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with Malicious User Suppression

Tingting Zhao and Yuping Zhao

State Key Laboratory of Advanced Optical Communication Systems and Networks

Peking University, Beijing, P.R. China

Email: tingtingzhaopku@gmail.com, yuping.zhao@pku.edu.cn

AbstractSpectrum detection for vacant bands is one of the

key techniques in cognitive radio (CR) systems. Cooperative

detection outperforms single user detection in many aspects.

The existence of malicious user could severely degrade the

performance of cooperative CR systems. In this paper, a new

cooperative detection scheme with malicious user suppression is

proposed, which has lower complexity and better performance

compared with the existing one. Simulation results show that

when 25% users in the system are malicious, our proposed

method can introduce more improvement of missed detection

probability by nearly 20%.

I. I NTRODUCTION

The increasing demand for scarce spectrum resource is one

of the main problems in wireless communications. Actually,

according to the report by the Spectrum Policy Task Force

within Federal Communications Commission (FCC) [1], many

bands are underutilized due to the spectrum allocation scheme

based on authorization. In 1999, J. Mitola proposed cognitive

radio (CR) technology [2], which introduced a completely

new way to improve spectrum efficiency. In a CR network,

unlicensed users, i.e., secondary users (SUs), detect spectrum

environment and utilize the spectrum vacancy while tolerable

interference is guaranteed to the licensed user, i.e., primary

user (PU).

If SUs are lack of knowledge about the characteristics of

PU signal, energy detection is the optimal choice with the least

complexity [3] and generally adopted in recent research work.

However, the performance of energy detection is always degraded because of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) wall or channel

fading/shadowing [4], [5]. To increase the detection reliability,

cooperative technique has been proposed to perform among

multiple SUs [6], [7]. In a cooperative system, multiple SUs

separately detect the spectrum state and give their detection

results to the central user (CU) through a control channel.

Generally, if bandwidth of the control channel allows only one

bit, the detection information is hard decision result indicating

whether the observed band is vacant; if the bandwidth is wider,

soft information, which is always quantized energy value,

is transmitted. The detection results are fused by CU. For

soft information, equal gain combining (EGC) is the simplest

method and weighted combining (WC) is more complex with

better performance [8].

In some cases, malicious users possibly exist in cooperative

detection system [9]. Because of malfunction or out of greed,

these users would transmit false information instead of real

CU. In simple condition, malicious users would continuously

transmit extreme values indicating always Yes or always

No. The information of always Yes will increase the false

alarm probability and that of always No will deteriorate the

missed detection probability. In [10], an effective WC method

was proposed to suppress the impact of false information.

This paper proposes a new cooperative detection technique

to alleviate the influence caused by malicious users. Local

decision results instead of detected energy are fused using

WC for global decision. Weighted coefficients are updated

recursively according to the deviations between separate decision information and the combining result, which avoids

the calculation of mean and standard deviation in the existing method [10]. Additionally, closed-form solution to local

threshold is given and the global threshold is fixed, which

relatively decreases the complexity. Through theoretical analysis and simulations, we prove that the proposed method

outperforms the existing one when the ratio of malicious users

increases.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II

introduces system model and the existing cooperative detection

method with malicious user suppression. In Section III, the

proposed cooperative detection scheme is described in detail

and the theoretical performance comparison with the existing

one is given. Simulation results and analysis are illustrated in

Section IV, and finally, a conclusion is given in Section V.

II. S YSTEM D ESCRIPTION

We discuss a CR network composed of one CU and N SUs,

denoted by SUi , i = 1, 2, . . . , N . There is one PU occupying

the observed band with a certain probability. Channels between

PU and SUs are assumed to be independent and identically

distributed (i.i.d.). The control channel between SU and CU

is regarded as error-free and can support m-bit (m > 1)

detection information. In addition, we suppose that there

are M (M N ) malicious users in the system. Without

loss of generality, SUi , i = 1, 2, . . . , M , are assumed to be

malicious and continuously provide false information with

extreme values. The state of the observed band indicated by

the false information is always opposite to the truth.

The detection for PU signal is a binary hypothesis testing

problem. The hypotheses of absence and presence of PU

signal, denoted by H0 and H1 , have equal probabilities, i.e.,

This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2009 proceedings

instant k is expressed as follows:

H0 : Yi (k) = ni (k)

(1)

H1 : Yi (k) = hi (k)S(k) + ni (k)

where ni (k) is white Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance n2 ; S(k) is the signal transmitted by PU with variance

s2 ; hi (k) denotes channel fading from PU to SUi , keeping

unchanged during at least one detection interval. The instant

values of hi (k) for SUs are different, but the average channel

gains are assumed to be equal as E[h2i (k)] = h2 . The average

SNR for any SUi is i = = h2 s2 /n2 , i = 1, 2, . . . , N .

When the feature of S(k) is unknown, the SUs perform

energy detection independently. With window width L, the

detected energy from the pth detection of SUi is denoted as

Xp,i =

pL

|Yi (k)|2

(2)

k=(p1)L+1

for Xp,i under H0 is central chi-square distributed and that

under H1 is non-central chi-square distributed [11]. According to the Central Limit theorem, P (Xp,i |Hl ) approximately

follows Gaussian distribution N (l , l2 ) if L is large enough.

Values of l and l2 under hypotheses H0 and H1 can be

expressed as [11]

0 = Ln2

(3)

H0 :

02 = 2Ln4

and

H1 :

1 = L(1 + )n2

12 = 2L(1 + 2

)n4

(4)

quantization of Xp,i , is calculated and transmitted to CU. CU

combines Zp,i from N SUs to get the combining result Zp .

The simplest fusion scheme is EGC, expressed as

1

Zp =

N

N

Zp,i

(5)

i=1

N

1

Zp =

wp,i Zp,i

N i=1

(6)

the principle of enhancing the contribution of highly reliable

SU and suppressing that of SU with low credibility.

p is given by comparing Zp with

At last, the final decision H

the global threshold 1 :

H0 , if Zp < 1

p =

(7)

H

H1 , if Zp 1

Based on Neyman-Pearson criteria, the setting of threshold

aims to minimize missed detection probability Pm while

satisfying the system requirement of false alarm probability,

which is denoted as Pf [5].

WC is used to reduce the negative impacts of malicious

SUs. No closed-form solution to threshold 1 is given, so

Monte Carlo simulation is needed. Moreover, as its weighted

coefficients wp,i are based on the energy deviations in distribution from the underlying distribution, the mean and standard

deviation for N energy values are needed for each combining,

which also increases the computational complexity.

III. P ROPOSED A LGORITHM D ESCRIPTION

In the proposed algorithm, each SU performs local decision

by comparing the detected energy Xp,i with a local threshold

0 . The m-bit quantized relative energy (i.e. Xp,i 0 ),

instead of quantized energy, is used as soft information Zp,i .

Its sign is regarded as hard decision result and its absolute

value is defined as decision credibility. WC algorithm is used

to combine Zp,i at CU with proper weighted coefficients to

nullify the false information from malicious SUs. Finally, the

combining result Zp is used for final decision with 0 fixed as

global threshold.

A. Weighted Coefficients

In system with malicious users, weighted coefficients are

helpful in nullifying the effect of false information in order

to enhance the reliability of global decision. In this paper, the

updating of weighted coefficients is related with the credibility

of each SUs detection information.

Here, we define factor Cp,i to evaluate the loss of reliability

at the pth detection for SUi , i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The value of Cp,i

ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents no loss of credibility

and 1 means completely unreliable. The function of Cp,i ,

denoted as wp,i = (Cp,i ), is used as weighted coefficient

for Zp,i . Then the combining result from WC is

N

1

(Cp,i )Zp,i

Zp =

N i=1

(8)

function of C (C, w [0, 1]) to assign larger weighing (wp,i

is closer to 1) to SU with higher credibility (Cp,i is closer to

0). In this paper, a raised-cosine function with roll-off factor

is recommended:

1

if 0 C < 1

1+

(C 12 )

if 1

C

<

w = (C) = 21 1sin

2

2

1+

0

if 2 C 1

(9)

By adjusting the value of , the roll-off property of raisedcosine function can be controlled, leading to a flexible suppression effect.

Using Zp as a reference value, we define the normalized

deviation for Zp,i as

p,i =

|p,i |

max{|p,i |}

i

(10)

This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2009 proceedings

i

|p,i | over all possible i, i = 1, 2, ..., N . Then the recursive

updating process for Cp,i can be expressed as

Cp,i = Cp1,i + (1

)p,i

(11)

where [0, 1] is the forgetting factor and its value is a tradeoff between accuracy and convergence speed. With initialization as C0,i = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N , factors Cp,i finally converge

to different stable values. With = 0.5 and = 0.95, the

updating processes of Cp,i and wp,i for one malicious user

and one law-abiding user are illustrated in Fig. 1. For the

malicious user, which provides false information continuously

during the observation time, the corresponding Cp,i gradually

grows to 1 and wp,i approaches 0; for the law-abiding user,

its Cp,i converges to a small value and wp,i remains 1. The

recursive updating of Cp,i can enhance the contribution of SUs

with better channel condition while suppressing the effects

of those with bad channel condition or continuous malicious

motivation in the observation duration.

1

0.6

0.4

0.6

0.4

0.2

100

200

300

400

100

200

300

400

Fig. 1. The updating processes of Cp,i and wp,i for one malicious user and

one law-abiding user.

relies on the deviation of detection results rather than the

deviation of their distribution as in [10], which can avoid

the calculation of mean and standard deviation for each

combining. Therefore, our proposed WC method has relatively

lower complexity than the existing one.

B. Threshold and Performance

If the effect of quantization is neglected, Zp,i follows

Gaussian distribution with central offset 0 and equal variance

compared with N (l , l2 ), l {0, 1}:

P (Zp,i |H0 ) N (0 0 , 02 )

(12)

P (Zp,i |H1 ) N (1 0 , 12 )

where l and l2 are expressed as (3) and (4).

We suppose that Zp,i from N SUs are independent. If WC

is used to combine them, the distribution of Zp is

N

N

2 2

wp,i , N02

wp,i

P (Zp |H0 ) N 0N 0

i=1

i=1

(13)

N

N

12 2

1 0

P (Zp |H1 ) N

w

,

w

2

p,i

p,i

N

N

i=1

i=1

i=1

2

+

as Q(x) = 12 x et /2 dt. For ease, we define

N

wp,i

Wp =
i=1

N

2

wp,i

i=1

simplified as

( )W

0

0

p

(14)

Pf (0 ) = P (Zp > 0|H0 ) = Q

0

(15)

system requirement Pf can be expressed as

2L

2

0 = n

Q1 (Pf ) + L

(16)

Wp

0.2

N

wp,i

0

0 i=1

,

Pf (0 ) = P (Zp > 0|H0 ) = Q

0

N

2

wp,i

( )W

0

1

p

Pm (0 ) = P (Zp < 0|H1 ) = 1 Q

1

0.8

weighted coefficient wp,i

factor Cp,i

0.8

the system can be expressed as

depends on the value of Wp at CU, which may introduce

time delay or bandwidth overhead for information transmission

from CU to multiple SUs. In ideal condition, the value of wp,i

for a malicious user is 0 while that for a law-abiding user is

1, then we can derive

1

N M

=

.

Wp =

N M

N 1 M/N

When the ratio of malicious users is sufficiently small, i.e.,

M

1 , so the threshold in (16) can

0

N 0, Wp is close to

N

be approximated into

2L

2

Q1 (Pf )+ L

(17)

0 n

N

This approximate threshold is independent of Wp , which leads

to relatively lower complexity compared with that in (16).

Then, we can get the false alarm probability from (14) and

(3) as

W

p

(18)

Pf (0 ) = Q Q1 (Pf )

N

and the missed detection probability from (15) and (4) as

Wp

LN

Q (Pf )

Pm (0 ) = 1 Q

2

N 1 + 2

(19)

This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2009 proceedings

is fused at CU and the global threshold 1 is obtained

through Monte Carlo simulation. In this paper, a closed-form

solution to 1 for the existing method is also given based

on the required Pf . Neglecting the effect of quantization,

the distribution of Zp,i is the same as that of Xp,i , so Zp

is distributed as

N

N

2 2

wp,i , N02

wp,i

P (Zp |H0 ) N N0

i=1

i=1

.

N

N

12 2

1

P (Zp |H1 ) N N

wp,i , N 2

wp,i

i=1

If

Pf

i=1

is satisfied, i.e.,

1

Pf (1 ) = P (Zp > 1 |H0 ) = Q

0

N

02

N2

N

i=1

N

i=1

wp,i

= Pf

2

wp,i

(20)

we can deduce

N

N

2

n

2 Q1 (P ) + L

1 =

2L

wp,i

w

p,i

f

N

i=1

i=1

expressed as

Pm (1 ) = P (Zp

< 1 |H1 )

1

L

1

= 1 Q 1+2 Q (Pf ) 2 Wp

According to Cauchy inequality,

N

i=1

(21)

wp,i

N

i=1

2 is

wp,i

decreasing characteristic of Q(x), we can get

1

LN

1

Q

(P

)

Pm (1 ) 1 Q 1+2

f

2

W

LN

1

1

1 Q Np 1+2

Q

(P

)

f

2

(22)

Comparing (19) with (22), we conclude that the proposed

method has lower Pm than the existing one. In the same way,

we can find that the gain obtained on Pm also introduces some

performance loss in terms of Pf , which is deduced from (18)

and (20). However, if the ratio of malicious users is sufficiently

small (i.e., M N ), Pm and Pf for the two algorithms will

be approximately the same.

IV. S IMULATION R ESULT

A. Simulation Environment

We consider a CR network with one CU as well as N = 40

SUs, among which M SUs are malicious. There exists a PU,

possibly transmitting random BPSK signals with power s2 = 1.

Channels between PU and SUs obey i.i.d. Rayleigh fading1

1 The

different SUs are equal and range from -16 dB to -4 dB. Lawabiding SUs perform energy detection as (2) with window

width L = 40 and provide real detection information, which

can be quantized energy or local decision results. Malicious

SUs continuously transmit false information with extreme

values. The maximum false alarm probability allowed in the

system is Pf = 1%. The detected energy Xp,i is up bounded

by 1 + 41 (the overflow probability P (Xp,i > 1 + 41 ) is

less than 3.2 105 ) and uniformly quantized with m = 8

bits. Empirically, the roll-off factor in (9) is set as 0.5 and

the forgetting factor in (11) is set as 0.95.

probability Pm and false alarm probability Pf under the given

average SNR and number of malicious users, obtained from

10000 rounds of detection. Three algorithms compared in

the simulation are EGC method based on quantized energy,

existing WC method based on quantized energy given in [10]

and the proposed WC method based on local decision results.

Firstly, we suppose that there are only M = 2 malicious

users in the system. Comparisons of Pm and Pf are depicted in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. In both figures, the first curve

depicts system performance in the ideal condition (i.e. no

malicious user) and the second curve is for the condition

when 2 malicious users exist. We can see that the presence of

malicious users significantly degrades Pm and Pf . The third

and fourth curves show that both of the existing and proposed

WC algorithms can suppress false information significantly

and improve system performance to be close to the ideal

condition. The simulation results agree with the conclusion

in Section III, i.e., the performance of the two WC algorithms

is nearly the same when M N .

When the average SNR is fixed as -8 dB, comparisons of

Pm and Pf for different algorithms with various ratios of

malicious SUs are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. From the first

curve in both figures, we can see that system performance

degrades rapidly with the increasing ratio of malicious SUs.

According to (21),(19) and (20),(18), the theoretical curves

for Pm and Pf are given as the second and third curves. The

corresponding simulation results are shown as the scatterplots

in the figures. Compared with the ideal condition without

malicious user, Pm is reduced by nearly 80% and Pf by more

than 95% when the ratio of malicious users is up to 25%.

If WC algorithms with malicious user suppression are used,

performance deterioration can be effectively compensated.

With little loss in Pf , the proposed method can achieve more

gains in Pm compared with the existing one, especially when

the ratio of malicious users is large, which is coincident

with the analysis in Section III. For instance, when 25%

SUs in the system are malicious, the proposed method can

reduce Pm more by 20%, as shown in Fig. 4. From both

theoretical curves and simulated curves, we can see that the

difference between two WC algorithms becomes more obvious

100

100

90

90

80

80

70

70

60

60

Pm (%)

Pm (%)

50

40

40

30

30

20

10

0

-16

Fig. 2.

20

2 malicious SUs, no suppression

existing WC with suppression

proposed WC with suppression

-14

-12

-10

average SNR (dB)

10

-8

-6

-4

50

40

Pf (%)

60

25

40

15

30

10

20

10

Fig. 3.

0.25

-8

-6

-4

condition M N can not be satisfied any more.

V. C ONCLUSION

In this paper, a new cooperative detection technique for

malicious user suppression in CR systems is proposed. In our

method, local decision is made by each SU and the detection

results are combined with WC method at CU based on their

reliabilities. Theoretical analysis and simulation results verify

that, compared with the existing method, the proposed scheme

performs better in terms of missed detection probability with

a negligible loss in false alarm probability. Moreover, the

complexity of the proposed method is lower than the existing

one.

R EFERENCES

[1] FCC, Notice of proposed rule making and order, ET Rocket No. 03222, Dec. 2003.

[2] J. M. III and G. M. Jr., Cognitive radio: making software radios more

personal, IEEE Personal Communications, vol. 6, pp. 1318, Aug.

1999.

[3] A. Sahai, N. Hoven, and R. Tandra, Some fundamental limits on

cognitive radio, in Allerton Conference on Communication, Control,

and Computing, Oct. 2004, pp. 131136.

[4] D. Cabric, S. Mishra, and R. Brodersen, Implementation issues in

spectrum sensing for cognitive radios, in The Thirty-Eighth Asilomar

Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, Nov. 2004, pp. 772

776.

Fig. 5.

no suppression

existing WC in theory

proposed WC in theory

existing WC in simulation

proposed WC in simulation

50

20

-10

average SNR (dB)

0.2

80

70

-12

0.1

0.15

ratio of malicious SUs

90

30

-14

0.05

100

35

0

-16

2 malicious SUs, no suppression

existing WC with suppression

proposed WC with suppression

45

Pf (%)

no suppression

existing WC in theory

proposed WC in theory

existing WC in simulation

proposed WC in simulation

50

0.05

0.1

0.15

ratio of malicious SUs

0.2

0.25

detection for cognitive radio, in IEEE Global Telecommunications

Conference, GLOBECOM, Nov. 2007, pp. 29722976.

[6] E. Visotsky, S. Kuffner, and R. Peterson, On collaborative detection of

tv transmissions in support of dynamic spectrum sharing, in First IEEE

Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks,

Nov. 2005, pp. 338345.

[7] A. Ghasemi and E. Sousa, Collaborative spectrum sensing for opportunistic access in fading environments, in First IEEE Symposium on

New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, Nov. 2005, pp.

131136.

[8] J. Ma and Y. Li, Soft combination and detection for cooperative

spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks, in IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM, Nov. 2007, pp. 31393143.

[9] S. Mishra, A. Sahai, and R. Brodersen, Cooperative sensing among

cognitive radios, in IEEE International Conference on Communications,

ICC, Jun. 2006, pp. 16581663.

[10] P. Kaligineedi, M. Khabbazian, and E. Bhargava, Secure cooperative

sensing techniques for cognitive radio systems, in IEEE International

Conference on Communications, ICC, May 2008, pp. 34063410.

[11] Z. Quan, S. Cui, and A. Sayed, Optimal linear cooperation for spectrum

sensing in cognitive radio networks, IEEE Journal of Selected Topics

in Signal Processing, vol. 2, pp. 2840, Feb. 2008.

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