicable) . Finally. RA 8249 is not a penal law. NUNEZ VS. The other contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under RA 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of RA 8249 is incorrect. Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to “define. does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. (NOTE: Though the Supreme Court rejected all the above arguments raised by the petitioner and the intervenors who are against the trial of their cases with the Sandiganbayan and prefer to have their cases be tried and decided by the RTC of Quezon City. as in this case. in employing the word “define” in the title of the law. 111 SCRA 433. DE GUZMAN VS. The Congress. ALVIAR VS. 205 Phil. to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough. the new law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 1982 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. Moreover.369 Ex post facto law prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. the expansion of the jurisdiction. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. December 15. 2001. prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. The same was revived by the DOJ in April.

COMELEC. 1988 or 21 days after the petitioner was proclaimed. Jr. GR No. 1988. vs. 46 & 56 SCRA 5. the petitioner claims that the petition was late because the payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of an appeal. NO. VS. 1990 CHAPTER XXII-CITIZENSHIP 1. VS. 86564. 1992 a. Sevilleja vs. Kay Villegas Kami. 1988. The petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of the City of Baguio on January 20.00. Tan vs. August 1.a. On February 10. The private respondent claimed he filed the petition on time because when he first filed the same. 149 SCRA 562. COMELEC. Comelec. 4. 1989 RAMON LABO. 35 SCRA 429 3. res judicata Unanimous en banc decision (NOTE: This is also important in your Remedial Law) Cruz. citing Manchester vs.R. the private respondent paid the filing fee of P300. Ramon Labo. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND LUIS LARDIZABAL. 2. 1989 Citizenship. 86564. Facts: 1. Since the filing fee was paid beyond the reglementary period. the private respondent filed a quo warranto case against the petitioner but no filing fee was paid. August 1.-1 RAMON LABO JR. P vs. it was treated by the . Ferrer. Barrios. G. 5. July 3. J. who takes the place of a disqualified winner in an election. JR. On January 26. CA.370 2. October 18. 3. Effect of naturalization in another country Read: a. renunciation of. 107 SCRA 141 4.

CA. 98 SCRA 575. 92 PHIL. is qualified for the office of the City Mayor of Baguio or not? 3. LIANGA LUMBER CO. CA. 135 SCRA 37. CA. 99 PHIL. 30. PAREDES. AS HIS CITIZENSHIP IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDING. CA. HOWEVER. BEAUTIFONT VS. may the Supreme Court determine whether petitioner Ramon Labor. LIANGA TIMBER CO. 1988.371 COMELEC as a pre-proclamation controversy which needs no filing fee. . 57. 21 SCRA 1039. 1988. GARCIA. AND CONSIDERING THE NECESSITY FOR AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THAT MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION CLEARLY AND URGENTLY AFFECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST. MABILANGAN. US VS. Normally. SAMSON. 105 PHIL. he immediately paid the filing fee on said date. the same was not traceable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. Issues: 1. GIRONELLA. VALENCIA VS. 108 PHIL. SOTTO VS. 112 SCRA 629. GIMINEZ. 592. 34 PHIL. 157 SCRA 357). who shall take his place as the City Mayor? Held: 1. 74. REPUBLIC VS. SAMAL VS. JAYMALIN. HEIRS OF CHIGAS. 159 SCRA 100 and LIANGA BAY LOGGING VS. ALGER ELECTRIC VS. January 29. Was the petition for quo warranto filed on time? 2. LI SHIU LIAT VS. even assuming that the filing fee was paid late. FRANCISCO VS. TEJONES VS. (DEL CASTILLO VS. the filing fee was paid on time. REPUBLIC. However. Hence. VS. Since the case was merely for determination on whether or not the petition was filed on time or not. The petition was filed on time since the filing fee was paid immediately when the COMELEC treated the same as a quo warranto and not a pre-proclamation controversy. CITY OF DAVAO. 76 SCRA 197. When the COMELEC treated it as a quo warranto case on February 8. . Since the petitioner won in the election and turned out to be not qualified for said position. 12 SCRA 628. FERNANDEZ VS. Jr. What is important is that the filing fee was paid. ERICO VS. the case should end here as the sole issue raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. 2. 162. WE SHALL DIRECTLY ADDRESS IT NOW IN THIS SAME ACTION AGAINST HIM. 5 SCRA 733.

LEE VS. JR. Since none of these is present to show that he was able to reacquire Philippine citizenship. This is without merit since even assuming it to be true. Again. the same voters of Baguio City could not change the requirements of the Constitution and the Local Government Code. the Commission on Immigration and Deportation held that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. COMMISSIONER.100 votes. b) by naturalization. the same did not automatically vest him Philippine Citizenship which could be reacquired only by: a) a direct act of Congress. he is not even qualified to be a voter under the Constitution. 1976. COMMISSIONER. he won by just over 2. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia or at the least a stateless person to preside over them as the City Mayor of Baguio. On May 12. There are two administrative decisions involving the citizenship of the petitioner. since the petitioner claims that the respondent COMELEC has prejudged the case against him because it adopted the private respondent's COMMENT which repeatedly asserted that he is not a Filipino citizen. But even assuming further that he was elected unanimously. The probability that many of those who voted for him may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the . the COMELEC held that he is a Filipino citizen while on September 13. this is without basis because to be more accurate. As such. much less as a candidate for the position of Mayor in the City of Baguio. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege. with more reason that the Supreme Court shall now decide the case with finality instead of returning the same to the COMELEC. DEPORTATION BOARD. SIA REYES VS. 37 SCRA 213. Labo also claims that his naturalization in Australia was annulled since it was found out that his marriage to an Australian was bigamous. In a statement by the Australian consul in the Philippines. It must be pointed out that res judicata does not apply to questions involving citizenship (SORIA VS. Labo claims further that the "futile" technicality should not frustrate the will of the electorate in Baguio City who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority. it was found out that RAMON LABO. 1988. 3. was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on July 28. Labo is not considered a Filipino citizen. and c) by repatriation. 122 SCRA 478). 42 SCRA 561.372 In addition thereto. 1982. However. Labo claims that the petition to disqualify him because of his citizenship is already barred by res judicata because of the earlier ruling of the COMELEC that he is a Filipino citizen.

23 Phil. which is the more logical and democratic rule first announced in the 1912 case of Topacio vs.1983 2. won by default. Aznar vs. Moy Ya Lim vs. on Immigration. 1989 c. It is true that in SANTOS vs. Effect on the citizenship of a Filipino woman on her an alien. Read: 292 marriage to . Paredes. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF BAGUIO CITY. the second placer shall take the place of the disqualified candidate since the latter was considered as non-candidate and all that he received are considered stray votes. The Vice Mayor of the City of Baguio shall be entitled to become the City Mayor instead of the private respondent. Republic.May 30. 3. and was supported by ten (10) members of the Court without any dissent. Burca vs. 1991 d. Said decision was supported by 8 members of the Court.51 SCRA 248 2. COMELEC. De la Rosa and William Gatchalian. Deportation Board. two reserved their votes and one on leave. b. Effect on the citizenship of an alien woman married Filipino citizen to a Read: 1. the Supreme Court held that in cases like this. COMELEC. Board of Commissioners vs. The second placer. 136 SCRA 435. the same shall be REVERSED in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo vs. 238. 137 SCRA 740 . Reyes vs. 41 SCRA 3. May 31.373 conclusion that the results of the elections cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. COMELEC. Comm. Frivaldo vs. in effect. COMELEC. Effect of naturalization of wife and minor children Read: 1. Who shall take the place of the petitioner then as the City Mayor of Baguio? Is the private respondent entitled to it? HE CANNOT FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT HE OBTAINED ONLY THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IN THE ELECTION AND THEREFORE. Re-examining said decision. 185 SCRA 703 1-a. June 23. three dissented.

117 SCRA 637 4. P vs. 119 SCRA 1 5. Republic. 55 SCRA 1 5. Republic vs. vs. Rusk. vs. 34 SCRA 668 4.374 1. Rep. Rep. Cokeng. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization Read: 1. Procedure for repatriation Read: 1. Guy. Republic vs. Schneider vs. 115 SCRA 244 ********************************* . Chan Teck Lao vs. 23 SCRA 559 3. Tandayag. 377 US 163 2. Cokeng. Avengoza.