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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 5:13-CV-00143-ACC-PRL

LARRY KLAYMAN,

Plaintiff,
v.

CITY PAGES, et. al.

Defendants.


MOTION TO FILE REPLY AND REPLY CONCERNING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST
EXPEDITED MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND
APPOINT A COMPUTER EXPERT AND MOTION TO SHORTEN RESPONSE TIME

Plaintiff, Larry Klayman hereby moves for leave to file this reply as set forth below on
the grounds that Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel misstates facts and law
with the effect of attempting to mislead this Court.
Again, missing no opportunity to smear and defame Plaintiff, Defendants and their
counsel mischaracterize the factual record and again maliciously impugn Plaintiff’s reputation.
First, not citing actual findings of the Magistrate in Plaintiff’s custody case in Cleveland Ohio,
which has given rise to on-going litigation against this Magistrate, who harbored an extra-
judicial bias and prejudice against Plaintiff based in large part on his religious beliefs – indeed
several mocking statements were contained in his recommended decision – Defendants instead
dwell primarily on the false allegations of Klayman’s estranged ex-wife. These false allegations,
made only after Plaintiff was forced to file for custody of his children, and conveniently years
after the alleged fact, were soundly rejected and dismissed by the Cleveland Department of
Children and Families, the Cleveland District Attorney and were totally put to rest by virtue of a
polygraph test which Plaintiff voluntarily took and handily passed. See Exhibits 1, 2, 3. To the
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contrary, Plaintiff’s ex-wife refused to take a polygraph after she conjured up the false
allegations which she then fed to the family’s longstanding pediatrician, the likes of which
regrettably are used frequently by sleazy divorce lawyers in custody cases. Indeed, even the
magistrate never found that Plaintiff had sexually abused his children, since there was no
evidence on the record to do so. He stated “[h]is conduct may not have been sexual in the sense
that he intended to or did derive any sexual pleasure from it or that he intended his children
would.” Instead, he found only that Plaintiff had acted in an “inappropriate manner”, a finding
that was also wholly false.
But Defendants make no mention of these undisputed facts because their continued aim is
to totally destroy Plaintiff and prejudice this Court, as he is the lawyer or perceived counsel for
persons which they loathe; Bradlee Dean and Sheriff Joe Arpaio, as plead in the Third Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff is also a friend and conservative colleague of Congresswoman Michele
Bachmann, who Defendants hate based on her alleged views on homosexuality and gay
marriage. A book written by Defendant Avidor, but not produced in discovery despite a request
to do so, smears not just Bachmann but also Plaintiff who he ties to Congresswoman Bachmann
as a close friend, underscoring Defendants’ malice.
As for The Florida Bar, Plaintiff agreed to a reprimand only to get the matter behind him,
as he was going through a very difficult period financially and personally with the false
allegations about his children. Indeed, the Consent Judgment shows that Plaintiff was not found
to have acted dishonestly, only that he could not pay the agreed settlement amount timely due to
his financial distress. The Consent Judgment contains a recitation of mitigating circumstances:
9.32(a) (absence of prior disciplinary record) – Respondent has been continuously
a member of The Florida Bar in good standing for nearly thirty-five (35) years.

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9.32(c)(personal or emotional problems) – Respondent maintains that since the
time the Mediation Agreement was entered into he has sustained significant
financial distress, which prevented him from making timely payments to Humm
and from providing timely responses to The Florida Bar. Respondent further
maintains that he agreed to submit Humm’s claim to mediation and agreed to the
terms of the Mediation Agreement simply to save valuable time and resources for
all concerned. Respondent had agreed to represent Humm in a criminal
proceeding, but she subsequently decided to retain new counsel when the case
was transferred from Miami to Orlando federal court. Respondent maintains that
Humm was never entitled to any refund and further asserts that Humm’s
subsequent counsel admitted as much in an e-mail he sent to Respondent, where
he stated, “[i]t is unlikely that (you) would want to refund a cent so please provide
me with an explanation so that I may pass it along to Ms. Humm.” Respondent
also maintains that Humm had similarly asked her prior counsel for a refund and
even requested that Respondent sue him, which Respondent refused to do.
Respondent thus claims a pattern in Humm’s behavior toward counsel.
Nevertheless, in an effort to promptly resolve the claim and to save valuable time
and resources, Respondent ultimately agreed to the terms of the Mediation
Agreement, as the mediator had urged.

With respect to his failure to provide timely responses to The Bar, Respondent
submits that he did not timely receive correspondence from The Bar, as his
address had changed and he inadvertently did not immediately change the address
with The Florida Bar. As a result, Respondent claims he did not timely receive
notice that the Grievance Committee had made a probable cause finding or that a
formal complaint had been filed in this matter, and consequently, that he did not
have a timely opportunity to argue against the probable cause finding or to resolve
this matter prior to a formal complaint being filed. Respondent acknowledges that
he should have provided his new address to The Bar, but inadvertently forgot to
do so in time for the referenced correspondence to arrive timely.

9.32(g) (character or reputation) – Respondent has been a respected member of
The Bar for nearly thirty-five (35) years.

9.32(i) (remorse) – Respondent is remorseful for his delay in satisfying the terms
of the Mediation Agreement which ultimately led to the filing of a formal
complaint in this matter. Moreover, Respondent has now fully satisfied his
outstanding obligation to Humm and made such payment without conditioning it
on any consent judgment.

As set forth in Exhibit 4, Plaintiff has continuously been a member in good standing of
The Florida Bar for thirty-seven (37) years. And, he has had a distinguished career of legal and
political activism, running for the U.S. Senate in this state in 2004. Exhibit 5 is a recent
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Washington Post Magazine cover story about him, an eight (8) page expose and pictorial which
hardly depicts someone who, as Defendants would like to portray, is “libel proof” in their
equally vile motion for summary judgment, filed just two days ago. See also Exhibit 6, the front
and back of Plaintiff’s book with similarly positive remarks on Plaintiff’s reputation.
Thus, not only do the Defendants misstate facts to again smear Plaintiff, these false
“facts” are irrelevant to Plaintiff’s motion to compel, and only intended to prejudice the court
against Plaintiff. The smear job by Defendants and their pliant counsel rises to such a level,
given its blatant misstatement of facts, to amount to multiple violations of the Florida Code of
Professional Responsibility, and not just the laws of defamation. See Rules 4-4.1(a) 4-4.4, 4-
4.8(c) and 4-4.8(d).
Notwithstanding the factual misstatements, the thrust of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is
that Defendants must produce documents that are not just relevant, but which may lead to
relevant evidence. This is “Evidence 101” for any law student. Indeed, the scope of discovery is
broad and it is not for Defendants and their counsel to make evidentiary rulings on what would
ultimately be admissible at trial. Thus, their disingenuous argument that documents which show
actual malice must make specific reference to the three defamatory articles at issue is absurd. As
just one example, suppose an unproduced document makes reference to or characterizes Plaintiff
as a criminal, but does not make reference to the defamatory statements that Klayman criminally
sexually abused his children and took, that is stole, money from a client without doing any work.
That the document does not make these specific references to the defamatory articles and
statements
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at issue does not mean that the document referring to Plaintiff as a criminal – which

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For examples of some of the alleged defamatory statements plead, “Turns out, gays aren’t the
only ones capable of disturbing, criminal sexual behavior – apparently even conservative straight
guys tight with Bradlee Dean can turn out to be total creeps” and “Klayman’s been in trouble
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he is not – is not discoverable to show actual malice. It would bear on Defendants state of mind
in maliciously defaming Plaintiff.
Courts throughout Florida, the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court and throughout the land
have uniformly ruled that discovery is broad and that actual malice in defamation cases can be
proved by a pattern of defamatory conduct and by direct and indirect (circumstantial) evidence.
That is why Defendants’ futile attempts to appoint themselves judge or magistrate-judge and in
effect arrogantly make evidentiary rulings for themselves concerning what must be produced, is
simply a subterfuge intended to obstruct discovery and deny due process to Plaintiff. That they
would go to such lengths to avoid producing documents raises a strong inference, along with the
established fact that Defendants have already been forced to admit deleting emails and removing
blog posts from public view, speaks for itself. Defendants are simply deleting and hiding relevant
documents and documents which may lead to relevant evidence.
For instance, in an action for libel against a newspaper finding that discovery is broad,
the court found that the publication of similar libel on even other persons, not joined as
defendants, may be discoverable as relevant evidence. The showing of a reckless indifference to
the rights and reputations of others may furnish a basis for an inference the publication in
questions was malicious. Gleichenhaus v. Carlyle, 597 P. 2d 611, 170 (Kan. 1979). In
Gleichenhaus, as in this case, it was necessary for the appellant, a public figure, to show actual
malice or reckless disregard for falsity in public comments before the appellee could be found
liable for defamation. Thus, the appellee’s malicious intent was central issue to the case.
“The requested information was clearly relevant to the primary issue and could
have led to other evidence. The answers to the interrogatories would have been
competent evidence at trial to establish a frame of mind on the part of the appellee

with a Bar association before, as he was publicly reprimanded by the Florida Bar in 2011 for
taking money from a client, and never doing any work”.
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of malice toward the appellant. Therefore, in an action for libel against a
newspaper, the publication of similar libels on other persons may be discoverable
as relevant evidence. The showing of a reckless indifference to the rights and
reputations of others may furnish a basis for an inference the publication in
controversy was malicious.”

Id. at 170-171. Accordingly, the trial court erred in Gleichenhaus in limiting the appellant’s
discovery and the decision was reversed on appeal. See also Amente v. Newman, 653 So.2d 1030
(Fla. 1995) (the concept of relevancy is broader in discovery context than in trial context, and
party may be permitted to discover relevant evidence that would be inadmissible at trial if it may
lead to discovery of relevant evidence); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 60
L.Ed.2d 115 (1979) (holding that during discovery a public official could ask a defendant
journalist about his or her state of mind when publishing the alleged defamatory falsehood to
seek to establish the “actual malice” of the defendant).
In Warford v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 789 S.W.2d 758 (Ken. 1990), the court held
that relevant evidence pertains even to a subjective determination of the appellee’s state of mind.
This Court looks to the finding in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) -- which Plaintiff cited
in its original Motion to Compel -- which states “proof of the necessary state of mind could be in
the form of objective circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be inferred.” Lando, 441
U.S. at 160. “ . . . [T]he thoughts and editorial processes of the alleged defamer would be open to
examination.” Id. See also NCAA v. Hornung, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 855 (1988) (holding that “. . .
malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause in a malicious prosecution action.”).
In Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589 (S.C 2005), a public figure plaintiff
brought a libel case against a newspaper. There, the Court recognized that “a plaintiff will rarely
find success in proving awareness that a statement is false from the mouth of a defendant
himself.” Id. at 596 Therefore, any direct or indirect evidence relevant to the defendant’s state of
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mind is admissible to prove actual malice. A plaintiff may present competent circumstantial
evidence of bad faith to establish actual malice despite a defendant’s contention that the
publication was made with a belief the statements were true.” Id. at 596. “Furthermore, a
subjective awareness of probable falsity can be shown if there are obvious reasons to doubt the
veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989). The court in Anderson held that “circumstantial
evidence that a newspaper recklessly disregarded truth created jury question as to actual malice.”
Anderson, 365 S.C. at 688.
In sum, it is not for Defendants themselves to decide which documents are relevant or
which may lead to relevant evidence during discovery. It is not for Defendants themselves to
rewrite and misstate the law of defamation and falsely put forth argument that maintains that
Plaintiff cannot prove actual malice unless the document refers specifically to the alleged
defamatory articles and statements. The law is clear and Defendants, who have already been
caught deleting emails and removing blog postings from public access not coincidentally just
after they were served with the intitial complaint, must come clean and be ordered to produce the
requested documents. They are not the court and their arrogant attempt to hide potential
evidence, but rather try to smear Plaintiff instead in court pleadings, cannot be countenanced.
Further, under these circumstances, the court should respectfully appoint a computer expert to
inspect Defendants’ computers, as there has been a showing of attempts to destroy and hide
discoverable documents and Defendants can no longer be trusted.
For all of these compelling reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel must respectfully be
granted. After consulting with Defendants’ counsel, they do not consent to this motion.

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Dated: October 22, 2014
Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Larry Klayman
Larry Klayman, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 246220
2775 NW 49
th
Ave., Suite 205-346
Ocala, FL 34483
(310) 595-0800
Email: leklayman@gmail.com

Plaintiff Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of October, 2014 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Motion to File Reply and Reply Concerning Plaintiff’s First Expedited Motion to
Compel the Production of Documents (Case No. 5:13-cv-00143) was submitted electronically to
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida and served via CM/ECF upon the
following:

Sanford Lewis Bohrer
Holland & Knight, LLP
Suite 3000
701 Brickell Ave
Miami, FL 33131
305/374-8500
Fax: 305/789-7799
Email: sbohrer@hklaw.com


Scott D. Ponce
Holland & Knight, LLP
Suite 3000
701 Brickell Ave
Miami, FL 33131
305/789-7575
Email: sponce@hklaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants



/s/ Larry Klayman
Larry Klayman, Esq.


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