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1- What is competition like in the minicar segment of the European automobile industry? What do we learn about the nature and strength of the competitive pressures Toyota Motor Europe (TME) faces from doing a five-forces analysis?
For Toyota Motor Europe (TME), locally designed cars and the availability of diesel engines provided impressive oppurtunuties in the European Car Market; Sales grew by almost ,50% from 2000 to 2005 and the operating profit increased nine-fold to $654 million in 2003. After plant openings in France, Turkey, Poland and the Czech Republic, local production was expected to reach 60% in 2006 thanks to lowered exposure on the exchange rates and import tariffs. However in the minicar segment Toyota's Aygo minicar was to face the challenge of finding 100,000 buyers annually . This segment was seen as a difficult market: low prices meant low margins. Mercedes-Benz's "MCC smart" recorded losses of €4 billion between 2000 and 2005. As shown on the following table ,Toyota Aygo ,Peugoet107 and Citroen C1 ,as JV Partners , could only get % 6 of the Europen Minicar segment of app.1 Mio cars.
Brand, Model Name Aygo Toyota Peugeot 107 Citroen CI BMW Mini Chevrolet Matiz Daewoo Matiz Citroen Saxo Fiat Panda Hyundai Atos Kia Picanto MCC smart Mercedes AClass Opel/Vauxhall Agila Peugeot 106 Renault Twingo VWFox 2001 0 0 0 24,98 0 91,476 243,962 101,924 60,606 0 115 165,915 86,236 109,244 168,358 0 2002 0 0 0 144,119 0 72,232 164,477 117,959 40^30 0 120 151,646 79,218 67,764 143,441 0 2003 0 0 0 176,465 0 59,176 71,478 131,677 19,679 0 123 132,911 74,518 38,656 116,472 0 2004 0 0 0 184,357 22,066 36,528 1,737 224,055 37,186 58,135 152 125,95 55,237 1,919 85,58 0 2005 21,224 19,552 17,73 200,428 53,247 1,879 19 228,106 37,45 83,076 125 172,539 37,143 11 76,853 50,862
Five Force Analysis:
The Degree of Rivalry : The intensity of rivalry is strong because of major players are dominant in the market by
nearly same technology and manufacturing processes, suppliers relationship and distribution systems.The intensity of rivalry, which is the most obvious of the five forces in an industry, helped Toyota to determine the value added to be accounted for in this fierce competition. In terms of “value-added” in the car Industry ; manufacturing , purchasing and R&D accounted for around 70% and Marketing and Distribution 30% .Competition , while important, was only one of several forces that determined the industry attractiveness in Toyota case.The possible threat subsititude products in the minicar segment cars of European Manufacturers and existing power of suppliers and buyers in the market gave grounds to set up a JV for Toyota,Peugoet and Citroen Groups. The Threat of Entry: Both potential and existing competitors influenced average industry profitability. The threat of new entrants is low due to huge capital and cutting-edge technology. Entrants was usually based on the market entry barriers as such that EU Regulations obliged Car Makers to improve reduction of carbon dioxide (C02) emissions to 140 grams per kilometer by the year 2008by 2008. Thanks to high-tech Toyota Production System ,Toyota could easily eliminate the market barrier entrance. Economies of scale: The benefits associated with bulk purchasing were advantageous. Cost of entry: The investment into technology was shared by the JV Partners. Distribution channels: Seperate distribution channels provided competitors. easy access for
Cost advantages :Toyota was good at Manufacturing and technology while PSA was was famouse for its cost management systems. The Threat of Subsitutes: Substitutes are moderately strong due to different and less-expensive transportation facilities. As per the agreement between JV Partners , 93% parts commonality between Toyota,Peugoet and Citroen brands provided cost advantageous in terms of Suppliers,Transportation,Technical Support and resulted in positive price/performance ratio in different types of products or services . The threat of substitution would also be affected by switching costs – ie; the costs in areas such as retraining, retooling and redesigning based on customers switches to a different type of product or service. Buyer Power: Buyers were weak due to low demand for non-consumer goods (automobile) and high switching costs; moreover, buyers were not able to backward integrate. Buyer power is one of the two horizontal forces that influence the appropriation of the value created by an industry with reference too the diagram above. The most important determinants of buyer power in Toyota case were the size and the composition of customers. Generation Y was definitely attractive size wise, but reaching them would require many changes to the existing ways of doing things for the Generation X. Given the challenge of entering a new segment, there were different approaches for launching the Aygo in Europe. These cars were to be demonstrated at many European car shows and to be supported by marketing material and appropriate lounching approaches. The buyers were to be informed about features of the new cars ,the technology used,compliance to green rules,fuel savings, mobility concept such as special rates at parking garages etc in order to attract them as potential buyer .This,of course,required high marketing budget. Supplier Power: Suppliers were not seemed to be so strong as they were spread all over the world and
cannot easily forward integrate. Although TPCA was directly dealing with around 150 Tier1 suppliers who were the big suppliers at the top of the hierarchy ,many of them were the Czech or Slovak subsidiaries of the big international suppliers. To realize the TPCA’s objective to produce a minicar with 93% common parts between the Toyota, Peugeot and Citroen cars, the JV required reliable Supplier network since high level of synergy was expected. For Toyota, this was a completely new segment. Being the fact that Supplier Power is a mirror image of the Buyer Power , analysis indicated that the market was characterized by resonable supplier power and at the same time by low buyer power of Generation Y. Suppliers bargaining power existed in the following situations: The switching costs are high from one ar to another(except in Sweden where leasingof cars were favorible); High power of brands (Fiat Panda,BMW Mini,Mercedes A..)
2- What are the terms of the strategic alliance between Toyota and PSA? What is your evaluation of the structure of the deal between the two companies?
The deal between Toyota and PSA was a stargetic alliance which was concluded as follows: -The factory was to be established in Kolin of Czech Republic. -As per the deal two-thirds of the new factory costs development cost was shared . were paid by PSA and the
-PSA would absorb 200,000 units annually and Toyota 100,000. -Toyota would be responsible for running the factory (according to the Toyota Production System [TPS]) and would be responsible for the development of the three vehicles to be produced at the factory (including the Peugeot 107 and Citroen CI). This helped greatly to build in the 93% parts commonality between the different brands. -In return, PSA would handle all purchasing and supplier relations including their selection. - Each partner would also bring one engine to the venture with the right [size] specification. - Toyota would produce a 3-cylinder gasoline engine (also to be used in the bigger Toyota Yaris model) and PSA would bring a 4-cylinder diesel engine (also used in the Peugeot 206, Citroen C2 and C3). Engines were among the most expensive components of a car, averaging at around 32% of total vehicle cost.14 In my opinion both JV Partners gained mutual benefits from each other and created synergy resulting effectiveness and productivity. Toyota was hoping to benefit from PSA's experience with European suppliers.PSA enjoyed low manufacturing cost and effeciency from the Factory operations.
3- Why did Toyota & PSA opt for a Minicar Joint Venture? Would either be better off alone?
The objective was to produce a minicar with 93% common parts between the Toyota, Peugeot and Citroen cars. For Toyota, this was a completely new segment. Peugeot's aim was to produce the replacement model for Peugeot 106 and and Citroen Group aimed to lounch a replacement model for Citroen Saxo. Peugeot 106 was on sale between 1991 and 2004 and Citroen Saxo between 1997 and 2003.Both sold a total of 2.8 million units over that period. Until the Kolin factory opened in mid-2005, PSA did not
have a replacement for the Peugeot 106 and the Citroen Saxo. Toyota’s objective was 15% share by 2010 globally and to realize this target ,continued growth in Europe was essential. In 2005 Toyota sales in Europe reached 900.000 cars ,and Toyota announced its its sales goal as 1.2 million units annually in Europe by 2010 . Toyota was known for its deciveness to achive its goals.That is why commitment to buy from the TPCA Plant 100.000 Toyota minicars was made when the JV agreement to set up Manufacturing facility was signed.Since the alliance was limited to manufacturing and the sales and distribution channels were seperated ,both JV Partners kept their marketing stragies as is,but cooperated to supply market with high demanded minicar models as per the deal. There was a need to cooperate and win synergy with each other rather than staying alone in order to reduce cost from PSA viewpoint and increase sales turnover by producing minicars from Toyata point of view.
4- What are the respective capabilities of Toyota and PSA? What does PSA have that Toyota does not? What does Toyota have that PSA needs?
In the five years up to 2005, PSA increased its European share from 12% to 14% in 2005 and remained Europe's second biggest manufacturer (after the VW Group). PSA was praised for its good vehicle designs, diesel engines, clever advertising and excellent cost position in manufacturing, but it was disappointed by the results of quality surveys. Within the automotive industry, PSA was also known for thedeals with various JV’s; diesel engines with Ford, gasoline engines with Renault and BMW, commercial trucks with Fiat and SUVs with Mitsubishi. In TPCA joint venture;thanks to its cost focus reputation ,PSA's capability was to manage all purchasing functions including developing the local supply infrastructure, which accounted for 80% of all parts purchased (by value and volume). PSA was involved also in the manufacturing process. Toyota is an excellent reference in the industry in the field of simplicity and economic efficiency.Toyota is a relationship-oriented company in terms of relations with suppliers. Toyota would be responsible for running the factory (according to the Toyota Production System [TPS]) and would be responsible for the development of the three vehicles to be produced at the factory (including the Peugeot 107 and Citroen CI). This helped greatly to build in the 93% parts commonality between the different brands. Toyota was hoping to benefit from PSA's experience with European suppliers. Each partner would also bring one engine to the venture with the right [size] specification.
5- Why Kolin in the Czech Republic?
Kolin was only 60 km from the home town of Skoda Auto (member of the VW Group) and close to many suppliers.In many ways, the Kolin plant was is a typical Toyota factory. The principles of efficient production that Toyota has established over the years are practiced in full at TPCA, including kaizen (continuous improvement), jidoka (fixing problems right away, where they occur), and just-in-time delivery. Much of this can be attributed to Satoshi Takae. Takae was a Toyota veteran who started in Kolin as factory manager and was promoted to president of TPCA in 2005. His goal for the factory was very clear: "To be the number one plant in Europe." In order to realize this, he had to work together with not only his 30 expatriate colleagues from Toyota, but also with nine permanent members of staff from PSA. For Takae, this meant exposing the Toyota Way, the "mysterious" Toyota DNA to outsiders. At the same time, this working arrangement implied transferring control of suppliers to PSA. Competent Leadership, engaged employees and reliance to the Toyota Production system were a.o. the main determining criteria.
6- How does the alliance create value for each partner?
Major added-value was the fact that Toyota would benefit from PSA's experience with European suppliers. Each partner would also bring one engine to the venture with the right [size] specification. Toyota would produce a 3-cylinder gasoline engine (also to be used in the bigger Toyota Yaris model) and PSA would bring a 4-cylinder diesel engine (also used in the Peugeot 206, Citroen C2 and C3). Engines were among the most expensive components of a car, averaging at around 32% of total vehicle cost. PSA and Toyota gained added value from TPCA project based on the added value of 69% from supply and assembly processes such as ; purchasing,production.research & development and 31% from marketing and distribution processes mainly; sales and marketing,price to the consumer. Besides the competence,learning and manufacturing processes development cost was shared by PSA and Toyota ; two-thirds and one-third of the new factory in Kolin by PSA and Toyota respectively. PSA would buy 200,000 units annually and Toyota 100.000. Toyota would be responsible for running the factory (according to the Toyota Production System [TPS]) and would be responsible for the development of the three vehicles to be produced at the factory (including the Peugeot 107 and Citroen CI). This helped greatly to build in the 93% parts commonality between the different brands. In return, PSA would handle all purchasing and supplier relations including their selection.
7- How do Toyota and PSA limit potential threats to the alliance – specifically, adverse selection, moral hazard, and holdup?
PEST analysis point of view JV Partners agreed to create synergy and to get benefit from the alliance.On the one hand Europe 2nd bigger car maker PSA and on the other hand Toyota . a global brand name in the Automotive sector signed an JV Manufaturing agreement with clear responsibilities and focus on the selection of appropriate market and segments. A total of Euro 1.3 Billion investment requires to have well in advance information about Political stability and government regulations about taxes and tariffs. Establisment and maintenance of good relationship with the government and official bodies is a must to ensure long-term profit as a result of the invested capital. Economical factors are more related with automobile industry because of consumers' purchasing power and per capital income in particular country related with demand and supply. Moreover, the Social factors influence consumers buying behavior and lifestyle. Technological factors are the major factors for this industry as it is highly depending on innovative technology and knowledge-based. Technological changes have contributed much more on industry's growth. Withregards to adverse selection , JV Partners have an equilibrium balanced responsibilites as per the JV agreement where responsibilities and accountabilities were clearly stipulated ;such as: • PSA is responsible for all purchasing functions including developing the local supply infrastructure and selection of Suppliers, which accounted for 80% of all parts purchased (by value and volume). • PSA was involved also in the manufacturing process. • Toyota is responsible for running the factory (according to the Toyota Production System [TPS]) and would be responsible for the development of the three vehicles to be produced at the factory (including the Peugeot 107 and Citroen CI). This helped greatly to build in the 93% parts commonality between the different brands. • Toyota expects to benefit from PSA's experience with European suppliers. • Each partner would also bring one engine to the venture with the right [size] specification. Moral hazard is also a critical matter to be addressed by the JV Partners.Both parties are aware of their competence and skills:Toyota has got a global brand name,
economies of scale, and highly skilled engineers and TPS technology.PSA is good at vehicle designs, diesel engines, clever advertising and excellent cost position in manufacturing.Both also know each others shortcomings: Toyota has to depend on USA market for total sales and less market shares on other markets.PSA has suffered from quality related aspects. Related to Holdups , PSA and Toyota has to deal with cultural and language barriers as there are three national cultures ;Japanese, French and Czech and two company cultures with very different histories and production systems. Parties agreed on one principle to which will override cultural difficulties:cost reduction will be the principle to overcome language barriers. TPCA had a systematic meeting structure in order to minimize miscommunications and Managers at TPCA had to represent the interests of both TPCA and their employers. Daily Production Meeting : This meeting took place every morning at 8:30. At this meeting, most managers were present in order to discuss quality, absenteeism and announce major decisions. • Project Leaders Meeting : Managers from both companies originally met on a monthly basis and then only once a quarter. These meetings were attended by 10 to 20 managers from PSA and around 30 to 40 from Toyota. • Steering Committee :TPCA's highest decision-making committee: Critical decisions were discussed here. There were five members from each side including Takae and Guibert. The meetings took place either at Toyota's HQ in Tokyo or PSA's HQ in Paris. This committee met twice a year. Within TPCA there were a few things that were off-limits to managers from the parent companies, as they were protected by patents or seen as proprietary. •
8- Will the alliance lead to a sustained competitive advantage? Why or why not?
In early 2006 Aygo was doing extremely well on the forecasted resale values of the major leasing companies. This limited the risk Toyota had to take when financing the cars. The launch was widely seen as successful and Toyota won the coveted "best media strategy award" in Germany. This was the trophy everyone wanted to have, but for managers at Toyota in Europe in 2006, the question was, how to keep up the momentum? The answer would be YES because of the fact that Eastern European automobile market,being an emerging market, offers much room to grow as compared to countries belonging to the European Union .On the otherhand ,due to the fact that much more attention has been paid to the environment regulations in the coming years minicar segmented cars with less CO2 emission rate per km would likely to be prefered by the potential buyers.This would result in the increase of new car demand as older cars are scrapped. As a result, Central and Eastern Europe will be vital for Toyota to provide golden oppurtunuty to achieve its goal of selling 1.2 million units a year in Europe by 2010. TPCA has established competitive advantage at its Kolin Production Center thorough manufacturing operations that allowed the two global carmakers to combine their knowledge of product design, styling, production and supplier relationships, while learning from each other’s corporate cultures, technologies and processes, as there seems to be very good teamwork and cooperation between Toyota and PSA. Toyota learns from PSA mostly about purchasing issues, supplier relationships,both from a European and a general point of view, and even about production methods and shift management. On the other hand, PSA learns about Toyota’s management style and the Toyota Way, and TPS and the production process. As stated by Ichijo ‘it is crucial for the competitive advantage of a corporation operating globally that knowledge created in a certain local unit is disseminated to other local units effectively, efficiently, and fast’, since ‘sharing knowledge globally constitutes competitive advantage of a corporation’
Finally, the lessons learned from the Toyota Way of global knowledge creation can be summarized as the following propositions: (1) as knowledge has become a critical source for competitive advantage, marketing – and management in general – has to become knowledge-based; (2) tacit knowledge needs to be leveraged both on a global and local level; tapping tacit local knowledge, blending and integrating it and finally applying it globally is a sine qua non for strategic knowledge management; (3) global as well as local knowledge creation have to be nurtured by a set of enabling conditions; (4) in the network economy of the 21st century, a decentralized global knowledge creation strategy –involving customers, suppliers, other partners and even competitors – is more effective than a centralized one; (5) IJVs can be a useful vehicle not only for knowledge accessing and acquisition but also for knowledge co-creation on the local and global level; (6) a learn local, act global strategy is especially effective when entering new, emerging markets and in collaborating with local agents like customers, suppliers, business partners and even competitors; (7) this strategy goes far beyond mere local customization and cross-country collaboration; it is about a systematic and ontinuous way of leveraging local and global knowledge and about co-creating new knowledge with a variety of local and global partners (including competitors). Toyota’s strategy of ‘Learn local and Act global’ will be the core competence and sustainable competetive advantage for the achievement of Toyota’s 2010 objective.
9- Analyze the nature of competition in automobile industry in Turkey using five-forces analysis (as of year 2009). What main trends are identifiable in the business environment in general and in the car market in particular in 2009?
Analysis of the competition in the automobile industry in Turkey in 2009: Competetive rivalry is the most obvious of the five forces in this industry.The intensity of competition has been very strong due to the fact that major players in the market are dominant and that they use somewhat similar technology in their manufacturing processes and also similar systems in their supplier relationship and distribution.Market structure is carecterized as highly labor and capital intensive.Majority of cost elements for manufacturing are Labor , Materials and Advertising. SWOT analysis of the Turkish Automotive Industry from economical point of view are as follows: Strength
• • • •
Third major sector in Turkish manufacturing industry Leading private sector investor Driving force in manufacturing industry with its high value added A reliable source of tax revenue with its totally registered production
High-skilled human resources both in production and management
• • • • •
Sustainable and improvable competitive workforce with low labor cost and culture of productivity Accumulated technological know-how and rapidly growing investments in R&D Quality management systems Widespread distribution and marketing networks Integration with world automotive industry since 1990s
• The most developed automotive industry and a unique export and production base •
• • in the region with close bilateral relations with EU, G8, Eurasia Export experience and strong export markets Easy access to potential emerging markets Unstable domestic market
• Loss of quality and quantity in manpower as a result of the crises caused by the
• • •
weak economy of the country In adequate investments in the sector High costs of raw materials due to capacity utilization and production below economies of scale High sales taxes and gasoline prices Lack of international strategy Excess capacity Insufficient export incentives
Business environment in general: Today’s economic outlook for Turkey is deteriorating. GDP growth has been revised to 3.6% for 2008 (against 4.3% previously) and to 3.0% for 2009 (previously 4.0%). Turkey’s unemployment rate rose to 9.4%. The slowdown in growth in 2007 (GDP growth of 4.5%) and 1H08 was mainly due to the deceleration in domestic credit following the rise in domestic interest rate (to dampen an acceleration ininflation). External financing of the country’s large account deficit is becoming more challenging given the decline in FDI inflows and the global financial turmoil. The macro environment is more challenging for Turkish banks, because of weak economic growth and ongoing financial market volatility. Turkish banks have become better capitalised (at 17.5% at end-June 2008) and less reliant on wholesale funding (13%) since the 2001 crisis. We believe the asset quality deterioration is the main risk for the sector. The sector has experienced higher default rates in credit cards and consumer loans in 2007 and 1H08. Although most Turkish banks are expecting higher NPLs for year-end 2008 and 2009, we believe that the impact of a sharp deteriorating macro environment in the loan asset quality is underestimated. We have to keep in mind that Turkish banks’ loan books remain untested through a full economic cycle and vulnerable to interest rate hikes. Business environment,specifically in automobile industry, is not much different from the global trends. Like in many countries, the car manufacturing industry has been
significantly affected by the global financial crises. In March 2009, Turkey's Automotive Industry Association (OSD) reported that the automotive production fell by 63% on year in the first two months of 2009, as exports dropped by 61.6% in the same period. With a cluster of car-makers and parts suppliers, the Turkish automotive sector - with a production of 1,147,110 motor vehicles, ranking as the 6th largest producer in Europe (behind the United Kingdom and above Italy) and the 15th largest producer in the world had become an integral part of the global network of production bases, exporting over USD 22,944,000,000 worth of motor vehicles and components in 2008. Production,Domestic Retail Sales, Domestic Factory Sales and Export activities –although supported by Tax Incentives through March-September 2009 period-showed decline in terms of sales volume and production quantities as compared to 2008 as follows: Production The recessionary conditions, which penetrated the market 13 month ago, continue within context of manufacturing in automotive sector although the pace of contraction has eased. According OSD figures, the total automotive production -excluding tractors- reads as 615,995 units, which highlights 36% annual decline in the first nine month of 2009. Automotive production exhibited a m-o-m hike of 74% in September 2009 because of the the higher demand before the expiration of taxincentive and also the base effect (factory maintenance in the previous month). Oyak Renault sustained its leadership in total production league with 198K units of manufacturing. Tofaş and Ford Otosan were the companies, who we accustomed to see as 2nd and 3rd, respectively. Domestic Retail Sales Retail sales have boomed in September before the expiration of the PCT incentive as end of the month. Domestic retail sales mounted by 125% to 83,385 units in September compared to August, which is the highest monthly figure since December 2007. Jazzy September-only figures led passenger car and LCV sales to bid up by 7% y-o-y totally in the first nine months of 2009 whereas where HCV sales, the less incentive-affected segment, continued to exhibit a contraction, which narrowed by 46% y-o-y. Volkswagen continued to manage retail sales team with 26,804 units of imported passenger cars and LCVs in toto, who is followed closely by Ford with the 25,106 units of sale. Renault, the accustomed leader in imported LCV sales sold 8,798 units. Domestic Factory Sales In parallel with the retail sales figures above, total domestic wholesales swelled by 108% m-o-m, again mainly due to the dying of the tax incentive at the end of September. On monthly basis, main contributors to the hike were passenger car and LCV, which felt the positive impact of the incentive most. On the other hand, surprisingly high demand in the corresponding month was not enough to sustain a growth for nine months period. Tofaş continued to be top-notch in domestic wholesale figures, in which the company sold 64,586 units in 9M09, who was followed by Oyak-Renault and Ford Otosan. Exports Total automotive exports waned by 44% in the first nine months of 2009, where 435,303 units were exported.Exports rose by 76% in September compared to a month ago just because of the low exports in August due to factory maintenance. Cp cty However dimuniton a ai Cma i s op O es i w Prn r at e P dc r o continues ne yo-m basis. n r hp vehicle exports retreatedu t 11%VhceYa on Motor by compared to the same e i l / er month of last year. TFŞ OA J V F T I A 4 00 0 0. 0 O E AL . N UT R J its R as L E A an 30 0 Oyak-Renault sustainedV leadership NUT automotive exporter also in6 .0 0 first nine the P as . r C T YT OOA FI D T YT OOA 1 00 0 5. 0 months AS2009 by exporting 156,927 UD I who was pursued by Tofaş1 00 0Ford Otosan of A units, and HUD I S N Y NA J V H NA Y 0. 0
H NA OD F R OOA OD T S N HUD IAS N Y NA S A K RA AS N B . . . C M OOO T YL M E Z ÜK . NTR B A A OUS Z N D L I UU T MA ES AK M SA OOA T KR M. . . N A FI D P asT t l . r oa C J V J V Lcl oa Lcl oa J V J V J V Lcl oa Lcl oa Lcl oa FI D H NA OD
Motor F R Vehicle Manufacturers 2008 OD
HUD I Y NA PUE T E GO Lcl oa I EO VC M EZ . N B I UU SZ Lcl oa Lcl oa L N R VR AD OE MN A
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5. 0 00 0 10 00 0 . 6. 0 2 50 0 9. 0 2. 0 50 0 2. 0 50 0 2. 0 20 0 1. 0 80 0 1. 0 30 0 1. 0 30 0 1. 0 10 0 90 0 .0 80 0 .0 40 0 .0 4 30 0 4. 0
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The chief problems facing the Turkish automotive industry are the availability of capital and external demand. A slowdown in foreign financing is weighing on demand conditions through externally-driven output projects. This is also depressing the domestic credit market, with the rising cost of banks' external borrowing affecting consumer loans.
BURCU SELCAN 108604034
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