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DISTRICT COURT, BOULDER COUNTY, STATE

OF COLORADO
1777 6th Street
Boulder, CO 80302
______________________________________________
Plaintiffs: Michael Davis, Boulder County Republican
Party,

v.

Defendants: Hillary Hall, in her official capacity as
Boulder County Clerk and Recorder.

______________________________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
Richard A. Westfall, Reg. No. 15295
Andrea Dalton, Reg No 35076

Hale Westfall, LLP
600 Stout Street, Suite 500
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: (720) 904-6000
E-mail: rwestfall@halewestfall.com
adalton@halewestfall.com







COURT USE ONLY



Case Number:
Div.:
Courtroom:
MOTION FOR AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER C.R.S.
1-1-113 AND C.R.C.P. 65
Plaintiffs Michael Davis and the Boulder County Republican Party, respectfully request
that this Court conduct a forthwith hearing, order the Defendant to forthwith comply with
Colorados election law under C.R.S. 1-1-113, or, in the alternative, issue a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants from continuing to violate
C.R.S. 1-7-108(3) and 8 CCR 1505-1 (hereinafter Election Rule) 8.4.2. Plaintiffs are, at
the same time of filing this motion brief, filing a Verified Complaint under C.R.S. 1-1-113 and
incorporate the allegations therein by reference. In addition, Plaintiffs provide the following:

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NATURE OF CONTROVERSY
Defendant Hillary Hall, Clerk and Recorder for Boulder County, has taken a wholly
unreasonable position contrary to Colorados election watcher laws, particularly C.R.S. 1-7-
108 (Watcher Statute), and Election Rule 8.4.2. The Watcher Statute and the Rule provide that
all watchers are allowed full access at every step of the election process to insure the integrity of
the election. Under C.R.S. 1-7-108(3), watchers have the statutory right to witness and verify
each step in the conduct of the election from prior to the opening of the polls through the
completion of the count and announcement of the results. Under Rule 8.4.2:
Watchers must be permitted access that would allow them to attest to the accuracy
of election-related activities, including recall elections. This includes personal
visual access at a reasonable proximity to read documents, writings or electronic
screens and reasonable proximity to hear election-related discussions between
election judges and electors. Witness and verify means to personally observe
actions of election officials in each step of the conduct of an election.

Election Rule 8.4.2 (emphasis added). Election Rule 8.4.2 contains additional specifics
involving mail ballots. Under it, access to all election-related activities includes:
Witnessing the signature verification of mail ballot envelopes at close enough
distance to verify or challenge the signature.

Election Rule 8.4.2(a)(2).
Defendant Clerk is denying reasonable watcher access provided for by statute and rule in
at least three material respects. First, she is refusing to allow Mr. Davis and other Republican
watchers access to the necessary information to determine whether mail signatures that have
already been called into question are in fact valid signatures. Under the procedures established
by the Defendant Clerk, if the Republican and Democratic Election judges agree that a signature
is either valid or invalid, then either the mail ballot is treated appropriately as signature deficient
and additional follow up occurs with the alleged voter (but the ballot remains in its envelope and
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is segregated) or it is verified, the mail ballot is removed from the envelope, and the vote is cast.
The situation at issue here is when one election judge does not believe a signature is valid. The
Defendant Clerk has established a secondary signature verification process, using the Statewide
voter data base (SCORE) and other databases to determine whether the discrepancy can be
resolved. It is this critical step in the verification process to which the Defendant Clerk is
materially and dramatically curtailing watcher access.
As will be testified to by Mr. Davis, and as set forth in Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, the
critical information that is being used by the election judges to resolve the discrepancy is being
denied him and other watchers. The rationale from the Defendant Clerk for denying access is that
it may be possible for Mr. Davis or other watchers to catch a glimpse of confidential voter
information while looking at the computer screen displaying the SCORE or other database. See
Election Rule 8.4.2(d) (watchers not to be provided access to confidential voter information).
Assuming that this is even possible given the matter of seconds that Mr. Davis and others would
be afforded access to the screen, it is extremely unlikely that Mr. Davis could, even if he wanted
to, copy any confidential information while the signature verification process is occurring. In
fact, his attention will be focused on the signature and evidence related to it, not confidential
voter information (e.g., a drivers license number), and there is no ability for him to take a
picture or otherwise copy the information. Moreover, even assuming hypothetically that on
occasion one or more pieces of confidential information are seen by Mr. Davis or other watchers,
the watcher certificate he signed and swore to contains the oath, inter alia, that he will not
record or disclose confidential voter information. See Exhibit A to Complaint. In the
extremely unlikely situation that a watcher does in fact gather confidential voter information and
violates his or her oath, then that situation can be dealt with at the appropriate time and in the
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appropriate way. Defendant Clerk cannot use the assumption of watcher violation of oaths and
this remote possibility as a basis for defying the Watcher Statute and the Election Rule.
Second, the Defendant Clerk is refusing to allow watchers sufficient time and access to
take even the most basic of steps to determine whether a signature should be verified or to lodge
a challenge as is their right. As will be testified to by Mr. Davis, verification is taking place in a
matter of a few seconds, and even where a watcher believes some brief pause is required because
of a question involving the validity of the signature, the election judges have instructed to
proceed with verification forthwith. Further, Defendant Clerk has made it difficult if not
impossible for a watcher such as Mr. Davis to even lodge a reasonable and responsible
challenge.
Third, one step in the election process where not even one partisan election judge is
allowed access involves the receipt of military and overseas voters (UOCAVA) and emergency
and electronically transmitted ballots. Additionally, Defendant Clerk has set up a system where
only one employee of hers is allowed access to the computer used to receive the ballots. No
election judge or watcher is even allowed to witness the receipt of UOCAVA ballots. This is
particularly troublesome in that there is no way to verify that a UOCAVA ballot has been
received, accepted, and properly counted. Even a request for some documentation, a log for
example, by Mr. Davis was met with, well, that is subject to CORA and you can receive the
information after the election. This is a patent violation of the Watcher Statute and Election
Rule 8.4.2.



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ARGUMENT
I. Reasonable Regulation of Elections Is Necessary to Secure the Franchise for All
Coloradoans
To protect the electoral franchise, it is well-settled that there must be reasonable
regulations to ensure that every eligible voters vote is properly counted and not diluted by
illegal activity. There must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). When a state election law provision imposes
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon voters rights, including rights grounded in the
United States Constitution, the States important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to
justify the restrictions. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); see also Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the
conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring elections.).
Undeniably, the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified
citizens to vote, in state as well as federal elections. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554
(1964). However, the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizens vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.
Id. at 555; see also Colorado Common Cause v. Davidson, 2004 WL 2360485, at *2 (Colo. D.
Ct. Oct. 18, 2004) (Hoffman, J .) (Votes count, and because they count they must be sought and
given in a structured environment that allows the votes of all other proper voters to count.
(emphasis in original)).
Nearly 90 years ago, the Colorado Supreme Court explained that it is surely the design
of [the States] statutes that the sanctity of elections . . . be recognized and preserved and the
secrecy and purity of the ballot . . . be secured. People v. Lindsey, 253 P. 465, 470 (Colo.
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1927). The proper regulation of elections in Colorado is mandated by the Colorado Constitution,
which directs that [t]he general assembly shall pass laws to secure the purity of elections, and
guard against abuses of the elective franchise. Colo. Const. art. VII, 11. Colorado courts
have consistently recognized that reasonable election regulations are both constitutional and
necessary. See National Prohibition Party v. State of Colorado, 752 P.2d 80, 83 (Colo. 1988)
(observing that the rights of individuals to associate for political purposes and of qualified voters
to cast their votes effectively are not absolute and are necessarily subject to qualification if
elections are to be run fairly and effectively (internal quotations omitted)); see also In re Weber,
525 P.2d 465, 466 (Colo. 1974) (We find the state statute is a proper exercise of a compelling
state interest in the reasonable regulation of political party primaries.).
II. Colorado Statutes and Regulations, Including the Watcher Statute and Regulations,
Protect the Electoral Franchise for All Coloradans

A. Colorado Has An Effective System in Place for The Regulation Of Elections

The Colorado General Assembly and the Secretary of State have enacted and
promulgated a comprehensive scheme to ensure that the purity of elections is protected for all
Coloradans. The Colorado Election Code is comprehensive and establishes a fair and just
regulatory scheme. See generally Colorado Common Cause, 2004 WL 2360485, at *3-6.
The Secretary of State has near plenary power to regulate elections in the State of
Colorado. C.R.S. 1-1-107(1)(a) (Secretary has power [t]o supervise the conduct of primary,
general, congressional vacancy, and statewide ballot issue elections in this state); 107(2)(c)
([w]ith the assistance and advice of the attorney general, [the power] to make uniform
interpretations of the Colorado Election Code); 107(2)(a) (power to promulgate, publish and
distribute, either in conjunction with copies of the election laws pursuant to section 1-1-108 or
separately, such rules as the secretary of state finds necessary for the proper administration and
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enforcement of the election laws . . .). Pursuant to this power, the Secretary has promulgated
comprehensive election regulations in the Election Rules including Election Rule 8.4.2 that is at
issue in this case.
The Watcher Statute and Election Rules effectuating it are designed to insure the integrity
of the election process by allowing partisan watchers from all major parties to satisfy for
themselves that an election has been fairly and accurately conducted. Non-compliance with these
rules undermines the integrity of the election process itself.
B. The Courts Recognize That Non-Compliance with Election Rules Harms the
Public Interest

Courts have consistently determined that the public interest is harmed by last-minute
changes to election rules or the failure to follow them. In vacating an injunction preventing
Arizona from enforcing a voter identification requirement, the United States Supreme Court
noted:
Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves
result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.
As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.

Purcell v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1, 7 (2006). The Sixth Circuit has similarly held that there is a
strong public interest in smooth and effective administration of the voting laws that militates
against changing the rules in the middle of submission of absentee ballots. Northeast Ohio
Coalition for the Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1012 (6th Cir. 2006).
Here, absent an injunction, the Watcher Statute and the Election Rules effectuating them
will continue to be violated and will cast a pall on the validity of the decisions being made
concerning verification of mail ballots especially in situations where the purported signature
has already been called into question and pose the additional problem of uniformity. Upon
information and belief (including conversations with officials of the Secretary of States
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Elections Division) Defendant Clerk is the only county clerk and recorder limiting watcher
access in the manner challenged here. While no equal challenge is being made here, the
Defendant Clerks conduct unquestionably raises equal protection concerns .
C. Recent Colorado Case Law Upholds Colorado Election Law in the Face of
Eleventh-Hour Non-compliance With the Election Code, and Demonstrates
that Colorado Courts Are Competent to Adjudicate Election-Day
Emergencies

In the 2004 election cycle, Colorado Common Cause brought a challenge against three
election regulations: (1) Colorados identification requirements; (2) requiring voters to vote in
their precincts to have their votes count as to all races; and (3) prohibiting persons who requested
an absentee ballot from casting a provisional ballot. Colorado Common Cause v. Davidson, 2004
WL 2360485 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2004). The Denver District Court upheld the third,
provisional ballot challenge on grounds that it was inconsistent with the federal Help America
Vote Act. The district court upheld the other two regulations in the face of constitutional
challenges, based upon the Storer and Burdick line of cases.
Regarding the identification regulations, the district court observed conditions existed in
2004 that are similar in many respects to what the State faces today. Ms. Davidson and others,
including one local election official called by Plaintiffs, all testified that they were aware, in
varying degrees, of problems with the current lists of registered voters, including many examples
of multiple registrations under the same name and address, and many registrations with non-
existent addresses. 2004 WL 2360485, at *12. The district court therefore concluded as follows:
It may or may not be true, as Plaintiffs claim, that as an historical matter actual
voter fraud has been rare in Colorado. But the state has a legitimate, indeed
compelling, interest in doing what it can to make sure that last months fraudulent
or no-longer-eligible registrant does not become next months fraudulent voter.
Ms. Davidson and local election officials testified that once a fraudulent regular
ballot is cast, and the voters identity forever divorced from the ballot, there is no
way to remedy the fraud. The fraudulent vote will count. That is, election fraud
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must be detected before fraudulent regular ballots are cast and fraudulent
provisional ballots are counted.
Id.
Concerning the precinct voting regulations, the district court observed that the
states compelling interest in preventing voter fraud is palpably advanced by conducting
elections in the smallest geographic units possible. Id. at *13.
This is not just a matter of mere administrative convenience, as Plaintiffs have
argued. It is a matter of constructing an election system where we increase the
chances that election officials know voters and vice versa, and where we avoid the
right hand in one precinct not knowing what the left hand is doing in another
precinct. In what must surely qualify as one of the understatements of the year,
even Plaintiffs own witness, a Denver election official, testified that allowing
voters to vote in any precinct they wished could be problematic.

Id.
In 2006, the Colorado Democratic Party attempted to keep the polls open on
election day in the City and County of Denver alone, in contravention of C.R.S. 1-7-
101. The Denver District Court rejected this attempt to change the rules on Election Day.
Waak, et al. v. Vaden, et al., No. 06CV 11655, (Denver Dist Ct., Nov. 7, 2007) (bench
ruling). The court explicitly noted that if the rules for an election may be changed at the
last minute due to exceptional circumstances one year, this invites future bids to change
the rules: What if next year or the next time we have an election, we have a snowstorm,
we have construction, we have accidents, do we then go back into court and say this is an
extraordinary situation, we need an extraordinary remedy because certain individuals do
not have access to the polls? Transcript at 109.
In sum, laws like the Watcher Statute and the Election Rules enforcing them must be
implemented as written and not subject to the whim of a clerk and recorder who refuses to
effectuate them.
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II. Injunctive Relief Is Necessary to Enjoin the Continued Violation of Colorado
Election Law

A. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Relief Under C.R.S. 1-1-113

C.R.S. 1-1-113 provides that a person charged with a duty under Colorados Election
Code has committed or is about to commit a breach or neglect of duty or other wrongful act,
after notice to the official which includes an opportunity to be heard, upon a finding of good
cause, the district court shall issue an order requiring substantial compliance with the provisions
of this code [including the Election Rules promulgated under it. C.R.S. 1-1-113. For the
reasons detailed more in the following sections, this Court should order the Defendant Clerk to
follow the law and allow meaningful access to the signature verification process, meaningful
opportunity to file challenges, and meaningful access to the UOCAVA and emergency ballot
receipt process.
B. Standards for Injunctive Relief

In the alternative, this Court should issue a temporary restraining order where necessary
to avoid immediate and irreparable injury to the plaintiff. A temporary restraining order may be
granted without notice upon a showing that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will result to the applicant before the adverse party. . . can be heard in opposition. C.R.C.P.
65(b); Stull v. Dist. Court of Pueblo Cnty., 135 Colo. 86, 89 (1957). An applicant for a temporary
restraining order also must certify to the court the efforts, if any, which have been made to give
the notice and the reasons supporting his claim that notice should not be required. C.R.C.P.
65(b); Feigin v. Digital Interactive Assocs., Inc., 987 P.2d 876, 883 (Colo. App. 1999).
The standard for granting a preliminary injunction is likewise well established. A trial
court should issue a preliminary injunction where the plaintiffs show six essential factors:
(1) the moving party has a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) a danger of real,
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immediate, and irreparable injury exists that may be prevented by injunctive relief; (3) the
moving party has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; (4) the granting of a preliminary
injunction will not disserve the public interest; (5) the balance of equities favors granting the
injunction; and (6) the injunction will preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits.
Phoenix Capital, Inc. v. Dowell, 176 P.3d 835, 839 (Colo. App. 2007) (citing Rathke v.
MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648, 65354 (Colo. 1982)). As set forth below, Plaintiffs satisfy each of
these factors.
As discussed below, the injunctive relief sought here is warranted because, inter alia,
(1) the Defendant Clerk is patently violating the Watcher Statute and the Election Rule
effectuating it; (2) absent an injunction to prevent these violations, the Boulder County
Republican Partys rights to have watchers insure the integrity of the election are violated and,
indeed, all voters of Colorado will be irreparably damaged through the potential dilution of their
vote, (3) given the roughly day-and-a-half remaining prior to the polls closing, there is no
available adequate remedy at law; (4) granting the injunction will serve the public interest;
(5) the balance of equities clearly favors following the law as written while Defendant Clerk can
point to nothing except speculation involving access to confidential voter information; and
(6) the status quo can and should be following the law as written.
In Colorado Common Cause v. Davidson, 2004 WL 2360485, the district court observed
that voter fraud, once perpetrated, cannot be remedied. [Then-Secretary of State] Davidson and
others, including one local election official called by Plaintiffs, all testified that they were aware,
in varying degrees, of problems with the current lists of registered voters, including many
examples of multiple registrations under the same name and address, and many registrations with
non-existent addresses. Id. at *12. The district court therefore concluded as follows:
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It may or may not be true, as Plaintiffs claim, that as an historical matter actual
voter fraud has been rare in Colorado. But the state has a legitimate, indeed
compelling, interest in doing what it can to make sure that last months fraudulent
or no-longer-eligible registrant does not become next months fraudulent voter.
Ms. Davidson and local election officials testified that once a fraudulent regular
ballot is cast, and the voters identity forever divorced from the ballot, there is
no way to remedy the fraud. The fraudulent vote will count. That is, election
fraud must be detected before fraudulent regular ballots are cast and fraudulent
provisional ballots are counted.
Id. (emphasis added).
If a mail ballot is improperly cast because it does not comply with Colorado law, there is
no remedy after the fact. Only through preservation of existing procedures can the integrity of
the process be protected.
C. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Injunctive Relief
This Court should issue a temporary restraining order to prevent the defendants ongoing
violations of Colorado election law. First, the Verified Complaint establishes that, unless this
Court grants immediate relief, the plaintiffs will suffer immediate and irreparable injury. Colo.
R. Civ. P. 65(b). The general election presently is in progress, and the Defendant Clerk will have
completed most of the mail ballot signature verification process and processing of UOCAVA
and emergency ballots.
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Unless this Court grants immediate relief, the Colorado voters right to
vote will be irreparably and illegally diluted and the Boulder County Republican Partys watcher
access will become moot. See Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

1
As noted above, notice of the Verified Complaint and the instant Motion is being served
contemporaneously on the Defendant. Due to the limited time remaining before the verification
process is concluded, however, this Court should adjudicate this issue immediately. See, e.g.,
United States v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 815 F. Supp. 1475, 1478-79 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (Where an
impending election is imminent and the election machinery is already in progress, a Court may
take into account equitable considerations when prescribing immediate relief.) (citing Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 585).

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128434, at *12-*14 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2010) (recognizing that a candidate may suffer
irreparable harm if provisional ballots that should be counted are not counted); Miami Heat
Pship v. Leahy, 682 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. App. 1996) (noting that irreparable injury would
result from election law violations).
Second, as will be testified to by Mr. Davis, every attempt was made Friday, Saturday
and Monday to resolve this dispute short of litigation. The Defendant Clerk simply categorically
refused to comply with the law, even when confronted by a request from the Elections Division
of the Department of State. Plaintiffs here certify to this Court the efforts they have taken to
notify the Defendant of these proceedings. Namely, the Plaintiffs are serving the Complaint, this
Motion, and the proposed order on the County Attorneys office by email and by alerting the
County Attorney by phone. Moreover, even if the Plaintiffs had not gone to such lengths to
provide notice of these proceedings to the Defendant, this Court could grant relief because of the
exigencies in this matter. Due to the limited time remaining before the polls close, and the
unavailability of alternative remedies after the polls close, this Court should adjudicate this issue
immediately because the Plaintiffs will suffer immediate and irreparable injury absent temporary
relief. See Simpson v. Simpson, 376 P.2d 55, 57 (Colo. 1962) (discussing the courts discretion to
grant a temporary restraining order without notice).
The plaintiffs also satisfy the six-factor test for obtaining a preliminary injunction. First,
Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because Defendants actions violate
C.R.S. 1-7-106 and 1-7-108(3) and Colorado Secy of State Election Rule 8.4, by denying
Plaintiff Davis and other Boulder County Republican Party election watchers the ability to
properly verify the accuracy of mail-in ballots.
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Second, Plaintiffs and all Colorado voters are irreparably harmed by the actions of
Defendant Clerk because her actions and failures to follow Colorado law threaten the integrity
and fairness of the election and potentially call into question the reliability of its results.
Third, this injury cannot be remedied monetarily. The Plaintiffs imminent injuries relate
to the ongoing electionand the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to
vote is a fundamental political right, preservative of all rights. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886). This right extends not only to the initial allocation of the franchise, but also to
the manner of its exercise. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). Infringement of
fundamental constitutional freedoms such as the right to vote, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). The
Defendants ongoing violations of Colorado election laws threaten to burden or infringe upon the
Plaintiffs rights, causing injury that cannot be remedied by monetary damages.
Fourth, the preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest. To the
contrary, the overriding public interest at stake here is ensuring the integrity of the vote and the
purity of the electoral processboth principles codified by statute, the Election Rules, and in the
Colorado Constitution. See Colo. Const. art. VII, 8, 11; Colorado Libertarian Party, 817 P.2d
at 1005 (finding that Colorados compelling interest in maintaining a fair election process
justified upholding ballot access law).
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There is a strong public interest in enforcing state
election laws and protecting the fundamental right to vote. See, e.g., Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 370

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See also Neelley v. Farr, 158 P. 458, 465 (Colo. 1916) (At any election in which much
interest is felt, and where the opposing parties are supposed to be nearly equal in numbers, most
careful scrutiny will be made of these registry lists, every voters name and residence taken, and
his right to vote verified by examination. The matter will not be left to the pressure and
excitement of election day, but will all be ascertained and determined prior thereto. The value of
such a registry for the preservation of the purity of the ballot box cannot be too highly
estimated.) (quoting State v. Butts, 31 Kan. 537 (1884)).
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(recognizing that the right to vote is a fundamental political right, preservative of all rights);
Jackson v. State, 966 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Colo. 1998) (discussing the peoples fundamental right
to vote); Constitution Party of Kan. v. Biggs, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (D. Kan. 2011) (The
law is well-settled that a state has the power to engage in substantial regulation of elections . . . if
some sort of order . . . is to accompany the democratic process); MacGuire v. Houston, 717
P.2d 948 (Colo. 1986) (noting the Supreme Courts acknowledgment that if elections are to be
fair, honest, and orderly, states must substantially regulate them) (citing Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)
(recognizing that as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they
are going to be fair and honest); Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344
F.3d 882, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the public interest is clearly served by adherence to
state election laws); Springer v. Balough, No. 00-5071, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28288, at *10
(10th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000).
Fifth, the harm that a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction will prevent
far outweighs any potential harm that may result from its issuance. No one will be harmed if this
Court requires the Defendant Clerk to follow the procedures set forth in the Watcher Statute and
the Election Rules implementing it. By contrast, if no relief is afforded by this Court, significant
watchers rights possessed by the Boulder County Republican Party will be destroyed or mooted,
and any illegal vote dilution will be beyond remedy.
Sixth, the injunction will preserve the status quo by ensuring that existing election laws
are uniformly followed and that an open and regular election occurs. See, e.g., Robert Wood
Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6893, at *26 (D.N.J . 2004)
(noting that the status quo is uniform application and enforcement of the laws and that
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exempting certain entities from the restrictions imposed by the law would dramatically alter the
status quo).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this Court should grant Plaintiffs request for an order under C.R.S.
1-1-113 or in the alternative an order for injunctive relief.
Dated this 3rd day of November, 2014.
HALE WESTFALL, LLP


s/Richard A. Westfall
Richard A. Westfall, No. 15295

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of November, 2014, a true and correct pleading was
served via e-mail on the following:

David Hughes
Boulder County Attorneys Office
P.O. Box 471
Boulder, CO 80306
dhughes@bouldercounty.org

Matthew D. Grove
Assistant Attorney General
1300 Broadway, 10
th
Floor
Denver, CO 80203
matt.grove@state.co.us
Counsel for the Secretary of State

Martha Tierney
Heizer Paul LLP
2401 15
th
St., Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202
mtierney@hpfirm.com
Counsel for the Colorado Democratic Party


s/Bethany Lillis
Bethany Lillis