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A.

Pleadings
1. Manner of making allegations in pleadings

Rule 6
Section 1. Pleadings defined.
Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and
defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate
judgment.
Sec. 2. Pleadings allowed.
The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.
The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading
asserting a claim against him. An answer may be responded to by a
reply.
Sec. 12. Bringing new parties.
When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is
required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a
counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought
in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.
Rule 7, Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial

agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or


claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable
by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but
shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of
a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to
the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
DIGITAL MICROWAVE v. CA (JO)

FACTS: Private respondent Asian High technology filed a complaint


against petitioner Digital for a sum of money and damages before the
RTC Pasig. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint which
was denied by the TC and subsequently filed a motion for
Reconsideration which was also denied by the TC. Petitioner then
initiated a special civil action alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Court in dismissing its petition for failure to comply with the
Revised Circular no 28-91 or the sworn certification rule against forum
shopping which should be signed by the petitioner but instead in this
case it was signed by the counsel of the petitioner. Petition moved for
the reconsideration of the case however it was also denied by the CA.
Aggrieved petitioner is now before the SC asking for the reversal of
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the CA ruling.
Petitioner alleged that since it is a corporation the certification against
forum shopping may be signed by a natural person authorized to do
so. In such case petitioner argues that their counsel of record has that
authority to execute the certification on behalf of the corporation
considering that under the Rules of Court counsels authority to
represent his client is presumed.

ISSUE: W/N the pleading filed by the petitioner has complied with
Revised Circular no. 28-91?

RULING: No. The requirement for a sworn certification against forum


shopping was extended by AO 04-94 to complaints, petitions,
applications or other initiatory pleadings filed in all courts or agencies
other than the SC and CA.
If the court will follow the arguments of the petitioner then the
requirement in the Revised Cirtcular would be rendered useless.
The reason for the certification that is required to be accomplished by
petitioner himself is because only the petitioner himself has actual
knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or
proceedings in different courts.
Court disagrees with the argument of the petitioner that a corporation
cannot possibly hope to comply with the requirement because it is a
juridical entity. If this were so, then it would have been impossible for
a corporation to do anything at all. This is the reason why a
corporation has its officers to represent it in its transactions with
others. It could easily have been made by a duly authorized director
or officer for instance.
In this case, petitioner has not adequately explained its failure to have
the certification against forum shopping signed by one of its officer.
Neither has it shown any compelling reason for the court to disregard
the strict compliance with the rules.
PETITION DENIED

CLARK DEVT v. MONDRAGON (TUGS)


FACTS: Petitioner Clark Development Corporation (CDC) is a GOCC
authorized to develop the Clark Special Economic Zone. CDC entered
into a Lease Agreement with respondents Mondragon Leisure and
Resorts Corporation (MLRC), Mondragon International Philippines,
Inc., and Mondragon Securities Corporation (herein collectively
referred to as "Mondragon"), covering the area now known as the
Mimosa Leisure Estate. The parties thereafter executed Supplemental
Agreements for additional smaller areas. Mondragon put up Holiday
Inn Hotel, Mimosa Golf and Country Club, the North Vista Hotel,
Mimosa Regency Casino, and other facilities and amenities.
CDC made a written demand on Mondragon to pay rental arrears
amounting to P427 M to be paid within 30 days from receipt of the
demand; otherwise, the Lease Agreement would be terminated.
Mondragon filed before the Angeles City, RTC Branch 58 (Civil Case
No. 9242) an action for specific performance with prayer for injunctive
reliefs pendente lite against CDC (First Mondragon Case). In said
case, Mondragon sought for a judicial writ for the parties dispute on
the rental arrearages to be submitted to arbitration.
RTC granted the TRO and later, a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining CDC from terminating the Lease Agreement and taking
over the Mimosa Leisure Estate. CDC questioned the issuance of the
injunctive reliefs pendente lite before the CA. CA declared the
injunctive reliefs null and void. Mondragon appealed to the SC.
The parties executed a Compromise Agreement, which the SC
incorporated and noted in its Resolution.
In the Compromise Agreement, it is stated that in case of
Mondragons failure to comply with its obligations, CDC is empowered
to cancel and terminate the said agreement after 30 days counted
from Mondragons receipt of a demand from petitioner. Mondragon
shall leave the leased premises and return to petitioner the parcels of
land known as Wagner, and all lands and improvements along the
parade grounds, except the lands where the Mimosa Regency Casino
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and Chi Restaurant were situated.

relating thereto is forum shopping.

Mondragon failed to pay for the rental arrears and to open the
irrevocable domestic letter of credit. CDC sent s letter to Mondragon
demanding compliance with all its obligations under the Compromise
Agreement. In view of Mondragons failure to comply, CDC sent
another letter informing Mondragon of the cancellation and
termination of the Compromise Agreement and demanding it to
vacate all the leased premises.

HELD: The petition is meritorious. Hence, the decision in RTC Branch


60 is dismissed with prejudiced.

CDC filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution of Judgment by


Compromise Agreement. Before the RTC could resolve the motion
Mondragon filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Specific
Performance before the Angeles City RTC Branch 60 (Civil Case No.
9596). CDC filed a Motion to Dismiss (Second Mondragon Case)
alleging that (1) Mondragon was guilty of forum shopping; (2) the
petition was barred by prior judgments; and (3) the petition stated no
cause of action. Mondragon opposed the Motion.
Pending resolution of the motion to dismiss in the Second Mondragon
Case, the RTC Branch 58 in First Mondragon Case granted the
Motions for Execution of its order. Meanwhile, the RTC Branch 60
dismissed the Second Mondragon Case (Civil Case No. 9596)
because of forum shopping. Mondragon filed a MR but was denied.
Mondragon appealed to CA. CA held that the presiding judge of the
Angeles City RTC, Branch 60 abused her discretion in finding
Mondragon guilty of forum shopping. The CA ruled that while there
was an identity of parties in both cases, nevertheless, the nature and
causes of the actions and the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case Nos.
9242 (First Mondragon Case) and 9596 (Second Mondragon Case)
were entirely different.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it ruled that there was no forum
shopping and allowed the continuance of civil case no. 9596 when in
fact re judicata had already set in and any matter/case raised.filed

FORUM SHOPPING is the institution of two (2) or more actions or


proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition or the act of a
party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another
forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari.
The test to determine whether forum shopping exists is whether the
elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Res judicata means
a matter or thing adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled
by judgment. Its requisites are: (1) the former judgment or order must
be final; (2) the judgment or order must be one on the merits; (3) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties; and (4) between the first and second
actions, there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action. where a litigant (or one representing the same interest or
person) sues the same party against whom another action or actions
for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the
same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendencia in one
case is a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would
constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest.
In either case, forum shopping could be cited by the other party as a
ground to ask for summary dismissal of the two (or more) complaints
or petitions, and for the imposition of the other sanctions, which are
direct contempt of court, criminal prosecution, and disciplinary action
against the erring lawyer. Moreover, the Court held that the filing by a
party of two apparently different actions, but with the same objective,
constituted forum shopping. Ultimately, the decisive test in forum
shopping is the possible vexation caused to the courts and litigants by
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the filing of actions based on the same or related issues in different


fora.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the first requirement of
identity of parties was met. As regards the rights asserted and reliefs
sought, there existed an identity of causes of action and reliefs based
on the same objective standard enunciated in the aforecited cases.
Mondragon had only one objective in filing the two cases, that is, the
perpetuation of its lease. In Civil Case No. 9242, Mondragon tried to
prevent the termination of the Lease Agreement, while in Civil Case
No. 9596, it tried to prevent the termination of the Compromise
Agreement. While they differ in nomenclature and specific provisions,
the subject of the two agreements was the samethe lease over the
Mimosa Leisure Estate. Mondragons cause of action against
petitioner CDC, in essence, was the latters alleged premature
termination of the lease over the Mimosa Leisure Estate. The ultimate
relief sought by Mondragon from the courts, on the other hand, is to
be allowed to continue the lease. Without doubt, Mondragons
objectives in filing the two civil cases were the same, that is, to
continue its lease over the Mimosa Leisure Estate.
Mondragon believes that Civil Case No. 9242 (First Mondragon Case)
covered a subject matter and cause of action distinct from Civil Case
No. 9596 (Second Mondragon Case). The Court disagrees. The
Compromise Agreement between CDC and Mondragon supplanted
the Lease Agreement. By entering into a compromise, the parties
decided to set aside the Lease Agreement in favor of terms and
conditions more acceptable to both. They had also waived any issues
arising from the
Lease Agreement. Thus, in a Resolution the Court incorporated the
said Compromise Agreement. This judgment by compromise already
became final and executory and should be complied with any other
judgment as it stands as the judgment in Civil Case No. 9242. In filing
the second civil case, Mondragons objective was the same as the
first civil actionto perpetuate its lease over the Mimosa Leisure

Estate.
Ultimately, the decisive test in forum shopping is the possible vexation
caused to the courts and litigants by the filing of actions based on the
same or related issues in different fora.
The vexation to the courts in this case is evident. There is a high risk
of conflict between the decisions of the RTC Branches 58 and 60
regarding their respective civil cases. A decision by one branch of
court will constitute res judicata in the other case pending before the
other branch of court. Alternatively, if the RTC Branch 60 exercised its
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief, then it would have to
restrain the execution proceedings in the RTC Branch 58. Thus,
interference with the proceedings in another court would ensue.
KAUNLARAN v. UY (LEA)

DOCTRINE:In case of a corporation, it has long been settled that the


certificate [of non-forum shopping] must be signed for and on its
behalf by a specifically authorized officer or agent who has personal
knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed.
FACTS:Respondent Loreta Uy filed before the RTCof Dagupan City a
complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and related
documents plus damages against petitioners Kaunlaran Lending
Investors, Inc. and Lelia Chua Sy, along with Wilfredo Chua and
Magno Zareno.
Loreta avers that when Jose, Virgilio and Wilfredo agreed to establish
a business of buy and sell of second-hand motor vehicles in which
Virgilio would be the manager, Wilfredo would scout for a financier,
and Jose would provide the security for any loan. Through the efforts
of Wilfredo, Lelia, then a Branch Manager of the Far East Bank and
Trust Co., Inc. who was alleged to be the owner of the controlling
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interest in KLII, agreed to arrange for the grant of a loan as secured


by the parcels of land in QC. Wilfredo thus asked Jose in whose favor
his mother Loreta issued a Special Power of Attorney.
The trial court dismissed the case against Kaunlaran and declared
that the Real Estate Mortgage, Promissory Note and related
documents in question to be valid and legal. However, the Court of
Appeals, reversed the trial court's decision, declaring the real estate
mortgage and promissory note null and void.
Lelia, Wilfredo, and KLII moved for reconsiderationwhich was denied,
prompting KLII and Lelia to file before this Court the present petition.
In her Comment, Loreta moves for the dismissal of the petition due to
defective verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, adding
that the petition raises factual issues.
ISSUE: Whether there was a defect in the verification and certicate of
non forum shopping?
HELD: Yes. For For failure of KLII to present proof that its president,
Rolando Tan, was authorized to sign the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping on its behalf, the petition must be denied.
In a long list of jurisprudence, the Court held that:
In case of a corporation, it has long been settled that the certificate [of
non-forum shopping] must be signed for and on its behalf by a
specifically authorized officer or agent who has personal knowledge of
the facts required to be disclosed.
xxxx
Consequently, without the needed proof from the board of directors,
the certificate would be considered defective. Thus, xxx even the
regular officers of a corporation, like the chairman and president, may
not even know the details required in a certificate of non-forum
shopping; they must therefore be authorized by the board of directors
just like any other officer or agent.

However, the merits of the petition justify the relaxation of the rule on
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, for from a review of
the records Loreta has not proven by preponderance of evidence that
she was deceived into signing the documents required for the release
of the proceeds of the loan.
ATENEO DE NAGA v. MANALO (NADIA)

DOCTRINE: Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping;


The lone signature of the University President, who is himself also a
party, is sufficient to fulfill the verification requirementsuch school
officer, whose acts as president of the university are in issue, is a real
party-in-interest and has sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in their petition for certiorari.
As regards the verification requirement, that such requirement is
deemed substantially complied with when, as in that case, two out of
25 real parties-in-interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge
and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition, signed
the verification attached to it. Such verification is deemed sufficient
assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.

FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the


Rules of Court, petitioners urge this Court to reverse the Resolutions
of 23 January 2003 and 03 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals
which, respectively, dismissed, insofar as petitioners are concerned,
the petition for certiorari and entitled Ateneo de Naga University, Fr.
Joel Tabora, S.J., and Mr. Edwin P. Bernal vs. Hon. National Labor
Relations Commission and Jovita S. Manalo on the ground that the
verification and certification against forum shopping was signed only
by Fr. Tabora, and denied the motion to reconsider the former.
The controversy stemmed from the complaint for constructive
dismissal, with prayer for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees, filed by respondent with the Sub-Regional NLRC in
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Naga City against petitioners ADNU and Dean Edwin P. Bernal of


ADNUs College of Commerce, and ADNU President Fr. Joel Tabora,
S.J.

Labor Arbiter Jesus Orlando M. Quiones rendered judgment against


petitioners and Fr. Tabora. The labor arbiter found respondent to have
been constructively dismissed when she was transferred from the
Accountancy Department of the College of Commerce to the
Department of Social Sciences of the College of Arts and Sciences of
petitioner ADNU after being charged with alleged mismanagement of
the Ateneo de Naga Multi-Purpose Cooperative.
On appeal the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of the labor arbiter
and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners and Fr.
Tabora. petitioners and Fr. Tabora filed with the Court of Appeals, it
dismissed the said petition in a Resolution dated 23 January 2003,
finding the verification and certification against forum shopping
attached to the petition to have been signed only by Fr. Tabora.
Petitioners and Fr. Tabora filed a motion for reconsideration5 of the
foregoing resolution on the ground that Fr. Tabora signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping not only for himself
but also for petitioners herein. Petitioners explained that as president
of ADNU, Fr. Tabora was its official representative, and in such
capacity, he was duly authorized to sign for and in its behalf. Likewise,
petitioners argued that Fr. Tabora was duly authorized by petitioner
Bernal to sign for and in his behalf, as evidenced by the Special
Power of Attorney.

respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with


Motion to Admit Opposition asserting that with respect to petitioner
ADNU, no secretarys certificate or board resolution authorizing Fr.
Tabora to file the petition for certiorari was attached to the motion for
reconsideration; neither was there an allegation to the effect that Fr.
Tabora was so authorized, neither petitioner Bernal nor Fr. Tabora

was authorized to file the petition for certiorari for the primary
petitioner, ADNU.
The Court of Appeals, unconvinced by petitioners arguments and the
documents they presented, issued a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration insofar as petitioners are concerned but granting it
relative to Fr. Tabora.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition
for certiorari insofar as petitioners are concerned for lack of proper
verification and certification against forum shopping. Specifically, the
problem in this case is not the lack of verification and certification but
the adequacy of one executed by only one of three petitioners in the
Court of Appeals, invoking substantial compliance.

HELD: Yes. That such requirement is deemed substantially complied


with when, as in that case, two out of 25 real parties-in-interest, who
undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the petition, signed the verification attached to it.
Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, not merely speculative.

Applying the foregoing to the instant petition, this Court finds that, at
the minimum, the lone signature of Fr. Tabora is sufficient to fulfill the
verification requirement. Undoubtedly, Fr. Tabora, whose acts as
president of petitioner ADNU are in issue, is a real party-in-interest.
As ADNUs president and himself a party to the instant case, Fr.
Tabora has sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in their petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.
His signature, therefore, is sufficient assurance that the allegations in
their petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not
merely speculative.
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In fact, the signature of Fr. Tabora is sufficient to stand for petitioners


ADNU and Bernal. Although belatedly shown, the authority of Fr.
Tabora to sign on behalf of petitioners is apparent from the record.
Thus, attached to petitioners motion for reconsideration was a
Special Power of Attorney16 dated 18 November 2002, and to their
Comment to Opposition and Manifestation with Motion to Expunge
from the Records dated 09 July 2003 were attached the Secretarys
Certificates17 showing that ADNUs Board of Trustees authorized Fr.
Tabora to file the petition for certiorari and sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping and ratified Fr.
Taboras acts in connection with the filing of said petition. While these
documents were not attached to the petition for certiorari filed with the
Court of Appeals and were submitted only after the filing of said
petition, they nonetheless confirm the authority of Fr. Tabora to act on
behalf of petitioners in filing the petition.

Any suspicion on the authenticity and due execution of the special


power of attorney and the two secretarys certificates, which are
notarized documentsand as such, public documentscannot stand
against the presumption of regularity in their favor absent evidence
that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.18 The
rule of long standing is that a public document executed and attested
through the intervention of a notary public is evidence of the facts in a
clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed.19 In the instant case,
except for respondents bare allegations to cast doubt on these
documents, there was no evidence adduced in support thereof.
Absent such evidence, the presumption must stand and the special
power of attorney and secretarys certificates must be upheld.
Considering the foregoing, this Court finds Fr. Tabora to be duly
authorized to sign on behalf of petitioners the verification attached to
their petition for certiorari, and, for the same reason, the certification
against forum shopping.

It appearing that Fr. Tabora was, in fact, a duly authorized signatory, it


can be said that there was at least substantial compliance with, and
that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural
requirements.20 The delay in the presentation of the documents
showing the authority of Fr. Tabora to sign on behalf of petitioners
cannot be allowed to defeat the petition for certiorari filed with the
Court of Appeals. By the time the Court of Appeals resolved to uphold
its dismissal of the petition as to them, they had already submitted
proof of their conferment upon Fr. Tabora of the authority to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping. Such dismissal
exalts technicality over substantial right, which this Court cannot
countenance.
Moreover, as regards the certification against forum shopping, this
Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring
the submission of such certification considering that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.23 This Court has also applied the
rule of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances with
respect to the contents of the certification.24 If this Court has, in
previous rulings, allowed the belated filing of the certification against
forum shopping for compelling reasons, with more reason should it
sanction the timely submission of such certification albeit the proof of
authority of the signatory was put forward only after.

Rule 8, Sec. 1. In general.


Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting
the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof
and their applicability to him shall be clearly and concisely stated.
GERALES v. CA (ROCEL)
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FACTS: A car owned by Leticia Fideldia, then driven by Enrique E.


Pimentel, hit another car, owned by Teresita Gerales then driven by
Cesar Dela Fuente, with Marcela Golding, Maria Vergara and Perlito
Trigero as passengers at San Jose, San Fernando, Pampanga.
Private respondent Enrique E. Pimentel was charged before the
Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga with the crime of
Damage to Property with Multiple Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence.

During the pendency of the criminal case, private offended parties


(now petitioners) Maria Vergara, Perlito Trigero, Marcela del Rosario
Golding, Cesar Dela Fuente, and Teresita Gerales filed a civil case for
Damages in the total amount of P400,000.00 docketed as Civil Case
No. 5210, in the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Enrique E.
Pimentel and Leticia Fideldia. This civil case is based on the same
incident for which private respondent, Enrique E. Pimentel was
charged in the Criminal Case.

Ater the filing of Civil Case but before the service of summons upon
the defendants (herein private respondents), the claims of the
offended parties (plaintiffs in Civil Case) were amicably settled and
individually executed and signed a "Release Of Claim," the contents
of which substantially reads as follows:
For the sole consideration of . . ., the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, (I), (We) . . . for myself, my heirs, representatives,
successors and assigns do hereby forever release, discharge E. and
absolve Atty. Enrique Pimentel, Leticia Fideldia & F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc.
of and from all actions, claims and demands whatsoever that now
exist or may hereafter develop and particularly on account of all
known, unknown and unanticipated injuries and damages arising out
of and in consequence of the accident/illness occurring on or about
July 9, 1984 at about 6:00 P.M. along the North Expressway, San
Fernando, Pampanga when I sustained serious physical injuries while

riding as a passenger of a Toyota Corona Sedan with Plate No. CFR447 was hit and bumped by a Mit. Lancer Sedan with Plate No. NLL979 driven by Atty. Enrique E. Pimentel and owned by Leticia
Fideldia.

The undersigned furthermore agrees that the foregoing sum is


voluntarily accepted as full and final compromise, adjustment and
settlement of all claims with respect to both civil and/or criminal
actions that may have been filed in connection with the above
accident; that the payment of said amount shall never be construed as
an admission of liability by the party/parties hereby released.
Municipal Trial Court accordingly dismissed Criminal Case
Respondent Enrique E. Pimentel wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan that a Motion to Dismiss
was submitted and thus the affected parties mutually settled the case
before the Municipal Trial Court of Pampanga,
Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan issued an order declaring
respondents Enrique E. Pimentel and Leticia Fideldia in default and
Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners, ordering
respondents Enrique E. Pimentel and Leticia T. Fideldia, to pay them
jointly and severally.

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
the complaint against private respondents
Petitioners claim that the respondent court, in dismissing the civil case
for damages on the sole basis of the "releases of claims," had denied
them procedural due process as they were not afforded the
opportunity to refute, assail, and overcome their/probative value
Private respondents maintain that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in not considering their letter as their responsive
pleading and in consequently declaring them in default.

ISSUE: WON trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in not


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considering their letter as their responsive pleading and in


consequently declaring them in default?

HELD: YES. Trial court committed grave abuse of discretion


An examination of the records of the case shows that the trial court,
after taking judicial notice of the letter of private respondents informing
the court that the parties have mutually settled the case, and that a
Motion to Dismiss was even filed by petitioners' counsel in the related
criminal case, altogether did not consider nor treat it as private
respondents' responsive pleading to the complaint for damages. In
fact, on motion of petitioners, the private respondents were and
declared in default accordingly, a judgment by default was rendered
against them (private respondents).

Under the factual setting of the case, the trial court ought to have
considered the letter of respondent Enrique E. Pimentel as a
responsive pleading even if it lacks the formalities required by law.
Undoubtedly, the letter made mention of the fact that the parties
mutually settled the case, which allegation may be deemed as an
averment of an affirmative defense and if proven in a preliminary
hearing pursuant to Section 5, Rule l6, would constitute a meritorious
defense of private respondents which would bar petitioners from
recovering damages from the former as the claim or demand set forth
in plaintiffs' (petitioners') pleading had been paid or extinguished.
Pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed in
order that the litigant may have ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims, and possible denial of substantial justice, due to
technicalities, may be avoided (Cabutin, et al. v. Amacio, 170 SCRA
750 [1989], citing Quibuyen v. CA, 9 SCRA 741 [1963]). Litigations
should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on
technicality (Fonseca v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 40 [1988], citing
A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590, 594 [1980]).
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant

consideration from courts (American Express International, Inc. v.


Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 209 [1988] citing Alonso v.
Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910]), and because there is no vested right in
technicalities, in meritorious crises, a liberal, not literal interpretation of
the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be
resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules, which
is the proper and just determination of a litigation (Fonseca v. C.A.,
supra.).

Petitioners can not now question the validity and/or veracity of the
releases of claims on the allegation that the same were executed on
their belief that what they received were only partial settlements and
that they could not have released them "forever from all actions
arising from such vehicular accident." If they did not release their
claims against, respondents forever, why did they cause the dismissal
of the criminal case against Enrique Pimentel?
When petitioners executed the releases of claims, Civil Case No.
5210 for damages had already been filed by petitioners as plaintiffs
against private respondents as defendants. With the subsequent
execution of the releases of claims by petitioners, all claims and
demands of petitioners as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5210 which "had
been filed in connection with the above (vehicular) accident," were
fully and finally compromised, settled and forever.
2. Initiatory Pleadings
a). Complaints

Rule 6, Sec. 3. Complaint.


The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes
of action. The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant
must be stated in the complaint.
Page 9 of 24

TANTUICO v. REPUBLIC (JO)

FACTS: Republic represented by the PGG and assisted by the Office


of the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case for
the reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
The principal defendants are Benjamin Romualdez, Ferdinand Marcos
and Imelda Marcos. Petitioner Tantuico Jr. was included as defendant
on the theory that he acted in unlawful concert with the principal
defendants in the misappropriation and theft of public funds and that
he also acted as dummy by allowing himself to be incorporators
beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal defendants.
Petitoner then filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars alleging that he is
sued for acts allegedly committed by him in a complaint couched in
too general terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the
factual and legal basis thereof, and that too enable him to understand
and know with certainty the particular acts allegedly committed by him
and which he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary that
plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein relative to the
Amended Complaint so that he can intelligently prepare his
responsive pleading and prepare for the trial. Solicitor General
opposed the motion. After the petitioner had filed his reply respondent
Sandiganbayan promulgated resolution denying the petitioners
motion for a bill of particulars on the ground that the particulars sought
by petitioner are evidentiary in nature. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but this was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition.

an action for ill gotten wealth are complied with by the petitioner
hence petitioner is not anymore entitled to a bill of particulars.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the disputed resolution.
RULING: YES. A complaint as a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or causes of action. Like all other
pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complaint shall contain in
a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the
statement of mere evidentiary facts. The complaint should inform the
defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff relies to
support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action
which forms the bases of the plaintiffs claim liability.
The rules on pleading speak of 2 kinds of facts: Ultimate facts and
evidentiary facts.
Ultimate facts are the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action while evidentiary fact are those which are necessary for
determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which
conclusions of ultimate facts are based.

Petitioners allegations in the second amended complaint in the Civil


Case that it only state conclusions of fact and law, inferences of facts
from facts not pleaded and mere presumptions, not ultimate facts as
required by the Rules of Court.

Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the 3


essential elements of a cause of action namely: 1) the legal right of
the plaintiff; 2) correlative obligation of the defendant and 3) act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint
states the cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to
a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
However, where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite
or in the form of conclusions the proper recourse would be, a motion
for a bill of particulars.

Respondent Sandiganbayan contends that the essential elements of

In the complaint this court ruled that they are mere conclusions of law
Page 10 of 24

unsupported by factual premises because nothing in the complaint


about the petitioner which alleged what the duties the petitioner failed
to perform or the particular rights he abused.
The allegations in the complaint pertaining to the petitioner are,
therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law
and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence without
the particulars prayed for in petitioners motion for bill of particulars, it
can be said the petitioner cannot intelligently prepare his responsive
pleading and for trial.
Rule 8, Sec. 4. Capacity.
Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or
the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is
made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as
to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue
or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial,
which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within
the pleader's knowledge.
Rule 8, Sec. 7. Action or defense based on document.
Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or
document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set
forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a
part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in
the pleading.

METROBANK v. QUILTS (TUGS)

DOCTRINE: Complaint must allege the ultimate facts upon which the
plaintiff bases his cause of action.
FACTS: Relita P. de los Santos (de los Santos) then Corporate
Secretary issued a Secretarys Certificate which certified that in a
special meeting of the Board of Directors of Quilts and All, Inc. (Quilts)
its President, Mr. Senen B. Dizon (Dizon) was authorized and
empowered to mortgage in favor of Metrobank, a property belonging
to Quilts. On the basis of this Secretarys Certificate, Metrobank
restructured Dizons existing personal loan in the amount of
P700,000.00 secured by his house and lot at Angeles City and the
property owned by Quilts. Aside from the mortgage lien, the
Secretarys Certificate was likewise annotated on a TCT. More than a
year later, Metrobank received a letter from Atty. Villanueva, Quilts
counsel offering the amount of P200,000.00 for the cancellation of the
mortgage on the property owned by Quilts because, allegedly, Mr. &
Mrs. Senen Dizon had left the Philippines, leaving several creditors.
Metrobank refused the offer since the amount offered did not
approximate the appraised value of the mortgaged property.
Atty. Trinidad, Quilts new counsel wrote Metrobank. Counsel wrote
Metrobank reiterating the mortgage cancellation. In addition, counsel
claimed that the alleged special meeting could not have taken place
for lack of the requisite number of directors present to constitute a
quorum since the Chairman and 2 other members of the Board of
Directors were abroad on that date.
Quilts filed a complaint against Metrobank, Dizon and de los Santos
for annulment and cancellation of mortgage. Metrobank moved to
dismiss the complaint based on 1) lack of jurisdiction and 2) failure to
state a cause of action. The RTC granted the motion.
Page 11 of 24

However upon Quilts motion, the RTC issued an Order reconsidering


and setting aside the dismissal order because the grounds relied upon
by Metrobank did not appear to be indubitable, and deferred the
determination of the motion until the trial.
Metrobank filed an original petition for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, contesting the reinstatement of the complaint and in the
process reiterating as grounds lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court and failure of Quilts complaint to state a cause of action.
The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the lower Court only with respect to
Metrobank. It dismissed the case against Dizon and de los Santos,
since the issue of whether or not these two persons had committed
ultra vires acts is an intra-corporate matter which falls within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Pending the outcome of the case that would be
filed in the SEC, however, the Court of Appeals directed the
suspension of the proceedings against Metrobank.
The CA also stated that paragraph 10 of Quilts complaint was
sufficient basis for Quilts case against Metrobank.
10. That plaintiff corporation suffered and continue to suffer actual
damages as a result of the illegal acts of defendants for which the
former should be compensated in an amount to be proved during the
trial of the instant cases.
ISSUE: WON Quilts complaint sufficiently states a cause of action
against Metrobank?
HELD: An examination of the complaint shows that the allegations
therein pertain mostly to the alleged ultra vires acts of Dizon and de
los Santos. Paragraph 10 of the complaint, upon which both the trial
court and the CA premised a case against Metrobank, merely
expresses legal conclusions, and is not an averment or allegation of

ultimate facts. In the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. vs. First
Farmers Milling Co., Inc., it was held that Although it is averred that
the defendants acts were done in bad faith, the Complaint does not
contain anyaverment of facts showing that the acts were done in the
manner alleged. Such a bare statement neither establishes any right
or cause of action on the part of the plaintiff-appellant. It is a mere
conclusion of law not sustained by declarations of facts, much less
admitted by defendants-appellees. It does not, therefore, aid in
anywise the complaint in setting forth a cause of action.
The SC agreed with Metrobank that the complaint does not contain
allegations that Metrobank had prior knowledge of, or could have
known with the exercise of due diligence, that the recitals in the
Secretarys Certificate were false. The complaint does not even allege
specific overt acts which show that Metrobank acted in conspiracy
with its co-defendants to defraud Quilts.
On the other hand, Metrobank cannot be faulted for relying on the
Secretarys Certificate. It did so in good faith, unaware of any flaw and
on the presumption that the ordinary course of business had been
followed and that the Corporate Secretary had regularly performed
her duties.
MATHAY v. CONSOLIDATED BANK (LEA)

DOCTRINE: A class suit did not lie in an action for recovery of real
property where separate portions of the same parcel were occupied
and claimed individually by different parties to the exclusion of each
other, such that the different parties had determinable, though
undivided interests, in the property in question.
FACTS: smael Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of
Consolidated Mines Inc. Petitioners filed a case for a class suit
against CMI containing six causes of action. Petitioners alleged that
Page 12 of 24

in violation of the Board resolution, the defendants unlawfully


acquired
stockholdings in the defendant Bank in excess of what they were
lawfully entitled, hence depriving the petitioners of their right to
subscribe at par value, in proportion to their equities established
under their respective "Pre-Incorporation Agreements to Subscribe" to
the capital stock and that the Articles of Incorporation were
fraudulently
amended by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed by the
Trial Court on the ground that the class suit could not be maintained
because of the absence of a showing in the complaint that the
plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently numerous and representative,
and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The CA
affirmed the ruling, hence, the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the instant action is a class suit?
HELD: The action at bar is not a class suit. The necessary elements
for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject
matter of the controversy is one
of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such
persons be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
to the court. The statute requires that the complaint should allege the
existence of the necessary facts, the existence of a class and the
number of members in the said class so as to enable the court to
determine whether the members of the said class are so numerous as
to make it impractical to bring them all to court. The complaint in the
instant case failed to state the number of said CMI subscribing
stockholders that the trial court
could not infer nor make sure that the parties are indeed so numerous
that they cannot practically appear in court and that the plaintiffs are
representative of the other stockholders. The statute also requires
that the subject-matter of the controversy be of common interest to
numerous persons. In the instant case, the interest that appellants,
plaintiffs and intervenors, and the CMI stockholders had in the subject

matter of this suit was several, not common or general in the sense
required by the statute. Each one of the appellants and the CMI
stockholders had determinable interest; each one had a right, if any,
only to his respective portion of
the stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the
stock to which another was entitled.
b). Amended and Supplemental Complaints
Rule 10
Section 1. Amendments in general.
Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or
the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a
party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any
other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may
speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the
most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right.
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at
any time within ten (l0) days after it is served.
Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court.
Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave
may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made
with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in
this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice
to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Page 13 of 24

Sec. 4. Formal amendments.


A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or
typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any
stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice
is caused thereby to the adverse party.
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to
at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall
do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and
the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court
may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
Sec. 6. Supplemental pleadings.
Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and
upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental
pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.
The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice
of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.

incorporating the amendments, which shall be indicated by


appropriate marks, shall be filed.
Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleadings.
An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends.
However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in
evidence against the pleader; and claims or defenses alleged therein
not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.
Rule 11, Sec. 3. Answer to amended complaint.
Where the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right, the
defendant shall answer the same within fifteen (l5) days after being
served with a copy thereof.
Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the
amended complaint within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the same. An answer earlier filed may serve as the answer
to the amended complaint if no new answer is filed.
This Rule shall apply to the answer to an amended counterclaim,
amended cross-claim, amended third (fourth, etc.) party complaint,
and amended complaint-in-intervention.
Rule 11, Sec. 7. Answer to supplemental complaint.
A supplemental complaint may be answered within ten (10) days from
notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is
fixed by the court. The answer to the complaint shall serve as the
answer to the supplemental complaint if no new or supplemental
answer is filed.

Sec. 7. Filing of amended pleadings.


When any pleading is amended, a new copy of the entire pleading,
Page 14 of 24

JOSEPHINE NG v. SPS. MARCELO (ROCEL)

FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for accounting, injunction and


damages with writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order against respondents Spouses Marcelo and Maria Fe Soco and
Marvin Soco with the RTC of Negros Oriental.
Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of Jo's Chicken Barbecue
(Chicken Inato) "secret recipe." The said recipe is used by petitioners'
chain of restaurants in some cities in the Visayas and Mindanao.
That they entered into a partnership agreement with respondents to
operate a restaurant, the Soco's Manokan Nook Restaurant. The
agreement provided that in the event of the dissolution of the
partnership, respondents shall lose the right to use the "secret recipe"
and ownership thereof shall revert back to petitioners.
Not long after, the aforesaid partnership was dissolved on account of
disagreement among the parties. Believing that respondents
continued to operate the same business, petitioners filed the
complaint for accounting with the court a quo. During the hearing on
the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
petitioners learned that a certain Magno Garcia, respondents'
nephew, is operating the restaurant under the name Manokan sa
Sugbu. Upon the belief that Garcia was merely used as dummy by
respondents in order to evade their contractual obligation, i.e., to
cease using the "secret recipe," petitioners filed with the trial court a
motion to admit amended complaint to implead Garcia as one of the
defendants.
Trial court denied said motion. The amendment cannot be allowed
because, "the amendment now, not only requires or compels the
defendants (respondents herein) to change their defense but also
subjects them to all the acts, knowledge, admission and even the
omissions of Magno Garcia."1
Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court. Amendment

could not be allowed, as the same is substantial and has the effect of
changing the theory of the case. Garcia is not an indispensable party

ISSUE: WON the amended complaint which merely seeks to include


the dummy of the respondents could not be admitted because
petitioners' theory of the case is thereby changed and because said
dummy is not an indispensable party

HELD: YES, Amended complaint may not be admitted


Formal and substantial amendments to a pleading may be made at
anytime before a responsive pleading has been filed. Such
amendment is a matter of right. Thereafter, and during trial,
amendments may only be done with the permission of the court.
Amendments are not proper and should be denied when delay would
arise, or when amendments would result in a change of cause of
action or theory of the case, or would be inconsistent with the
allegations in the original complaint.4
In this case, the court a quo denied petitioners' amended complaint
upon finding that it will substantially alter "the cause of action or
defense or theory of the case."5 The trial court found that
respondents' defense will be altered by the amendment because they
will be made liable "not only for their individual acts but also for the
acts of their alleged co-conspirator Garcia."6
The Court agrees with the appellate court that the trial court did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' amended
complaint. The admission thereof was clearly not a matter of right on
the part of petitioners as they sought the same only after a responsive
pleading (in this case, an answer) had already been filed by
respondents. The matter was thus within the discretion of the trial
court. And, as consistently held by this Court, "the granting of leave to
file amended pleadings is a matter peculiarly within the sound
discretion of the trial court and such discretion would not normally be
disturbed on appeal except when evident abuse thereof is apparent."7
None has been shown in this case.
Page 15 of 24

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL v. CA (JO)

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages


arising from breach of contract. Impleaded as principal defendant
therein was Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading GMBH
(Ferro) and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL
and respondent British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against
them RTC denied the motions to dismiss, as well as the ensuing
motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, respondent British
Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals. ISL then filed its answer to the complaint. Meanwhile,
petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein
additional factual allegations constitutive of its cause of action against
respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner maintained that it can amend the complaint as a matter of
right because respondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading
thereto.
ISSUE: Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before
an answer has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for
its dismissal before the higher court?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly
states that a pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a
responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior to the filing
of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the
complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is
introduced. Substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed
without leave of court after an answer has been served, because any
material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could
prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his
defense in the answer. In such an event, the defendant has not

presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the


amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10.
Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his
complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by
the defendant. The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law
to amend the complaint before an answer has been served is not
precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding
contesting its sufficiency. Moreover, amendment of pleadings is
favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in
order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without
regard to technicalities. The fact that the other defendants below has
filed their answers to the complaint does not bar petitioners right to
amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where some but
not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its
complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted
solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims
asserted against the other defendants.
SIASOCO v. CA (TUGS)

DOCTRINE: Notwithstanding the filing of a responsive pleading by


one defendant, the complaint may still be amended once, as a matter
of right, by the plaintiff in respect to claims against the non-answering
defendant(s).
FACTS: Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land
located in Montalban, Rizal. They began to offer the subject properties
for sale. Subsequently, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) negotiated with the
petitioners, but the parties failed to agree on the terms of the
purchase.
More than a year later, both parties revived their discussions. In a
letter, petitioners made a final offer to the INC. The latters counsel
sent a reply received by Petitioner Mario Siasoco stating that the offer
Page 16 of 24

was accepted, but that the INC was not amenable to your proposal to
an undervaluation of the total consideration. In their letter, petitioners
claimed that the INC had not really accepted the offer, adding that,
prior to their receipt of the aforementioned reply they had already
contracted with Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc.
for the sale of the said properties due to the absence of any response
to their offer from INC.
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that
the corresponding deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners refused.

so with leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not
acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting INCs Amended
Complaint. The CA also held that the Amended Complaint did not
substantially alter private respondents cause of action, since
petitioners were not being asked to answer a legal obligation different
from that stated in the original Complaint.
ISSUE: WON CA gravely erred in holding that the respondent Judges
admission of INCs Amended Complaint was proper.
HELD: SC sustained the Court of Appeals.

INC filed a civil suit for specific performance and damages against
petitioners and Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc.
Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue and lack of capacity to sue.
Carissa Homes filed its answer to the complaint.
Pending resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss, INC negotiated
with Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the subject
properties of Carissa Homes by INC.
INC filed an Amended Complaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one of
the defendants and changing the nature of the case to a mere case
for damages.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint,
contending that the complaint cannot be amended without leave of
court, since a responsive pleading has been filed.
An order denying petitioners Motion to Strike Out Amended
Complaint was rendered by the trial court.
CA ruled that although private respondent could no longer amend its
original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not precluded from doing

Where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may
amend their
Complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted
solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims
asserted against the other defendants.It is clear that plaintiff (herein
private respondent) can amend its complaint once, as a matter of
right, before a responsive pleading is filed. Contrary to the petitioners
contention, the fact that Carissa had already filed its Answer did not
bar private respondent from amending its original Complaint once, as
a matter of right, against herein petitioners.
Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered,
plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a matter of right, in
respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering
defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other
defendants.
After a responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be
rejected when the defense is substantially altered since such
amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant but
also delays the action; Amendments to pleadings are generally
favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice.The
rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the
Page 17 of 24

Rules of Court, which provides that after a responsive pleading has


been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the defense is
substantially altered. Such amendment does not only prejudice the
rights of the defendant; it also delays the action. In the first place,
where a party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there are no
defenses that can be altered. Furthermore, the Court has held that
[a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be
liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may
so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to
speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuity of action and
unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as
inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the
like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.

METROBANK v. PRESIDING JUDGE (LEA)

In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they were


prejudiced by private respondents Amended Complaint. True,
Carissa had already filed its own Answer. Petitioners, however, have
not yet filed any. Moreover, they do not allege that their defense is
similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private respondents claims
against the latter and against petitioners are different. Against
petitioners, whose offer to sell the subject parcels of land had
allegedly been accepted by private respondent, the latter is suing for
specific performance and damages for breach of contract. Although
private respondent could no longer amend, as a matter of right, its
Complaint against Carissa, it could do so against petitioners who, at
the time, had not yet filed an answer.

FACTS:Petitioner Metropolitan Bank in whose favor a deed of chattel


mortgage was executed by Good Earth Emporium, Inc. over certain
air conditioning units installed in the GEE building, filed a complaint
for replevin against Uniwide, and the BPI Investment Corporation and
several other banks collectively called BPI-Consortium, for the
recovery of the possession of the air-conditioning units or in the event
they may not be recovered, for the defendants which acquired the
GEE building in an auction sale, (to) be required, jointly and severally,
to pay the plaintiff the unpaid obligations on the units.

The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the action.
Au contraire, it simplified the case and tended to expedite its
disposition. The Amended Complaint became simply an action for
damages, since the claims for specific performance and declaration of
nullity of the sale have been deleted.

DOCTRINE: Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a


third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either
joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting
with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding
something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a
third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the
admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to
pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party
thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be
affected by such proceedings.

Metrobank alleged that the air-conditioning units were installed on a


loan of P4,900,000.00 it extended to Good Earth Emporium &
Supermarket, Inc. in its building located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, after the
land and building had been foreclosed and purchased oat public
auction by the defendants, except Uniwide, and in order to secure
repayment of the loan, a deed of chattel mortgage was constituted
over the personal properties listed in the deed which included the
airconditioning units. The loan proceeds were used by GEE to finance
the acquisition of airconditioning equipment from Reycor Air Control
System, Inc. under an Agreement of Sale.
Page 18 of 24

Raycor Air filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging' it has a direct
and immediate interest on the subject matter of the litigation such that
it will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment'. There was no opposition to the motion and the intervention
complaint was admitted by the lower court. Metrobank filed its Answer
To The Intervention Complaint.
RTC allowed the motion to intervene suit despite the agreement
between Metrobank and Uniwide. Metrobank filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals
contending that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in allowing, per the intervention suit to
survive despite the dismissal of the main action and also in admitting
the amended complaint in intervention.

with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding


something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a
third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the
admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to
pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party
thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be
affected by such proceedings."
Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in
the success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, may
intervene in such action, and when he has become a party thereto it is
error for the court to dismiss the action, including the intervention suit
on the basis of an agreement between the original parties to the
action. Any settlement made by the plaintiff and the defendant is
necessarily ineffective unless the intervenor is a party to it.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, hence, this appeal.


ISSUE: Whether the intervention suit is proper?
HELD: Yes. There no final dismissal of the main case. The
aforementioned order of the lower court has the effect not only of
allowing the intervention suit to proceed but also of vacating its
previous order of dismissal. The reinstatement of the case in order to
try and determine the claims and rights of the intervenor is proper.
The joint motion of therein plaintiff and the original defendants to
dismiss the case, without notice to and consent of the intervenor, has
the effect of putting to rest only the respective claims of the said
original parties inter se but the same cannot in any way affect the
claim of private respondent which was allowed by the court to
intervene without opposition from the original parties. A resume of
pertinent rulings on the matter would be in order.
Intervention is defined as "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a
third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either
joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting

By the very definition of "intervention," the intervenor is a party to the


action as the original parties and to make his right effectual he must
necessarily have the same power as the original parties, subject to
the authority of the court reasonably to control the proceedings in the
case.
O' LACO v. CO CHO CHIT (NADIA)

DOCTRINE: Where the plaintiff is allowed to introduce evidence to


correct perceived defect in the complaint, said complaint is deemed
accordingly amended to conform to the evidence; Case at bar.
Plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint to correct the defect if
the amendment does not actually confer jurisdiction on the court in
which the action is filed, i.e., if the cause of action was originally within
that court's jurisdiction. In such case, the amendment is only to cure
the perceived defect in the complaint, thus may be allowed. In the
case before Us, while respondent-spouses did not formally amend
their complaint, they were nonetheless allowed to introduce evidence
Page 19 of 24

purporting to show that earnest efforts toward a compromise had


been made. xxx. Hence, the complaint was deemed accordingly
amended to conform to the evidence, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 10.
Introduction of evidence supplying necessary allegations of a
defective complaint, without objection on the part of the defendant,
ipso facto cures insufficiency of allegations thereof.Indeed, if the
defendant permits evidence to be introduced without objection and
which supplies the necessary allegations of a defective complaint,
then the evidence is deemed to have the effect of curing the defects
of the complaint. The insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint
is deemed ipso facto rectified.
FACTS: It involves half-sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel
of land. While petitioner Emilia O'Laco asserts that she merely left the
certificate of title covering the property with private respondent O Lay
Kia for safekeeping, the latter who is the former's older sister insists
that the title was in her possession because she and her husband
bought the property from their conjugal funds.
the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., sold a
parcel of land, Lot No. 5, Block No. 10, Plan Psu-10038, situated at
Oroquieta St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, with the Deed of Absolute Sale
naming Emilia O'Laco as vendee; thereafter, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 66456 was issued in her name.
private respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia
learned from the newspapers that Emilia O'Laco sold the same
property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila for
P230,000.00, with assumption of the real estate mortgage constituted
thereon.4
On 22 June 1960, respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O
Lay Kia sued petitioner-spouses Emilia O'Laco and Hugo Luna to
recover the purchase price of the land before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, respondent-spouses asserting that petitioner Emilia
O'Laco knew that they were the real vendees of the Oroquieta
property sold in 1943 by Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Company, Ltd., and that the legal title thereto was merely placed in

her name. They contend that Emilia O'Laco breached the trust when
she sold the land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
Petitioner-spouses deny the existence of any form of trust relation.
They aver that Emilia O'Laco actually bought the property with her
own money; that she left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
corresponding title with respondent-spouses merely for safekeeping;
that when she asked for the return of the documents evidencing her
ownership, respondent-spouses told her that these were misplaced or
lost, then Court of First Instance of Manila granted her petition.
Finding no trust relation between the parties, the trial court dismissed
the complaint together with the counterclaim. Court of Appeals set
aside the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint
to correct the defect if the amendment does not actually confer
jurisdiction on the court in which the action is filed, i.e., if the cause of
action was originally within that court's jurisdiction.

HELD: "Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of


evidence.When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings x x x x" (italics
supplied).

Where the plaintiff is allowed to introduce evidence to correct


perceived defect in the complaint, said complaint is deemed
accordingly amended to conform to the evidence; Case at bar.
Plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint to correct the defect if
the amendment does not actually confer jurisdiction on the court in
which the action is filed, i.e., if the cause of action was originally within
that court's jurisdiction. In such case, the amendment is only to cure
the perceived defect in the complaint, thus may be allowed. In the
case before Us, while respondent-spouses did not formally amend
their complaint, they were nonetheless allowed to introduce evidence
Page 20 of 24

purporting to show that earnest efforts toward a compromise had


been made. xxx. Hence, the complaint was deemed accordingly
amended to conform to the evidence, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 10.
Introduction of evidence supplying necessary allegations of a
defective complaint, without objection on the part of the defendant,
ipso facto cures insufficiency of allegations thereof.Indeed, if the
defendant permits evidence to be introduced without objection and
which supplies the necessary allegations of a defective complaint,
then the evidence is deemed to have the effect of curing the defects
of the complaint. The insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint
is deemed ipso facto rectified.

complaint to implead the heirs of the deceased plaintiff which


respondent Judge admitted in an order. Respondent moved to further
amend their complaint. Notable amendment introduced in the First
Amended Complaint Is the inclusion of another parcel of land as
subject matter. Sadi property belongs to the spouses Agripino and
Soledad Viloria and mortgaged also with PNB. PNB opposed the
admission of the private respondents First Amended Complaint on the
grounds that there was no proper notice of hearing as required by the
Uniform CAR rules of procedure. Respondent judge granted private
respondents motion thus the First Amended Complaint. PNBs motion
for reconsideration order was denied by respondent judge in an order
hence this petition.

PHILBANK v. IAC (ROCEL)


PNB v. FLORENDO (JO)

FACTS: Plaintiffs are tenants of 4 parcels of land whose previous


owner Valeroso mortgaged the same to the PNB. In 1971 said parcels
of land were brought by spouses Agripino and Soledad Viloria who
assumed the mortgage with PNB. In 1974 PNB requested defendant
Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental to foreclose the mortgage on the
parcel of land after the failure of the owners to pay certain
amortization and the same was sold at public auction to the defendant
bank as the highest bidder. Notwithstanding the fact that the said
lands were already brought under the Land Reform Program of the
government, the PNB caused the titles to said parcels of land
transferred in its name to the prejudice of plaintiffs. Palintiffs Viloria
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the foreclosure
proceedings in violation of PD 27 and 946 against the defendants
PNB in the court of agrarian relations. Defendant PNB answered the
complaint with counrterclaim for damages. Plaintiffs filed their reply to
the counterclaim. Defendant PNB then moved for leave of court to file
third party complaint against the registered owners-mortgagors of the
subject parcels of land. Plaintiffs moved for the amendment of their

ISSUE: W/N respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in admitting


the First Amended Complaint which adds another parcel of land not
within the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD
27.
RULING: Petition impressed with merit.
Upon the abolition of the Court of Agrarian Relations by BP 129 and
fully implemented the jurisdiction over agrarian disputes is now vested
in the appropriate RTC pursuant to the provisions of Sec 19 (7) of the
said law.
Now the appropriate Branch of the RTC of Negros Oriental that has
jurisdiction over the case. Be that as it may, the same law provides
that whenever a RTC takes cognizance of agrarian case, the special
rules of procedures applicable under the present laws to such cases
shall continue to be applied, unless amended by law or by rules of
court promulgated by the SC. The law which conferred jurisdiction on
the Court of Agrarian Relations, now transferred to the appropriate
Branch of the RTC, concerning agricultural lands, is PD 946.
Jurisdiction in general is either one over the nature of the action, over
Page 21 of 24

the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the
issue framed in the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter, on
the other hand, is conferred by law and does not depend on the
consent or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or any one
of them. The law which conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Agrarian
Relations, now transferred to the appropriate Branch of the RTC,
concerning agricultural lands, is PD 946.
Indeed amendment to pleadings are generally favored and should be
liberally construed however, where the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, it is evident that the amendment of the
complaint could not be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon the
court over said property.
It being apparent that the Court of Agrarian Relations has no
jurisdiction over the lot aside from the fact that said court has already
been abolished by BP 129 the issue as to its territorial jurisdiction has
become moot and academic.
The order of the respondent judge admitting the First Amended
Complaint including therein the questioned lot which is a residential lot
not falling within the ambit of PD 27 hence, beyond CARs jurisdiction.
The term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or officer
has jurisdiction over a case but oversteps such jurisdiction while
acting thereon.
SM v. CA (TUGS)
SHOEMART V. CA
DOCTRINE
A supplemental pleading supplies deficiencies in aid of an original
pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter.

Judgment may be rendered validly as regards issues not raised in the


pleadings if the opposing party failed to object to the presentation of
evidence to prove the same

FACTS
Anson Emporium Corporation (Anson) leased from Shoemart, Inc.
(Shoemart) a portion of the building known as the Makati Arcade
consisting of 374 square meters of store area at its ground floor and
678 square meters at its second floor, for a period of two (2) years
starting said date at a monthly rental of P18,842.00 with a stipulation
that: "after termination of the lease for any reason whatsoever, if the
Owner shall permit the tenant to remain in possession of the leased
premises, it is expressly understood and agreed that the lease shall
be on a month to month basis in the absence of a written agreement
to the contrary."
Anson remained in possession after the two year period but on an
increased rental of P34,622.00. Four years later Shoemart terminated
the month to month lease and gave notice to Anson to vacate not later
than August 31, 1977. Notwithstanding the notice and demand, Anson
continued to stay on, thus the complaint for ejectment filed with the
then MTC of Makati.
In its answer, Anson raised the defenses that (1) the lease did not
express the true intention and real agreement of the parties, the true
one being that its stay was guaranteed by Shoemart for a maximum
period of twenty-four (24) years and (2) assuming that the lease had
expired, it still cannot be ejected until a longer term is fixed in
accordance with Article 1673 in relation to Article 1687 of the Civil
Code.

Page 22 of 24

After were on their way, Shoemart asked for and was granted leave to
file supplemental complaint which alleged that the rental of all the
tenants of the premises had been increased effective January 1, 1979
to P45,142.00 which Anson refused to pay.

reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court's decision was denied.


Hence, this instant petition.

The supplemental complaint became an issue in a petition for


certiorari in the CFI of Rizal which upheld the admission, then in the
IAC which sustained the CFI and finally in the Supreme Court where
the matter was laid to rest with the High Court giving the final
imprimatur to the admission.

ISSUE

In its answer to the supplemental complaint, Anson raised the


defenses that Shoemart's claim for increased rentals has been barred
by estoppel, novation, statute of frauds/limitations, condonation,
release and/or laches and in any event, the increase was inequitable,
unconscionable and arbitrary.
The trial court ruled for Anson and dismissed the complaint.
Shoemart filed a MR on the ground that the amount of damages
awarded in the form of reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the subject premises is less than what is really due.
Anson likewise filed its motion for reconsideration seeking the
affirmance of the court a quo's appealed decision.
RTC issued an Order denying Anson's MR but Shoemarts motion
was granted and the decision was amended.
On appeal CA issued the assailed judgment which while affirming the
ejectment Anson from the premises, reduced the amount of damages
awarded as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises. Both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.
Anson sought the correction of the clerical error regarding date of the
effectivity of the one (1%) percent interest. Said motion was granted
by CA. Shoemarts motion for reconsideration seeking the

WON THE CA ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN LIMITING ANSON


TO PAY ONLY THE SUM OF P45,142.00 MONTHLY STARTING
JANUARY 1, 1979 UNTIL IT VACATES THE PREMISES DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THERE WERE FOUR (4) RENTAL INCREASES
EFFECTED ON THE SUBJECT PREMISES DURING THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER PERIOD AND DURING PENDENCY OF
THE INSTANT CASE WHICH INCREASES WERE PROVEN
DURING THE TRIAL.
HELD
Contrary to the conclusion of CA, petitioner's recovery is not limited by
the amount of P45,142.00 prayed for in the supplemental complaint
as increased rental effective January 1, 1979. This is not a case of a
complaint subsequently amended, the effect of which is to render the
original complaint abandoned or inexistent and let the amendment
take form as the sole substitute upon which the case stands for trial.
On the other hand, a supplemental complaint or pleading supplies
deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, not to entirely substitute the
latter. A perusal of the original complaint shows that it prayed, among
others, that the defendant (private respondent) be ordered to pay
plaintiff (petitioner) the monthly rental of P34,622.00 "and all other
rentals and charges that may be due until such time that defendant
xxx shall have vacated the premises". Petitioner, therefore, did not
foreclose its right to demand increased rentals that may be recovered
expressed in terms of the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the real property. This is
so because, unlike in an amended complaint, the original complaint
exists side by side with the supplemental complaint. In the case at
Page 23 of 24

bar, the supplemental pleading merely served to aver supervening


facts which were then not ripe for judicial relief when the original
pleading was filed. As aforesaid, supplemental pleadings are meant to
supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading, and not to dispense
with the latter.
In view of the failure of Anson to object to the presentation of
evidence showing that there were four (4) rental increases on the
subject premises although three (3) of said increases are not alleged
in the pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as regards the
said increases or issues which shall be considered as if they have
been raised in the pleadings . Thus, section 5, Rule 10 provides:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as
if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issues.

Page 24 of 24