MINIMAL CONTACTS necessary Case: Parties: International Shoe Co. v. Washington Appellant (defendant) - International Shoe Co.

Appellee (plaintiff) - Washington Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Procedural History:

Facts: Appellant principle location in St. Louis, Missouri, incorporated in Delaware. They had 13 salesmen in Washington, working for them. However, the salesmen had limited responsibilities and powers. They were no allowed to enter into a contract on behalf of the corporation. The salesmen showed the shoes for sale, and if someone wanted to make a purchase, they would carry out the transaction directly with the headquarters in Missouri, and the appellants would ship the merchandise F.O.B. (once it leaves vendor's warehouse, it becomes property of the buyer). Salesmen were paid commissions. Washington State attempted to collect unemployment compensation from the Missouri-based corporation, and they served one of the salesmen in Washington and mailed a notice via registered mail to the corporation last known address in St. Louis. Appellant moved to set aside the notice and order on the grounds that they are not a corporation of Washington, do not do their business in Washington, and nor do they have employees in Washington which could be served. Issue: Within the limitations of the due process clause of the 14 th Amendment, does the a corporation of Delaware, whose main business location is Missouri, subject itself to proceedings in Washington if they have business activities in that state, and therefore, does Washington have a right to collect unemployment contributions reserved for businesses in that state? Judgment: Affirmed for plaintiff (Washington) Holding: To have specific jurisdiction in a state, a defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" The salesman working with the corporation inside Washington State were sufficient as minimum contacts. The maintenance of the suit did not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,' since the corporation' s business dealings in Washington were very systematic, over a period of several years. They resulted "in a large volume of interstate commerce," and in which time the appellant received the benefits and protections of the state in which they were conducting business. They established sufficient contacts with the state that it is fair and just to have jurisdiction.