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DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 113087 June 27, 1994


REBECCO PANLILIO, ERLINDA PANLILIO and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSEFINA G. SALONGA, Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati Branch 149 and FE V.
FEDERIS,respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioners.
Paruangao, Abesamis, Eleazar and Pulgar Law Office for private respondent.

MELO, J.:
Through a supplication for a writ of habeas corpus initiated by the natural mother, the Honorable
Josefina Guevara Salonga, Presiding Judge of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Makati, was persuaded to accede to the requested writ
albeit the grandparents of the minor child had been previously designated guardians
ad litem by another coordinate court in Naic, Cavite. It is petitioners' submission in the recourse
before us that the action pursued by the natural mother vis-a-vis the reaction thereto of the Makati
court is punctuated with congenital and procedural infirmity.
Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio who was born on July 7, 1990, is said to be the natural child of petitioner
Jose Marcel E. Panlilio and private respondent Fe V. Federis (p. 69, Rollo) while principal petitioners
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio are the natural grandparents of the minor, being the parents of Jose
Marcel E. Panlilio.
Owing to the so-called cruelty, moral depravity and gross neglect of private respondent, the
grandparents felt obliged to exercise substitute parental authority over the minor which apprehension
led to the initiation on December 14, 1993 of special proceedings geared towards securing their
appointment as guardians ad litem of the ward (p. 87, Rollo). The Presiding Judge of Branch 15 of
the Regional Trial Court stationed in Naic, Cavite, before whom the case was eventually raffled,
issued an order on December 16, 1993 in the following tenor:
This is a verified petition for the deprivation of parental authority of the natural mother
herein respondent Fe V. Federis. The petition is sufficient in form and substance.

WHEREFORE, the Court believes that it is to the best interest of the minor Michael
Lancelot F. Panlilio, the natural grandson of petitioners, for Spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio who are presently in custody of the minor, to be appointed guardian
ad litem pending determination of the merits of this case.
(p. 22, Rollo.)
On December 22, 1993, a petition for habeas corpus was submitted by private respondent and later
assigned to Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati. The natural mother's remedial
measure tersely narrated how she was allegedly duped into permitting her son on one occasion to
go with herein petitioners in Makati only to wait in vain on account of the vehement and persistent
reluctance of petitioners to return the child despite repeated demands therefor (p. 56, Rollo). The
Makati court immediately ordered the issuance of the writ ofhabeas corpus on December 23, 1993 in
this manner:
Whereas, a duly verified petition has been filed in the above-entitled case by Fe V.
Federis alleging that the minor Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio is presently detained and
restrained of his liberty by Sps. Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio and Jose Marcel E.
Panlilio and/or all persons having custody of the child.
NOW, therefore, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, you are
commanded to take the body and person of Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio before this
Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati, Metro Manila, and to make a return
of the writ both to be done on December 27, 1993 at 9:30 in the morning, at which
date and time the parties will be heard.
Witness the Hon. JOSEFINA GUEVARA SALONGA of this Court, this 23rd day of
December, 1993, at Makati, Metro Manila
(p. 60, Rollo.)
which was supplemented on December 29, 1993 by a hold departure order of Michael
Lancelot F. Panlilio until further orders (p. 62, Rollo).
In the meantime, herein petitioners moved to dismiss the habeas corpus petition on the basis of litis
pendentia as well as lack of cause of action (p. 70, Rollo), while herein private respondent filed her
own motion to dismiss in the Cavite custody case anchored on improper venue and the existence of
a prejudicial question (p. 132, Rollo).
When petitioners' motion to dismiss was submitted for resolution on January 7, 1994, the Makati
judge hearing the habeas corpus case supposedly made a verbal order to produce the body of the
minor child on January 10, 1994 which prompted herein petitioners to forthwith file the petition at
bench
(p. 2, Rollo).
Following the filing of said petition which had a corollary plea for issuance of a restraining order, this
Court resolved to:
. . . ISSUE the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER prayed for, restraining the
implementation of the verbal orders of respondent Judge made in open court on
January 7, 1994 in Sp. Proc. No. 3711, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch

149 and from conducting further proceedings in the case, effective today and until
further orders from this Court. (Feliciano, Jr., no part)
(p. 26, Rollo.)
Petitioners are of the fundamental impression that their appointment as guardians ad litem by the
Cavite court was rendered illusory by private respondent's expedient act of filing in Makati a petition
for, and issuance of the writ of, habeas corpus. Suggestion is made that private respondent's
maneuver is tantamount to the abhorred practice of shopping for a friendly forum. Even then,
petitioners are confident that their momentary custody of the ward by virtue of a lawful court order
bars the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus due to the proscription under Section 4, Rule 102 of
the Revised Rules of Court which pertinently provides:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court of judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed . . .
By contrast, private respondent harps on certain perceived flaws on procedural matters starting from
the filing of the petition for termination of her parental authority in Cavite up to the promulgation of
the order appointing petitioners as guardians ad litem. Moreover, private respondent emphasizes the
salient features of the Family Code with particular reference to the exercise of parental authority by
the mother over her own illegitimate child and the general caveat that no child under 7 years of age
shall be separated from the mother except when the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. At any rate, she maintains that petitioners' appointment as guardians ad litem poses no
obstacle to her own recourse designed to regain custody of her child via a habeas corpus petition.
We perceive merit in the petition.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to
the competencia of the Makati court to entertain the habeas corpus case on account of the previous
assumption of jurisdiction by the Cavite court, and the designation of petitioners as guardians ad
litem of the ward. Indeed, the policy of peaceful co-existence among courts of the same judicial
plane, so to speak, was aptly described in Republic vs. Reyes (155 SCRA 313 [1987]), thus:
. . . the doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an elementary principle of
higher importance in the administration of justice that the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction (30-A Am Jur 605). As this Court ruled in the case of Mas
vs. Dumara-og, 12 SCRA 34 [1964], a Judge of a branch of one should not annul the
order of a judge of another branch of the same court. Any branch even if it be in the
same judicial district that attempts to annul a judgment of a branch of the CFI either
exceeds its jurisdiction (Cabigo vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 84 [1949]) or acts with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (PNB vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525
[1952]). Thus, in the case of Parco vs. Ca, 111 SCRA 262, this Court held that the
various branches of the Court of First Instance being co-equal cannot interfere with
the respective cases of each branch, much less a branch's order or judgment.
(pp. 324-325)

Consequently, even as the appointment of principal petitioners is still subject to the outcome of the
case lodged before the Cavite court, not to mention the possible courses of action which private
respondent may pursue in said case to vindicate custody of her child, it cannot be gainsaid that the
immediate assumption of authority by the Makati court, although possibly motivated by a noble goal,
is tantamount to defeating the very essence of the order emanating from the Cavite court.
While habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of minor children as enunciated
in Salvana and Saliendra vs. Gaela (55 Phil. 680 [1931]; 5-B, Francisco, Revised Rules of Court,
1970 ed., p. 694) yet this principle is understood to presuppose that there is no other previous case
whose issue is necessarily interwoven with the nature of a habeas corpus proceeding. Verily, the
existence of an anterior suit, such as the termination of private respondent's parental authority in the
Cavite court, coupled with the order appointing principal petitioners as guardians ad litem of the
ward, is sufficient to momentarily stave off private respondent's short-cut and subtle attempt to
regain custody of her son at another forum, by reason of the corollary principle that initial acquisition
of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction (Valdez
vs. Lucero, 43 OG, No. 11, 2835; 1 Francisco Revised Rules of Court, 1973 ed., p. 115;St. Anne
Medical Center vs. Panel, 176 SCRA 755; 761 [1989]). Justice Paras, in Lee vs. Presiding Judge,
MTC of Legaspi City, Branch I
(145 SCRA 408 [1986]), echoed oft-repeated truisms:
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic
that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts" (Laquian vs.
Baltazar, 31 SCRA 552, 556 [1970], please see cases cited therein).
In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject
only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of,
and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This
doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial.
The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and
while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and
courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to
prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the
process. (14 Am, Jr. 435-436, cited in Francisco, Vicente, Revised Rules of Court,
pp. 57-58, Vol. I, 1965 ed.).
(p. 416)
And certainly, given the propensity of the Makati court to intrude and render nugatory an order or
decision of another co-equal court, certiorari is the appropriate relief against deviation from the
doctrine of judicial comity(Annotation on Judicial Interference by One Court in the Actuations of
Another Co-equal Court, 99 SCRA 84; 89).
Of course, we are not unmindful of private respondent's protestations on the manner the order of
petitioners' appointment as guardian ad litem was effected but her insinuations on this score should
be first addressed to, and resolved by, the Cavite court, not to mention the availability of appeal
therefrom in the event an unfavorable decision is finally made. Not to be ignored too, is private
respondent's reliance on Articles 176 and Article 213 of the Family Code, with reference to the
parental authority of the mother over her illegitimate child and the general proscription that no child
under 7 years shall be separated from the mother except under certain cases. Again, these matters
would be relevant in and capable of resolution in the case filed in Cavite, but may not now be utilized
by herein private respondent to assail the authority of the Cavite court for the simple, nay, obvious

reason that these considerations are matters of defense which may be availed of by private
respondent to ward off the suit for termination of her parental authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Honorable Josefina G. Salonga, Presiding
Judge of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is hereby directed to dismiss the habeas
corpus case. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on January 12, 1994 is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC
ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI,
Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225


(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ)

Present:

- versus -

JUDGE RASAD G.
BALINDONG, Acting Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City,
Respondent.

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,* and
REYES,** JJ.

Promulgated:

September 6, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

We resolve the administrative complaint against respondent Acting


Presiding Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi
City, Branch 8, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse
of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial
Service.[1]
The Factual Antecedents
The antecedent facts, gathered from the records, are summarized below.
Civil Case No. 06-2954[2] is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan
City RTC against the Mindanao State University (MSU), et al., arising from a
vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical injuries to
several others.
On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding
the MSU liable for damages amounting to P2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision and the CA decision subsequently
lapsed to finality. On January 19, 2009, Entry of Judgment was made.[3]
On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution.[4] The
MSU, however, failed to comply with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009, Sheriff
Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSUs depository bank,
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution,
albeit belatedly, in behalf of MSU.[6] The Iligan City RTC denied the
opposition in its March 31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded to the denial by
filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition
and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff
Gaje.[7] The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC, Marawi City, Branch 8,
presided by respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a
TRO on April 8, 2009.[8] After this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO

restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi


City Branch account.[9]
On April 17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, he
required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.[10] On April 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to
dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[11] The respondent Judge
thereafter granted the motion and dismissed the case.[12]
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the
private plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the
respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority,
Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the
Judicial Service for interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the
Iligan City RTC, by issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from
garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[13]
The respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of Branch 6 of
the Iligan City RTC.[14] He explained that he merely gave the parties the
opportunity to be heard and eventually dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.[15]
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) found the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
violating the elementary rule of non-interference with the proceedings of a court of
co-equal jurisdiction.[16] It recommended a fine of P40,000.00, noting that this is
the respondent Judges second offense.[17]
The Court resolved to re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative
matter and to require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records on file.[18]
Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili complied through his manifestation of April 19,
2010, stating that he learned from reliable sources that the respondent Judge is
basically a good Judge, and an admonition will probably
[19]

suffice as reminder to respondent not to repeat the same mistake


in
the
[20]
[21]
future. The respondent Judge filed his manifestation on September 28, 2010.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds the OCAs recommendation well-taken.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of
justice:[22] no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of
another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by the injunction.[23] The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment
therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate
courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection
with this judgment.[24]
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been
issued is considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution
are still proceedings in the suit.[25] A court which issued a writ of execution has the
inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial
officers and to control its own processes.[26]To hold otherwise would be to divide
the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in
execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.[27]
Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions.
In Aquino, Sr. v. Valenciano,[28] the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion for issuing a TRO that interfered with or frustrated the
implementation of an order of another court of co-equal jurisdiction. In Yau v. The
Manila Banking Corporation,[29] the Court held that undue interference by one in
the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law.

In Coronado v. Rojas,[30] the judge was found liable for gross ignorance of
the law when he proceeded to enjoin the final and executory decision of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) on the pretext that the
temporary injunction and the writ of injunction he issued were not directed against
the HLURBs writ of execution, but only against the manner of its execution. The
Court noted that the judge cannot feign ignorance that the effect of the
injunctive writ was to freeze the enforcement of the writ of execution, thus
frustrating the lawful order of the HLURB, a co-equal body.[31]
In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera,[32] the Court penalized two judges for
issuing a TRO against the execution of a demolition order issued by another coequal court. The Court stressed that when the respondents-judges acted on the
application for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they were acting on
matters pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC,
which was already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case No.
435-T. Nonetheless, respondent-judges still opted to interfere with the order of a
co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard of
the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom in adjective law. [33]
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may
violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should
be a remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to
another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of
the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution,
under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2,[34] speaks of and which this Court has
operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.[35]
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of
judicial stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain[36] Sheriff Gaje from
enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan
City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of P2,726,189.90
from MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge
was aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final
decision of a co-equal and coordinate court since he even quoted MSUs
allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.[37]

The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition
because Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any
question on the enforcement of the writ of execution. Section 16, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Courts deliberations, finds no
application to this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third
person, other than the judgment obligor or his agent;[38] a third-party claimant
of a property under execution may file a claim with another court [39] which, in the
exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining order. In this
case, the petition for injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by
MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or
exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU
was to file a motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which
issued the decision, not from any other court,[40] or to elevate the matter to the CA
on a petition for certiorari.[41] In this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the
Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse
through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge.
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of
execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO
enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the
executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not
discretionary.[42] As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the
implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts,
and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body. Significantly,
MSU did file its opposition before the issuing court Iligan City RTC which
denied this opposition.
That the respondent Judge subsequently rectified his error by eventually
dismissing the petition before him for lack of jurisdiction is not a defense that the
respondent Judge can use.[43] His lack of familiarity with the rules in interfering
with the acts of a co-equal court undermines public confidence in the judiciary
through his demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed upon the Iligan
public that the kind of interference he exhibited can be done, even if only
temporarily, i.e., that an official act of the Iligan City RTC can be thwarted by
going to the Marawi City RTC although they are co-equal courts. That the

complaining lawyer, Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, subsequently reversed course and
manifested that the respondent Judge is basically a good Judge,[44] and should
only be reprimanded, cannot affect the respondent Judges liability. This liability
and the commensurate penalty do not depend on the complainants personal
opinion but on the facts he alleged and proved, and on the applicable law and
jurisprudence.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and
to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the
law.[45]
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious
charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not
exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service.
Considering the attendant circumstances of this case, the Court after prolonged
deliberations holds that a fine of P30,000.00 is the appropriate penalty. This
imposition is an act of leniency as we can, if we so hold, rule for the maximum fine
of P40,000.00 or for suspension since this is the respondent Judges second
offense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Rasad G.
Balindong, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City,
is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the
amount of P30,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

.
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
REMEDIAL LAW is that branch of law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress
for their invasion [Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640]. It is also known as Adjective Law.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW is one which creates, defines, and regulates rights.

PROCEDURE is the method of conducting a judicial proceeding. It includes whatever is embraced in the
technical terms, pleadings, practice, and evidence. It is the means by which the power or authority of a
court to hear and decide a class of cases is put to action [Manila Railroad vs. Atty. General, 20 Phil. 523].
JURISDICTION is the power to hear and decide cases [Herrera vs. Baretto & Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245]. It is the
power with which courts are invested with the power of administering justice, that is, for hearing and
deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties [Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina, 166 SCRA 39].
JURISDICTION

VENUE

The authority to hear and determine a case

The place where the case is to be heard or tried

A matter of substantive law

A matter of procedural law

Establishes a relation between the court and the

Establishes a relation between plaintiff and

subject matter

defendant, or petitioner and respondent

Fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the

May be conferred by the act or agreement of the

parties

parties

PRINCIPLE OF THE EXERCISE OF EQUITY JURISDICTION is a situation where the court is called upon to
decide a particular situation and release the parties from their correlative obligations but if it would result in
adverse consequences to the parties and the public, the court would go beyond its power to avoid negative
consequences in the release of the parties [Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793; Naga Telephone Co.
vs. CA, 48 SCAD 539].
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION:

(1) Jurisdiction over the subject

(2) Jurisdiction over the parties

(3) Jurisdiction over the res

It is conferred by law (BP 129),

Jurisdiction over the person of

It is acquired by the seizure of

and does not depend on the

the plaintiff is acquired by the

the thing under legal process

matter or nature of the case

objection or the acts or omissions filing of the initiatory pleading,

whereby it is brought into actual

of the parties or anyone of

custody of law, or it may result

like a complaint.

them [Republic vs. Sangalang,

from the institution of a legal

159 SCRA 515].

proceeding wherein the power of


Jurisdiction over the person of

the court over the thing is

the defendant is acquired by the

recognized and made

It is not waivable, except in cases proper service of summons, or by effective [Banco-Espaol Filipino
of estoppel to question or raise

his voluntary appearance in court vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 291].

jurisdiction[Tijam vs.

and his submission to the

Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29].

authority of the court[Paramount

It is determined upon the

Industries vs. Luna, 148 SCRA

allegations made in the

564].

complaint, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled or
not, to recover upon the claim
asserted therein, a matter

resolved only after and as a


result of the trial.
ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:

(1) Territorial jurisdiction

(2) Jurisdiction over the subject

(3) Jurisdiction over the person of

matter

the accused

It is determined by the

It is determined by the

It is acquired by the voluntary

geographical area over which a

allegations of the complaint or

appearance or surrender of the

court presides, and the fact that

information in accordance with

accused or by his arrest [Choc vs.

the crime was committed, or any the law in force at the time of the Vera, 64 Phil. 1066].
of its essential ingredients took

institution of the action, not at

place within said area [US vs.

the time of its commission [US

Jueves, 23 Phil. 100].

vs. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366].

INSTANCES WHEN A COURT MAY LOSE JURISDICTION EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN ATTACHED TO IT:

When a subsequent law provides a prohibition for the continued exercise of


jurisdiction[Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, 21 SCRA 717].

Where the law penalizing an act which is punishable is repealed by a subsequent law. The
reason is that, the State loses the power to prosecute when the law is repealed, hence, the
court has no more power to decide [People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000].

When accused is deprived of his constitutional right such as where the court fails to provide
counsel for the accused who is unable to obtain one and does not intelligently waive his
constitutional right [Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663].

When the proceeding s in the court acquiring jurisdiction is terminated, abandoned or declared
void [Seven vs. Pichay, 108 Phil. 419].

When the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it intended to operate as
to actions pending before its enactment [Bengzon vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 284].

Once appeal has been perfected [Alma vs. Abbas, 18 SCRA 836].

When the law is curative [Garcia vs. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331].

DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY: Should one branch be permitted to equally assert, assume, or retain
jurisdiction over a case in controversy over which another coordinate or co-equal branch has already
assumed jurisdiction, then that would be sanctioning undue interference by one branch over another. With
that, judicial stability would be meaningless precept in a well-ordered administration of justice[Parcon vs.
CA, 111 SCRA 262].
JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS:
1.

Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within
their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

2.

Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective
of the kind, nature, value or amount therof; provided, however, that in offenses involving damage
to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

[Sec. 2, RA 7691].
JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (RTC):
1.

In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

2.

In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000, or for civil actions in Metro
Manila where such value exceeds P50,000 except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the MeTC, MTC,
and MCTC;

3.

In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds P200,00,
or in Metro Manila where such demand or claim exceeds P400,00;

4.

In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds
P200,00 or probate mattes in Metro Manila where such value exceeds P400,000;

5.

In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

6.

In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
juridicial or quasi-judicial functions;

7.

In all civil actions and civil proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and

8.

In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and cost or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
P200,000, or in such other cases in Metro Manila where the demand, exclusive of the above-

mentioned items exceeds P400,000.


JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS (CA):
1.

Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

2.

Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs;

3.

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards
of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or omissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948;

4.

The CA shall have the power to receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve
factual issues raised in (a) cases falling within its original jurisdiction, such as actions for

annulment of judgments of RTCs, (b) cases falling within its appellate jurisdiction where a motion
for new trial based only on newly discovered evidence is granted by it.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT (SC):
1.

Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and other petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

2.

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
which shall be heard by the SC en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of the majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberation on the issues in the case and voted thereon;

3.

Cases on matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.

4. The Supreme Court has the power to:


(a) exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus;
(b) review, revise, reverse, modify, of affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulations is in question;
(2) all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto;
(3)

all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;

(4)

all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed in reclusive perpetua or higher;

(5)

all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

CLASSES OF JURISDICTION:

General power to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from the plenary
powers of the court.
Special or Limited restricts the courts jurisdiction only to particular cases and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by the governing law.

Original power of the court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the
first time under conditions provided by law.
Appellate authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower

court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review.

Exclusive power to adjudicate a case or proceeding to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage.
Concurrence/Confluent/Coordinate power conferred upon different courts, whether of the same or
different ranks, to take cognizance at the same stage of the same case in the same or different
judicial territories.