G.R. No.

184805 March 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VICTORIO PAGKALINAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J .:
The Case
This is an appeal from the May 9, 2008 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 02648 entitled People of the Philippines v. Victorio Pagkalinawan, which affirmed the
January 16, 2007 Joint Decision
2
in Criminal Case Nos. 13624-D and 13625-D of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 267 in Pasig City. The RTC found accused-appellant
Victorio
3
Pagkalinawan guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
The charges against appellant stemmed from the following Informations:
Criminal Case No. 13624-D
(Violation of Sec. 5, paragraph 1 [Sale], Art. II of RA 9165)
That, on or about the 20th day of July 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell,
deliver, and give away to another 0.28 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, which was found positive to the test for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in consideration of
the amount of Php500.00, and violation of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law.
4

Criminal Case No. 13625-D
(Violation of Sec. 11, par. 2 [Possession], Art. II of RA 9165)
That, on or about the 20th day of July 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly possess 0.13 gram and 0.08 gram, respectively, or a total of 0.21
gram of white crystalline substance separately contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets, which substance was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law.
5

On August 9, 2004, appellant was arraigned. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charges against him.
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
During the trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses Police Officer (PO1) Rey
Memoracion and PO3 Arnulfo Vicua, both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit,
Taguig Police Station, Taguig City. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses
appellant Pagkalinawan, Paula San Pedro, and May Pagkalinawan.
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
On July 20, 2004, at around 11:00 p.m., a confidential informant arrived at the office of the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF) of the Taguig City Police
and reported the illegal activities of a certain "Berto," a resident of Captain Ciano St., Ibayo,
Tipaz, Taguig City.
The leader of the group, Police Senior Inspector Romeo Paat, immediately formed a buy-bust
team with PO1 Memoracion as the poseur-buyer and the rest of the group as back-up. The buy-
bust money was then marked and recorded in the blotter. Afterwards, the team, along with the
police informant, proceeded to where Berto lives. Upon reaching the place, PO1 Memoracion
and the informant alighted from the service vehicle and walked towards Berto, who was leaning
against a wall, while the rest of the team positioned themselves in strategic locations from
where they could see clearly what was going on.
The informant introduced PO1 Memoracion to Berto as a taxi driver who wanted to buy shabu.
Berto immediately took the PhP 500 buy-bust money from PO1 Memoracion and showed three
(3) plastic sachets containing shabu in his palm, and asked the poseur-buyer to pick one. Once
PO1 Memoracion took hold of the shabu, he took off his cap, which was the pre-arranged signal
for the rest of the team to close in and arrest Berto. Berto suddenly became suspicious of PO3
Vicua, who was coming up to them, so he attempted to flee the scene. PO1 Memoracion was
able to stop him and ordered him to empty his pockets. The other two (2) sachets of shabu were
recovered from him and the appropriate markings were made on them. Berto was identified later
on as appellant Pagkalinawan.
Afterwards, the team brought appellant to its headquarters in Taguig City for investigation. After
the police investigator made the request for laboratory examination of the confiscated
transparent plastic sachets of suspected shabu, PO1 Memoracion brought these to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Southern Police District Crime Laboratory
Office. Police Inspector (P/Insp.) May Andrea A. Bonifacio, Forensic Chemical Officer,
conducted a qualitative examination on the specimens, which tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. She issued Physical Science Report No.
D-546-04S dated July 21, 2004, which showed the following results:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Three (3) heat-sealed transparent sachets each containing white crystalline substance with the
following markings and net weights:
A ("SAID-SOTF" VSP) = 0.28 gram
B ("SAID-SOTF" VSP) = 0.13 gram
C ("SAID-SOTF" VSP) = 0.08 gram
x x x x
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of any dangerous drug. x x x
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the
tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A to C contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
6
x x x
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, interposed the defense of denial.
Appellant recounted that, on July 20, 2004, he was watching television inside their house at No.
10-D Ibayo, Tipaz, Taguig City. His granddaughter Paula San Pedro and sister-in-law May
Pagkalinawan were with him in the house at the time. Suddenly, armed men barged into the
house and introduced themselves as policemen. One of them pointed a gun at him and asked
where he was keeping the shabu. He denied having what the policemen were looking after.
Despite his denial, the policemen still searched his house. When they could not find any
prohibited drugs there, the policemen brought him to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Taguig
City Police Station. At the police station, he was told by the policemen to amicably settle the
case with them. But because he did not heed their order, cases for violation of RA 9165 were
filed against him by the policemen.
May Pagkalinawan testified that, on July 20, 2004, she was resting inside their house at No. 10-
D Ibayo, Tipaz, Taguig City after selling her wares, while appellant was watching television.
Between 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., however, she went to the house of her sister-in-law Zenaida for
about ten minutes, but when she returned home, she saw policemen apprehending appellant.
She asked the policemen where they were bringing appellant and they told her to follow them at
the police station in the Taguig City Hall. She also averred that the policemen did not present
any document giving them authority to search their house and arrest appellant. She further
claimed that the police officers did not apprise appellant of his constitutional rights during and
after the arrest.
Defense witness Paula San Pedro, who claimed to be appellants granddaughter, also
corroborated the stories of both May Pagkalinawan and appellant. In her testimony, she
stressed that her grandfather was apprehended but not bodily frisked by the policemen inside
their house; hence, it was not possible for an illegal drug to be found in the possession of
appellant.
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant. The dispositive portion of its Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused VIRGILIO
PAGKALINAWAN y Silvestre alyas "Berto" in Criminal Case No. 13624-D for Violation of
Section 5, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, accused Virgilio
Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" is hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENTand
ordered to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP500,000.00).
Moreover, accused VIRGILIO PAGKALINAWAN y Silvestre alyas "Berto" is also found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 13625-D for Violation of Section 11, 2nd
paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Drugs
Act of 2002". And since the quantity of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) found in the
possession of the accused is only 0.21 gram, accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas
"Berto" is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY as minimum -to- FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS as
maximum. Accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" is further penalized to pay a
fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP300,000.00).
Accordingly, the Jail Warden of the Taguig City Jail where accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y
Silvestre alyas "Berto" is presently detained is hereby ordered to forthwith commit the person of
convicted Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" to the New Bilibid Prisons, Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
Upon the other hand, the shabu contained in three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
with a total weight of 0.49 [gram] which are the subject matter of the above-captioned cases are
hereby ordered to be immediately transmitted and/or submitted to the custody of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for its proper disposition.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
7

On appeal to the CA, appellant disputed the RTCs finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes charged. He argued that the presumption of innocence should prevail over the
principle of regularity of performance of the police officers. Further, he contended that what
actually happened was an instigation and not a buy-bust operation. Lastly, he claimed that there
was no compliance with the law as to the proper requirements for a valid buy-bust operation.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On May 9, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. It ruled that the prosecution was
able to discharge the statutory burden of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It also dismissed the
allegation of instigation, saying that what happened was actually an entrapment, to wit:
x x x It should be noted that the accused-appellant was neither cajoled nor seduced into
peddling drugs. In fact, when he was told that the poseur buyer wanted to score shabu, the
accused-appellant had several sachets of shabu ready in his pocket. This means that even
without the slightest prodding from the police officers, the accused-appellant already harbored
the intent to commit the crime of drug pushing. The feigned offer to buy on the part of the
poseur-buyer was merely a ploy to entrap a drug peddler who was about to actualize his
felonious intent.
8

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussion, the appealed Joint decision dated 16
January 2007 is perforce affirmed in toto
.
SO ORDERED.
9

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of the decision of the CA.
The Issue
Appellant assigns the following errors:
I.
The trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the incredible testimony of the prosecution
witnesses while totally disregarding the evidence adduced by the defense.
II.
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime
charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
We sustain appellants conviction.
Buy-Bust Operation Is a Form of Entrapment
Appellant argues that the buy-bust operation conducted was invalid and that what really
happened was instigation, not entrapment. Such contention lacks basis and is contrary to
jurisprudence.
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such
ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker.
10

In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, the Court laid down the distinction between entrapment
and instigation, to wit:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and
while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is
that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the decoy solicitation of persons seeking
to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent
of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a
prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent;
and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the
larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for
an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a spotter, detective, or hired informer;
but there are cases holding the contrary.
11

One form of entrapment is the buy-bust operation. It is legal and has been proved to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.
12

In order to determine the validity of a buy-bust operation, this Court has consistently applied the
"objective" test. In People v. Doria,
13
this Court stressed that in applying the "objective" test, the
details of the purported transaction during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and
adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, and the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale
by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. It further emphasized that the "manner by
which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase
the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to
the informant alone or the police officer, must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that
law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense."
14

In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment, not
instigation, to capture appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug. It was the confidential
informant who made initial contact with appellant when he introduced PO1 Memoracion as a
buyer for shabu. Appellant immediately took the PhP 500 buy-bust money from PO1
Memoracion and showed him three pieces of sachet containing shabu and asked him to pick
one. Once PO1 Memoracion got the shabu, he gave the pre-arranged signal and appellant was
arrested. The facts categorically show a typical buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment. The
police officers conduct was within the acceptable standards for the fair and honorable
administration of justice.
Moreover, contrary to appellants argument that the acts of the informant and the poseur-buyer
in pretending that they were in need of shabu instigated or induced him to violate the Anti-Drugs
Law, a police officers act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or
what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render the buy-
bust operation invalid.
15
This was clarified by the Court in People v. Sta Maria:
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the office
is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct.lavvphil
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that
appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an
informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant
induced the appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
16

It bears stressing that what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti. In other words, the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs are: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and (2) he knew that
what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.
17
All these elements were satisfactorily
proved by the prosecution in the instant case. Appellant sold and delivered the shabu for PhP
500 to PO1 Memoracion posing as buyer; the said drug was seized and identified as a
prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the
marked money and contraband; and finally, appellant was fully aware that he was selling and
delivering a prohibited drug.
Likewise, the prosecution was also able to prove with moral certainty the guilt of appellant for
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It was able to prove the following elements:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulatory drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
18

In the case at bar, appellant was caught in actual possession of prohibited drugs without
showing any proof that he was duly authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in
flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on appellants
part.
19

As a matter of fact, the trial court, in disposing of the case, said:
The substance of the prosecutions evidence is to the effect that accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan
y Silvestre alyas "Berto" was arrested by the police because of the existence of shabu he sold
to PO1 Rey B. Memoracion as well as the recovery of the buy-bust money from his possession
together with the other two (2) plastic sachets similarly containing shabu.
To accentuate, the prosecution witnesses in the person of PO1 B. Memoracion and PO3 Arnulfo
J. Vicua positively identified accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" as the
person that they apprehended on July 20, 2004 at Ibayo, Tipaz, Taguig City. That they arrested
accused Virgilio S. Pagkalinawan within the vicinity of a store because their team was able to
procure shabu from him during the buy-bust operation they purposely conducted against the
aforementioned accused.
The buy-bust money recovered by the arresting police officers from the possession of the
accused Virgilio Pagkalinawan y Silvestre alyas "Berto" as well as the shabu they were able to
purchase from the accused sufficiently constitute as the very corpus delicti of the crime of
"Violation of Section 5, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165", and the two (2)
plastic sachets containing shabu that were recovered from the same accused Pagkalinawan
similarly constitute as the corpus delicti of the crime of "Violation of Section 11, 2nd paragraph,
No. 3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165". As already established, corpus delicti has been
defined x x x as the body or substance of the crime and refers to the fact that a crime has
actually been committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by
someone of the particular crime.
The testimony of PO1 Rey B. Memoracion that was corroborated by PO3 Arnulfo J. Vicua, who
have not shown and displayed any ill motive to arrest the accused, is sufficient enough to
convict the accused of the crimes charged against him. x x x As law enforcers, their narration of
the incident is worthy of belief and as such they are presumed to have performed their duties in
a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. To stress x x x testimony of
arresting officers, with no motive or reason to falsely impute a serious charge against the
accused, is credible.
20

This Court has consistently relied upon the assessment of the trial court, which had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. It is a
fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve
credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or
speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses,
having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial.
21
In this case, appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated the application of any of the
aforementioned exceptions.
Sec. 21 of RA 9165 Provides for Exceptions
Additionally, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to show compliance with Sec. 21 of RA
9165 and its implementing rules regarding the custody and disposition of the evidence against
him. He contends that absolute compliance is required and that anything short of that renders
the evidence against him inadmissible.
We are not persuaded.
Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
As can be gleaned from the language of Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules, it is clear that the
failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with it is not fatal. It does not render appellants
arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.
22
What is essential is "the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
23

Here, there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs seized from
appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was
shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that after PO1
Memoracion seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked money,
appellant was immediately arrested and brought to the police station for investigation, where the
sachets of suspected shabu were marked appropriately. Immediately thereafter, the confiscated
substance, with a letter of request for examination, was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for laboratory examination to determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per Physical
Science Report No. D-546-04S dated July 21, 2004, the specimen submitted contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The examination was conducted by one
P/Insp. May Andrea A. Bonifacio, a Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Therefore, it is evidently clear that there was an unbroken chain in the custody of the illicit drug
purchased from appellant.
Presumption of Regularity of Performance Stands
Notably, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired
by any improper motive, this Court will not appreciate the defense of denial and instead apply
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents.
In the instant case, the defense of appellant consists of bare denial. It is considered as an
inherently weak defense, for it can easily be concocted and is a common standard line of
defense in drug cases.
Furthermore, as found by the trial court, the defense has failed to show any evidence of ill
motive on the part of the police officers:
Such allegation of the accused that his apprehension was just a result of a frame-up, as he was
not really engaged in peddling shabu when he was arrested, cannot be given credence because
he was not able to offer and show proof of any previous disagreement between him and the
arresting law officers that may lead the police officers to concoct and hatch baseless
accusations against him, or the presence of any other circumstances that may have fired up the
ire of the police officers against him.
24
x x x
For this reason, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and
find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 02648
finding appellant Victorio Pagkalinawan guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 2-11. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by
Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Pampio A. Abarintos.
2
CA rollo, pp. 11-22. Penned by Judge Florito S. Macalino.
3
Also referred to as "Virgilio" and "Victorino" in some parts of the records.
4
Records, p. 1.
5
Id. at 11.
6
Id. at 8.
7
CA rollo, p. 22.
8
Rollo, pp. 9-10.
9
Id. at 10-11.
10
People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 179150, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 741; citing People v.
Gatong-o, No. L-78698, December 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 716, 717.
11
56 Phil. 44, 52-53 (1931).
12
People v. Herrera, G.R. No. 93728, August 21, 1995, 247 SCRA 433, 439; People v.
Tadepa, G.R. No. 100354, May 26, 1995, 244 SCRA 339.
13
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668.
14
Id. at 698-699.
15
People v. Bayani, supra note 10.
16
G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 628.
17
People v. Pendatun, G.R. No. 148822, July 12, 2004, 434 SCRA 148, 155-156; citing
People v. Cercado, G.R. No. 144494, July 26, 2002, 385 SCRA 277; People v. Pacis,
G.R. No. 146309, July 18, 2002, 384 SCRA 684.
18
People v. Del Norte, G.R. No. 149462, March 29, 2004, 426 SCRA 383.
19
U.S. v. Bandoc, 23 Phil. 14, 15 (1912).
20
CA rollo, pp. 19-20.
21
People v. Julian-Fernandez, 423 Phil. 895, 910 (2001).
22
People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 448; citing People
v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 627.
23
Id.; citing People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421.
24
CA rollo, p. 62.

G.R. No. 34917 September 7, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.
Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuao, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J .:
The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal importation of opium, and sentencing them each
to four years' imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the proportional costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as committed by
the court below in its judgment to wit:
The lower court erred:
1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular Collector of
Customs to exhibit in court the record of the administrative investigation against Joaquin
Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret
service agent of Cebu, both of whom have since been dismissed from service.
2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments have passed
thru the customhouse without the knowledge of the customs secret service."
3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in denouncing the
accused was actuated by a desire to protect himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin
Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from
the service.
4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs secret service
agent of Cebu, is above reproach and utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives
attributed to him by the accused.
5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the court room
while other prosecution witnesses were testifying, despite the previous order of the court
excluding the Government witnesses from the court room, and in refusing to allow the
defense to inquire from Insular Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official
conduct of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu.
6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.
7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the
opium from Hongkong.
8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the conversation
between Juan Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.
9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between
Juan Samson and the appellant Lua Chu.
10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the crime of
illegal importation of opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four years' imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the presumption of innocence which
has not been overcome, despite the unlawful inducement, despite the inherent
weakness of the evidence presented by the prosecution, emanating from a spirit of
revenge and from a contaminated, polluted source.
The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium.
About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan Samson,
had returned from a vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of customs for the
Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter, after a short conversation, asked
him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the secret service told him he had spent
P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a drawer in his table, the amount of P300, in
paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive shortly,
and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money,
left, and put it into the safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer
of Cebu. A week later, Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred
to consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's
house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house and told him he had
come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The said accused informed Samson
that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay Natividad
P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October
awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu.
At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the
steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera Filipina a shipping company in Cebu had had
built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the same date
Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been put on board the
steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson would receive P2,000,
Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in
the customhouse.
Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of November,
Natividad informed the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of
certain engine trouble, and remained there until December 7th. In view of this, the shipper
several times attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told each time by the captain, who
needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on
board.
The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he was
examining the manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After conferring
with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do everything possible to have the cargo unloaded,
and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the morning of November 16, 1929,
Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had the papers ready to withdraw the cases
marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se
Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night
and was told that he must pay over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse.
Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we
see whether we can take the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed
Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of all that had taken place, and the said colonel
instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of the opium
owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the latter's house that same
night. That afternoon Samson went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the
fiscal, and asked for a stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se
Tieng that night in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good
stenographer available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on
the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of December 17, 1929, as
agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's
house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung from the
window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy
Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He replied that he had not,
saying that the owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him
to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house. After pointing out to
Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the opium was, and Uy
Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins.
Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu,
who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila, named Tan, and
another in Amoy were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the
opium, and the latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if
he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the opium
was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which was taken down in shorthand,
Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you tell
me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir; you were
not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he had come to
bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called
me aside and said there was good business, because opium brought a good price, and he
needed money." All this conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It was then
agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the
appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng
was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been
hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which
consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters,
and relating to the articles described in Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to
the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went
to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a coat hanging on a wall, which
Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five letters written in Chinese characters relating to
the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the
Constabulary headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked
"U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a
quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and asked
him to tell the truth as to who was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows:
"Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not going to answer to them. The only
thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to
bring it in here without the knowledge of those " pointing towards the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200 from Uy
Se Tieng, he induced him to order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to
P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make a good deal of
money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that
there would be no danger, because he and the collector of customs would protect him; that Uy
Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy
Se Tieng then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he had
ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the
payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the
order, but the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded and the captain of
the Kolambugan refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived, Samson insisted
upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua
Chu on the night of December 14th, and proposed that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was
unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the
opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of
December 17th, because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the
P6,000, provided Lua Chu personally promised to pay him that amount.
The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its judgment.
Some refer to the refusal of the trial judge to permit the presentation of certain documentary
evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness for the Government, from
the court room during the hearing; others refer to the admission of the alleged statements of the
accused taken in shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution
to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings against Joaquin
Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service
agent of Cebu, who were dismissed from the service, the trial court did not err in not permitting
it, for, whatever the result of those proceedings, they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan
Samson, for it is not one of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure
to that end.
With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal
witness of the Government, from the court room during the hearing, it is within the power of said
judge to do so or not, and it does not appear that he has abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris,
842).
Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes
of the defendants' statements, since they contain admissions made by themselves, and the
person who took them in shorthand attested at the trial that they were faithfully taken down.
Besides the contents are corroborated by unimpeached witnesses who heard the statements.
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the information,
we find that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution should be believed,
because the officers of the Constabulary and the chief of the customs secret service, who gave
it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal
importation of the opium, though the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was only a guarantor to
secure the payment of the gratuity which the former collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad,
had asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion, however, is
contradicted by his own statement made to Juan Samson and overheard by Captain
Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners of the opium that had been unlawfully imported.
But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the
opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction
of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A public official who induces a
person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary to seize the
instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in
mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug,
but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug,
leaving only its introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and
he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure the
seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid
down by the courts of the United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section
57, as follows:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. While it has been said that the practice of
entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be
deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been
condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or
punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act
was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a
kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that
an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter
in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of
such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the
owner or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief
in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it
is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by
a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.
As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-appellants
to import the opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding
with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad who had promised them that he would
remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the customhouse was
concerned not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the
better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.
There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the
Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an
innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to
catch a criminal.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret
service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the
customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its
importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-46638 July 9, 1986
AQUILINA R. ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate
Court, finding the accused appellant guilty of the crime of bribery. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment of conviction, We hereby find the
defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bribery under the
second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code; and there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, We hereby impose upon her the penalty
of imprisonment consisting of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days and a
fine of P 100.00. The defendant shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary
disqualification from holding office. With costs.
Atty. Aquilina Araneta was charged with violation of Section 3, Subsection B of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" in an information which
reads:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1971, in the City of Cabanatuan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then employed as Hearing Officer in the Department of Labor,
with station at Cabanatuan City, and therefore, a public officer, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand and receive for herself the amount of
One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency, from one Mrs. Gertrudes M.
Yoyongco, as a condition and/or consideration for her to act on the claim for
compensation benefits filed by the said Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco pertaining
to the death of her husband, which claim was then pending in the office wherein
the abovenamed accused was employed and in which, under the law, she has
the official capacity to intervene.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the respondent appellate court in its
decision as follows:
Complainant Gertrudes M. Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco, an
employee of the National Irrigation Administration assigned as instrument man at
the Upper Pampanga River Project. Upon the death of her husband on April 27,
1971, she approached the appellant, a hearing officer of the Workmen's
Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City, to inquire about the procedure for filing a
claim for death compensation. Learning the requirements, she prepared the
application forms and attachments and filed them with the Workmen's
Compensation Unit at San Fernando, Pampanga. (pp. 213, TSN, October 3,
1973).
After a few days, the complainant went back to San Fernando to verify the status
of her claim. She was informed that the death certificate of her husband, their
marriage contract and the birth certificates of their children were needed. She
secured these documents and brought them to San Fernando. She was told that
her claim papers had been forwarded to Cabanatuan City, particularly to the
appellant, for consolidation of the requirements. So she went to see the
appellant. (pp. 13-18, TSN, October 3, 1973).
When she saw the appellant, the complainant was told that she had to pay P
100.00 so that her claim would be acted upon. The complainant told the
appellant that she had no money then, but if the appellant would process her
claim she would give her the P100.00 upon its approval. The appellant was
adamant. She would not agree to the complainant's proposal. According to her,
on previous occasions certain claimants made similar promises but they failed to
live up to them. (pp. 18-24, TSN, October 3,1973).
The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, erstwhile chief of the
Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, to inform him of the
demand of the appellant. Col. Yoyongco gave the complainant two 50-peso bills
(Exhibits B and B-1 ) and instructed her to go to Col. David Laureaga, Provincial
Commander of Nueva Ecija, for help. (pp. 24-25, TSN, October 3, 1973).
After listening to the complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to
entrap the appellant. The two 50-peso bills were marked with the notations 'CC-
NE-l' and 'CC-NE-2', photographed and dusted with ultra-violet powder. With this
preparation, Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno, CIC Balcos and the complainant proceeded
to the office of the appellant. When they arrived thereat, the appellant was talking
with three persons who had a hearing before her. They allowed the three
persons to finish their business with the appellant. After the group had left, the
complainant and CIC Balcos who pretended to be the complainant's nephew
approached the appellant. Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno stationed themselves
outside the room and observed events through a glass window. Aside from the
appellant, the complainant and CIC Balcos, there were three other persons
inside the office. These were Atty. Herminio Garcia, Renato de Lara and
Gregorio Ocampo. The complainant again requested the appellant to process her
claim. The appellant countered by asking her if she already had the P100.00. In
answer, the complainant brought out the two 50-peso bills from her bag and
handed them to the appellant. As the appellant took hold of the money, CIC
Balcos grabbed her hand and told her she was under arrest. Whereupon, Lt.
Carlos and Sgt. Beleno immediately entered the room and helped in the arrest of
the appellant. (pp. 3-12, TSN, November 6, 1973).
The appellant was brought to the PC headquarters where her hands were
examined with a special light for the presence of ultra-violet powder. The
examination was witnessed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Talavera. The result
was positive. (pp. 12-13, TSN, November 6, 1973).
On the other hand, the petitioner presented her own version of the facts:
On her part, the appellant testified that there was indeed an offer of P 100.00 by
the complainant. She declined the offer and never touched the bills when they
were laid on her table. If she was found positive for ultra-violet powder, it was
because CIC Balcos rubbed the bills on her hand and dress. He did it four times
once at her office, once at the Milky way Restaurant and twice at the PC
Headquarters. (Decision, Court of Appeals, Annex "A", p. 5)
When the complainant went to the office of the appellant in Cabanatuan City, she
demanded the release of the decision of her case, but appellant told her that she
cannot do so for the reason that she is only a hearing officer to receive evidence
about the claim for compensation due to the death of her husband, and the real
office to decide the case is that Workmen's Compensation Branch in San
Fernando, Pampanga. The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col.
Yoyongco, Chief of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary,
Cabanatuan City to inform him of the demand of the appellant for P100.00. Col.
Yoyongco gave complainant two fifty (P50.00) peso bills. After listening to the
complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to entrap appellant by
the use of fifty (P50.00) peso bills which were marked with the notation 'CC-NE-l'
and 'CC-NE-2', photographed and dusted with ultra-violet powder, the two fifty-
peso bills. After this preparation Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno and the complainant
proceeded to the office of the complainant. When they arrived in the place the
complainant was talking to the 3 persons who had then a hearing before her.
After the appellant finished the hearing the complainant and the CIC Balgos who
pretended to be the complainant's nephew approached the appellant. Then the
complainant again requested the appellant to process her claim by this time the
complainant took the 2 fifty-peso bills from her bag and gave to the appellant but
the appellant pushed the money, and CIC Balgos grabbed her hand and told her
appellant was under arrest. The appellant was brought to the headquarters
where her hands were examined with special light for the presence of ultra-violet
powder. The examination was witnessed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Cabanatuan City and the result was positive. (TSN, pp. 12- 13, November 6,
1973)
On the other hand, Renato de Lara, a witness for the appellant testified that he
was in the office of the appellant at the time the incident took place and he saw
the amount of P100.00 being offered by the complainant to the appellant but the
latter refused to accept the money. When appellant refused, CIC Balgos took it,
rubbed it on the hand of the appellant and announced that he was arresting her.
Appellant further testify (sic) that complainant offered P100.00 to her to expedite
the preparation of the decision of her claim and said complainant put two fifty
peso bills in her table after which she was arrested and investigated and a
complaint was filed against her for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
After trial, the lower court convicted the petitioner as charged. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Atty. Aquiline R. Araneta
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and
hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment for ONE (1) YEAR, with perpetual
disqualification from public office, and to pay the costs. The P100.00 consisting
of two fifty-peso bills which were marked as Exhibits 'B' and 'B-l' are hereby
ordered returned to Mrs. Gertrudes Yoyongco who owns them.
As indicated earlier, the respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower court and
convicted the petitioner instead of the crime of bribery under the second paragraph of Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner now assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER
ON THE BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT EVIDENCE DEVISED BY MEMBERS OF
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY IN CABANATUAN CITY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER OF
BRIBERY WHERE SUCH CRIME WAS NOT CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION FILED BY THE FISCAL AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER
FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Relative to the first error, the petitioner submits that the criminal intent originated in the mind of
the entrapping person and for which reason, no conviction can be had against her.
This argument has no merit.
The petitioner confuses entrapment with instigation, We agree with the submission of the
Solicitor General that:
xxx xxx xxx
... There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure
the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime.
There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the crime (People
vs. Galicia, [CA], 40 OG 4476). The difference in the nature of the two lies in the
origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind
of the criminal. The Idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In
instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests
to the accused who adopts the Idea and carries it into execution.
The legal effects of entrapment and instigation are also different. As already
stated, entrapment does not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does.
Even more emphatic on this point is People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng (56 Phil. 44) where
this Court ruled that the mere fact that the Chief of Customs Secret Service pretended to agree
to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customs house, in order to assure
the seizure of the said opium and the arrest of its importers is no bar to the prosecution and
conviction of the latter. In that case, this Court quoted with approval 16 Corpus Juris, p. 88, Sec.
57, which states that:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.- While it has been said that the practice of
entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions
is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment,
has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act
from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in
his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act
were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and
the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception
by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him
free from the influence of the instigation of the detective. ...
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that she was denied due process of
law because she was not charged with bribery in the information but for a crime falling under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Again, this argument is erroneous. The contention of the petitioner was squarely answered
in United States vs. Panlilio (28 Phil. 608) where this Court held that the fact that the information
in its preamble charged a violation of Act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the
accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. To the same effect is our ruling
in United States vs. Guzman (25 Phil. 22) where the appellant was convicted of the crime of
estafa in the lower court, but on appeal, he was instead convicted of the crime of embezzlement
of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740.
As long as the information clearly recites all the elements of the crime of bribery and the facts
proved during the trial show its having been committed beyond reasonable doubt, an error in the
designation of the crime's name is not a denial of due process.
In United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. 740), this Court held that:
The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of credible
witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred, show beyond
peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as defined in article
387, in connection with Article 383 of the Penal Code, has been committed, it
being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of Act No.
355 of the Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as the same
recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of bribery as
defined and punished in the aforesaid articles of the Penal Code.
Our review of this decision shows that the crime for which the petitioner was convicted has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the respondent court is AFFIRMED without costs.
Considering however, that this case has been pending since 1971, that the amount involved is
only P100.00 and that the defendant-appellant is a mother of four, it is recommended that the
petitioner either be granted executive clemency or be given the privilege of probation if she is
qualified.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Ministry of Justice for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 146309. July 18, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROBERTO MENDOZA
PACIS, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Entrapment is a legally sanctioned method resorted to by the police for the purpose
of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plans. Bare
denials by the accused cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the arresting
officers performance of official functions.
The Case
Roberto Mendoza Pacis appeals the August 18, 2000 Decision
[1]
of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 265) in Criminal Case No. 6292-D, in which he
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua after being found guilty of violating Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act 6425 (RA 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA
7659).
The Information dated June 3, 1998, and signed by State Prosecutor Marilyn
RO. Campomanes, charged appellant as follows:
That on the afternoon of April 07, 1998, inside Unit #375 Caimito Ville,
Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and dispatch 497.2940 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as SHABU, a regulated
drug to undercover NBI agents who acted as poseur-buyer[s], without the
corresponding license, and/or prescription to sell, distribute and dispatch the
aforementioned regulated drug, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic
of the Philippines.
[2]

During his arraignment on July 30, 1998, appellant refused to plead despite the
assistance of counsel.
[3]
Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered for him.
[4]
After due trial,
the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the [a]ccused,
ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Violation of Section 15, Article III [of] Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No, 7650, and hereby SENTENCES him to
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00), plus the cost of suit.
The Shabu, subject matter of the Information in this case, is hereby ordered
FORFEITED in favor of the [g]overnment and ordered TURNED OVER to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal as provided by law.
[5]

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the facts is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) as follows:
[6]

On April 6, 1998, Atty. Jose Justo S. Yap, supervising agent of the
Dangerous Drugs Division-National Bureau of Investigation, received
information that a certain Roberto Mendoza Pacis was offering to sell one-half
(1/2) kilogram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu for the amount
of nine hundred fifty pesos (P950.00) per gram or a total of four hundred
seventy five thousand pesos (P475,000.00). The NBI Chief of the Dangerous
Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and Senior Agent
Midgonio S. Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case.
In the afternoon of the same day, Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon and the
informant went to the house of appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street,
Valle Verde II, Pasig City. The informant introduced Atty. Yap to appellant as
interested buyer. They negotiated the sale of one-half (1/2) kilogram of
shabu. The total price was reduced to four hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P450,000.00). It was agreed that payment and delivery of shabu would be
made on the following day, at the same place.
On April 17, 1998, around 6:30 in the evening, the NBI agents and the
informant went to appellants house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper
bag with markings yellow cab. When he opened the bag, Atty. Yap found a
transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance inside. While
examining it, appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap instructed Senior
Agent Congzon to get the money from the car. When Senior Agent Congzon
returned, he gave the boodle money to Atty. Yap who then handed the
money to the appellant. Upon appellants receipt of the payment, the officers
identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him.
Per instruction of Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon transmitted the shabu to
the Forensic Chemistry Laboratory for examination.
NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosales testified that on April 8, 1998, she
received the specimen from Senior Agent Congzon together with the letter
request. The specimen weighed 497.292940 grams. After examination, the
specimen was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, presents the following version of the facts:
[7]

Accused-appellant, ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS is a legitimate
businessman having been engaged in the sale of imported automotive for
quite a long time. On April 6, 1998, he was in his house at 375 Caimito
Street, Caimito Ville, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. In the afternoon of April 6,
1998, he was in Caloocan City in Dome Street, in the house of defense
witness Ramon Ty. He was there to pick-up witness Ty because they had an
agreement that he was to bring him to far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan. They
left right after lunch at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. Witness Ty
mentioned to him that they were to meet Mr. Andrada and Dr. Lachica. They
reached Pangasinan at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon. They saw the
persons they were supposed to meet in Urdaneta, Pangasinan and after
seeing those persons, they stayed overnight. In his address at Valle Verde II,
accused-appellant had a live-in partner named ANNIE GONZALES. He was a
car owner and had a former driver named Rey, who drove for him for less
than a year. He had to dismiss his driver Rey because he was always late or
would be absent for work without informing him ahead of time. After staying
overnight in far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan, they left for Manila on April 7,
1998 at 7:00 oclock in the morning. When they reached Manila proper, he
dropped off witness Ramon Ty in his house at Caloocan. Then, he went
straight home to Valle Verde to take a nap. At more or less 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon of April 7, 1998, he was at home at Valle Verde, together with his
live-in partner, ANNIE GONZALES. Later that afternoon, three (3)-armed
persons entered his condominium unit. There was a commotion downstairs
and his live-in partner Annie Gonzales opened the door and he was
awakened. Annie told him that there were three (3) people with guns looking
for him and they went up to the room right away. The three-armed men told
him that they were NBI agents but did not show any identification. Agent
Justo Yap, Jr. was one of them. Agent Congzon Jr. was also one of them, but
NBI Special Investigator Larosa was not one of them. When they entered the
room, the gun of NBI Agent Yap was already pointed at him while the two (2)
other agents were holding the butts of their guns. They were in civilian
clothes. They told him to step-out and that they were looking for
[s]habu. They were not able to find any in his room or downstairs. When they
were looking for the [s]habu, the accused appellant responded WHAT
SHABU? What [s]habu are you looking for? When he stepped out of the
room to go down to the living room, he saw his former driver Rey together with
his father. Rey[,] as stated before was his former driver and he had seen the
father of Rey once or twice before. Rey and his father were also in the living
room. A paper bag with the lettering CAB was presented to the accused
appellant in his house. He noticed that the bag came from Rey and was
hiding it behind him when he gave it to agent Yap. Agent Yap got it from the
cabinet near the kitchen. Agent Yap wanted him to admit that it belongs to
him and that it came from his condominium. Agent Yap also showed him the
bag with white powder and what was shown to him was a white substance in
powdery form. After it was shown to him and he was asked to admit that it
was taken from his place, he and his live-in partner ANNIE GONZALES were
brought to the NBI at Taft Avenue. He did not see Rey and his father
anymore at the NBI Office. When they were at the NBI, the Agents asked the
accused-appellant to admit that the shabu was taken from his apartment. He
told them that it was not from his apartment. Agent Yap told him that if he will
not admit he will stay in jail longer or will be put behind bars. The accused
appellant was brought to the NBI Headquarters on April 7, 1998. When he
was taken from his house by the three NBI Agents, he was not informed or
appraised of his constitutional rights such as the right to counsel and to
remain silent. The same thing is true when he was brought to the NBI
Headquarters, where he was not appraised of these basic rights. When he
was asked to admit that the shabu was taken from his place, he told them that
it was not from him and asked why [they were] doing [this] to him. The NBI
Agents insisted that he is hard-headed and if he would just follow them he will
be free if he will tell the source of the shabu. There were no statements taken
from the accused-appellant in the afternoon of April 7, 1998; no statements
were also taken from him in the morning of April 8, 1998. The agents were
trying to negotiate with him. The negotiation was such that if he cannot
produce the source of the contraband, then he had to produce P200,000.00 in
order to get himself free. The NBI Agents agreed to let Annie Gonzales go
and look for money. Annie Gonzales was able to produce only P40,000.00. It
was brought back by Annie Gonzales to the NBI on April 8, 1998 and gave the
sum to Agent Yap. Agent Yap looked very disappointed when he received the
money. He said that it was not the agreement that was made. That, the
agreed price ofP200,000.00 was short of P160,000.00. The accused-
appellant requested again if he could use the phone to call up his cousin J-C
Mendoza. He got in touch with his cousin, who said that he will try to get the
amount. He again requested Agent Yap if he could allow Annie Gonzales [to]
go to his cousin and see if there was cash that she can get. Annie Gonzales
was allowed to leave again but the P160,000.00 was not produced. Annie
Gonzales did not come back anymore because she was not able to produce
the money. She did not show up anymore at the NBI Headquarters because
she will be detained together with him (accused-appellant).
Defense witness Ramon V. Ty corroborated, on all material points, the
testimony of the accused-appellant. He was the driver of Joey Albert, the
singer, for three (3) years more or less. He knows accused-appellant because
he is the brother-in-law of Joey Albert. He first met Roberto Mendoza Pacis at
his house, when he together with Vicente Pacis, husband of Joey Albert, went
there. In the morning of April 6, 1998, he was at home. In the afternoon, they
left his house at around 2:00 oclock. They were bound [for] far away
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, because his physical therapist, Dr. Lachica who
resided in Pangasinan, was supposed to buy some instruments from him. He
needed the instruments to help him exercise his body even without therapy
because he had a stroke in 1993. When they reached Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
he did not see his therapist because the latter was at his cousins
house. After being told where Dr. Lachica was, they went to see him. They
were able to get the gadget from him. They went to Manila the following
morning. They left at about 7:00 oclock in the morning of April 7, 1998 and
reached his house in Caloocan City at around 10:30 oclock in the
morning. Whe[n] they reached Caloocan, he went home and Roberto
Mendoza Pacis said that he will also go home.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, noting that they testified in a clear and straightforward manner. It debunked
appellants defense of frame-up as it was neither substantiated nor proven. It held
that affirmative testimony, especially when it came from the mouth of a credible witness,
was far stronger than a negative one.
Hence, this appeal.
[8]

The Issues
Appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration:
1. The lower court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425
as amended, despite the inherent incredibility of the NBI (National Bureau of
Investigation) version of the manner the alleged buy-bust operation was
conducted.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in giving too much weight to the testimony
of the witnesses for the prosecution when their testimonies were shot with
material discrepancies and inconsistencies.
3. The lower court erred when it failed to accord full significance [of] the
fact that the informant was not presented in court when circumstances
demand for his presentation.
4. The lower court erred when it failed to give weight and credence to the
alibi offered by the accused as a defense.
[9]

These issues may be summed as follows: (1) whether the buy-bust operation that
led to appellants arrest was valid, (2) whether the presentation of the informant was
necessary to prove appellants guilt, and (3) whether the trial court erred in not giving
weight and credence to appellants alibi.
This Courts Ruling
The appeal is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Validity of the Buy-Bust Operation
Claiming that he was framed by the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), appellant assails the validity of the buy-bust operation that led to his arrest.
Entrapment Distinguished
from Instigation
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other
hand, instigators practically induce the would-be defendant into the commission of the
offense and become co-principals themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by
this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of apprehending
criminal elements engaged in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs.
[10]

A careful examination of the records shows that the operation that led to the arrest
of appellant was indeed an entrapment, not an instigation. The trial courts assessment
of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the highest respect, because it had the
advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus in a better position to discern if
they were telling the truth or not.
[11]
In the present case, the RTC noted that the
prosecution witnesses testified in a clear and straightforward manner in narrating the
events that had transpired before and during the buy-bust operation.
Furthermore, courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.
[12]
Accordingly, in
entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by prosecution
witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
[13]

No Proof of Ill Motive
on the Part of NBI Agents
It is not unusual in criminal cases of this kind to have a version of the prosecution so
diametrically opposed to that of the defense. However, upon a careful perusal of the
records, we find the evidence presented by the defense to be unsound and self-serving.
Appellant did not submit any plausible reason or ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers to falsely impute to him a serious and unfounded charge. Where there
is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper
motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved, and that their testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.
[14]
The records show that appellant had a ready supply of
shabu for sale and disposition to anyone willing to pay the right price.
Elements of Crime
Duly Proven
Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal
sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to
another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous
drug.
[15]
These elements were duly proven in the case herein. The records show that
appellant sold and delivered the shabu to NBI agents posing as buyers. It was seized
and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence. Appellant
was likewise shown to be aware that what he was selling and delivering was a
prohibited substance.
Second Issue:
Identity of Informant Not Necessary
With respect to the informants identity, we hold that it may remain
confidential. There are strong practical reasons for keeping its secrecy, including the
continued health and safety of the informant and the encouragement of others to report
any wrongdoing to police authorities.
[16]
This is settled jurisprudence and we will not
belabor it here.
Third Issue:
Alibi as a Defense
On April 6, 1998, NBI agents, acting as poseur-buyers of illegal drugs, allegedly
went to the house of appellant to discuss with him preliminary arrangements for the
sale. However, Pacis disputed this allegation. To bolster his claim, he presented his
sister-in-laws driver, Ramon V. Ty, who testified that he was with the former in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan on that same day; hence, appellant could not have been with the
poseur-buyers in Manila to discuss the quantity and the price of the shabu to be
delivered the next day.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The
excuse must be so airtight that it admits of no exception.
[17]

In the present case, however, we agree with the RTC that the claim of Ty was not
substantiated by the testimonies of the persons he and appellant were supposed to
have met in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
Hence, appellant was unable to disprove the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that on April 6, 1998, he was discussing the terms of the sale with the
poseur-buyers.
Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that the positive identification of the accused --
when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses -- prevails over alibi and denial which are negative and self-serving,
undeserving of weight in law.
[18]

Compared with the detailed, convincing and well-documented Decision of the trial
court, appellants denial and alibi pale into insignificance.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.



[1]
Written by Judge Edwin A. Villasor; rollo, pp. 16-44; records, pp. 259-287.
[2]
Rollo, p. 5; records, p. 1.
[3]
Atty. Ernesto O. Pua.
[4]
Order dated July 30, 1998; records, p. 38.
[5]
Assailed Decision, pp. 28-29; rollo, pp. 16-44; records, pp. 259-287.
[6]
Appellees Brief, pp. 3-6; rollo, pp. 137-140. The Brief was signed by Assistant Solicitor General Carlos
N. Ortega, Assistant Solicitor General Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Associate Solicitor Elmira S. Cruz.
[7]
Appellants Brief, pp. 5-11; rollo, pp. 63-69. The Brief was signed by Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino.
[8]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 4, 2002, upon receipt by this Court of
appellees Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none had been submitted within the
reglementary period.
[9]
Appellants Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 59. Original in upper case.
[10]
People v. Lapatha, 167 SCRA 159, November 9, 1988; People v. Rualo, 152 SCRA 635, July 31,
1987; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483, November 13, 1986.
[11]
People v. Ruedas, 194 SCRA 553, February 27, 1991.
[12]
People v. Lamog, 172 SCRA 342, April 17, 1989.
[13]
People v. Boholst, 152 SCRA 263, July 23, 1987.
[14]
People v. Sanchez, 173 SCRA 305, May 12, 1989.
[15]
People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561, 579, September 5, 1997; People v. Manzano, 227 SCRA 780, 785,
November 16, 1993.
[16]
Ibid.
[17]
People v. Barera, 262 SCRA 63, September 19, 1996.
[18]
People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550, February 13, 2002.