MCQ Answers Question 1 C. Citing section 2 (4th paragraph Rule 111 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The extinction of the penal action did not carry with it extinction of the civil action, However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgement in the criminal action that the act or omission from the civil liability may arise did not exist. The case of Faraon V Priela GR No. L-23129 August 2 1968 Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of civil UNLESS the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgement that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Question 2 D. Citing Clemente V foreign Mission sisters. A hospital is not engaged in industry, hence not subsidiarily liable for acts of nurses. Nurses, in treating a patient, are not acting as servants of the hospitals because they are employed to carry out the orders of the physicians to whose authority they are subject. Question 3 B. citing People V Engay Although it was held in the Hicks case that the causes which produce in the mind loss of reason and self control and which lessens criminal responsibility are those which originate from lawful sentiments not those which arise from vicious unworthy and immoral passions yet such s not the case here where the fact that the accused lived for 15 years as the real wife of the deceased whose house she helped support could not but arouse that natural feeling of despair in the woman who saw her life broken and found herself abandoned by the very man whom she considered for so long a time as her husband and fro whom she had made so many sacrifices.The circumstance of passion and obfuscation was considered in favor of the accused. Question 4 A. Minority is always a privilege mitigating circumstance. It is easy to detect whether the circumstance which mitigates the liability of the offender is privilege or not, that is, if the penalty is reduced by degree. If the penalty is lowered by one or two degrees, it is privilege; therefore, even if there is an aggravating circumstance, do not compensate because that would be violating the rules. The circumstances under Article 13 are generally ordinary mitigating, except in paragraph 1, where it is privilege, Article 69 would apply. So also, paragraph 2, in cases where the offender is below 18 years old, such an offender if criminally liable is entitled to the lowering of penalty by one degree. But if over nine but under 15, he is entitled to a discretionary penalty of at least two degrees lower. When there is a lowering of penalties by degrees, it is a privilege. It cannot be offset by an aggravating circumstance. Although the bulk of the circumstances in Article 13 are ordinary mitigating circumstances, yet, when the crime committed is punishable by a divisible penalty, two or more of these ordinary mitigating circumstances shall have the effect of a privilege mitigating circumstances if there is no aggravating circumstance at all. Question 5 B Question 6 D Question 7 D. Generally, death extinguishes criminal liability as to personal penalties. As to pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Exception: Art. 33 (based on contracts). Even if the accused dies pending appeal, the right to file a separate civil action is not lost. The Code express provides that death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. The Effect of the Death of the Accused on His Civil Liability In a separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino in People v. Satorre, the effect of the death of the accused on his civil liability may be deduced from the following rules: 1. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code). When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately (Sec. 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court). 2. The plaintiff in the criminal action is the State. Its purpose is to obtain a judgment of conviction imposing the corresponding penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, a private person is the plaintiff in the civil action. The satisfaction of the civil liability does not extinguish the criminal action. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist (Sec. 3[c], Rule 111, Rules of Court). 3. Although the criminal and civil actions may be joined in the criminal case, they are distinct from each other. The plaintiffs in two actions are distinct and the objectives of the two actions are different. Thus, even if the accused started serving his sentence within the fifteen-day period from the promulgation of the judgment of conviction by the lower court, thereby making the judgment against him final, the complainant may, within the fifteen-day reglementary period, still ask that the civil liability be fixed by the court, if the judgment does not adjudicate any civil liability. In that case, the trial court has jurisdiction to adjudge the civil liability although the judgment imposing the penalty is already final and cannot be altered by the court anymore . 4. The extinction of the civil liability is governed by the rules of the civil law regarding obligations (Art. 112, Revised Penal Code). 5. Actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against an executor or administrator. For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for causes which survive. As to ordinary money claims, if the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, the claims should be dismissed and may be prosecuted under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court). 2
The corollary is that if death occurs after final judgment by the Court of First Instance, the action may be continued but the proper substitution of party defendant should be made under section 17 of Rule 3. Question 8 B Question 9 E. All of the above. Motive is relevant in the following: The identity of the accused is disputed. There are two antagonistic versions of the killing. No eyewitnesses to the crime and there are several suspects. Where evidence is circumstantial. As held in People v. De Mesa, the Supreme Court held that Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. Question 10 B. Subsidiary Imprisonment Not Proper Principal penalty imposed is more than prision correccional Principal penalty consists in other than prison sentence which is not of fixed duration Subsidiary penalty not expressly stated in sentence to take the place of fine in case of insolvency Sentence imposed does not include fine Convict has means to pay the fine Question 11 B Question 12 B Question 13 Question 14 B Question 15 D. IVLER case Question 16 C Question 17 E Question 18 C Question 19 C Question 20 D Question 21 Question 23 B Question 24 B. The Supreme Court in a landmark case of Colinares v. People, may have qualified its earlier ruling enunciated in De los Santos and Francisco and held that even if the accused who made an appeal, he can still apply for a probation, if there was no fault on his part. In this case, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, accused did not qualify for probation. Accused appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self- defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it. Not satisfied, accused went to the Supreme Court on petition for review. In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required the accused and the Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming accused committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court. Both complied with accused taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argued that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The issue is that given a finding that the accused is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court. The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. Ordinarily, accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But, the Supreme Court found the accused guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and held that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair 3
to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. Some in the Supreme Court disagreed. They contended that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. Since the accused appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation. But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that the accused had the right to such privilege; he certainly did not have. What he had was the right to apply for that privilege. The Court noted that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allowed him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case. Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to the accused: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court. If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the probation law on the accused based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. Moreover, the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. As clearly stated by Justice Abad: Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there? It also declared that had the RTC done what was right and imposed on the accused the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable. Question 25 A. Even if he did not appeal his conviction if the accused was sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6 years he will still be disqualified from being placed on probation. citing section 9 of probation law. the penalty for Art. 155. Alarms and scandals is arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 pesos.
Essay Questions 1. Answer 1 The question is a tricky one, but on my part I based my answer only on the things that have been proven during trial on the part of the accused, voluntary surrender and plea of guilt which are two separate mitigating circumstance. The supposed aggravating circumstance of dwelling, night time and disregard of age I purposely did not take into consideration since the accused was a tenant, he did not purposely sought the night, and that there was no disregard of age as it was proven by the accused that the first attack came from the victim. After taking the above considerations the judge should impose an indeterminate penalty ( this is where I illustrated the appropriate penalty). Whether Im correct or not I believe I earn points for that kind of answer, hehe Answer 2 Bruno should be acquitted, he should not have been convicted. He was able to prove self-defense. There was no provocation on his part when the victim attacked him. The fact is silent as to the nature of the attack, but I assume that there was necessity on Brunos part thats why he used his knife. Again, he did not provoke the victim and it was the latter who attacked first. As a supplemental, assuming that Bruno failed to establish self-defense, he is entitled to claim incomplete self-defense and the other mitigating circumstances given and then use ISLAW to determine the actual penalty. 2. Anwer Kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape? 3. Obstruction of justice? Benj yan din inisip ko, but the problem is art. 20 rpc brothers kasi sila and i dont think he profited or assisted in allowing the offender to profit since hindi lang nya sinabi dahil di nya alam gagawin. But nevertheless those accessories that can not be held liable as such under art 20 does not preclude them from being liable under PD 1829 4. Gigi is not correct. She committed libel. I believe even if Gigi was correct in claiming that Pablo is a public servant, the content of her column was about his private and personal life, which does not belong to the public sphere. Mas Consti at Civ ang attack ko dito, I think I cited that even the freedom of expression has a limitation and that journalists are not given an overarching license to write everything they want to write about. Issues pertaining to family relations are private and must remain that way. 5. Medyo nabitin ang sagot ko dito, under 9344 pwede but upto 21 years old under the same law. I forgot a case na na discuss sa amin which interpreted that part, parang ang gist nung case na yun is that 4
pag umabot na ng 21 when the sentence his handed down, suspension of sentence can no longer be availed of. Answer 2 The promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. P vs jimenez, 2011.
6. In Mel Dimat vs. People (2012) case, there were allegedly 2 sales of a carnapped Nissan Safari orginally owned by Mantequilla. First sale was from Tolentino to Dimat. Then the second sale was from Dimat to Sonia Delgado. Here, it was only Dimat who was charged before the RTC of violation with the anti-fencing law wherein paper works pertaining to the vehicle and sale thereof were presented as evidence the husband of Delgado, original owner Mantequilla and the police officers testified. after trial the RTC convicted him and the CA subsequently affirmed the same but with modification. On appeal to SC, one of Dimats arguments was that Sonia Delgado should also be held liable because she did not check the papers pertaining to the sale of the vehicle but the SC simply said that it is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case. The SC affirmed So taking into consideration what the SC said, then examiner should accept any of the following logical answers in this essay question: 1. Charge both Inigo and Roberto with the crime of fencing then explain the requisites for the criminal liability to attach and the facts of the case satisfying said requisites; or 2. Charge only Inigo because he solely facilitated the sale of the vehicle which came from an illicit source, explain the requisites for the criminal liability to attach and the facts of the case satisfying said requisites and as to Roberto, either make him a witness or not to bother him at all. 7. Double direct assault? Tama ka. Direct assault upon a person in authority at direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. 8. The charge is correct. ESTAFA through FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT. Akala ko nung una mali ako, until I encountered a case, Estate of Gonzales v Sato. Almost the same facts, son-in-law nagfalsify ng SPA na ginamit nya to sell the property of the mother-in-law. May discussion din sa case na hindi napuputol ang family ties with the death of the wife. Kung simple estafa yung case, hindi proper, pero dahil complex crime na siya, hindi na mag- aaply yung family ties. Pero di ko ginalaw ang issue ng family ties, sinagot ko siya point blank kung tama o hindi tama yung charge. Medyo mababaw lang ang natatandaan ko na explanation ko, SPA is forged and may sale of land (presumed public ang documents since land ang property involved), and the falsified public document was used to perpetuate fraud, the crucial element of estafa. 9. Supplement only, the 3 fold rule does not apply to the imposition of sentence but instead pertains to the service thereof ( see art. 70 RPC, look at the title) Answer 2 Art 70 of the revised penal code is concerned exclusively with the service of sentence it speaks of duration of penalty and penalty to be inflicted.nowhere is it there envisioned that the court should nake a computation and in its decision sentence the culprit to not more than the 3 fold the most severe of the penalties imposable upon hin. Computation is for the prison authorities to undertake coting people v Salazar 10. Correct, the gravamen of the offense of violation of BP 222 is the mere issuance of a worthless check. Agree, proper yung charge ng BP 22. Alam naman ng karamihan na BP 22 siya, question is, bakit ganyan ang phrasing ng tanong? Ano ang hinahanap ng examiner o ni Justice Brion? Naglagay tuloy ako ng Pro Reo diyan, magkapatid sila, may fair warning naman na wag muna i-cash at BP 22 cases clogging the dockets of the court therefore i-settle na lang alternatively. tama ka anon na mere issuance of unfunded check is the gravamen of the law. be that as it may, the law provides leeway that Frank could have prevented the case if after receiving the Erics written notice of dishonor and demand for payment, he paid him the value of the check within 5 banking days. Accordingly, the charge against Frank is correct. on the other hand, since the facts were silent as to whether Eric gave the written notice of dishonor and demand for payment and/or the period 5 banking days within which Frank must pay; pwede ring isagot na the charge is not correct against Frank because the one and/or two of the requisites for criminal liability to attach under the BP22 was/were not satisfied.: 1. no written notice of dishonor and demand for payment were made by Eric; and/or 2. no 5 banking days within which to make good the value of the check was given to Frank. 11. Penalty is the suffering that is inflicted by the state for the transgression of a law.the states purpose in punishing crimes is to secure justice. The state in providing punishment for a criminal offense seeks refuge from its inherent duty to prevent or suppress the danger to the state arising from criminal acts of an offender. These penalties are also part of the measure of self defense by the state so as to protect the society fron the threat and wrong inflicted by criminal.the main objective of imposing punishment in criminal 5
cases is to correct and reform the offender.imposition of penalty is also for exemplarity or to serve as an example to deter other from committing crimes. To approve the proposed bill by such senator would defeat the very end or purpose of imposing punishment. Considering ethics and morality it is every mans duty to uphold the constitution, uphold the laws of the land and to always see to it that justice is served.
United States v. Hernan Francisco Perez-Tosta, Gustavo Javier Correa-Patino, Erasmo Perez-Aguilera, Luis Guillermo Rojas-Valdez, 36 F.3d 1552, 11th Cir. (1994)