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United States v.

Ang Tang Ho
Facts:


Issue:

Held:

The Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn that authorizes the Governor General (GG),
during extraordinary circumstances, to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products.
Pursuant to this Act, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 that fixed the price at which rice should be
sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of
eighty centavos that was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. He was charged for violation of the
said EO.
He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine.
He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.

Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of
all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use.

The law did not provide the parameters of “extraordinary circumstances” that will be determined by the
Governor General and the “necessary rules and regulations” that will be issued.

The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of
the legislature.

S Supreme Court held that national security served as the sufficient standard of the assailed rule. Held: The U.Hirabayashi v United States Facts: The petitioner challenged the regulation establishing curfew hours for Niseis (American Citizens of Japanese ancestry). . there being no sufficient standard mentioned in the pertinent law to limit the delegate’s discretion. during World War I. He claimed that the rule was invalidly delegated legislative power. The proclamations themselves followed a standard authorized by the Executive Order for the necessity of protecting military resources in the designated areas against espionage and sabotage.

the Probation Act is applicable in that province and if it does not. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards with no standard or rule to guide them.People v. the provincial boards may thus be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act shall take effect in their respective provinces. For purposes of the Probation Act. This is virtual surrender of legislative power to them.  However the law does not lay down any rule or standard to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power. .  If the provincial board makes the appropriation. Vera FACTS  Supreme Court found the old Probation Act unconstitutional being violative of the equal protection clause and an invalid delegation of legislative power for lack of sufficient standard because it was made to depend upon an act to be done by the provincial board of the provinces to appropriate funds for the salary of a probation officer. the law is not applicable therein.

The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. President Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from province to province but the movement of carabeef as well Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo and was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit. . He argued that the authority provided by EO 626-A to confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. Intermediate Appellate court Facts:   There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626) and to strengthen the law. and in their own exclusive discretion. Held (in connection with sufficient standard):  The law provides that the seized property shall “be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit” (Emphasis supplied).  The reasonable guidelines and limitations of the officers are not specified and their options are apparently boundless.Ynot v. Then who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer. and even corruption.  The phrase “may see fit” can result to ambiguity and can be seen as an opportunity for partiality. abuse.

it was maintained Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President through Sec. Sec. and without the aforementioned standard. it is essential. filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities claiming that the EOs were unconstitutional because Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. with reasonable certainty. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present. Held:  No. 68 of the RAC. how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios.In this case. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution.THE PELAEZ CASE (EMMANUEL PELAEZ V. 68 of the RAC. cannot even create a barrio. enforcement or administration of a law. such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. without a statutory declaration of policy. AUDITOR GENERAL) Facts:  In 1964. although Sec. . Indeed. the Congress did not delegate the power to create municipalities to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC. Issue:  Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. as a taxpayer. carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. under this new law.  Pelaez argues: “If the President.  Further. to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers. that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed. . since barrios are units of municipalities?”  The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the President and municipalities are exempted from the inhibition and therefore the President can create a municipality and furthermore. there would be no means to determine. 68 lacked any such standard. President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part: The President may by executive order define the boundary xxx of any xxx municipality xxx and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require xxx  The then Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez. whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality. In the first place. what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” is properly interpreted as “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. .  The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is legislative in character not administrative and not executive.

A. Rewards and Incentives Fund. as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Declaration of Policy. subject to . that the rewards under this Act may also take the form of nonmonetary benefits.Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves  These tests were fully satisfied by R. distribution and release of the fund due to the agency as provided for in Sections 4 and 5 of this Act: Provided. with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act. – the Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions: (a) To prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation. Section 2. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets. to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year. (b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7. hereinafter referred to as the Fund.5%). – A rewards and Incentives Fund. Powers and Functions of the Board. 9335 (An Act To Improve The Revenue Collection Performance Of The Bureau Of Internal Revenue (BIR) And The Bureau Of Customs (BOC) Through The Creation Of A Rewards And Incentives Fund And Of A Revenue Performance Evaluation Board And For Other Purposes) as evident in Sections 2. No. Section 4. is hereby created. in the following percentages xxx Section 7. 4 and 7 thereof.

A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas 3 delegata non delegari potest . otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA). (2) indicating circumstance under which it is to be pursued and effected and. sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects. 2) The ERC was also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used. fixed and approved by the ERC. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA on the following grounds: 1 1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. but in conformity with. Held There is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC. 34 thereof. Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC. security and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and management meet the requirements for valid delegation. the amount is nevertheless made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. . These requirements are 4 5 denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test . in relation to Sec. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined. carried out or implemented by the delegate.Case # G-16 Gerochi v DOE (2007) Facts:  RA 9136.The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as the delegation of said power to any 2 executive or administrative agency like the Energy Regulatory Commission is unconstitutional for giving the same unlimited authority. The Court finds that the EPIRA. fixed and approved by the ERC. and the quality.generating entities A government agency that enforces power regulation promotes long-term consumer interests in terms of quality and reasonable pricing of a sustainable supply of electricity. 34 of the EPIRA. hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority. shall be imposed on all electricity end-users and did not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge. as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the Implementing Rules and Regulations. (3) specifies the public agency to apply. the standards prescribed by the law. and that it contains sufficient standards. It is intended to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority by (1) defining the legislative policy. reliability.Although Sec. 1 A tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self. 34 of the EPIRA only provided that within one (1) year from effectivity thereof. All that is required for the valid exercise of the power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to. is complete in all its essential terms and conditions. . a Universal Charge to be determined. 1st test . 3 What has been delegated cannot be delegated 2 4 5 Sets forth therein the policy to be executed.Provisions of the EPIRA such as. 2nd test . to ensure the total electrification of the country.

Case # G-17 Abakada Guro Party List. it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department. who must do it. 6 The exceptions are: (a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution. (d) delegation to local governments . (b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution. Before the law took effect the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. (c) delegation to the people at large . No discretion would be exercised by the President. they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. Article VI of the Constitution. Sec. Thus. In this case. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done. and what is the scope of his authority. it is not a delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. legislative. Exec. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. There was no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law and this is constitutionally permissible. considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. (e) delegation to administrative bodies . et al vs. The use of the word SHALL connote a mandatory order. Moreover. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. Ermita (2005) Facts:   The President signed Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2). or inherently and 6 exclusively. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly.

hereinafter referred to as the Fund. Rewards and Incentives Fund. Supreme Court also recognized the following as sufficient standards: (a) public interest. – A rewards and Incentives Fund.  Petitioners. and (d) simplicity. It provides a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets . regardless of employment status. 8 . (b) justice and equity. filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing the revenue 7 8 targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law through Sec. to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year.Case # G-18 ABAKADA GURO vs. is hereby created. as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). a tax reform legislation. invoking their right as taxpayers. 4 of the law. . PURISIMA (2008) FACTS:  Republic Act No. One of their contention is that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks sufficient standard on that matter. RA. Issue Whether or not RA. 9335 unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President Held Yes. economy and welfare 7 Declaration of Policy. It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service. (c) public convenience and welfare. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). 2 and Sec.

No. the construction and safety of race tracks.D. A sufficient standard is one which indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. and the security of racing.Case # G-19 Dagan vs PRC (2009) Facts:  Philippine Racing Commission issued a directive requiring Manila Jockey Club and Philippine Racing Club. It is the declared policy to promote and direct the accelerated development and continued growth of horse-racing not only in pursuance of the sports development program but also in order to insure the full exploitation of the sport as a source of revenue and employment. or transport horses from any locality or place except when accompanied by a certificate issued by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI). were removed from the actual day of race. Subsequently. 11 Specific Powers. 10 Declaration of Policy. MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners of racehorses stable in their establishments to submit the horses to blood sampling and administration of the Coggins Test to determine if they are infected. drive. firm or corporation to ship. The equine infectious anemia virus (EIAV) is categorized as a lentivirus: it contains genetic RNA material. the blood testing proceeded. Held: The court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom in issuing the contested guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with Philracom’s directive. including the framing and scheduling of races. 9 Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) is an infectious and potentially fatal viral disease of members of the horse family. there is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom. 9 Inc to come up with their Clubs’ House Rule to address the Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) problem and to rid their facilities of horses infected it. 11 Section 9 of the law fixes the standards and limitations to which Philracom must conform in the performance of its functions. 420. As to the supposed delegation by Philracom of its rule-making powers to MJCI and PRCI. Philracom issued copies of the guidelines for the monitoring and eradication of EIA. Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in 10 Section 1 of said law. Furthermore. whose owners refused to comply were banned from the races. prohibited from renewing their licenses or evicted from their stables. Issue: Whether or not Philracom had unconstitutionally delegated its rule-making power to PRCI and MJCI in issuing the directive for them to come up with club rules.  Said directive was issued pursuant to Administrative Order by the Department of Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person. It is valid only if the law is complete in itself and fixes a standard to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Compliance with the Philracom’s directive is part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI. The delegation made in the presidential decree is valid. its duty is not derived from the delegated authority of Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to them by Congress. Despite resistance from petitioners. PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they ordered the racehorse owners to submit blood samples and subject their race horses to blood testing. The horses. The Philracom directive is merely instructive in character. as the delegator and MJCI and PRCI as delegates. Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of horse racing. .  Thus. As proffered by MJCI. which it uses to produce DNA. Philracom’s authority is drawn from P.