CHAPTER TWO

ACEH: THE LONG MARCH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

This chapter explores the historical background of the integration of Aceh into
Indonesia, with special emphasis on the contribution of Aceh to Indonesia since the
period of colonialism. Exploration as such is extremely important, because it
addresses questions why Aceh later had become such a rebellious region in Indonesia
and why Aceh deserved to be given special attention by the central government.
istorically, Aceh has a very special place in the history of the political and
economic development of Indonesia. Aceh was the last frontier in defending the
independence of the !epublic. It provided not only manpower but also financial
support that made the Indonesian international diplomatic missions possible. Their
fierce struggle against the "utch military aggression and loyalty had made Indonesia
what it is today.
#$
These contributions and past achievement, in his speech on
%eptember &, '()( in *eulaboh, +est Aceh, ,resident %ukarno declared that Aceh as
the Region of Capital for Indonesia independence.
#'

owever, after independence, Aceh although an autonomous province by
itself, was integrated with the -orth %umatra province. The integration was promptly
responded by the people in Aceh with discontent, especially from the local business
#$
!ead Ibrahim Alfian, .The Aceh question,/ International 0onference on, The Future Integration of
Indonesia: Focus on Aceh, -ew 1ork 2April 3
rd
, '(((45 A.6. 7akobi, Aceh daerah modal: Long march
ke Medan area 27akarta8 1ayasan .%eulawah !I9$$'/: ,t. ,elita ,ersatuan, '((;4 <9(5 A.6.7akobi,
ACEH: alam !erang Mempertahankan !roklamasi "emerdekaan, dan !eranan Teuku Hamid A#$ar
%e&agai !e'uang 27akarta8 ,T. =ramedia ,ustaka >tama, '((<4 3$3933<.
;<'9<&5 Abdullah Ali et al.( %e'arah !er'uangan Rak)at Aceh dalam !erang "emerdekaan *+,-.*+,+
2"inas ,endidikan dan 6ebudayaan ,ropinsi "aerah Istimewa Aceh, '(<)4 ;(#5 the late Abu *ansour
Ismail, Interview by author, ,etaling 7aya, %elangor, '; 7anuary '((;5 .,enuturan ?rang "ekat "aud
@eureueh/ "ARI%MA. -o.#. +eek A, *ay B 7une '(((, ';
#'
%ee Ibrahim Alfian,
3&
group and local elite who envisaged that their authority had been reduced. %imilarly,
*uslim groups who conceived that the central government was trying to limit the role
of Islam in Aceh. aving no favourable response from the central government, the
Acehnese had waged two bloodiest civil wars against the central government. Cirstly,
the arul Islam revolution in the '()$s under the leadership of the ,?E%A or ,>%A
2!ersatuan /0lama %eluruh Aceh1All Aceh /0lama Association4
#;
and secondly, the
=A* in '(D$s 2=erakan Aceh *erdeka: Cree Aceh *ovement4 under the leadership
of marginalised local elites, most of them were former follower of ,>%A. The arul
Islam revolution lasted for '$ years and the =A* had lasted for 3$ years claiming as
many as '$,$$$ to ;#,$$$ civilian lives. The conflicts had a devastating effect not only
on the socio9political structure, but also it seriously crippled the economic activities of
the people in the region.

"espites being a resource rich region, the conflict had left
Aceh as one of the poorest regions in Indonesia.
#3
Geography, Populato! a!" La!guage
Aceh is the %orthwestern province on the %umatra Island in Indonesia. It covers an
area of )D, 3#), )D km. It composes of ''( islands stretching along its +estern 0oast,
D3 maEor rivers and ; lakes. The region is surrounded by the %trait of *alacca in the
north, -orth %umatra ,rovince in the East and the Indian ?cean in the %outh and the
+est. Aceh was a special territory 2daerah istime$a4, an administrative designation
#;
At the end of the +orld +ar II, the ,>%A, an association which was formed by the reformist 0lama
of Aceh, took over the government of Aceh from its traditional elites the 0l23&alangs after three years
bloody civil war between the two groups.
#3
owever, there was no reliable statistic report available on the exact number of death during the
second phase of the insurgency, in which the central government undertook a counter9insurgency
operation, known as the .*ilitary ?peration Fone/ 2"?* G aerah 4perasi Militer5. '$,$$$ is
reported by -=?s and most of medias, while ;#,$$$ is what has been claimed by =A*. see, "amien
6ingsbury, .The Cree Aceh *ovement8 Islam and democratisation,/ 6ournal of Contemporar) Asis,
Aol. 3D, -o. ;, *ay 2;$$D48 '##9'<(, see also *uhammad Abubakar, .,olitics of national integration8
The case of Aceh in Indonesia 2*.A Thesis8 International Islamic >niversity, ;$$$4
3)
intended to give the area more autonomy from the central government in 7akarta. The
capital and largest city in Aceh is @anda Aceh or "uta Ra'a, located on the coast near
the northern tip of %umatra. ?ther maEor cities include %abang, Hhokseumawe, and
Hangsa. At the present, the region is administratively subdivided into seventeen
regencies and four municipalities. These local political subdivisions include Aceh
@arat 2+est Aceh4, Aceh @arat "aya, Aceh @esar, Aceh 7aya, Aceh %ingkil, Aceh
%elatan 2%outh Aceh4, Aceh Tenggara 2%outheast Aceh4, Aceh Timur 2East Aceh4,
Aceh Tengah 20entral Aceh4, Aceh >tara 2-orth Aceh4, @ireun, @anda Aceh, =ayo
Hues, Hangsa, Hhokseumawe, ,idie, %abang, %imeulue Island 2formerly part of Aceh
@arat4, -agan !aya, Aceh Tamiang, and @ener *eriah.
#&
The population of Aceh before the "ecember ;$$& was &,;D',$$$5 and after
earthquake and tsunami disaster, the population was reported to be &,$3',)<( 2;$$)4,
which represents about ;I of the population of Indonesia. The population composes
of six indigenous groups 9 the Acehnese( Teumieung, %imeulu( Anak 6ame7, 8a)o,
Alas and "luet
#)
G and many other ethnics groups from other parts of Indonesia who
came to Aceh as migrants to make a living in the region.
=enerally speaking, the Acehnese speak Acehnese language which is
completely different from the *alay language, but the indigenous groups also
subscribe to their own local dialect, such as =ayo and Alas speak =ayo language, the
%imeulu and Anak 7ameJ speak *inang dialect, while the Teumieung speak a *alay
#&
!egarding administrative subdivision, the region is experiencing rapid transformation of the cities to
become districts and then regencies. The above mentioned are the present cities, districts and regencies
registered in the Indonesian *inistry of ome Affairs.
#)
The Acehnese are found along the coastal area( the Teumieung in Aceh Teumieung, the %imeulue in
%imeulue Island( The Anak 6ame7 and the "luet in %outh and %outhwest Aceh, the 8a)o in 0entral
Aceh, @ener *eriah, =ayo Hues and also in East Aceh, and the Alas are found in %outhest Aceh.
"espites of being divided into different indigenous groups, the outsider address them all as the
Acehnese.
3#
dialect. "espites of all these languages, the Indonesian language has been used as the
official language.
istorically, Aceh was the first place touched by Islam in the %outheast Asia
region. Islam has become the maEor religion in Aceh and has been deeply rooted in the
culture and tradition of the Acehnese. The Acehnese tradition had been undergoing a
long process of IslamiKation, so that %hari7ah and local tradition were gradually
integrated as one single entity. Islam had transformed the people of Aceh, from a
simple community into becoming a nation that played an important role in the
historical development of Islam in the %outheast Asia region, and in the struggle for
independent Indonesia as well.
A#eh!e$e Polt#al Tra"to!: the Trias Politica A"%!$trat&e Sy$te%
istorically, there were many small kingdoms in Aceh such ast the kingdom of "aya,
,edier, @eunua 2Tamieng4, Hinge, and 7aya. In the early sixteenth century A.0 the
%ultan Alaiddin Ali *ughaiyat %yah integrated these kingdoms into the %ultanate of
Aceh "arussalam.
##
The unification, however, did not change the status9quo5 the
influence of the %ultan remained weak and was confined into the interior matters
within the palace. The ra'as7 2princes4 influences were still strong with their own
respective kingdoms. %imilarly, the 0l23&alangs
#D
retained control over the public
affairs of the nanggrou. Their control over the seaports and on the taxes of export and
levies on the import of goods had helped them to become richer and stronger.
*eanwhile the 0lamas
9:
2clergies4 were very close to the %ultan and provided him
##
Hukman Thaib, The politics and go;ernment of %outheast Asia 26uala Humpur8 =olden @ooks 0enter
%dn. @hd, '((D4, &#
#D
0l23&alang is denoted initially as head of <anggrou or self9governing rule. It also refers to an
aristocrat who holds the title of Teuku. Thus, here I attach suffix .s/ in case the word is used as plural.
#<
The term L0lama or Teungku denotes .religious scholar/, in Acehnese usage. It can be either singular
or plural which contradicts the Arabic usage. I attach suffix MsM to indicate its plural form.
3D
with advice on Islamic matters. aving strong support from the %ultan, the 0lamas
had developed Aceh as the centre of Islamic studies.
#(

The ,rinces and 0l23&alangs remained the main actors in the political process
and trading until Iskandar *uda was sworn to the throne. e eventually took over the
control of the seaports thereby reducing the influence of the orang ka)a 2merchants4
and the 0l23&alangs. e recruited administrators into the administration of the city,
=andar Aceh "arussalam. The %ultan had become militarily stronger and rich because
increase in revenues from the taxes and levies on goods that were coming in and out
of the seaport.
D$
e introduced a system of government that contained elements of
both a proto9democracy and a .complex balance of power/. %uch .complex balance of
power/
D'
can be defined as the mediating influence of the sultan, the traditional lords
20l23&alangs4 and the clergy 20lamas4. This concept of power sharing has been
beautifully expressed in the following hadi ma'a 2local wise words48 . Adat &ak !o
Teumeureuhom( Hokum &ak %)ha "uala( "anun &ak !utrou !hang( Reusam &ak
Laksamana> 2,ower rests with the %ultan, Haw with the great imam of %yah 6uala,
Tradition with the ,rincess of ,ahang
D;
and !egulation with the Admiral4.
D3

This hadih ma'a has become the reference for explaining the nature of the
power distribution in the political tradition of Acehnese communities. It implies that
the political system is comprised of three branches of state administration8 the %ultan,
0lergy
D&
and Laksamana G ideally there was no single group or individual that
#(
Ismail amid, .The earliest center of Islamic studies in the *alay world,/ in Islamic Herald, Aol. '$,
-o. &, 6uala Humpur 2Ceb, '(<#4, ''9'&
D$
Hee 6am ing, The sultanate of Aceh relation $ith the =ritish *?9@.*:A, 26uala Humpur8 ?xford
>niversity ,ress, '(()4, '&
D'
-aKaruddin %, Repu&lican re;olt 2%ingapore8 %ingapore >niversity ,ress, '(<)4, 'D
D;
The ,rincess of ,ahang was politically married to Iskandar *uda.
D3
The above hadih ma'a 2local wise word4 has been adopted as the state code of Aceh by the Cree Aceh
*ovement G=A* with modification, it removed the term of the ,rincess of ,ahang and use the
=entara instead of Laksaman. %ee 6ingsbury, pp. '##9'<(
D&
The role of the ,rincess of ,ahang, as the constitution of the tradition, was not so independent for the
tradition remained as the integral part of the shari7a and within the realm of the clergy group who had
the veto right on what is Islam and what is not. Thus, what is appear in the political scene was the
3<
dominated the political regime. It created a division of discreet areas of responsibility,
which had created a balance between the administrative, legal and religious influences
in the Acehnese traditional community.
D)

%uch a balanced system of government, enabled the %ultan to plan and build up
strategies for a more dynamic socio9political development. =andar Aceh arussalam
was a typical metropolitan city during the sixteenth and seventieth centuries. The
%ultan gradually built a strong naval force in the region and began to take control over
the *alacca straits, and posed a challenge to the reign of the indu 6ingdom of
*aEapahit.
D#
>nder the leadership of %ultan Iskandar *uda, who reigned from '#$D to
'#3# A.0, the %ultanate of Aceh "arussalam began to extend its political influence up
to the ,ahang in the *alay peninsular.
DD
"uring this period the %ultan claimed that
along the +est 0oast their territory extended beyond Tapus, @arus, %orkam, and even
Tapanuli. In the East 0oast, @atubara and Tamiang were said to be the limits marking
the Acehnese %ultanate influence.
D<
Almost half of the %umatra Island was under its
control until the coming of the "utch in '<D3. This period was considered to be the
golden era of the %ultanate of Aceh "arussalam, which had been proudly told from
one generation to the next generation.
After the death of Iskandar *uda, the %ultanate witnessed a period of decline
and was weakening. The 0l23&alangs took this opportunity to reclaim their former
authority and limited the role of the %ultan within the ,alace. It created a competitive
environment, each competing with the other for political authority at the nanggrou and
control over the ports. It did not mean that the %ultan was no longer important, the
dominant role of the above three branches of administrative system
D)
6ingsbury, .The Cree Aceh *ovement8../, 'D;
D#
7on *. !einhardt, Foreign polic) and national integration: The case of Indonesia 2-ew aven8 1ale
>niversity %outh East Asia %tudies, '(D'4, '&.
DD
Hee 6am ing, ;.
D<
I&id.( (.
3(
0l23&alangs remained dependent on the %ultan as the source of political authority,
because only the %ultan could issue a letter of surakata 2letter of acknowledgement as
traditional chief Gkatua adat4. +ithout the surakata( the 0l23&alang was seen as a
pirate or outlaw. "uring this period, the 0lamas were always close to the %ultan and
they were playing a very important role in the political process as the balancing force
to the chieftain.
D(

owever, after the fall of the %ultanate to the hand of colonial powers the role
of the 0lama was marginalised, as they openly organised revolution against the
colonial government. The 0l23&alang took advantage by cooperating with the "utch
and that has not only re9established their control in economic, but also in politics.
They took the advantage of the support provided by the "utch to increase their
political manoeuvre and self9enrichment through maladministration of the
<anggrou.
<$
%uch maladministration continued to be prevalent during the 7apanese
occupation. The political animosity between these elites led to the so9called social
revolution 2!rang Chum&ok1 war in 0humbok4
<'
soon after the departure of the
7apanese forces from Indonesia. The civil war removed the 0l23&alang from the local
politics, and brought in the 0lama of ,>%A to the local politics. %uch animosity
between local elites had profound implications on the subsequent relationship between
Aceh and the central government.
A#eh u!"er the Ol" Or"er: A Struggle 'or a! ($la%# Pro&!#e o'
A#eh
D(
%ee %iegel T. 7ames, The Rope of 8od 2Hos Angeles8 >niversity 0alifornia ,ress, '(#(4.
<$
%ee %nouck urgronEe, 0, The Achehnese, translated from "utch by A.+.%, ?J%ullivan 2Heiden8 E.
7. @rill, '($#4, vol. ', '$;
<'
0humbok is a village located in the ,idie !egency, it was there the war brook and spread all over
Aceh.
&$
After Independence, the newly born !epublic of Indonesia experienced a very
dynamic political process. The debate between the Islamists and secular9nationalists
on ideological foundations of the !epublic had preoccupied the parliament. According
to Ceith and 0astles, there were two primary sources of political thought in Indonesia,
the first was derived from the local tradition and the second was derived from western
political thought. ?ut of these two political poles, there emerged five political
groupings and these groupings had a profound effect on the political process in
Indonesia.
<;

The communists derived all of their political concepts directly or indirectly
from +estern political thought. They were closely cooperating with the 7avanese
traditionalists 2a&angan4 group and together they formed a very solid grass root
political base, and formed the Indonesian 0ommunist ,arty. %econdly, the social
democratic group5 this group was not very successful in establishing grass root
political support, so they established a significant coalition with other parties such as8
the *asyumi 2Ma'elis %)ura Muslimin Indonesia: *uslim 0onsultative @oard4 and
,-I 2!artai <asional Indonesia 9Indonesian -ational ,arty4. The third group was the
Islamists who were divided into two wings8 the religious wing and political wing.
They formed two important parties, the *asyumi under a reformist leader and ->
2<ahdatul 0lama4 under a conservative leader. The fourth group was the radical
nationalists. They established strong links with the other three important groups, the
7avanese traditionalist 2a&angan4, the communists and the social democrats. They
formed the Indonesian -ationalist ,arty. Cinally, 7avanese traditionalists 2A&angan4,
who subscribed to local traditions that based on mysticism and indu traditions. They
<;
erbert Ceith and Hance 0astles 2ed.4, Indonesian !olitical Thinking *+,-.*+9- 2Hondon8 0ornell
>niversity ,ress, '(D$4, #9 'D
&'
did not form any political party but they were actively recruited by other parties as the
source of their grass root political support.
<3
"uring the earlier years of the !epublic, these political parties were involved
in serious competition for political power, especially between the Islamists and the
secular nationalists. In the parliament there emerged two political poles 9 the Islamic
and anti9Islamic pole. "ebate on the ideological issues had predominantly controlled
the flow of ,arliamentary hearing. The Islamists defended that Islam should the sole
ideological foundation of the !epublic, but it was strongly opposed by the rival
parties9 the secular nationalist groups. The debate continued until *asyumi totally lost
its political power in the coalition government in 7uly '()3. The removal of *asyumi
from the government, had significantly affected the local politics in Aceh, it had lost
its potential political ally at the central government, who would defend Islam and also
its provincial status which was given by %yafruddinJs emergency government '(&<.
<&

The For%ato! o' the Pro&!#e o' A#eh: Pro a!" Co!tra
<3
"anie "hakidae, .,artai politik dan sistem kepartain di Indonesia/, in, Analisa kekuatan !olitik di
Indonesia, ed. Carchan @ulkin 27akarta8 H,3E%, '(<)4, ;'<
<&
%Eafruddin ,rawirangara was appointed as the deputy ,rime *inister of Emergency =overnment of
the Indonesian !epublic and be posted in @anda Aceh, the only region that was not pacified by the
"utch. e was assigned to make preparation for any possible outcomes of the Round Ta&le Conference
in The ague. In case the negotiation failed, %Eafruddin should be able to take any precautionary action
for defending independence that would begin in Aceh. %ukarno also appointed Teungku "aud @eureueh
as a *ilitary =overnor with the honorary rank of *aEor =eneral. is authority covered Aceh 9 as the
capital 9 Hangakat and Tanah 6aro, and was confined not only within military affairs, but civil affairs
connected with defenses as well. %ee, 0. Aan "iEk, Re&ellion under the &anner of Islam: The arul
Islam in Indonesia 2The ague8 *artinus -iEhoff, '(<'4, ;<<.
&;
The formation of Aceh as a single province was well received by the 0lamas( who
perceived that by having their own provincial government it would be easy for them to
put Islam into practice as the way of life of the people in the region. owever, the
0l23&alangs( who Eust lost their power to the 0lamas in the civil war of Chum&ok
perceived it indifferently. %Eafruddin was well aware of such a pro and contra around
the formation of Aceh as a province within the local politics, but he made a decision to
form Aceh as a province without having to wait for the possible outcome of the 6@*
2"onfrensi Me'a =undar1 !ound Table 0onference4 in the late '(&(. e based the
decision on three grounds. Cirstly, the backbone of the Acehnese struggle against the
colonial rulers was the /0lamas( while 0l23&alangs were the Nlite group manipulated
by colonial rulers and people did not trust them. Therefore, the 0l23&alangs7
antagonistic opinion was considered as the vested self9interest of a minority group
within the community of Aceh. %econdly, the Acehnese had contributed not only their
fine youth, but also their properties in the war to defend independence from the
second attempt of annexation by the "utch. Cinally, he was told personally by the late
"aud @eureueh
<)
that %ukarno himself had promised him and sworn in the name of
Allah to give freedom to Aceh to be an Islamic province.
<#

?n "ecember 'D, '(&(, %Eafruddin issued a regulation of emergency
government
<D
that divided -orth %umatra into two new provinces8 Aceh ,rovince that
included Hangkat, and Tapanuli: East %umatra provinces. The creation of the province
of Aceh was an extraordinary decision that did not follow normal procedure whereby
the creation of a new province should be based on an act of ,arliament. owever, the
parliament was yet to be formed and the partition of the -orth %umatra was
<)
"aud @eureueh was the leading figure of young Blama, who founded the ,>%A.
<#
AEip !osidi, %'afruddin !ra$iranegara le&ih takut "epada Allah 27akarta8 Inti Idayu ,ress, '(<#4, ')$.
<D
,eraturan ,emerintah ,engganti >ndang9>ndang no. <:"es:+6,*, '(&(
&3
considered as an urgent necessity to improve the administrative structure.
<<
e offered
the governorship to @eureueh but he refused, and instead suggested as the first
governor of Aceh, Teuku "aud %yah, an 0l23&alang who had been closely associated
with ,>%A during the struggle against colonial powers.
owever, the opposing elites groups continued to criticiKe the formation of
Aceh province. The nationalists and secular educated elites who dominated the
politics at the center at that time were strongly against the idea of an Islamic %tate of
Indonesia. Cor them the creation of Aceh province was considered as a threat to the
secular ideology of Indonesia, because the ,>%A was the dominant elites in Aceh.
Therefore, they insisted on the amalgamation of the province, so as to destroy the
,>%A political domination. +hile on the other hand, the *asyumi, the *uslim
political party of -orth %umatra branch, was also against the formation of a separate
province of Aceh, because of the fear that they would loose during the general
elections that would be held in '()). Aceh was the stronghold of this *uslim party
and it had formed an alliance with ,>%A. Therefore, the exclusion of Aceh from
-orth %umatra would certainly affect the final result of the elections, even to the
extent that they could not form the maEority in the ,arliament.
<(
?n August ', '()$, the central government set up a new preparatory committee
for the creation of -orth %umatra, with %. ,arman !eksodiharEo as the chairman and
Teuku "aud %yah as a member. ?n August '), '()$, the >nited %tates of Indonesia
which was created by the "utch was officially abrogated and replaced by the >nitary
!epublic. The new government system issued a number of regulations governing the
provincial administration division substituting regulations issued by previous
government. Cor instance, government regulation no ;', stated that the territory of
<<
Aan "iEk, ;<(.
<(
AEip !osidi,.')$
&&
Indonesia was comprised of ten provinces and -orth %umatra was one of them. It had
overruled the regulation that %Eafruddin issued on the creation of the province of
Aceh.
($
The amalgamation of Aceh with the -orth %umatra had profound effects on
Acehnese socio9political and economy. The ,>%A provided a long list of arguments
as to why Aceh should be given an independent provincial status and be treated
differently in many respects, for instance in education, the economic, legal and
religious fields. %ince Aceh had been in a state of continuous warfare during the
colonial period, it had suffered serious political instability and enormous educational
slowdown, agricultural insufficiency, extremely bad infrastructure, and inefficient
fishing industries.
Therefore, Aceh was in dire need of a very effective and efficient
administration that required an independent provincial status in order to deal
effectively with these problems. As the ,>%A leaders were aware of their weakness in
the bargaining position ;is.C.;is the government, they adopted a pressuring tactic, by
threatening that .if these demands are not given appropriate response, we, the %ons of
Aceh and whoever shared the same ideal and presently holding the position in
administration in the region would resign./
('
In response to this threat, the central
government sent a delegation led by Asaat, the *inister of Internal Affairs to negotiate
with @euereueh, as the leading figure of ,>%A. The delegation, however, failed to
reach an agreement. The Aice9,resident, atta, came to @anda Aceh in -ovember and
also failed to reach understanding with the ,>%A.
(;
($
Aan "iEk, ;('.
('
Ibid., ;('.
(;
Ibid.( ;(;.
&)
In 7anuary '()', however, when the provincial reorganiKation was due to take
effect, ,rime *inister *ohamed -atsir went to Aceh and talked to the Nlite of Aceh.
e stated that the creation of the -orth %umatra province would not lock any other
future possibilities for Aceh to be a province. Cor the central government was not
opposing the call for autonomy for Aceh, and the matter now became a national issue
that would be settled down in a nation9wide context. After the talk, -atsir, on !adio in
@anda Aceh, 7anuary ;3, '()' announced the agreement reached between him and
@eureueh,
(3
and so the dispute ended. ?n 7anuary ;), the provincial governorJs office,
which was formerly in @anda Aceh, was shifted to *edan and Abdul akim was
appointed the governor. As in Aceh, the regency was set up to administer and
supervise the residential administration instead.
aving coalition with the *asyumi, @eureueh and his followers remained calm
in Aceh and took the stand to wait and see for any political development in 7akarta.
The political condition in 7akarta was so dynamic and *asyumi was one of the
leading party after ,-I. These two parties controlled the alteration of political power
not only in the parliament politics 2party9 politics4, but also in the formation of cabinet
politics. @oth, *asyumi and ,-I played a leading role in the parliament and also in
state administration. +ithin two years, Indonesia experienced a six time cabinet
reshuffle that rotated within these two leading parties8 -atsirJs cabinet 2*asyumi4,
%ukimanJs cabinet 2*asyumi4, +ilopoJs cabinet 2coalition of *asyumi and ,-I4, Ali
%astromidEoEoJs cabinet I 2,-I4, @urhanidinJs cabinet 2*asyumi4 and Ali
%astromidEoEoJs cabinet II 2,-I4
(&

owever, in 7uly '()3, Ali %astromidEoEo formed a new cabinet for the second
time and excluded the *asyumi from the cabinet. The exclusion had a profound effect
(3
Ibid.(
(&
%ee, @ulkin, ;';
&#
on the local politics in Aceh. The ,>%A realiKed that there was no more hope for
establishing an Islamic %tate of Indonesia, nor was there any hope for Aceh to attain
the provincial status. The ,>%A leaders turned to use radical means of putting
pressure on the central government. They began by mobiliKing communal grievances
against the central government on a wide range of issues related to the loss of the
provincial status of Aceh.
The issues were exemplified by8 firstly, the imposition of the prohibition on
AcehOs direct9trading with *alaya and %ingapore. %econdly, the replacement of
Acehnese military units by other races 2non9Acehnese officers4 in Aceh had led to the
increase of un9Islamic activities such as gambling and liquor drinking. Thirdly, Aceh
had been treated in a step9motherly manner by the central government in terms of
educational development, infrastructure improvement, and in the development of
sophisticated irrigation. Cinally, @eureueh inferred that %ukarno and the proponents of
!ancasila have betrayed the trust for establishing an Islamic Aceh in particular, and
Islamic Indonesia in general.
()
ence, when %ukarno visited Aceh in *arch '()3, he
was protested and banner were every where stating that .Aceh must not be treated as
a stepchild/ and .+e love the ,resident but we love religion more./
(#
The protest did
not change the government decision. @eureueh then called for the meeting in @atee
6rueng and called for full support from every Acehnese. e established connection
with -II 2-egara Islam Indonesia: Islamic %tate of Indonesia, and declared the
establishment of !IA 2Islamic !epublic of Aceh4 or -@A 2<egara =ahagian Aceh:
the %tate of Aceh4 under the federation of -II.
(D
()
Ibid., '&;.
(#
erbert Ceith, The decline of constitutional democrac) in Indonesia( 2-ew 1ork8 0ornell >niversity
,ress, '(#<4, 3&#.
(D
!IA or -@A is term used to explaining the "I:TII revolution in Aceh.
&D
Darl-Islam Re&oluto! a!" the Re!$tallato! o' A#eh Pro&!#al
Auto!o%ou$ Statu$
?n %eptember '(, '()3, @eureueh declared the arl Islam 2Islamic %tate4 revolution
in Aceh, which was also known as "I:TII revolution 2arl Islam1 Tentara Islam
Indonesia Darl. Islam1 Islamic *ilitary of Indonesia4 In response to that, the
government launched a military operation in the countryside to chase the rebels,
which led to the incident of ,ulot90ot 7eumpa. The incident not only shook the
Acehnese in the region but also the Acehnese community in 7akarta. 1et, ,rime
*inister Ali %astromiEdoEo reEected all allegations that government forces massacred
innocent civilians brutally. Al90haidar et al. have precisely stated what really
happened8
In *arch '()&, a sweeping operation was conducted and a convoy of
military trucks was passing by a small village. +hen they reached a
bridge at ,ulot village, they were attacked by rebel guerillas. %hooting
took place and the rebels escaped through the two villages, ,ulot
Heupung and 0ot 7eumpa. They called for help from 6utaraEa and that
very day the Indonesian *ilitary launched the greatest operation
chasing the rebels by sweeping the whole villages. The military which
outnumbered the villagers began to interrogate the villagers who
started panicking. -one of them was able to speak and give satisfactory
answers on the rebelsJ whereabouts. Eventually, as villagers failed to
give positive cooperation, a group of soldiers from @attalion '&;, out
of disappointment and anger, open fire on the villagers and killed ((
civilian.
(<
The exposure of the bloody incident had prompted the Acehnese community in
7akarta to assemble in the Ea)asan Iskandar 2Iskandar foundation4 and discussed to
find solution to the conflict in Aceh. As the issue was growing serious, the third
parliament hearing was held on April '3, '()& on the inhuman incident of ,ulot
Heupung and 0ot 7eumpa5 and the AliJs cabinet was badly criticised and condemned
by the opposition parties for the policy that the government took to calm down the
(<
Al90haidar et al., Aceh &ersim&ah darah 27akarta Timur8 ,ustaka 6autsar, '((<4, ;D93'.
&<
revolution. In response to the opposition, Ali %astromidEoEo in his apologetic statement
to ,arliament in mid9April, accused the "I:TIIJs forces of the abduction and
assassination of ;< members of the ,>T, ';3 of the ,-I and ';$ of the ,6I
2Indonesian 0ommunist ,arty4.
((
In the meantime, the newly appointed -orth %umatra =overnor, %. *. Amin
began a conciliatory approach by sending a letter to @eureueh, requesting him and his
followers to end their resistance and prepare for negotiations. e also promised the
latter to grant them an amnesty. In reply, @eureueh made a draft of a government
regulation in which the central government would hold negotiations with the founders
of the Islamic %tate of Indonesia in 7ava, Aceh, 6alimantan 2@orneo4 and %ulawesi.
The latter should grant protection and assistance for the members of the delegation of
the Islamic %tate during the negotiations. Amin, then sent the letter to 7akarta for the
approval of the ,rime *inister Ali, but the government did not react.
'$$
As the deadlock remained, %Eammaun =aharu
'$'
suggested to =eneral Abdul
aris -asution, the then 0hief of %taff of the =overnment Army that the Aceh case
was very complicated and it could be best solved by the Acehnese themselves in the
Acehnese way. Cirstly, he proposed that Aceh must be given provincial status and
Acehnese military officers be returned to Aceh and placed under his command.
%econdly, he suggested that some of the respected L0lamas of ,>%A who had been
imprisoned, must be returned to previous positions as AcehJs religious, Eudicial and
educational officials.
'$;
((
Aan "iEk, 3;D.
'$$
Ibid., 3;(933$.
'$'
e was the commander of the T6! PTentara "eamanan Rak)at1 ,eople %ecurity CorcesQ in Aceh
during the Indonesian revolution in ?ctober '(&)9 '(&#, before he was replaced by Amir usin al
*uEahid, following a social revolution in Aceh in '(&#. e left to 7akarta.
'$;
"avid @rown, The state and ethnic politics in %outheast Asia 2Hondon8 !outledge, '((&4, '&&.
&(
>pon =aharuJs proposal, at the end of '()#, 7akarta through the government
regulation granted Aceh a provincial status. Ali asymy, the pre9war leader of the
,>%A 1outh of Aceh ,roper, was appointed as the =overnor. =aharu, together with
asymy, began a conciliation policy to end the rebellion.
'$3
In April '()D, in the
middle of !amadan, the *uslim fasting month, negotiations were held with a number
of prominent "I:TII leaders at Hamteh. The negotiations were later known as the
Hamteh 0harter where .@oth sides pledged themselves to promote Islam, to stimulate
the development of Aceh in the broadest sense of the word, and to try to bring
prosperity and peace to the people and society of Aceh./
'$&
The ,rime *inister "Euanda who formed a new cabinet in %eptember '()D,
issued a resolution 2"eputusan !erdana Mentri Repu&lik Indonesia no. *1 Missi1 *+-+
P"ecision of ,rime *inister of !epublic of Indonesia no.':*issi: '()(Q4 to the effect
that, as of *ay ;#
th
, '()( the ,rovince of Aceh could style itself aerah Istime$a
Aceh P%pecial !egion of AcehQ. The government also promised to give Aceh the
widest possible autonomy, in particular in the field of religion, education and
customary law, but with the provision that this should not be in contravention with
existing legislation.
'$)
The change of the government policy towards Aceh had distracted the arl.
Islam members. Cor instance, asan %aleh, "I:TII military commander in Aceh,
together with other rebellion leaders deserted @eureueh and formed an Aceh
!evolutionary 0ouncil that would negotiate with the central government. In *ay
'()(, the government granted amnesty to the followers of asan %aleh. *eanwhile,
@eureueh and a few of his die9hard followers remained in the mountains and sought to
'$3
I&id.( '&).
'$&
Aan "iEk, 333.
'$)
I&id.( 33).
)$
Eoin ,!!I
'$#
F!emerintah Re;olusi Repu&lik Indonesia1 Re;olutionar) 8o;ernment of
Repu&lic of Indonesia5 in '(#$, where Aceh was self9proclaimed as the !IA. @ut, the
,!!I rebellion was short9lived, due to the lack of leadership consensus.
In April '(#; government agreed to issue a decree that authoriKed the
implementation of some elements of Islamic Haw in Aceh, and @eureueh agreed to go
down from the mountains. Aceh again stood as a provincial government with special
status in the field of religion, education and customary law.
A#eh u!"er the Ne) Or"er Reg%e
The failure of the communist coup attempt in %eptember 3$
th
, '(#), marked the end of
%oekarnoJs political power, and the beginning of the -ew ?rder. %uharto, who was the
leader of the army quickly seiKed the political power and became the second president
of Indonesia. e implemented a total restructuring policy that emphasiKed security
and economic development by placing the A@!I 2Armed Corces of !epublic of
Indonesia4 as a strong backbone of the -ew ?rder regime. The regime fully utiliKed
the doctrine of the dual function of A@!I to legally empower the military to assume
security and civil administrative responsibility in that system. The incorporation of the
military in civil administration contributed to a state of political stability5 and
therefore enhance economic development.
In addition, the regimeJs open and pro9+est economic policies attracted foreign
investments into the country5 more and more capital inflows and financial support
from developed countries became available for the countryJs development. owever,
'$#
,!!I consisted of !IA 2Repu&lik Islam Aceh: Islamic !epublic of Aceh4, ,!I 2!er'uanga Repu&lik
Indonesia: The !evolution of !epublic of Indonesia4 and -II 2<egara Islam Indonesia: Islamic %tate
of Indonesia4. %ee, %%. 7uangga @atu @ara, Teungku. T'hik. Muhammad aud =eureueh: Mu'ahid
Terangung di <usantara 2*edan8 =erakan ,erEuangan dan ,embebasan !epublik Islam Cederasi
%umatra, '(<D4.
)'
such an impressive economic development did not contribute to an even development
and equal distribution of economic prosperity. It was only a few who belonged to the
patron9client circle that enEoyed the prosperity. %uharto used his political power to
suppress any resisting group and reward loyal supporters with political positions and
economic benefits. *eanwhile to maintain grass roots support, he established a strong
patronage at village levels. 0rouch observed8
After '(##, =eneral %uharto gradually tightened his hold on the armed
forcesRto use coercion against resisting groups5...the distribution of
patronageRto reward loyal supporters and win over dissidentsRwith
appointments to civil posts that offer prospects of material gains.
P+hileQ other officers were encouraged to go into business, with the
promise of help from the administrationRlicenses, credits, or
contractRcontrol over machinery of patronageR%uharto maintained
the support of the armed forces for his leadership.
'$D
%uharto developed a strong neo9patrimonial political system, in which the
relationship between the top and subordinates is characteriKed by the term =apakism
PCatherismQ.
'$<
e slowly centraliKed all state political power and system of
governance by intrducing the .,ancasila "emocracy/

system of government.
'$(

%uharto began his political manoeuvre by reducing the number of political
parties from ten political parties into three maEor political parties8 The ,,, 2,artai
,ersatuan ,embangunan: >nited "evelopment ,arty4 which was identified as *uslim
party, =olkar 2=olongan 6arya :Cunctional =roup4 which identified with the
'$D
arold 0rouch, .,atrimonialism and military rule in Indonesia,/ in Atul 6ohli 2eds.4, The state and
de;elopment in the Third Gord 2>%8 ,rinceton >niversity ,ress, '(<#4, ;&D9;&<.
'$<
%ee, @. !. ?J=. Anderson .The idea of power in 7avanese culture/ in 0laire olt 2eds.4, Culture and
politics in Indonesia 2Ithaca8 0ornell >niversity ,ress, '(D;4, '35 6. ". 7ackson and H. +. ,ye 2ed.4,
!olitical po$er and communications in Indonesia 2@erkeley8 >niversity of 0alifornia ,ress, '(D<4, 3&5
!einhardt, 3#.
'$(
!ancasila as the sole ideological foundation of political parties in August '(<3 and of all non9
governmental agencies a year later. !ancasila consists of five principles8 2'4 @elief in the ?ne %upreme
=od, 2;4 A 7ust and 0iviliKed umanity, 234 -ationalism, 2&4 0onsultation, and 2)4 %ocial9Eustice.
According to %Eafruddin, all these can be interpreted and applied according to the wishes and thought of
those who hold power. Implicitly, the policy has Eustified the success of %oeharto to defeat his political
opposition, the Islamic movement in particular. %ee %Eafruddin ,rawiranegara, .!ancasila as the sole
foundation/ Indonesia( no. 3< 2?ctober '(<D48 <'
);
nationalist and were close allies of %uharto, and ,"I 2,artai "emokrasi Indonesia:
Indonesian "emocratic ,arty4 which identified as a nationalist and non9*uslim party.
.,ancasila "emocracy/ was a party system that contained dualism in its
substance. It allowed three political parties to get involved in general election, to show
as if there was a fair political competition in the system. In political reality, the =olkar
had become a hegemonic party. In the '(D' election, =olkar swept a maEority vote and
also in every general election during the -ew ?rder regime. +hile the other two
political parties were minorities in the *,! 2,eopleJs !epresentative Assembly4 and
",! 2,eopleJs 0onsultative Assembly4. Their presence and voice would not affect
any decision taken by the =olkar.
*edian %irait, a distinguished figure in =olkar explained that, there were six
factors contributing to the success of =olkar in the achievement of a big win in the
election of '(D'. Cirst, =olkar was in actual fact the ruling party, second, the
weaknesses of the other two parties, third, =olkar addressed very real and relevant
issues during the campaigning process, fourth, the grass roots were not exposed to any
ideas related to democracy and human rights so as to consider them as issue, fifth,
=olkar was an effective organiKation, and sixth, =olkar received good support from
intellectuals and technocrats.
''$
owever, "hakidae critically explained that the
success of =okar in every election was due to a strong political support that they
received from the Indonesian Armed forces. ,ublic servants were also forced to vote
for =olkar.
'''
In addition to the political party, %uharto went further to impose ,ancasila as
the sole ideology for all mass organiKations in Indonesia. There should be no mass
organiKations that were based on other ideologies, including Islam. The imposition
''$
0ited in Awad @ahasoan, .=olongan karya mencari format baru/, in @ulkin, ;('
'''
Ibid, ;;)
)3
received strong opposition from *uslim students of ,II 2,ersatuan ,elaEar Islam:
*uslim %tudent Association4. The government then declared that ,II was outlaw and
many of its leaders were recalled and forbidden to leave the country. It was a big blow
for the Acehnese as the government moved not only to limit the scope of Islam as a
social and political force, but also to bring all other countervailing sources of power
into its tight control. The government gradually evolved to become a strong
centraliKed political system, leaving little more room for the regional autonomy which
was given to Aceh by the previous regime.
'';
%uch social, political and economic
transformations had profound effects on all regions of Indonesia, and Aceh in
particular, although it was granted a special status which carried a limited sense of
autonomous rights.
A#eh: the La!" o' Fortu!e
"uring the -ew ?rder, when the first five9year plan was introduced in '(#(, Aceh,
due to its fertile soil and historic crops barn, was to be developed as an agricultural
region that would become .the rice barn of Indonesia/.
''3
owever, this changed by
the discovery of huge reserves of natural gas in Arun, Hhokseumawe, -orth Aceh, by
*obil of Indonesia in '(D'. @y '(DD, the Arun refinery of liquefied natural gas 2H-=4
had started production and Hhokseumawe was developed as one of the chemical
industrial Kones .FIH%/ 2Hona Industri Lhokseuma$e: Hhokseumawe Industrial
Fone4. The discovery had later put the region as one of the maEor contributors to
national economic development besides !iau and 6alimantan 2+est @orneo4. As it
has been operating effectively since '(DD, Arun has been producing four types of high
'';
Tim 6ell, The root of Acehnese re&ellion( *+:+.*++A 2Ithaca8 0ornell *odern Indonesian ,roEect,
'(()4, ;<.
''3
.Fone pertanian, konsep baru pembangunan daerah istimewa Aceh,/ !risma( '# 7uly '(<D, (#
)&
value export products, namely8 0ondensate, H-= 2Hiquefied -atural =as4, H,=
2Hiquefied ,etroleum =as4 ,ropane and H,= 2Hiquefied ,etroleum =as4 @utane. All
of these four products in their total worth of >%S;.# billion equal to 3'# trillion
Indonesian !upiahs per year.
''&

%ince the '(<$s the province has been contributing 3$ percent of the countryJs
oil and gas exports,
'')
2excluding the revenue that other industries have contributed4,
such as8 Iskandar *uda CertiliKer Industry, A%EA- fertiliKer industry, Andalas
0ement Industry, and Aceh 0raft ,aper Industry. Almost ((,3 I of all commodities
produced by Aceh are of exportable value
''#
such as timber, since approximately
D&.)#I of AcehJs land is rainforest which produces different species of timber.
''D
This
optimal exploitation of AcehJs reserve of natural resources implied that Aceh seemed
to have been more integrated economically.
''<

A#eh*$ E#o!o%y: the (%pa#t o' Ce!tral$e" Sy$te% o' E#o!o%y
@efore the discovery of natural gas, agriculture, fishing and shrimp farming were the
primary sources of income for the people in Aceh, and -orth Aceh in particular. The
creation of the FIH% has shocked the surrounding population. *any of the
''&
."engan autonomy yang lebih luas aceh akan sama dengan %ingapura,/ Gaspada, %eptember '',
'((<, <
'')
.+aging a dirty war in Aceh,/ Asia$eek, '; April '((', 335 Adam %chwaK, .Hiquefied assets,/ Far
Eastern Economic Re;ie$, "ecember '&, '(<(, '$;5 "onal 6. Emmerson, .>nderstanding the -ew
?rder8 @ureaucratic pluralism in Indonesia,/ Asian %ur;e) ;3, '' 2-ovember '(<348';3;.
''#
1ayasan @hakti, .".I Aceh/ in $a$asan <usantara 27akarta8 ,T. Inter-usa, '((;4, D.
''D
owever, %oehartoJs cronies9owned industries, whose headquarters are in 7akarta monopoliKed the
forest production. These industries are classified into three different categories which are based on the
nature of their production9 , 2ak ,engelolaan utan: The !ight to Corest Administration4, I,6
2IKin ,enebangan 6ayu: Hicense for Timber 0ut4 and TI 2utan Tebang Indonesia: Corest for
Hogging4. There are about '( , industries operating in Aceh whose income annually reaches up to
($$ billion Indonesian !upiahs, such as that owned by @ob asan one of %oehartoJs cronies. +ith only
a concession paper of ,, he monopoliKed almost ;)I of the %hares of the Aceh 6raft Industry with
the value reaching up to <) billion Indonesian !upiah in '(<). *eanwhile, AcehJs ,A" 2,endapatan
Asli "aerah: ?riginal ,rovincial !evenue4 can only have &) billion Indonesian !upiah, which is only
$,)I of its forest richness. %ee Al90haidar et al., '3.
''<
0hristine "rake, <ational integration in Indonesia: !attern and politics 2onolulu8 >niversity of
awaii ,ress, '(<(4, '$D.
))
resettlement locations were soon deserted, either because people failed to initiate
transitions to new livelihood or because the promise of the new land has never been
fulfilled. Thus, the appropriation of land for industrial use and resettlement of the
villagers has destroyed the traditional livelihood.
Although the big industries did employ the local people during the construction
of the plant, it was only temporary. ?nce the industries were operated, only a few of
the locals were employed, while many others were brought in from outside of Aceh.
''(
%ince recruitment has been made in 7akarta, the practice of favoring ones cronies has
alienated the local people and deprived them from their natural right for the Eob.
';$
The
Acehnese were marginaliKed and were deprived of their rights to enEoy development
within their own land. ?ut of discontentment, they said, .Tan)oue ureung Aceh ka
lage &u)a krueng( n)ang tedeung.deung( &u)a tameung n)ang meteme raseuki 2we,
Acehnese, are like local river crocodiles that stands still and hungry, while the migrant
crocodiles are enEoying profits4/ The development of the Fone in deed did not offer a
long9term alternative to many local people.
';'

The growth of .rich ghettos of migrants,/ employees of the big industries and
the glaring socio9cultural and economic disparities with the surrounding population
have become obvious. Cor example, the facilities enEoyed by the employees of the
industries were sharply in contrast with the poor state of infrastructure in adEoining
villages.
';;
@y '((;, inasmuch as the industries utiliKed the abundance of
electricity
';3
and clean water supplies, only ;$ percent of the residents of the industrial
''(
Ibid., ((.
';$
The recruitment policy has been made at the central government. %ee 6ell, ;D5 Al90haidar et al., '&.
';'
.Fona Industri Hhokseumawe,/ !risma( '# 7uly '(<D, <<9((.
';;
@udhy TEahEati %. %oegiEoko, ."ampak pembangunan proyek besar8 6asus Kona industri
Hhokseumawe,/ !risma( '& "ecember '(<), #(9D$.
';3
According to "ayan and %yafriKal, in spite of being an energy9rich province, less than '$ percent of
the villages in Aceh have a steady supply of electricity. %ee "ayan "awood and %yafriKal, .Aceh8 The
H-= boom,/ in 0nit) and di;ersit): Regional economic de;elopment in Indonesia since *+?@( ed. al
ill F%ingapore8 ?xford >niversity ,ress, '(<(4, ';;.
)#
Kone had supplies of water that met official standards of cleanliness, while the
maEority made use of well water which was vulnerable to pollution by the waste
discharged from the factories.
';&

The impact of industrial growth on Aceh, such as environmental devastation,
was so profound on the peopleJs social and economic situations, particularly on the
local population in the area of the Fone. !esearch done in '(($ reported that there
was a common complaint that the Arun H-= refinery had produced a large scale of
pollution for the locals, while earning >% S D million per day in foreign exchange for
the treasury of Indonesia.
';)
In the middle of '((', it was reported that #$ percent of
fishermen in traditional fishing villages in the Hhokseumawe area were living below
the poverty line, and were even close to starvation, as a result of critical low catches
over the previous three years. The fishermen blamed the decline on the discharge of
pollutants from the FIH%. %uch discharge of chemical waste from the *obil ?il
Indonesia 2*?I4 refinery at Arun was responsible for the devastation of doKens of
hectares of shrimp and fishponds owned by ;&$ farmers in '(('.
';#
"espite environmental pollution, the safety of the inhabitants of the FIH% had
remained vulnerable to physical destruction. It was reported that in "ecember '((',
there were about eighty9 eight people badly affected by the leak of ammonia gas from
the Iskandar *uda CertiliKer 0ompany. In -ovember '((;, another incident occurred
where five people were severely burnt, three houses burnt, and livestock and crops
were killed and destroyed.
';D
In response to the disaster caused by the FIH%, the
government set up several official agencies to study and control the pollution of FIH%
';&
as the impact of the pollution, it is reported that around #< percent of the children were suffering from
breathing problems. %ee .%ebuah ,esisir yang =emerlapan,/ "ompas( ;3 -ovember '((;, ''.
';)
1ayasan Hembaga @antuan ukum 21H@4, .Haporan observasi lapangan di propinsi daerah
Istimewa Aceh,/ *edan, "ecember '(($, '#9'D.
';#
."itangani serious, kasus pencemaran tambak rakyat di Aceh >tara/, "ompas, D ?ctober '((', '3.
';D
.,ipa kondensat Arun bocor dan terbakar/, "ompas, ;( -ovember '((;, ''.
)D
on the environment. %uch agencies included the @apedal 2=adan !encegah ampak
Lingkungan1 Environmental Impact 0ontrol Agency4 and the T,;+I 2Tim !encegah
dan !em&angunan Gila)ah Industri1 Industrial Fone "evelopment and 0ontrol
Team4. owever, none of these agencies were able to provide a better solution to the
problem and this gave the impression to the people that their presence was that of a
superfluous institution.
';<

Initially, the development of FIH% was to stimulate not only a large9scale of
chemical industries, but also many medium and small rural industries where the
former acts as a foster parent of the latter in the region
';(
. owever, it turned to be
more center9oriented, as 6ell states8
The economy of -orth Aceh .is more oriented towards the capital of
@anda Aceh and, through it to *edan, 7akarta, and the International
economy, than the rest of Aceh./ And the H-= and oil sector .is far
better integrated with the East Asian economy/ than it is with its
immediate hinterland. The FIH% has had .very limited spread effect/ in
Aceh, not only geographically but also in terms of the impact it has had
on the growth of other sectors of the economy. %uch manufacturingR
there was .no functional link/ between industrial activity in the -orth
Aceh enclave and other economic activities, including agriculture and
existing manufacturing industriesRall is reflected in the lack of
development of infrastructure in the areas close to it, outside, but
within the industrial enclave.
'3$
The pattern of development did not stimulate a rapid structural change of the
AcehJs economy. In terms of the manufacturing sector, it remained very small and its
contribution to employment was very low. Carming was still the dominant economic
activity throughout the province and at least D<.& percent of the Acehnese still
depended to live off the land.
'3'
Therefore, the provincial government introduced a
new scheme .=reen !evolution/ that intensified the agriculture sectors to enhance the
';<
A more detailed description of the T,;+IJs activities can be found in . Fona industri Hhokseumawe/
!risma( '# 7uly '(<D, '$$9'$3.
';(
%oegiEoko, D$.
'3$
6ell, ;;.
'3'
%oegiEoko, #3.
)<
prosperity of the people and made Aceh to become the principal rice barn in
%umatra.
'3;
In '((3 the province showed encouraging results when Aceh produced
'',&)$ tons of rice which were exported to Africa.
'33
owever, the price of the rice
was relatively the lowest in Indonesia compared to other commodities, the people
continued living far from prosperity. *any of them sold their land to the landlords and
migrated to the urban area to find Eobs for better income.
6ell claims that the provinceJs lack of autonomy in economic matters by virtue
of the highly centraliKed state power under the -ew ?rder, has become the bottleneck
for AcehJs economic development8
'3&
-ot only does the central government control the revenue that accrues
from AcehJs export industries, but the concentration in 7akarta, both
authority over industrial policy and of the bureaucratic agencies which
grants licenses for new industrial proEect, also has .7avanese centric
effect./ The pattern is accentuated by an additional .web of informal
connection,/ which ensures for example, that military and government
officials and professional people in 7akarta are the ones who reap the
greatest reward from the negotiation of local equity in foreign owned
ventureR
PCurthermoreQ Aceh no longer has the freedom, let alone the
infrastructure ability, to conduct trade in the fashion that accorded in its
greatness as an independent state in the past century. AcehJs economy
was now not only closely integrated with the rest of Indonesia, but
today it and other outlying provinces are being taxed by the high
protection conferred on 2predominantly4 7ava9based manufacturers, and
by the high cost domestic shipping system. Thus, Aceh would have
more to gain by having complete freedom on trade directly with
*alaysia, %ingapore and other countries in the region. owever, the
capacity of AcehJs port to handle international trade is limited, and the
economy of the province is heavily dependent on *edan, and its port
@elawan as an entrepTt.
'3)
'3;
-aKaruddin %Eamsuddin, .6emiskinan dan pemiskinan di pedesaan,/ "ompas, ( %eptember '((3, &.
'33
.Aceh expor beras ke Afrika,/ "ompas, ;3 "ecember '((3, '3.
'3&
The -ew ?rder, in enhancing economic development, has created a division of economic
development order. ?ut of twenty9seven provinces, there are four maEor growth centers of the first
order5 in %umatra, *edan is the maEor growth center, and !iau is growth center of the second, and Aceh
is a sub9growth center. According to this order, it is no wonder that Aceh depended strongly on the
@elawan port of *edan for export. %ee "rake;;D9;;(.
'3)
6ell( ;D.
)(
+ith the creation of the FIH%, Aceh emerged as a maEor exporter of oil and
natural gas and became one of the richest regions of Indonesia with the fastest growth
rate. owever, Aceh and its inhabitants remained backward and poor, as its revenues
were exploited by the central government. All of the shortcomings of economic
development and the gap between the development of AcehJs resource revenue and
the standard of living of the ordinary Acehnese people mentioned above, served as
stumbling blocks to its integration with the rest of Indonesia. Although the creation of
the FIH% helped silence the Nlite who were concerned with the economic development
of Aceh, the government failed to silence the perpetual call for prosperity by the
maEority of Acehnese who continued living under the state poverty. This failure is an
advantage for the L0lamas who continued their resistance against the secular central
government to win support from the Acehnese community. Accordingly, it is
important to discuss the impact of the patrimonial system of the -ew ?rder on
Acehnese politics, as a system used by the government to maintain its control over
Aceh.
The Re!#ar!ato! o' Ulbalang ! the Lo#al Polt#$
As the -ew ?rder government was concerned with the twin goals of economic
development and political stability, the regime set about to bring all independent
institutions and alternative sources of power under its control, and when necessary,
creating new institutions.
'3#
This move was possible through enhancing the power of
'3#
As mentioned above, in order to enhance its control, the regime imposed !ancasila as the sole
foundation of every institution, thereby curtailing all sort of divisive ideological issues. In creating new
institution, the regime had allowed only three political parties to get involved in the election. The ,,,
2,artai ,ersatuan ,embangunan: >nited "evelopment ,arty4 which was identified as *uslim party,
=olkar 2=olongan 6arya :Cunctional =roup4 which identified with the nationalist and were close allies
of %oeharto, and ,"I 2,artai "emokrasi Indonesia: Indonesian "emocratic ,arty4 which identified as a
nationalist and non9*uslim party. Theoretically, the ,,, and ,"I were the opposition parties, yet in
practice %oeharto controlled both of these parties, by having the right to veto the appointment of their
chairmen.
#$
the central government. +ithin the context of Acehnese politics, the regimeJs policy to
contain Islam excluding it from state political power had a profound impact on the
Acehnese L0lamas, as their hope that the change of regime would herald a revival of
Islamic power in Indonesia were quickly dashed.
0onsequently, they found themselves unable to make any significant progress
towards their goal of an Islamic Aceh because of the absence of cooperation from the
center. ?n the one hand, it led to a relative decline of the Islamic schools, while on the
other hand it led to the expansion of secular education with the establishment of a
secular university such as >-%1IA 2>niversity of %yiah 6uala4 in the '(#$s. This
contributed to the emergence of a new generation of secular educated Acehnese whose
interests were more in the socio9economic development of the region, rather than in
the Islamic development. In order to silence the reformist /0lamas or ,>%A, the IAI-
27amiLah Ar9raniry %tate Islamic Institution4, Islamic %chool %ystem and *>I
2Indonesian 0ouncil of L0lama4 were established. Apart from that, the conservative
L0lamas who had less influence in the government, but were close to the people,
found refuge in the Traditional Islamic @oarding %chool, the a)ah.
The emergence of secular educated elite group had triggered internal political
fragmentation within the local elite in Aceh. It had stimulated tied competition for
political supports either from the grass roots or government in 7akarta. aving full
understanding of the local politics, %uharto began to manipulate the local condition by
giving full support to the newly emerged secular local elites who gradually embraced
the regimeJs economic development and modernisation policies. These alliances
helped enhance the governmentJs control over the local politics. At the same time, the
imposition of ,ancasila as the state ideology had pushed ,>%A out of the local
politics and many of their members were recruited in *>I.
#'
It was a reflection of the past political conditions. If in the past the
0l23&alangs were co9opted by the colonial power, under the -ew ?rder regime, the
emerging secular educated Nlite were considered as .new 0l23&alanghip/,
'3D
since
both shared similarities in terms of their role as agents of the central government to
counterbalance their rival influence, the /0lamas. Thus, instead of manning AcehJs
administration with 7avanese, as was the case in other regions, the central government
deliberately established a .technocratic linkageJ with the new technocrats in Aceh. At
this point, =olkar, the ruling party played a very significant role in forging an alliance
with the secular educated Nlite and employed them against the L0lamas.
'3<
The central
government purposefully nurtured the new pattern of leadership in Aceh, as they
would develop a different definition of the conditions in Aceh. @rown states8
They could attempt to persuade the Acehnese people of the validity of
their regionalist development goal by arguing that the apparent paucity
of central expenditure in Aceh had arisen, not from any internal9
colonial exploitation by the center arising from its 7avanese bias. It is
rather from AcehJs social9backwardness and its lack of influence at the
center and its parochial insularity, engendered by adherence to fanatical
Islam.
'3(
%uch a definition contradicted with that of the L0lamas who expressed the goal
of an Islamic Aceh, defending itself against the un9Islamic center. As each leadership
articulated a version of Acehnese communalism that had widespread potential support
in Acehnese %ociety, there emerged a third Nlite group
'&$
who offered a different
diagnosis and panacea for Aceh problem. They sought the support not only from
among the regionalists but also from amongst the religiously committed people of the
community.
'3D
@rown, ')$
'3<
Eric *orris, Islam and politics in Aceh: A case stud) of center.peripher) relations in Indonesia,
2,h.". Thesis, *acro Cilm8 0ornell >niversity, '(<34, ;)).
'3(
@rown, ')$
'&$
The third elite group, most of them were either former ,>%A youth wing or children of the arl.
Islam revolution.
#;
The third elite group began to doubt the wisdom of the strategy of allying with
=olkar, primarily because of the perpetuation of the gap between the contribution of
Aceh to IndonesiaJs economy and the contribution of 7akarta to AcehJs economy. The
argument on alliance with the center was the way to increase the bargaining power of
the Aceh, seemed less convincing. They tried to accommodate the L0lamasJ version of
the definition of AcehJs problem by accusing the secular elite alliance with
government as a new form of internal colonialist relation. @rown states that8
The alternative possibility was to argue that the centerJs 7avanese bias
in resource distribution signified an Linternal colonial relationship to
Aceh that can only be corrected by Aceh moving towards a political
autonomy in which it could retain control over its own resource
revenues.
'&'
The erosion of the distinction between regionalist concerns with development,
and religious concerns with Islam, coupled with no change in the political system in
7akarta led to another nationalist movement in Aceh, the =A* 2=erakan Aceh
*erdeka: Cree Aceh *ovement4
'&;
that began in '(D#.
GAM: The For%ato! o' A#eh!e$e Nato!al$%
?n "ecember &, '(D#, Teungku asan *uhammad diTiro declared an independent
state of Aceh and claimed that his movement was a continuation of the Acehnese
struggle against the colonial force, the Indonesia97ava
'&3
as a new coloniKer that tried
to coloniKe other nations in the outer islands and he referred to Aceh specifically.
=A* was set up to ensure the survival of the Aceh %umatra nation from the
'&'
Ibid., ')'.
'&;
At the early stage of its emergence, the movement was known as =A*, but when diTiro left Aceh
and lived in exile in %weden, he changed =A* to be A%-HC 2Aceh %umatra Hiberation Cront4 as the
new platform for other %umatra nations to fight for their independency. owever, after the revival of
the =A* in '(<(, the A%-HC seemed less popular, because there was no data available on the
existence of other insurgency in %umatra, except in Aceh5 see, 6ell, #)
'&3
erein the term Indonesia97ava is referred to the term used by diTiro, describing that the 7avanese
domination of Indonesia.
#3
destruction of their socio9political and cultural heritage, as well as exploitation of their
economic assets by the 7avanese. Therefore, it made a straightforward ethnic appeal to
provoke against 7avanese colonialism.
aving diTiro as the Gali nanggrou 2,resident of the %tate4, the movement was
able to win the support among a small group of alienated young Nlite
'&&
and no more
than ;$$ people who were formerly followers of "I:TII
'&)
. owever, it failed to win
widespread support among the L0lamas who would have helped them to build mass
support.
'&#
0onsequently, the government easily silenced its first incarnation by killing
and sending to prison some of its prominent leaders and driving others into exile in
%weden.
The Re&&al o' GAM ! +,-,
+./
%ince there was a profound administrative contact failure between the rural dweller
and government officials at the district level5 this created a .vacuumJ of authority in
some rural areas. %uch failure was perpetuated by the lack of infrastructure connecting
rural and urban areas and it was .the biggest mistake/ that government officials and
=olkar made in Aceh.
'&<
,eople made the criticism that development had been
concentrated at the center5 the government had forgotten the need for development in
the rural areas.
'&(
As such conditions remained, Acehnese resentment escalated
'&&
These Nlites perceived that their prospect for promotion were blocked both by the 7avanese bias of the
regime and by those Acehnese technocrats who had become a closed Acehnese oligarchy enEoying
exceptional privileges that exclude other educated and qualified Nlite after being co9opted by the center.
%ee @rown, ')D.
'&)
The reason why the former "I:TII followers supported the movement was due to the fact that diTiro
was trying to establish a successor state to the Islamic %ultanate of Aceh "arussalam, in which Islam
had become the integral part of the state. This is in contrast to the !epublic of Indonesia which is
neither secular nor an Islamic state as it is based on !ancasila,. Idris *ahmud, *,9=A*, Interviewed
by author. "amansara >tama, 6uala Humpur, ') August '((<.
'&#
6ell, #).5 -aKaruddin %Eamsuddin, Issues and !oliticsI, ';).
'&D
%ee, *uhammad Abubkar, 0hapter &.
'&<
.=ubernur Aceh Ibrahim asan,/ "ompas, ;( *arch '((;, ;.
'&(
#&
following ,resident %uhartoOs resettlement 2transmigratie4 policy in the early '(<$s.
This policy gave the people an impression that the government was trying to 7avaniKe
the region through resettlement of 7avanese from the overcrowded 7ava Island into the
rural area of Aceh.
%uch a condition gave the =A* a room to secretly propagate and spread its
ideology and propaganda to the community in different regencies, such as ,roper
Aceh, ,idie, -orth, East, %outh, and 0entral Aceh. *any of the Hibya9trained
Acehnese
')$
returned home in '(<( to fill this .vacuum/.
')'
@y Eoining a number of
fighters who remained in the forests of Aceh, they began to create disturbances in
Aceh, namely in ,idie, -orth and East Aceh regencies. In the middle of '(<(, they
attacked the government forces, civil servants, and suspected government informers.
*ost of the incidents occurred in areas around FIH%.
Accordingly, *aEor =eneral . !. ,ramono
');
said, the movement was well
established in the villages of these three regencies. The =,6s
')3
28erom&olan
!engacau "eamanan: =ang of %ecurity "isrupters4 were .everywhere/ among the
,eople claimed that the governmentJs top official paid more attention to the proEect through which they
might earn a higher percentage of profits and such proEects could only be found at the urban area. The
rural area where there were no such big proEects were neglected. It seemed that such conditions were
deliberately neglected, for it could be used for political campaigns, promising people that their village
would be developed if they voted for the =olkar.
')$
The =A*Js bilateral link with Hibya was manifested by the establishment of the Matha&a
organiKation, in which diTiro was holding a position as 0hairman of the ,olitical 0ommittee in the late
'(<$s. This organiKation was against the ideologies of Imperialism, !acism, Fionism and Cascism, and
was headed by 0olonel =addafi. It supplied moral and financial support to liberation movements
around the world. %ince Aceh is a rich country it did not receive any financial and arms support from
the organiKation5 what they received was only the military training. %ee 6ell, D35 Tan %ri. %anusi 7unid,
interviewed by author, "amansara, 6uala Humpur, '; 7anuary ;$$&.
')'
.Aceh menarik rambut/, Tempo, ;' 7uly '(($, 3).
');
*aEor =enereal ,ramono was the first commander of 6?"A* I: @.@ 2!egional *ilitary 0ommand
@ukit @arisan4 from the middle '(($ to '((3. e was replaced by Albertus ,ranowo. The .@ukit
@arisan/ command is based in *edan, and incorporates Aceh, -orth %umatra, +est %umatra and !iau.
In Aceh, there are two sub9regional commands. The first is .Hiliwangsa/ *ilitary !esort 0ommand
26orem $'':Hiliwangsa4, based in Hhokseumawe, and covering -orth, East, 0entral Aceh, and ,idie.
The second is the 6orem $';: Teuku >mar 2.Teuku >mar/ !esort *ilitary 0ommand4, based in
@anda Aceh, the provincial capital, covering ,roper Aceh, the municipalities @anda Aceh and %abang,
+est, %outh, and %outheast Aceh.
')3
The =,6 is another term given by the central government to =A*Js fighters.
#)
people, and .had a concept, had guns, and on the ground had the masses/. >ncertain
of the actual numerical strength of the movement, ,ramono only assumed that they
were approximately hundreds of thousands, including their followers who were from a
lower level of education, such as trishaw drivers, fishermen and farmers.
')&
owever, the strength of the movement became more apparent in these three
regencies in particular, only after the military began a counterinsurgency operation in
August '(($. ere, about ')$$ people came to pledge their loyalty to the !epublic
and confessed that they were forced to support the =A*.
'))
In addition, the =A* had
also gained secret support from among government civil servants, politicians,
businessmen, students and the local military, and police officers. 6ell states8
In a report of an interview with ,ramono, he said, .there were A@!I
who, because members of their family were with =,6, carried out their
duties halfheartedly if they were on patrol. PCor instanceQ a senior
official in the East Aceh police head quarters and the chief of police in a
sub9district of ,idie, were imprisoned for assisting =A* fighters
during '(($.
')#

6ell further asserted that the maEority of Acehnese support the separatist
movement including the upper echelons of the provincial authorities, albeit only
passively. e refers to =eneral ,ramonoJs statement that he did not deny that the idea
of separatism had penetrated government officials and leading public figures who
were trying to influence the people.
')D
This signifies that the =A* succeeded in
tapping deep feelings of resentment towards the Indonesian government.
')<
')&
6ell, #D.
'))
Ibid.5 %ee 1ayasan Hembaga @antuan ukum Indonesia 21H@I4, . Haporan hasil observasi lanEutan
kasus LAceh *erdekaJ di "aerah Istimewa Aceh/ *edan, '; -ovember '(($, '9;.
')#
6ell, #D5 .,erwira polisi didakwa terlibat =,6 Aceh/ "ompas, ' -ovember '((', #5 .6apten 2,ol4
. Ahmad Adami dituntut hukuman enam tahun penEara/ Ibid., ) -ovember '((', #5 Adami passed
away in '((#, one year before his term finished. e was reported very sick due to being tortured while
serving six years imprisonment.
')D
.?perasi territorial untuk mengikis habis ide %eparatis,/ "ompas, '# %eptember '((;, '3.
')<
Asia +atch, .Indonesia8 uman right Abuses in Aceh,/ <e$s From Asia Gatch, ;D "ecember '(($,
&.
##
As the insurgency reached its peak in the middle of '(($, the 7avanese settlers
in -orth and East Aceh became the target of =A* threats. *any people fled their
houses in the villages, sought protection in the big towns, and even left to *edan in
-orth %umatra.
')(
These incidents led to the disruption of the transmigration program
and caused great embarrassment to the provincial government. Ibrahim asan was
quoted saying that, .I apologiKe to the central government, because that incident was
beyond our reach./
'#$
Collowing the tension created by the insurgency, Ibrahim met
the president in 7akarta regarding the current peace disturbance in Aceh by =,6. The
then president %uharto responded that since Aceh has a very solid customary law
under the supervision of the L0lamas, the conflict in Aceh should be solved through a
cultural and societal approach. The role of the L0lamas is of the paramount
importance to raise awareness among the people of the calamity imbued in the idea of
separatism. e further asserted that the success of this propagation depended strongly
on the support given by the community, because only the Acehnese knew better who
were directly involved in the insurgence. If this approach failed, only then would
A@!I be involved.
'#'
>pon the advice of the president, Ibrahim called a meeting with all influential
Acehnese from various walks of life and provincial bureaucrats, discussing the way
out to the conflict. They agreed to render this responsibility to the L0lamas and
community with support from the A@!I. The late asymy, who was then the
chairman of *>I, went down to earth in the region, but his effort ended with no
success. The people, particularly the youth, who were uneducated and unemployed by
big industries in the FIH% were strongly influenced by the idea of separatism and
')(
.!ebels harass 7ava migrants,/ International Herald Tri&une( ;# 7uly '(($, '$5 .Transmigran stress
dipukuli =,6 Aceh,/ Ter&it, 3$ *arch '((', 3
'#$
.@agi Aceh, transmigrasi adalah investasi,/ "ompas, ' *arch '((3, #
'#'
Al90haidar et al., ;$$9;$'.
#D
independence which promised them a better future. Ibrahim also called the students of
various organiKations to take part in the mission, but none of them dared to take
responsibility except with A@!I companionship.
'#;
The failure of the cultural and societal approach led Ibrahim, after consulting
L0lamas and provincial bureaucrats,
'#3
to meet %uharto and request for the deployment
in Aceh of intelligence and additional military forces. At first, he suggested to %uharto
that the military should remain in Aceh for six months only, for if they stayed longer,
they might behave out of control, unless the conditions demanded.
'#&
In '(($, in Aceh
there were already #$$$ troops under the "odam I1 =.=. following the request, %uharto
deployed another #$$$ troops from other headquarters. This included the !ed @eret
special force, "opassus 2"omando !asukan "husus: %pecial Corce 0ommand4 from
7ava, that was made up of a total number of ';,$$$ soldiers located in the province.
'#)
%uch conditions explicitly transformed Aceh from an industrial Kone to 2by using the
term given by human right activist and politicians in Aceh4 the ."?*/ 2aerah
4perasi Militer: *ilitary ?peration Area4. Through the years of '(<( to '((<, a
decade of military operations, as counter insurgency approach, thousands of civilians
had been killed, victims of abduction, sexual harassment, rape and physical and
mental torture, many have experienced deep psychological trauma.
Re!$tallato! o' the Spe#al Auto!o%ou$ Pro&!#e o' A#eh
'#;
Ibid.,
'#3
Among them were the late Ali asymy, asan Ali and asan %aleh, former "I:TII members, but
none of them was able to come up with solutions except the military approach. Ibid., ;$;.
'#&
.Ibrahim asan8 Hive interview/ on RCTI JRa'a$ali Citra Tele;ision IndonesiaK, ;$ 7uly '((<,
<8$$.a.m.
'#)
6ell, D&.
#<
The fall of %uharto in '((< and the political change that occurred in Indonesia,
had profound effect on the local politics all over Indonesia. Hong military domination
over politics had come into public scrutiny and was strongly criticiKed and condemned
for the maladministration of the country. The change of political orientation of the
central government under abibieJs administration had significantly affected the
political environment in Aceh. e lifted the status of "?* and withdrew non9organic
military forces from Aceh. e reinstalled a special autonomous status of Aceh by
endorsing Haw -o. &&:'((( concerning the recognition and reinstallation of the
autonomous status of Aceh region since '()( and the implementation of Islamic
%hari7a in Aceh.
As the central government wrestling against the tide of the multi facet problem
inherited from the previous regime, the idea for independence was gaining momentum
in Aceh, particular after the referendum took place in East Timor, whereby maEority
voted for Independence of East Timor from Indonesia. The demand for Independence
has now been shared by all levels of the community in Aceh. %tudents in Aceh began
to form their own flat9form, and the most influential one has been the %I!A
2Information 0enter for !eferendum Aceh4. They successfully organiKed the biggest
mass gathering that ever took place in Aceh, thousands of people gathered in front of
the =rand *osque, @aiturrahman, @anda Aceh, praying for the peaceful settlement of
the conflict. The gathering was concluded by the signing of memorandum that
contained the demand for referendum for Aceh. They demanded from the 7akarta
government to give the people in Aceh the right to decide their own future, with two
options, whether to remain as a part of Indonesia or to separate as an independent state
of Aceh.
#(
Abdurrahman +ahed 2=usdur4, as the newly appointed ,resident of Indonesia,
in responding to such demand, he initiated a political dialogue in 7anuary ;$$$ to end
the conflict in Aceh. The dialogue was facilitated by a %wiss based -=?, the enry
"unant 0entre and on '; *ay ;$$$ both parties agreed for .umanitarian ,ause/,
which created a peaceful environment in Aceh. @oth rival parties, the =A* and A@!I
agreed to pause the fighting. It was planned to open the way for another important
peace dialogue between the Indonesian government and the =A* top leaders on the
possible solution to the protracted conflict in the region. To strengthen the agreement,
=usdur then issued ,residential "ecree, -o. & 1ear ;$$' on the political condition in
Aceh that contained a comprehensive plan on economic, social, laws, public stability,
public peace, information and communication. +ith regard to peace and stability, the
"ecree gave full authority to the ,olice of the !epublic of Indonesia to plan any
action for creating and maintaining peace in Aceh. To accommodate socio9economic
problem and political autonomy in the region, +ahid issues a regulation -o. '<:;$$'
regarding special autonomy for Aceh with the name <anggrou Aceh arussalam
which took effect under *egawatiJs administration.
+ahid peaceful policy left profound effect in the local politics in Aceh. Hocal
political narration has changed its course by focusing on human right issues and
Eustice for the victims of the conflict. It began with the narration of the .heartbreak of
the people in Aceh/, .their human dignity/, and .their natural right/ which have been
inhumanely abused and torn apart during the "?*. The =A* was well aware that the
only way to proEect the conflict in Aceh to the world at large was by focusing on
human right issues. In this case, =A* was right and their struggle for human right
had been well received by other human rights groups who took the case of Aceh to
their respective governments. =A*Js international move ended with a 0oA
D$
20essation of ostilities Agreement4 which was signed in "ecember (, ;$$;. It related
with four important issues8 peace, humanitarian relief, reconstruction and civil
dialogue.
It was a very brief blessing peace for the people in Aceh, it gave them a chance
to breath and open new opportunity for a peaceful solution to the conflict. It drew out
the line of free Kone to enable humanitarian aids process, keep a part both rival groups
by the redeployment of military forces and =A*, and reformulation of the @!I*?@
2*obile Corce @rigade4 as civil police. Cinally, it organiKed all inclusive dialogues as
to enlarge civil involvement in restructuring the community toward a better and
democratic community in Aceh. A side of 0oA, a 7%0 27oint %ecurity 0ommittee4
was formed to monitor and supervise the implementation of 0oA, and a senior Thai
officer was appointed to head the 7%0. Although 0oA was quite successful in
creating peace Kone in several districts in the region during its early establishment, it
was short lived, as the government in 7akarta perceived an awkward political
condition in Aceh. It seemed that =A* effectively took advantage of the 0oA to
strengthen its political influence and built their grass roots supports, quietly they
began to recruit more and more Acehnese youngsters and even established a new force
of Inoung =alee 2widows4. In response, IndonesiaJs military also made a plot to end
0oA by paying some group of civilians5 most of them were victims of =A* to
create social unrest in the peace Kone by burning 7%0 offices, and that led to the death
of 0oA.
The failure of 0oA made *egawatiJs administration to loose interest in
peaceful settlement of conflict proposed by =usdur5 and proposed a operasi terpadu
2comprehensive operation4 to be carried out in the region for peace, rehabilitation,
humanitarian, implementation of laws and strengthening of local administrations
D'
specifically in those districts where =A* had strong support8 ,idie, -orth Aceh,
@ireun 7eumpa, ,roper Aceh and East Aceh. @esides, the government in fact was
planning to go beyond peaceful means of counter insurgency, they were waiting for
the result of Tokyo talk, where Indonesian government imposing two options to =A*,
to remain part of Indonesia or state of military emergency in Aceh. *eanwhile, at
home, the government worked very hard through mass media on socialiKing the
change of political course in the case of Aceh. +ith the support of mass media,
government began to shape Indonesian public opinion that national integration and
sovereignty of the nation was at stake, and therefore any threat to the very existence of
Indonesia should be dealt forcefully, and =A* has to be destroyed. aving strong
support at home, following the failure of Tokyo talk, *egawati issued a "eppres
2"eputusan !resident1 ,residential "ecision4 -o. ;< 1ear ;$$3 on a state of military
emergency in Aceh that would take into effect in *ay '(, ;$$3, time $$.$$, for six
months. +ith such status, the highest military command at the center was in the hands
of the ,resident and in the region it was in the hands of the 0ommander in 0hief of
Iskandar *uda !egional 0ommander.
'##
%tate of emergency still could not completely demolish political influence of
=A*, and knocked down the A=A* 2Angkatan 8erakan Aceh Merdeka1 *ilitary
force of =A*4 that kept on ambushing Indonesian military post. After six months
intensive operation, the military pushed the A=A* up to the hilly and mountainous
areas. 1et, it took a year for military to demoraliKe the A=A* in the mountain by
intimidating the villagers5 many check points were built and sweeping was intensified5
and the A=A* was completely out of reach. They were cut off, and ran out of life
stocks, because no villagers were allowed to stay over night in the plantation hill. 1et,
'##
%ee, 6irsten E. %chulKe, .The conflict in Aceh8 struggle over oil,/ in 4il Gars( ed., *ary 6aldor,
et.al., 2Hondon, ,luto ,ress, ;$$D4, ;';.
D;
the =A* and A=A* remained as prickle to the -6!I 2-egara 6esatuan !epublik
Indonesia: >nitary %tate of !epublic of Indonesia4.
The conflict between =A* and =oI 2=overnment of Indonesia4 seemed to last
long unless =A* was completely destroyed. owever, in "ecember ;#, ;$$& an extra
ordinary natural disaster that had never occurred in human history, earth9quake and
tsunami occurred and destroyed the capital city of Aceh and killed more than ')$.$$$
people and caused hundreds of thousand to be without a place to live in and to live in
poverty. It was a blessing in disguise5 tsunami has open Aceh to the world at large.
umanitarian aids were coming to Aceh from all over the world to help reconstruct
Aceh. In order to ensure the safety and smooth running of the humanitarian aid, the
International community requested both rival parties, the =A* and =oI, to hold
another peace dialogue, as agreed upon, both met in elsinki, Cinland. In August '),
;$$), both parties agreed and signed a *o> 2*emorandum of >nderstanding4 that
brought to an end one of the longest conflicts in Indonesia. The *o> not only brought
peace into the region, but also had strengthened the broad autonomous status of Aceh.
Collowing the elsinkiJs *o>, the central government endorsed a new law on
governing of Aceh, Ho=A, Haw -o. '':;$$#. It was a new dawn for Aceh.
Ta0le 12+: Stage$ o' the #o!'l#t a!" #au$alte$
,hase I8 '(D#9
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%ource8 +ork @ank staff estimate 2with modification4
Co!#lu$o!
D3
Aceh was a region of capital for independence and development of Indonesia. It was
the only territory which could escape from "utch reoccupation in the two military
aggressions of '(&D and '(&<. It was a territory which fully remained under the
control of the government of Indonesia. It made Indonesian international diplomatic
mission possible and led to a Round Ta&le Conference in the ague, a conference that
return full sovereignty of Indonesia on "ecember '&, '(&(.
owever, %ukarno did not keep his promise to make Indonesia an Islamic state,
or to grant Aceh a special status as an Islamic province of Indonesia. In addition, the
adoption of "utch laws and !ancasila as the %tate ideology instead of Islam, has
caused great disappointment among the Acehnese leaders, in particular the /0lamas of
,>%A. *oreover, the inclusion of Aceh into -orth %umatra province automatically
revoked the Islamic !eligious 0ourt in Aceh and imposed prohibition on trading
between Aceh and *alaya. This change had a great impact on the perception of the
Acehnese vis9U9vis the central government in 7akarta. They felt betrayed and treated as
a stepchild in return of their contributions for the independence of Indonesia. As the
result, they waged a rebellion, "I:TII in '()3, against 7akarta. It was ended by the
Hampteh agreement5 and the central government recogniKed Aceh as a province with
the title of %pecial !egion of Aceh that imbued the implementation of some elements
of Islamic laws.
"espite being recognised as an autonomous and resource rich province, Aceh
remained one of the most backward regions in Indonesia. In terms of socio9political
development there was no significant development that took place in Aceh. In fact, the
practice of patrimonial system of administration had affected the local politics in Aceh
significantly. The -ew ?rder regime was very well aware of the strong influence of
D&
/0lama in local politics, it was for the best interest of the regime that this political
group should be removed from the local politics5 and to do that, %uharto adopted the
"utchJs politics by creating an alternative political elite, the secularist technocrats.
+ith full support from the central government the new elites captured the local
government and removed the /0lama7s political influence from the local politics. The
new elites propagated that Aceh should change its political attitude, by denouncing the
role of 0lama, they proposed that Aceh should support central government in order
for Aceh to be developed.
%ince Aceh economically was integrated with -orth %umatra economy, as a
periphery region, it faced similar economic fate. It had to wait for the favour from the
elite at the centre for economic development. It had become the cow9milk for the
-orth %umatra province and the central government. %eeing no economic
development in the region, there emerged the third elites group. This group proposed
another definition of development in Aceh, and wisely balanced their concept with the
interest of the /0lama. They also propagated that independence was the only solution
for Aceh to develop and to preserve its Islamic tradition. They form an Acehnese
nationalist movement, =A*. As the result, Aceh had to field another armed conflict
between =A* and Indonesia forces. After 3$ years of conflict, which was ended by
the elsinkiJs *o> in Augut )
th
;$$).
The conflict had a very profound impact on the socio9political and economic
aspects of the local people. To name a few, the greatest impact of the conflict was on
the number of lives lost. ?ver 3$ years, around '$,$$$ to ;#,$$$ people have been
killed.
'#D
In terms of social impact, poverty worsened. The percentages of the poor in
Aceh have been increasing, ';.D percent in '((# to'&.< percent in '(((, and to 3$
'#D
This total figure derives from a range of public and private sources. owever, there do not appear to
be any reliable statistics about this matter.
D)
percent in ;$$;, and &$ percent after the tsunami natural disaster. In fact the share of
people living in absolute poverty in the region has been almost twice as high as that in
other areas of Indonesia, making Aceh as one of the poorest provinces.
'#<
In the
educational sector, Aceh also experienced serious set back. %chools had been
primarily targeted by the =A*, in order to stop the influence of the Indonesia97ava
system of education, and the military that used school for temporary encampment in
their pursuit of =A*. *any schools were destroyed and damaged and more than #$
teachers were killed and more than ;$$ were assaulted.
+ith regard to the function of the local government, only during the third phase
of conflict =A* succeeded to disable local government and to replace these
institution by =A*: Acehnese institution. =A* introduced !a'ak <anggrou 2state
taxes4, performing and registering marriages, issuance of licences, etc. =A* also call
for mass strike and boycott. "uring the '((( election, =A* called for a boycott of the
election, only '.& percent of electorate in -orth Aceh and '' percent in East Aceh
turned out. ,articularly in the strong hold of =A* such as in part of ,idie, -orth
Aceh, and East Aceh, local government was hardly operating, and many public
servants did not go to work for fear of being attacked or abducted. ?nly ':#
th
of
AcehJs budget for ;$$' had been spent by the middle of the years, and most of it, for
the law enforcement.
Thus, the conflict had significantly affected the regional economic
performance. The economic over all was stagnant5 AcehJs contribution to IndonesianJs
=", had dropped from 3.# percent in '(($ to ;.; percent in ;$$', especially after the
withdrawal of investors and closed down of business in the gas field area, and the
stopped operation of palm oil plantation in East Timur Aceh, following the security
'#<
%ee, .Aceh public expenditure analysis . via Vhttp8::www.yahoo.comW 2accessed '; 7anuary ;$$&4
D#
condition that had worsened. In addition, income from fisheries and agriculture went
down because fishermen were not allowed to go out to fish without a permit5 and so
did the farmers who were not allowed to go for plantation in the hill and mountainous
area. As a result, around 3)$,$$$ people were unemployed. The conflict had
significantly damaged the socio9political and economic structure of the region.
>pon this historical background, it is very rational for the central government
to treat Aceh in a very special manner. The endorsement of Ho=A8 Haw -o. '<:;$$'
and Haw -o. '':;$$# gave Aceh a true sense of self government. Thus, the following
chapter will address issues related to decentralisation program in Indonesia with
special emphasis on the distribution of authorities between the central government and
local governments. It also addresses fiscal balance distribution of revenues between
the central government and local governments with special referent to Aceh region.
DD