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Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013


Human Rights Condition Counterplans – GDI 2013

These counterplans all condition the mandate of the plan on the target country’s acceptance
of certain conditions designed to address human rights concerns (human trafficking, political
dissent and election reforms).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

1NC - Political Dissent Conditions

(vs. Embargo aff)
Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase economic
engagement by lifting the embargo If and only if the government of Cuba agrees to release all
political dissidents, reform its laws criminalizing dissent and dismantle the institutions that
enforce them.

(vs. Terrorism List aff)
Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase economic
engagement by removing Cuba from the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism
if and only if the government of Cuba agrees to release all political dissidents, reform its laws
criminalizing dissent and dismantle the institutions that enforce them.

Cuba violates basic human rights of prisoners and dissidents
Steinberg, researcher in Human Rights Watch’s Americas Division, 09 [Steinberg,
November 2009, Human Rights Watch, “New Castro, Same Cuba,”, 7/7/13, AR]

Cuba fails to meet basic international standards regarding the treatment of prisoners.
Conditions are abysmal for common and political prisoners alike, with overcrowded cells,
unhygienic and insufficient food and water, and inadequate medical treatment.
Under international human rights law, prisoners retain their human rights and fundamental
freedoms, except for restrictions on rights that are required by incarceration, and the
conditions of detention should not aggravate the suffering inherent in imprisonment. But
in Cuba, prisoners who attempt to exercise their rights are severely reprimanded. Political
prisoners who criticize the government, document abuses, report violations, or engage in
any activity deemed “counterrevolutionary” suffer consequences that are harmful to their
physical and psychological health.
Political prisoners who speak out are routinely subjected to extended periods of solitary
confinement, harassment, and beatings. They are denied access to medical treatment in
spite of chronic health problems rooted in, and exacerbated by, abysmal prison conditions.
Family visits and other forms of communication are arbitrarily refused. Human Rights Watch
documented three cases in which political prisoners were deliberately moved to close
quarters with prisoners infected with tuberculosis, despite the fact that they themselves
were not infected. Compounding these widespread and systematic abuses is the fact that
prisoners have no effective complaint mechanism through which to seek redress, creating
an environment of total impunity.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Using the leverage of the plan best solves repression of political dissent in Cuba – they will
respond to pressure
Steinberg, researcher in Human Rights Watch’s Americas Division, 09
*Steinberg, November 2009, Human Rights Watch, “New Castro, Same Cuba,”, 7/7/13, AR]

Worse still, Latin American governments across¶ the political spectrum have been reluctant to¶
criticize Cuba, and in some cases have openly¶ embraced the Castro government, despite its¶
dismal human rights record. Coun¶ tries like Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador hold Cuba up as¶ a
model, while others quietly admit its abuses ev¶ en as they enthusiastically push for Cuba’s¶ reintegration
into regional bodies such as th¶ e Organization of American States (OAS). The¶ silence of the Latin
governments condones Cuba’s abusive behavior, and perpetuates a¶ climate of impunity that
allows repression to co¶ ntinue. This is particularly troubling coming¶ from a region in which many
countries have le¶ arned firsthand the high cost of international¶ indifference to state-sponsored
repression.¶ Not only have all of these policies—US, Eu¶ ropean, Canadian, and Latin
American—failed¶ individually to improve human rights in Cu¶ ba, but their divided and even
contradictory¶ nature has allowed the Cuban government to ev¶ ade effective pressure and
deflect criticism¶ of its practices.¶ To remedy this continuing failure, the US must¶ end its failed
embargo policy. It should shift¶ the goal of its Cuba strategy away from regime change and
toward promoting human rights.¶ In particular, it should replace its sweeping ba¶ ns on travel
and trade with Cuba with more¶ effective forms of pressure.¶ This move would fundamentally
shift the balance in the Cuban government’s relationship¶ with its own people and the international co¶
mmunity. No longer would Cuba be able to¶ manipulate the embargo as a pretext for repressing its own
people. Nor would other¶ countries be able to blame the US policy for th¶ eir own failures to hold Cuba
accountable for¶ its abuses.¶ However, ending the current embargo policy by¶ itself will not bring
an end to Cuba’s¶ repression. Only a multilateral approach will have the political power and
moral authority to¶ press the Cuban government to end its repressive¶ practices. Therefore,
before changing its¶ policy, the US should work to secure commitme¶ nts from the EU, Canada,
and Latin American allies that they will join together to pressure Cuba to meet a single,
concrete demand: the¶ immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners.¶ In
order to enforce this demand, the multilateral¶ coalition should establish a clear definition¶ of
who constitutes a political prisoner—one¶ that includes all Cubans imprisoned for¶
exercising their fundamental rights, including those incarcerated for the pre-criminal
offense¶ of “dangerousness” and the 53 dissidents still in¶ prison from the 2003¶ crackdown.
It should¶ also set a firm deadline for compliance, granti¶ ng the Raúl Castro government six
months to¶ meet this demand.¶ Most important, the members of the coalition should
commit themselves to holding the¶ Cuban government accountable should it fail to¶ release
its political prisoners. The penalties¶ should be significant enough that they bear real
consequences for the Cuban government.¶ And they should be focused enough to target the
Cuban leadership, rather than the Cuban¶ population on the whole. Options include adop¶
ting targeted sanctions on the government¶ officials, such as travel bans and asset freezes;
and withholding any new forms of foreign¶ investment until Cuba meets the demand.¶ During
the six-month period, Latin American countries, Canada, the EU, and the US should¶ be able to choose
individually whether or no¶ t to impose their own restrictions on Cuba.¶ Some may enact targeted
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

sanctions on Cuba’s¶ leadership immediately, while others may put¶ no restrictions on Cuba during that
time.¶ Regardless, if the Castro government is still¶ holding political prisoners at the end of six¶
months, Cuba must be held accountable. All¶ of the countries must honor their agreement¶ and
impose joint punitive measures on Cuba that will effectively pressure the Castro¶ government to release
its political prisoners.¶ On the other hand, if the Cuban government re¶ leases all political
prisoners—whether before¶ or after the six month period is complete—these punitive
measures should be lifted. Then,¶ the multilateral coalition should devise a sust¶ ained,
incremental strategy to push the Raúl¶ Castro government to improve its human righ¶ ts
record. This strategy should focus on¶ pressuring Cuba to reform its laws criminalizing
dissent, dismantle the repressive¶ institutions that enforce them, and end abuses of basic
rights. And the impact of the¶ strategy should be monitored regularly to ensure¶ it is not creating more
repression than it¶ curbs.Ultimately, it is the Raúl Castro government¶ that bears responsibility for such
abuses—and¶ has the power to address them. Yet as the last¶ three years of Raúl Castro’s rule show,
Cuba¶ will not improve its human rights record¶ unless it is pressured to do so.
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Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Solvency – Political Dissidents
The US Must Require End to Political Dissident Suppression to Normalize Cuban Relations
Carbonell, International Public Affairs Consultant, 09
*Carbonell, April 2009, Forbes, “Bailing Out The Castro Regime?”,
accessed 7/5/13, AR]

After 50 years of almost continuous antagonism between the U.S. and the Castro-Communist
regime, there is a swelling desire in the U.S. and abroad to overcome this predicament through
constructive engagement. Since this would not be the first time that engagement has been
pursued, let us review the outcome of prior U.S. quests for a rapprochement with this regime, a regime
that was expelled from the Organization of American States in 1962 because it had established a
Marxist-Leninist tyranny declared incompatible with the inter-American system, had aligned itself with
the Soviet bloc and had suppressed all human rights.¶ Despite a litany of crimes, interventions in the
internal affairs of more than a dozen of Latin American countries, and threats to the peace and security
of the hemisphere that culminated in the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy tried to seek an
accommodation with Castro. On Sept. 23, 1963, U.S. Ambassador William H. Attwood secretly
commenced negotiations in New York with the Cuban ambassador to the U.N., Carlos Lechuga.¶ A few
days prior to Kennedy’s assassination, a follow-up meeting was arranged with Castro in Havana.
Negotiations were dropped almost simultaneously because several tons of war equipment that were
shipped from Cuba to Venezuela’s Marxist “Armed Forces of National Liberation” were uncovered by
the local authorities.¶ In March 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announced that the U.S.
was “ready to move in a new direction,” which could lead to normalizing relations with Cuba
and the lifting of the then 14-year-old trade embargo. After almost one year of intense
negotiations between Assistant Secretary of State William Rogers and Castro representatives, the U.
S. called them off when 15,000 Cuban troops landed in Angola.¶ In March 1977, President Jimmy
Carter issued a presidential directive, stating: “I have concluded that we should attempt to
achieve normalization of our relations with Cuba.” Interest Section offices were established in
Havana and Washington, and a large number of Cuban political prisoners were released. Hopes
for normalization were quashed when the Castro regime deployed troops to Ethiopia and,
subsequently, unleashed the Mariel boatlift, which brought 125,000 refugees to Florida, including
over 2,700 criminals and misfits.¶ President Reagan tried to engage the Castro regime. In
November 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig met in Mexico with Cuban Vice President Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, and in March 1982, General Vernon Walter spoke with Castro in Havana.
Negotiations stalled when Castro rejected U.S. trade and other concessions in exchange for
ending Cuban military shipments to Central American guerrillas.¶ With the Cold War over, President Bill
Clinton actively pursued constructive engagement with the Castro regime. He liberalized U.S.-
Cuban remittances and travel to the island (as currently under way), and significantly expanded
people-to-people exchanges. Castro foiled this quest for a rapprochement with a new rafter crisis
in 1994 and when two Cuban MIG jet fighters shot down two unarmed civilian planes of
“Brothers to the Rescue,” which were flying over international waters in 1996 on a humanitarian
mission.¶ The above examples of frustrated attempts to normalize relations with Communist
Cuba reflect a pattern of deception on the part of Castro and his politburo–eager to obtain U.S.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

concessions without liberalizing the regime, feigning a desire to settle differences with the U.S., yet
always scuttling negotiations and resuming their unyielding and contagious anti-Yankee
defiance.¶ Will this pattern change under the dual or solo leadership of Raul Castro–the ruthless
party hierarch largely responsible for building the totalitarian military apparatus in Cuba? He has made
conciliatory overtures to the U.S., yet he continues to harbor terrorists and support the
authoritarian and expansionist design of his chief subsidizer, Hugo Chavez, with over 40,000 Cuban
agents, including military and intelligence officers and indoctrinators, based in Venezuela.¶ Raul Castro
has promised structural changes and open debate, but there are no signs of glasnost or
perestroika in Cuba; no Chinese-type opening of the inefficient state-controlled economy; no
dismantling of the apartheid system, which effectively bars the local population from entering tourist
enclaves. A handful of political prisoners have been conditionally released, but more than 300
remain in prison under brutal conditions. Raul Castro has proposed swapping some of them for the
five Cuban spies held in the U.S.¶ Relying primarily on military comrades from the Old Guard, the
regime is gearing up to quell increasing discontent and demands for reforms. The dissidents,
now more numerous and vocal than in the past, are constantly being harassed, and several
high-level government officials, accused of deviationism and disloyalty, were recently purged
and forced to repent, Stalin-style.¶ Notwithstanding these developments, there are those in the U.S.
who contend that change in Cuba can be achieved without prodding, through soft diplomacy.
They urge Washington to stop, rather that sharpen and intensify, direct support to the dissident
movement on the island. And yet it was strong and sustained support to similar movements that
helped bring about the democratic transition in Poland and the rest of the Soviet-bloc countries. Others
recommend that the U.S. unconditionally lift the embargo on Cuba and give up its levers. That, in
essence, is what the European Union did by dropping its sanctions in the vain hope that human rights
would improve on the island.¶ Assuming that Washington will pursue a quid pro quo engagement
with the Castro regime, a guarded approach is called for. The key objective from the U.S. side
should be to pave the way for democracy in Cuba with tangible steps leading to free
elections, and not to prop up the failed and bankrupt tyranny.¶ It is a tyranny that is striving to
perpetuate itself through several means. First, by shoring up its standing with high-level
negotiations in Washington and readmission to regional forums. Second, by harnessing plenty of
dollars from herded American tourists to supplement Chavez’s shrinking petro-subsidies. Third, by
obtaining U.S.-backed credit lines along with access to international banks and monetary funds to
facilitate the renegotiation or cancellation of its huge external debt of close to $30 billion, as recently
reported by the Paris Club of creditors.¶ That is the bailout that the Castro regime is seeking–a
bailout that, without concrete and irreversible measures for a democratic transition in Cuba,
the U. S. must not support.¶
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

AT: Cuba Says No
Conditional engagement works best – creates public accountability
Cuba Study Group, organization of Cuban businesses and community leaders, 6
(Cuba Study Group, 3/15/06, Cuba Study Group, “Enhancing U.S. Policy toward Cuba: Building blocks of
a transition,”
95ba8b693d8a, accessed 7/5/13, AK)

We believe the best vehicle to meet these challenges may be a well thought-out policy of
conditional engagement. We believe the Cuban exile community is prepared to accept a policy
change that would keep the regime’s feet to the fire while encouraging meaningful change
by providing political and economic rewards only in exchange for meaningful political and
economic freedoms for the Cuban people. President Bush was met with thunderous applause when
he suggested this very idea during a speech in Miami on May 20, 2002. By clearly spelling out the
conditions required for changes in U.S. policy, with specific attention to realistic expectations
and priorities, the Cuban regime is put on the defensive and forced to explain to its own
people and to the international community, its failure to accept what are obvious,
reasonable conditions. Secondly, conditional engagement may in fact be the way to develop a
common multilateral policy with Latin American, European and other key nations. As we have
noted in our position paper entitled “Building a Common, Multilateral Cuba policy”, a common
international approach would be more effective than a unilateral policy. We suggest,
therefore, that the U.S. be prepared to adopt a policy towards Cuba that manifests a
commitment to change current policy in exchange for meaningful, positive and long-lasting
economic and political changes in Cuba. The conditions to be spelled out must be crafted
around the following fundamental premises: Ethical and moral principles should serve as the
bedrock on which we build our policies. The best interests of the United States and of Cuba
can only truly be served over the long-term through a thriving democracy and a prosperous
market-based economy in Cuba. Thus, the full extent of a complete, business-as-usual,
bilateral relationship should be reserved until such time. Every condition postulated should
promote a substantive change in Cuba that grants Cubans more freedoms, gives them more
rights, helps build a civil society, promotes family reunification and contacts or helps make
citizens less dependent on the state. We should attempt to emulate policies such as those
that existed in relation to pre-transition eastern European countries, which clearly led to
effective results. The policies must respect Cuba’s sovereignty. Accordingly, the U.S. policy
should be crafted as a response to legitimate efforts by the Cuban government and its
citizens to transform their nation toward an open society, with a market-based economy,
under the rule of law, where human rights and personal freedoms are respected. The release
of all political prisoners.
Cuba Will Say Yes – Empirically, pressure worked on prisoner reform
Carroll, Latin America correspondent, 10 *Carroll, July 2010, The Guardian, “Cuba indicates
it will free all its political prisoners,”
political-prisoners, 7/7/13, AR]

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Cuba has signaled that it will free all its political prisoners and let them stay on the island in a
bold attempt to repair Havana's ties with the international community.¶ Senior officials said
the recent release of 15 prisoners would be followed by dozens more and the dissidents
would be free to stay, should they wish, or they could emigrate.¶ The announcement was
followed by another public appearance by Fidel Castro, who yesterday attended a ceremony
honouring comrades killed at the outset of his revolution over half a century ago.¶ The 83-year-
old former president wore an olive-green shirt and state media referred to him as "commander
in chief", emphasising his continued influence despite being sidelined by a health crisis in 2006.¶
His return to the limelight has coincided with the recent prisoner releases, part of a Vatican-
brokered deal in which the communist government promised to free 52 of 75 detainees jailed
in a 2003 crackdown.¶ Last week the head of Cuba's parliament, Ricardo Alarcon, went further
and said it was the government's wish "to free all the people" on condition they had not been
accused of murder.¶ Speaking on the sidelines of a conference in Switzerland, he said the
released men would not be forced into exile. "In Cuba there are people who have been freed
from prison several years ago and who stayed in their homes. As in this case."¶ Western
diplomats in Havana said authorities were taking brave, pragmatic steps. "It shows the
government is willing to change course," said one. "Whether it is linked to a wider process,
time will tell." Spain has urged the European Union to reward Havana with diplomatic and
economic concessions.¶ The releases – and promise of more to come – altered the political
landscape, said Michael Shifter, head of the Inter-American Dialogue thinktank. "It does not
signify political liberalisation – no one is claiming that – but it is a positive step in which
everyone wins." He urged the Obama administration to respond creatively.¶ Exactly how many
political prisoners there are is now an urgent question. Amnesty International, using narrow
criteria, lists 53 prisoners of conscience. Human Rights Watch, which includes activists jailed on
ostensibly criminal charges, estimates more. The Cuban Human Rights and National
Reconciliation Commission counted 167. The Castro government does not acknowledge holding
any political prisoners, only US-funded "mercenaries" and "terrorists".¶ Freeing prisoners
should help President Raul Castro to concentrate on stalled economic reforms which are
widely expected to determine the fate of the revolution. "Raul knows that's where he needs
to direct his energies," said one diplomat.¶ Over the weekend a group of artists and intellectuals
probed the boundaries of official tolerance with an unauthorised three-day meeting in Havana
to debate Cuba's future. "It was an experiment to see if people could openly express views,"
said Antonio Rodiles, one of the organisers. "If we succeed with this I think we will be able to
say we have all won: the authorities, the participants and the public."¶

Raul will be more open to exchange engagement for reform
Perez, Yale Law School, 10
*David A. Perez, 9/2010, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the
U.S. State Department,” MVL+

The notion of offering a quid pro quo - easing restrictions for genuine irreversible reform - has
always been impos-sible because of Fidel's stubborn personality. Once he is out of the picture
permanently, there would be no other leader who could maintain such rigidity in the face of
genuine and constructive engagement from Washington. Re-form-oriented leaders will
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

[*207] feel less pressure to remain silent, while the government itself will feel more pressure
from the populace to address the growing concerns on the island. While Fidel Castro has always
exuded confidence in his leadership, in the immediate wake of his death the Cuban regime is sure
to feel a tremendous amount of insecurity, which, if handled properly and respectfully, would
strengthen Washington's political hand. n52 At that point, the best - indeed, the only - way to have
leverage in Cuba, is for America to engage the island directly.
Raul Castro willing to put state interest over ideology if US pressures
Perez, Yale Law School, 10
*David A. Perez, 9/2010, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the
U.S. State Department,” MVL+

American diplomacy has traditionally suffered from a lack of funding and use. n62 This diplomatic
neglect is perhaps no more apparent than in the case of U.S.-Cuban relations. Therefore, to influence
Cuba's behavior, particularly in the area of human rights and democracy, the U.S. State
Department should directly engage the Cuban government. Short of a costly [*211] military
invasion, there is no realistic chance of toppling the current regime, either through the embargo or the
travel ban. On the other hand, it is not certain that direct engagement would yield results on every
issue, or any issue for that matter. However, if the United States were to extend a sincere olive
branch to the Cuban government, and these efforts then failed to achieve any measurable progress, a
more cogent argument could then be advanced for the re-implementation of a hard-line approach. Fidel
and Raul Castro, when forced to choose, have consistently put the state above their
revolution: they did so during the Cold War when they aligned themselves too closely with the Soviet
Union in order to stay in power; they did so during the "Special Period" of the 1990s when they
introduced market reforms to help the economy recover; n64 and they are doing so now by
introducing even more economic reforms, while showing a modicum of political pragmatism by
releasing some political prisoners n65 and allowing some demonstration

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

AT: No Solvency – Can’t Define Dissident
Definition of a Cuban Political Dissident
Steinberg, researcher in Human Rights Watch’s Americas Division, 09 [Steinberg,
November 2009, Human Rights Watch, “New Castro, Same Cuba,”, 7/7/13, AR]

This report will use the term “dissident” to refer to any individual who expresses dissent
toward the government. This includes a broad range of nonviolent actors in Cuba, including
human rights defenders, journalists, and trade unionists, as well as members of political
groups, religious organizations, and other civil society groups not recognized by the Cuban
government, and thus considered illegal. It also consists of people unaffiliated with any
group who criticize the government or who abstain from cooperating with the state in some
way. These diverse individuals do not share a single ideology, affiliation, or objective.
It is not uncommon for dissidents in Cuba to exercise their dissent through more than one
medium. A person, for example, may belong to an unauthorized political group and
simultaneously monitor human rights abuses. We consider this individual a human rights
defender, a political activist, and a dissident. At points in this report we will refer to such
individuals solely using the umbrella term of “dissident.” The Cuban government, however,
does not differentiate between these individuals or their forms of expression, branding all
dissent as “counterrevolutionary” activity and thus worthy of punishment.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Net Benefits
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Conditional engagement best solves ethical obligation to sanction immoral behavior
Werlau, staff writer for WSJ, 9
*Maria, 4/13/09, The Wall Street Journal, “Toward a New Cuba Policy,”, accessed 7/7/13, AK]

The ascendancy of Raúl Castro to Cuba's presidency has fueled expectations of reform in the
50-year-old dictatorship. Next week, President Barack Obama will be pressed on the issue at the
Summit of the Americas in Trinidad-Tobago. It is a good time to acknowledge that neither the U.S.
embargo nor engagement by the rest of the world have helped Cubans attain their rights.
Sanctions, though ethically justified, can't work unilaterally; treating Cuba as a normal
partner is immoral and counterproductive. A new unified approach is needed. Just as the
oppressed people of South Africa, Chile, and other tyrannies received international support, finding an
effective approach to the Cuba problem is a shared duty. It is also in everyone's interest. A
democratic, stable and prosperous Cuba would cease threatening the security of the region, slow the
flow of Cuban refugees and provide better trade and business opportunities.¶ If the U.S. president
understands totalitarianism better than his hemispheric counterparts, he will remind them that at the
Ibero-American Summit in 1996 Fidel Castro signed the Viña del Mar Declaration pledging to support
democratic pluralism. He has consistently ignored all such international agreements. Now Trinidad
summiteers should jointly call Cuba's bluff.¶ What is needed is a policy of comprehensive
conditional engagement. Measures chosen from the menu of possible policy measures should
not depend on cooperation from Cuba, should be flexible if Cuba responds, and should factor
in sanctions of increasing firmness. Developing a multilateral effort would extend the
responsibility for the democratization of Cuba to the international community, where it
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Human Rights Credibility
Even if Castro says No, still bolsters US credibility
O’Sullivan, Foreign Policy Writer, and Haas, foreign policy writer, 2000.
*Meghan L. and Richard N., 6/2000, Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries,”, accessed 7/6/13,

Rather than continuing with its 40-year-old approach, the United States should simultaneously pursue
two forms of engagement with Cuba. First, the U.S. government should test Fidel Castro's
willingness to engage in a conditional relationship and to chart a course toward more
satisfactory relations. The United States should enter into a dialogue with Castro in which
reasonable benefits are offered in return for reasonable changes in Cuban behavior. Rather
than insisting on regime change or immediate democratic elections in Cuba, U.S. policymakers should
make lesser goals the initial focus of their policy; the more ambitious the demands, the less
likely Castro is to enter into a process of engagement. For instance, a willingness to settle claims
for expropriated assets, release political prisoners, and/or legitimize political parties might be
proposed in exchange for lifting various elements of the embargo. If Castro accepted this
dialogue, U.S. policy would advance real political liberalization on the island; if Castro
rejected these attempts at conditional engagement, Washington would still ease tensions
with its European allies by demonstrating increased flexibility.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

US Leadership
Conditional engagement sends regional signal of US leadership
Pascal Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution and Huddleston,
Visiting Fellow 9
(Carlos and Vicki, “Foreign Policy Report of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in
Transition”, Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition, April, 7-6-13 SH)

Engagement does not mean approval of the Cuban government’s policies, nor should it
indicate ¶ a wish to control internal developments in Cuba; ¶ legitimate changes in Cuba will
only come from ¶ the actions of Cubans. If the United States is to ¶ play a positive role in Cuba’s
future, it must not ¶ indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue ¶ on issues that would advance
democracy, justice, ¶ and human rights as well as our broader national ¶ interests. Perversely, the policy
of seeking to isolate Cuba, rather than achieving its objective, has ¶ contributed to undermining the
well-being of ¶ the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence ¶ in Cuba and Latin America. It has
reinforced the ¶ Cuban government’s power over its citizens by increasing their dependence on it for
every aspect of ¶ their livelihood. By slowing the flow of ideas and ¶ information, we have unwittingly
helped Cuban ¶ state security delay Cuba’s political and economic ¶ evolution toward a more open and
representative government. And, by too tightly embracing ¶ Cuba’s brave dissidents, we have provided
the Cuban authorities with an excuse to denounce their ¶ legitimate efforts to build a more open
Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the ¶ Obama administration because it offers a
unique ¶ opportunity for the president to transform our relations with the hemisphere. Even
a slight shift away ¶ from hostility to engagement will permit the United ¶ States to work
more closely with the region to effectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba.
By announcing a policy of critical and constructive ¶ engagement at the April Summit of the
Americas in ¶ Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that ¶ he has been listening to the
region. He can underline this commitment by removing all restrictions . On travel and
remittances on Cuban Americans, ¶ and engaging in dialogue with the regime, as promised
during his campaign. By reciprocally improving our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will
enhance our understanding of the island, its people, ¶ and its leaders. However, while these
measures will ¶ promote understanding, improve the lives of people ¶ on the island, and
build support for a new relationship between our countries, they are insufficient to ¶ ensure
the changes needed to result in normal diplomatic relations over time.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Bipartisan support that Human Rights agreements should be a precondition to
engaging with Cuba.
Williams, FOX News Political Analyst, 13
*Juan, 2/5/13, FOX News, “The US would be crazy to re-establish ties with Cuba,”,
accessed 7/2/13, AK]

With so many signs pointing in one direction – resumption of U.S. ties to Cuba – it is time to call for a
STOP sign. For example, CELAC’s decision is tragically wrong given Cuba’s awful history on human
rights and democracy. Cuba continues to jail political opponents and suppress free speech. That is a
fact. Independent observers can see it. José Miguel Vivanco of Human Rights Watch said Castro’s
selection as CELAC president “sends a message *that Latin governments+ couldn’t care less about the
poor human rights record and the lack of fundamental freedoms in Cuba.” And it will be a mistake for
President Obama to end any part of the U.S. embargo without insisting on a full slate of democratic
freedoms, human rights and property rights in Cuba. Writing in the Wall Street Journal last year, I
expressed my disagreement with those who have suggested cozying up to Latin American dictators like
the Castro brothers and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. It is personal with me. My family fled Panama in the
early 1950’s to escape the poverty and open the door to education and opportunity. Those doors were
shut by a Latin strong man -- Panama’s Arnulfo Arias. I wrote: “My life's major turn away from poverty
came thanks to my father's vision of his children escaping a despot like Arias. That dream of a better life
is alive throughout Latin America. To romanticize any dictator is to kill those dreams by condemning
poor kids in Latin America, like me, to tyrants and the burden of limited education and economic
opportunity." Congressional Republicans remain largely united in their opposition to normalizing
relations with Castro’s Cuba. They are led by Florida Senator Marco Rubio and Florida Congresswoman
Ileana Ros-Lethnien, both Cuban Americans. New Jersey Democratic Senator Bob Menendez, a Cuban
American, supports continuing tight restrictions to isolate the Castro regime and promote democracy
and human rights for the Cuban people. He is scheduled to become chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations panel. It will be up to Rubio, Ros-Lethnien and Menendez to stop President Obama from
making a big mistake and turning away from a freedom agenda for America’s neighbors in Latin
America. STOP!
Congress will not support unconditional lift
Claver-Carone, Executive Director of Cuba Democracy Advocates, 13
[Mauricio, 4-2-13, The American, Cuba Sees an Opening,
terrorism, 7-7-13, GZ]

Cuba’s Castro brothers have spent billions of dollars over the last decade seducing U.S. farm
bureaus and agri-business to lobby Congress to support lifting sanctions on Cuba. Recently
recognizing that Congress is unlikely to support unconditional changes, and perceiving a possible
opening with the new Secretary of State John Kerry, Castro lobbyists have shifted their focus to the
Obama administration and a related goal: the removal of Cuba from the State Department’s list of state
sponsors of terrorism.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

There is bipartisan support against concessions to Castro dictatorship.
De la Cruz, Vice President of the Governor's Board of Commerce in Puerto Rico, 11
[Alberto, 11-15-11, Babalu, Bipartisan effort in U.S. Senate stops another unilateral concession to the
Castro dictatorship,
unilateral-concession-to-the-castro-dictatorship/, 7-7-13, GZ]

Democrat Senator Bob Menendez and Republican Senator Marco Rubio led a bipartisan effort
late yesterday to stop a "minibus" Senate spending bill, which contained another unilateral
concession to the Castro dictatorship. In a three-bill spending package that funds the State
Department and foreign operations, a provision was inserted that would allow U.S. banks to do
direct business with the Castro regime. This provision would have given the illegal and criminal
Cuban dictatorship permission to open bank accounts in U.S. financial institutions.¶ The Senate
was stalled on Monday evening as senators started debate on the energy and water appropriations bill,
which Senate Democratic leaders want to combine with the State and foreign ops and financial services
appropriations bills into a miniature omnibus measure that's affectionately known on the Hill as a
"minibus." By packaging three bills together, the Senate hopes to be able to get more work done faster.
However, two senators won't let that happen until their concerns about language allowing U.S. banks to
do business in Cuba are addressed.¶ "There is concern among a group of senators on both sides of
the aisle with longstanding concerns for human rights and democracy in Cuba with regard to the
loosening of restrictions on Cuba in the financial services bill," a senior GOP Senate aide told The
Cable Monday afternoon. "If that language was taken out, those senators would drop their objection to
bringing up foreign ops for consideration."¶ Procedurally, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) has
already brought up the energy and water appropriations bill and wants to add the other two bills
(state/foreign ops and financial services) as an amendment. But Reid needs unanimous consent in order
to do that without a lengthy cloture process, and we're told by Senate sources that Sens. Robert
Menendez (D-NJ) and Marco Rubio (R-FL) are objecting.¶ "Senator Rubio is objecting to a provision in the
bill that would allow Cuba to become the only country on the State Department's State Sponsors of
Terrorism list with a general exception for access to U.S.-based financial institutions," Rubio's
spokesman Alex Conant told The Cable. "Under Cuban law, the Castro regime has a monopoly on all
banking, commerce and trade, so this amendment would allow Cuba's totalitarian regime to
directly open corresponding accounts in U.S.-based financial institutions, and vice versa."¶ The
senators don't have any problem with the State and foreign ops section of the minibus, but Reid's
attempt at adding both bills as one amendment has embroiled them in the dispute.
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1NC - Human Trafficking Conditions
Text: The United States federal government should
(do the mandates of the Aff plan) if and only if the government of Mexico agrees to a National
Action Plan for Trafficking in Persons.

Many Mexican officials have been complicit in Human Trafficking
Department, 6-14-2010, “Trafficking in Persons Report 2010” Accessed: 7-2-2013 BK)

NGOs, members of the government, and other observers continued to report that corruption
among public officials, especially local law enforcement and judicial and immigration officials,
was a significant concern. Some officials reportedly accepted or extorted bribes or sexual
services, falsified identity documents, discouraged trafficking victims from reporting their
crimes, or tolerated child prostitution and other human trafficking activity in commercial sex
sites. Two immigration officials arrested in 2007 for their alleged leadership of an organized
criminal group involved in human trafficking were convicted during the reporting period and
remain incarcerated pending sentencing. A highlevel immigration official was investigated for
suspected involvement in human trafficking.

We have a moral obligation to fight human trafficking – it is the most fundamental assault on
Pryce, U.S. Representative 06 – *Deborah, U.S. Representative, May 8, “COMBATING MODERN-DAY SLAVERY”]Date Accessed: 7-4-2013 BK

We have a moral obligation to fight this evil. Trafficking in human beings is an assault on our
most cherished beliefs, that every human being has freedom and dignity and worth. A nation
that stands for the freedom and dignity of every human being cannot tolerate the exploitation
of the innocent on its own soil. This needs to be a national priority, because it is a global outrage.
In 2005, I led a congressional delegation to Italy, Greece, Albania and Moldova to meet with trafficking
victims and government officials and discuss ways to end this crime and protect its victims. During this
trip, and later during hearings I held as chairman of a House financial services subcommittee, I heard
testimony on the economic and financial implications of human trafficking, as well as the heartrending
stories of trafficking victims. Their stories of rape, torture and routine brutality are simply beyond
description. Congress passed, and the President signed, the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act. This legislation strengthens the original Trafficking Victims Protection Act to keep
the U.S. at the forefront of the global war on this modern-day slavery. Included in the $360-million
package is an expansion of the Operation Innocence Lost program, a nationwide initiative that
aggressively pursues sex traffickers and child prostitution rings. Over the last two years, the program has
rescued more than 200 child victims and helped uncover the Toledo sex trafficking ring. Congress has
also recently taken steps to target demand for sex trafficking. Provisions of the Trafficking Victims
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Protection Act that I authored along with Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D.-N.Y.) will provide state and local law
enforcement with new tools to target demand and investigate and prosecute sex trafficking, fund a
national conference on best practices for reducing demand for sex trafficking and fund a review of the
incidence of sex trafficking in the U.S., to provide us with a more accurate picture of the scope of this
problem. Our law enforcement strategy must be wedded to a vigorous partnership between
government agencies and private and religious organizations on the front lines of this struggle. For years
these groups have helped rescue and support trafficking victims and raise awareness about the fight
against human trafficking. Human trafficking is a heinous crime, a betrayal of one of the most
basic obligations of morality -- the obligation to defend the innocent. The presence of this
scourge in our midst cannot and will not be tolerated. But those who would so debase
themselves and the human family by buying and selling women and children are beyond
mere reproach. They will not respond to outrage, but to action.
Plan should be used as leverage to ensure Mexico implements a National Action Plan for
Trafficking in Persons
Department, 6-14-2010, “Trafficking in Persons Report 2010” Accessed: 7-4-2013, BK)

Recommendations for Mexico: Approve and implement a National Action Plan for Trafficking
in Persons, including increased funding and guidance to federal agencies and state
governments for such implementation; increase federal and state efforts to investigate and
prosecute trafficking offenses, and convict and punish trafficking offenders, including
complicit public officials; uphold the principle, contained in Article 3 of the 2000 UN TIP
Protocol, that a victim’s consent is not relevant when elements of force or coercion are
verified; dedicate more resources for victim assistance and ensure that victims receive
adequate protection; increase collaboration with NGOs to provide victim care; continue to
implement formal procedures to identify trafficking victims among vulnerable populations;
and increase anti-trafficking training for judges and law enforcement, including immigration
and labor officials.
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AT: Mexico Says N0
Empirical evidence proves condition works—Merida Initiative
Mendoza, AP writer, 10
*Martha, 09/03/10 “U.S. Withholding Aid To Mexico Over Human-Rights Abuses”
rights_n_705501.html 7/5/13 EYS]

The Obama administration is withholding $26 million in aid to Mexico, recommending that
the government give more power to its human rights commission and crack down on abusive
In a report released Friday, the State Department said the Mexican government, which is mired
in a violent battle with powerful drug cartels, has met human rights requirements to receive
$36 million in previously withheld funds that are part of a $1.4 billion Merida Initiative.
But the U.S. was going to withhold 15 percent of newly authorized funds until the Mexican
government meets several requirements: enhancing authority of the National Human Rights
Commission, limiting authority of military courts in cases involving abuse of civilians, and
improving communication with human rights organizations in Mexico.
"We believe there has been progress, very significant progress, on human rights in Mexico, but
as a policy decision – not a legal decision – we are going to wait on a portion of new funding because
we think additional progress can be made," said Roberta Jacobson, a deputy assistant secretary for
Mexico and Canada at the State Department.
The Mexican government said it is working to improve human rights and urged Washington
to speed up implementation of the Merida Initiative.
"The State Department report establishes that the government of Mexico is carrying out actions to
strengthen the observance of human rights," the Foreign Relations Department said in a statement.
"Cooperation with the United States against transnational organized crime through the framework of
the Merida Initiative is based on shared responsibility, mutual trust and respect for the jurisdiction of
each country, not on unilateral plans for evaluating and conditions unacceptable to the government of
Maureen Meyer, a Mexico expert at the Washington Office on Latin America, which promotes human
rights and democracy in the region, said withholding funds sends the message "that you cannot
fight crime with crime and you cannot fight drugs while tolerating abuses by your security
The Merida Initiative was a 2008 commitment from the U.S. to help Mexico combat drug
cartels. Under the rules, the State Department must certify that Mexico is banning torture,
prosecuting law enforcement agents and soldiers who abuse civil rights before allocating all
of the funds.
A State Department report sent to the Senate this week commends the Mexican government
for cracking down on torture, improving transparency and listening to human rights groups'
allegations that about military abuses.
But the report, which has not been publicly released, said the government needs to be more public
and aggressive when investigating and prosecuting allegations of abuse by security forces.
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Mexico has faced repeated criticism for alleged military abuses. This year, human rights officials accused
soldiers of shooting two children and altering the crime scene to try to blame the deaths on drug cartel
The army denies the allegations, and says the boys, ages 5 and 9, were killed in April when their family's
vehicle was caught in the crossfire of a shootout between soldiers and gunmen in the northern state of
The scandal has renewed demands from human rights activists that civilian authorities, not the army,
investigate human rights cases involving Mexico's military.
Because Merida spending lags more than a year behind allocations, Friday's decision will have minimal
financial impact.
But Andrew Selee, director of the Washington D.C.-based Mexico Institute, said it does underscore
concerns, both in Mexico and the U.S., about the lack of progress in fairly prosecuting public officials
accused of committing human rights abuses.
"This has raised particular concern in the U.S. Congress, where there remains considerable support for
Mexico's efforts against organized crime, but also some worries about the lack of progress in ensuring
transparent investigations of alleged human rights abuses," said Selee.
Merida initiative proves that conditional engagement with Mexico has been successful.
Huffington Post, 9
*8/5/09, Huffington Post, “Mexico Anti-Drug Aid Delayed Due To Human Rights Criticism,”, accessed
7/5/13, MC]

WASHINGTON — Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., blocked the release of a favorable State Department report
on Mexico's human rights record, The Washington Post reported Wednesday.
Leahy's action delays the release of $100 million in U.S. aid meant to help Mexico combat drug
traffickers. The Merida Initiative, a $1.4 billion, three-year package, requires Congress to
withhold some of the funding unless the State Department reports that Mexico is not violating
human rights while prosecuting the drug war, the Post reported.
"Those requirements have not been met, so it is premature to send the report to Congress," Leahy said
in a statement released to the newspaper. "We had good faith discussions with Mexican and U.S.
officials in reaching these requirements in the law, and I hope we can continue in that spirit."
The Post reported that the State Department had intended to send its report praising Mexico's progress
on human rights to Congress this week. But aides to Leahy, chairman of the Senate Appropriations
foreign operations subcommittee, cited reports of torture and forced disappearances in rejecting
the report.
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Net Benefits
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There is bipartisan support against human rights violations in Mexico
Meyer, Director of WOLA Mexico, 2013
[Maureen, 4-25-2013, WOLA, As President Obama Heads to Mexico, Members of Congress Express Concern over Human
_rights, GZ]

On April 23, 24 members of Congress sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry expressing their concern
about the persistence of grave human rights violations in Mexico and urging the administration to make the
defense of human rights a central part of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral agenda. The bipartisan letter sponsored by
Congressmen James Moran (D - VA) and Ted Poe (R - TX) comes just a week before President Obama will travel to Mexico to
meet with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. The letter cites the five-fold increase in complaints of human
rights violations by Mexican soldiers and federal police since the Mexican government began its “war on organized
crime” in 2006 and advises Secretary Kerry that “*n+ow is an opportune moment to work with the Mexican government to
improve the situation in that country.Ӧ The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) supports this letter and
believes that it is critical for the United States to express its concern about the human rights situation in the
country as well as its support for the Mexican government’s efforts to protect human rights. “The dire human
rights situation in Mexico is not going to solve itself,” said Maureen Meyer, WOLA Senior Associate for Mexico and Central
America. “As the bilateral agenda evolves, it is critical that the U.S. and Mexican governments continue to focus
on how best to support and defend human rights in Mexico.” The letter expresses concern not only about the
proliferation of human rights violations committed by government security forces, but also about the fact that only a
handful of those responsible for such violations are ever investigated or sanctioned. “Unfortunately, a majority of
these abuses go uninvestigated, and as a consequence, unpunished,” the members of Congress write, noting that
government data shows that only two federal agents were convicted for torture between January 1994 and June 2010,
and only 38 soldiers have been sentenced by military courts for human right abuses since 2006. “To date, the
Mexican government has not responded affectively to abuses committed by members of the armed forces and
federal police against the civilian population,” said Meyer. “Holding violators of human rights accountable by investigating
specific cases is key to curbing abuses.” The United States has provided Mexico with over US$1.9 billion in security
assistance since FY2008. However, as the congressional letter notes, the State Department is currently withholding $18
million of this assistance until the United States identifies areas of future collaboration with the Peña Nieto government on
key human rights issues. The members of Congress emphasize that “*t+he human rights crisis will not improve
until there are stronger legal protections, increased human rights training for Mexico’s security forces, and
more government agents held responsible for the human rights violations they commit.”
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1NC – Election Reforms Conditions

Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic
investment in oil infrastructure in Venezuela if and only if the government of Venezuela
agrees to election reforms.
Engagement with without conditions fails
Christy, a senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative, 13
(Patrick, 3/15/13, “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela”,
democratic-venezuela, Accessed 7/5/13,I.K)

Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and
improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever
influence America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly
united political opposition. The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled
policy towards a post-Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should: pressure Caracas to
implement key election reforms. Venezuela's opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim
President Maduro will use the government's near-monopoly control of public airwaves, its established
networks of political patronage and last-minute public spending programs to bolster his populist
agenda. Washington should stress publicly and privately that any attempts to suppress or intimidate the
opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution and the principles defined in the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, José Cárdenas, a former
USAID acting assistant administrator for Latin America, writes, The Venezuelan opposition continues to
insist that the constitution (which is of Chavez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up a list of
simple electoral reforms that would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan people to
chart their own future free of chavista and foreign interference. Demand free, fair and verifiable
elections. Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez will be held next
month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make a democracy. Indeed, Chavez long
embraced the rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined
Venezuela's previously democratic political system and altered the outcomes of election through
corruption, fraud and intimidation. The Obama administration should make clear that free and fair
elections, properly monitored by respected international election observers, are essential to
Venezuela's future standing in the hemisphere and the world. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry
should work with regional partners—including (but not limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and
Mexico—to firmly encourage Maduro's interim government. A unified regional voice would send a
powerful signal to Chavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime enablers in China, Iran and Russia.
Condition future diplomatic and economic relations. Corruption and criminality were widespread
under the Chavez regime, as high-level government and military officials benefited from close ties to
corrupt businesses and international drug traffickers. Yet to date, the Obama administration has done
little to hold Venezuela's leaders accountable. Washington should make clear that full diplomatic
relations with the United States will be contingent upon Venezuela ending ties to
international terrorist groups and rogue regimes like Iran. If Venezuela takes meaningful
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steps to end these ties and ensure future elections, the United States should work with
Caracas and the private sector to reform Venezuela's energy industry and identify key
development projects and reforms to improve the country's economic future. The United
States can play an important role in shaping Venezuela's post-Chavez future. But to do so, the Obama
administration will need to stand with the people of Venezuela by publicly defending
democratic principles and the impartial rule of law in Latin America.
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The US should create prerequisites before engaging with Venezuela
Roberts, Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth, 13
(James, 4/15/13, “Venezuela: U.S. Should Push President Maduro Toward Economic Freedom”,
toward-economic-freedom, Accessed 7/5/13, I.K)

Washington should insist on strict conditionality before sending a new U.S. ambassador to
Caracas or assenting to any new lending to Venezuela by international financial institutions
until the new government:
 Produces a comprehensive plan for reform that reduces the size of the public sector, reverses
nationalizations and expropriations of land and enterprises with just compensation to owners, restores
the independence of the central bank and judicial institutions, reforms the electoral system, and
submits to an internationally supervised audit of the government’s books during the Chavez years;
 Takes steps to privatize PDVSA to bring in international equity partners with the expertise and financial
capacity to restore PDVSA to the high level of professional operational and managerial expertise for
which it was widely respected prior to 1999;
 Immediately stops all subsidies to Cuba and terminates wasteful and economically
destabilizing subsidy programs such as PetroCaribe and ALBA;
 Ceases cooperation with international state sponsors of terrorism (such as Iran) and joins the
international community’s cooperative efforts in the fight against transnational crime,
narco-trafficking, and terrorism; and
 Restores freedom of the press and access to information for all Venezuelans.
The foundations of economic freedom in Venezuela were severely weakened during the 14-year misrule
by Chavez. Although Chavez’s death may aggravate instability and further polarize Venezuela, it need
not be that way. Venezuela is in need of immediate and sweeping reforms, but these changes will take
time, effort, determination, and, above all, dedicated reformers in Venezuela. The Obama
Administration should step into the breach with active and forward-looking policies to bring Venezuela
back into the globalized economic system.
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AT: Perm - Condition Something Else
The US must use energy sector leverage in order to pressure Maduro
Walser, Ph.D. Senior Policy Analyst, 13
(Ray,3/18/13,“Beware of Venezuela’s Paranoid Anti-Americanism”
,, Accessed
Attacks on the U.S. are integral to the strategy of Maduro and the inner Chavista circle. Their current
course aims to inflame the nationalistic militancy of Chavez’s followers. It is a calculated effort to
distract Venezuelan voters from grave violations of the constitutional order and stark domestic
challenges—inflation, fiscal deficits, devaluations, crime, and increasing food shortages—that have
worsened since Maduro took de facto control of the government in early December 2012. Governability
and stability in Venezuela before and after the elections could become a major challenge. The Miami
Herald’s veteran Venezuela watcher Andres Oppenheimer suggests that the April 14 elections will be
neither fair nor genuinely free. Maduro’s wild accusations also lower expectations for swift
improvement in relations with the U.S. The limited leverage that the U.S. still poses over
Venezuela resides in its commercial, financial, and energy links and in the frayed democratic
consensus in the inter-American community. Like it or not, the Obama Administration finds
itself drawn into Venezuela’s growing crisis of governability caused by the increasingly
irresponsible behavior of Chavez knock-offs like Maduro.
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AT: Venezuela Says No
Despite recent tensions, Maduro wishes to increase relations with the United States
Jamison, International Politics at Georgetown University, 2013
[Anne, 4/27/13, Policymic, “Maduro Venezuela: He wont usher in a new era of U.S.-Venezuela
relations, and that’s OK,”
won-t-usher-in-a-new-era-of-u-s--venezuela-relations-and-that-s-ok, 7/5/13, TZ]

The April 19 inauguration of Nicolás Maduro, vice president of Venezuela under the recently deceased
Hugo Chávez, has the world debating whether or not the self-proclaimed "son of Chávez" could lead to
improved relations with the United States.¶ However, the question isn't as relevant as we are making it
out to be. The U.S. and Venezuela have for years managed to cooperate economically, despite
all the heated political rhetoric you read about in the media, and they'll likely continue to do so.¶
Before we tackle the future of diplomatic relations, allow me to offer a brief history of the tumultuous
relationship shared by Venezuela and the U.S. in the past 14 years. Let's begin with the nasty break-up
that occurred when Hugo Chávez assumed office in 1999. Prior to Chávez, the U.S. and Venezuela
enjoyed a rather blissful diplomatic and economic relationship, complemented by the shared ambition
to curb illegal drug production and distribution. This strong relationship between the two countries
existed under the government of conservative neoliberal Rafael Caldera (President of Venezuela 1969-
1974; 1994-1999).¶ In 1999 things began to go downhill, and were hardly helped by the controversy over
the Bush administration’s support for the failed coup attempt against Chávez. In 2005 the two countries
stopped working together to fight illegal drugs. Then, in 2006, there was Chávez's infamous speech to
the United Nations in which he referred to George W. Bush as the devil. In 2008 Venezuela broke off
diplomatic ties with the U.S. altogether out of solidarity with its ally Bolivia, but President Obama
managed to patch things up to an extent in June 2009. Ties between the two countries have
been strained (to the extent that neither country had an ambassador in the other’s capital since June
2010), until now, when the opportunity for an improved relationship has accompanied a new
leader to the table. It is worth nothing that throughout diplomatic problems OPEC member Venezuela
never stopped supplying oil, its biggest export, to the U.S., its biggest customer.¶ Optimists cringed as
Maduro employed a strong anti-American sentiment in his campaign to be Chávez. To be fair, it would
have been hard to try and embody the spirit of Chávez without aggressively opposing the United States.
Maduro even went so far as to suggest that the CIA was responsible for the cancer that killed Chávez on
March 5.¶ Albeit unsurprisingly, none of Maduro's rhetoric looked particularly promising. However, just
before securing the election, Maduro contacted the former governor of New Mexico, Bill
Richardson, who was in Caracas on behalf of the Organization of American States. Maduro
said, according to an interview with Richardson, that "we want to improve the relationship
with the U.S., regularize the relationship." Apparently the U.S. did not respond favorably to this,
and subsequently supported a recount of the close election that declared Maduro the winner. Maduro
hardly found this amusing in the aftermath of the 2000 Bush vs. Gore election, and referred to the
actions of the U.S. as "brutal" and "vulgar."¶ However, during a live television address on Tuesday,
Maduro seemed to offer a conciliatory message. "We want to have the best ties with all the
world's governments, and the U.S. government, but on the basis of respect. There can be no
threats." He also named Calixto Ortega the new charge d'affaires in Washington, doing so in
hope of opening up a dialogue with the U.S. in the absence of an ambassador.¶ Maduro
proceeded to proclaim that Venezuela "[hopes] one day to have respectful relations with the
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United States, a dialogue between equals, state-to-state."¶ These are, without question,
steps in the right direction. They are not, however, reason to assume that diplomatic ties between
the U.S. and Venezuela will get their happy ever after. Ultimately, if the 14 years of Chávez proved
anything about relations between the two nations, they proved that their economic co-dependent
relationship is not dependent on having a stable diplomatic relationship or any diplomatic relationship
at all. Keeping that in mind, while both sides would prefer amicable diplomatic relations, they are not a
matter of life or death. Their trade relationship is intact, and that is their priority.
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General - 2NC/1NR
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2NC Conditions CP Good
Conditions Counterplans are good—

Key to neg ground—holding the aff to immediacy and solely governmental action is critical to politics
and perception DAs—that the majority of negative ground this year—they cause one-side debate
which kills clash and research because there’s no incentive to do neg work—internal link turns in-
round education and destroys the only portable skill from debate

Key to strategic thinking—increases avenues for discussion which enhances quality debate and

Counterplan guarantees ground—inherency means there’s opposition to the condition in the status
quo by affected parties

Net benefits check abuse—aff can straight turn the net benefit

Counter-interpretation: Conditions CPs are legitimate if their net benefits justify the status quo—
means debates are topic specific and predictable—solves all of their offense

Default to theoretical reasonability—we just have to win we don’t destroy debate, not that we make
it perfect

Reject the argument, not the team—no precedent is set by voting on Conditions theory

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2NC AT Textual Competition
Evaluating whether two policies can practically co-exist is best:

We meet—The Counterplan still competes textually because the plan text uses words like will or
should that imply unconditional and guaranteed enforcement.

Counterplan Ground—textual competition destroys our ability to counterplan in uniqueness by
making “ban the plan” non-competitive, which is critical to ground. The aff can always rearrange
words or letter to make all counterplans not competitive.

Hurts Education and Clash—debating about various interpretations of texts better simulates critical
thought and allows more clash because you can read disads and turns off of the effects of the policy
instead of only evaluating the words in a vacuum.

Its bad for the Aff too—it allows counterplans to exclude a word from the plan or replace acronyms or
hyphens and win on dumb net benefits like E-prime and Marcouse.

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2NC AT Perm—Do CP

It is severance—

Textually—CP excludes/switches [ ] from the plan text—proves it’s


“Resolved” means “to make a firm decision about”, American Heritage Dictionary, 03 – indicates
certainty—the CP severs out of that by allowing Cuba to not meet the condition—means the
permutation structurally excludes topical action.

“Should” means “used to express obligation”,, 03—the CP is neither immediate or an
obligation—should requires immediate legal effect.
Summers ‘94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"
in the May 18 order connotes
futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.
The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;
must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language
usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro
ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law
issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.
¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to
give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.
The order's
language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's
signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.
When applied
to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of
Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358]
signed by the judge.
True minutes
of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject
out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again
revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the
statutory policy of this State. IV CONCLUSION Nisi prius judgments and orders should be construed in a manner which gives effect and meaning
to the complete substance of the memorial. When a judge-signed direction is capable of two interpretations, one of which would make it a valid
part of the record proper and the other would render it a meaningless exercise in futility, the adoption of the former interpretation is this
court's due. A rule - that on direct appeal views as fatal to the order's efficacy the mere omission from the journal entry of a long and
customarily implied phrase, i.e., "and the same hereby is" - is soon likely to drift into the body of principles which govern the facial validity of
judgments. This development would make judicial acts acutely vulnerable to collateral attack for the most trivial of reasons and tend to
undermine the stability of titles or other adjudicated rights. It is obvious the trial judge intended his May 18 memorial to be an in praesenti
order overruling Dollarsaver's motion for judgment n.o.v. It is hence that memorial, and not the later June 2 entry, which triggered appeal time
in this case. Because the petition. in error was not filed within 30 days of May 18, the appeal is untimely. I would hence sustain the appellee's
motion to dismiss.
The pertinent terms of the memorial of May 18, 1993 are: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BRYAN COUNTY, STATE
OF OKLAHOMA COURT MINUTE 5/18/93 No. C-91-223 After having heard and considered arguments of counsel in support of and in opposition
to the motions of the Defendant for judgment N.O.V. and a new trial, the Court finds that the motions should be overruled. Approved as to
form: /s/ Ken Rainbolt /s/ Austin R. Deaton, Jr. /s/ Don Michael Haggerty /s/ Rocky L. Powers Judge
The turgid phrase - "should be and the
same hereby is" - is a tautological absurdity. This is so because "should" is synonymous with ought or must and is in itself sufficient to effect an
inpraesenti ruling - one that is couched in "a present indicative synonymous with ought." See infra note 15.
Carter v. Carter, Okl., 783 P.2d
969, 970 (1989); Horizons, Inc. v. Keo Leasing Co., Okl., 681 P.2d 757, 759 (1984); Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, Okl., 655 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1983); Knell
v. Burnes, Okl., 645 P.2d 471, 473 (1982); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburgh County, Okl., 630 P.2d 772, 775 (1981); Harry v. Hertzler, 185 Okl.
151, 90 P.2d 656, 659 (1939); Ginn v. Knight, 106 Okl. 4, 232 P. 936, 937 (1925).
"Recordable" means that by force of 12 O.S. 1991 § 24 an
instrument meeting that section's criteria must be entered on or "recorded" in the court's journal. The clerk may "enter" only that which is "on
file." The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 24 are: "Upon the journal record required to be kept by the clerk of the district court in civil cases . .
. shall be entered copies of the following instruments on file: 1. All items of process by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of
each defendant in the case; and 2. All instruments filed in the case that bear the signature of the and judge and specify clearly the relief granted
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

or order made." [Emphasis added.]
See 12 O.S. 1991 § 1116 which states in pertinent part: "Every direction of a court or judge made or
entered in writing, and not included in a judgment is an order." [Emphasis added.]
The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1993 § 696.3 , effective
October 1, 1993, are: "A. Judgments, decrees and appealable orders that are filed with the clerk of the court shall contain: 1. A caption setting
forth the name of the court, the names and designation of the parties, the file number of the case and the title of the instrument; 2. A
statement of the disposition of the action, proceeding, or motion, including a statement of the relief awarded to a party or parties and the
liabilities and obligations imposed on the other party or parties; 3. The signature and title of the court; . . ."
The court holds that the May 18
memorial's recital that "the Court finds that the motions should be overruled" is a "finding" and not a ruling. In its pure form, a finding is
generally not effective as an order or judgment. See, e.g., Tillman v. Tillman, 199 Okl. 130, 184 P.2d 784 (1947), cited in the court's opinion.

When ruling upon a motion for judgment n.o.v. the court must take into account all the evidence favorable to the party against whom the
motion is directed and disregard all conflicting evidence favorable to the movant. If the court should conclude the motion is sustainable, it must
hold, as a matter of law, that there is an entire absence of proof tending to show a right to recover. See Austin v. Wilkerson, Inc., Okl., 519 P.2d
899, 903 (1974).
See Bullard v. Grisham Const. Co., Okl., 660 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1983), where this court reviewed a trial judge's "findings of
fact", perceived as a basis for his ruling on a motion for judgment n.o.v. (in the face of a defendant's reliance on plaintiff's contributory
negligence). These judicial findings were held impermissible as an invasion of the providence of the jury and proscribed by OKLA. CONST. ART,
23, § 6 . Id. at 1048.
Everyday courthouse parlance does not always distinguish between a judge's "finding", which denotes nisi prius
resolution of fact issues, and "ruling" or "conclusion of law". The latter resolves disputed issues of law. In practice usage members of the bench
and bar often confuse what the judge "finds" with what that official "concludes", i.e., resolves as a legal matter.
See Fowler v. Thomsen, 68
Neb. 578, 94 N.W. 810, 811-12 (1903), where the court determined a ruling that "[1] find from the bill of particulars that there is due the
plaintiff the sum of . . ." was a judgment and not a finding. In reaching its conclusion the court reasoned that "[e]ffect must be given to the
entire in the docket according to the manifest intention of the justice in making them." Id., 94 N.W. at 811.
When the language of a judgment
is susceptible of two interpretations, that which makes it correct and valid is preferred to one that would render it erroneous. Hale v.
Independent Powder Co., 46 Okl. 135, 148 P. 715, 716 (1915); Sharp v. McColm, 79 Kan. 772, 101 P. 659, 662 (1909); Clay v. Hildebrand, 34 Kan.
694, 9 P. 466, 470 (1886); see also 1 A.C. FREEMAN LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 76 (5th ed. 1925).
"Should" not only is used as a "present
indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J.
Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown,
45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate
a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating
that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an
obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813(1990) (one of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to
mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should"
would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers
they "should disregard false testimony").
In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or
immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in
futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

Severance is a reason to reject the team because it denies us stable ground and makes them a moving
target, neither of which is reciprocal with block time skew.

Permutation is a reason to vote negative on presumption—proves they agree with the CP as a

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

2NC AT Perm—Do Both

Any permutation is either severance or intrinsic—they either add something not in the plan or CP text,
or they sever out of the immediacy or implementation of the plan—both are reasons to reject the

Severance is a voting issue—skews negative strategy, curtails detailed policy analysis and fosters a
culture of argumentative irresponsibility because the aff becomes a moving target

Intrinsicness is also a reason to reject the team—skews negative ground and is infinitely regressive—
there are an infinite number of things they could add to the plan

Links to the net benefit—Conditioning on human rights is key

Impossible—you can’t implement the plan and then condition it later

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Conditions Solves
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Smart Sanctions Pressure Solves
Smarter sanctions are more successful in compelling gov’ts to make political changes.
O’Sullivan, former deputy national security advisor of Iraq & Afghanistan, 3
[Meghan, 2003, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, p.288, MC]

Although each sanctions regime would need to be carefully crafted to fit the country in question and the
situation at hand, it is useful to briefly consider what stylized sanctions regimes would look like if they
were shrewdly crafted to advance three categories of goals: behavior change, containment, and regime
change. Sanctions whose primary aim is to change certain behaviors of a leadership are in some
respects the most difficult to fashion. Policymakers need not be only—or even primarily—concerned
that sanctions have an impact; they also must focus on whether the impact of sanctions is translated
into effectiveness—whether the pain sanctions inflict succeeds in compelling the targeted
government to make political changes. Sanctions regimes that form the basis for a bargaining
framework between the sanctioned country and the United States or the United Nations are
most conducive to this sort of success.4 The structure of sanctions must be flexible enough to
accommodate and encourage gradual changes in the behavior of the target, ideally by allowing
restrictions to be lifted or letting them lapse incrementally as the country takes actions
desired by the United States. Although not essential to success, this process works best if there is a
reciprocal element to it, even if it is not nearly an equal one. Sanctions used for this purpose must be
accompanied by dialogue between the two countries, preferably in a regular and institutionalized way
that allows each side to articulate its expectations and demonstrate the reforms it has under- taken; in
an ideal situation, a road map—a document that charts out care- fully calibrated steps along the path to
better relations—would anchor these discussions.5 Finally, the shrewd use of sanctions for behavior
change will often demand the use of additional penalties and incentives apart from those offered by
imposition and lifting of sanctions to coerce and entice a country down the road of rehabilitation.
Constructive engagement prompts positive change.
Forcese, LL.M. from Yale, 2
*Craig, YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J., Vo. 5, “Globalizing Decency: Responsible¶
Engagement in an Era of Economic¶ Integration”, p 6-8, accessed 7-7, CC]

The vision of “constructive engagement” as a form of subversion¶ through economic
development has been enunciated most succinctly by¶ the U.S. anti-sanctions lobby group
USA*Engage. In its paper, Economic¶ Engagement Promotes Freedom, the organization urged that
“*m+arketoriented¶ economic development causes social changes that impede¶ authoritarian
rule.” 12 The key proxies of social change are said to include¶ “widespread education, the
opening of society to the outside world, and¶ the development of an independent middle
class.”13 An emerging middle¶ class, fueled by economic growth, “does not depend on the state for¶
economic advancement, and thus is far more free to challenge political¶ control. A government faced
with this change must seek the support of the¶ middle class and must respond to middle class demands
for greater¶ political freedom, the rule of law, and the elimination of corruption.”14¶ Contact with the
outside world, meanwhile, is said to expand “the flow of information. ¶ The internet, television,
books, newspapers, copying¶ machines, foreign magazines, all the various forms of popular¶
entertainment and intellectual thought begin to flow, spreading ideas like¶ democracy,
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

human rights, and the rule of law.”15 USA*Engage further¶ asserts that “American businesses
and agricultural concerns transplant¶ American values and culture to the host country.”16¶
U.S. business is said to foster political liberalization in a number of¶ ways. First, American
companies support the rule of law by seeking¶ “certain assurances when operating in foreign
countries, including respect¶ for the rule of law (honoring contracts, arbitration of disputes,
objective¶ legal systems, etc.), protection of intellectual property rights, and restraints¶ on
conduct that generates commercial uncertainty (corruption and¶ nepotism).”17 Second, U.S.
investment prompts the development of local¶ infrastructure that supports business
operations, resulting in “significant¶ benefits to the locality, such as telephone systems, roads and
health care¶ facilities or even food production.”18 Third, U.S. businesses demand, and¶ contribute
to the training of, skilled workers. Executives retained by U.S.¶ investors are usually drawn
from “the class that is most opposed to a¶ corrupt and repressive government.19 For the same
reason, corporate¶ independence from such a government frequently is essential to successful¶
recruiting: the very fact that the corporation is American, and brings with it¶ American values and
practices, is a powerful draw.”20 Fourth, the very¶ production systems used by American
companies have an antiauthoritarian¶ bent. In particular, “*t]he operating and productions
systems¶ of American businesses assume that employees are prepared to think and¶ act
independently, to show initiative, and to be creative. . . . When¶ introduced overseas, such
systems require fundamentally different¶ organizational systems and ways of thinking, particularly in
formerly¶ authoritarian workplaces.”21 Last, U.S. investment is said to prompt the¶ development
of a local supply chain run by local entrepreneurs.22 ¶ U.S. companies are not alone in urging
constructive economic¶ engagement as a viable human rights-sensitive foreign policy. In
Canada,¶ for example, the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), the country’s¶ foremost
business lobby group, has argued that companies should engage¶ in more business with non-
democratic countries because “trade will act as¶ a positive catalyst for change.”23 Canadian
business people have defended¶ Canada’s policy of strong constructive engagement with
China by urging“that exposure to western products, technology and the free market will¶
inspire Chinese citizens to pursue freedom and democracy.”24
Sanctions can create positive outcomes.
Forcese, LL.M. from Yale, 2
*Craig, YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J., Vo. 5, “Globalizing Decency: Responsible¶
Engagement in an Era of Economic¶ Integration”, p 17-19, accessed 7-7, CC]

While the conclusions noted above are strongly critical of the¶ constructive engagement position, they
cannot be read as necessarily¶ supporting the “disengagement” view. To conclude that constructive¶
engagement and economic growth are no guarantee of political¶ liberalization and that trade and
investment can prop up repressive¶ regimes is not to say that measures designed to reduce economic
growth¶ and investment lead dictatorships to tumble. Evaluating the capacity of¶ disengagement –
specifically, of economic sanctions – to induce political¶ liberalization is a separate question. This
Article follows the Congressional¶ Research Service in defining “economic sanctions” as “. .
.the deliberate,¶ government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary¶
trade or financial relations,”76 via “measures such as trade embargoes;¶ restrictions on
particular exports or imports; denial of foreign assistance,¶ loans, and investments; or control
of foreign assets and economic¶ transactions” involving citizens in the sanctioning country.77¶
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There is now a rich and extensive literature on economic sanctions and¶ their effectiveness. Much of it
has been critical of sanctions, suggesting that¶ these measures are often highly ineffective and
frequently¶ counterproductive. Summarizing recent literature on sanctions, Haas and¶ O’Sullivan put it
this way:¶ [s]anctions almost always result in some economic hardship, but¶ this impact is often
insufficient or unable to force the desired¶ political change in the target country. Moreover, sanctions
can be¶ costly for innocent bystanders, particularly the poorest in the target¶ country and American
businesses and commercial interests. In¶ addition, sanctions often evoke unintended consequences,
such as¶ the strengthening of obnoxious regimes.78¶ Accordingly, as an earlier study noted, ¶ sanctions
can have the perverse effect of bolstering authoritarian,¶ statist societies. By creating scarcity, they
enable governments to¶ better control distribution of goods. The danger is both moral, in¶ that
innocents are affected, as well as practical, in that sanctions¶ that harm the population at large can bring
about undesired effects¶ that include bolstering the regime, triggering large scale¶ emigration, and
retarding the emergence of a middle class and civil¶ society. 79¶ In a similar vein, in a study focusing on
the utility of sanctions for¶ middle powers, Nossal argued that “sanctions are, on balance, a¶ normatively
bad policy instrument: not only are they generally ineffective¶ in producing political change in the target
nation, but they also are a¶ violent, blunt, and gendered tool of statecraft.”80 Nossal viewed sanctions¶
introduced by middle powers like Canada and Australia as “rain dances,”¶ described as measures
satisfying domestic constituencies without having¶ appreciable impact on the political behavior of the
sanctioned country.81¶ More than ineffective, sanctions have a discernable negative impact on the¶
most vulnerable populations, leaving the political elite untouched. These¶ conclusions are affirmed by a
now vast literature on the often-devastating¶ humanitarian “side-effects” of sanctions.82¶ Unilateral
sanctions have been singled out for particular criticism. For¶ example, the Cato Institute has urged there
are “no examples of U.S.¶ unilateral economic sanctions changing the basic character or significant¶
policies of a foreign nation.”83 The Center for Strategic and International¶ Studies is in
substantial agreement, 84 though it notes some instances where¶ narrowly targeted, non-
comprehensive unilateral sanctions “have been¶ successful in meeting their goal.”85 For his
part, Haas, in a Brookings¶ Institution paper, concluded “unilateral sanctions tend to impose greater¶
costs on American firms than on the target, which can usually find¶ substitute sources of supply and
financing.”86¶ The literature is not, however, all bleak. Several studies point to¶ instances where
sanctions have achieved their objectives. The leading¶ study by Hufbauer et al. reviews 116 sanctions
regimes and concludes that¶ sanctions contributed to their ultimate goal 34 percent of the time,87¶
although other scholars contest this figure.88 More recently, Haas observed¶ “sanctions can on
occasion achieve (or help to achieve) various foreign¶ policy goals ranging from the modest to
the fairly significant.”89 In this¶ regard, sanctions introduced after the Gulf War are said to have
increased¶ Iraqi compliance with resolutions on the destruction of weapons of mass¶
destruction. Sanctions are also said to have contributed to Serbia’s¶ acceptance of the Dayton
agreement on Bosnia in August 1995. Similarly, a¶ recent study by the International Peace
Academy financed by the Canadian¶ government and released with some fanfare at the
United Nations in 2000¶ traces U.N. experience with sanctions in the 1990s.91 Measuring
“success”¶ in terms of weakened power on the part of an abusive regime, the study¶
concluded “sanctions appear to be more effective in gaining target¶ compliance than is widely
Targeted specific sanctions achieve goals.
Forcese, LL.M. from Yale, 2
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

*Craig, YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J., Vo. 5, “Globalizing Decency: Responsible¶
Engagement in an Era of Economic¶ Integration”, p 20-21, accessed 7-7, CC]

These conclusions echo those of the International Peace Academy in its¶ 2000 study. For the Academy,
success is more likely with “comprehensive,¶ rigorously enforced sanctions” and less likely with
“limited, unenforced¶ measures.”95 Yet, comprehensive sanctions represent the bluntest form of¶
economic coercion, one with often unpredictable and devastating¶ humanitarian and political side
effects. Conversely, “*m+ore selective,¶ targeted sanctions resulted in fewer humanitarian difficulties.”96
These¶ findings lead the authors to favor narrowly tailored measures and to argue¶ “not that
targeted or selective sanctions are ineffective, but that policy steps¶ necessary to enhance the
impact of these more limited measures have not¶ been taken.”97 Specifically, “whether sanctions are
comprehensive or¶ selective, general or targeted, their political impact depends on effective¶
implementation.”98 According to the study, sanctions¶ are most likely to be effective when
they target the decision-makers¶ responsible for wrongdoing and deny the assets and
resources that¶ are most valuable to these decision-making elites. At the same¶ time, care must
be taken to avoid measures that cause unintended¶ humanitarian hardships or inadvertently enrich or
empower¶ decision-makers or criminal elements. The essence of smart¶ sanctions strategy is
tailoring sanctions to meet specific objectives¶ and focusing coercive pressure on particular
groups and¶ resources.99¶ The Academy establishes a sophisticated analytical framework for¶
assessing the viability of sanctions. Rather than endorsing a “naïve theory”¶ that envisages political
change flowing directly from the economic pain¶ caused by sanctions, the study suggests that the
“political impact of¶ sanctions ultimately depends on internal political dynamics within the¶ targeted
country.”100 Specifically,¶ Sanctions succeed when targeted decision-makers change their¶ calculation
of costs and benefits and determine that the advantages¶ of cooperation with Security Council
resolutions outweigh the¶ costs of continued defiance of expressed global norms. One of the¶ key
considerations in a leadership’s calculation of costs is the¶ degree of opposition from
domestic political constituencies. To the¶ strength that sanctions strengthen or encourage these
opposition¶ constituencies, they are more likely to achieve success.101¶ Put another way, sanctions
might be most appropriate when directed¶ against states exhibiting some domestic
opposition.102¶ In terms of specific economic sanctions measures, the study calls¶ financial sanctions
“the centerpiece of a targeted sanctions strategy”.103¶ The effectiveness of these measures depends, in
the study’s words, “on the¶ ability to identify and target specific individuals and entities whose assets¶
are to be frozen”.104 Similarly, arms embargoes are regarded as a¶ “potentially effective form . . . of
targeted sanctions,” one “intended to¶ deny wrongdoers the resources needed for repression and
military¶ aggression.”105 The effectiveness of arms embargoes depends, of course, on¶ the wholesale
co-operation of the international community, particularly¶ “frontline” states likely to see the growth of
arms smuggling.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Conditions Ethical
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Conditions are Ethical
Sanctions are ethically justified—self-defense and humanitarian intervention
Winkler, PhD in political science, 99
*Adam, Human Rights Quarterly Volume 21 Issue 1, “Just Sanctions”, Page 141-142,, accessed
7/9/13, VJ]

Under the laws of just war, just cause is necessary to legitimize any resort to force. What
constitutes just cause is a limited range of potential motivations behind the use of force,
including self-defense 50 and humanitarian intervention. 51 [End Page 141] Under the principle
of self-defense, states can resort to doing harm when faced with an actual or imminent
infringement of state sovereignty. Self-defense against aggression has been codified as a
legitimate reason to use force in Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter, 52 but the principle can be
traced to the beginnings of the just war tradition. 53 The scope of self-defense is broad enough to
encompass collective self-defense, enabling allied states to come to the assistance of a nation
under attack by an aggressor. 54 Self-defense can also justify the use of harmful force enacted for
the purposes of deterrence, a strategy designed to diminish potential future infringements of
sovereignty. But the principle of self-defense has its limits: one can fight back to repel an attack, but one
cannot harm the aggressor for purposes of revenge or domination. 55 In the context of economic
sanctions, self-defense means that states certainly can resort to harmful economic measures
when faced with infringements of territorial boundaries; where just war would declare the use
of armed force to be legitimate, economic sanctions of some sort are justifiable. Self-defense
would also allow the adoption of sanctions when an aggressor state imposes measures of economic
coercion against other states without appropriate reason. If, for example, one nation declared economic
war on a neighbor, the neighboring state and its allies would be justified in imposing economic sanctions
as a defensive response. An example of self-defense supplying just cause for the use of economic
sanctions is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Although there had been longstanding disputes over
the borders of the two countries, the existing borders were internationally recognized. In addition, Iraq
was clearly the aggressor under international norms; the UN General Assembly's 1974 Declaration on
Aggression provides that the first resort to armed force in a dispute is prima facie evidence of
aggression, 56 and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of aggressive force against the
territorial integrity of another nation. Therefore, when the Security Council imposed mandatory
sanctions against Iraq, just cause was present. 57 Beyond self-defense, the laws of just war consider
humanitarian [End Page 142] intervention to constitute just cause legitimizing the use of force.
58 Therefore, when a state engages in widespread violations of internationally recognized
human rights, other nations can properly resort to harmful force to end the violations.
Although the exact marking lines are unclear for when the treatment of people within a state reaches
the level at which an international response is justified, among the conditions allowing the use of force
are enslavement, genocide, and subjugation of peoples. 59 While the principle of self-
determination generally allows the state to deal with its citizens in the manner that they as a
people wish to be treated, self-determination is a misnomer if the state severely oppresses
part of its population. 60 And while some have suggested that concern with humanitarian ideals
represents a new focus for international relations--an evolution from states to individuals as relevant
actors 61 --the laws of just war dictate that humanitarian intervention can amount to just
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

cause, thereby providing at least one instance where the pursuit of humanitarian ideals
maintains a focus on the state. 62 Humanitarian reasons would support the resort to
economic sanctions, and, indeed, violations of international humanitarian norms have provided
justification for the use of sanctions in recent years. For example, the UN Security Council's sanctions
against Serb-controlled areas of the former Yugoslavia 63 were prompted in part by the
Serbian war policy of "ethnic cleansing," a polite way of referring to genocide. During the late
1980s, the Iraqis also engaged in genocide. Targeting its Kurdish population, Iraq used chemical
weapons, destroyed Kurdish villages, and buried Kurdish casualties in mass unmarked graves.
64 Even in the absence of territorial aggression, this would have supplied ample just cause for
the imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq. [End Page 143]
Targeted sanctions are better than generic ones
Lopez, PhD from Syracuse University, 12
*George A., Spring, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 26, Issue 1, “In Defense of Smart Sanctions: A
Response to Joy Gordon”, page PQ, Pro Quest, accessed 7/5/13, VJ]

Gordon's first concern, that targeted sanctions are no more successful than general trade
sanctions, has varied dimensions.4 The first is Gordon's contention--echoing Daniel Drezner--that
targeted sanctions, which are applied by the UN Security Council, will always have limited success
because UN member states have varied goals in imposing them and quite diverse commitments to
enforcing them fully. 5 But this is true of every public policy that is legislated, whether at the
domestic or international level (for example, by a resolution of the Security Council). The measure
of success of a policy lies not in the intentions of its framers, nor very much in assessing the
roadblocks or inconsistencies that such a policy may manifest in its implementation. Rather,
the measure of success lies in the empirical impact of the policy--and, in the case of sanctions, on
constraining its targets in the manner specified in the Security Council resolution. Thus, a perfect
policy outcome would be one in which the change in behavior of the target perfectly
conforms to the resolution imposing the sanctions. Moreover, because economic sanctions of
even the targeted variety are political in nature, they will always be affected by the current
tensions within the Security Council, with its various rivalries among regional and other powerful
actors, and will invariably fall victim to problems of implementation, monitoring, and compliance. In the
worst instances, issues of implementation, monitoring, and compliance are a function of the weak
workings of the Security Council, in which major world powers will muster up the organizational
strength to legislate targeted sanctions, but will have neither the political will nor the institutional
strength to carry them out in full. A second, data-based point undercuts Gordon's claim that
targeted sanctions fare no better than trade sanctions. The global volume of trade for 2010 was
nearly $15 trillion, more than double the $6 trillion of 1995. Moreover, the trade-based component
of the gross domestic product of most countries has steadily increased as well. Both logically
and empirically, then, the application of traditional trade sanctions focused on entire nations
in our current era would have a much more substantial dislocation to both unintended
secondary entities and, most certainly, the general population than they did in the early
1990s. Trade-based sanctions in 2012 would more rapidly affect the quality of life of average people
within a targeted country, and in a more widespread manner. This is an outcome that Gordon clearly
wants to avoid. Thus, it is difficult to understand how Gordon could argue that targeted sanctions
imposed on those persons and entities most responsible for an objectionable policy, or placed on those
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

who violate existing sanctions, fail to be superior to such broadly affecting trade sanctions. A third
approach to support my argument for the utility of targeted sanctions emerges if we assess their
success by examining more than just the general strengths and weaknesses of the discrete
types of targeted measures--for example, financial, aviation, and so on--that are analyzed by Gordon.
Especially in judging the adequacy of Security Council sanctions, and as a recent book by Andrea Charron
convincingly demonstrates, sanctions cases should also be analyzed in terms of the very specific types of
violations in international law they are meant to correct and the UN Charter-based goals that the
Security Council expressed in adopting them. 6 Utilizing this lens of analysis points to four types of
goals for which sanctions are imposed: to end serious violent conflict; to prevent
international terrorism; to control nuclear proliferation; and to protect human rights and
civilians during serious violent conflict. After a brief discussion of each of these goals, I assess
how well targeted, smart sanctions performed in achieving them.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

AT: Harms Innocents to Punish Regime
The responsibility for immoral sanction doesn’t rest with sanctioners—it lies with the
authoritarian leaders of the country
Lopez, PhD from Syracuse University, 99
*George A., March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “More Ethical than Not: Sanctions
as Surgical Tools: Response to “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy”” page 145-146, Wiley Library,
accessed 7/5/13, VJ]

Gordon correctly notes that there has also been difficulty with implementing in full the
humanitarian exemptions and programs that are intended to operate during sanctions episodes. She,
again rightly, raises concerns about their adequacy to the needs of a beleaguered population. Whether
it be in the case of the Haiti or the Angola (UNITA) sanctions, we can now point to terrible
ineptitude and lack of political will in enforcing sanctions as keys to their ineffectiveness, and
by extension to their harsh impact on the innocent. We can also point to the slowness with
which humanitarian exemptions have been adjusted in response to the documented need of
vulnerable populations. But these are correctable problems, and they have been analyzed in
some detail by both the Security Council and humanitarian agencies. That past behavior does
not inspire confidence that attention will be paid to all the humanitarian needs of a
sanctioned population may be clear, but being naive about issues of moral agency in the
impact of sanctions compounds the problem. Specifically, Gordon takes the facts that harm
comes to innocents and that sanctions are imposed by sanctioners and mistakenly makes the
pain of the former the direct and singular responsibility of the latter. She refuses to deal with
the intermediary and decision-making role that leadership in a target state plays in
determining the impact of sanctions. While she blames the imposers of sanctions for treating
a general population instrumentally, she appears not to acknowledge at all the moral
responsibility of despicable leaders who victimize their own people instrumentally through
the manipulation of sanctions. While the impact of sanctions maybe either immoral or moral,
any judgment regarding their impact on innocent people must be assessed by examining the
responses of the sanctioned country’s leader and in light of the international humanitarian
relief effort mobilized on behalf of the innocent. Again here, the case of Iraq focuses the discussion
on the burden of responsibility borne by Iraqi leaders.
Sanctions are necessary— we can and should assume that we have the consent of the
people—they can’t express consent under authoritarian regimes
Lopez, PhD from Syracuse University, 99
[George A., March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “More Ethical than Not: Sanctions
as Surgical Tools: Response to “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy””, page 146-147, Wiley Library,
accessed 7/5/13, VJ]

Two other disagreements with Gordon are noteworthy. The first concerns the problem of
sanctions’ having increased moral power if they were imposed with the consent of those
likely to bear their brunt. Gordon, considering as the norm the South Africa case, wherein the
African National Congress and resident trade union and church groups endorsed sanctions outright, is
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unwilling to consider cases of implied consent, which may come from exiles or the wider
international community in the name of a repressed people. I would claim that recent
evidence, such as the crowds in the streets of Russia and Eastern Europe toppling statues of
past dictators and the throngs in the Congo rejoicing after the fall of Mobuto, underscores a
fundamental generalization: We can morally argue for sanctions on some countries because
history supports the contention that repressed people will consent to such. Considering the
evidence of the past in repressive states, such as Haiti, Iraq, or Rwanda, we can combine the criterion
of “right intention” with “right reason” in a philosophical sense to maintain that if these
(Haitian, Iraqi, or Rwandan) citizens lived in an environment where they could speak freely, they
would argue for bystanders, or outsiders, to take all actions, such as sanctions, on their behalf
to bring down the regime, To suggest, as Gordon appears to do, that under repression citizens
need to express consent for external coercive sanctions in order for the latter to be moral is
to condemn those citizens to being the regime’s next targets.
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AT: Sanctions Immoral – Humanitarian Grounds
“Smart sanctions” solve humanitarian concerns
Lopez, PhD from Syracuse University, 99
*George A., March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “More Ethical than Not: Sanctions
as Surgical Tools: Response to “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy””, page 148, Wiley Library, accessed
7/5/13, VJ]

Gordon dismisses much too quickly the possibility of “smart sanctions” that can have minimal
humanitarian impact and target elites responsible for the policies that generated the
sanctions. Admittedly, the idea of “smart sanctions” may be more elegant in conceptualization than
application at the present time. But the momentum in the diplomatic and academic communities
to make them a reality is in full force. Various analyses and forums have now explored in
detail the possibility of more robust and refined sanctions mechanisms, such as asset freezes
and other financial measures, which can be more dynamically integrated with arms
embargoes and bans on travel and international meetings, and targeted specifically at elites.
To be fully effective, these smarter measures will need further strategic design and improved
implementation through monitoring and via the enforcement capabilities of the Security Council.5 But
their advent—and their importance to the international community-is clear. On balance, then, I cannot
share Gordon’s condemnation of sanctions as categorically unethical. There is no question that
this decade has witnessed a set of costly and sometimes inhumane sanctions cases, with Iraq being an
extraordinary quagmire. But some other sanctions episodes (Rhodesia, South Africa, and Libya) have
appeared to be successful without terrible humanitarian consequences, while other cases had
limited negative humanitarian tragedy relative to accomplishing compliance (the former
Yugoslavia). As a result of these experiences and from critiques like Gordon’s, sanctions that
are more just, ethical, and effective now lie within our grasp. When they are again called for in
response to violations of international norms, we should move deliberatively to assure that sanctions be
imposed only under these heightened criteria.
There are checks on humanitarian impacts, and that impact is miniscule anyway
Lopez, PhD from Syracuse University, 12
[George A., Spring, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 26, Issue 1, “In Defense of Smart Sanctions: A
Response to Joy Gordon”, page PQ, Pro Quest, accessed 7/5/13, VJ+

Joy Gordon has been the foremost singular intellectual voice calling for close scrutiny of sanctions on
humanitarian grounds and for the application of ethical criteria to assess them. Thus, it is not surprising
that she has astutely pointed out the serious impact of aviation sanctions on health and other sectors,
and the potentially far-reaching legal and ethical dilemmas inherent in the sanctions listing process and
in financial sanctions. 11 No serious analyst of sanctions can claim that smart sanctions have no
unintended consequences, or that there are no inconsistencies in particular cases. The disagreements I
have with Gordon's assessment--in addition to the '90s hangover mentioned at the outset--are twofold.
First, the humanitarian impact of targeted sanctions is miniscule compared to that during the
era of trade sanctions, and Gordon does not place her current examples in that larger
context. She does acknowledge that the studies of sanctions in the mid to late 1990s and the
practical changes they underwent during this time went a long way toward ameliorating
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much of their worst humanitarian effects. Her claim that not every set of targeted sanctions is
subject to a pre-assessment of impact by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is
correct. But that is not because humanitarian concerns are slighted in sanctions design as the Security
Council resolution is being formulated. Rather, it is because the Council has had sufficient
experience in crafting sanctions so as to preempt many of the potential negative
consequences. 12 And, I would assert, the truer test of whether the sanctions process is
committed to avoiding negative humanitarian effects lies in the presence of effective
sanctions-monitoring mechanisms, which can aid in correcting unintended consequences.
Monitoring mechanisms also allow policy-makers to continually improve the design and
implementation of sanctions to bring them more fully in line with the rule of humanitarian
law. UN missions, the special representatives of the secretary-general, and the panels of experts for
each UN sanctions case all focus on monitoring in ways that did not exist a decade ago. 13 My second
major disagreement with Gordon is again a matter of degree. Specifically, I am referring to her concerns
about due process rights and the listing controversy that has engulfed the UN's "1267 regime" for
counterterrorism. While I understand her critique, Gordon's judgment is more severe than my own, as I
believe she fails to acknowledge a few realities of the past five years. First, although she describes most
of the reforms undertaken over time by the Council regarding delisting and due process, Gordon does
not give sufficient weight to these. I would claim that in passing five new resolutions since 2006 the
Security Council has undergone a remarkable evolution to a more rights-sensitive system that
is consistent with the concerns and claims of the "like-minded states" that championed the
due process challenge, and at the same time holds firm to a fundamental distinction made by a
number of Security Council members that placing an entity or individual on the sanctions list is an act of
preventive security, not a judicial decision subject to judicial review. 14 Further, Gordon overestimates
the significance of a very small number of cases of due process in connection to asset freezes that are
currently working their way through the European court system and that comprise this controversy.
Moreover, analysts and lawyers of quite different persuasions disagree about the role and place of the
European human rights judicial system in evaluating Security Council resolutions in this issue area. In
sum, Gordon's concern with targeted sanctions writ large, when the listing due process
problem has affected a very small number of individuals, and only in the counterterrorism
area, seems overstated.
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AT: Sanctions Empirically Fail
Sanctions work—ethical or practical failures are due to lack of quid pro quo
Lopez, PhD from Syracuse University, 99
*George A., March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “More Ethical than Not: Sanctions
as Surgical Tools: Response to “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy””, page 145, Wiley Library, accessed
7/5/13, VJ]

Beyond this “sanctions theory,” the empirical record of sanctions’ success has more positive
examples than simply the South African case, which Gordon considers an anomaly. Certainly in the
Rhodesian case, sanctions combined with diplomatic incentives and initiatives to produce the
settlement resulting in majority rule. As I will amplify below, the Iraq case is characterized by a
great deal more compliance than is recognized regarding weapons of mass destruction. And
there is no question that economic sanctions was one of the factors that pressured the Belgrade
government to participate in the Dayton peace accords process. As we write, Libya has finally
agreed to release for trial the two suspects in the Lockerbie bombing. Gordon’s claims that
sanctions are a patent failure, and that the evidence (and the logic of sanctions) suggests that
sanctions are far more likely to guarantee noncompliance, are simply incorrect. If there is a practical
or ethical dilemma with sanctions it is not compliance failure, but compliance
underachievement. From recent analyses of cases, however, we know that this results because
leaders who impose sanctions have neither fully used nor fully understood the mechanism and how
to properly assess its impact. In some cases the Security Council has not set conditions for the
immediate lifting of sanctions upon compliance; or, they have “moved the goalposts” after
sanctions have been imposed. Most problematic, sanctioners have failed to mix sanctions with
incentives in order to get meaningful compliance. There is little question that the UN Sanctions
Committee system has learned some unfortunate lessons through trial and error and that, especially
regarding the Iraq case, the Security Council was fairly unimaginative in executing an effective sanctions
policy. In particular, the council failed to see in the multiple requirements placed on Iraq after
the Gulf War an opportunity to mix pressure, pain, and promises in ways that might have
sparked more compliance and that would have rewarded the real progress made in Iraq’s
compliance with various provisions important to the council. Sanctions have gone awry
because the council did not mix carrots (such as the partial lifting of sanctions as rewards) with
sticks (keeping sanctions on the free flow of oil) in attempting to close down Iraq’s weapons
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Human Rights Leadership Net Benefit
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US Human Rights Credibility Low Now
US Human Rights Credibility Low Now
Shattuck, CEO of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation and a lecturer on U.S. foreign
policy at Tufts University, 08 *Shattuck, 2008, American Bar Association, “Restoring U.S. Credibility
on Human Rights,
human_rights_fall2008/hr_fall08_shattuck.html,” 7/9/13, AR+

Among the many challenges facing you from the time you take office will be how to restore U.S.
credibility in the world. One way to do this will be to change the global perception that the
United States is a human rights violator.¶ International public opinion of the recent U.S. record
on human rights has been devastating. A poll conducted last year in eighteen countries on all
continents by the British Broadcasting Corporation revealed that 67 percent disapproved of U.S.
detention practices in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Another poll in Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and
India found that majorities or pluralities condemned the United States for torture and other
violations of international law. A third poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations showed that
majorities in thirteen countries, including many traditional allies, believe “the U.S. cannot be
trusted to act responsibly in the world.”
US has Lost its Leadership in Human Rights
Boustany, Washington Post Foreign Service, 07 [Boustany, January 2007, The Washington Post, dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011101658.html“U.S.
Has Lost Credibility On Rights, Group Asserts,” 7/9/13, AR+

The advocacy group Human Rights Watch said yesterday that Washington's once-powerful role as a
prime defender of human rights had effectively ended because of arbitrary detentions and
reports of torture since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the group urged the European
Union to step up as a leader of the cause.¶ Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch,
released the group's World Report 2007, an assessment of last year's global human rights practices, by
saying that the counterterrorism record of the United States over the past five years has
tarnished its credibility as an influential moral voice.¶ He listed several practices he said were
being used by the Bush administration in its fight against terrorism, including torture, arbitrary
detentions, allowing CIA interrogators to use coercive techniques and the unsupervised
handling of so-called enemy combatants held in other countries.¶ "This catastrophic path has left
the United States effectively incapable of defending some of the most basic rights," Roth said in the
report, released on the fifth anniversary of the arrival of the first detainees at the U.S. prison at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.¶ Roth said Sudan, where the people of the western Darfur region are subject to
mass murder, rape and forcible displacement, finds it easier to resist an international protection force
because of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.¶ "The trend is bleak, but not irreversible," Roth wrote in an
introduction to the report, saying it was up to the new Democratic-led Congress to repudiate
past abuses, press for policy change and seek accountability. The report listed the governments
of North Korea, Burma and Turkmenistan as "repressive" and as imposing "enormous cruelty" on their
populations. Saudi Arabia, Syria and Vietnam remain closed dictatorships. Russia and Egypt are cracking
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down on nongovernmental organizations, while Peru and Venezuela are considering the same path. Iran
and Ethiopia are silencing dissidents with impunity, the report said.¶ The report's introduction lamented
the poor performance of the new U.N. Human Rights Council and called it hardly an improvement over
its predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights. Though the council's central duty is to pressure
highly abusive governments to change, it "has so far failed to criticize any government other than
Israel," in "a mockery of the high principles of its founding."¶ With Washington's voice diminished,
the E.U. should be the strongest and most potent defender of human rights, Roth said, but as
the group seeks consensus among its enlarged membership, its impact on the world stage is much less
than its potential.¶ "We are looking for a powerful actor. The Europeans say all the right things, but
there is no sense of immersion, no sense of duty," Roth said in an interview Wednesday. "When you
have 27 members, how do you decide on common policy?" He also criticized Europe's role in the rights
council as being "too micro-tactical and one of a micromanager worried with changing words here and
there rather than being effective."¶ Roth also said the E.U.'s current system of a six-month rotating
presidency hampers the group's effectiveness.¶ "Human rights work is about sustained follow-up.
You come back and you come back until you get someone or a country to change its
behavior," Roth said. "When you have this rotating blur of presidencies . . . it is a recipe for failure. The
most reluctant member determines E.U. policy, so the whole is less than the sum of its parts."
Actions Must Be Taken To Boost US Human Rights Leadership and Credibility
Schulz, Senior Fellow for the Center for American Progress, 08 [Schulz, 2008, Better World
Campaign, The Future of Human Rights: Restoring America’s Leadership,, accessed 7/9/13, AR”
The United States has been living in contradiction for more than fifty years; the last seven have
merely¶ made that contradiction starker. On the one hand, the U.S. has with some good reason
prided itself on¶ being a champion of human rights around the world; on the other, it has
regularly balked at the authority of the international community upon which those rights are
based, especially when it comes¶ to its own practices.¶ Moreover, no nation, no matter how
powerful, can successfully pursue improvements in human rights¶ around the world
independent of that international community. If it tries, for example, to impose¶ unilateral
sanctions upon a country to protest human rights abuses there, those sanctions will
inevitably¶ fail if they lack the support and cooperation of others.¶ What has been especially
damaging to human rights over the past seven years is that policies inimical to¶ human rights
have been carried out¶ in the name¶ of human rights. This includes the Iraq War of course¶ (since
human rights were at least a latter-day rationale for that conflict), but also encompasses the¶
larger war on terror that has been pursued in the name of defending freedom and the rule of
law. The¶ result has been an unfortunate identification of human rights with America’s
worldly ambitions—an¶ identification that has only exacerbated the customary suspicion in
which human rights have been held¶ by some in the developing world who see them as a
guise for imposition of Western values.¶ All of this has contributed markedly to the decline in
the U.S.’s global reputation.¶ A new administration, whether Republican or Democratic, has
an opportunity to reverse that decline¶ and, in the process, renew America’s reputation for
human rights leadership. How it addresses these¶ issues cannot be considered independent of
many of the other topics addressed in the “Don’t Go It¶ Alone” series: the Iraq War, for
example, or the promotion of democracy, or the pursuit of women’s¶ health, or the fight
against poverty. All of these have implications for human rights policy
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US Human Rights Ratings Have Dropped
Schulz, Senior Fellow for the Center for American Progress, 08 [Schulz, 2008, Better World
Campaign, The Future of Human Rights: Restoring America’s Leadership,, accessed 7/9/13, AR”

What has been far more problematic over the last few years than random disparities between
domestic¶ and international interpretations of human rights law has been a fundamental
disparagement of the¶ authority of the international community itself. Such depreciation started
early: in 2000 Condoleezza¶ Rice, then foreign policy advisor to candidate George W. Bush, wrote in¶
Foreign Affairs¶ magazine, “Foreign¶ policy in a Republican administration...will proceed from the firm
ground of the national interest, not¶ from the interests of an¶ illusory¶ international community
*emphasis added+.” Over the past seven years¶ the U.S. has repeatedly demonstrated its
contempt for that allegedly chimerical community by doing such¶ things as “unsigning” the
Rome statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC); declaring the Geneva¶ Conventions
inapplicable to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and other so-called “unlawful combatants;”¶
ignoring UN findings and resolutions in the run-up to the Iraq War; or refusing to stand for
election to the¶ UN Human Rights Council.¶ The consequences have been devastating for the
reputations both of the U.S., which has seen its favorability ratings drop precipitously around
the world, and, paradoxically, of human rights themselves.
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Refusing unconditional engagement with human rights abusers signals commitment to
human rights – Magnitsky proves
AP 12
[11-16, The Guardian, “Magnitsky human rights bill helps US House vote to end Soviet-era trade law”,, accessed 7-9,
The legislation, which has the backing of the Obama administration, now goes to the Senate, where the
Democratic leadership has indicated it will consider it promptly. Differences remain between the House
and the Senate on the human rights part of the bill: the House bill imposes visa and financial
restrictions on Russian officials linked to human rights abuses. The pending Senate bill would
broaden that to human rights violators around the world.¶ Numerous House members said they
would not have voted for the trade bill without inclusion of the human rights measure. "The issue that
concerns me and many members is not trade but human rights," said Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairman of
the House foreign affairs committee.¶ The trade bill, unlike bilateral free trade treaties, requires no
concessions from the US side. With passage, US companies and farmers would see lower tariffs, better
protections for intellectual property and greater access to Russia's service market and would be able to
go to the WTO to resolve disputes.¶ The administration and economists have predicted that US exports
of goods and services, currently at $11bn, could double in five years if trade relations were normalized.¶
The bill, the White House said in a statement supporting its passage, "is about providing opportunities
for American businesses and workers and creating jobs here at home".¶ The legislation would also
extend permanent normal trade relations to Moldova, another former Soviet state.¶ At issue is the
Jackson-Vanik amendment to a 1974 trade bill that tied trade with the Soviet Union to greater freedom
for Jews and other Soviet minorities seeking to leave the country. Since the 1990s, US presidents have
annually waived the now-obsolete requirement, but it still must be eliminated as part of a permanent
trade relations accord.¶ Democrats who normally take a harder look at trade bills were strongly
supportive, with many mentioning the addition of the Magnitsky measure.¶ "It's important to
remember that the rule of law in another country is vital, otherwise investment is perilous,"
said Sander Levin, top Democrat on the ways and means committee. "The Magnitsky
legislation was added here in part in recognition that when you talk about trade, you have to
look at a fuller picture," the Michigan congressman said.¶ But passage of the human rights provision
could spike tensions with Moscow at a time when the United States and Russia already are at odds over
issues including missile defense, Syria's civil war and Iran's nuclear ambitions. Russian deputy foreign
minister Sergei Ryabkov said Friday that Moscow had prepared a "tough" response to the passage of the
Magnitsky bill. On Thursday the ministry spokesman said the measure was an "unfriendly, provocative
act".¶ The Obama administration has said that while it does not object to the Magnitsky bill, it would
have preferred that the trade legislation be taken up on its own. The White House policy statement on
the bill refers generally to the need to promote respect for human rights around the world
and says the administration will continue to work with Congress to support those seeking a
free and democratic future in Russia.
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Conditioning engagement with Cuba bolsters US human rights leadership
Calzon, Executive Director of the Center for a Free Cuba, 9 (Frank Calzon, 12/2/9, America’s
Quarterly, “Obama, Cuba, and Complacency Toward Evil,”,
accessed 7-2-13, KB)

This may suit those global corporations,” Walesa wrote, “and shamefully there may be American
corporations which would like to cut similar deals, [but] if your administration is going to live up to the
expectation that the United States of America will be restored to the position of international
leadership on Human Rights, you should not be complicit in the abuse of workers, now taking place in
Cuba…The shameful practice of the Cuban government of paying their workers in one currency and
forcing them to purchase necessities of life in government stores in another currency is yet another
form of serious exploitation of workers.” ¶ It is not known what, if any, response Walesa received from
Obama, but neither was there a reference to labor issues in the press reports following conversations
held recently in Havana between a high State Department official and the Cuban regime.¶ Former
President Vaclav Havel also has been outspoken about Cuba and the need to help defenders of human
rights under dictatorships around the world. As quoted in mid-October by Madrid’s El Pais about
Europe’s willingness to do business with dictatorships, Havel opined that “The European Union suffers
that old European illness that is a tendency to accept evil, to close our eyes and cooperate with
autocratic regimes, and at times, even with dictators. I believe that the new European Union
members, who have a recent experience with totalitarianism, should alert the EU about the danger
because complacency toward evil has never forced evil to retreat.Ӧ Neither American interests nor
the interests of the Cuban people would be well served should the United States ignore Cuban history
and the nature of the Castros’ regime. American policy makers are best advised to listen to Havel,
Walesa, and Aung Sang Suu Kyi.¶ Failing to condition the United States’ Cuba policy on political and
economic reforms and yielding to Havana’s braggadocio serves only to strengthen the hard-line
gerontocracy that now rules the island and inspires the world’s like-minded despots to parrot Fidel
Castro’s familiar anti-American rant.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Failure to pressure Venezuela destroys US human rights leadership
Tegel, GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America 12
(Simeon, “In Latin America, man bites watchdog”, Global Post, Jun 8,
human-rights-group, accessed 7/12/13)

LIMA, Peru — US influence in Latin America is again under attack.
This time, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which is backed and funded by the United
States, is under pressure from regional governments angry at what they say is US meddling in
their internal affairs.
The attacks have been led by Venezuela President Hugo Chavez and his Ecuadorean and Bolivian
counterparts, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales. The three are leading members of Chavez’s leftist
“Bolivarian” alliance of the Americas, known as ALBA.
The governments of Chavez and Correa in particular have come under intense scrutiny from the
commission for either perpetrating or permitting serious human rights abuses.
They claim the system, and its parent body, the Organization of American States (OAS), are tools of
US domination and fail to address Latin America’s real needs.
At the OAS’ 42nd assembly in Cochabamba, Bolivia this week, Correa and Chavez won an agreement to
propose specific reforms to the Inter-American Commission and its sister body, the region's human
rights court, within six months.
The move is the latest sign of waning US influence south of the Rio Grande. Although
relationships have improved since US President Barack Obama entered the White House,
Latin America’s leftist, popularly-elected leaders have flaunted their autonomy from
Washington on a range of issues, from the war in Iraq to trade policy. Now, a dispute over how to
secure citizen's human rights is pitting Latin leaders against one of the hemisphere’s most highly-
regarded US-backed organizations.

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U.S. human rights leadership key to democracy promotion
Griffey, human rights consultant who has worked for the United Nations, 11
*Brian, 3/18, The Hill, “U.S. leadership on human rights essential to strengthen democracy abroad”,
to-strengthen-democracy-abroad#ixzz2YaDZcImO, accessed 7/9, CC]

Nonetheless, U.S. leadership on human rights offers clear opportunities to advance not only
international peace and security – a fundamental purpose of the U.N. – but also conjoined US
political and economic interests at home and abroad.¶ The U.S. is presently demonstrating
exactly how crucial such involvement is as an elected member of the Human Rights Council,
participating in vital negotiations on how best to mitigate widespread abuses responding to
ongoing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, including by strategic US allies in global
security and trade.¶ As Secretary Clinton expressed en route to Geneva to participate in recent talks
on human rights violations in Libya, joining the Council has “proven to be a good decision,
because we’ve been able to influence a number of actions that we otherwise would have
been on the outside looking in.Ӧ In its first submission to the body, the U.S. likewise recognized that
participation in the Council’s peer-review system allows the U.S. not only to lead by example and
“encourage others to strengthen their commitments to human rights,” but also to address domestic
human rights shortcomings.¶ By leading international discourse on human rights, the U.S. will
be in a better position both to advance observation of human rights abroad, and to take on
new treaty commitments that demonstrate adherence of our own system to the vaulting
principles we identify with our democracy.¶ While the U.S. is party to more than 12,000 treaties, it
has dodged most human rights treaties drafted since World War II through the U.N., and has ratified
only a dozen.¶ Upon transmission of four core human rights treaties to the Senate in 1978, President
Carter observed: “Our failure to become a party increasingly reflects upon our attainments, and
prejudices United States participation in the development of the international law of human rights.Ӧ
The Senate ratified two of those treaties 15 years later. The others continue to languish in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, still awaiting ratification after 32 years. It likewise took the Senate almost
40 years to approve a treaty punishing genocide, after signing it in 1948 following the Holocaust.¶ Other
human rights treaties U.S. presidents have signed – but the Senate has yet to agree to – include U.N.
conventions protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities.¶ The U.S. is the only
nation in the world that hasn’t ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with the exception of
war-torn Somalia, which lacks a functioning government and control over much of its territory. ¶ As we
watch the contours and nature of power being reshaped in the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S.
must have a singular message on human rights – both at home and abroad:¶ Human rights go
hand-in-hand with a healthy democracy, and demand a concerted and collective effort to be
upheld, especially in times of crisis.¶ Greater U.S. participation in U.N. human rights treaties
would ensure that the country has not only a seat at the table, but also an authoritative voice
on matters vital to advancing democracy abroad, and our national security.¶ A welcome
consequence would be a more prominent place for the human rights lens in our vision of U.S.
democracy – and perhaps a stronger resolve to ameliorate the plights of those least well off
in our own society.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Democracy promotion prevents war.
Lagon, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights, 11
*Mark, February, Council on Foreign Relations, “Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the
United States and the International Community”,
democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090, accessed 7-9, CC]

Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to
build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed
the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism.
Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words
have clouded appreciation of this truth.¶ Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy
promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that
established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy “realists” advocate
working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and
suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows
from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not
promotes similar international conduct for governments.¶ There has long been controversy about
whether democracy enhances economic development. The dramatic growth of China certainly
challenges this notion. Still, history will likely show that democracy yields the most prosperity.
Notwithstanding the global financial turbulence of the past three years, democracy’s
elements facilitate long-term economic growth. These elements include above all freedom of
expression and learning to promote innovation, and rule of law to foster predictability for investors and
stop corruption from stunting growth. It is for that reason that the UN Development Programme (UNDP)
and the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference in Monterey, Mexico, embraced good
governance as the enabler of development. These elements have unleashed new emerging
powers such as India and Brazil and raised the quality of life for impoverished peoples. Those
who argue that economic development will eventually yield political freedoms may be
reversing the order of influences—or at least discounting the reciprocal relationship between
political and economic liberalization.¶ Finally, democracy affords all groups equal access to
justice—and equal opportunity to shine as assets in a country’s economy. Democracy’s
support for pluralism prevents human assets—including religious and ethnic minorities,
women, and migrants—from being squandered. Indeed, a shortage of economic opportunities and
outlets for grievances has contributed significantly to the ongoing upheaval in the Middle East. Pluralism
is also precisely what is needed to stop violent extremism from wreaking havoc on the world.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Human Rights Promotion Reduces Conflict/War
National security and human rights are inextricably linked- protection of human rights would
enhance global and national security
Burke-White, Deputy Dean and Prof. of Law at University of Pennsylvania, 2004 [William W,
expert on international law and global governance, served in the Obama Administration from 2009-
2011, 2004, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation” Harvard Human Rights
Journal. Vol. 17.,
Accessed 7/9/13- JM]

For most of the past fifty years, U.S. foreign policymakers have largely viewed the promotion of
human rights and the protection of national security as in inherent tension. Almost without
exception, each administration has treated the two goals as mutually exclusive: promote human
rights at the expense of national security or protect national security while overlooking international
human rights. While U.S. policymakers have been motivated at times by human rights
concerns, such concerns have generally been subordinate to national security. For example,
President Bush’s 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy speaks of a “commitment to protecting basic
human rights.” In the same document, President Bush makes it clear that “defending our Nation against
its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”
This subordination
of human rights to national security is both unnecessary and strategically questionable. A
more effective U.S. foreign policy would view human rights and national security as
correlated and complementary goals. Better protection of human rights around the world
would make the United States safer and more secure. The United States needs to restructure its
foreign policy accordingly. This Article presents a strategic—as opposed to ideological or normative—
argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S.
foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of
states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to
U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly
endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require
U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post–Cold War period
indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens’ human rights are also those
most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states’ human
rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights
can significantly enhance U.S. and global security.

International aggression is initiated by states with poor human rights for its citizens-
empirically proven
Burke-White, Deputy Dean and Prof. of Law at University of Pennsylvania, 2004 [William W,
expert on international law and global governance, served in the Obama Administration from 2009-
2011, 2004, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation” Harvard Human Rights
Journal. Vol. 17.,
Accessed 7/9/13- JM]
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Soon after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Michael Ignatieff asked: “Is the Human Rights
Era Ending?” He asserted that for the movement to remain relevant it has “to challenge
directly the claim that national security trumps human rights.”147 This article strives to do just
that. It has suggested a correlation between a state’s domestic human rights record and its
propensity to engage in international aggression. In the post–Cold War period, every instance
of aggression was either initiated by a state that systematically denied the human rights of its
own citizens or was undertaken by a human rights respecting state at least in part to protect the
human rights of citizens in the target state. Taken in conjunction with the numerous statistical studies
on the democratic peace phenomenon, these findings appear likely to be accurate. Both institutional
constraints and social beliefs may offer causal mechanisms for this human rights peace. Additional
studies, relying on political science methods of statistical regression analysis, will be necessary to isolate
other variables and prove the robustness of this correlation. The strategic linkage between a state’s
domestic human rights record and its propensity for international aggression is sufficiently strong to
advance the claim that the international promotion of human rights is integral to U.S. national
security. By advancing the promotion of human rights around the globe, the United States can decrease
the likelihood of international aggression and thereby enhance national security. In the post–September
11 world, it is all the more important that the United States reject the traditional view that
human rights and national security are in competition or mutually exclusive and, instead, allow
human rights to inform foreign policy. The resulting policy will not only reinvigorate the human
rights movement, but will also make the United States more secure.
Foreign policy based on human rights would prevent abusive States from obtaining WMDs
Burke-White, Deputy Dean and Prof. of Law at University of Pennsylvania, 2004 [William W,
expert on international law and global governance, served in the Obama Administration from 2009-
2011, 2004, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation” Harvard Human Rights
Journal. Vol. 17.,
Accessed 7/9/13- JM]

Since 1990, a state’s domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that
state’s propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy
has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression.2 If the
correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to
enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between
national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications.
First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as
presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states.
Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their
domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent
future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of
human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states
obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N.
cooperation on human rights issues. In some cases this linkage yields only minor changes in actual
policy—for example, greater scrutiny of particular states with troubling human rights records or an
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

increased emphasis on human rights in our bilateral dialogues with some states. However, where
human rights have largely been marginalized by national security concerns, such as in U.S.-China
or U.S.-Russia relations, the strategic linkage could be reason to focus on—rather than overlook—
human rights abuses in Chechnya, Tibet, and elsewhere.
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Copelon, Law Professor CUNY, 98
(Rhonda, Professor of Law and Director of the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic at the
City University of New York School of Law, New York City Law Review, /99, 3 N.Y. City L. Rev. 59)

The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to truncate it
in the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority of the U.S.
version of rights, to rebuild popular expectations, and to help develop a culture and jurisprudence of
indivisible human rights. Indeed, in the face of systemic inequality and crushing poverty, violence by
official and private actors, globalization of the market economy, and military and environmental
depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions. It is being
broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of the world, particularly in the
Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the protection of human rights as a
matter of individual and collective human survival and betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-
generation rights, encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and
that call for new mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging
rights include human-centered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and
security. Given the poverty and inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it is
imperative that we bring the human rights framework to bear on both domestic and foreign policy.

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Appeasement NB
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Uniqueness- Obama Tough on Rogue States
Obama’s taking a hard line approach to foreign policy now
Carpenter, senior fellow at the Cato institute, 11
[Ted Galen, December 28
, Cato Institute, “The GOP’s Allegations of Appeasement Against Obama”,,
accessed 7/9/13, VJ]

Republican presidential candidates (with the exception of Ron Paul) have taken to accusing
President Obama of conducting a foreign policy of appeasement. This is not a new tactic for the
neocon-dominated Grand Old Party. In a speech to the Israeli Knesset in 2008, President George W.
Bush attacked advocates of a more restrained approach to global affairs in the same fashion. Actually,
appeasement historically had a fairly good track record of achieving positive results until the British-
French miscalculation of trying to mollify Adolf Hitler at Munich. Among the examples of success was
London’s shrewd decision in the 1890s to give way and accept the United States as the dominant power
in the Western Hemisphere, thereby paving the way for more than a century of Ango-American
cooperation. But the Munich fiasco seemingly forever discredited appeasement in all situations. Instead,
the term has become a vacuous slur that hawks use to intimidate anyone who opposes promiscuous
war-making. The appeasement allegations directed against Obama, though, border on bizarre.
And the president fired back at his opponents, suggesting that they ask Osama Bin Laden and
the twenty-two other high-level al-Qaeda operatives who have been killed since Obama took
office whether he is an appeaser. Fox News host Sean Hannity immediately sneered that
Obama merely cited “his one foreign policy success.” By success, Hannity implicitly meant an
uncompromising, hard-line policy. But even by that dubious standard, the Republican
appeasement charge is misguided. The current bastardized definition of appeasement implies a
weak-kneed willingness to make far-reaching, unwise concessions to aggressors. That certainly does
not describe the current occupant of the Oval Office. After all, Obama sharply escalated the
war in Afghanistan, has led efforts to impose harsher economic sanctions on Iran, adopted a
hostile stance regarding China’s ambitious territorial claims in the South China Sea and served
as the godfather of NATO’s military campaign to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi. That’s not
exactly a record reminiscent of Neville Chamberlain. So what is the president’s conduct that
warrants allegations of appeasement? For the current crop of GOP presidential wannabes, merely
exhibiting a willingness to conduct negotiations with adversaries is considered evidence of craven
appeasement on the part of an American policy maker. And because Obama has attempted to open or
advance dialogues with such adversaries, Republican activists excoriate him
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Uniqueness- No Appeasement Now
Obama has adopted a policy of “strategic engagement” which projects a tough image in the
status quo.
Oloya, New Vision writer, 12
[Opiyo, New Vision, 10/1/12, “Strategic global engagement is not appeasement, but way forward for the
but-way-forward-for-the-usa.aspx, Accessed 7/8/13, HW]

After the September 11, 2001 attacks on America, President George Bush also talked tough,
vowing to seek and destroy America’s enemies. He opened wars on two fronts in Iraq to seek
‘weapons of mass destruction” and in Afghanistan to demonstrate that he meant business.
America sorely lost the war in Iraq which cost 4488 American and several hundred thousands
of Iraqi lives, and billions of dollars. The ongoing war in Afghanistan, meanwhile, is in the
save-face phase which is mostly about allowing the US-led NATO forces to withdraw by 2014
without looking like defeated warriors. The reality is that the war failed to achieve its most
basic objective which was to create a stable post-Taliban democracy in Afghanistan that would deny
terrorists safe haven from which to attack America. Today, Afghanistan is anything but stable,
democratic and peaceful. As recent as two days ago, the Taliban brazenly walked right inside Camp
Bastion, killing two American Marines and damaging military planes. The attack underlined the simple
fact that despite the billions of dollars and hundreds of lives lost in this war, it is essentially a failure.
What’s more, rather than engender fear and respect from world citizens, America stoked anger,
resentment and further isolation, increasing the target on its backside that read: Hit me. This explains
President Barack Obama’s dilemma when it comes to foreign policy. Despite the image of a
weakling that his opponents enjoy using against him, Obama has sought to define America’s
foreign policy exactly as displayed on the US Coats of Arms which shows a bald eagle
clutching olives branches in its right talons while wielding 13 arrows with the left talons. Best
described as strategic engagement, Obama approaches foreign policy by shying away from
the masochistic I-am-the-man swagger that characterised Reagan and Bush. He seeks instead
to firmly promote America’s global interests without sounding threatening or warlike. Yet,
make no mistake that Obama is an American hawk like no other, tough if not tougher than
his predecessors. Consider that under the Obama administration there have been more troops
on the battlefield, more unilateral incursions on sovereign soils and more targeted killing
using drones than in the last three US administrations combined. For instance, the Marines did
not knock on the door of Pakistan to seek permission to enter when they killed Osama bin Laden on May
2, 2011. Indeed, supposedly soft like Jell-O according to his detractors, Obama even refused to
distinguish between enemies of America who are foreign nationals and Americans that have turned
enemies like US-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki who was killed in a US drone attack on September 30, 2011.
Despite talk, Obama’s foreign policy has not been a policy of appeasement
Martinez, Journalist, 6-27-13, (Guillermo Martinez, ,Sun Sentinel, “Guillermo Martinez: Appeasement
doesn't work, so Obama must be tough” June 27th 2013, <
Accessed: 7-9-2013, BK)

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Former British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain is best known for his attempts at preventing
World War II by appeasing Adolf Hitler. Appeasement didn't work then, and it won't work
now.¶ Not to say that recent American presidents – George W. Bush and Barrack Obama – have
had a policy of appeasement precisely. But both, and particularly Obama in recent years, has
preached, talked, how he intends to improve relations with rival nations by approaching them and
establishing better relations.¶
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Uniqueness- Tough on NK Now
Obama is pursuing a hardline policy with North Korea now
Boot, foreign policy analyst, 13
*Max, 3/8, Commentary Magazine, “Obama’s Commendable Response to North Korea’s Threats”,
threats/, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]
Give credit where it’s due: the Obama administration deserves praise for pursuing a hardline
policy against North Korea–in fact a harder line than the Bush administration policy, at least in
Bush’s second term. In 2008, recall, the Bush administration–thanks to the misguided efforts of
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and negotiator Chris Hill–announced an accord to lift some
economic sanctions on North Korea and remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism
in return for unbelievable, and quickly abandoned, promises from Pyongyang to abandon its
nuclear program. This was widely seen as a bid–similar to the ill-advised Annapolis conference she
convened in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations–by Rice to land
herself a Nobel Prize, or at least rack up some notable achievement, before she left office. Perhaps,
then, it’s a good thing that Obama already got his Nobel because he doesn’t seem to feel
compelled to engage in pointless outreach with North Korea. Instead, he continues to ratchet
up sanctions and has even managed to get Chinese support at the United Nations for the
latest round of sanctions. The fact that the North Korean regime is threatening in retaliation
to erase the Korean War armistice and launch a preemptive nuclear attack on the U.S. is a
sign that it is feeling the pressure. The North Korean threats should not be taken lightly–as the
sinking of a South Korean ship by a North Korean submarine in 2010 demonstrated, the North is
capable of lashing out in unpredictable and deadly ways. But nor should the North’s threats deter
its neighbors from continuing to increase the pressure on this criminal regime. At the end of the day,
third-generation dictator Kim Jong-un is not suicidal: He knows that launching an attack on the
United States or a major assault on South Korea will result in the end of his regime. Nuclear
weapons or not, North Korea’s antiquated military could not long survive a South Korean-
American military offensive. Like his father and grandfather, Kim is only trying to gain
concessions from the West by threatening us. Obama deserves credit for hanging tough in the
face of these continued North Korean provocations.
Hardline approach with North Korea now
Pace, Associated Press, 13
[Julie, May 7
, MilitaryTimes, “Obama, S. Korea show united front against Pyongyang”,
against-Pyongyang, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]
WASHINGTON — Projecting a united front, President Obama and South Korea's new leader warned
North Korea on Tuesday against further nuclear provocations, with Obama declaring that the
days when Pyongyang could "create a crisis and elicit concessions" were over. Obama also
disputed the notion that his cautious response to reported chemical weapons use in Syria — a move he
had said would cross a "red line" — could embolden North Korea's unpredictable young leader and
other U.S. foes. "Whether it's bin Laden or Gadhafi, if we say we're taking a position, I would
think at this point the international community has a pretty good sense that we typically
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

follow through on our commitments," Obama said, referring to the al-Qaida commander Osama bin
Laden and former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, both of whom were killed during Obama's watch.
Tuesday's meetings between Obama and South Korean President Park Geun-hye followed
months of increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea conducted an
underground atomic test in February and had appeared ready for another. New U.S. intelligence
assessments also showed for the first time that North Korea may have the know-how to launch a
nuclear-armed missile, though American officials say Pyongyang still appears to lack the capability to
carry out an attack. Ahead of Tuesday's talks, the North appeared to send mixed messages. U.S.
officials said Pyongyang removed from a launch pad a set of medium-range ballistic missiles
that had been readied for possible test-firing. But North Korea also warned the U.S. and
South Korea that it would retaliate if joint military exercise between the two allies resulted in
any shells landing on its territory. Speaking at a joint news conference at the White House, Obama
and Park warned Pyongyang of unspecified consequences if it pressed ahead with provocative actions,
with Obama vowing to protect the U.S. and its allies using both "conventional and nuclear forces." Still,
in keeping with their countries' long-standing policies, the two leaders left open the
possibility of direct negotiations should the North signal its readiness to end its nuclear
pursuits or take other meaningful actions. "Should North Korea choose the path to becoming a
responsible member of the community of nations, we are willing to provide assistance, together with
the international community," Park said. Analysts see some of North Korea's recent bluster as an
attempt by the country's new leader, Kim Jong Un, to establish himself as a power player, both within
his own country and in the international community. Obama said he knew little about Kim personally
and has never spoken to him, but added that his actions were leading him down a dead end. "There's
going to have to be changes in behavior," Obama said. "We have an expression in English,
'Don't worry about what I say, just watch what I do.'" North Korea ratcheted up its provocations
this year after the U.N. Security Council tightened sanctions in response to the February nuclear test, its
third since 2006. Pyongyang claims to have scrapped the 1953 Korean War armistice and has threatened
nuclear strikes on the U.S., prompting Washington to bolster missile defenses. While another nuclear
test had seemed likely, a pair of launch-ready missiles has been removed from a launch pad, according
to two U.S. officials. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to
publicly discuss a matter involving sensitive U.S. intelligence. Park's visit was also focused on building a
rapport with Obama, who had a close relationship with her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak. Lee took a
hard line on relations with Pyongyang, cutting aid to the impoverished nation. While his approach had
Obama's firm backing, public frustration in the South has mounted over the North's continued weapons
tests and other provocative actions, including attacks in 2010 that left dozens of South Koreans dead. In
a change of tone, Park, although a conservative, has advocated trying to build trust with
Pyongyang through aid shipments and large-scale economic initiatives if there's progress on
the nuclear issue, even as she and South Korea's military promise to respond forcefully to any
attack from the North. Obama made clear Tuesday that there continues to be no daylight
between the White House and the new South Korean leader. "If Pyongyang thought its recent
threats would drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States or somehow garner
the North international respect, today is further evidence that North Korea has failed again,"
he said
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Uniqueness- Tough on Iran Now
Hard line approach now—Obama is ramping up pressure on Iran
Bengali, LA Times, 13
[Shashank, June 3
, LATimes, “Obama announces new sanctions on Iran”,, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]

President Obama announced new economic sanctions on Iran on Monday in a bid to raise
pressure on conservative hard-liners who have vowed not to compromise with the West over
Tehran's nuclear development program. Obama, who has faced demands from Congress to
tighten sanctions, issued an executive order targeting large transactions involving the Iranian
currency, the rial, in overseas banks. The goal is to further undermine a currency that has lost
two-thirds of its value in two years. He also slapped sanctions on Iran's domestic auto
industry, a major revenue source for the government and, U.S. experts charge, the cover for
procuring industrial equipment that can be used for nuclear infrastructure. The moves less than two
weeks before Iran's presidential election were the latest restrictions by the Obama administration amid
an escalating standoff with Tehran over its nuclear program and its support for Syrian President Bashar
Assad's military campaign against rebels seeking to overthrow him. U.S. experts said the new sanctions
are unlikely to affect Iran's June 14 election, which is being contested by eight conservative candidates
who were approved by the nation's hard-line theocracy. Secretary of State John F. Kerry said last week
that the outcome of the election won't change Iran's "fundamental calculus," which is determined by
the anti-Western supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. "The discourse of the campaign in Iran has
already been formulated along the lines of how hard-core you are going to be against Western
sanctions," said Mehrzad Boroujerdi, an Iran expert and associate professor at Syracuse University.
Obama administration officials say the latest sanctions are intended to narrow the choice for
Iran's ruling clerics: Abandon pursuit of a nuclear weapon or face economic collapse. Iran's
leaders deny they are seeking to build a nuclear bomb. "This is a significant step up in the
force and reach of our sanctions, but there is more to come," said a senior Obama
administration official who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity. The new sanctions
are to go into effect July 1, the same day as measures Obama previously announced to target
Iran's shipping and energy sectors.
Obama is increasing pressure on Iran—new sanctions
AP 13
*Associated Press, 6/3, WHDH News, “Obama orders new economic sanctions on Iran”,
sanctions-on-iran/, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Turning the screw on Iran and its nuclear program, the Obama
administration imposed new sanctions Monday on Iran's currency and auto industry, seeking
to render Iranian money useless outside the country and to cut off the regime from critical
revenue sources. The executive order from President Barack Obama broadens an already
concerted and multifaceted sanctions campaign aimed at crippling Iran's economy, forcing it
to comply with international demands that it prove its nuclear program is peaceful. The U.S.
believes Iran is working to develop nuclear weapons, a charge that Iran denies. Officials described the
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

move as part of a dual-track effort to offer meaningful negotiations to the Iranian regime
while continually upping the economic stakes. "Even as we intensify our pressure on the
Iranian government, we hold the door open to a diplomatic solution that allows Iran to rejoin
the community of nations if they meet their obligations. However, Iran must understand that
time is not unlimited," said White House press secretary Jay Carney, adding that more sanctions will
follow if the regime doesn't change course. The new sanctions marked the first time Iran's
currency, the rial, has been targeted directly with sanctions, the White House said. The sanctions
apply to foreign financial institutions that purchase or sell significant amounts of the rial, and to those
who hold significant amounts of the rial in accounts outside Iran. Senior administration officials said the
sanctions were designed to make the rial essentially unusable outside of Iran. The hope is that banks
and businesses holding Iranian currency will dump the funds, making the rial weaker. The value
of the rial has dropped by half since the start of 2012, the White House said.
Iran strategy will succeed now- new president ensures Iranian compromise
Lederman, writer, 13
*Josh, 6/15, Huffington Post, “U.S. Respects Iran Election Results, White House Says”,, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]

The stunning surge in Friday's election behind Rowhani, a former nuclear negotiator, was
perceived by supporters as a rebuke to hard-line policies that have left Iran diplomatically
and economically isolated. The U.S. and other nations have used penalties to undercut
Tehran's disputed nuclear program. Iran's ruling clerics barred more prominent reform candidates
from the ballot, leaving a group of mostly staunch loyalists to the Islamic establishment. Iran's
opposition settled on Rowhani as the least objectionable, making the 64-year-old cleric the de facto
candidate for reform-minded Iranians. "It is our hope that the Iranian government will heed the will
of the Iranian people and make responsible choices that create a better future for all
Iranians," Carney said. Signaling that the election has not changed the administration's stance, Carney
said the U.S. is still willing to engage Tehran directly to find a diplomatic solution to concerns
about Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. has been ramping up efforts geared toward
persuading Iran to prove its nuclear program is peaceful. The U.S. believes Iran is working to
develop nuclear weapons, a charge that Iran denies. But the strict limitations the regime placed on
who could compete in the election dampened U.S. hopes that a postelection Iran would pursue a
different course. Kerry said last month he wasn't optimistic that the election would produce any change
in Iran's nuclear ambitions, a topic he revisited in his statement after the election. "We, along with
our international partners, remain ready to engage directly with the Iranian government,"
Kerry said. "We hope they will honor their international obligations to the rest of the world in
order to reach a diplomatic solution that will fully address the international community's
concerns about Iran's nuclear program."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

AT: Not Unique- Appeasing Iran Now
Obama not appeasing Iran- maintaining stringent sanctions now.
Duss, national security reporter for the Center for American Progress, 11
[Matt, Think Progress, 12/16/11, “What Appeasement Isn’t”,, Accessed 7/8/13, HW]

One can disagree with the Obama administration’s two track approach of engagement and
pressure. But to describe that approach — which includes the adoption of some of the most
stringent multilateral sanctions ever, successfully supporting the appointment of a special UN human
rights monitor for Iran, and unprecedented defense cooperation with regional allies — as
"appeasement" is to declare oneself desperately in need of a dictionary.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Link- Unconditional Engagement
Unconditional engagement creates a moral hazard and encourages future blackmail just to
maintain good behavior.
Davies, Senior Lecturer @ University of Leeds & Essex, 11
(Graeme A. M., “The Domestic Consequences of International Over-Cooperation,” April 12,
eb526efebe98, 7/6/13, PD)

A second area of disapproval relates particularly to transformative or unconditional
engagement. Mastaduno (2003) suggests that engagement strategies associated with diffuse
reciprocity can increase the likelihood of the state being blackmailed by an adversary. If
benefits are sent to encourage a general transformation in behaviour, rather than for
a specific quid pro quo , the target state may subsequently demand further benefits as a
condition for maintaining good behaviour. The public may recognise this potential for
blackmail, or believe that they have been bullied into sending resources to a potential enemy.
The third point is closely related and concerns moral hazard. Pursuing the earlier example, the
public may conclude that its government is rewarding bad behaviour by sending inducements
to a rogue state that is developing a nuclear weapon. What is to stop other states developing their
own weapons in order to extract further benefits (Hass and O’Sullivan, 2000)? The use of incentives
may in fact embolden an opponent to become more aggressive in order to extract further
benefits, which in turn further undermines the security of the sender state (Cortright, 1997a,
1997b). Given the lack of monitoring involved in transformative policy, the handing over of
inducements without guarantees can appear naïve at best, and at worst risks undermining a
state’s reputation and credibility for tough negotiation on the international stage (Sartori,
2002; Fearon, 1994, 1997). The fourth concern pertains to the balance of sender-receiver power
and ultimately the security of the sender state. This is particularly relevant to unconditional
engagement that relies on diffuse reciprocity and transformative change in the behaviour of
the target. The key point is that inducement resources could have been used by the sender to
strengthen its own military capacity, but may instead boost the capabilities of the target state and
thus the threat it poses (Gowa, 1994; Kastner, 2009). Even if these resources are not reallocated
towards military capabilities the use of aid will help the leader of the target state to remain in
Making engagement conditional prevents the perception of weakness otherwise created by
unconditional agreements
Cortright, Director of Policy Studies, International Peace Studies at Notre Dame, 9
[David, American Political Science Association, March 2002, “Appeasement in International Politics by
Stephen R. Rock Review by: David Cortright”,, Accessed 7/6/13, HW]

Inducement policies carry significant risks. They may be ¶ perceived by the adversary as a
sign of weakness and may ¶ lead to further attempts to extract concessions. The adver- ¶
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

sary may become more daring and aggressive in pursuit of ¶ its hostile objectives. Rock argues
that this is more likely in ¶ a regime that is motivated by greed than by insecurity, al- ¶ though his
evidence in support of this claim is limited. Rock ¶ is on firmer ground when he identifies means for
avoiding ¶ this moral hazard. A state can diminish the chances of be- ¶ ing perceived as weak by
making concessions conditional ¶ on reciprocal cooperation, by establishing a reputation for
¶ firmness and strength, and by maintaining the materiel ca- ¶ pability to employ deterrent
or coercive strategies if concil- ¶ iatory gestures fail. In the case of North Korea, the United ¶ States and
its South Korean and Japanese partners offered ¶ incentives on a step-by-step basis and made the
delivery of ¶ benefits conditional on reciprocal cooperation from the other ¶ side. ¶

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Link- Cuba
Unilaterally lifting the embargo is appeasement- hurts the Cuban people and sends a signal of
Brookes, Heritage Foundation, Senior Fellow 9 [Peter Brookes, member of the congressional US-
China Commission, Previously: deputy assistant secretary of defense, CIA officer, State Department
official, naval officer, 4-15-09, New York Post, “KEEP THE EMBARGO, O STAND FOR CUBAN HUMAN
accessed 7-05-13 AMS]

IN another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the
easing of some restrictions on Cuba.
Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance.
Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even
though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America.
And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will
siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there.
In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be
a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not.
And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House
proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift.
Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of
change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies.
So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us.
Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even
more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang.
Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962,
which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions
on Cuba's part, of course.
Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white
flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and
encouraging the Latin American Left.
Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national
coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda
The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a
jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim
enough already.
The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison.
The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or
Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor
the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in
Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look
to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)
With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of
nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in
the Western Hemisphere.
The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet
sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused
internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.
Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free.
Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.
The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal
repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?
Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should
hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Internal Link- Resolve/Perception of Weakness
Acceding to one adversary undermines resolve and encourages others to attack.
Treisman, Professor of Political Science @ UCLA, 4
(Daniel, 2004, “Rational Appeasement”
io2004v58n2.pdf, 7/6/13, PD)

Appeasement has few defenders+ Ever since Neville Chamberlain’s famous piece of paper failed to
stop the Nazi advances in the 1930s, making concessions to an aggressor in the hope of
preventing war has seemed to most observers rather foolish+ Winston Churchill ridiculed
appeasement as the strategy of “one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last+” 1
Reasons for distrusting the policy were, in fact, noticed long before Munich+ Classical political thinkers
from Thucydides to Machiavelli offer many statements of the anti-appeasement view+ Appeasement,
many argue, is not just futile: it is self-destructive+ The danger is most acute when many
potential challengers exist+ Acceding to one challenger undermines the appeaser’s reputation
for resolve and encourages others to attack, starting a cascade of dominoes+ The argument
received a compelling game theoretic formulation in the solutions of Kreps and Wilson and Milgrom and
Roberts to Reinhard Selten’s “chain-store paradox.”
Appeasing rogue nations sends a signal of weakness that empowers hostile challengers.
O’Leary, PM Group, Chairman, 8 *Brad O'Leary, 2008, Brad O'Leary “The Audacity of Deceit: Barack
Obama's War on American Values”, P. 136-137, Google Books, AMS]

In fact, it has been U.S. policy for decades—through Republican and Democratic administrations—
not to appease rogue nations—nations that (a) sponsor terrorism (think Venezuela and Iran);
or (b) attempt to hold U.S. foreign policy and that of its allies hostage (think Iran and North
Korea, via their nuclear weapons programs). Negotiations, when they have taken place, have
usually been through third-party intermediaries or in conjunction with oilier nations, though in the case
of Cuba (the Clinton administration) and North Korea(the Bush administration), the U.S. did occasionally
hold certain high-level direct talks, depending on the importance of the issue. The reason is simple: as a
superpower, the U.S. cannot afford to look weak before the world by appearing to kowtow to
a lesser enemy or adversary. To do so would encourage smaller, less powerful nations to do
the same and, worse, stronger enemies would feel empowered to take a more hostile
approach to the U.S., thinking they can get away with such affronts. This isn't rocket science; it's
Diplomacy 101.
Conciliatory foreign policy spills over other states as well- Iraq & Serbia prove
Henriksen, Senior Fellow @ The Hoover Institution, ‘99
(Thomas H., 2/1/99, The Hoover Institute, “Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States”,, Accessed 7/9/13, PD)

In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence
actions on the other side, meaning that how the United States responds to a regional rogue
has worldwide implications. Rogue leaders draw conclusions from weak responses to aggression.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, escaped unpunished for his invasion of Kuwait no doubt
emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his campaign to extirpate Muslims
from Bosnia-Herzegovina in pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is a valuable
mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the cold war, and it may afford the only realistic option
available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containment may not be enough. Before
NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist conflict
raised the specter of a wider war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia.

Weakness of foreign policy in one area spills over into others- empirics prove
Paul, Senior Fellow @ The Hoover Institution, ‘99
(Wolfowitz, 2/1/99, “US POLICY ON IRAQ: Hearing Before theHouse National Security Committee”,,
Accessed 7/6/13,PD)
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I would just say amen. And I think just as I believe weakness in one area affects
another, if we think that Saddam Hussein and the North Koreans aren't talking to one
another I think we're dreaming. But strength in one area sets an example elsewhere. As a
matter of fact, if you go back and look at the history of our dealings with North Korea, among
the few concessions they ever made to us were in late 1991 and early 1992, when they first
agreed to inspections. And there are different theories about why this happened, because there were
multiple causes. But I was convinced that one of the reasons was because they saw what we
were doing in terms of dismantling Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capability, and they
were trying to wiggle out from under that. Unfortunately now they can see that even the Iraqis
don't have to worry too much. I think if we could get serious -- and I believe the public would support
it -- in one place, it would begin to have positive ripple effects elsewhere.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Impacts- North Korea
Appeasement with Latin American regimes sends a global signal—North Korea has shown
that it is willing to attack the south if the US weakens resolve globally—Korean war draws in
US and China
Grey, founder of Crestridge Investments, 10
*Christopher, 11/29, WND Commentary, “BLAME APPEASEMENT FOR NORTH KOREA'S ANTICS”,, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]

The recent attack by North Korea on South Korea killed numerous civilians. It created panic
and outrage in South Korea. It roiled the South Korean government, leading to the resignation of
their defense minister and unprecedented language from their leaders vowing “a thousand fold”
revenge on the North. This attack is the worst violence on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the war
in 1953. It has struck fear into the entire Asian region. However, the untold story of this attack is
that it could have been prevented. You even could say that the North Koreans have a point when
they claim that the United States “orchestrated” the circumstances that led to this attack. The
appeasement policy of the Obama administration, including his endless apologies for America
and his coddling of dictators such as Hugo Chavez and Ahmedinejad are the diplomatic
equivalent of throwing red meat in front of North Korea’s wild, carnivorous beast of a regime
and daring them to eat it. They have not disappointed. Conventional wisdom is that this
attack was caused by the inevitable turmoil resulting from the ongoing transfer of power
from longstanding dictator Kim Jong-il to his young son, Kim Jong-un. Some have suggested
the attack was intended to give the appearance inside heavily controlled North Korea that
Kim Jong-un was responsible for a great military victory against the South. This may be true,
but why do something so extreme and risk creating a real war, as well as angering their
benefactors in China, just for internal public relations reasons? People say the North Koreans
are crazy and their behavior can’t be explained with reason, but I think their behavior shows a
rational mind at work. They have calculated that the current American administration is so
weak, so willing to surrender and appease an aggressor, that they really don’t have any
significant risk of paying the price for this attack. The North Koreans may have miscalculated
though. South Korea was shaken to its core by what happened. Up until this attack, the South
Koreans have been moving away from a close alliance with America’s military. They have been
pushing for U.S. troops to leave. They have been objecting to the economic and political costs of
a perceived military and diplomatic dependency on America. They generally have been
conciliatory with North Korea and have bent over backwards to avoid confrontation and hostility. They
have supported the Chinese approach to engaging North Korea, which basically involves treating them
as equals. Even after the incident earlier this year in which North Korea sank a South Korean ship, killing
46 sailors, the South exercised restraint. This time is different. South Korea’s people and
government are enraged by this attack. The rhetoric coming from South Korea towards the North is
now the most hostile that it has been since the two countries were at war nearly 60 years ago. For
South Korea, this attack seems to feel like Pearl Harbor. Their national identity has been violated.
Any kinship they have felt with the North seems to be gone. High level government officials in the South
are calling for military retaliation and not ruling out the possibility of war with the North. Suddenly,
South Korea is begging to get closer to America’s military. They requested one of our carrier
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

groups be sent immediately to conduct war games with them. Of course, we have
accommodated them. We have no choice but to help them not only by treaty but also
because we cannot afford to turn our back on an ally. If we don’t support our allies, especially
those allies of over 60 years, we won’t have any allies in the world. China is in a similar mess. They
cannot back down from their support of North Korea even as this situation is exactly what
they don’t want for both diplomatic and economic reasons. There is no upside for the Chinese
to get dragged into a war on the Korean Peninsula. They want to keep North Korea, which is
basically their violent stepchild, in a controlled box. Unfortunately, North Korea is making it clear that
they want more. They want to flex their muscles. That’s what this attack was really trying to
demonstrate. North Korea wanted to show that they could blatantly attack the South at will,
kill civilians, and get away with it because both the South Koreans and the Americans don’t
have the guts to do anything about it. North Korea further has threatened to use nuclear
weapons both on South Korea and even on the United States, Japan or any country
supporting South Korea if war does occur. They have moved surface to surface missiles into
position. This provocation cannot be taken lightly. We know that North Korea has nuclear
warheads as well as the necessary long range surface to surface missiles on which to send them. They
probably don’t have the technology to reach the mainland of the United States, but they could possibly
reach Hawaii. Defense analysts have feared something like this for years. Of course, any such attack
logically would be suicide. The United States easily could annihilate the entire country of
North Korea. In all likelihood, these are empty threats. However, the risk of a severe and
disastrous miscalculation by the North Koreans grows with every sign of weakness by the
United States. During the Cuban missile crisis decades ago, the only way we prevailed was by
convincing the Soviets that we would annihilate them if they attacked us. We and our allies
need similar resolve, rather than half measures and conciliation, right now. North Korea is a
bully. They view any attempts to help them as weak. They view negotiation and diplomacy as weak.
They view civilized behavior as weak. The only thing they understand is strength. They need to believe
that we will destroy them if they do not stop their aggression. The Chinese can help deliver this
message to the North Koreans, but first the Chinese have to believe it themselves. The Chinese have
been pushing us around economically for years. They violate trade and currency agreements at will.
Every time we raise an objection to their human rights abuses or aggressive behavior towards Taiwan,
Tibet, or Japan, they tell us shut up and stay out of their affairs. We have a credibility problem with
them as well. To be fair to the Obama administration, this appeasement of North Korea has been
going on for decades. No administration has been willing to step up and get rid of this rogue state that
is a danger to the entire world. The difference now is that we have circumstances inside North
Korea that are more volatile than they have been in decades combined and an American
administration that is perceived as the weakest on national security since Jimmy Carter. This
is an extremely dangerous mixture.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Impacts- Appeasement => North Korean Miscalc
Appeasement fuels rogue regimes – new signs of weakness invite nuclear miscalculation by
North Korea.
Grey, a senior executive and managing partner in private equity, finance and banking for
fifteen years, 2010
[Christopher, WND Commentary, 11/29/10, “BLAME APPEASEMENT FOR NORTH KOREA'S ANTICS”,, Accessed 7/8/13, HW]

The recent attack by North Korea on South Korea killed numerous civilians. It created panic and
outrage in South Korea. It roiled the South Korean government, leading to the resignation of their
defense minister and unprecedented language from their leaders vowing “a thousand fold” revenge on
the North. This attack is the worst violence on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the war in
1953. It has struck fear into the entire Asian region. However, the untold story of this attack is
that it could have been prevented. You even could say that the North Koreans have a point when
they claim that the United States “orchestrated” the circumstances that led to this attack. The
appeasement policy of the Obama administration, including his endless apologies for America
and his coddling of dictators such as Hugo Chavez and Ahmedinejad are the diplomatic
equivalent of throwing red meat in front of North Korea’s wild, carnivorous beast of a regime
and daring them to eat it. They have not disappointed. Conventional wisdom is that this attack was
caused by the inevitable turmoil resulting from the ongoing transfer of power from longstanding
dictator Kim Jong-il to his young son, Kim Jong-un. Some have suggested the attack was intended to give
the appearance inside heavily controlled North Korea that Kim Jong-un was responsible for a great
military victory against the South. This may be true, but why do something so extreme and risk creating
a real war, as well as angering their benefactors in China, just for internal public relations reasons?
People say the North Koreans are crazy and their behavior can’t be explained with reason,
but I think their behavior shows a rational mind at work. They have calculated that the
current American administration is so weak, so willing to surrender and appease an
aggressor, that they really don’t have any significant risk of paying the price for this attack.
The North Koreans may have miscalculated though. South Korea was shaken to its core by what
happened. Up until this attack, the South Koreans have been moving away from a close alliance with
America’s military. They have been pushing for U.S. troops to leave. They have been objecting to the
economic and political costs of a perceived military and diplomatic dependency on America. They
generally have been conciliatory with North Korea and have bent over backwards to avoid confrontation
and hostility. They have supported the Chinese approach to engaging North Korea, which basically
involves treating them as equals. Even after the incident earlier this year in which North Korea sank a
South Korean ship, killing 46 sailors, the South exercised restraint. This time is different. South Korea’s
people and government are enraged by this attack. The rhetoric coming from South Korea towards the
North is now the most hostile that it has been since the two countries were at war nearly 60 years ago.
For South Korea, this attack seems to feel like Pearl Harbor. Their national identity has been violated.
Any kinship they have felt with the North seems to be gone. High level government officials in the South
are calling for military retaliation and not ruling out the possibility of war with the North. Suddenly,
South Korea is begging to get closer to America’s military. They requested one of our carrier groups be
sent immediately to conduct war games with them. Of course, we have accommodated them. We have
no choice but to help them not only by treaty but also because we cannot afford to turn our back on an
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

ally. If we don’t support our allies, especially those allies of over 60 years, we won’t have any allies in the
world. China is in a similar mess. They cannot back down from their support of North Korea even as this
situation is exactly what they don’t want for both diplomatic and economic reasons. There is no upside
for the Chinese to get dragged into a war on the Korean Peninsula. They want to keep North Korea,
which is basically their violent stepchild, in a controlled box. Unfortunately, North Korea is making it
clear that they want more. They want to flex their muscles. That’s what this attack was really
trying to demonstrate. North Korea wanted to show that they could blatantly attack the South at will,
kill civilians, and get away with it because both the South Koreans and the Americans don’t have the
guts to do anything about it. North Korea further has threatened to use nuclear weapons both on South
Korea and even on the United States, Japan or any country supporting South Korea if war does occur.
They have moved surface to surface missiles into position. This provocation cannot be taken lightly. We
know that North Korea has nuclear warheads as well as the necessary long range surface to surface
missiles on which to send them. They probably don’t have the technology to reach the mainland of the
United States, but they could possibly reach Hawaii. Defense analysts have feared something like this for
years. Of course, any such attack logically would be suicide. The United States easily could annihilate the
entire country of North Korea. In all likelihood, these are empty threats. However, the risk of
a severe and disastrous miscalculation by the North Koreans grows with every sign of
weakness by the United States. During the Cuban missile crisis decades ago, the only way
we prevailed was by convincing the Soviets that we would annihilate them if they attacked
us. We and our allies need similar resolve, rather than half measures and conciliation, right
now. North Korea is a bully. They view any attempts to help them as weak. They view negotiation
and diplomacy as weak. They view civilized behavior as weak. The only thing they understand is
strength. They need to believe that we will destroy them if they do not stop their aggression.
The Chinese can help deliver this message to the North Koreans, but first the Chinese have to believe it
themselves. The Chinese have been pushing us around economically for years. They violate trade and
currency agreements at will. Every time we raise an objection to their human rights abuses or aggressive
behavior towards Taiwan, Tibet, or Japan, they tell us shut up and stay out of their affairs. We have a
credibility problem with them as well. To be fair to the Obama administration, this appeasement of
North Korea has been going on for decades. No administration has been willing to step up and get rid of
this rogue state that is a danger to the entire world. The difference now is that we have
circumstances inside North Korea that are more volatile than they have been in decades
combined and an American administration that is perceived as the weakest on national security since
Jimmy Carter. This is an extremely dangerous mixture. Hopefully Obama and his team can, like John
Kennedy and his team did during the Cuban crisis, rise to the occasion and get the North Koreans
to back down. War can be prevented, but the possibility of war is real. This situation could
spin out of control and lead to a catastrophe if it is not handled properly. Let’s hope that this
administration is up to daunting job at hand. Potentially millions of lives depend on it.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Impacts- Appeasement => Violence
Appeasement just emboldens dictators- empirically causes millions of deaths.
Hanson, Senior Fellow at Hoover Institute, 04, (Victor Davis Hanson, Historian and Senior Fellow at Hoover Institute,
spring 2004, City Journal, “The Fruits of Appeasement” <> Accessed: 7-7-2013, BK)

The twentieth century should have taught the citizens of liberal democracies the catastrophic
consequences of placating tyrants. British and French restraint over the occupation of the
Rhineland, the Anschluss, the absorption of the Czech Sudetenland, and the incorporation of
Bohemia and Moravia did not win gratitude but rather Hitler’s contempt for their weakness.
Fifty million dead, the Holocaust, and the near destruction of European civilization were the
wages of “appeasement”—a term that early-1930s liberals proudly embraced as far more
enlightened than the old idea of “deterrence” and “military readiness.”¶ So too did Western excuses for
the Russians’ violation of guarantees of free elections in postwar Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast
Asia only embolden the Soviet Union. What eventually contained Stalinism was the Truman Doctrine,
NATO, and nuclear deterrence—not the United Nations—and what destroyed its legacy was Ronald
Reagan’s assertiveness, not Jimmy Carter’s accommodation or Richard Nixon’s détente.¶ As long ago as
the fourth century b.c., Demosthenes warned how complacency and self-delusion among an affluent
and free Athenian people allowed a Macedonian thug like Philip II to end some four centuries of Greek
liberty—and in a mere 20 years of creeping aggrandizement down the Greek peninsula. Thereafter,
these historical lessons should have been clear to citizens of any liberal society: we must neither
presume that comfort and security are our birthrights and are guaranteed without constant
sacrifice and vigilance, nor expect that peoples outside the purview of bourgeois liberalism
share our commitment to reason, tolerance, and enlightened self-interest.¶ Most important,
military deterrence and the willingness to use force against evil in its infancy usually end up, in
the terrible arithmetic of war, saving more lives than they cost. All this can be a hard lesson to
relearn each generation, especially now that we contend with the sirens of the mall, Oprah, and latte.
Our affluence and leisure are as antithetical to the use of force as rural life and relative poverty once
were catalysts for muscular action. The age-old lure of appeasement—perhaps they will cease
with this latest concession, perhaps we provoked our enemies, perhaps demonstrations of
our future good intentions will win their approval—was never more evident than in the recent
Spanish elections, when an affluent European electorate, reeling from the horrific terrorist attack of
3/11, swept from power the pro-U.S. center-right government on the grounds that the mass murders
were more the fault of the United States for dragging Spain into the effort to remove fascists and
implant democracy in Iraq than of the primordial al-Qaidist culprits, who long ago promised the Western
and Christian Iberians ruin for the Crusades and the Reconquista.¶ What went wrong with the West—
and with the United States in particular—when not just the classical but especially the recent
antecedents to September 11, from the Iranian hostage-taking to the attack on the USS Cole, were so
clear? Though Americans in an election year, legitimately concerned about our war dead, may now be
divided over the Iraqi occupation, polls nevertheless show a surprising consensus that the many
precursors to the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings were acts of war, not police matters. Roll
the tape backward from the USS Cole in 2000, through the bombing of the Khobar Towers and the U.S.
embassies in East Africa in 1998, the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the destruction of the
American embassy and annex in Beirut in 1983, the mass murder of 241 U.S. Marine peacekeepers
asleep in their Lebanese barracks that same year, and assorted kidnappings and gruesome murders of
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

American citizens and diplomats (including TWA Flight 800, Pan Am 103, William R. Higgins, Leon
Klinghoffer, Robert Dean Stethem, and CIA operative William Francis Buckley), until we arrive at the
Iranian hostage-taking of November 1979: that debacle is where we first saw the strange brew of Islamic
fascism, autocracy, and Middle East state terrorism—and failed to grasp its menace, condemn it, and go
to war against it.¶ That lapse, worth meditating upon in this 25th anniversary year of Khomeinism, then
set the precedent that such aggression against the United States was better adjudicated as a matter of
law than settled by war. Criminals were to be understood, not punished; and we, not our enemies, were
at fault for our past behavior. Whether Carter’s impotence sprang from his deep-seated moral distrust
of using American power unilaterally or from real remorse over past American actions in the cold war or
even from his innate pessimism about the military capability of the United States mattered little to the
hostage takers in Teheran, who for some 444 days humiliated the United States through a variety of
public demands for changes in U.S. foreign policy, the return of the exiled Shah, and reparations.¶ But if
we know how we failed to respond in the last three decades, do we yet grasp why we were so
afraid to act decisively at these earlier junctures, which might have stopped the chain of
events that would lead to the al-Qaida terrorist acts of September 11? Our failure was never due
to a lack of the necessary wealth or military resources, but rather to a deeply ingrained assumption
that we should not retaliate—a hesitancy al-Qaida perceives and plays upon.¶ Along that sad
succession of provocations, we can look back and see particularly critical turning points that
reflected this now-institutionalized state policy of worrying more about what the enemy was
going to do to us than we to him, to paraphrase Grant’s dictum: not hammering back after the
murder of the marines in Lebanon for fear of ending up like the Israelis in a Lebanese quagmire; not
going to Baghdad in 1991 because of paranoia that the “coalition” would collapse and we would polarize
the Arabs; pulling abruptly out of Somalia once pictures of American bodies dragged through the streets
of Mogadishu were broadcast around the world; or turning down offers in 1995 from Sudan to place
Usama bin Ladin into our custody, for fear that U.S. diplomats or citizens might be murdered abroad.¶
Throughout this tragic quarter-century of appeasement, our response usually consisted of a
stern lecture by a Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, or Bill Clinton about “never
giving in to terrorist blackmail” and “not negotiating with terrorists.” Even Ronald Reagan’s
saber-rattling “You can run but not hide” did not preclude trading arms to the Iranian terrorists or
abruptly abandoning Lebanon after the horrific Hezbollah attack.
Appeasing evil governments gives them legitimacy, time to develop and sustain nuclear
weapons, and attention
Bolton, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, 8 (John R. Bolton, 5/19/8, The Wall Street
Journal, “Bring On the Foreign Policy Debate,”, accessed 7-9-13,
The real debate is radically different. On one side are those who believe that negotiations should be
used to resolve international disputes 99% of the time. That is where I am, and where I think Mr. McCain
is. On the other side are those like Mr. Obama, who apparently want to use negotiations 100% of
the time. It is the 100%-ers who suffer from an obsession that is naïve and dangerous.¶
Negotiation is not a policy. It is a technique. Saying that one favors negotiation with, say, Iran, has no
more intellectual content than saying one favors using a spoon. For what? Under what circumstances?
With what objectives? On these specifics, Mr. Obama has been consistently sketchy.¶ Like all human
activity, negotiation has costs and benefits. If only benefits were involved, then it would be hard to
quarrel with the "what can we lose?" mantra one hears so often. In fact, the costs and potential
downsides are real, and not to be ignored.¶ When the U.S. negotiates with "terrorists and
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

radicals," it gives them legitimacy, a precious and tangible political asset. Thus, even Mr. Obama
criticized former President Jimmy Carter for his recent meetings with Hamas leaders. Meeting with
leaders of state sponsors of terrorism such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Kim Jong Il is also a
mistake. State sponsors use others as surrogates, but they are just as much terrorists as those
who actually carry out the dastardly acts. Legitimacy and international acceptability are
qualities terrorists crave, and should therefore not be conferred casually, if at all.¶ Moreover,
negotiations – especially those "without precondition" as Mr. Obama has specifically
advocated – consume time, another precious asset that terrorists and rogue leaders prize.
Here, President Bush's reference to Hitler was particularly apt: While the diplomats of European
democracies played with their umbrellas, the Nazis were rearming and expanding their industrial
power.¶ In today's world of weapons of mass destruction, time is again a precious asset, one
almost invariably on the side of the would-be proliferators. Time allows them to perfect the
complex science and technology necessary to sustain nuclear weapons and missile programs,
and provides far greater opportunity for concealing their activities from our ability to detect
and, if necessary, destroy them.¶ Iran has conclusively proven how to use negotiations to this
end. After five years of negotiations with the Europeans, with the Bush administration's approbation
throughout, the only result is that Iran is five years closer to having nuclear weapons. North Korea has
also used the Six-Party Talks to gain time, testing its first nuclear weapon in 2006, all the while cloning
its Yongbyon reactor in the Syrian desert.¶ Finally, negotiations entail opportunity costs, consuming
scarce presidential time and attention. Those resources cannot be applied everywhere, and
engaging in true discussions, as opposed to political charades, does divert time and attention
from other priorities. No better example can be found than the Bush administration's pursuit of the
Annapolis Process between Arabs and Israelis, which has gone and will go nowhere. While Annapolis has
been burning up U.S. time and effort, Lebanon has been burning, as Hezbollah strengthens its position
there. This is an opportunity cost for the U.S., and a tragedy for the people of Lebanon.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

AT: Engagement Changes Behavior
Appeasement of Cuba and Venezuela has empirically failed- only reciprocated with hostile
Reich, Former United States Ambassador to Venezuela,12 [Otto Reich, President's Special Envoy
for the Western Hemisphere; Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs;; and
Assistant Administrator of the US Agency for International Development; Recipient of the Walter Judd
Freedom Award, 12-17-12, Inter-American Dialouges, Q&A, “Is the United States Losing Influence in
Latin America?”, accessed, 7-06-13

"Does the United States have influence in Latin America? It has enormous potential influence, by virtue
of being the remaining global superpower and by the geographic, historical and other ties that connect
us. Sadly, however, in the past four years the U.S. government has apparently decided that
Latin America is not worth the time or effort to use that influence for good purposes. The
problem may not be insufficient attention but rather misplaced priorities. How else to explain
the counterproductive policies directed at the region's most hostile countries while neglecting
the friendliest nations? The primary purpose of any nation's foreign policy is to advance its national
interests; U.S. interests are advanced by having free, democratic, secure, prosperous and friendly
neighbors. In the past four years, the United States has tried to appease the anti-American
alliance gathered under the ALBA umbrella, a group of failed or failing states united by anti-
Americanism, Marxist economics and authoritarian methods. These are Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador,
Bolivia, Nicaragua and Argentina (Argentina is not yet an ALBA member, but it imitates one). In the
same period that the United States exhibited unlimited patience with ALBA countries they
have, individually or collectively, for example: expelled U.S. ambassadors and other
diplomats; confiscated U.S. properties; cooperated with Iran and terrorist groups; held an
American civilian hostage for three years and counting; stamped out individual freedoms;
packed or neutered legislatures and judiciaries; voided the separation of powers; and
generally made a mockery of democratic institutions, all in the name of '21st Century
Socialism.' Meanwhile, it took the administration three years to ratify a free-trade agreement with
Colombia and with Panama, two friendly and strategically important countries; it has not begun or
promoted any new free-trade negotiations in the region; it has weakly assisted Mexico's war on
narcotics and organized crime; Chávez, Castro, Correa, Kirchner, Morales, Ortega and other despots still
enjoy the fruits of their authoritarianism. If we really have influence in the region, why not use it?."
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2AC Conditions CPs Bad
1. It’s infinitely regressive – we can’t predict all the different conditions the plan can place on
other countries to solve. Shifts the debate away from the resolution to unpredictable small
net benefits and small policy differences
2. Moots the 1ac: resulting in the entire plan’s mandate means we don’t get the 1ac as
3. CP is Plan Plus: it just specifies an additional portion of the plan that the aff did not.
4. Prefer functional competition—textual competition increases judge intervention and kills
substantive clash over the results of the plan and instead makes it about irrelevant
4. Interpretation: Counterplans can’t possibly result in the entire mandate of the plan

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2AC Textual Competition Good
Textual competition is best—

A. Focus on the wording of the two texts allows for the most predictable education—the plan
text is the starting point of the debate
B. Checks abusive CPs—forces advocacies that have intrinsic net benefits and allocates ground
for the 2AC—solves any strategy skew

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1AR—Perm Do Both
Permutation solves the entirety of the CP—doing the counterplan and the plan has multiple net

A. Certainty—CP excludes the certainty of the plan which means there is only a risk that the
permutation is able to solve the aff and the net benefit
B. Double offer—permutation is the best possible option for [Country name] because they can
choose which offer is preferable—only a risk it solves the CP better
Proves the counterplan isn’t competitive—doesn’t sever out of should or resolved because the
definite offer is the entirety of the plan

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1AR—Perm Do CP
Perm do the CP solves—

A. Doesn’t disprove the aff—no opportunity cost to the adoption of the plan because the CP
affirms the plan as a good idea
B. Not textually competitive—prefer it to functional competition because the plan text is the
locus point of the debate—most predictable standard
C. No link differential—artificial net benefits uniquely destroy debate because there isn’t
predictable ground that the aff can prepare to answer

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Cuba Says No/Say Yes = Collapse
Cuba says No - Raul Castro power base built on opposition to the US, saying yes would cause
elite backlash and instability
Suchlicki, Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 12
[Suchlicki, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor, October 2012, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-
American Studies, “Ignore Raúl Castro’s Siren Song,”, accessed 7/5/13, AR]

The Cuban leadership in Havana continues to try to woo the U.S. administration into providing
unilateral concessions to Cuba. The embargo and the travel ban will be ended, they believe, as a
result of internal pressures and a more accommodating Obama administration.¶ The latest attempt
comes via Louis Farrakhan, the Muslim-American leader who met this month with Gen. Raúl Castro in
Havana. “Raúl Castro asked me,” said Farrakhan, “to let the world know that Cuba is ready to talk
with the U.S. authorities.” The same statement has been repeated recently by several Cuban
officials.¶ Yet the issue is not about talking. The avenues for engagement between Cuba and
the U.S. have never been closed. The U.S. and Cuba signed anti-hijacking and migration accords.
They talk at the U.N., in Washington, and at cocktail parties. For the U.S. to change its policies there
has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions in the
area of human rights and political change. No country changes its policies without a
substantial quid pro quo from the other side.¶ We seem to cling to an outdated economic
determinism in trying to understand events in other societies and the motivations of their
leaders. Despite economic difficulties, Raúl Castro does not seem ready to provide
meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S.-Cuba normalization. He may release and
exile some political prisoners; he may offer more consumer goods and food to tranquilize the Cuban
population; but no major structural reforms that would open the Cuban economy and no political
openings.¶ Raúl’s legitimacy is based on his closeness to Fidel Castro’s policies of economic
centralization and opposition to the U.S. He cannot now reject Fidel’s legacy and move closer to
the U.S. A move in this direction would be fraught with danger. It would create uncertainty among
the elites that govern Cuba and increase instability as some advocate rapid change while
others cling to more orthodox policies. The Cuban population also could see this as an
opportunity for mobilization to demand faster reforms.¶
High risk of violent collapse in Cuba
Maybarduk, Analyst for Cuban economics and politics, 8
*Gary H., 2008, Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies, “The US strategy for Transition in
Cuba,”, accessed
7/5/13, AK]

There is no reliable method to predict Cuba’s path in the next few years. A few moments
thought can easily lead to a dozen different scenarios, but two polar examples are worth mentioning.
Collapse could follow from a military coup or, in a more likely scenario, from a series of public
protests that turned violent. The government has a wide variety of tools it uses to contain
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demonstrations when they occur. Violence is seldom necessary. Punishment of
demonstrators usually comes after the demonstrations are over.
Violent change is bad for both Cuba and US- it will worsen the conditions on the island – turns
CP solvency and is an external DA
Cuba Study Group, organization of Cuban businesses and community leaders, 6
(Cuba Study Group, 3/15/06, Cuba Study Group, “Enhancing U.S. Policy toward Cuba: Building blocks of
a transition,”
95ba8b693d8a, accessed 7/5/13, AK)

Violent change in Cuba is antithetical to the best interests of both the United States and
Cuba. The consequent instability would create a security risk to the United States and worsen
the conditions on the island, increasing the difficulties and the costs of economic reforms and
the necessary social and political transformations. Cuba’s proximity to Florida’s shores and
the history of migration of Cubans to the U.S. would result in a massive U.S.-bound exodus in
the event of any chaotic political development in Cuba. Due to the probable breakdown of law
and order under such scenario, Cuba is very likely to become a hotbed of corruption, organized
crime and drug trafficking, seriously hampering the processes for democracy to take effective
root. The American public would have little tolerance or support for such mass exodus to
their shores.
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Cuban Sanctions Unethical
Even utilitarian calculus rejects Cuban sanctions
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
*Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 133-135 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]

Since the formation of the League of Nations, those defending sanctions have justified
them in part on the basis of utilitarian reasons: the argument is that the economic hardship
of the civilian population of the target country entails less human harm overall, and less harm
to the sanctioned population, than the military aggression or human rights violations the
sanctions seek to prevent. Yet if this is so, then—as an ethical matter—we must look at the
effectiveness of sanctions. If they do not in fact stop military aggression or human rights
violations, then a procedure that harms innocent sectors of the population loses its utilitarian
justification. We might begin by distinguishing between economic effectiveness and political
effectiveness. A common view is that the “generally accepted goal” of sanctions is “to influence the
conduct of political actors in another country who refuse to conform to the accepted norms of
international conduct. “2° Economic effectiveness concerns “the volume of pecuniary damage or
disruption inflicted, while political effectiveness refers to the degree that desired changes, if any, are
undertaken by the target state. “21 Johan Galtung points out that the economic damage done by
sanctions in fact tends to have little likelihood of actually achieving the stated goal of forcing
the target nation to change its conduct or policies. Instead, he argues, what emerges is an ethos
of “conspicuous sacrifice. “22 Far from undermining the political legitimacy of the target state,
sanctions often trigger the opposite response: Galtung used the term “rally-around-the-flag
effect” to argue that leaders in target nations could use the economic pain caused by foreign
nations to rally their populations around their cause. Rather than creating disintegration in the
target state, sanctions would invoke nationalism and political integration.2j The relation between
economic effectiveness and political effectiveness is not at all clear; indeed, it may be an inverse
relation. Many economists and historians hold that, generally, sanctions are politically ineffectual. In
the twentieth century, this assessment dates back at least to the first time the League of Nations sought
to impose sanctions on a major military power—Italy under Mussolini— and failed quite
spectacularly.24 Rather than impeding Mussolini, the sanctions were reported to increase patriotic
fervor and support for his military project. Sanctions were denounced as ineffectual in
stopping aggression,zd and the League of Nations did not survive. Losman’s study of long-term
boycotts against Israel, Cuba, and Rhodesia notes that even where there was considerable
economic damage, the only apparent political effect was increased political integration.27
The common (though not universal) result is that “the morale-killing effects of economic sanctions
often operate in the opposite fashion, stimulating xenophobia and strengthening the determination
of the target country to maintain its stance. “28 The scholarship on sanctions has to a large extent
documented this phenomenon, though it has also described exceptions. In the first large empirical study
of the success of sanctions in the twentieth century, published in 1985, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott
held that sanctions had in fact been effective in about one-third of the situations in which they were
imposed.29 Theirs is one of the most optimistic estimates. Others question whether sanctions have
been effective even one-third of the time.JO It is not surprising to see historians, political scientists, and
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economists echoing the observation that target nations cannot generally be expected to change their
acts or policies in response to sanctions. Thus, when we work out the utilitarian calculus of
sanctions, we see on one side that there is not a high likelihood that sanctions will succeed in
stopping military aggression or human rights violations. On the other side of the calculus, we
see the high probability, if not inevitability, that sanctions will harm the most
vulnerable population.
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Conditioning Fails
The US should engage with Venezuela- Sanctions and conditions do not work
Griffin, a Crimson editorial writer,13
(John, 4/3/13,“Engage with Venezuela”,
Venezuela-Chavez-death/, Accessed 7/5/13,I.K)

Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened
Chávez’s position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests
or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas
(whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington
is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position, while
simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s. If Washington wants Latin America to stop its
current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less
astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an
aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin America. Beyond leading to more
amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would
also be economically advisable. With the world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources,
and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically.
Even now, America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at
one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to
keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil
company. Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with
the entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the United States was
unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most
trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the
United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from
such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best
course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has
created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic
cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can
rightly be criticized—authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly
policies—nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any
effect. The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and
work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We aren’t catching any flies with
our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey.

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General – Conditions Fail
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Conditions Fail
Constructive engagement is flawed.
Sur, 10
[June, Connectas Human Rights, “International Journal on Human Rights”, P 184-185, accessed 7-9, CC]
The argument is that the mere existence of aiding and abetting liability will deter¶ investment in foreign
countries and thereby undermine the U.S. foreign policy of¶ ‘constructive engagement’. To evaluate the
merits of this argument and so also the¶ correctness of its dismissal, it is necessary to outline the
‘constructive engagement’¶ model and examine the effect aiding and abetting liability would
have on it. The¶ model is largely based on the idea that foreign investment by corporations in
countries¶ with repressive regimes will encourage reform and promote democracy and
human¶ rights.42 The model is highly controversial and has generated much debate which¶ goes
beyond the scope of this paper. There have been contradictory empirical studies,¶ one
concluded that in some cases constructive engagement and investment actually¶ had the
opposite effect by encouraging and increasing repressive behavior (FORCESE,¶ 2002, p. 10-17)
while another concluded that foreign investment was associated with¶ increased respect for
civil and political rights (RICHARDS, 2001, p. 231-232).¶ What is of relevance is that since one of the
purported goals of constructive¶ engagement is to promote freedom and democracy; a
corporation which aids or¶ abets human rights violations would undermine the model and
further the very¶ abuses it claims to help eradicate. Moreover, complicit corporations may have
huge¶ legal and economic interests in maintaining or supporting oppressive regimes and¶ without the
threat of liability as incentive to encourage reform face no consequences.¶ In this regard aiding and
abetting liability could be used as a tool to ensure¶ that individual corporations who defy the policy of
constructive engagement are¶ held accountable. It could also encourage corporations to conduct
business in ways¶ which promote the goals of democracy and human rights in general. Thus
aiding¶ and abetting liability could actually facilitate rather than undermine the model¶ and the
argument of the U.S. government must fail.¶ The commentator Richard Herz has presented similar
arguments and noted¶ further inconsistencies. First, the U.S. government seems to be applying a
‘double¶ standard’ by criticizing oppressive regimes but protecting corporations for aiding
or¶ abetting abuses committed by them and that this casts doubt on how committed¶ the
government in fact is to brining about reform in advancing democracy and¶ human rights.43
Second, by protecting corporations from liability on foreign¶ policy grounds the government
may in fact ‘encourage or subsidize’ complicity.¶ This is so as without the possibility of being held
accountable corporations could¶ decrease costs involved with taking measures to avoid complicity and
without the¶ possibility of litigation avoid being liable for compensating successful victims. Such¶
corporations could have a competitive edge over other corporations who refuse to¶ operate
in countries with oppressive regimes.¶ It could be argued that the risks of litigation are too
marginal to deter¶ corporations from being complicit in abuses where comparatively huge
economic¶ profit is at stake. However, as Herz correctly points out, the U.S. government’s¶ argument
is that the risk of liability under the ATCA would be so substantial so as¶ to deter investment. Assuming
that the risks of liability would be too marginal to¶ deter complicity, the underlying rationale of the
government’s argument would fall¶ away. On the other hand if the risk of potential litigation were
substantial enough¶ to deter corporations from being complicit in abuses committed by oppressive¶
regimes, the U.S. government’s opposition of liability could reward and encourage¶ investment which
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directly undermines the model upon which their foreign policy¶ is based. These inconsistencies as
noted by Herz provide additional convincing¶ support for rejecting the views of the U.S.
government (HERZ, 2008, p. 207).¶ The preceding section argued that aiding and abetting liability could
promote¶ rather than undermine U.S. foreign policy. By opposing liability corporations¶ would be
shielded and perhaps even encouraged to engage in practices which would¶ undermine the
purported goals of the ‘constructive engagement’ model. For these¶ reasons Judge Scheindlin was
correct in dismissing the argument that aiding and¶ abetting liability would undermine U.S. foreign
Smart sanctions fail—don’t force change and continue humanitarian violations
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 11
*Joy, Fall, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 25, Issue 3, “Smart Sanctions Revisited” page PQ,
ProQuest, accessed 7/6/13, VJ]

Several types of targeted sanctions, such as arms embargoes, have structural problems with
implementation that appear to be irresolvable after almost two decades of efforts by practitioners,
NGOs, and academics. Most types of smart sanctions have not brought about an increase in
effectiveness that is dramatically better than that of "traditional" broad trade sanctions. Some
have argued that effectiveness has to be understood more broadly than just target compliance.
As noted earlier, Baldwin maintains that sanctions should be seen as effective if they increase the costs
to the targeted actor or otherwise affect the calculus of decision-making. Adopting a different approach,
Brzoska suggested that, in the case of arms embargoes, while target compliance was very low, arms
embargoes could be considered much more successful if we look instead at situations where the sender
is satisfied with the outcome, regardless of actual compliance. There may be merit to Baldwin's and
Brzoska's strategies for evaluating the impact of sanctions. However, they do not support the view that,
because they aim at specific individuals or goods, targeted sanctions are significantly more effective
than traditional trade sanctions. These proposals only suggest that if we use different criteria, we
will view sanctions as more successful than they seem by the measurement of target
compliance. But that is equally true of traditional sanctions. And, as Drezner notes, however
"smart" the sanctions are, their effectiveness is compromised when the senders have
different goals. One sender can be looking for containment, another for regime change; or
one sender's goals can change as its strategic interests in the region change, without any goal
being accomplished.75 To the extent that targeted sanctions are imposed to achieve conflicting or
ambiguous goals, they will be no more effective than traditional sanctions. More disappointingly,
targeted sanctions did not bring an end to the humanitarian damage or the ethical
conundrums presented by traditional trade sanctions - at least not in the manner expected. Arms
embargoes that are imposed against all parties- both aggressors and victims- can cripple the
self-defense efforts of those under attack. Aviation bans can undermine a major component
of a nation's transportation sector, adversely affecting the civilian population generally.
Financial sanctions targeting the personal assets of individuals - the form of targeted sanctions
that is often seen as the most promising in every regard - has raised issues of due process that have
brought into question the fundamental nature of the Council's authority to impose Chapter VII
measures. It may even be that the rhetoric of targeted sanctions has caused, so to speak, a
certain collateral damage: it seems that the trend toward designing- or at least labeling -
economic measures as "targeted" has done much to silence the discussion of the
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humanitarian impact. Where the 1990s witnessed growing demands that humanitarian monitoring be
incorporated within the sanctions regime, and for prior assessment of the humanitarian impact, this has
largely ceased. It seems that the common view is that since sanctions are now "smart," we no
longer have to worry about harming the innocent. But that is clearly not the case. Sanctions
targeting a nation's financial system, or critical industries or exports, disrupt the economy as
a whole, much like traditional trade sanctions.
Sanctions fail and it’s impossible to apply util to sanctions
McGee, president of the Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research, 03
*Robert W., December 1, Economic Affairs, pg 42, “THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS”, EBSCO,
accessed 7/6/13, VJ]
If the sanctions are successful, the nations imposing the sanctions gain psychic income, since
their efforts have paid off and have resulted in the target country buckling under pressure to change
behaviour. If the sanctions were imposed because the target country engages in human rights abuses,
the people who are being abused benefit when the abuses cease. If the abusive country has been
abusing the rights of 10 million of its own people, there are 10 million beneficiaries. But that
is only one side of the coin. Who are the losers? If the oil embargo is effective, the price of oil
must necessarily go up, since the supply is effectively reduced. That being the case, the 6
billion people on the planet who use oil, either directly or indirectly, are losers because they
must pay more for oil and oil products. The obvious retort to this line of reasoning is that the 10
million people who cease to have their human rights abused more than offsets the few extra pennies
that 6 billion losers must pay for their oil. That may or may not be the case. One of the major
problems with utilitarian ethics is that there is no precise way to measure gains and losses. Is
it worth it to pressure some country to ease up on their human rights abuses if doing so
causes the price of oil to increase just a little bit? Such a decision involves value judgements
and estimates as to gains and losses. Another major problem with this line of reasoning is
that the assumption is that the sanctions are effective. Studies have almost uniformly shown that
sanctions are more likely to fail than succeed. That being the case, it appears even less likely
that a sanction intended to prevent or reduce human rights abuses will result in a positive-
sum game. What is a more likely scenario is that the 10 million people in the target country
will not experience a lessening in the extent of the human rights abuses perpetrated against
them, while the 6 billion other people in the world will have to pay higher prices for oil and
oil products. Thus, everyone is a loser. Indeed, the sanctions may result in additional suffering
on the part of the very people the sanctions are intended to help. That is definitely the case with
the sanctions against Iraq, as we shall discuss below.
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Turn – Strengthens the Regime
Sanctions fail, hurt the general public, and strengthen repressive forces
Lopez, PhD from Syracuse University, 2K
[George A., November 25
, America Magazine, “Toward Ethical Economic Sanctions”,, accessed 7/5/13, VJ]

Despite their frequent use, however, the conventional belief still holds that sanctions are mostly
symbolic in nature and have little practical impact. One reporter described sanctions as an
ineffective bromide intended to placate public demands for action but incapable of achieving
real results. Whether in Cuba, where 40 years of U.S. embargo have not dislodged Castro, or in
Iraq, where Saddam Hussein remains firmly in power despite 10 years of U.N. sanctions, sanctions
seem to have minimal political consequences or none at all. Yet contrary to this critique, as the
case of Iraq illustrates, their economic bite can be sufficiently sharp that sanctions will have
severe humanitarian and social consequences. In Haiti the short-lived U.N. embargo of 1993-
94 also had negative impacts on children’s health. In Cuba and Nicaragua, unilateral U.S.
sanctions undermined significant advances in public health. Sanctions often cause social
consequences that make the desired political changes within the target regime less likely.
During the 1991-95 war in Yugoslavia, U.N. sanctions deprived middle-class human rights groups
of international contacts and support and reduced the availability of newsprint and
broadcasting equipment with which these groups sought to challenge the regime’s warlike
policies. Sanctions harmed the very constituencies within Serbia that were most supportive
of the human rights norms being advanced by the United Nations. Sanctions also have the
bitterly ironic result of fostering black market criminality, which in many cases is controlled
by state forces or paramilitary groups. This strengthens the repressive forces against which
sanctions are supposedly aimed.
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AT: Symbolic Solvency
Sanctions fail as symbolic messages—overly penal and there are better alternatives
Winkler, PhD in political science, 99
*Adam, Human Rights Quarterly Volume 21 Issue 1, “Just Sanctions”, Page 144,, accessed
7/9/13, VJ]

A second dilemma for right intention is that posed by the pursuit of symbolic goals. David
Baldwin argues that sanctions should be understood to have both primary economic objectives,
such as impacting a foreign economy and achieving a change in a target nation's policies, and symbolic
objectives, such as demonstrating resolve to allies or domestic constituents. 72 According to
Baldwin, even when sanctions have little economic impact, they may still be considered successful if
symbolic messages are relayed. 73 As sanctions are more often successful in relaying messages than in
achieving policy objectives, Baldwin recommends that states use them for their communicative
potential. 74 The principle of right intention, however, renders the pursuit of symbolic goals
objectionable. Because of the harm caused by economic sanctions, they are far too penal to
be used as signaling devices intended for domestic constituents or foreign allies. Symbolic
messages can be sent in numerous other ways without harming anyone, including public
statements, resolutions of international organizations, and diplomatic maneuvers, like
recalling ambassadors or negotiators. Symbolic sanctions are neither the last resort short of war nor
do they aim at objectives that absolutely mandate inflicting harm on others. Finally, symbolic goals
are often unarticulated and thus risk the same dangers of vague sanctioning goals described

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General - Conditions Unethical
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Punish Innocent Civilians
Sanctions are modern siege warfare—they systematically deprive the innocents of basic life
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
*Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 126-127 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]

Thus, the argument can be made that siege is a form of warfare that itself constitutes a war
crime. In just war doctrine we could demand a justification for a military strategy in terms of the
obligation to minimize harm to civilians: the ammunition factory was a legitimate target, and there was
no way to bomb it without collateral damage to nearby residential areas. But siege is peculiar in that it
resists such an analysis: the immediate goal is precisely to cause suffering to civilians. In the case
of the ammunitions factory, we can answer the question, how is this act consistent with the moral
requirement to discriminate? In the case of siege, we cannot. Sanctions are subject to many of the
same moral objections as siege. They intentionally, or at least predictably, harm the most
vulnerable and the least political, and this is something the party imposing sanctions either knows or
should know. To the extent that economic sanctions seek to undermine the economy of a society
and thereby prevent the production or importation of necessities, they are functioning as the
modern equivalent of siege. To the extent that sanctions deprive the most vulnerable and least
political sectors of society of the food, potable water, medical care, and fuel necessary for
survival and basic human needs, sanctions should be subject to the same moral objections as siege
warfare. Drew Christiansen and Gerard Powers argue that the just war doctrine does not apply to
peacetime sanctions in the same way that this doctrine applies to sieges and blockades imposed as part
of a war effort. The fundamental difference, they hold, is that the use of economic sanctions is rooted in
the intention to avoid the use of armed force, as opposed to the intent to multiply the effects of wars
The distinction between sanctions-as-war and sanctions-as-nonviolent-alternative-to war goes back to
the fundamental question, what kind of “things” are economic sanctions? Are sanctions “a stern but
peaceful act”-a punishment that inconveniences or embarrasses, but does no damage of the sort that
raises moral issues? Or are they a form of slow-acting but lethal warfare, which targets the
innocent and helpless in a way that would constitute a war crime in a military context? The
implications of this ontological issue are enormous: in one view, economic sanctions are attractive and
can be ethically justified easily and often; in the other view, sanctions do gratuitous, direct human
damage that is ethically indefensible. Christiansen and Powers suggest that warfare is akin to the
death penalty, whereas sanctions are more like attaching someone’s assets in a civil proceeding. In this
analogy, the economic domain is seen as fully separate, and of a different nature altogether, from the
domain of power and violence. But economic harm, while it is not directly physical, can also be a
form of violence. The sanctions-asmere- seizure-of-assets theory, whether on the level of the
individual or an entire economy, implicitly assumes a starting point of relative abundance. Whether the
seizure of someone’s assets is inconvenient or devastating depends entirely on what those assets are
and how much is left after the seizure. “Economic deprivation” is not a uniform phenomenon; the
loss of conveniences constitutes a different experience from the loss of the means to meet
basic needs. I do not deny that the contexts in which sanctions and sieges occur maybe different. The
intent of each may differ the nature of the demands maybe different, and the options of the besieged or
sanctioned states may be different. But the moral objection to sanctions does not rest on the analogy;
sanctions do not have to be identical to siege warfare in order to be subject to condemnation
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under just war principles. Indeed, if the intent of sanctions is peaceful rather than belligerent,
then the usual justifications in warfare are unavailable. I am morally permitted to kill where
my survival is at stake, and in war, I am morally permitted to kill even innocents, in some
circumstances. But if one’s goal is to see that international law is enforced or that human
rights are respected, then the stakes and the justificatory context are quite different. Lori
Fisler Damrosch has argued that sanctions warrant a particularly high degree of tolerance because of the
importance of the international norms they are intended to protect: Especially in the case of norms such
as the prohibitions against aggression and genocide, which are themselves devoted to the preservation
of human life, it may be necessary to tolerate a high level of civilian hardship in order to prevent or at
least discourage future violations.7 Yet it is hard to make sense of the claim that “collateral
damage” can be justified in the name of protecting human rights; or that international law
might be enforced by means that stand in violation of international laws, including the just
war principle of discrimination. Thus, if sanctions are analogous to siege warfare, then they are
problematic for the same reasons—both effectively violate the principle of discrimination. But if
sanctions are not analogous to siege, then they are even more difficult to justify. If the goals of
sanctions are the enforcement of humanitarian standards or compliance with legal and
ethical norms, then extensive and predictable harm to civilians cannot be justified even by
reference to survival or military advantage. Insofar as this is the case, sanctions are simply a
device of cruelty garbed in self-righteousness.
Smart sanctions only mask civilian suffering—sanctions are inherently unethical
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
*Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 141-142, Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]

Many of those who defend sanctions do not argue that damage to innocents is morally
acceptable, but rather that this damage is not inherent in sanctions and could in principle be
mitigated or avoided altogether. Where measures are taken to minimize civilian harm, the
argument goes, sanctions are ethically defensible. But this optimism is inconsistent with the
nature of economic sanctions, as well as with the history of sanctions and the logic of the
vested interests created by sanctions. If economic sanctions are motivated by an intent to do
economic damage, then partial sanctions and humanitarian exemptions will allow the target nation to
adjust its economy to minimize the overall damage, undermining the intentions of the political actors
imposing the sanctions. The more complete the sanctions, the more effective they will be, in
terms of economic damage; but that in turn means that the economy as a whole will be
undermined. The greater the degree to which the economy is generally undermined, the
greater the damage to the civilian population, outside the military and political leadership.
The greater the damage to the civilian population, the more serious the harm will be to the
most vulnerable sectors—infants, the elderly, the sick, the handicapped, pregnant women,
widows with children. Sanctions that are economically effective necessarily entail the greatest harm
to those who are the most vulnerable and the most disenfranchised from power. The ethical dilemma
is not resolved by placing blame on the target state for its initial wrongdoing or for its
response to economic crisis. We know from the history of sanctions, and of sieges and blockades
in wartime, that the state will generally increase the proportion of the economy that goes to the
support of the political leadership and to the military, for any of a number of reasons: because
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

national security is legitimately seen as the highest priority, or because the nature of the “siege
mentality” is that the leadership will first protect itself, or because desperate need for basic goods
creates opportunities for black marketeering. This may shift part of the moral responsibility to the
target state, but it does not vitiate the moral agency that resides in the state that initiated the
crisis by imposing sanctions in the first place, particularly in light of the predictability of the
outcome. The use of sanctions is even more troubling if we acknowledge that the odds are not good
that any political ends will be achieved by sanctions. Even if the end is one that could justify
the human cost of sanctions—such as stopping military aggression— the one thing we know
about sanctions is that they are generally unlikely to achieve their goal. Alternatively, we
could frame the “goals” of sanctions not in terms of political ends, but in terms of punishment or
symbolic expression. However, these cannot claim the ethical justification that was invoked
when sanctions were seen as the means of stopping war—that harm to innocents may be
justified when it is for the purpose of preventing a far greater harm. Establishing criteria for
the ethical use of sanctions does not resolve these contradictions, but instead masks them.
To say that sanctions are ethical as long as we make sure to minimize civilian harm is to mask
the fact that sanctions by their nature cause harm to civilians directly and primarily. It is like
using a pickaxe for brain surgery the nature of the instrument suggests that targeting certain areas with
precision and effectiveness, without killing the patient in the process, is not going to happen. It is
disingenuous to be surprised or apologetic when sanctions turn out to do no harm to a ruling
elite, to achieve none of the ostensible goals of the sanctions regarding “unacceptable behavior” or
“punishment of international outlaws, ” and to be generally ineffectual for much of anything besides
rhetorical posturing and the psychological gratification of having done something.
Sanctions take civilian populations hostage—the sacrifice of whole people for strategic
interests is ethically indefensible
Kochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94
*Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The
Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”,, accessed 7/8/13, VJ]
We don’t endorse ableist language

Comprehensive economic sanctions, then – continuing with the comparison above – have the
ethical quality of terror bombings: the civilian population is explicitly taken hostage in the
framework of a security strategy of power politics. It is self-evident that this kind of political
instrumentalization of the human being – as the citizen of a community that is a subject in
international law – is not compatible with his status as an autonomous subject, i.e. with human
dignity.23 People have a natural right not to be sacrificed for a strategic purpose over whose
formulation and realization they exercise no influence. As Quinn says, "They have a right not to
be pressed, in apparent violation of their prior rights, into the service of other people's
purposes."24 In the area of ethics, the so-called "Doctrine of Double Effect" secures every person's
right to veto "a certain kind of attempt to make the world a better place at his expense."25 It attacks
the purely utilitarian approach (the maximization of usefulness) which, in the case of
sanctions, could sacrifice the health and prosperity of a whole people for the sake of the
external political purposes of member states in the Security Council or of another state coalition.
(This could be clarified case by case in such measures as the sanctions placed against Iraq, Former
Yugoslavia, Haiti, etc.) The sacrifice of a whole people for the sake of the strategic interests of a
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

superpower or of a coalition of states (as may be formed within the Security Council) would
appear to be in no way ethically justifiable.26 Assertions to this effect have already been made in
connection with the sanctions against South Africa: if there are no general criteria for morally evaluating
a particular political strategy, then those who have to bear the primary costs of measures such as
sanctions should be able to decide whether they are to be imposed.27 The general ethical principle
guiding the use of sanctions should thus be that consideration be taken of the affected population in the
formulation of such measures. Precisely this principle, however, is excluded by the nature of the
coercive measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As American authors have
illustrated in an evaluation of the sanctions policy in the wake of the Gulf War, economic sanctions
cause the civilian population to be held hostage in its own country.28 Measures such as those which
explicitly intend to harm the population are to be judged as amoral,29 for "one cannot
intentionally cripple an economy without intentionally affecting the people whose working
and consuming lives are partially constitutive of that economy."30

Sanctions fail and disproportionally and intentionally target the most vulnerable and least
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
*Joy, Fall, Cross Currents, Volume 49, Issue 3, “ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, JUST WAR DOCTRINE, AND THE
7/9/13, VJ]

To some extent, their reasons reiterate the same arguments made by others -- that sanctions are less
harsh than warfare; that the population consented to, or for other reasons can properly be held
responsible for, the acts of the leadership; that structuring in humanitarian exceptions will prevent
sanctions from causing death or great suffering. I have addressed these issues elsewhere.(24) Here I
want to look at Christiansen and Powers to draw a distinction between sanctions-as-war and sanctions-
without-war. The distinction does not resolve the underlying question: Are sanctions a device that
keeps the peace and enforces international law, or are they intrinsically a form of violence,
which in fact violates the laws of warfare? Woodrow Wilson, in urging the adoption of sanctions as
a method by which the League of Nations would keep the world free of war, described them as a
"peaceful, silent, deadly remedy." And indeed, before the Iraq situation showed us how extensive
and extreme the human damage from sanctions can be, economic sanctions were most
commonly portrayed in the U.S. as a kind of stern but peaceful act -- a punishment which
inconveniences or embarrasses, but does no damage of the sort that raises moral issues. In fact, it was
the peace activists who, in 1990, were in the forefront arguing that sanctions be used in the case of Iraq
rather than military undertakings. Like many other commentators, Christiansen and Powers are partly
basing their claim on two sets of empirical assumptions regarding the speed and degree of damage done
by sanctions: "Whereas war's impact is speedy and frequently lethal, the impact of sanctions grows over
time and allows more easily for mitigation of these harmful effects and for a negotiated solution than
acts of war."(25) Christiansen and Powers suggest that the way to conceptualize sanctions is that
warfare is akin to the death penalty, whereas sanctions are more like attaching someone's assets in a
civil proceeding.(26) In this analogy, the economic domain is seen as fully separate, and of a
different nature altogether, than the domain of power and of violence. But economic harm,
while it is not directly physical, can also be a form of violence. The sanctions-as-mere-seizure-
of-assets theory, whether on the level of the individual or an entire economy, implicitly
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

assumes a starting point of relative abundance. Whether the seizure of someone's assets is
inconvenient or devastating depends entirely on what their assets are, and how much is left
after the seizure. For an upper-middle-class person with, say, $50,000 in stocks and an annual
income of $80,000, seizing $1000 from a checking account would at most cause
inconvenience, annoyance, perhaps some slight reduction in luxuries or indulgences. For
someone living at poverty level, seizing $1000 may mean that a family has lost irreplaceably
the ability to pay for fuel oil for a winter's heating season, or lost their car in a rural area with
no other transportation, or lost the security deposit and first month's rent on an apartment
that would have given them a way out of a homeless shelter. Living in a home with a
temperature of 40 degrees in the winter does not kill quickly, in the way that a bullet does,
and may not kill at all. It may only make someone sick, or over some time, worsen an illness
until death occurs. Living in a shelter or on the street for a night or for a week or for a month
doesn't kill in the way that a bullet does, but it exposes someone to a risk of considerable
random violence, including killings. To conceptualize economic deprivation in terms of mild
punishment whose effects are reversible with no permanent damage -- inconvenience,
embarrassment, living on a budget -- is to misunderstand the nature of the economic.
"Economic deprivation" is not a uniform phenomenon; the loss of conveniences constitutes a different
experience than the loss of the means to meet basic needs. There is a reason that infant mortality rates
and life expectancy rates are used as measures of economic development: poverty manifests itself in
malnutrition, sickness, exposure to the elements, exhaustion, dirty drinking water, the lack of means to
leave a violent country or neighborhood -- the shortening of one's life. It is for this reason that liberation
theologians and others have argued that poverty is indeed a form of violence, although it doesn't kill in
the way that a bullet does. Christiansen and Powers argue that sanctions differ from siege partly on the
grounds that the intent of sanctions is to prevent violence rather than exacerbate it. Under the doctrine
of double effect, however, this does not seem to hold. The doctrine of double effect provides that the
foreseen evil effect of a man's action is not morally imputable to him, provided that (1) the action in
itself is directed immediately to some other result, (2) the evil effect is not willed either in itself or as a
means to the other result, (3) the permitting of the evil effect is justified by reasons of proportionate
weight.(27) Although the doctrine of double effect would seem to justify "collateral damage,"
it does not offer a justification of sanctions. "Collateral damage" entails the unintended
secondary harm to civilians. If a bombing raid is conducted against a military base, the
collateral damage would be that the schoolhouse half a mile away was destroyed by a bomb
that missed its intended target, which was the military base. In that case, the bombing raid would
be equally successful if the base were hit, and the schoolhouse were undamaged. But the damage done
by indirect sanctions is not in fact "collateral," in that the damage to the civilian population is necessary
and instrumental. The direct damage to the economy is intended to indirectly influence the
leadership, by triggering political pressure or uprisings of the civilians, or by generating moral
guilt from the "fearful spectacle of the civilian dead." Sanctions directed against an economy
would in fact be considered unsuccessful if no disruption of the economy took place. We often
hear commentators objecting that "sanctions didn't work" in one situation or another because they
weren't "tight" enough -- they did not succeed in disrupting the economy. Thus, sanctions are not
defensible under the doctrine of double effect. Although the end may indeed be legitimate, the
intended intermediate means consists of the generalized damage to the economy, which violates both
the first and second requirements of the doctrine. But there is a second reason why good intent can not
available as a justification for sanctions: the intent cannot in good faith be reconciled with the history
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

and the logic of sanctions, and with the likely outcome. We know from the history of siege warfare that,
legitimately or not, in the face of economic strangulation, the military and political leadership
will insulate themselves from its consequences, and place a disproportionate burden on the
civilian population. We also know from history that economic strangulation will consolidate
the state's power rather than undermine it; we know that sanctions are, for the most part,
unlikely to prevent military aggression, or stop human rights violations, or achieve
compliance with any political or military demand, even when sanctions drag on for decades. It
is hard to reconcile the claimed "good intent" of sanctions with a history that makes it easy to foresee
that those intentions are not likely to be realized. Thus, I would suggest that while sanctions may
have very different goals than siege warfare -- including goals such as international
governance -- they are nevertheless subject to many of the same moral objections: that they
intentionally, or at least predictably, harm the most vulnerable and the least political; and that
this is something which the party imposing sanctions either knows, or should know. To the extent that
economic sanctions seek to undermine the economy of a society, and thereby prevent the production or
importation of necessities, they are functioning as the modern equivalent of siege. To the extent that
sanctions deprive the most vulnerable and least political sectors of society of the food,
potable water, medical care, and fuel necessary for survival and basic human needs,
sanctions should be subject to the same moral objections as siege warfare.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Sanctions are Genocide/Warfare
Violent sanctions outweigh war
Dalecki, writer, 12
[Maggie, October 1
, The Ethics Blog, “Are Economic Sanctions Ethical?”,, accessed 7/6/13, VJ]

Economic sanctions are often seen as a way to change the way a government behaves that is
easier and more humane than war. However, Professor Emily Muller (University of Manitoba)
argues that our faith in them is based on a misperception. When we look more closely at their
effects on civilian populations, and at their effectiveness in actually bringing change, we can
see that they are often a bad idea. Those in favour of sanctions argue that because they avoid
military action, they are an important tool to promote change internationally without
bringing on the horrors of war. But economic sanctions can be brutal. They often create levels
of civilian suffering and hardship as great as or even greater than those resulting from war. If
their imposition is to be ethically defensible, the harm done to civilians should be offset or outweighed
by a reasonable chance of securing victory. Another problem with economic sanctions, however,
is that they are imprecise and their effects are unpredictable. Generally it is extremely
difficult to know whom they will hurt most, or whether they will affect those in power at all.
Further, if sanctions are to work, there must be a reliable connection between subjecting civilian
populations to economic hardship and those populations pressuring their governments to change. And if
the people do bring such pressure, it must be effective. Professor Muller thinks that in many cases, the
sanctions will either rally support for the enemy regime, or rob the population of its ability to
bring about change. There is a strong connection between a thriving middle class and accountable
governments, says Professor Muller. She argues that when societies are placed under economic
sanctions, it often disempowers the middle class by reducing them to poverty. This in turn
robs them of their capacity to deal with political oppression. It is also important to consider,
when contemplating sanctions, who takes responsibility. Because sanctions seem like an easy and
bloodless alternative to war, and because the harms are indirect and hard to calculate,
governments are often quick to impose them, without thinking seriously about the true costs
or about the prospects for success. And the governments responsible for sanctions often fail
to accept any blame for the suffering they cause. Whoever imposes economic sanctions must
take their decision seriously, and must be prepared to bear responsibility for the effects –
especially harmful ones – of this decision.

Sanctions are genocidal
Anderson, senior editor, 10
*David E., September 13, Religion & Ethics Weekly, “The Ethics of Sanctions”,, accessed
7/6/13, VJ]

Sanctions are attractive to policy makers—and the public—for a number of reasons. They
seem more substantial than diplomatic finger-wagging, less costly to impose than military
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action, and morally preferable to war. “They are often discussed as though they were a mild
sort of punishment, not an act of aggression of the kind that has actual human costs,’’ Gordon
wrote in a 1999 issue of CrossCurrents, the journal of Association for Religion and Intellectual Life. Over
the years, as the humanitarian consequences and punitive social impact of comprehensive
economic sanctions imposed on Iraq and other countries such as Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Yugoslavia became apparent, ethicists began debating more urgently how this tool should be
understood. Albert C. Pierce, professor of ethics and national security at the National Defense
University in Washington, DC, writing in a 1996 issue of Ethics & International Affairs, the journal of the
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, argued that economic sanctions “are intended to
inflict great human suffering, pain, harm, and even death and thus should be subject to the
same kind of careful moral and ethical scrutiny given to the use of military force before it is
chosen as a means to achieve national political objectives.’’ According to Gordon, “because
sanctions are themselves a form of violence, they cannot legitimately be seen merely as a
peacekeeping device, or as a tool for enforcing international law.…They require the same
level of justification as other acts of warfare.’’ Pierce, Gordon, and others say sanctions should
be evaluated in much the same way and with similar principles as force is evaluated, that is,
with the just war doctrine. Gordon, for example, argues the sanctions imposed on Iraq violated both
the criteria that must be met before going to war, such as just cause and the probability of success, and
the criteria for how the war is conducted, employing such norms as proportionality and discrimination,’
which bars directly intended attacks on noncombatants and noncombatant targets. Comprehensive
economic sanctions as employed against nations such as Iraq in 1990, Haiti in 1991, and Cuba since the
1960s, have failed to achieve their goals while at the same imposing devastating hardships on the
civilian population. Gordon cites studies that found the economic sanctions leveled against Iraq were
responsible for the death of some 237,000 Iraqi children under age five. At best, sanctions have been
successful in just a third of the cases where they have been employed. US sanctions in Iraq
“systemically overrode many of the basic principles of international humanitarian law,” she
writes, adding that “many have maintained that the magnitude of the suffering was such that
the sanctions regime could properly be termed genocidal.”
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Unethical - Must Reject the CP
Sanctions are ethically unacceptable
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
*Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 128-129 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]

In addition to viewing sanctions within the ethical framework offered by the just war
doctrine, we should also examine them from a deontological perspective. I refer here to Kant’s
ethical theory, which holds that all rational beings are characterized by “dignity,” the inherent
worth of a person that makes him or her irreplaceable and that stands in contrast to those
material things with a price, which can be exchanged for other things of equal or greater price
without loss. This is the basis for Kant’s claim that all rational beings have autonomy, the right and the
capacity to rule themselves. In Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that it is a
categorical imperative, an unconditional moral mandate binding on all rational beings, to “act
in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
another, always as an end and never simply as a means.”8 This ethical framework would arguably
have had little to offer in the debate over sanctions at the time that Article 16 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations was being set forth as a mechanism of enforcement. The articulated purpose of
sanctions was quite narrow: it was to stop military aggression. In that context, there were
two innocent populations involved—the nonpolitical/nonmilitary population of the aggressor
nation and the entire population of the nation under attack. Because deontological ethics enjoins
us to treat all human beings as ends in themselves and not solely as means, it would not offer much
guidance in the situation where some innocent population (or at least a sector of the population) will be
harmed, and where the issue is whether the innocents who are harmed will be the civilian population of
the aggressor nation upon whom sanctions are imposed, or the civilian population of the attacked
nations who are the objects of military aggression. In this case, either one population is the means to
the military victory of the aggressor, or the other population is the means to interdict the aggressor. But
deontological arguments do offer guidance in situations where military aggression is not at
issue, and where the choice therefore is not which innocent population suffers harm, but whether
an innocent population may be harmed in the service of the political interests of a foreign
state, or for the interest of the international community in enforcing norms. Where sanctions
impose suffering on innocent sectors of the target country population for an objective other
than preventing the deaths of other innocent persons, this is clearly incompatible with
deontological ethics, since in these situations, to use Kantian language, human beings are reduced
to nothing more than a means to an end, where that end is something less than the lives of
other human beings.
Sanctions fail and are only ethical if they result in change
Rarick, Professor at Purdue, and Duchatelet, Dean at Purdue, 08
[Charles A, Martine, June 1
, Economic Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 2, “AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

When we look at the consequences of sanctions, in most cases the outcome has been to
lower the economic, educational and healthcare systems of the sanctioned countries. While
one could argue that higher pleasures such as virtue and moral principle could override the
negative consequences of sanctions, it is questionable that most people in sanctioned
countries would agree with that argument. In some cases the citizens of sanctioned countries may.
through state propaganda, take a different view. However, factual data concerning quality-of-life issues
is a better indicator of negative consequences. The longest-running case of economic sanctions,
the embargo against Cuba, has harmed the healthcare industry of that country. A study by
the American Association for World Health concluded that economic sanctions haw had a
devastating impact on the quality of healthcare in Cuba. The trade embargo is responsible, at
least in part, for increases in certain diseases such as waterbome illness, the lack of surgical
supplies and equipment, and the unavailability of medicine (Williams, 191")- While the socialist
policies of Fidel Castro have made medical services available to all citizens of Cuba, the lack of medicine,
medical supplies and equipment have decreased the effectiveness of healthcare providers. The dire
economic conditions in Cuba, of course, cannot entirely be blamed on US economic sanctions. Castro
has been a less than effective economic planner. He has, however, been able to blame his failed policies
on US-imposed sanctions (Katz, 2005) and has gained some sympathy with other political leaders in the
region. There are both short- and long-term consequences of US sanctions against Cuba, and
the results of this policy may be felt for some time past the eventual lifting of the sanctions. If
sanctions were effective most of the time, it could be argued that the positive results gained
by the people of the sanctioned country justify* the necessary pain they experience in the
application of the sanctions. This is not, however, the case because economic sanctions
seldom achieve their desired aims. In most cases, they therefore result in a net loss in
happiness for sanctioned-country citizens, both in terms of lower and higher forms of
Sanctions are unethical instruments of mass destruction
Rarick, Professor at Purdue, and Duchatelet, Dean at Purdue, 08
[Charles A, Martine, June 1
, Economic Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 2, “AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE

The main deontologist. eighteenth-century German
philosopher Immanuel Kant, discounted the consequences of behaviour in assessing ethics, and instead
focused on human reasoning and logic. Kant developed the categorical imperative as his framework for
ethical behaviour. The categorical imperative has two formulations; the first being universalism. In
order to act in an ethical manner a person has to want the behaviour they are engaging in to
be universally applied. For example, if you want the act of murder to be ethical, you would
have to accept that everyone is entitled to murder others. The second formulation of the
categorical imperative - 'So act that you use humanity, whether in your person or in the person of any
other, always at the same time as an ends, never as a means' (Kant. can be used to argue against the use
of sanctions. Sanctions are a means to an end. The theory operating behind sanctions is to cause
as much pain as possible to the people of the receiving country in order for pressure to be
brought on the government. The citizens of the sanctioned country are used as a means to
achieve the foreign policy objectives of the sanctioning country. Using people as a means
represents an inhumane form of public policy. Dennis Halliday. former co-ordinator of United
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Nations Resolution 986 (Food-for-Oil in Iraq), describes economic sanctions as a 'totally bankrupt
concept'. Sanctions in Iraq caused the price of basic food products to greatly increase,
resulted in inadequate nutrition, caused a decline of healthcare, and led to the collapse of the
national currency (BBC, 1998). According to UN1CEF, economic sanctions against Iraq resulted in
a doubling of the death rate for children less than five years of age. The organisation reports that
the sanctions made it wry difficult for parents to provide needed medicine, food and safe drinking water
for their children, and estimates that they resulted in the deaths of 500,000 children under the age of
five between 1991 and 199s (Pigler, 2004)- Economic sanctions themselves can be called
instruments of mass destruction (Mueller and Mueller, 1999) when one considers the human
toll inflicted on the innocent people of
sanctioned countries.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Economic Bullying
Sanctions are economic bullying—only the superpowers have the ability to hurt growing
nations to maintain their lead
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
*Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 136-137 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]

Large and diversified economies are virtually immune to sanctions, since they have the
economic flexibility to pay higher costs in the short run, and to make structural changes in the
long run.sq Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott note that nations with weak or unstable economies
therefore make the best targets for economic sanctions. In a section entitled “The Weakest Go to
the Wall,” they argue that “there seems to be a direct correlation between the political and
economic health of the target country and its susceptibility to economic pressure,” and suggest
that their data “demonstrate that countries in distress or experiencing significant problems are far more
likely to succumb to coercion by the sender country. “3s They conclude with a list of “dos and don’ts”
for those imposing sanctions, including “Do pick on the weak and helpless. “3s Their analysis of the
cases indicates that sanctions are most effective when the target is much smaller than the
country imposing sanctions, and economically weak and politically unstable. In successful cases,
the average sender’s economy was 187 times larger than that of the average target.37 Thus,
sanctions offer themselves solely as mechanisms that strong nations with large economies, or
international alliances including strong nations with large economies, can effectively use against
countries with weak or import-dependent economies, or countries with unstable governments. The
reverse is not true— sanctions are not a device realistically available to small or poor nations
that can be used with any significant impact against large or economically dominant nations,
even if the latter were to, say, engage in aggression or human rights violations, or otherwise
offend the international community. This has been obvious since the reformulation of sanctions as a
tool of international law.38 Therefore, there is a danger that sanctions will be used
“opportunistically” by powerful nations39 —for example, as a response by a superpower to its
declining economic hegemony. Here we can understand the particular enthusiasm the United
States holds for sanctions; the sheer size of the U.S. economy means that sanctions can be
imposed at little cost to itself, and with no likelihood that any other nation could retaliate in
kind. It would seem that we have lost altogether the rationale for sanctions that was articulated in the
formation of the League of Nations, It may be that sanctions, and the attendant harm to
innocents, can be justified as an alternative to actual warfare; but in order to justify this
choice on utilitarian grounds, we would have to have reason to believe that sanctions in fact
obtain compliance by the target state. If not, then they simply constitute the gratuitous
imposition of suffering on a helpless population, for no ethically defensible reason.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

ATL Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism a bad way to weigh unethical sanctions
McGee, president of the Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research, 03
*Robert W., December 1, Economic Affairs, pg 43, “THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS”, EBSCO,
accessed 7/6/13, VJ]

Sanctions generally cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds because the losers exceed the
winners. However, utilitarian ethics is not a precise tool because it is not possible to precisely
measure gains and losses, especially when some of the gains and losses cannot be reduced to
monetary units. Psychic gains are only one example. Many other gains and losses are of a non-
monetary nature. If sanctions kill, which they sometimes do, how can total gains and losses
be measured and compared? Another major problem with applying utilitarian ethics is that
utilitarians ignore rights violations. All that matters to a utilitarian is whether the gains
exceed the losses. The ends justify the means. For a utilitarian, killing a few (or a few million)
innocent people might be justified as long as the result is a good one. That is one of the major
problems with utilitarian ethics and it is one of the major strengths of rights-based ethics. A
rights-based ethic takes the position that an action is bad if someone’s rights are violated,
regardless of whether the good outweighs the bad. What is wrong prima facie does not become
right just because some majority ultimately benefits. A major advantage of a rights-based ethic is
that there is no need to calculate total gains and compare them with total losses. It is
impossible to precisely measure gains and losses anyway. A rights-based ethic removes this
problem. The only thing that needs to be determined is whether someone’s rights would be
violated. The matter is further complicated, however, because there are two different kinds of
rights, negative rights and positive rights. Negative rights include the right not to have your
property taken from you without your consent and the right not to be killed. One attribute of
negative rights is that they do not conflict. My right to property does not conflict with your right to
property. My right to life does not conflict with your right to life. Positive rights have different attributes
from negative rights. Examples of positive rights include the right to free or low-cost medical
care and the right to subsidised housing. One attribute of positive rights is that they always involve
the violation of someone’s negative rights. My right to free or low-cost medical care comes at the
expense of the taxpayers who must pay something to make up the difference between the market price
of the service and the price I have to pay. My right to lowcost housing comes at the expense of the
landlord, who is prohibited from charging the market rate for the rental of his property. In a sense,
positive rights are not rights at all. They are a licence to expropriate the property of others with legal
sanction. The kind of rights we need to look at when we are trying to determine whether a
particular sanction is justified is negative rights. We must ask ourselves the question: ‘Are
anyone’s negative rights to life, property, contract, etc. violated by this sanction?’ If the
answer is ‘yes,’ then the sanction cannot be justified. That being the case, one can easily
conclude that the vast majority of sanctions cannot be justified on ethical grounds because
someone’s rights are almost certainly violated. If even one willing buyer is prevented from
buying what he wants from whomever he wants, rights are violated. But what is more likely
is that the rights of thousands, or even millions, are violated by economic sanctions. The two
case studies examined in this article are the sanctions that have been imposed against Iraq and
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Cuba. Although they are both good examples, because they illustrate the point, they are by no means
the only examples that could be given. They have been chosen because they are cases the average
reader is most likely to be familiar with because they have been reported frequently in the popular
Sanctions unethical and utilitarianism can’t be applied
Kochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94
*Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The
Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”,, accessed 7/8/13, VJ]

Comprehensive economic sanctions which heavily impact the life and health of the civilian
population need to be analyzed from an ethical standpoint before a normative evaluation of the
current practice in international law can be undertaken. Indeed, comprehensive economic sanctions
seem to be the "classical" instruments for inducing submission in the power politics of the so-
called "New World Order"14 – and instruments whose permissibility must be critically examined from
the standpoint of ethics as well as of international law. It does not of necessity follow that a
measure praised as the panacea of power politics fulfills the requirements placed on a
legitimate international order. In the first place, coercive measures like economic sanctions
represent a form of collective punishment15 and thus do not comply with the ethical principle
of individual responsibility, i. e. with the ability to attribute behaviour to an individual. The
punishment of people not responsible for political decisions is most akin to a terrorist
measure; the aim of such a measure is to influence the government's course of action by
deliberately assaulting the civilian population.16 Purposefully injuring the innocent is,
however, an immoral act per se, one which cannot be justified by any construction of utilitarian
ethics. In accordance with the conception of Thomas Aquinas, inquiring into the intention behind a
particular decision is of decisive value for an ethical evaluation.17 In the present context, several
conditions govern the moral permissibility of acts in which a morally questionable bad upshot is
foreseen: (a) the intended final end must be good, (b) the intended means to it must be morally
acceptable; (c) the foreseen bad upshot must not itself be willed (that is, must not be, in some sense,
intended); and (d) the good end must be proportionate to the bad upshot18, (that is, must be important
enough to justify the bad upshot).19 The problematic nature of this utilitarian context of
evaluation is plain to view. Are those who suffer under a certain measure to be viewed
sympathetically as the victims of the pursuit of a good intention, or is their suffering to be
regarded as the deliberate component of a strategy? This debate seems merely to invite
hypocritical casuistry. The outcome for the affected population is one and the same. A
"superficial" difference may only be discerned by an ethics of attitude from the viewpoint of
the perpetrator. The latter appeases his conscience with reference to the unintentional but
"inevitable" side effects. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the so-called "Doctrine of Double Effect"
was developed, following a distinction made by Thomas Aquinas.20 It was designed to help clarify
ethical questions that arise when a morally good end can only be reached through inflicting
harm upon other people.21 In the concrete instance of comprehensive economic sanctions in
accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the moral good that is aspired is the maintenance
or restoration of international peace; the wrong that is thereby effected is the suffering of
the civilian population (including sickness and death as results of the mass suffering that
accompanies the breakdown in the distribution of essential commodities). According to Quinn's
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

ethical analysis, it is necessary to take into account the relation which the aspired goal has to the
foreseen wrong that results from it.22 In this context, Quinn refers to the difference between
"terror bombing" and "strategic" bombing in war: in the first instance, the suffering of the
civilian population is deliberately intended; in the second, the possibility that the population
will suffer is merely tolerated. In the first instance, harm is directly inflicted, in the second
case indirectly. (In accordance with the currently valid rules of international humanitarian law, which
we will later examine more closely, terror bombings are strictly prohibited, for the civilian population is
never allowed to be the direct target in a military conflict.) Economic sanctions, however, are in line
with the first case mentioned above: harm is directly and deliberately inflicted so as to force
the government to alter its course of action.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Sanctions are a form of corrupt ethnocentrism
Rarick, Professor at Purdue, and Duchatelet, Dean at Purdue, 08
[Charles A, Martine, June 1
, Economic Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 2, “AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE

A number of economic sanctions have been imposed based upon a lack of democracy in a
country. While democracy is generally viewed as the preferred form of government, even
democracies can be ineffective in advancing the interests of all citizens, and democracy will
not solve every country's problems. Reich (2007) has argued that even in democratic countries such
as the USA. citizen interest has been overtaken by special-interest groups lobbying law-makers
for policies favourable to their interests. Brittan (2007) warns against viewing democracy as
everything that is politically desirable. While this paper does not argue against the desirability of a
democratic form of government, it does propose that economic sanctions cannot be relied upon to
produce democratic forms of government, or to ease the suffering of people under
totalitarian regimes. It is an ethnocentric viewpoint to assume that people strongly desire
democracy over economic freedom and development. Economic sanctions aimed at
producing political change can have the opposite effect and harden dictatorial rule, increasing
the suffering of people in the sanctioned countries. In the case of Myanma r. recent civil unrest
over the military regime's policies and worsening economic situation has produced an even harsher
response from the government (Kazmin, 2007) including a crackdown even on the monastic community
of the country. Government leaders have a fiduciary duty to represent all people, not just
those with special interests. Young (2007) has proposed that leaders should use this fiduciary duty,
which has evolved from the Judaeo-Chrtstian tradition and Roman law, to represent all stakeholders.
Often sanctions are imposed because of pressure brought by special-interest groups, such as
Burmese or Cuban refugees living in the USA. who are successful in getting sanctions imposed
in order to advance their own agendas. Economic sanctions imposed for a special interest,
even with good intentions, can be questioned on the basis of their ethical legitimacy. Using the
three major frameworks of ethics the morality of economic sanctions can be explored, and conclusions
drawn concerning the ethical nature of this type of public policy.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Human Rights Leadership Answers
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Non Unique –
Magnitsky signaled a zero tolerance policy for human rights violators – proves leadership high
Cohen and Titoff, contributors to the Heritage Foundation, 12
*Ariel Cohen and Dmitri Titoff, November 19, Heritage Foundation, “Magnitsky Act Promises to Punish
Human Rights Abuse, Open Trade”,
punish-human-rights-abuse-open-trade/, accessed 7/9, CC]

Russia’s lawlessness and corruption brought about the Magnitsky bill. “The bill is beneficial
to my country, punishes the criminals, and fosters economic relations between Russia and the U.S.,” said Boris Nemtsov, a
democratic opposition leader, on a visit to Washington.¶ The Magnitsky case is far from being the only outrage. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former
CEO of the Yukos oil company, which was illegally seized by the Russian government in 2004 and 2005, is serving a second nine-year prison
term. Amnesty International has recognized Khodorkovsky as a political prisoner. There are hundreds more businesspeople like him in Russian
jails.¶ American lawmakers stepped in where Russian law enforcement failed so abysmally. It
was these lawmakers who drew attention to the outrages in Russian jails and contributed to
a better business climate through the Magnitsky Act.¶ The Magnitsky Act was part of legislation that granted
Russia—now a World Trade Organization member—permanent normal trade relations status (PNTR). Without PNTR, U.S. firms doing business
with Russia would be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign firms. U.S. businesses lobbied Congress to foster access to the $400 billion import
market in Russia.¶ The Heritage Foundation has been at the forefront of this issue since the beginning, arguing that the U.S. should
not juxtapose human rights and business. Both are important U.S. priorities.¶ Until the Senate votes on
the bill with Magnitsky language, trade with Russia—worth $40 billion a year, less than half of Russian trade with Germany—remains subject to
the 1974 Jackson–Vanik Amendment adopted during the Ford Administration.¶ The Jackson–Vanik legislation was an
important tool for promoting freedom of emigration and other human rights issues in the
Soviet Union. In the 21st century, however, it became antiquated, as emigration from Russia is now free. And while official Moscow may
be fuming for now, its long-term interest lies in growing U.S.–Russian business ties.¶ Continuing the work of the House on
this issue would be an important signal for Congress to send. By doing so, the Senate would
provide a solution that pinpoints and punishes gross violators of human rights while allowing
U.S. companies to compete for business in Russia and elsewhere.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

No Impact – Alt Causes Take Out
Can’t overcome loss of leadership on surveillance
New America Foundation 13
(“Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of Surveillance”, July,

As Brazil formally asks the U.S. to explain how American surveillance programs harm
Brazilians, and the European Parliament insists that this “serious violation” of its peoples’
rights warrants an inquiry into state surveillance, the U.S. must confront its global human
rights commitments to people beyond the purview of the U.S. Constitution.
The United States has increasingly played a leadership role in international internet human
rights battles. A cross-regional statement that the U.S. signed on June 10 emphasized online
security measures must be “consistent with states’ obligations under international human rights law
and full respect for human rights must be maintained.” The tension between this stance and the
recent surveillance revelations has created a moment, as a global society, to discuss and
implement appropriate checks and balances for the protection of privacy and freedom of
expression online. U.N. Special Rapporteur Frank la Rue offers an authoritative view on privacy and
freedom of expression, setting global standards for international behavior.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

AT: Democracy Impacts
Democracy promotion fails - authoritarian governments will not give way to democracy-
benefits outweighed by violence
Pei, Director China Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7
[Minxin, senior associate, "How Will China Democratize?", Journl of Democracy, July, vol 18, # 3, accessed 7/12/13]

A serious flaw in the liberal-evolution theory is its assumption that the ruling elites will accept
democracy as inevitable and do nothing to blunt the political effects of socioeconomic modernization.
The reality appears to be the opposite. Few authoritarian rulers in history have voluntarily chosen to
cede power simply because their societies have grown wealthier and their people better schooled.
Historically, democratization most often comes about via peaceful bargaining among elites, crisis-driven
regime collapse, or even violent uprising. The record of successful liberal evolution is rather thin, with
a short list of cases covering England, Taiwan, South Korea, and Mexico. More often than not,
transitions involve the fall of the old order, social revolution, domestic upheaval, and external
intervention. Why has political evolution produced so few democratic transitions? The answer is
simple: Ruling elites who sense that their power is at risk can show great determination and
resourcefulness in seeking to hold onto it. Rapid economic growth can actually strengthen elites by
furnishing the authoritarian state with more resources to pay for efforts to counter the political
effects of economic modernization.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

AT: Conflict Impacts
Human rights promotion tears nations apart, causing conflict
Gentry, retired Army officer, researcher and writer on defense and security issues, 4
(John A., Human Rights: Opposing Viewpoints, p. 52)

The proliferation of human rights is a boon for rights-oriented bureaucracies and trial lawyers, but it
damages the social fabric that turns groups of people into communities and communities into
a nation. Because the only asset any government ultimately has is its legitimacy, the cost of a
government’s inability to satisfy rights-based demands is overwhelming. That cost rises
further when governments, and the political parties that seek to control them, favor some
rights over competing claims to please political backers or to curry favor with voters.

Human rights collapse nationhood and will inevitably cause civil war
Gentry, adjunct professor at National Intelligence University, 99
(John, “The Cancer of Human Rights”, Sept. 22, The Washington Quarterly,

Excessive human rights are anathema to nationhood because they denigrate the compromise,
discipline, and sacrifice needed for collective work in pursuit of common goals in favor of the
immediate gratification of individual desires. With personal desires enshrined as rights through
justifications of ideology or theology, there is no need to share them or to compromise on their
definition, cost, or speed of actualization. Rights are absolute by definition. With claims to rights clear,
the shared community values and goals that helped bond society when rights were fewer and resource
constraints more obvious are much less important. There is less need to work together and thus less of
the glue of nationhood. Even when nationhood is diminished or destroyed, however, government
structures remain to service the rights of individuals and small groups, including the employment rights
of bureaucracies and unions built to provide services justified by rights.Although initially created as
individual properties, human rights are easily aggregated to become collective assets of groups of similar
individuals. The logical step is small, but the consequences of this action are sometimes very large
because group rights are different from and greater than the sum of rights of individuals. Just as
individuals have alleged rights of opportunity and sometimes results, activists often claim that the
collective ambitions of groups deserve actualization as rights. The variously defined performances of
groups in society -- be they consumption levels, unemployment rates, or inmate populations -- must in
aggregate be at least equal to that of other groups without consideration of troublesome distractions
such as historical and cultural factors, labor force participation rates, and work ethics. As in Lake
Wobegone, everyone must be at least average. Subpar performance by any of a host of measures is
allegedly evidence of discrimination. As for individuals, the rights of groups allegedly are immutable and
merit immediate gratification. Because they too are absolute, there is no appropriate compromise
among the demands for group rights. The result is proliferation of strident social subgroups of special
interests little inclined to work constructively with one another except for reasons of tactical
expediency. The degeneration of U.S. society into narrow interest groups further diminishes the
nationhood of the United States. Countless commentators have identified symptoms; single-issue
groups constitute a growing share of politically active citizens, for example. Samuel Huntington made
the point differently by observing that, in the name of multiculturalism, powerful forces in the United
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

States are accentuating the differences among U.S. residents and encouraging their preservation. By so
doing, these persons attack the identity of the United States as a member of Western civilization. n3
Failure to assimilate immigrant groups risks transformation of the United States into what Huntington
calls a cleft country, with potentially dire consequences for political stability. This amounts to an
attack on the whole in the name of the perceived rights of groups that refuse to assimilate. Countries
that are not nations can survive a long time in the absence of a crisis. They are prone to fail in the face
of external threat but may explode, however, if the crisis is internal. They are especially likely to fail if
disparate groups, bolstered by the certainty that they hold rights to their goals, strive for self-
gratification at the expense of other groups. If groups threaten the perceived vital interests of other
groups, including perceived human rights, civil war may result. This happened in Bosnia in 1992 and in
Kosovo in 1998. Although not an immediate threat, it could happen in California, too.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

**Appeasement Aff**
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Not Unique- Appeasement Now
Non-unique -- US has engaged with enemies in the past and there was no impact
Rubin, Political Writer for The Post, 11 (Jennifer Rubin, 10/18/11, Washington Post, “Obama’s Cuba
appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html, accessed 7-7-13, KB)

The blowback was swift. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) put out a statement that read: “It’s deplorable that
the U.S. government offered several unilateral concessions to the Castro regime in exchange
for the release of a man who was wrongfully jailed in the first place. Rather than easing sanctions in
response to hostage taking, the U.S. should put more punitive measures on the Castro regime. Until
Secretary Clinton answers for this, the nomination of Roberta Jacobson to be the next assistant
secretary of state for the western hemisphere will be in question.Ӧ The chairwoman of the foreign
affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: “According to news reports, the
Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan
Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the
murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous
willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by
the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this
Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didn’t try to engage. It seems that a
rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon
engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should
not be trying to barter with them. We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a
quid-pro-quo with tyrants.Ӧ As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions
didn’t stop there. The Associated Press reported, “The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former
New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban
officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross’ release. He also told Cuban Foreign
Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to
Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing
spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross;
authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving
postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the
United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United
States.”¶ Former deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams explained, “It is especially offensive that
we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust
imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those
engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that
imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities.
Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration
has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with
the Castro regime.”¶ The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro
regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic
reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration
orders up more of the same.¶ Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the
cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and
promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. There is simply no
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States.¶ Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the
administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with
aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and
chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk
about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with
attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into
World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and,
from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s
willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.
Non-Unique – US is appeasing so called tyrants now
Foreign Affairs, , 13 (Foreign Affairs, 1/4/13, Ros-Lehtinen House, “Engagement with the Chavez Regime Is
Counterproductive, State’s Actions Undermine U.S. Foreign Policy Interests,”
release/engagement-chavez-regime-counterproductive-state%E2%80%99s-actions-undermine-us-foreign-policy, accessed 7-7-
13, KB)

“It is very troubling but not surprising that, once again, the Department of State looks to cozy
up with yet another tyrant in the Western Hemisphere. Chavez and his cohorts have a long and
nefarious track record of supporting illicit activities such as drug trafficking, aiding the Iranian and Syrian
regimes, violent extremist groups, and suppressing human rights.¶ State’s policy of engaging bad
actors while ignoring their abusive power grabs and oppression of civil society only encourages
rogue regimes’ to continue their unlawful and unconstitutional actions. This approach has failed with
regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador but the Department of State does not learn from
its mistakes.¶ The Obama Administration’s continued policy of appeasing tyrants who
undermine democratic principles does nothing to advance our national interest nor does it benefit
the Venezuelan people. The U.S. must support true democratic reforms in Venezuela and urge the
immediate rejection of transnational illicit networks before any further engagement with the Chavez
regime takes place.”
Obama appeasing enemies now
Greenfield, Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center., 12 (Daniel Greenfield, 10/22/12, Front Page
Magazine, “Obama Still Trying to Appease North Korea,”
appease-north-korea/, accessed 7-9-13, KB)
Clifford Hart, the Obama administration’s special envoy to the now-defunct Six Party Talks, met with
Han Song-ryol, North Korea’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, and Choe Son Hui,
the deputy director-general of the North American affairs bureau in the DPRK foreign
ministry, late last month in China¶ No progress was made on toward resuming negotiations over
North Korea’s nuclear program, both officials said.¶ Obama’s appeasement of Iran gets top billing
in national security dialogue. His appeasement of the Muslim world in general is often talked
about. But Obama doesn’t limit himself there. He’s a man who will go anywhere and bow to
anyone… or send off his subordinates to do it for him.¶ The moment that Lil Kim crooks a
finger and offers to possibly one day allow inspections of North Korea’s nuclear program,
Obama will rush to shower him with everything he could ask for. Because the Democrats just
don’t change.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Not Unique- Appeasing Cuba Now
Not unique- Obama is perceived as appeasing Cuba now.
Zuckerman, Concentration in Latin America for Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 12
[Jessica, The Heritage Foundation, 1/13/12, ““Ladies in White” and Obama’s Failed Policy of Cuban
policy-of-cuban-appeasement/, Accessed 7/8/13, HW]

They call themselves “las Damas de Blanco” (“the Ladies in White”). They are a prominent group
of courageous Cuban women, many of them wives of political prisoners. They have fought
not just for the rights of the unjustly imprisoned but for the rights of all the Cuban people to
have a voice in the way their country is governed. Their tactics are entirely peaceful: They
take to the streets of Havana and Santiago de Cuba each Sunday and silently march in protest
against human rights violations of the Castro regime and the harassment and jailing of Cuban
activists and dissidents. Dressed in white and holding red gladiolas flowers, the Ladies in White are
enduring symbols of the acute toll of Cuban political oppression. In July 2010, following the
sacrifices of prisoners of conscience, such as hunger striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo (d. February 23,
2010), the Ladies in White achieved their first major victory. In a deal brokered by the Roman
Catholic Church and the Spanish government, 52 activists jailed since 2003 were released, among
them the husband of Ladies in White founder Laura Pollan. But the summer also brought an
escalation of attacks against the Ladies in White by Castro thugs and state security goons as
the women once again became victims of brutal beatings and attacks at the hands of the
regime. In October, the Ladies in White suffered another blow when Pollan died of a heart attack at the
age of 63. Pollan’s leadership in the fight for Cuban freedom was extraordinary. For her determination,
she was posthumously awarded the National Endowment for Democracy’s Human Rights Award. The
repression and violence experienced by the Ladies in White is, unfortunately, not unusual.
Just this week, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation
announced that a record 786 political arrests occurred in Cuba last month. While many are of a
short-term nature, they are designed to promote fear and intimidation. These arrests brought the
2011 total to 4,123, compared with 2,074 in 2010. Yet all too often the media and Obama
Administration overlook this continuing wave of repression in Cuba. This inaction, at least on
the part of the Administration, is a manifestation of Obama’s flawed foreign policy of
engaging with U.S. adversaries such as Iran, Venezuela and Cuba. Thankfully, some in the U.S.
Senate are not inclined to ignore the day-to-day struggle for freedom in Cuba, Most recently,
Senators Marco Rubio (R–FL) and Robert Menendez (D–NJ)called for the release of Ladies in
White member Ivonne Malleza and activist Isabel Hayde Alvarez Mosqueda. This is a just demand
that the Obama Administration has yet to endorse but is needed to underscore the
precarious human rights situation in Cuba.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Not Unique- Travel Restrictions Eased
Cuba appeasement now- travel restrictions lifted.
Cardenas, former assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for
International Development, 12
[Jose, Foreign Policy, 10/9/12, “Obama defends, then changes, Cuba policy”,,
Accessed 7/8/13, HW]

The Obama campaign recently took umbrage with criticisms of the president's Cuba policy by Paul Ryan
in a campaign swing through Miami, the heart of the Cuban exile community. Ryan charged that the
policy amounted to appeasement of the Castro regime, to which the campaign responded that
Obama "has repeatedly renewed the trade embargo with Cuba, pressured the Castro regime to give its
people more of a say in their own future, and supported democracy movements on the island." Yet even
as the campaign defended the president's policy, administration officials were furiously rewriting the
rules of one of the president's signature Cuba initiatives that had gone scandalously awry. Last year,
the Obama administration significantly liberalized Bush-era restrictions on private travel to
Cuba that were designed to deny hard currency transfers to the Stalinist dictatorship. The thinking
behind the change was that "purposeful" or "people-to-people" travel can build relationships
between Americans and Cubans and empower the latter to think and act as individuals rather than
as vassals of the state. Well, as it happens, the initiative came to serve no purpose other than to
become a propaganda vehicle for the Castro regime with the complicity of fellow-traveling
U.S. tour operators. Far from promoting contact with real Cubans, the trip itineraries revealed
close collaboration with the Castro regime and featured interactions only with Cubans
approved by the regime -- hapless minions who could only be counted on to spout the party
line that all of poor, little Cuba's problems are caused by the big, mean old United States. And
where the indoctrination ended, it was rounded-out by frivolous tourist activities -- rum, salsa,
Hemingway! -- that are carefully walled off from interaction with ordinary Cuban citizens. In fact, the
abuses became so flagrant that Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) held up the nomination of a senior State
Department official until the administration agreed to review a program that had egregiously gone off
track. Typical of the purposeless results is a recent report in which a professor at the University of Iowa
gushed about an essay written by a student after meeting with "an American fugitive who had escaped
the country and taken asylum in Cuba." That would likely be either Joanne Chesimard or Charlie Hill, two
radicals wanted by U.S. authorities for the murders of U.S. law enforcement officials in the 1970s. Then
there is the Duke University Alumni Association promoting an "Art & Architecture Tour of Havana" next
month. Not only is the trip wholly choreographed by the Castro regime, but the group is only allowed to
meet with regime-approved artists. But the key line in their brochure is this: "The arts have long
presented Cubans with an opportunity to cautiously express their views on society."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Engagement Good/Appeasement Analogy Bad
United States shunning and refusal to “engage” strengthens the regimes and deprives the US
of influence
Larison, PhD in history from the University of Chicago, 12
[Daniel, The American Conservative, 4/27/12, “Engagement Is Not Appeasement”,, Accessed 7/5/13,

The most important error Rubin makes is the assumption that engagement mainly benefits the regime
being engaged over the long term. Cutting off contacts with other regimes doesn’t hasten their
downfall or weaken their hold on power. On the contrary, such regimes can take advantage
of attempts at isolation to suppress dissent, consolidate power, and rally their nations behind
them. It is not the purpose of engagement to undermine other regimes. The purpose is and should be
to advance the interests of the United States. It is more likely that authoritarian regimes will
gradually lose their grip on power if the people in their countries are exposed more regularly
to contacts with other nations than if they are shut off from them.¶ Repressive regimes will
engage in brutal crackdowns and will violently suppress challenges to their control. That isn’t
going to change, and it will happen no matter who occupies different Cabinet posts or the White House.
That isn’t something that the U.S. can normally prevent, nor does the U.S. have the resources to police
how all these regimes act in their own countries, but it is something that the U.S. might be able to
limit to some degree if it were in a position to influence these regimes. Refusing to engage
with these regimes deprives the U.S. of influence. It deprives these regimes of nothing.

Have to stop using Hitler as an example of appeasement going wrong – appeasement falsely
defined with one moment in history
Record, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 8 (Jeffrey Record, Summer 2008,
Strategic Studies Institute, “Retiring Hitler and¶ ‘Appeasement’ from the¶ National Security Debate,”, accessed 7-7-13, KB)

It is high time to retire Adolf Hitler and “appeasement” from the national security debate.
The repeated analogizing of current threats to the menace of Hitler¶ in the 1930s, and
comparing diplomatic efforts to Anglo-French placating of the¶ Nazi dictator, has spoiled the true
meaning of appeasement, distorted sound¶ thinking regarding national security challenges
and responses, and falsified history. For the past six decades every President except Jimmy Carter
has routinely¶ invoked the Munich analogy as a means of inflating national security threats and¶
demonizing dictators. Presidents and their spokespersons have not only believed¶ the analogy but also
used it to mobilize public opinion for war.2 After all, if the¶ enemy really is another Hitler, then force
becomes mandatory, and the sooner it¶ is used the better. More recently, neoconservatives and their
allies in government¶ have branded as appeasers any and all proponents of using nonviolent
conflict¶ resolution to negotiate with hostile dictatorships. For neoconservatives, to appease is to
be naïve, cowardly, and soft on the threat du jour, be it terrorism, a¶ rogue state, or a rising great power.
To appease is to be a Chamberlain rather than¶ a Churchill, to comprise with evil rather than slay it.¶
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Summer 2008 91The Munich analogy informed every major threatened or actual US¶ use of
force during the first two decades of the Cold War as well as the decisions¶ to attack Iraq in
1991 and 2003. Munich conditioned the thinking of almost every Cold War President from
Harry S. Truman to George H.W. Bush. For Truman, the analogy dictated intervention in Korea:
“Communism was acting in¶ Korea just as Hitler and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, twenty years
earlier.”3 A year after the Korean War ended, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, citing the “domino
effects” of a Communist victory in French Indochina on the¶ rest of Southeast Asia, invoked Munich in an
appeal for Anglo-American military action. “We failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler by not
acting in¶ unity and in time. . . . May it not be that [we] have learned something from that¶ lesson?”4¶
President John F. Kennedy invoked the Munich analogy during the¶ Cuban Missile Crisis, warning that the
“1930s taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked, ultimately leads to
war.”5¶ Munich indisputably propelled the United States into Vietnam. President Lyndon B.
Johnson told his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, that¶ if the United States pulled out of
Vietnam, “the dominoes would fall and a part¶ of the world would go Communist.”6¶ Johnson later told
historian Doris Kearns¶ that “everything I knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let¶
Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I’d be doing exactly what¶ [Neville] Chamberlain did.
. . . I’d be giving a fat reward to aggression.”7¶ President Ronald Reagan saw in the Soviet Union a replay
of the challenges the democracies faced in the 1930s and invoked the Munich analogy to justify a¶
major US military buildup, intervention in Grenada, and possible intervention¶ in Nicaragua.
“One of the great tragedies of this century,” he said in a 1983¶ speech, “was that it was only after the
balance of power was allowed to erode¶ and a ruthless adversary, Adolf Hitler, deliberately weighed the
risks and decided to strike that the importance of a strong defense was realized.”8¶ Similarly,¶ George
H.W. Bush saw Saddam Hussein as an Arab Hitler whose aggression¶ against Kuwait, if unchecked, would
lead to further aggression in the Persian¶ Gulf. In announcing the dispatch of US forces to Saudi Arabia in
response to¶ Saddam Hussein’s conquest of Kuwait, he declared, “If history teaches us anything, it is that
we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case
in the 1930s, we see in Saddam¶ Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.”9 Lessons of
Munich¶ In the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, war proponents¶ claimed that war with Iraq was
unavoidable, citing the lessons of Munich.¶ Richard Perle, the influential chairman of the Pentagon’s
Defense Policy¶ Board, argued in an August 2002 interview:¶ [An] action to remove Saddam Hussein
could precipitate the very thing we are¶ most anxious to prevent: his use of chemical or biological
weapons. But the danger that springs from his capabilities will only grow as he expands his arsenal. A¶
preemptive strike against Hitler at the time of Munich would have meant an immediate war, as opposed
to the one that came later. Later was much worse.10¶ In that same month, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, in a television interview, opined, “Think of all the countries that said, ‘Well, we don’t¶ have
enough evidence.’Mein Kampf had already been written. Hitler had indicated what he intended to do.
Maybe he won’t attack us. . . . Well, there are millions of dead because of *those+ miscalculations.”
Later, Rumsfeld added,¶ “Maybe Winston Churchill was right. Maybe that lone voice expressing concern
about what was happening was right.”11 President George W. Bush, in a¶ speech on 17 March 2003,
pointedly noted that in “the twentieth century, some¶ chose to appease murderous dictators, whose
threats were allowed to grow into¶ genocide and war.”12¶ Unfortunately, invocations of the Munich
analogy almost invariably¶ mislead because they distort the true nature of appeasement,
ignore the extreme¶ rarity of the Nazi German threat, and falsely suggest that Britain and
France¶ could have readily stopped Hitler prior to 1939. Additionally, the Munich analogy
reinforces the presidential tendency since 1945 to overstate threats for the¶ purpose of
rallying public and congressional support, and overstated threats encourage resort to force in
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circumstances where alternatives might better serve¶ long-term US security interests. Threats
that are in fact limited—as was Baathist¶ Iraq after the 9/11 attacks—tend to be portrayed in
Manichaean terms, thus¶ skewing the policy choice toward military action, including
preventive war with¶ all its attendant risks and penalties. If the 1930s reveal the danger of
underestimating a security threat, the post-World War II decades and post-9/11 years contain
examples of the danger of overestimating such threats.

Hitler was just one example of appeasement going wrong – shouldn’t base it off of the Hitler
Record, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 8 (Jeffrey Record, Summer 2008,
Strategic Studies Institute, “Retiring Hitler and¶ ‘Appeasement’ from the¶ National Security Debate,”, accessed 7-8-13, KB)

Critics of Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler properly recognize that¶ appeasement failed
because Hitler’s ambitions in Europe reached far beyond¶ what the appeasers were prepared
to give. But the critics’assumption that Hitler¶ could have been deterred from attempting the
subjugation of Europe by an early¶ show of force or the formation of a grand alliance to stop
him reflects a fundamental misreading of Hitler and the Nazi German threat.24 The early
adoption of¶ a policy of firmness and deterrence would have altered Hitler’s tactical
calculations, but there is no reason to believe such a policy would have caused him to¶
change strategic goals. His tactical opportunism did not encompass a willingness to discard
the commitment to creating a German racial empire stretching¶ from the English Channel to
the Ural Mountains.¶ Historian Ernest R. May has observed that if the appeasers had illusions
about Hitler, so too did many “anti-appeasers” (presumably including¶ Churchill), who “had
their own illusions which were almost equally distant from¶ reality. They believed that Hitler
could be deterred by the threat of war. Few suspected that Hitler wanted war.”25 Thus
Churchill was wrong when he claimed in¶ 1946 that “*t+here was never a war in all history
easier to prevent by timely action¶ than the one that has just desolated the globe. It could
have been prevented without the firing of a single shot.”26 Hitler wanted war no later than
1943, and he believed that Germany would be powerful enough to defeat any combination
of¶ opposing states. War was thus inevitable as long as Hitler remained in power.¶ Hitler’s
undeterrability renders moot much discussion regarding what¶ might have been. Would, for
example, a credible Anglo-French alliance with the¶ Soviet Union (Churchill’s favored course
of action) have deterred Hitler from¶ seeking to enslave the Slavic untermensch in the East?
Hitler was ideologically¶ propelled to invade the Soviet Union, for which he had both racial
and military¶ contempt, and he proceeded to do so in June 1941 notwithstanding an
unfinished¶ and expanding war with Britain in the West and the growing difficulties of his¶
Italian ally in the Mediterranean. In reality there was no prospect of a credible¶ Anglo-French-
Soviet alliance in the 1930s, given Stalin’s suspicions of capitalist Britain and France and the
extreme hostility of much British and French political opinion to Bolshevism and the Soviet
pariah state. Russia’s military value as¶ an ally was also questionable, given Stalin’s
decimation of the Red Army’s senior leadership. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s lack of a
common border with¶ Germany blocked Moscow from projecting its military power against
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Germany¶ except through Poland and Czechoslovakia.¶ The fact that Hitler could be neither
deterred nor appeased meant¶ that war could have been avoided only via Hitler’s death or
removal from¶ power, options that prior to the war were apparently not considered by
LonSummer 2008 99don or Paris and only briefly weighed by some German military leaders i
n¶ 1938. (Democratic Britain and France were not in the business of sponsoring¶ assassinations
of European heads of state.) Beyond Hitler’s departure from¶ power, only a preventive war
that crippled German military power, collapsed¶ the Nazi regime, or both could have averted
World War II. Yet Britain in the¶ 1930s had no capacity to project decisive military power onto
the Continent,¶ much less deep into Germany; and France, though in possession of a large¶
army, had adopted a purely defensive strategy. In neither country was there¶ any public or
parliamentary support for a preventive war against Germany;¶ even Churchill rejected
preventive war in favor of deterrence through the creation of a grand coalition of anti-Nazi
states (and if Hitler nonetheless decided on war, then at least Britain would have locked in
powerful allies). Thus when neoconservative critics of appeasement speak about how¶ Hitler
could and should have been stopped prior to 1939, they mean forcible regime change of the
kind the United States launched against Saddam Hussein in¶ 2003. But it is here that the
neoconservatives and others who believe in the continuing validity of the Munich analogy
enter the fantasy realm of historical¶ counterfactualism. For Britain and France in the 1930s,
a decisive preventive¶ war against Nazi Germany was morally unacceptable, politically
impossible,¶ and militarily infeasible. Neville Chamberlain did horribly misread Hitler, but¶ the
neoconservative indictment of Chamberlain falsely assumes that the option¶ of preventive
war against Germany was as readily available to London and Paris¶ in 1938 as it was to the
United States against Iraq in 2003.
The Munich analogy distorted what appeasement actually is – it is the only way to peace
Record, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 8 (Jeffrey Record, Summer 2008,
Strategic Studies Institute, “Retiring Hitler and¶ ‘Appeasement’ from the¶ National Security Debate,”, accessed 7-8-13, KB)

Unfortunately, invocations of the Munich analogy almost invariably¶ mislead because they
distort the true nature of appeasement, ignore the extreme¶ rarity of the Nazi German
threat, and falsely suggest that Britain and France¶ could have readily stopped Hitler prior to
1939. Additionally, the Munich analogy reinforces the presidential tendency since 1945 to
overstate threats for the¶ purpose of rallying public and congressional support, and
overstated threats encourage resort to force in circumstances where alternatives might
better serve¶ long-term US security interests. Threats that are in fact limited—as was
Baathist¶ Iraq after the 9/11 attacks—tend to be portrayed in Manichaean terms, thus¶
skewing the policy choice toward military action, including preventive war with¶ all its
attendant risks and penalties. If the 1930s reveal the danger of underestimating a security
threat, the post-World War II decades and post-9/11 years contain examples of the danger of
overestimating such threats.¶ Appeasement, which became a politically charged term only
after¶ World War II, actually means “to pacify, quiet, or satisfy, especially by giving¶ in to the
demands of,” according to Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, which goes on to
list synonyms including “amends, settlement, reparation, conciliation, and compromise.”13
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These terms are consistent with what¶ most historians and international relations theorists
understand to be the phe¶ nomenon of appeasement: states seeking to adjust or settle their
differences by¶ measures short of war. Theorist Stephen Rock defines appeasement as
simply¶ “the policy of reducing tensions with one’s adversary by removing the causes¶ of
conflict and disagreement,”14 a definition echoed by political scientists¶ Gordon Craig and
Alexander George: “the reduction of tension between *two¶ states+ by the methodical
removal of the principal causes of conflict and disagreement between them.”15 Thus Richard
Nixon was guilty of “appeasing”¶ Communist China in 1972 by embracing Beijing’s one-China
policy, and Ronald Reagan was guilty of “appeasing” the Soviet Union in 1987 by resolving¶
tensions with Moscow over actual and planned deployments of intermediaterange nuclear
forces in Europe.¶ Unfortunately, Anglo-French behavior toward Nazi Germany gave¶
appeasement such a bad name that the term is no longer usable except as a political
pejorative. Before Munich, however, observes historian Paul Kennedy,¶ “the policy of
settling international . . . quarrels by admitting and satisfying¶ grievances through rational
negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding¶ the resort to an armed conflict which would
be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous” was generally viewed as “constructive,
positive, and¶ honorable.”16 Five years after World War II, Winston Churchill, the great¶ anti-
appeaser of Hitler, declared, “Appeasement in itself may be good or bad¶ according to the
circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is¶ alike futile and fatal.” He added,
“Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the surest and only
path to world peace.”17

Critics of appeasement are wrong - appeasement actually prevents war and proliferation
Scoblic, Scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s Nonproliferation Project and Executive Editor
of the New Republic, 8 (J. Peter Scoblic, 5/17/8, Los Angeles Times, “It's 2008, not 1938: History shows that talking to
our enemies doesn't equal appeasement,” /may/17/opinion/oe-scoblic17, accessed 7-9-13,

Containment, negotiation, nuclear stability -- each of these things helped protect the United
States and end the Cold War. And yet, at the time, conservatives thought each was
synonymous with appeasement.¶ The Bush administration has been little different, refusing
for years to talk to North Korea or Iran about their nuclear programs because it wanted to
defeat evil, not talk to it. The result was that Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon and Iran's
uranium program continued unfettered. (By contrast, when the administration negotiated
with Libya -- an act that its chief arms controller, John Bolton, had previously derided as, yes,
"appeasement" -- it succeeded in eliminating Tripoli's nuclear program.)¶ Alas, John McCain
accused President Clinton of "appeasement" for engaging North Korea, instead calling for
"rogue state rollback," and now he dismisses the idea of negotiations with Iran. Given
conservatism's historical record, Obama's inclination to negotiate seems only sensible. When
will conservatives learn that it is 2008, not 1938?

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Appeasement actually prevents wars and conflicts – empirics prove
Matthews, Political Analyst, 12 (Chris Matthews, 10/14/12, New Republic, “How John F. Kennedy's Appeasement
Strategy Averted a Nuclear Holocaust,”
appeasement-strategy-averted-nuclear-holocaust#, accessed 7-9-13, KB)

Fifty Octobers ago, the world faced a nuclear war that would have left this planet a very different place.
The danger was every bit as it appeared. Nikita Krushchev, the Soviet leader who had secretly deployed
90 nuclear missiles in Cuba, had a back-up plan should the United States attack the weapon sites.¶ “I
knew the United States could knock out some of our installations, but not all of them,” he wrote in his
memoirs. “If a quarter or even a tenth of our missiles survived—even if only one or two big ones were
left—we could still hit New York, and there wouldn’t be much of New York left.” ¶ The U.S. never tested
Khrushchev’s dire resolve. We never attacked his missiles. Instead, President Kennedy
improvised a jerry-built policy that included an embargo on further shipment of Soviet missiles and a
demand that all such weapons in Cuba be removed. Khrushchev turned back his cargo ships and
removed his missiles. In this eyeball-to-eyeball conflict, he appeared to “blink” while his counterpart,
President John F. Kennedy stood firm. ¶ The full truth, which would only get out years later, is that the
American president, dreading nuclear war and fearing a “miscalculation” that would trigger
it, made an under-the-table deal. He gave Khrushchev precisely what he needed : something to
get the hawks off his back. He agreed to remove the nuclear missiles we had deployed in Turkey, to do
so in a short period of time but quietly, out of the glare of media—and Republican—attention. He did
what was necessary, proffering a deal he knew he couldn't sell to his fellow countrymen.¶
This is the lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis that gets overlooked but should be the key to all
future confrontations with a dangerous enemy: Always leave the other side a way out.
Otherwise, they will only have a way in.

Diplomacy does not mean appeasement – empirics prove with other Presidents making deals
with enemies of the US
Mataconis, Lawyer, 12
(Doug Mataconis, 1/3/12, Outside the Beltway, “The GOP’s Ridiculous Appeasement Argument,”, accessed 7-7-13, KB)

That was just one example, though, of this odd idea that Republicans seem to have developed that
there’s something wrong with diplomacy, at least when the other guy does it. If anything, it’s more
important that we have open lines of communication with our adversaries than our friends, if only to
prevent misunderstandings and mistakes that could lead to a crisis that doesn’t need to happen. More
broadly, though, the suggestion that being willing to talk to ones adversaries under the right conditions
is in and of itself appeasement is simply absurd. History is full of examples where that precise thing
occurred, to the benefit of all parties involved.¶ Kennedy met with Kruschev. Nixon met with Mao.
Reagan met with Gorbachev (and said he would have met with Brezhnev, Andropov, or Chernenko if
Russian leaders in the early 1980s hadn’t developed the inconvenient habit of dying every 18 months).
Heck, we’ve sent Secretaries of State to North Korea and have diplomatic relations with the Vietnamese
now. For years, we didn’t have diplomatic relations with the Libyans and yet the Bush Administration
made contact with them and successfully negotiated the dismantling of the Libyan chemical weapons
program. And before all that happened there were lower-level meetings going on for years between the
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United States and regimes that posed a far greater threat to our security, and their own citizens, than a
mad-man like Ahmenijad does today.¶ And that’s the part of this that Republicans can’t explain — if it’s
okay to talk to the Soviets, the Red Chinese, the North Koreans, the Vietnamese, the Cubans, and the
Libyans then what’s so bad about suggesting the possibility of diplomatic contact with Iran ?¶ Diplomacy
is a good thing, as Winston Churchill himself recognized. Since Sir Winston seems to be the only
European that conservatives like, perhaps they’d listen to what he has to say about the matter.

Conservative understandings of negotiation are fundamentally wrong- appeasement
Yglesias, Senior Editor @ Center for American Progress Action Fund, ‘08
(Matthew, 5/23/08, The American Prospect, “The Appeasement Paradox”,, Accessed 7/8/13, PD)

One defining feature of appeasement-phobia, after all, is a curious tendency to underrate the
importance of objective reality in determining the behavior of foreign countries. In a speech
Tuesday on Cuba policy, McCain derided willingness to "sit down unconditionally for a
presidential meeting with Raul Castro" on the grounds that this would "send the worst
possible signal to Cuba's dictators -- there is no need to undertake fundamental reforms; they
can simply wait for a unilateral change in U.S. policy." The idea that Cuban decision-making would
hinge on a "signal" from Washington is baffling. After all, the past 50 years of failed American efforts to
starve the Cuban people into rebelling against the Castro regime is better evidence than any signal that
Havana has no need to back down in the face of our embargo. Similarly, Buckley worried that meeting
Khruschev would signal low U.S. morale to Moscow, with unspecified dire results. And McCain says the
trouble with meeting with Iranian leaders (when he's not too busy being confused about who the
leaders of Iran are) is that a meeting "is the most prestigious card we have to play" and scheduling one
might give the Iranians an ego boost and "confer both international legitimacy on the Iranian president
and could strengthen him domestically." That's all fine, but the premise of the appeasement frame is
that we're dealing with hardcore irrational ideologues who'll stop at nothing to destroy us. Adolf Hitler
actually was such a man and, not coincidentally, he wasn't particularly interested in acquiring the
international prestige and legitimacy associated with a sit-down with English politicians -- he wanted a
giant war. In general, the right wants us to believe that world history is littered with countries
whose rulers, like Hitler, will stop at nothing short of world-domination but who also spend
their evenings fondly dreaming of the chance at a White House photo-op. But that’s absurd.
One shouldn’t, of course, strike a bad bargain with a foreign country just because you held a
meeting, but to fear that the very act of holding a meeting is a blow to the national interest is
silly. Genuine madmen aren’t going to care what “signal” we’re sending, and non-crazy people can be
productively bargained with. The truth, however, is that conservatives don't just make this
mistake over and over again, they fundamentally don't understand the use of diplomacy.
McCain describes Iran as "an implacable foe of the United States" but the truth is that the Iranian
government made several post-September 11 overtures to the U.S. seeking to improve relations. The
real implacable foe of our era is al-Qaeda, the same al-Qaeda that's recently been denouncing Iran
Bush/McCain-style for an alleged plot to dominate the Middle East. But the Bush administration rejected
those overtures out of hand, preferring to hold out for regime change. As Dick Cheney said of North
Korea, "we don't negotiate with evil, we defeat it."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013

Engagement => Change- Cuba
Unconditional economic engagement can actually get them to change – unconditional is key
Haass and O’Sullivan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and
Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, 2k
[Richard and Meghan, Brookings Institution, June 2000, “Engaging Problem Countries”,, Accessed 7/7/13, HW]

When stringent U.S. sanctions were placed on Cuba in 1962, Cuba posed a threat to the
United States as an outpost of communism in the Western Hemisphere and an ardent exporter of
revolution to its neighbors. However, Cuba's importance has since dwindled and its ability to
promote radical politics among its democratizing neighbors has almost entirely evaporated.
Not only has much of the rationale for isolating Cuba collapsed, but U.S. policy toward the country—
in particular the imposition of 'secondary sanctions'—has created tensions with America's
European allies that outweigh Cuba's importance. Most important, there is no evidence
suggesting that the current U.S. policy of isolation is close to achieving the objective of a
peaceful transition to a democratic, market-oriented Cuba. Regardless, unconditional
engagement can be undertaken and expanded. The recent easing of certain restrictions in the
hope of building ties between the United States and Cuba at the civic level is laudable. Yet
the United States should also expand unconditional engagement of the economic variety with
Cuba, a low-risk strategy that can gradually promote internal changes as Cubans benefit from
new economic opportunities. Even if Castro resists conditional engagement, U.S. policymakers
should consider ways in which investment codes—which would allow for American economic
involvement with Cuban entities meeting specific conditions concerning ownership structure and labor
rights—could replace aspects of the embargo. A relaxation of the embargo to permit the export of
agricultural and pharmaceutical products by the United States also makes sense in this
Engaging Cuba does not indicate approval of the gov’t, and attempting to isolate them
strengthens the regime
Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at The Brookings institution, 9
[Carlos, Brookings Institution, Spring 2009, “Cuba: A New policy of Critical and
Constructive Engagement”,,
Accessed 7/7/13, HW]

Engagement does not mean approval of the Cuban government’s policies, nor should it
indicate a wish to control internal developments in Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only
come from the actions of Cubans. If the United States is to play a positive role in Cuba’s future, it must
not indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue on issues that would advance democracy, justice,
and human rights as well as our broader national interests. Perversely, the policy of seeking to
isolate Cuba, rather than achieving its objective, has contributed to undermining the well-
being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and Latin America. It has
reinforced the Cuban government’s power over its citizens by increasing their dependence on
it for every aspect of their livelihood. By slowing the flow of ideas and information, we have
unwittingly helped Cuban state security delay Cuba’s political and economic evolution toward
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a more open and representative government. And, by too tightly embracing Cuba’s brave
dissidents, we have provided the Cuban authorities with an excuse to denounce their legitimate efforts
to build a more open society.