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[GR No. L-824, January 14, 1948]
ROAD HILARIO MONCADO, RECURRENT COURT AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND JOHN M. LADAW,
AS ATTORNEY SPECIAL, APPEALED. DECISION
PAUL, J.:
In an original application for certiorari . the appellant, accused of treason in the criminal case No. 3522 of
the People's Court, alleges that in April 4, 1945 at about 6 pm, he was arrested by members of the Army
CIC U.S. at his home in San Rafael Street, No. 199-A, Manila, without a warrant and was taken to prisons
in Muntinglupa, Rizal, a week after his wife, who had moved to his residence in the house Rosario Street,
No. 3, Quezon City, was invited by several members of the ICC under the command of Lieutenant Olves
to witness the search of his house on Calle San Rafael, who refused to follow them because they had a
search warrant, but as assured that even without his presence had to do anyway check, she
accompanied them, that on arrival at the house, he saw that several effects were strewn on the ground
including several documents, that Lieutenant Olves informed her that was carrying some documents to
prove the guilt of her husband, that the June 27, 1946 the appellant filed a motion with the People's Court
asking the return of such documents alleging as a reason that has been obtained from his residence
without a search warrant, and that court, with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction and
following the doctrine established in the case of Alveroagainst Dizon (76 Phil., 637) rejected it, that unless
this Court order the special prosecutor that appellant returned to , his constitutional rights guaranteed by
the Constitution would be violated. And because it has no other choice simple, rapid and appropriate in
the ordinary course of law, requests that this Court ( a ) set aside the order of the People's Court of 9 July
1946, ( b ) that the Court is required to order the return of such documents to the plaintiff, ( c ) the
issuance of a restraining order prohibiting the Special Prosecutor to present them as evidence against the
appellant in the case of treason. These requests show that the documents are relevant evidence, plus
admissible because there is no rule that prevents (Model Code of Evidence, 87).
This well established appellant's contention that the decision in the case of Alvero against Dizon 76 Phil.,
637) is not applicable to the particular case. Documents in the case of Alvero have been seized by
members of the CIC when the military government exercised in full swing its occupation army
functions. Instead, when they took on April 11, 1945, documents that are the subject of this case, General
MacArthur on behalf of the Government of the United States, and had re-established in February 27 of
that year, the Commonwealth with all its powers and prerogatives (41 Off. Gaz. 86). The Commonwealth
government was already exerting all his powers and legal eonstitucionales without Iimitación some in the
City of Manila. President Ho talks suspended constitutional guarantees.
Doctrine is well established in the Philippines, United States, England and Canada that the admissibility
of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means of the party has used to obtain them.

[1]

is

followed by many years doctrine "until arose - this Court said in Pueblo against Carlos, 47 Phil., 660 - the
fatal majority opinion in the case of Boyd vs . U.S. in 1885, which has had pernicious influence in many
states on subsequent judicial opinions. "

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"The development of this doctrine of the case of Boyd vs . U.S. was as follows. ( a) The case of Boyd
continued without putting into question in the same court for twenty years, and meanwhile received
frequent disapproval of state courts ( atparagraph 2183). ( b ) Then in case of Adams vs. . New York, in
1904, was implicitly rejected . in the Federal Supreme Court, and the registered Orthodox precedents in
the courts of the State ( at paragraph 2I83) were expressly approved. ( c ) Then, after another twenty
years, in 1914, in the cause of Weeksvs . U.S., the Federal Supreme Court moved at this time not by
history wrong, but by a misplaced sentimentality - back to the original doctrine the cause of Boyd, but
with a condition . namely that the illegality of the search and seizure should first have been directly
litigated and established by a motion made before trial, for the return of things seized, so that, after the
motion and only then, could illegality noted in the main trial and the evidence so obtained should be
excluded. ***. "Under the authority of the Weeks doctrine vs . U.S., and other decisions of the same
school the appellant exercised this action, requesting the return of the documents illegally removed by
ICC members.
We concur with the appellant's complaint that under these constitutional guarantees, had the right to be
respected home, your documents should not be seized by any authority or agent of authority, without a
search warrant duly issued.
These constitutional limitations, however, not go so far as to exclude relevant evidence documents
obtained illegally or improperly E1. The Court Rules, Rule 123, determines what evidence should be
excluded, which is not admissible and competent and incompetent classified as the illegally obtained
evidence. The fundamental law sets the limits far can the executive, legislative and judiciary in the
performance of their duties. The executive should not abuse their power, violating the citizen's home or
improperly seizing their goods and documents, the legislature should not pass laws which frustrate the
sacred home and courts should punish violators of the Constitution, without of whether they are public
servants or not.As President Lumpkin Williams vs . State, 28 SE, 624:
"As we understand it, the main, if not the sole, purpose of our constitutional inhibitions against
unreasonable searches and seizures, was to place a restriction upon the salutary powers of
government.That is to say, we believe the framers of the Constitutions of the United States and of this
and other states Merely Sought to Provide against any attempt, by legislation or Otherwise, to authorize,
justify, or declare lawful, any unreasonable search or seizure. wise This was Intended to Operate
restriction upon legislative bodies, so as to render ineffectual any effort to legalize by statute what the
people Expressly stipulated in no event Could be made lawful; upon executives, so That law not violative
of this constitutional inhibition Should ever be enforced, and upon the judiciary, so as to render it the duty
of the courts to denounce as unlawful search and seizure every unreasonable, without any color Whether
confessedly of authority, or Sought to be Justified under the guise of legislative sanction. For the
misconduct of private persons, acting upon Their Individual Responsibility and of Their Own volition,
surely none of the three divisions of government is responsible. If an official, or a mere agent of the state
petty, exceeds or abuses the authority with Which he is clothed, he is to be Deemed as acting, not for the

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state, but for himself only, and THEREFORE I alone, and not the state, held accountable Should be for
his acts. If the constitutional rights of a citizen are invaded by a mere individual, The Most That any
branch of government can do is to AFFORD the Such citizen redress as is possible, and bring the
wrongdoer to account for his unlawful conduct. ***. "
We believe that the framers Filipino nan never had the slightest idea of granting criminal immunity to
violating the sanctity of the home, or any lawbreaker criminal for the mere fact that the evidence against
him have been obtained illegally. The procedure healthy, fair and orderly is to be punished according to
Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code to the individual who, under the guise of public officer without a
search warrant, unduly profane a ciudano home and seized his papers and also to punish that citizen is
guilty of a crime, regardless of whether the evidence of his guilt was obtained illegally. The medium used
in the acquisition of the document does not alter its probative value. Thus in Stevison vs. Earnest, 80,
111. 5L3, said, "It is Contemplated, and such ought ever to be the fact, That the records of Courts
REMAIN permanently in the places Assigned by the law for Their custody. It does not logically follow,
However, That the records, being Obtained, can not be used as instruments of evidence, for the mere
fact of (illegally) does not change them Obtaining That Which is written in them ***. Suppose the
Presence of a witness to Have Been procured by fraud or violence, while the THUS party procuring the
attendance of the witness would be liable to severe punishment, surely That Could not be urged us
against the competency of the witness. If I Could not, why Marshall to record, although illegally taken from
its proper place of custody and Brought before the Court, but otherwise free from suspicion, be held
incompetent? "
In Com. vs. . Dana, 2 METC., 329, the Court said: "Admitting That the lottery tickets and matetials Were
Seized illegally, this is still no legal objection to the admission in evidence of them. Were If the search
warrant illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority, the party on the warrant issued
Whose complaint, or the officer, would be responsible for the wrong done. But this is no good reason for
excluding the papers Seized, as evidence, if They Were pertinent to the issue, As They unquestionably
were. Offered When papers are in evidence the Court can not take notice how They Were Obtained, lawfully or unlawfully Whether, - nor would form a collateral issue They determined to question That. "
The appellant cites the case of Burdeau vs . McDowell as follows:
"Certain books, papers, memoranda, etc.., Private property McDowell were stolen by certain people who
were interested in research that would practice the Grand Jury against McDowell for some offense which
said it had made on the use fraudulent email. Such documents and books were delivered to Burdeau
after by the people who had been robbed. Burdeau was the special assistant to the Attorney-General of
the United States, which would have the direction and control of the prosecution before the Grand Jury .
McDowell Burdeau tried to prevent such books and documents used by a motion was filed in this regard.
Burdeau opposed the motion, arguing that he was entitled to use these papers. The Supreme Court of
the United States upheld the contention Burdeau , saying;

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"'We knew of no constitutional principle Which Requires the government to surrender the papers under
Such circumstances.
"'The papers having eaten into possession of the government without a violation of petitioner's rights by
Governmental authority, we see no reason why the fact That Individuals unconnected With The
Government May have wrongfully taken them, Should Prevent them from being held for use in
prosecuting an offense where the documents are of incriminatory character. ' (Burdeau vs . McDowell.)
"Adopt our Supreme Court doctrine is announced in this decision? Submit that this is a bad rule of law,
and our humble opinion, should not adopt our court."
The recurring appointment after some decisions of state supreme courts nan not adopted this doctrine of
Federal Supreme Court. No wonder. Each court adopts its own discretion. But of the 45 States of the
American Union - by Judge Cardozo in his decision rendered in 1926, in People vs. . Defore, 150 NE, 585
- fourteen adopted heterodox doctrine Weeks and 31 rejected, and as Wigmore, in 1940, fourteen years
later, six more states, 37 in all, including Hawaii and Puerto Rico rejected, maintaining orthodox doctrine
. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3. Ed, p. 5-11) and after considering the various decisions of the two schools,
Cardozo made these pertinent observations on the doctrine of Weeks:
"We are confirmed CONCLUSION In This When We Reflect how far-reaching in its effect upon the new
society would be Consequences. The pettiest peace officer would Have It in his power, through overzeal
or indiscretion, to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the MOST flagitious. A room is searched
against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If the place of discovery may not be PROVED,
The Other Circumstances may be Insufficient to connect the defendant With The crime. The privacy of the
home has been infringed, and the murderer goes free. Another search, Once More Against the Law,
discloses counterfeit money or the implements of forgery. The Absence of a warrant means the freedom
of the forger. Multiplied Like instances can be. "
Concretémonos to this case. If documents whose return calls the appellant prove his guilt of the crime of
treason, why the state has to return and save him from the accusation? Is not this consent and validate
the crime? Do not constitute judicial approval of the commission of two crimes, the violation of the
defendant's domicile committed by members of the CIC and the treason committed by the
appellant? Such a practice would encourage crime rather than prevent its commission. Moreover,
obtaining documents not alter its probative value. If he had mediated a search warrant, the documents
would be admissible evidence. There is no constitutional, legal or release the accused from criminal
liability because there was no warrant. Vigilante justice requires that criminal offenders are punished. The
release of the blame for the simple fact that the evidence against E1 has not been legally obtenlda is
judicially punish crime.
Consider a case: John who witnesses a murder, the murderer gets snatch the knife, and with which
orders him arrested and not give you to the presidency of the people. Along the way he meets Peter who
intercedes for the murderer, John, for sentimentality misunderstood returns the dagger and helps the
accused to remove all traces of the crime to avoid being caught. John and Peter, not only commit acts

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unworthy of good citizenship, but must be punished for abetting (Art. 19, Cod. Pen. Rev.). The public will
never understand why these two individuals should be punished and instead, a court, under the doctrine
of Weeks, may order the return of the stolen document proving the guilt of the accused and to free this
and that stole the document.
Another case. For his suspicious catadura, one Jose is arrested by two police officers to go to the rostrum
where are gathered senior officials of the executive, legislative and judicial Along with diplomatic
representatives of friendly nations to witness stop independence anniversary and in his pocket found a
pump that is capable of flying across the platform. Two other policemen, after learning of the arrest,
confiscate the house of Joseph and found documents showing that he has received orders from a foreign
organization for all of the top polverizar government personel at the first opportunity. The police have no
warrant, no search warrant. Is it fair that a motion in the criminal José followed against him, is ordered by
the court the return of the documents that prove his crime? Did not give such encouragement to
anarchism in practice? The court would play the sad role of helping those who wish to undermine the
foundations of our institutions. In U.S. vs . Snyder, 278 Fed, 650, the Court said: "To hold that no criminal
can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant,
would be to leave society, to a large Extent , at the mercy of the shrewdest, The Most expert, and the
MOST depraved of criminals, Facilitating Their escape in many instances. " And in People vs . Mayen,
205 Pac., 435 stated: "Upon what theory can it be held That Such proceeding (for the return of the
articles) is an incident of the trial, in Such a Sense That the ruling thereon goes up on appeal as part of
the record and subject to review by the appellate court? Rather It seems to us an independent civil
proceeding to enforce a right in no way Involved in the criminal case. The right of the defendant is not to
exclude the incriminating documents from evidence, but to recover the possession of articles Which Were
wrongfully taken from him. Entirely That right exists apart from any Proposed use of the property by the
State or its agents. *** The fallacy of the doctrine contended for by appellant is in Assuming That the
constitutional rights of the defendant are Violated by using his private papers as evidence against him,
Whereas it was the invasion of his premises and the taking of his goods That constituted the offense
irrespective of what was taken or what use was made of it, and the law having Declared That the articles
taken are Competent and admissible evidence, notwithstanding the unlawful search and seizure, how can
the circumstance That the court erred in an independent proceeding for the return of the property on
defendant's demand add anything to or detract from the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in
the unlawful search and seizure?
"The Constitution and the laws of the land are not solicitous to aid persons charged with crime in Their
Efforts to conceal or sequester evidence of Their iniquity." (8 Wig., 37)
Weeks theory vs . U.S. that subverts the rules of evidence is not acceptable in this jurisdiction, is contrary
to the sense of justice and the orderly and sound administration of justice. The orthodox doctrine imposed
by consistency proven through many years. Do not leave if you want that constitutional rights are
respected and not desecrated. The culprits should get their condign punishment, but the evidence against

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them have been obtained illegally.

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and those in breach of the law and the Constitution

improperly seize such evidence should also be punished. This is how the law prevails, majestic and
unscathed.
Rejecting the application with costs.
Moran,

[1]

CJ,

Fair,

and

Padilla

MM. ,

concur. Tuazon

J. ,

concur

in

the

result.

See the decisions of England, Canada, the States of Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,

Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, Hawaii and Puerto Rico cited by the author in 8 Wigmore on
Evidence, 3. Ed, pages. 5-11. The Constitution guarantees the inviolability of individual rights in the
following terms "seviolará not the right people to be secure in their persons, dwellings, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and kidnappings, nor be issued search warrants or arrest, unless
probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses that arises, and detailed description of the site that is to be recorded and
the persons or nan to grasp things that have to be seized. " (Title III, Article 1., Paragraph 3.
º.)

[2]

Barton againstLeyte

Asphalt

&

Mineral

Oil

Co.,

46

Phil.,

973.

CONCURRING
YARN, J. :
I concur, but I would support the CONCLUSION Further arrived at by the Following additional
considerations:
In April, 1945, When the CIC Detachment of the United States Army made the search at petitioner's
house and effected the seizure of his papers and effects Mentioned in the Majority decision, as is of
general knowledge and Within the legal notice of this Court, fighting continued in Luzon, in fact, as late as
June, 1945, the cannonades and shellings Could Still Be Heard Clearly in this City of Manila, and There
Were Still units of the Japanese Army resisting the liberation forces. Under Such Circumstances,
Continuing the war was not only technically but actually in the island of Luzon, and the military security
and safety of the liberation forces Demanded Measures Such as Were ADOPTED by the CIC

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Detachment of the United States Army in making said search and effecting said seizure to the end That
the Activities of pro-Japanese elements and Their chances of Effectively aiding the Japanese forces still
continued THUS Which Might Be Brought to resist down to a minimum and, if possible, entirely foiled. The
Difference between this case and the case in L-342, Alvero vs . Dizon, 43 Off. Gaz., 429), is, to my mind,
one

of

degree-Merely

the

principle

Involved

in

Both

cases

is

identical.

Dissenting
PERFECT, J. :
Accused of treason Petitioner stands before the People's Court, the information having been filed against
him by Prosecutor John M. Ladaw on February 28, 1946.
Almost a year before, on April 4, 1945, at about 6, 00 pm, petitioner was arrested by members of the
Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States army at his residence at 199-A San Rafael St., Manila,
without any warrant of arrest, and taken to the Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa, Where He Was Detained.
On April 11, 1945, petitioner's wife, who Transferred to Their house at 3 Rosario Drive, Quezon City, was
Approached by several CIC officers, headed by Lt. Olves, and ordered to Accompany them to the house
at San Rafael to witness the taking of documents and things Belonging to petitioner. Upon hearing from
the officers did not That They Have Any search warrant for the purpose, she refused to go with them, but
after the officers Told Her That With or Without Her Presence They would search the house at San
Rafael, Mrs. Moncado Decided to Accompany them.
Upon arrival at the house, Mrs. Moncado noticed That Their belongings had been ransacked by American
officers and That Which the trunks she had kept in the attic and in the garage When she left the house,
had been ripped open and Their contents scattered on the floor. Lt. Olves Informed That They Were Mrs.
Moncado going to take a bundle of documents and things, Which Were separated from the rest of the
scattered things, Because They PROVED the guilt of her husband. Mrs. Moncado protested in vain. No
receipt was issued to her. Subsequently, after making an inventory of Their belongings at San Rafael,
Mrs. Moncado found the Following things missing:
" (a) Passes issued by Japanese friends for the personal safety of the petitioner and couduct;
"(B) Correspondences of the petitioner as president of the Neighborhood Association in Quezon City
During the Japanese occupation;
"(C) Correspondence of the petitioner with Japanese Certain Officers;
"(D) The personnel file and the love letters of Mrs. Moncado to Dr. Moncado and vice versa;
"(E) Marriage certificate of Dr. Moncado with Mrs. Moncado issued at Reno, Nevada;
"(F) Private correspondence and letters of Dr. Moncado to and from his Filipino Federation of America in
Hawaii and United States;

Myrna Loy. Gary Cooper. or I does not . and National Geographic Society. instead of objecting to the return on legal grounds. petitioner filed With The People's Court a motion praying That the return of said documents and things be ordered. Wallace Beery. "(I) Complete collection of American magazines. That Convinced us in petitioner's and respondent's minds there is no d isagreement on the identity in question. Thereupon. otherwise. be set-aside. Moncado while I was studying dancing at Waldorf-Astoria. That said court be required to order the return of the documents and things in question to petitioner . 1946. Moncado by actors and actresses from Hollywood. 000) in behalf of Architect Mr. Moncado. Petition for Certiorari and Injunction. San Francisco Chronicle. 1946. "(H) A complete collection of the 'Tribune' During compilation of the same occupation Until the last day of its Issuance. We Should not ignore three questions of fact raised in the answers of respondeds: as to the identity of the documents and things. The petition was denied on July 9. "(J) Personal letters of Dr. Marquez of Quezon City. Robert Montgomery. " (Pages 3 and 4. 1946. without disputing or correcting any identity Their mistake of description made by petitioner. pamphlets of dancing Obtained by Dr. Moncado. I Would Have Alleged That Such things are not in his possession. petitioner filed With This Supreme Court on August 10. and as to Whether They Were taken at the time of petitioner's arrest or later. "(L) Certificate as first Flighter in the Pan-American Airways and even several stickers Issued by Pan American Airways for Passengers' baggage. Clark Gable. and That the prosecutor be restrained from using and presenting them as evidence at the trial of the criminal case for treason. "(N) Three (3) volumes of modern ballroom dancing by Arthur MacMurray of New York. international law. without disputing Their identity. "(K) Pictures with personal dedication and autograph to Dr. Boris Karloff. Igmidio A. Including Mary Astor. William and Dick Powell . Harvard Classics (complete set). Moncado with several members of the United States Senate and Congress of the United States Including a picture of President Hoover dedicated to Dr. Moncado for Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50. books on diplomacy. and Mrs. samba and tango Obtained from Mexico and Argentina by Dr.the Los Angeles Examiner. Before proceeding to Consider the questions of law raised In This Case. and That in the present proceeding the prosecutor admits To Have Them In his possession. Los Angeles Evening Herald and newspapers edited and owned by Dr. Binnie Barnes.8 "(G) Several law books by Guevara. a petition praying That the lower court's order of July 9. "(O) Two (2) volumes of rhumba. Albert. "(M) A promissory note of Dr. Bette Davis and Ceasar Romero.) On June 27. Francis. The Fact That the return of the documents and Things Were Opposed to in the lower court by the prosecutor. Moncado and published in the United States. from 1940 to 1941 . 1946. There should not be any doubt That the papers and things Described and CLAIMED by petitioner are the ones in the prosecutor's possession. as to Whether They Were taken from the house at San Rafael or from the house at Rosario Heights. New York.

To make them glow With All Their force. They are Frequently Replaced by Their antitheses. is punished by law as an accessory after the fact. illegal searches against security personnel and seizures. Whose existence is violative of the Constitution. is indisputably PROVED by petitioner's and his wife's depositions not contradicted by any other evidence.Whether Things Were taken at San Rafael or at Rosario Heights compeltely is immaterial. always lurking at every turn of human life. having been made without any search warrant. exacts continuous vigilance. Human minds must always be kept well tempered and sharpened as damask swords. That They Were taken not at the time of petitioner's arrest but much later. or even a crime to serve its AIMS. So That They may continue radiating the sparks of Their truth and virtue. clothed in tinsel and cellophane. The risk. as the metal hammered on the anvil. or That They did not exist at the all. The government may profit from an illegality.Other questions concern as Affected by Personal Liberty illegal detention. They need the continuous smelting analysis and synthesis as the molten iron in a Bessemer furnace. The fact Is that the reality and existence of things and petitioner's ownership thereof. Including the loftiest? May justice be Administered by making use of the fruits of a lawless action? If a private individual. What is worse. and That They Were taken from a house of petitioner. This case offers a Conclusive Evidence That key ideas. rules and principles are in constant need of restatement If They Are Not to Lose Their vitality. The seizure of the papers and effects in question. can not merit Olaim better than a servile adherence to a legal wrong doctrine. are undisputed. Why Should the government or an official system of justice be allowed to ignore and mock the moral principle Which Condemns the individual? Is there a moral standard for the government different from the one by Which private conduct is Measured? While a private citizen is not allowed to violate any rule of decency and fair play.9 know where They are. judicial mind emancipation from colonial attitude. There are minds forget That That duty of thinking by ourselves and of not sticking to the Teachings of foreign mentors've Become more imperative since July 4. besides having been rendered by a second Supreme Court. Respondents urges us to follow the decision ill Alvero vs . was and is illegal. Otherwise. Why Should a government be allowed to profit and make use of property tainted by theft or robbery or smeared With The Blood of crime? The above are among the basic questions answered That Must Be In This case. if we are not lacking the moral courage to face all the issues raised by the parties. ready to decapitate the hydra of error and overthrow the idols from the muddy gilded pedestals of pretense and imposture. when to Profiting from the fruits of a criminal offeHse. the government may follow a procedure Which shocks the common sense of decency and fair play? If a person can not enrich himself with stolen property. decorated by the halo of authority of courts of a former metropolis. Which With The deceitful pose dazzle of false gods. an unconstitutional act. Dizon (L-342) Which. and was effected in open violation of the Following Provisions of the Constitution: . They Become rusty. 1946. They Need the Repeated pounding of intense discussion. decayed or relegated as useless scraps in the dumping ground of oblivion. purity and splendor.

one of them heavily punished with correctional prison . " "SEC. and no warrants Shall issue but upon probable cause. 128. Shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof..-The penalty of arrest increased in its medium and maximum periods imposed Shall Be upon a public officer or employee who.10 "The right of the people to be secure in Their persons. Which read: "ART. or in the Absence of any person. and Particularly Describing the place to be searched. The Offenses are punished by articles 128 and 130 of the Revised Penal Code. search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of Such owner. or if any papers or effects not Constituting evidence of a crime be not returned Immediately after the search made by the offender.) "The privacy of communication and correspondence be inviolable except upon Marshall lawful order of the court or public safety and order When Otherwise require. and 11 of Rule 122.) The seizure was in open violation of Also sections 3. in the Presence of at least two witnesses. the same Followed in the decision in Alvero vs .criminal Offenses. . section 1 [3] of the Constitution. leave a receipt in the place in Which I found the Seized Property. or In Their default. refuse to do so Marshall. . " "SEC. any member of his family.The penalty of prision correctional in its minimum period imposed upon Shall Be Any public officer or employee who. "If the offense be Committed in the nighttime. 11. without the Presence of two witnesses Residing in the same locality. 465). having surreptitiously Entered said dwelling. and Particularly Describing the place to be searched. domicile Searching without witnesses . and being required to leave the premises. 10. and the persons or things to be Seized. together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath. . Requirements for Issuing search warrant. " Even more. 130. papers. Dizon. in cases where a search is proper. 10. in the Absence of the Latter. must. papers or other belongings of any person. and the persons or things to be Seized. to be determined by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses may have produced. not being Authorized by court order. -The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on Whom or in Whose possession it was found. Receipt for the property Seized. Violation of domicile . Which are as follows: "SEC. MacDowell (256 U. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures Shall Not Be Violated. -A search warrant issue Shall Not but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses may have produced. houses. " (Article III. or. the illegality and unconstitutionality amounted to two. 3. the penalty Shall Be prision correctional in its medium and maximum periods.The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the justice of the peace or judge of the Municipal Court or of the Court of First Instance issued the warrant Which.S. Shall search the domicile. " The main authority Which Respondents rely upon is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bordeau vs ." (Article III. " "ART. section 1 [5] of the Constitution. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court.

And in the development of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been a large factor. Were Certain documents stolen from MacDowell. Justice can not exist where the good is not distinguished from the wicked. To merit Respect and obedience to government must be just. are now the guiding beacons of the Supreme Court of the United States. The federal Supreme Court denied the motion on the ground That there is no law or constitutional principle Requiring the government to surrender papers Which May have eaten into its possession where the government has not Violated the Constitutional Rights of the petitioner. in charge of the prosecution against MacDowell.These are some of the maxims through Which the common sense of decency and fair play is Manifested. to the Extent of symbolizing It With the fire stolen from the heavens by Prometeus. In the case Bordeau. by universal conscience. The power of understanding Brings forth freedom of choice. This freedom develops the faculty of discrimination Between good and evil. " Taking aside the great intellectual. Suddenly begins to wield the prodigious power of understanding and of intelligent grasping of the meanings and relations of the Things with Which he is In direct or remote contact through his senses.I soon discovered That society is an essential condition to Attain his ends. dissented. There is no miracle Greater than scintillated When its first sparks in the mind of a child.Good ends do not justify foul means. and subjects them to the Which rules of conduct That same commands to the citizen. Reason is a key characteristic of man. What is bad per se can not be good Because It Is Done to Attain a good object. Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Two of the greatest American Justices. As a Consequence. Should one not profit from crime. man had taken millennia of Struggles in order to Develop The Basic Ideas Which Will insure his survival and allow him to enjoy the greatest measure of well-being and happiness. That Is Further Developed discrimination into a sense of justice. in its enforcement. No wrong is atoned by good Intention. the Latter sayings: "At the foundation of our civil liberty lies the principle to government denies Which Officials exceptional position before the law. the poignant sense of logic and truth rockbottom Expressed by Justice Brandeis is enough to completely discredit the Majority in the Bordeau case doctrine. To be good it must stick to the principles of decency and fair play As They Are Understood by a common man's sense. What before had only the vegetative life of a plant or the animal life of a mollusk or frog. written twenty years ago. To be just. a doctrine That in principle and by its evil effects appears to be irretrievably immoral. delivered them to the robbers Bordeau. legal and moral prestige of the two dissenters. and of proclaiming himself as the king of the creation. Principles are not to be sacrificed for any purpose.11 (L-342). Which means to shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play. Upon finding the documents Contained That evidence of the fraudulent use of the mails by MacDowell. Respect for law will not be advanced by resort. the government must be good. The Latter filed a motion to Prevent Bordeau from using the documents as evidence against him. I Fought against all anti-social thoughts and conduct and had to discover or invent and then Develop the principles and . Whose dissenting opinions. While the advent of the astounding miracle of reason has kindled so much the pride of man.

Either kind of Characteristics and qualities may be Originated and developed. Seems to LACK the power of checking and staving off the tendencies of atavism." We must never forget That it is a Constitution we are expounding'-I pointed out That Just as the power of Congress had been kept by court . It is the same Eternal Struggle Between truth and error. Such a double standard will be nomoctonous Necessarily.Anarchy and chaos Will Become inevitable. The mysterious genes uninterrupted Which keep the chain of heredity. Such ideals are trampled down by the adoption of the double moral standard Which can only take its place in the ideology of the supporters of absolute Monarchies. I've so far failed to find the key to always correct thinking. "For Justice Brandeis Such a narrow construction degraded our great charter of freedom to the level of a city ordinance. is to throw society into the abyss of legal ataxia. The idea of moral double standard is incompatible With The temper and idiosyncracy of social order Established by our Constitution. Man is Easily deceived or led into Committing blunders into The Most absurd aberrations. Quoting Chief Justice Marshall's famous admonition. 568 and 569). The infamy of Japanese occupation Gave our people the bitter taste of the operation of the double moral standard. To set two moral standards. we quote an analogous legal situmtion: "In the famous wire-tapping case Chief Justice Taft. Seems to be the lone and exclusive holder of the divine fire of reason. notwithstanding its being a human institution. A Free Man's Life" by Alpheus Thomas Mason (pp. The Filipino people ordained and promulgated the Constitution "in order to Establish That Shall government to embody Their ideals. democracy. While man. That Theirs is the maxim "the king can do no wrong.12 qualities of sociability. a strict one for Private Individuals vitiated with laxity and another for the government. in the multifarious ensemble of the universe. and Is repugnant to its provisions. It would place government in a category apart from humanity wholly." Among These Ideals are justice. unredeemable-an absurdity. so there was neither search nor seizure. That the inconsistency may be Explained by its genesis is why We Should not surrender ground to it. From "Brandeis. They would not measure the government With The same moral standard. The inconsistency of Respondents Malthus is explainable. the promotion of social justice.In the moral ctetology. Taft reasoned. equal protection of the laws to everybody. The solution to the failures of reason is a riddle yet to be unlocked. The struggle has been long and it will Have to Continue Until The End of the centuries.While They would raise Their brows at the mere insinuation That a single private profit may justifiably by the results or fruits of a criminal offense. All government authority emanates from the people in Whom Sovereignty resides. while permitting the transmission of the best qualities and characteristics. between right and wrong. It is the antithesis of the golden rule. Tapped No wires Entered Their homes and offices. overruled the defendants' claim That the Evidence Obtained When government agents tapped telephone wires Violated Their unreasonable searches and seizures Either or the constitutional protection against self-incrimination." The iniquities and misery Such havocked by maxim would need Hundreds or Thousands of volumes to record them. delivering the opinion.

Their Thoughts. as against the government. *** "'Our government is the potent. The prosecution is called upon to make the assumption That the goods and properties in question are evidence of a crime. p. and extended the Fundamental Law to objects of Which the Founding Fathers never dreamed. The prosecution can not make a conclusive pronouncement. sensations and Their. so must the Judges Also in construing Limitations on the powers of Congress be evermindful of Changes Brought About by discovery and invention. For good or ill. must in turn stand on an authoritative pronouncement Which can only be made in a final and executory decision rendered by a court of justice.] 438 [1928].to declare That the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal . in order to be valid. Ways may some day be developed by Which the government. but without understanding. That presupposition. it breeds contempt for law. it Teaches the whole people by example. the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right valued by civilized men MOST. If the government Becomes a lawbreaker. under the argument.would bring dreadful retribution. 485. it invites every man to become a law unto himself. and by Which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the MOST intimate occurrences of the home. the omnipresent teacher. They Sought to protect Americans in Their Beliefs. without removing papers from secret drawers. and Satisfactions of life are to be found in materials things.) The Argument That goods and personal properties illegally taken. will entitle the prosecution to retain and use the goods and properties in question. '"(Olmstead vs. 'subtler and. Their emotions.S. wellmeaning.S. pleasure. crime is contagious. the basic fact Which. 478. To declare That in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means . more far-reaching means of invading privacy Have Become Available to the government. "They Recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature. or Snatched from the owner or possessor without a duly issued search warrant can be Retained by the prosecution for use as evidence in a criminal case is Instituted Initiated by an original and basic flaw. as to the existence or commission of a crime. the assumption has yet to be proved Please. To be valid. us to be MOST on our guard to protect liberty When the government's Purposes are beneficent.13 interpretation abreast of scientific progress. *** "'Experience Should Teach. To have a living Constitution. 473-474. They conferred. Limitations on power no less than grants of power must ba Broadly construed. can play them in court. 277 [U. *** "'The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions conducive to the pursuit of happiness. stolen.. under the orderly Processes of law. Men horn to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of Their liberty by evilminded rulers. But. U. of his feelings and of his intellect. the argument Assumes a fact the existence of . it invites anarchy.' Observed Brandeis. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal. 479." I emphasized. the assumption has to presuppose the existence of the commission or crime. . and it is impossible to be before it can be PROVED of any use to support and clinch the argument. They only knew That part of the pain to. The argument Rests on the Assumed existence or commission of a crime as its minor premise. *** The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.

Down through the centuries Respect for men's abodes has Remained a heritage of civilization. It is only part of the crusade to curtail court delay Which We felt our duty to engage in since it had been our privilege to sit in the supreme Court I. and will lead to irretrievable disaster and destruction. They are and Should be uniform and universal and no single unit or organ of human society can disregard them or any one of them alluring without catastrophic consequences. In justice to him. J. Dissenting Bengzon. Invasion was anathema thereof. Processes and Governing the vital functions of social organism. They are but biological laws. . Such a reasoning process is Fundamentally subversive to logic and is naturally incompatible With The workings of the human mind. In exposing the fact we mean only to Emphasize the crying need of changing a situation or a system of procedure That Permits the promulgation of our decisions one year or more after a case has been submitted to us for final action. In Stating this fact we do not want to put any blame on the distinguished member who penned the decision now to be promulgated. 1947. Our decision is to grant all the prayers of the petition. of assimilation and waste dislodgment. and it did not take him more than a month To Have Majority opinion. anytime. Which may lead to the fact disputed right of the prosecution to retain the goods and properties as essential evidence illegally Seized of the crime. Moral standards are the laws of social life. in the nuclear chromatin Whether or the cytosome of a single protoplasmic of amoeba or cell in the sinews of the heaviest marsupial. When This Court took the vote for the disposal of this case. In Rome the citizen's dwelling was a safe asylum. The house of man was the first house of God. Whether in the development of a frog or in the attainment of the perfect curves and velvety skin of a lovely girl. The Rules Governing the phenomena of diffusion and osmosis. are uniform and universal. The line of reasoning That build up the argument can be in more abstract terms Restated as follows: Justify the means by Their Necessity to Attain an end by starting from the premise That the end was accomplished. and it was so ever since February 24.14 Which Still Remains to be PROVED and Continues to be enveloped in the mists of the realm of Uncertainties. That we may record the drafting of the Majority decision was TRANSFERRED and Entrusted to him for many months after the final vote had been taken on the case. isotonic equilibrium of permeability and. In a different plane and order. : Sanctity of the home is a by-word anywhere. like all laws of life. of development and reproduction. Any disregard of them is fatal. Whose vantage in the legal field imposes upon the members thereof the role of leadership in legal thought and practice for The Most Effective administration of justice. the uniformity and universality of biological laws are Manifested unrelentlessly. Whether in the formation of the smallest bud or in the display of color and flavor by the most beautiful flower.

houses. *** "(McLurg vs . and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures Shall Not Be Violated. and the persons or things to be Seized ". ' His home was indeed his castle.. 616 and many others. even bloodhounds must wait till the law. Custer County. At the closed door of the home. Court of First Instance of Tayabas. 373. whatever its source. his private books. Dare not all his forces cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. defy all the forces of the Crown. without a legal warrant procured for That Purpose.) Our Constitution in its Bill of Bights Decrees That "the right pf the people to be secure in Their persons. to be Determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses may have produced. However mean or humble. And in the United States: "The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his home.. No amount of incriminating evidence. Constitutional Limitations. 20 Phil. and while the power to search and seize is Necessary to public welfare.S. be it palace or hovel. We had said before That "That it is better oftentimes go unpunished crimes Than That Should The Citizen Should be liable To Have his premises invaded. letters. We Followed the Federal rule in Boyd vs . and That Involves the exemption of his private affairs. section 1 [3]. U. ***" The mere fact That a man is an officer. Must Be Given Such a liberal construction or strict construction as will be in his favor. article III. books. vs .irrespective of Their evidentiary value provided seasonable motions are submitted. It is essential Agreed That the rights of the single guaranteed by the Constitution. his desks broken open. the poorest man in his cottage Could. 965. State vs. quoted in 20 Phil. still it must be Exercised without transgressing the constitutional rights of Citizens. the storm may enter. high or low Whether of degree. its roof may shake. citing Cooley. Because the enforcement of statutes is never Sufficiently important to justify violation of the basic principles of government. bids it open. the wind may blow through it. McDaniel 231 Pac."It may be frail. Brenton. will supply the place of Such warrant. is the ruling we Announced in Alvarez vs .) In the Alvarez decision we Reflected That "of all rights of a citizen of Greater Importance are few or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security. to Prevent gradual or stealthy encroachment Such depreciation of essential rights. but the King of England may not enter. 116 U. has been protected for centuries With The MOST solicitous care.) . 473. and no warrants Shall issue but upon probable cause. 237 Pac. embodied in our Organic Laws. De los Reyes and Esguerra. Gives him no more right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home and its occupants subject to the indignity of a search for the evidence of crime . free from arbitrary invasion and search. by authoritative process. 362. *** under the direction of a mere ministerial officer "*** Perhaps insensitive to the rights and feelings of others.S. and Particularly Describing the place to be searched. the rain may enter.(Constitution.. 472.S. (State vs . (U. 198 Pac. and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others ". papers. 33 That Seized documents unlawfully in a man's home must be returned .15 In England.) Logical and practical culmination application of the above principles. and papers exposed to prying curiosity. 123 Iowa 368. 64 Phil.

p. 64 Phil. The sanctuary. copying exactly the wording of the Federal Constitution. in Addition.Valenzuela. U. all nestle in an atmosphere of there security. 37 Off.16 This is an improvement over the Provisions of the Jones Law Regarding warrants and seizures. It is significant the Convention Readily ADOPTED That the recommendation of the Committee on Bill of Rights after its Chairman had spoken. This last doctrine. U.S. to the vexation or shame of the unhappy occupants. Suggests fearful possibilities. explaining the meaning and Extent of the provision on searches and seizures and específicamente Invoking the United States decisions of Boyd vs . 1043. in court. was familiar to this Court (People vs . Their master. in New York. p. 160. Carlos. Sy Juco. The Pause That soothes. 116 Gould vs . Defore NE 150. Justice Gardozo in the Court of Appeals of New York is cited as authority for the Majority view (People vs . U. Gaz. about the Admissibility of Evidence Obtained through illegal searches and seizures. coupled With The citation of Boyd vs . 3291. is little consolation. upholding to the limit the inviolability of man's domicil. Under This new ruling the "King's forces" may now "cross the threshold of the ruined tenement" seize the skeleton from the family closet and rattle it in public. Remove that security and you destroy the home. No. 616 and U. p. (Aruego. the castle. a circumstance Which.(Civil Rights of Law) (See the same case. 626. 3296) I argued for That proposition as follows: . Yet it is markworthy That.) THEREFORE. p. 667. 630) before it voted to adopt the doctrine in Federal Alvarez vs .S. L-670. protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is hot promised by the Constitution of the State but by a mere statute. That may be jailed Those forces for trespass. 1044. 47 Phil. 1947 (44 Off.. (supra ). That the decision is legally erroneous Alvarez. 585). with all due respect.) New York is the only state That denies this privilege the status of a constitutional prerogative.not to HEREIN petitioner who has relied on it. Cit. 225 U. for Purposes of argument only.. 2416) was probably Known to the Constitutional Convention That. I Maintain That Should the new doctrine apply to future cases . Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Constitution. Framing of the Philippine Constitution. That we are not at liberty now to select Between Two conflicting theories. In Santiago and Flores vs . Villamil. 1156. and 56 CJ. Applied in several subsequent cases (People vs . Vol I.(Aruego op. the affection That Gives Life. supra . Home! The Tie That Binds. It was designed to make our Constitution "conform entirely" to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Gaz.S. Moreover. 1043..S. Hence the precedent is obviously inconclusive. Rodriguez vs . Which The Majority of this Court would now discard and overrule. Vol II. The selection has been made by the Constitutional Convention When It impliedly chose to abide by the Federal decisions. are gone with the wind.S. Vol II. adherence to the Federal Showed That debars evidence doctrine Obtained by illegal search or seizure unlawful.) The Split Between State Supreme Courts several on one side and the Federal Supreme Court on the other. April 30. An opinion of Mr. 298. it is submitted. Admitting. That may be forces Those pardoned by the King. made the constitutional mandate on the point more complete and explicit.

971... S. More about this in the future. 492. . are law none the less for intermediate transactions.effect. 280. 17 Law. 101 U. supra ).should be all the more acceptable to our system of jurisprudence... vs . 677 at p. However. said: "'A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself Between the principle of forward operation and That of relation backward. 677. 382. 44 S. Douglass vs . strengthened by a centuries-old tradition of respect for individual freedoms and citizens and for the fair and calm temperament of a breed as admirable as the Anglo . Indeed there are cases intimating. ed. . ed." The true rule ( of stare decisis ) is to give a change of judicial construction *** the same effect in its operation '*** as to 'a legislative amendment.' "And in Great Northern R. 174. etc. too Broadly (cf.S. Dubuque.S. young. 101 U.. . 263 U. 444. 197. v. 287 U. injustice or hardship Whenever Thereby will be averted. Ct. If a demooracia as nortearnericana . U. I think in this jurisdiction must adhere to the principle established in the case of Weeks v. [1] " DISSIDENT BRIONES. 25 Law. it must give them That That effect. '" "This view is not unanimous. and since That objection is untenable In This jurisdiction where declaratory relief is permitted (Rule 66). 687.not retroactive . through Mr. For the present. Gelpcke vs . 290. 21 S. as. Pike County... 179 U.17 "*** The reserved right to upset previous decisions is likewise qualified by the proposition That Shall have upsetting Such prospective . ed. prospective but not make it retroactive. who are just doing the initial first steps on the road to political independence. 45 Law. if i should happen to agree to an orerruling of previous decisions and the Should question hinge on its backward or forward application. ed. M. cited in the majority decision. it was declared. ie. Pike County.S.S. : I disagree with the paper. "In Douglass vs. Sunburst Oil & Ref Co. M. the view advocated HEREIN . It may Say That decisions of its highest court. Flanagan. PARAS. . 968. 358. 472. 1 Wall. a fortiori we have and ensure these guarantees in a democracy like ours. Co.S.ripe and well solidified. 667. I believe that should be granted by the appellant solicitude.it was considered necessary to ensure the privileges of the citizen under the shell of this doctrine. Justice Cardozo. Loeb vs . but has never been expresaron doubt That it may so treat them if it pleases.. though later overruled. enough to note some of the abundant literature on the point. Columbia Twp. Ct. inasmuch as one of the main arguments of the opposing school of thought Is that it makes the decision overruling a mere 'declaratory judgment'. 68 Law. 175.future operation only . the Supreme Court. I know. 250. and where demagoguery and anarchy dangerous trends and establishing a regime of force could thwart bendioiones of freedom won so many coast. Tidal Oil Co.

HON. a letter complaint with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of: (a) Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code. VILLALUZ. 265. 7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT.R. AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT. L-39525. HON. VS. 4713.R. AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT. June 18. Salvador T. 1937. L-34243. No. J. PETITIONER. IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT. [ G. L-36376. AND CESAR T.R. 265. 7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT STATIONED AT PASIG. The respondent submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles. petitioner Collector of Customs. also 'untaxed'. NIEVA. HON. [G. June 18. THE HON. ONOFRE A. L-34038. VS. RESPONDENTS. JUDGE ONOFRE A. June 18. RESPONDENTS. RESPONDENTS. The Customs Examiner assigned further asked him if he has something more to declare but the answer was in the negative. in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. in relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same Act. as amended by Republic Act No. RIZAL.R. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally. VILLALUZ. [G. HON. claiming that Cesar T. ONOFRE A. ONOFRE A. 1976] CALIXTO D. willfully and feloniously brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of 'untaxed blue seal' Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey. VILLALUZ AND FELIX C. 7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT. Makapugay. VS. MASCARDO. without the necessary permit from the proper authorities. PETITIONER. AS COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS STATIONED AT THE MIA AIRPORT CUSTOMHOUSE. [G. HALIMAO. Mascardo.R. 1976 ] THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AIRPORT CUSTOMHOUSE. RESPONDENTS. And in utter disregard of . 1971. RESPONDENTS. FELIX. [G. REYNALDO REYES AND LUCILA ENRIQUEZ. IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT. PETITIONER. 7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT. PETITIONER. AND SALVADOR T. No. June 18.18 The request is denied. No. VS. PASAY CITY. June 18. L-40031. GREGORIO CONDE AND ANASTACIA TORILLO. VS. AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. ENRIQUEZ.: On July 1. DECISION MAKASIAR. JOSE ARELLANO AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. ONOFRE A. 1976] PACITA NIEVA. L-38688. otherwise known as The Central Bank Act. filed against Cesar T. 1976] FRANCISCO P. RESPONDENTS. No. ONOFRE A. RIZAL. 1976] PEDRO E. VILLALUZ. MAKAPUGAY. HON. VILLALUZ. STATIONED AT PASIG. VILLALUZ. No. PETITIONER. (b) Central Bank Circular No. 1976] NICANOR MARCELO. VS. JOSE ARELLANO. and (c) Sections 3601 and 3602 of Republic Act No. JR. No. PETITIONERS. [G..R. June 18.

Circular 265. 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal complaints directly filed with him.00) Pesos cleverly hidden in one of the pieces of baggage examined by the assigned customs examiner. respondent Collector of Customs filed a letter-complaint with respondent Judge against petitioner Nicanor Marcelo for an alleged violation of Section 3602 in relation to Section 2505 of Republic Act 1937. the respondent brought into the country various Philippine Money in the amount of Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P2. Bags.280. conducted the preliminary examination and investigation. and is without authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure proceedings before Customs authorities. Armed with said order.B. 1971. and with intention to defraud the government did not declare the contents of his pieces of baggage in the Baggage Declaration Entry nor with the assigned Customs Examiner. R.). as well as the forfeiture of forty (40) cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey" (p. and on July 6. rec. rec. The criminal complaint having been docketed as Case No. CCC-VII-854-P. issued the challenged order. and one (1) box of airconditioning evaporator only. without prior permit from the Central Bank authorities. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of seizure proceedings thereon. 1971 issued the following order: "WHEREFORE. * * * (p. criminally. 13. what were found were various assorted Watches. rec. on June 22. dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering the return to private respondent the amount of P2. the respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction over the objection of petitioner's counsel. No.00 his passport No. instead of personal effects as declared in the Baggage Declaration Entry. Ag-2456 FA . constitute a criminal offense within the meaning of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines." The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for "Open Disobedience" under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code. B103813. G. In due time. this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation. otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code. Marcelo who is an arriving passenger from Hongkong on board a Philippine Air Lines plane. and thereafter on October 6. there being a preliminary investigation and examination conducted by the Court and considering that the respondent was given a chance to defend himself let a Warrant of Arrest be issued . 1971.). L-34243 On June 22. 19.. supposed to have been committed in the following manner: "* * * Mr.). and before the Customs Examiner despite inquiries made. * * *" (p.C. respondents filed their respective answers to the petition and subsequently both parties submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument. as amended.19 existing Central Bank Circulars. 1971. feloniously. simultaneously in the manner provided for by Section 13. * * * When his pieces of baggage were examined. cannot legally order the dismissal "with prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon. "The act of passenger Marcelo in intentionally refusing to declare the said articles in the Baggage Declaration Entry. particularly C. Hence.No. Montagut shirts and Dress materials which are highly taxable. seeking to annul and set aside the order dated July 6. 11. private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the articles so stated. Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court. Flight 307. before the City Fiscal of Pasay City.280.

On the other hand. On the day set. through the Solicitor General.. Villaluz. rec. rec. 1972. L-34038. which was granted by this Court in its December 13. 1971 * * *" (p. The respondent is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P5. 1971 (pp. respondent Judge forthwith issued an order of the following tenor: "Considering that the complaint filed * * * * sufficient in form and substance. 43-44. 23. On June 13. respondent Collector of Customs. versus Hon. rec. the same having been filed in accordance with Section 13. petitioners. "Pursuant to Section 6. . private respondents Gregorio Conde and Anastacia Torillo. through counsel. et al. Villaluz". the Supreme Court adopted a resolution requiring respondents to file an answer and likewise issued a writ of preliminary injunction. his representatives. No. Onofre A.).). rec. etc.000.). Petitioner Nicanor Marcelo filed this action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. rec. Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court. Collector of Customs. petitioners appeared at the sala of respondent Judge who proceeded to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case. rec. assigns or persons acting upon his orders. On October 20. 72. let the preliminary investigation of this case be set on February 24. The same was reset on February 26. and pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of "Mateo vs.). The complaint was ultimately docketed and on the same day (February 22. filed a manifestation on February 1.). adopting as his answer to the petition. herein petitioners filed this petition. etc. impugning the validity of the order of respondent Judge dated October 6. 1973 (p. enforcing and implementing his order of October 6. which was denied by respondent Judge in his order dated February 27. rec.R. 1972. 1973 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning" (p. filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" contesting the power of the respondent Judge to conduct the preliminary examination and investigation (p. 1973). in relation to Section 13. place or stead. the City Fiscal of Pasay is hereby ordered to file the corresponding information against the respondent before this court of competent jurisdiction within FORTY EIGHT (48) HOURS from receipt hereof" (p. No. 1973. 23. indicting petitioners with violations of the Anti-Graft Law. 1973. on the same ground as the petition in G. which respondent Judge granted by giving petitioners a period of just one (1) day to seek relief from this Tribunal. from executing. "restraining respondent Judge. G. filed a complaint directly with the Circuit Criminal Court.20 for his apprehension. the legal grounds averred in the original petition in G. L-36376 On February 22. Counsel for petitioners then asked for time to raise the issue before this Court. 1971. 1971 resolution (p.R. 31. L-34038. 1971. No. 62.).00 for his provisional release. Immediately before the hearing of February 26. 94. Accordingly. R. respondent Judge filed a petition for admission of answer on November 29. 22.). Rule 113 thereto. rec. the Supreme Court by resolution resolved to consider the case submitted for decision after noting the failure of petitioner to file his memorandum (p. (p.). rec. In compliance therewith. 1973. Rule 135 of the New Rules of court. 32.).

). the Court required the respondents to file their answer within ten (10) days from notice thereof and issued. Private respondents conformed thereto. On May 31. "enjoining respondent Judge. 1973. as well as the warrant. which complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. it appearing that the case involved in the petition is criminal in nature. Inv.). rec. 26.). respondent Judge. his agents. petitioner through counsel. R. the Solicitor General filed a manifestation requesting to be excused from filing an answer considering that in three other cases (The Collector of Customs v. 7th Judicial District. rec.21 On March 2. this Court required respondents to answer the petition and issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent Judge from * * * causing and effecting the arrest of petitioners herein" (p. 1974. for both parties. effective immediately. L-38688 On May 23. that may be issued for the arrest and imprisonment of petitioner" and to enjoin permanently respondent Judge from conducting preliminary investigations and from ordering petitioner's arrest.116-Rizal. 3019. Villaluz. 1974. Except for the Solicitor General who appeared for The People of the Philippines.R.). 49-50. 72-Rizal. representatives. .). rec. G. based on the ground that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct the same. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 1974. respondents in answer. No. 1974. Hon. 24. 1974. private respondent Felix Halimao filed a criminal complaint directly with the Circuit Criminal Court presided over by respondent Judge charging herein petitioner with alleged violations of Republic Act No. L-39525 On October 24. On October 30. At the hearing of May 27. this petition. if any. 1974.). G. G. 1973. Onofre A.R. rec. the respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion. through counsel. An oral motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (pp. On November 13. 64. invoking the same arguments in G. filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" (p. rec. No. L34243. No. 1974. rec. On June 17. a temporary restraining order against respondent Judge (p. R. held on to the view that the Circuit Criminal Courts are vested with the power and authority to conduct preliminary investigations. this Court by resolution gave due course to the petition and issued a restraining order. rec. the Court required herein petitioner to IMPLEAD the People of the Philippines as party-respondent (p. petitioner. . Prel. 39. Hence. No. In his answer filed on March 14. 1974 an amended petition impleading The People (pp. After arguments by counsels. frontally met the averments of petitioner. 14-15. petitioner filed this instant petition seeking to annul "any preliminary investigation conducted by respondent Judge in Preliminary Inv.). and/or any person or persons acting upon his orders or in his place or stead from proceeding further with the preliminary investigation * * *" (p. Circuit Criminal Court. In conformity thereto. 9. filed on June 28.

). Inv. "* * * *" (pp. Jr.R. CCC-VII-72 Rizal (pp. Nos. filed a motion praying that the instant case be consolidated and decided jointly with G. L-36376 and L-38688 as they involve the same issue.) stated that he joins the petitioner in his plea for the consolidation of the instant case with cases Nos. rec. 1974. Said motion was granted in the resolution of February 10. In his pleading dated February 5. Hon. 91 [Annex "B"].). Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court in relation to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of ‗Mateo versus Villaluz'. Nieva. and Francisco Felix v. 1975 (p.22 No. because ―. herein petitioner. 1974. Jose Arellano. respondent Judge issued an order that reads: "Pursuant to Section 14. rec. 137.). investigating Fiscal Teodoro B. Pasig. 3019) in connection with the P230. L-34038. On May 22. rec. for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. . L-38688) which involve the same legal issue. 14-16 [Annex "A"] rec. 130-132. Sacasas.). G. On January 11. rec. 1975. 5179 (p.000." In an urgent ex-parte motion dated May 24. rec. Seventh Judicial District. in addition to the affirmative defenses and arguments contained in private respondent's answer to the petition. 2. Onofre A. 87-104. with the Circuit Criminal Court. rec. L-34038. G. where herein petitioner holds the position of Auditor. (T)he facts and circumstances which has (sic) been the basis of this instant suit is the same set of facts and circumstances and involving the same parties in a case of ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION now pending preliminary investigation and also before this Honorable Court.). rec. and that the memoranda filed for petitioners in said four cases be reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for petitioner in this case. Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B. Petitioner. this endorsement in order to avoid duplication of effort and time in the resolution and disposition of the same incident. No. 122-124. pp. L-36376 and L38688 and prayed that the memorandum filed by respondent in L-38688 be considered reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for private respondent in this case. private respondent filed his answer (pp. and that this case be submitted for decision together with the aforementioned cases (p. his office maintains that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases which he may try and decide under Republic Act No. 1975. which should be deemed submitted for decision together with the aforementioned cases (pp. .00 industrial loan obtained by the Areson Woodtech Manufacturing Company headed by the complainant. 1974 filed with the Circuit Criminal Court pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Joint Circular of the Department of Justice and the Department of National Defense . The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case Prel. 1-2.). Villaluz.). Hence. No. On November 20. 21-22. on January 22. L-34243. herein private respondent Jose Arellano filed a complaint against Pedro E.Nicanor Marcelo v. Santos is hereby ordered to conduct the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case within five (5) days from receipt hereof and to file the necessary information in a court of competent jurisdiction if the evidence so warrants. L-34243. Hon. pp. private respondent (pp. 1974.. from the Development Bank of the Philippines.R. Villaluz. 90-91. R. L-34038. The records disclosed the following antecedent facts. Onofre A. 81. Rizal. together with his wife Pacita and daughter Patricia N. Santos endorsed the records of the case back to respondent Judge. On the same day the aforesaid complaint was filed in court. 129.

rec.). Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court. herein private respondent prayed that the endorsement of Fiscal Santos be given due course and that the preliminary investigation be conducted by the respondent Judge (pp. L-34038. L-38688. rec. 1974 (pp. 26.23 dated April 29. 50-59 [Annex "G"]. herein petitioner filed his opposition to the motion to strike out herein respondent's opposition (pp. respondent Judge proceeded to conduct the preliminary investigation in question. 92.). filed with the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig. On the same day. a complaint charging herein petitioner with estafa. 22. 3. Thereupon. pp. . Santos is hereby ordered to file the necessary information for the crime of Estafa against respondent Pacita Nieva.R. 3. the counsel for the People has taken the position that respondent Judge has no authority or jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases which he may try and decide under Republic Act No. and L-36376 (p. re-echoing the arguments invoked by petitioners in G. Jose Arellano.000. 1973. and for her provisional liberty. L-34243. L-40031 On November 2. she is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P20.). petitioner's counsel filed an urgent motion to declare the preliminary investigation proceedings null and void ab initio due to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court to conduct the same. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (p. Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B. Said complaint was subsequently docketed as CCC Case No.). pp. 1974 the challenged resolution which reads: "Wherefore. private respondent herein. 3.R. 1974. 93. 40-49 [Annex "F"]. After the termination of the proceedings. Inv. Pacita Nieva. p. this petition. No. Herein petitioner opposed the same in a pleading dated June 1. Rizal. On July 26. Hence. L-34243 and L-38688). G. this Court by resolution required respondents to file an answer to the petition and not to move for the dismissal of the same. 1975. rec. allegedly committed under the circumstances provided for in paragraph 4 1(b). "Let a warrant of arrest be issued for the immediate apprehension of respondent Mrs. Under date of June 18. a hearing was conducted by the respondent Judge on the urgent motion for preliminary investigation and immediately thereafter. rec. Nos. which involve the same legal issue. 104 [Annex "1"] rec. On January 28. L-36376 and L-38688 (p. 24. L-34038. rec. On September 24. which was amplified in another pleading dated September 24. 1974. in a court of competent jurisdiction. 14.). rec.). 7. the Solicitor General requested that he be excused from filing an answer on the ground that in three cases (G. rec. rec.).). 55-59 [Annex "G"].). 1974. 5179. In a manifestation filed on February 10. 93. R. rec. he denied said opposition of herein petitioner (Annex "H". In an order dated August 8. private respondent filed a motion to strike out herein petitioner's opposition to complainant's ex-parte urgent motion for preliminary investigation in view of the failure of herein petitioner's counsel to comply with the order of the Court to furnish a copy of his opposition to complainant Jose Arellano (pp.). within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt hereof. respondent Judge denied the same (p. The Court further resolved to consolidate the case with Cases Nos. 105-106 [Annex "2"]. 1974 (p.00" (p. Prel. respondent Judge issued on May 31.). 3. Nos. L-34038. 1975. pursuant to Section 13. L-34243. 1974.-65-Rizal. 62. 12. rec. 1974.

May 15. 5179. 126. 5179 is the scope of the cases that may be tried by Circuit Criminal Courts. rest their claim on Section 1 of Republic Act No. Crimes committed by public officers. the same not being embraced and contemplated within its given function to "try and decide" specific criminal cases. whether simple or complexed with other crimes. maintaining that respondent Judge has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 174.A. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Sections 1. No. 5179) nor the available Congressional debates intimate that Circuit Criminal Courts are clothed with the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations (Congressional Records of House. filed his answer on February 20. 1967). Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited jurisdiction. 3019. ***. I The one common legal issue posed by these six cases is whethser a Circuit Criminal Court possesses the power to conduct preliminary investigations. What is limited by Republic Act No. cannot exercise such power of preliminary investigation. 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. WE therefore examine the law. Nevertheless. having been conferred limited jurisdiction. 1967. pp. 9801 (now R. 5179. 5179. as amended by Presidential Decree No. and disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter: ―a. Violations of Sections 3601. 175 and 345 of the National Internal Revenue Code" (italics supplied). This is plain and evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic law. which provides: "In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as presently constituted. 5179: "SECTION 3. in maintaining that respondent Judge has no such power. Petitioners argue that said courts. ―b. invoking particularly Section 13. ―c. 41-45. only because they cannot try and decide all criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance as courts of general jurisdiction. there is hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction. Neither the explanatory note to House Bill No. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial. crimes against persons and crimes against property as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code.24 Private respondent. concurrent with the regular Court of First Instance. Petitioners. . Republic Act No. 1975. Violations of Republic Act No. on the other hand. March 28. through the Citizens Legal Assistance Office of the Department of Justice. They can only take cognizance of cases expressly specified in Section 1 of Republic Act No. they have the same powers and functions as those conferred upon regular Courts of First Instance necessary to effectively exercise such special and limited jurisdiction.

‖ Judges of the regular Courts of First Instance are expressly conferred the authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation by Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court: "SECTION 13. is without doubt. justice of the peace or other officer in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sections. "SECTION 14.Except where an investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance. The aforequoted portion of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1976. 77 and 911 issued respectively on December 6. * * * Unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. which provides: "SECTION. "necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect. Congress further confirmed that the Court of First Instance has the power to conduct preliminary investigation by approving on September 8. of the New Rules of Court of the Philippines. . hereof for preliminary examination and investigation. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First Instance. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city fiscal or by state attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance. or by a state attorney or his assistants." From the above-quoted provisions. 5180 was not modified by the amendatory Presidential Decrees Nos. shall be observed in the investigations of persons in custody. he shall issue a warrant for his arrest. Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance. The provisions of Section fifteen. * * *" The power of preliminary examination and investigation. no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal or any of his assistants. . without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him by issuing a corresponding subpoena.25 ************** "SECTION 6. "not inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. city or municipal judge or other officer in accordance with law and the Rules of Court of the Philippines. or state attorney. insofar as may be necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect." Moreover. no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except when an investigation has been conducted by a Judge of First Instance. without previous preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the fiscal. and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information" (italics supplied). or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding sections." and likewise. 1967 Republic Act No. which may be exercised by judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts. 5179. particularly Rule 112 thereof. the Circuit Criminal Courts shall have the same powers as those conferred by the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court upon regular Courts of First Instance. 5180 likewise continues the procedure prescribed in the Revised Rules of Court of 1964. 1972 and March 23. Rule 112. 2. Republic Act No. without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him or by his assistant by issuing a corresponding subpoena. the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint to the justice of the peace referred to in the second paragraph of Section 2. prescribing a uniform system of preliminary investigation by all government prosecutors. and should he find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged. * * * "SECTION. 1. 5180.

III. I took this view in my concurring opinion in the case of People v. IV." Before the amendment. Courts of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable thereunder and expressly directs that the "preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing. Sec. the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age. 199) or to contribute to the speedy resolution of criminal cases and help curb the progression of criminality in the country (Paraguya vs. Sept. 3. The determination of "probable cause" is the sole object of preliminary examinations. WE enunciated that the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts is for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein(People vs.. No. is confirmed by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.26 More decisively. Jurisdiction. 1971. 1935 Constitution. it is only logical that such authority vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. Tiro. 44. As opined by Mr. * * *" (41 SCRA 211). Art. -. as amended.R. to clothe the Circuit Criminal Court with all the powers vested in regular Courts of First Instance including the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations. . thus: "My principal reason for my vote in favor of the judgment in this case is that I cannot find any justification for allowing the Secretary of Justice to have any part at all in the distribution or assignment of cases among the different branches of any Court of First Instance. and I cannot see why I must opine differently now. Congress could not have possibly intended to deny the Circuit Criminal Courts such constitutional prerogative. that in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. Gutierrez. 41 SCRA 137). Art. and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act: Provided. 39. 5179 clearly intended. Osmeña vs. Gutierrez. 36 SCRA 172. If the main purposes then in creating Circuit Criminal Courts are to alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of the cases therein as well as stem the tide of criminality. Section 39 of which confers on Circuit Criminal Courts. 1973 Constitution). That Congress. as amended by Presidential Decree No. Sec. 6425.The Court of First Instance. of which the corresponding Circuit Criminal Court is one. G. "* * * Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts * * *". "The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing. supra. the Courts of First Instance would still be carrying the burden of conducting preliminary investigations in those cases where Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and consequently delaying the trial and disposition of criminal cases pending before such Courts of First Instance. the 1935 as well as 1973 Constitutions vests this essential power in all courts to first determine probable cause before ordering the arrest of those charged with a criminal offense (Section [3] 1 .. cited in the main opinion of Justice Villamor. etc. of Justice. Otherwise. et al. Section 39. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in the Gutierrez case. the law required only seven (7) days from the date of the commencement of the preliminary investigation. in enacting Republic Act No. otherwise known as Republic Act No. L32033. by Sections 3 and 6 thereof. which is part of the basic constitutional right of an individual whose person cannot be legally seized without prior preliminary examination by a judge. reads: "Sec. Surely. which he reiterated in his concurring opinion in the Osmeña case. 30. Circuit Criminal Court.

As heretofore stated. The term "judge". moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the law refers merely to a justice." It is patent that the aforequoted provision of Section 39 of Republic Act No. including the Courts of First Instance. in People versus Manantan (L-14129. the Circuit Criminal Court no longer has exclusive. 6425 affirms the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary examination and investigation in all the cases falling under their jurisdiction and additionally fixes the period for preliminary investigation. It is urged that the word "judge" in the above-quoted section of Presidential Decree No. but its jurisdiction to try and decide certain cases. 16. The Supreme Court in denying such contention. 1961. Election Code) and of the Anti-Subversion Act when the penalty imposable for the offense is prision mayor to death (Sec.27 "Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer and a prima facie case is established. 5 SCRA 684). held that there was no need of including justices of the peace in the enumeration in said section because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic term "judge". 1947 Revised Election Code." There is nothing in the amendatory decree from which it can be reasonably inferred that since the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court over violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act is no longer exclusive. the filing of the information and the rendition of decisions in all offenses penalized by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecuting officer within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case. WE should not distinguish (Colgate Palmolive Philippines. vs. 187. Recognizing the constitutional power of the courts. Circuit Criminal Court Judges no longer possess the authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation. Jan. the corresponding information should be filed by the proper prosecuting officer * * *. Gimenez. 44 (and also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions) contemplates not the Court of First Instance Judge nor the Circuit Criminal Court Judge but the municipal judge. 1971 Rev. Its authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation granted under Section 6 of Republic Act No. Inc. Under the amendment. They do not at all reveal an iota of any further restriction on the limited jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court other than those delineated in existing laws. Rep. is intended to comprehend all kinds of judges. . 28. Furthermore. 234. Act No. judge. 5179. remains intact and undiminished. not modified by any word or phrase. The statute cannot give a restricted meaning to the generic term "judge" used in the constitutional guarantee against reasonable searches and seizures. 1962. a justice of the peace. jurisdiction with the Courts of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts under the Dangerous Drugs Act. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist. 1 SCRA 267). L-14787. including justices of the peace. Sec. the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. he is beyond the coverage of the said Code. because the amendatory decree expressly directs that "If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist. other special laws specifically vest such authority exclusively in the Court of First Instance in cases of violation of the Revised Election Code (Sec. accused of violating Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. to conduct preliminary examination. it is an elementary precept in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish. 1700). but still retains concurrent. as amended. "Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the filing of the information. The cases of People versus Paderna (22 SCRA 273) and Paraguya versus Tiro (41 SCRA 13) involved not the power of the Circuit Criminal Court to conduct preliminary investigation. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case. July 31. or fiscal and that being a justice of the peace.

RPC). for which the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for more than 3 years (or 6 years in proper cases). through Mr." The same ruling was substantially reiterated in the more recent Tiro case. by command of the specific provisions of its charter. * *" (italics supplied). this case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the city court * * *.00 nor more than P200. supra. "* * * * * * "The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only on the type of cases but also on the penalties provided for those cases. however. Chief Justice Castro. held: "* * * The law (R. involving a violation of Section 174 of the Tax Code. speaking for the Supreme Court in ruling that the Circuit Criminal Court was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. 1967. be taken cognizance of by circuit criminal courts.000. 30 SCRA 529. 44[f] in relation to Sec. Judiciary Act of 1948. Mr. Lantin.00 and imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than 30 days because the value of the cigarettes does not exceed P500. L-25922. Jurisdiction of the court. Tapayan. it should also be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the regular Courts of First Instance. It is not denied that the crime of indirect bribery is essentially one committed by public officers. but also by the penalty imposable thereto. October 31. In the aforesaid cases.00 x x x and the penalty provided under Republic Act 4713 is a fine of not less than P50. Inasmuch as the case at bar falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the City Court. the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first instance where the latter's jurisdiction is original and exclusive.28 Thus. L-36885. the Circuit Criminal Court was clearly without jurisdiction to hear and decide the offenses involved. 30 SCRA 81.L. 20 SCRA 596. or fine of more than P3. In short. 87 [c]. April 16. or both such fine and imprisonment (Sec. provides in part that circuit criminal courts shall have ." "* * * Section 1 of Republic Act 5179. In passing upon the issue of the Circuit Criminal Court's limited jurisdiction. . 23 SCRA 93). June 30. the offense must not only be one of those enumerated under Section 1 of Republic Act No. Roan. supra. the Supreme Court. 5179) confined the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts (which is even made concurrent with the courts of first instance) to crimes committed by public officers. 5179. it was made clear that for the Circuit Criminal Court to acquire jurisdiction. stated: "* * * [T]he charge is for unlawful possession of untaxed 'blue seal cigarettes' of an appraised value of less than P500. "Since indirect bribery is penalized under the Revised Penal Code with imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months. Reyes.00 (or P6. which merely applied in said cited cases the statutory prescriptions. In these two cases. Andico vs. suspension and public censure (Art. circuit criminal courts' jurisdiction was limited merely to cases involving crimes specifically enumerated in Section 1 of Republic Act 5179. and not by a directive of the Supreme Court. Justice Jose B. 1968.00 as the case may be). it cannot. then Associate Justice. 211.00. November 28. L-26563. People vs. the case is clearly removed from the competence of the circuit criminal court to pass upon. the Judiciary Act and the Revised Penal Code. 1969. * * * only where they are falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the court of first instance. even if it involves a violation of section 174 of the Tax Code. which took effect on September 8. Avila. Esperat vs. to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter. in the Paderna case.limited jurisdiction concurrent with the regular court of first instance. L-24735. Mangila vs. is determined not only by nature of the offense charged in the information.000. involving indirect bribery committed by a public officer. 1967. as amended.A. 1969.

VIII. Lucero. and procedure in all courts. It is of course basic that only the Constitution and the law can confer jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases. Section 13 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court was not an innovation as it merely restated Section 13 of General Order No. shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade. the admission to the practice of law. alter. increase or modify. and are declared Rules of Courts. 1935 Constitution). . the same should be rendered inoperative by reason of the fact that the Supreme Court cannot. Art. and the admission to the practice of law. Art. is an adjective or procedural rule (Bustos vs. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish. which is the sole prerogative of the lawmaking authority. or supplemented by the National Assembly. however. there was no mention therein whether Courts of First Instance Judges are still possessed of such authority. which. 81 Phil. Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court merely implement Section 3 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution (now Section 3 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution).29 The Supreme Court cannot legally define additional restrictions.the power to promulgate rules of pleading. WE have ruled that Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court. 1627. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. practice. practice. The 1973 Constitution similarly authorizes the Supreme Court to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading. arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or grant any to the lower courts. 1973 Constitution). Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. practice. Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution. or supplement the rules concerning pleading. may be repealed. The law or rule on preliminary investigation is undoubtedly a rule of procedure. practice. 640). "All laws and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act" were repealed. The contrary view appears to entertain the mistaken notion that Section 13. Section 37 of Act No. increase or modify substantive rights" (Sec. and shall not [5] diminish. and procedure in all courts. and the integration of the Bar. being a rule of procedure. which is the predecessor of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. While admitting that Courts of First Instance were previously clothed with the power of preliminary investigation by virtue of Section 37 of Act 1627. and procedure. by promulgating a rule of procedure. in obedience to its rule-making authority under Section 13. lies in the fact that while the authority of municipal courts and city courts to conduct preliminary investigation was reiterated in said Judiciary Act. X. Rule 112 does not modify substantive rights but continues the procedure already operative prior to the 1935 Constitution. But equally true is the fact that both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly delegated to the Supreme Court the rule-making authority . it is argued that this same section was amended when the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted since under Section 99 of said Judiciary Act. 13. and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines" (Sec. substantive rights. and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes. and Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The inconsistency. 5 . nevertheless. practice and procedure and to amend the existing laws thereon. The Congress shall have the power to repeal. it is claimed. 58. The existing laws on pleading. The 1935 Constitution states: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading. altered.

B. papers. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. reiterating the doctrines in the cases of Qua Chee Gan. and particularly describing the place to be searched. 20 SCRA 462). June 30. vs. and particularly describing the place to be searched." Hence. et al. 30. papers. Deportation Board. of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution. to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 1947. And in Qua Chee Gan. 1963) and Morano vs. WE ruled unanimously through Mr. unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the United States that left undetermined which public officials could determine the existence of probable cause. which was ratified and took effect on January 17. Vivo (L-22196. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. vs. in prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens. this Court pointed out that Executive Order No. for the constitutional guarantee on arrest or search warrant is not qualified by some such phrase as "unless otherwise provided by law. issued by President Roxas. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. Justice J. of July 29. L-39525 and L-40031. and the persons or things to be seized‖ (Art. and no search warrant orwarrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge.30 If such repeal was intended. and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. 24 SCRA 155). IV. 1935 Constitution. houses. should govern the last four cases. 1963. only required the filing of a bond by an alien under investigation. It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution that until now only the judge can determine the existence of probable cause and can issue the warrant of arrest. and the persons or things to be seized. because the Constitution of 1935 and 1973 vest in the judge the power to issue a warrant of arrest or search warrant after conducting a preliminary investigation or examination. Sept. 1973. and particularly describing the place to be searched. Deportation Board (L-20280. to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 1973 Constitution. promulgated on September 30. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. providing: ‗3. italics supplied). and the persons or things to be seized" (Art. 1967. No law or presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular "responsible officer.L. L-38688. . 69. the term seizures or seized comprehends arrest. Thus. 1968. 1973. we are of the opinion that the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration. 3. solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued. Section 1. but did not authorize his arrest. and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures shall not be violated. et al. But even under the 1935 Constitution. L-20280." For a clearer appreciation. Reyes: "Nevertheless. the 1973 Constitution. L-36376. the Constitutional guarantee on arrest and search warrant reads: "(3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons. in Vivo versus Montesa (July 29.' "It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively. Congress could not divest the court of such authority as the Constitution does not permit it. III. namely. houses. italics supplied). houses. "Sec. it is unconstitutional. conflicts with paragraph 3. which arose after January 17. Nos. The right of the people to be secure in their persons.

It is enough. The Court remarked in said case: ‗Section 1 (3).S. as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. there is already an order of deportation. (L-21426. Such. either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose. et al. 2d 889.T. or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. Oct. such as a legal order of deportation. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him. this Court said in the same case: '*** *** *** ‗Under the express terms of our Constitution it is. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. The foregoing doctrine was last reiterated in Ang. in Morano vs. 20 SCRA 562. not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official. distinguished between administrative arrest in the execution of a final deportation order and arrest as preliminary to further administrative proceedings. page 741). even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of probable cause. by a judge. certainly. versus Galang. the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. 1. Vivo (L-22196. 30 June 1967. he has 'seized' that person (392 U. 1975). issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. in pursuance of a valid legislation'" (L-24576. Article III of the Constitution. 903 [1968] ). To carry out the order of deportation. therefore. Under the American Constitution. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action. does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away. ‗The (n) contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power to deportation is valid only when. why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation. during the investigation. 1967-B. we perceive." . leading to an administrative investigation. 1868. 20 LED. for example. etc.' "Following the same trend of thought. as already stated. Phil. 22. the aforesaid terms include not only arrest but also invitations for police interview or interrogation as well as stop-and-frisk measures. that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation. In the 1968 case of Terry versus Ohio.31 "Discussing the implications of the provision of our Bill of Rights on the issuance of administrative warrants of arrest. 161-162).C. this Court. as was true before the executive order of President Quirino. 16 88 S. the United States Supreme Court enunciated: "* * * It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime 'arrests' in traditional terminology. pp. But.

766. Young. without disturbing its meaning. Delegate Miguel Cuaderno categorically recounted: "An amendment affecting the issuance of an order of arrest and search warrant.32 That the aforesaid terms seizures and seized signify arrest was deliberately intended by the founding fathers of the 1935 Constitution. city and police courts and therefore the judge of the Louisville Law and equity court has authority to issue a warrant for such a search (Com. 75 Mo.City Bank vs. According to intent or context. Andaya. and also an amendment providing that prisoners charged with capital offenses shall be bailable before conviction unless the evidence of guilt is strong. the amendment being the insertion of the words. "judge" is a term employed to designate a public officer selected to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice (Ark.. 556). a justice of the peace (N. for it was provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Philippines. St. State vs. Lachica. 65. in Gen. 55 SCRA 261. Framing of the Philippine Constitution. italics supplied). Grubbs Special School Dist.. WE are not justified to create a distinction where the Constitution does not make any. Manantan. 5 SCRA 684. p. were approved upon the initiative of Delegate Francisco. No. 43 S. 2 SCRA 182).Y. The Framing of the Philippine Constitution. Jan. 2 S. for repeals and amendments by implication are not favored (Jalandoni vs. made before the judge. in order to make the principle more sacred to the judges and to prosecuting officials. The term "judge" employed in both Constitutions cannot be so limited to "municipal judge" as to exclude the judges of the Court of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Court (People vs. 43 N. Such being the case. Vol. L-23894. Rather. Admittedly. [1934]. 265-6. The dignification of the idea into a constitutional provision was zealously insisted upon. p. p. The term "a judge". vs. 84 KY 537). to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. is equivalent to "any judge" and comprehends an entire class. I. Statutory Construction. Mann97 N. it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Subido. be restricted in its applications to judges of county. People vs. and cannot. 30. 467).47. 24. L-31711. R.H. 184 Ark. O'Gorman.School Dist. 160).Y. Sept.W. 690-695). 49 Am. 1974. which words are likewise employed in the 1973 Constitution. 18 vs. Villegas vs. 370)." The question may now be asked: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed (Sutherland. many of which were in blank. Vol. 48 CJS 946).W. the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex propio vigore. the term "judge" may include an assistant judge (N. a county or court justice (Mo. . Section 99 of the Judiciary Act contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws and rulesinconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. 1. and quite strict in the matter of bail in cases where persons had been charged with capital offenses" (Cuaderno. providing that "a judge" may cause any house or building to be searched for the protection of gambling tables. The amendment was intended to be a remedy for the evils pointed out in the debates. 457). 1 & 22. 123. 863. It was the prevailing opinion among many delegates that some courts had been rather easy in the issuance of orders of arrest or search warrants.H. 41 SCRA 190. Delegate Jose Aruego added: "During the debates on the draft. Quimseng vs. The idea in the Francisco amendment was not new in the Philippines. to the effect that in each case the order must be supported by the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In general. etc. Watzel. upon mere affidavits on facts most of which were generally found afterwards to be false" (Aruego. the legislature is presumed to . 530. 1971. 125. . Delegate Francisco proposed an amendment which was adopted by the Convention. caused by the issuance of search warrants. C. 2d 765. Art. Indeed.

876). which warrants the courts alone can issue then as now. vs. This is confirmed by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. the proper step is to so express it with specificity (Continental Insurance Co. The opposite view likewise denies that the jurisdiction of our courts to conduct preliminary investigation could be traced to the Constitution. Inc. Even when the fiscal or prosecutor conducts the preliminary investigation. Section 37 of Act 1627 reads in part that such power of "every justice of the peace including the justice of Manila. Simpson. Bailey. 741-42). It is patent that under the 1935 Constitution. the two laws. 199 S. adding that the Charter of Manila and other cities confer upon the respective fiscals of said cities the power to conduct preliminary investigations. which is not manifest from the language of Section 99 of the Judiciary Act. only the judge can validly issue the warrant of arrest. only the "judge" is directed to conduct a preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by express constitutional conferment. To begin with. apart from the fact that Congress by itself alone had no power to amend the Constitution. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford. 8 F [2d] 439. Webb vs. if a repeal is intended. Feliciano. State vs. only the judge can validly conduct a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search warrant. refer to different persons and different methods applicable under different circumstances. But the power thus granted to the Manila City Fiscals (and later to City Fiscals and City Attorneys of other chartered cities) to conduct preliminary investigations did not and does not include the authority to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. he may rely on the investigation conducted by the fiscal or prosecutor (Amarga vs. and cannot. 51 P [2d] 832. 2188. and the Revised Administrative Code of 1917). * * * shall not exclude the proper judge of the Court of First Instance * * * from exercising such jurisdiction. which directs the judge to issue the warrant of arrest when he is "satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer (referring to the fiscal or the municipal mayor . 631). there is no such inconsistency. Va. the Philippine Bill of 1902." WE should not. 1940 ed.E. so that.. The organic acts prior to the 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the conferment of such a power to conduct preliminary examination or investigation on quasi-judicial officers like the city fiscals of chartered cities (see the instructions of President McKinley to First Philippine Commission. 521. unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist between the terms of the new and of the old statutes (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association. Abbas. Jackson. Jones Law of 1916.33 know the existing laws. while Section 87 of the Judiciary Act provides that municipal judges and judges of city courts may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense alleged to have been committed within their respective municipalities and cities * * *. Thus. adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of Congress. 98 Phil." Until such a law is enacted by the National Assembly. vs. But the 1973 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to grant the power to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest after conducting the necessary preliminary examination to "other responsible officer. 13 SCRA 377). 151 Ore. p. although as ruled in one case. Here. 120 W. although with a common objective. Construction of Statute. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures under the 1935 Constitution provides that only a judge can issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest after he has by himself personally determined the existence of probable cause upon his examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses. 739.

1965. 15 SCRA 518) is authority for the proposition that Sec. they cannot also issue warrants of arrest. which cannot be deprived of such authority to conduct preliminary examination because said prerogative of the courts emanates from the Constitution itself. It is true that this COURT held expressly and impliedly that under the charters of the cities of Manila. As heretofore intimated. 1948. the Judge cannot be divested of such a power. the power of the city prosecutors to conduct preliminary examination and investigation (minus the authority to issue warrants of arrest or search warrant) is purely statutory. obviously collides with the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. 18 SCRA 280. This situation would make the Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts totally dependent upon state prosecutors and municipal courts. Moreover. which are inferior to them. is merely statutory. 5) that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it. Sept. when the Court of First Instance itself conducts the preliminary investigation. 859. Unless the Constitution is amended. Bacolod and Cebu. but also . the theory tolerates an unthinkable . which. 228.from the fundamental law to which all other laws are subordinate. The possibility that the administration of criminal justice might stand still will not be very remote. But the charters of the cities of Manila. 1960). 80 Phil. which requires that. it must not only conduct the preliminary examination proper but the preliminary investigation as well since Section 13 commands the Court of First Instance to conduct both the preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously (523524). . which is an essential element of the cardinal right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures.34 under Sec. On the other hand. the present practice or rule of court authorizing the judge to issue warrants of arrest based on the preliminary investigation conducted by the city fiscal. If an objection must be raised. Neither the judge nor the law can delegate such an authority to another public officer without trenching upon this constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. The case of Albano vs. Bacolod and Cebu do not contain any provision making such grant of power to city prosecutors exclusive of the courts (Kapunan. 13 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court contains an innovation. and Balite vs. which requires the judge himself to conduct the preliminary examination. it should be against the authority of the fiscal to exercise such power of preliminary investigation. 97 Phil. as has been stated. De la Rosa.situation wherein the Court of First Instance and the Circuit Criminal Court must wait for prosecutors and courts inferior to them to conduct the preliminary examination and/or to issue the needed warrants of arrest before they could effectively exercise their power to try and decide the cases falling under their respective jurisdiction. 3rd Edition. Alvarez (December 22." Thus. the power to conduct preliminary investigation is exclusively lodged in the city prosecutor (Sayo vs. People. 868-869. No less than the Constitution confers upon the judge the power to conduct such examination and investigation. Said Albano case does not negate. 45 OG 196. * * *. the judge derives his authority not only from the Rules of Court. Criminal Procedure.and originally . Espiritu vs. If the present city charters conferred on city fiscals or city prosecutors the power to issue warrants of arrest. June 23. seems to violate the 1935 Constitution. May 12.because anomalous . 1955. 1966). it would be an unconstitutional grant of power under the 1935 Constitution. but recognizes the authority of the judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct such preliminary investigation. and that as a necessary consequence. Chief of Police. 30. 285-286. Ferrer. The theory that Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts Judges cannot exercise the power of preliminary examination and investigation. Montelibano vs. for their proper functioning.

590 of January 9.W. 13) for the issuance of the warrant of arrest" and authorized "a judge or a justice of the peace" to issue a search warrant upon his determination of the existence of probable cause therefor "particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized" (Secs. III. 58 (U. Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Act No. 2. 722. Sec. 1901.35 The two-fold purpose for which the Circuit Criminal Courts were created was to alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and accelerate the disposition of criminal cases filed therein (Osmeña vs. Navarro. 55 Phil. 68 Phil. 1887 and became effective four (4) months thereafter (U. S807. 1900. 3. 3042 of March 10. 58 amended (Sec. 96. 90 P. 635). Francisco. the Jones Law of 1916. the Philippine Bill of 1902. During the Spanish regime. 225. pp. Navarro.. Such being the admitted purpose. 58 was amended by Act No. to conduct the examination to determine probable cause before the issuance of the warrant of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information. App. People vs. 1960 ed. and Act No. for aside from being one of the instruments by which a case may be accelerated and disposed of. 3.. Tamparong. 5 Cal. pp. 77 Phil. Secretary of Justice. WE RULE that both Section 1(3). . IV. is germane to. Revilla. Cruz. 174. 710 [1931] . Criminal Procedure. Art. Criminal Procedure. Code. 1903. People vs. People vs. 1965 ed. including Judges of the Court of First Instance. Military Governor in the exercise of his legislative powers as commander-in-chief of the occupation army and took effect on April 13. 8). General Order No. 441 [1925] . 95 and 97). 79 Phil. and serves to promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose (Lo Cham vs. citing Pen. While the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure provided for a preliminary summary oral trial by the justice of the peace or gobernadorcillo.S. Gutierez. 1969 ed. Art. Vol. Swain. Tamparong. supra). 720. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provide the source of the power of all Judges. Act No. 1) the Criminal Code of Procedure enforced during the Spanish regime and vested in the magistrate "the authority to conduct preliminary investigation (Sec. 706. Solon. 270). the rules on criminal procedure were found in the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure which accompanied the Spanish Penal Code. the Circuit Criminal Courts.' People vs. it is a duty which truly lies within the scope of the office. vs. vs. 1973. General Order No. 1907. 58 was promulgated by the U. 1960 ed. Article III of the 1935 Constitution and Section 3. even if regarded as incidental and collateral. When the Philippines came under American Sovereignty. Criminal Procedure. Ocampo. p. 1935 Constitution. Criminal Procedure. essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was created (Sec. 1134-35). Philippine Penal Code and Procedure. Yatco. The sumariowas abolished by General Order No. These two laws were published in the Official Gazette in Manila on March 13 and 14.. The term "magistrate" comprehended the Court of First Instance (Temporosa vs. it did not require any preliminary examination or investigation before trial. 104-107 [1939] . 47 Phil. 171. the power to conduct preliminary examination must necessarily attach to the duties of a Circuit Criminal Court Judge. General Order No. 421. 1627 of July 1. 4178 of December 5. 31 Phil. II It may be well to trace briefly the historical background of our law on criminal procedure.S. 32-33. p. 1934. Marcos vs. 443. 1973 Constitution).. 226 [1947] . supra.. 1930 ed. 1922. Padilla. and other courts of equivalent rank. supra. 194 of August 10. Act No. Red. "A 'magistrate' is an 'officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense.

194 is that before its passage. 58. 1627. 78 P. to "conduct preliminary investigation of all crimes and offenses alleged to have been committed within his municipality and cognizable by Courts of First Instance. 194 is less categorical by employing the clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance. * * *" (Sec. 194 of August 10. (3) the county judges and justices of the peace. 33" (26 Words and Phrases. 892. subject to the power of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure. Act 590. 1627 of July 1. et al. (2) the judges of the Circuit Court. which was impliedly followed in the 1947 case of Temporosa vs. 46 Or. but this shall not exclude the proper judge of the Court of First Instance or of a municipal court fromexercising such jurisdiction. Act No. 58 (68 Phil. 1903 further amended Act No.. to issue orders of arrest. (4) all municipal officers authorized to exercise the powers and perform the duties of a justice of the peace. pp.36 "A 'magistrate' is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with the commission of a crime. Wallowa County vs. 58 by empowering "every justice of the peace * * * to make preliminary investigation of any crime alleged to have been committed within his municipality. The justice of the peace of a capital or of a municipality in which the provincial jail is located. * * *" (Sec. In the 1939 case of Marcos. The obvious inference from the aforequoted provision of Act No. 1901 amended General Order No. including the justice of the peace of Manila. which alone can conduct such preliminary investigation of a crime under its original jurisdiction pursuant to General Order No. The municipal courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by the Philippine Commission. 58 vested the authority in a magistrate. 1907 had the virtue of greater clarity when it authorized expressly every justice of the peace. The following persons are magistrates: (1) the justices of the Supreme Court. a generic term which includes judges of the Courts of First Instance and justices of the peace. 96. et al. the Supreme Court. supra. sustained the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations under Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No. through Justice Imperial. Act No. 37. Section 1 of Act No. italics supplied). subject in all matters to such alteration and amendment as maybe hereafter enacted by law. Act No. Act No. ***" (Sec. italics supplied). 106-107). 7." The Philippine Bill of 1902 in a similar ambiguous vein contained such authority when it merely provided that the "Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction asheretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands. But its enactment did not divest the Court of First Instance of such authority. when directed byan order from the judge of First Instance. Yatco. While General Order No. 194 by extending the power to conduct preliminary investigation to the justice of the peace of the provincial capital or of the town wherein the provincial jail is situated of crimes committed anywhere within the province but again utilized and equivocal clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the Courts of First Instance. Cruz. 45). the justice of the peace had no power to conduct preliminary investigation of any offense triable by the Court of First Instance. vs. although alleged to have been committed anywhere within the province. jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance" (Italics supplied). 44. shall have jurisdiction to conduct investigation at the expense of the municipality wherein the crime or offense was committed. Oakes. 590 of January 9. 9. . italics supplied).

Act No. the preliminary investigation before the justice of the peace or municipal court consisted of two stages. Moreno. is paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution. supra. to be followed by the actual trial (Marcos vs. were applied by the Supreme Court in Marcos." (Italics supplied). in any case where the prosecution announces itself ready and is ready for trial within three days. preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. which the defendant can demand as a matter of right. versus Cruz (68 Phil. 555 [1946]). namely. 58. 58 but still retained the authority of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination. In cases triable in the municipal court the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination. But. merely provides "that the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law" (Sec. Section 2474 aforequoted. In cases triable only in the Court of FirstInstance the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal of the city. after the request for an examination is presented. adds. because it provides that in "cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal of the city. and the second stage where the accused and his witnesses are heard. release on bail. 26. retains inferentially the discretion to conduct another preliminary investigation because the Court of First Instance Judge is not foreclosed by the preliminary examination conducted by the City Fiscal. or trial. while amending Section 13 of General Order No. 1935 to January 17. . when the City Fiscal has not conducted any preliminary examination. 4178 of December 5. 2474. The Judge of the Court of First Instance conducts only the first stage. as amended. 548. however. like the Philippine Bill of 1902. People vs. which guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons * * * against ." It will be noted. shall have presented an information against him in proper form. Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No.Everyperson arrested shall. Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 re-affirms the power of the Court of First Instance of Manila to conduct preliminary examination "Sec. without unnecessary delay. the Court of First Instance Judge himself certainly can proceed with such preliminary examination. It is clear that both the Manila Court of First Instance and municipal court can conduct a preliminary hearing or examination. Jones Law). or the Court of First Instance forpreliminary hearing. Under the jurisprudence then or prior to the 1935 Constitution. The basic source of the power of the Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary examination or investigation from May 14. Persons arrested to be promptly brought before a court . 106-107). 1922. be brought before the municipal court. 1973. after a due investigation of the facts. preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest where only the complainant and his witnesses are heard by the justice of the peace. that the City Fiscal impliedly may conduct such preliminary examination. 77 Phil. 3042 of March 10. 99. shall have presented an information against him in proper form. Cruz. that is. that it is only after the City Fiscal has conducted a preliminary examination that the accused ceases to "be entitled as of right" to a preliminary examination by the Judge of the Court of First Instance who. But the Court of First Instance may make suchsummary investigation into the case as it may deem necessary to enable it to fix the bail or to determine whether the offense isbailable. Act No. after a dueinvestigation of the facts. however. 1934 further amended Section 13 of General Order No. 96. not including Sundays. et al.Preliminary examinations in municipal court and Court of FirstInstance. however. 58. As heretofore stated.37 The Jones Law of 1916. except a summary one to enable the court to fix the bail. re-states the power of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

is actually committing. 1964 Revised Rules of Court). The preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioner (Provincial Fiscal) under Republic Act No. before issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest. the Supreme Court. Sections 13 and 14 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court re-state Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court. there must be a valid warrant of arrest. 98 Phil. . or is about to commit an offense in his presence. however. This grant obviously is exclusive of the provincial or city fiscal or other government prosecutors whose power to conduct preliminary investigation in all other cases is affirmed in the first clause of Section 5 thereof. 732 * * * does not. and particularly describing * * * the persons * * * to be seized. whether or not probable cause exists therefor. His conclusion as to whether ‗probable cause' existed or not is final and conclusive. if he is not satisfied. 859. 77 Phil. In all other cases. The proviso of Section 5 thereof expressly provides that the preliminary investigation of offenses defined and penalized therein by prision mayor to death shall be conducted by the proper Court of First Instance. et al. made upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney. however. vs. through then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras. 6. Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court expressly confer on the municipal or city judge.38 unreasonable * * * seizures * * * and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law. 216). and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it. only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest under the 1935 Constitution and prior thereto (Sayo. * * *. 739. The valid seizure of a person can only be executed through a lawful warrant of arrest. Fugoso. March 28. There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the conclusion that `probable cause' exists from the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone. 1956. 80 Phil. Hashim vs. Abbas. 71 Phil. et al. may rely on the facts stated in the information filed after preliminary investigation by the prosecuting attorney" (Amarga vs. 1957. When the seizure of a person is made without a warrant of arrest or with a warrant of arrest which is not based on a determination by the judge of the existence ofprobable cause. On June 20. dispense with the latter's duty to exercise his judicial power of determining. Republic Act No. Rule 113. Chief of Police. the arrest becomes unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. The Constitution vests such power in the respondent judge who." Construing the forgoing constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. pronounced that the determination of the existence of "probable cause must depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge * * * issuing the warrant. b) when an offense has in fact been committed. 741-742). then his conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue a warrant of arrest. to be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. and c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. Lino vs. the City Fiscal and the Judge of the Court of First Instance the power to conduct preliminary examination or investigation. * * *. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. While the power to conduct preliminary examination may be delegated by law to government prosecutors. call such witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. Arrest without a warrant can only be legally effected by a police officer or private individual a) when the person to be arrested has committed. He may. 933. Boncan. If he is satisfied that 'probable cause' exists from the facts stated in the complaint. or any other persons whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge * * *. as correctly contended by the respondent Judge. 1700. was approved.

39
As aforestated, aside from the challenged Sections 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit
Criminal Courts, Republic Act 5180 was approved on September 8, 1967, which affirms the prerogative of
the Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by said courts.
Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 promulgated respectively on December 6, 1972 and March 23,
1976, amending Republic Act No. 5180, did not modify the opening clause of Section 1 of said Republic
Act 5180 affirming the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation in
accordance with law and the Rules of Court.
Section 234 of the 1971 Revised Election Code, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6388, vests in the
Court of First Instance "exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations, issue warrants of
arrest and try and decide any criminal case or proceeding for violation of" the Election Law. This
provision was a reiteration of the previous election laws (Act No. 1582 of 1907; Com. Act No. 357 of
1938; and Republic Act No. 180 of 1947, as amended).
After the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973, the source of the authority of the judge
to conduct preliminary examination for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest, is still the Constitution, this
time the 1973 Constitution, which likewise guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons * * * against unreasonable * * * seizures for whatever nature and for any purpose * * * and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing * * * the
persons * * * to be seized" (Sec. 3 of Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). The 1973 Constitution, instead of
employing the generic term warrants to comprehend both search warrants and warrants of arrest, as did
the 1935 Constitution, expressly specifies "search warrants or warrants of arrest." The purpose of such
specification was apparently to clarify the doubt raised by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Montemayor in the Amarga case, supra, that the 1935 Constitution merely guarantees against
unreasonable searches but not against unreasonable arrests, despite the fact that the constitutional
guarantee expressly affirms "the right of the people to be secure in their persons * * * against
unreasonable * * * seizures * * * and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge * * * particularly describing * * * the persons * * * to be seized" (Par. 3, Sec. 1, Art. III, 1935
Constitution).
In passing, the dissent of Justice Montemayor in the Amarga case seems to deny equal, if not greater,
importance to individual freedom from illegal arrest or arbitrary detention vis-a-vis property rights and right
against self-incrimination. It will also likewise be noted that the 1973 Constitution also authorizes the lawmaking authority to empower other responsible officers to conduct such preliminary examination for
purposes of the issuance of a warrant of arrest. As enunciated in the Amarga case and in U.S. versus
Ocampo (18 Phil. 1, 41-42), the government prosecutors may be authorized to conduct such preliminary
examination and their determination of the existence of probable cause may be relied upon by the judge,
who may, as a consequence, issue the warrant of arrest; although the judge himself is not precluded from
conducting his own preliminary examination despite the conclusion of the prosecuting attorney as to the
existence or non-existence of probable cause.
III
1. The challenged order of July 6, 1971 issued by the respondent Judge in G.R. No. L-34038 (Collector
of Customs, etc. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.) dismissed the criminal complaint filed by petitioners
therein against private respondent with prejudice, obviously meaning that the case may not be re-filed

40
without exposing the accused to double jeopardy. The respondent Judge seriously erred in so issuing
said order, contravening as it does a basic legal principle on double jeopardy, and committing thereby a
grave abuse of discretion. The constitutional right against double jeopardy exists, not after the first
preliminary examination of investigation, but only after the first trial which results either in conviction or
acquittal or in the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or information and after the accused had pleaded to
the charge (Sec. 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court; Taladuavs. Ochotorena, et al., L-25595, February
15, 1974; Republic vs. Agoncillo, L-27257, August 31, 1971; 40 SCRA 579; People vs. Obsania, L-24447,
June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249; People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, petitioner's counsel, "dismissal at preliminary investigation is
never with prejudice. Re-filing of the same is allowed if evidence has become sufficient to warrant
conviction of private respondent." There has been no deviation from such established jurisprudence
exemplified in People vs.Bagsican (6 SCRA 400), wherein the Court held that "the finding in the
preliminaryinvestigation that no prima facie case existed against the accused does not bar subsequent
prosecution and conviction. - Such finding isnot final acquittal as would preclude further proceedings"
(italics supplied).
2. Aggravating his grave mistake and misapprehension of the law, respondent Judge also directed
through the same order the return of the articles allegedly seized from the person of respondent
Makapugay. This portion of the questioned order is fraught with undesirable consequences.
As stated heretofore, the dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage of preliminary
investigation does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction if the evidence warrants the re-filing of
the same. But with the challenged order commanding the return of the articles subject matter of the
complaint, the re-filing of the same becomes next to impossible. For the enforcement of such order would
virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of Customs of the evidence indispensable to a successful
prosecution of the case against the private respondent. Worse, the order nullified the power of seizure of
the customs official.
Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods are actually in
the possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the Bureau of
Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the
Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme
Court (Sections 2205 and 2303, Tariff and Customs Code; Papa, et al. vs. Mago, et al., Feb. 28, 1968, 22
SCRA 857; Virata, et al. vs. Aquino, et al., Sept. 30, 1973, 53 SCRA, 24; see also Vierneza vs.
Commissioner, July 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 394; Farm Implement & Machinery vs. Commissioner, August 30,
1968, 24 SCRA 905; Lazatin vs. Commissioner, et al., July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1016; Asaali, et al. vs.
Commissioner, December 16, 1968, 26 SCRA 382; Sare Enterprises vs. Commissioner, Aug. 28, 1969,
29 SCRA 112; Geotina, etc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362;
Commissioner vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., January 31, 1972; Lopez vs. Commissioner, et al.,
January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 327; Geotina vs. Broadway, etc., et al., January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 410;
Auyong Hianvs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 110; and Pacis, et al. vs.
Pamaran, etc., et al., March 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 16). Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of
First Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject matter
(Enrile, et al., vs. Venuya, et al., January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381) and divests such courts of the
prerogative to replevin properties subject to seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code (Diosamito, et al. vs. Balanque, et al., July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 836; Señeris vs. Frias,

41
June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 533); because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not
criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon
him of a penalty (Lazatin vs. Commissioner, et al., July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1016).
Respondent Judge claims that the pendency of a seizure proceeding was never brought to his attention
(p. 038, rec.) and that he could not have foreseen the possibility that petitioner would be instituting
seizure proceedings * * * and besides, it is understood that the order of the court commanding the release
of the subject articles was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or withholding the same for
some other lawful reasons (p. 039, rec.).
The questioned order of respondent Judge is unqualified and contains no intimation that the "release * * *
was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or withholding the same for some other lawful
reason." On the contrary, the tenor of the order is so absolute and so emphatic that it really leaves no
alternative for petitioner Collector of Customs except to return the articles.
The records of the case, moreover, reveal that a report of seizure (p. 14, rec.) and a warrant of seizure
and detention (p. 15, rec.) were made by petitioner Collector of Customs on June 30, 1971 and on July 9,
1971 respectively. It is patent that respondent Judge knew actually of the existence at least of the report
of seizure of June 30, 1971, which is six days prior to his order of dismissal dated July 6, 1971. He
should have anticipated that a warrant of seizure and detention will logically be issued as in fact it was
issued on July 9, 1971, because it was the petitioner Collector of Customs who filed the criminal
complaint directly with him on July 1, 1971. Respondent Judge chose to ignore the presence of the
report of seizure dated June 30, 1971, six days before his order of dismissal and the filing of the criminal
complaint on July 1, 1971. Prudence should have counselled him, so as not to frustrate the petitioner
Collector of Customs in enforcing the tariff and customs laws, against ordering the release of the seized
articles without first ascertaining from the petitioner Collector of Customs whether the latter intended to
institute or had instituted seizure proceedings.
As aptly expressed by Mr. Justice Barredo in his Concurring Opinion in People vs. Gutierez, supra, "It is
not enough that a judge trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of acting in good faith, it is equally
important that no circumstance attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of trustworthiness."
We have enjoined judges to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and not to dispose of a
case according to their personal views (Albert vs. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948).
IV
In G.R. No. L-36376 (Enriquez, et al. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.), the arbitrary denials displayed by
respondent Judge of motions presented before him likewise invite some cautionary reminders from this
Court.
In this case, petitioners were given an unreasonable period of one (1) day within which to elevate the
matter before this Tribunal. But considering the novelty of the issue, a grant of twenty-four hours to
prepare a petition for certiorari is a virtual denial of the motion. And petitioners' motion for an extension of
at least one (1) day was peremptorily brushed aside by respondent Judge with one single word DENIED.
The fact that petitioners succeeded in bringing the matter before the Supreme Court within the constricted
period of time granted them is beside the point. More important is the consideration by this Court of the
dangers posed by respondent Judge's peremptory denial of a reasonable time.
Indeed, it is commendable to see judges hasten the disposition of cases pending before them. But more
commendable would be for judges to contribute their share in maintaining the unswerving faith of litigants

42
in the courts of justice. WE once again stress that "One important judicial norm is that a judge's official
conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety" (Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165).
V
But while we sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary examination (p. 36),
pursuant to OUR constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1973
Constitution) as a matter of policy, WE enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court
Judges to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts (see Mateo vs.
Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29, March 31, 1973). The primary purpose of the creation of the Circuit Criminal
Courts in addition to the existing Courts of First Instance, as above intimated, is to mitigate the case load
of the Courts of First Instance as well as to expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving serious
offenses specified in Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, as amended. Circuit Criminal Judges therefore,
should not encumber themselves with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints, which they should refer to the municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal, who in turn can
utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary examination and investigation.
Or the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court can directly request the Secretary of Justice to assign a state
prosecutor for the same purpose (Sec. 3, Republic Act No. 5184).
Moreover, it seems that respondent Judge does not have adequate time to hear and dispose of the 34
criminal cases with detention prisoners pending in his sala, aside from the 479 pending cases of voluntary
submission by drug addicts, as of January 31, 1975) (A.M. No. 230-CCC, Item 42, Agenda of March 31,
1975), as revealed by his letter dated February 26, 1975, wherein he requested the Supreme Court to
renew the temporary detail in his sala of Municipal Judge Hermenegildo C. Cruz of Mandaluyong, Rizal,
to assist him. This significant fact should further dissuade him from actively conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal cases directly filed with him.
Furthermore, Judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts whose dockets permit, may be assigned by the
Supreme Court for a period not exceeding 6 months, unless with their consent, to assist Judges of regular
Courts of First Instance with clogged dockets (Sec. 5 [3], Art. X, 1973 Constitution).
WHEREFORE , IN G.R. NOS. L-34243, 36376, 38688 AND 39525, THE PETITIONS ARE HEREBY
DISMISSED AND THE WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR RESTRAINING ORDERS
ISSUED THEREIN ARE HEREBY LIFTED; IN G.R. NO. L-40031, THE PETITION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED; AND IN G.R. NO. L34038, THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED JULY 6, 1971
IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID INSOFAR AS THE SAME DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL
CASE WITH PREJUDICE AND INSOFAR AS THE SAME DIRECTED THE RETURN TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT THEREIN OF THE ARTICLES SEIZED FROM HIM WHICH ARE NOW SUBJECT OF
SEIZURE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES, AND THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREIN IS HEREBY MADE PERMANENT. NO COSTS.
Castro, C.J., Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs and submits a brief opinion.
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
FERNANDO, J.:
The opinion of the Court, both thorough and comprehensive, penned by Justice Makasiar, is impressive
for its analytical skill and scholarly attributes. On the whole then, especially so where reference is made to
our previous decisions, there is no impediment to full concurrence. This is particularly true where it
concerns the ruling announced by this Court, i.e., "that both Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935

43
Constitution and Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provide the source of the power of all
Judges, including Judges of the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, and other courts of
equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to determine probable cause before the issuance of the
warrant of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government
[1]
prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information." At that, there is still need, it seems to me, for
a few words not only to set forth the extent of my agreement with my brethren but also to indicate what for
me are the precise limits of our holding. The full and exhaustive treatment of the specific issue dealing
with the power of the circuit criminal courts to conduct preliminary examination, with historical and textual
allusions to the previous judicial pronouncements and comparable statutory provisions, certainly a virtue
to be commended, may for those not sufficiently discerning, yield implications which, for me, go further
than is intended by us. It is my understanding then that the decision reached is at most an affirmation that
the present Constitution, as did the 1935 Constitution, confers the power to conduct preliminary
examination preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest, to a circuit criminal court judge. Even then,
however, he should for sound policy reasons curb any eagerness or propensity to make use of such
competence.
1. To repeat, it is solely the first stage in the criminal process that may lead to the apprehension of the
accused that has been passed upon by this Court. It has not considered the second stage, that of
preliminary investigation proper, one of equal significance. As far back as 1910, its importance was
[2]
stressed in United States vs. Grant and Kennedy. Thus: "The object or purpose of a preliminary
investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed upon trial, is to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from an
open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
[3]
protect the State from useless and expensive trials." It is of the essence then that the accused should
be heard. There are overtones in the opinion of the Court susceptible to being misinterpreted in this
regard, if it be assumed that upon the termination of the preliminary examination the arraignment and trial
could then proceed. I would dissociate myself from such a view. I am gratified therefore that it is made
[4]
explicit therein that our ruling is limited to the power of a judge under the Circuit Criminal Court Act to
conduct a preliminary examination. As to his competence regarding a preliminary investigation, it is my
understanding that the question has been left open.
2. Respondent Judge was likewise admonished "to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases
[5]
filed before their courts (see Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29, March 31, 1973)." That is as it
should be. It is well that it is so. The occasion for its exercise should be minimized. That is the teaching of
Mateo v. Villaluz, the same respondent Judge in these petitions. The facts could be differentiated, but the
principle announced holds true. The load to be shouldered by a trial judge is heavy enough for him to
attend to matters which could be looked after by municipal judges. So this excerpt from Mateo would
indicate: ‗To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges are well-advised to limit
themselves to the task of adjudication and to leave to others the role of notarizing declarations. The less
an occupant of the bench fritters away his time and energy in tasks [that could be left to other hands], the
less the danger of his being a participant in any event that might lend itself to the interpretation that his
impartiality has been compromised. There is much to be said for displaying zeal and eagerness in
stamping out criminality, but that role is hardly fit for a judge who must bide his time until the case is
before him. He must ever be on guard lest what is done by him, even from the best of motives, may be
thought of as eroding that objectivity and sobriety which are the hallmarks of judicial conduct. Thus should
[6]
he attend to the performance of the sacred trust that is his." For me, the fact that a judge had listened

44
to testimony damaging to a prospective accused, without his being given the opportunity to refute the
same, may lead to a subconscious prejudice difficult to erase at the stage of trial.
[1]

Opinion, I (36).
18 Phil. 122.
[3]
Ibid, 147. The United States vs. Grant decision was cited with approval in United States vs. Laban, 21
Phil. 297 (1912); United States vs. Carlos, 21 Phil. 553 (1911); United States vs. Go Chanco, 23 Phil. 641
(1912); United States vs. Ipil, 27 Phil. 530 (1914); United States vs. Remegio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918); United
States vs. Alabot, 38 Phil. 698 (1918); Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920); People vs. Solon, 47
Phil. 443 (1925); People vs. Villegas, 55 Phil. 567 (1931); People vs. Cariñgan, 61 Phil. 416
(1935); People vs. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72 (1946);People vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 265 (1946); People vs. Zapanta,
79 Phil. 308 (1947); Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila,80 Phil. 859 (1948); Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil.
640 (1948); Lozada vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1051 (1953);Rodriguez vs. Arellano, 96 Phil. 954
(1955); Santos, Jr. vs. Flores, L-18251, Aug. 31, 1952, 5 SCRA 1136;Molinyawe vs. Flores, L-18256,
Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1137; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1969, 27 SCRA 1239; Sausi vs.
Querubin, L-24122, Jan. 29, 1975, 62 SCRA 154.
[4]
Republic Act No. 5179 (1967).
[5]
Opinion, V.
[6]
L-34756-59, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29.
[2]

CONCURRING
BARREDO,J.:
I concur in the result of the judgment in these cases, for although the main opinion sustains the authority
of Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary investigations, it strictly ordains, however, that "as a
matter of policy (sic)We enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court Judges to
concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts." With such an imperious
mandate, I am satisfied that Circuit Criminal Courts will not anymore do what I am fully convinced they are
not legally permitted to do. I am certain no Criminal Court Judge will dare deviate from the "policy"
announced in the main opinion, which, of course, I say is the policy of Republic Act 5179 itself. Indeed,
my uncompromising position is that it is the policy of the law itself, rather than that of this Court alone as
the main opinion would seem to imply, that Circuit Criminal Courts should strictly confine themselves to
merely trying and deciding the cases assigned to them, and I have always insisted that it should be on the
basis of that very policy of the law itself informed in public interest that this Court should construe the
statutory provision here in issue, Section 1 of Republic Act 5179 which provides as follows:
"In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as presently constituted, there is
hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction, concurrent with the regular Court of First
Instance, to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the latter:
'a. Crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and crimes against property as defined
and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
'b. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, x x
x;
' c. Violations of Sections 3601, 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 174, 175
and 345 of the National Internal Revenue Code.'"

45
Thus, the judgment of the Court in these cases will after all effectively effectuate what I maintain is the
spirit of the Act, notwithstanding the considerations predicating the main opinion which, with due respect
to my learned brethren in majority, I find it impossible to agree with. And so, I can give my assent to the
judgment in these cases without my having to sacrifice my conviction regarding the question of statutory
construction herein involved, which I am explaining in this separate opinion. Frankly, I will never be able
to comprehend why the majority can give the above provision a construction contrary to what plainly
appears to be policy that underlies it, only for them to just the same "enjoin" all Circuit Criminal Courts "as
a matter of policy," (of the Court) that they should not conduct preliminary investigations, which I say the
statute, as a matter of policy, never intended to allow them to do anyway.
Notwithstanding the scholarly and extended main opinion. I am not persuaded that the legislature ever
intended to confer upon Circuit Criminal Courts the power to conduct preliminary investigations. Not only
the specific words of the above provision, but the development of the law on preliminary investigations
and the circumstances obtaining at the Republic Act 5 179 was enacted point unmistakably, in my
considered opinion, to this conclusion.
There are already two earlier cases in which this Court had to dwell on the extent of the jurisdiction of the
circuit criminal courts. In both of them, the approach was restrictive. Way back in 1968, in the case of
People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273, the Court was confronted with the question of whether or not the
mere fact that under Section 1 (c) of Republic Act 5179, the organic act of the circuit criminal courts,
mentions violations of Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code to be among the cases under
the jurisdiction of said courts, is enough justification for disregarding the penalty provided in the Revenue
Code of fine of not less than P50 nor more than £200 and imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than
30 days when the value of the cigarettes involved does not exceed £500, which ordinarily would make
such violation fall within the original jurisdiction of the City Court of La Carlota City and considering such
violations to be within the jurisdiction of the corresponding Circuit Criminal Court. The Court, thru Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro, resolved the problem this wise:
"The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only on the type of cases but also on
the penalties provided for those cases. Inasmuch as the case at bar falls within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the city court, it cannot, even if it involves a violation of Section 174 of the Tax Code, be
taken cognizance of by the circuit criminal courts the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts
of first instance in criminal cases where the latter's jurisdiction is original and exclusive." (At p. 279.)
Almost four years later, in Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 137, the issue was whether or not a case of
indirect bribery, a crime committed by a public officer included in Section l(a) of the Act, but punishable
under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor, suspension and public censure,
penalties which are imposable by the city of municipal courts concurrently with the courts of first instance,
may be considered as within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Courts. We held that the fact alone that
the crime involved was one committed by a public officer did not suffice to place the case within the
jurisdiction of said courts. Reiterating the predicate of adherence to the letter of the statute adopted in
Parenda, supra, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, emphasized the reason therefor thus:
"In fact, the intention of the legislature to bestow unto these special criminal courts limited jurisdiction is
clear not only from the provision of the law itself; it was so stated that this limited jurisdiction of the circuit
courts would enable them to act with dispatch on the cases cognizable by said tribunals. And, this is
precisely the purpose for which the circuit criminal courts were created - — to contribute to the speedy
resolution of criminal cases and help curb the progression of criminality in the country (Explanatory Note
to Senate Bill No. 388, which became Republic Act No. 5179)" (At p. 142.)

2613 & 3828." which the main opinion emphasizes and the legislature must be presumed to have known can be better performed by the multitudinous other offices in the prosecution staff government already referred to above. without the consent of the judges concerned.A. And to these very apt observations. irrespective of the value of the property in controversy or the amount of the demand. to seek from this Court the detail of a municipal judge to assist him. such assignment may not last longer than six [1] months." What is more. — Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: (a) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. (b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property. exclusive of interest. (RA Nos. To my mind.. in circuit criminal courts "the trial of cases . all of these considerations point to the necessity of freeing the said courts from all functions other than "to try and decide" the cases enumerated in the Act. provided that.) (d) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. the main opinion invites attention to the number of pending cases and matters therein which compelled respondent judge. who. in turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct the requisite preliminary examination and investigation. amounts to more than ten thousand pesos. shall be continuous until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within thirty days from the time the case is submitted for decision. as if to predicate such observations on actuality and project them in the context of what is happening in the very court of respondent judge. It is important to note that the conferment in the Judiciary Act of jurisdiction upon the regular courts of first instance is worded thus: "SECTION 44. or the legality of any tax. 6. Circuit Criminal Judges. to borrow the language of the main opinion. Congress could have meant by omitting mention of preliminary investigations in the statute that it should nevertheless be construed in the sense of "encumbering". and note thereof. (c) In all cases in which the demand. It is inconceivable that with said considerations in view. except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on lands or buildings. appointment of guardians. Criminal Court Judges may be temporarily assigned by the Supreme Court to other stations. the circuit criminal courts with the burden of "attending to preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints. it is admitted in the main opinion that because "the primary purpose of the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the existing Courts of First Instance. (See also Section 90.) trustees and receivers. As may be seen. according to the opinion. once commenced. . (e) In all matters of probate. therefore. R. . and in all actions for annulment of marriage. original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts. all these considerations were precisely what the Congress had in mind when it enacted the law creating the circuit criminal courts. and in all such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for.. or the value of property in controversy. it may be added that unlike in the regular courts of first instance. both of testate and intestate estates. . is to expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving serious offenses specified in Section 1 of Republic Act 5179. 5179). Original jurisdiction. as above intimated.46 In the cases at bar. . impost or assessment. It further points out that under Section 5(3) Article X of the Constitution. or any interest therein." (Sec. should not encumber themselves with attending to the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints. Or the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court can directly request the Secretary of Justice to assign a state prosecutor for the same purpose. which they should refer to the Provincial or City Fiscals.

precisely because of the considerations expounded in the main opinion as to why. but. To my mind. unlike Section 1 ofRepublic Act 5179. this difference in phraseology must have been intentional in order to emphasize the restricted and limited prerogatives of Circuit Criminal Courts. April 30. it simply says they shall have original jurisdiction "in" and "over" the respective cases mentioned. The jurisdiction herein conferred may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which the ship or watercraft upon which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the commission thereof: Provided. this provision does not say that the Courts of First Instance shall "try and decide" the cases therein enumerated. 1971. In other words. certiorari. in the manner provided in the Rules of Court. shall have the power to issue writ of injunction. It exists only when duly granted. or any of them.L-24882. as may be plainly seen in the above-quoted tenor of its pertinent provision. I maintain that consonant with the need to make of the Circuit Criminal Courts the courts of special and limited jurisdiction designed to attend with utmost expeditiousness to the cases assigned to them. quo warranto andhabeas corpus. (See Director of Forestry vs. on board a ship or watercraft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippines in accordance with the laws thereof. as undoubtedly the law intends them to be. 38 SCRA 559. certiorari. And this Court has been very restrictive in construing this particular grant of jurisdiction. not only as to the nature of the cases that can be filed with them but also as to the extent of their functions and powers relative to said cases. prohibition quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective provinces districts.. mandamus. as a matter or Court's policy. in the sense not only that the jurisdiction of said courts is limited to the cases which they may take cognizance of. but also in that any other work not strictly part of the functions to "try and decide" said cases.) To repeat. at least. which by their nature could reasonably be deemed inferable from the grant of general jurisdiction. and cases therein cited. That the court first lawfully taking cognizance thereof shall have jurisdiction of the same to the exclusion of all other courts in the Philippines. prohibition. and only within their respective provinces and districts. (g) Over all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country. such authority would seem to be implicit from the grant of general jurisdiction. to try and decide" them. as ' kn ° .47 (f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months. It is a familiar rule that the jurisdiction of a court. and (h) Said court and their judges. Section 1 of the Act should be construed." Significantly. Whenever there is reason to doubt. Ruiz. Section 1 of Republic Act 5179 does not grant the circuit criminal courts jurisdiction "in" or "over" the cases listed. as in the case before Us. had still to be granted expressly to said courts.. or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippines. and yet We always insist that it should be specifically .J is to deny the existence of power. even in case of doubt. is not contemplated to be performed by them. it sh0 be borne in mind that the power to conduct preliminary 'investigations has never been deemed as a mere incidental prerogative of any court. Rather. or a fine of more than two hundred pesos. mandamus. only "the limited jurisdiction . may not be deemed granted by mere implication. In this connection. the circuit criminal courts should retrain from holding preliminary investigations the rule. It should be noted from the provisions of Section 44 of the Judiciary Act aforequoted that even the authority of the regular courts of first instance to grant writs of injunction. unless perhaps in instances when this is indubitably clear.

I dare say. disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. if any. albeit surprisingly the majority would give weight to such factual finding only to serve as basis for a policy only of the Court.' . which everyone knows have always conducted preliminary investigations since the enactment of Act 194 in 1901. "circuit criminal courts are nothing but additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts . by the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. 36 SCRA 172. Now. wna I said was this: "I take it that under Republic Act 5179. Republic Act 5179" that circuit criminal courts "have the same powers and functions as those conferred upon regular Courts of First Instance necessary to effectively exercise (their) special and limited jurisdiction. Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts with the limited concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of. We must consider the same as included in said power or as something that must indispensably be added thereto. in connection with the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. But the portion quoted from my opinion is not complete. such that the authority therefor need not be spelled out in black and white? Withal." But I am afraid this reasoning ignores that "the powers and Actions (of) the regular Courts of First Instance" conferred upon the circuit criminal courts are only those "necessary (for them) to effectively exercise (their) special and limited jurisdiction " and the issue precisely is what is the extent of that special and limited jurisdiction.48 conferred. what special reason is there why the conferment upon circuit criminal courts of the faculty to "try and decide" certain types of criminal cases should be deemed as necessarily including the authority to conduct preliminary investigations related thereto. And besides. Gutierrez." The main opinion quotes from my concurring opinion in People vs. whether by logical implication or by the reasons behind the organization of the courts. but only to "the provisions of the laws and the Rules of Court relative to the Judges of the Courts of First Instance. granting jurisdiction to regular courts of first instance to conduct preliminary investigations are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. try and decide only those cases enumerated in Section 1 of the Act. as found factually by the main opinion. transfer etc. and disposition and appeal of criminal cases" in the circuit criminal courts. since it is indeed the policy underlying the law itself. when according to what the main opinion emphasizes. apparently to show that in my view. salaries. a careful reading of Section 3 should make it clear to everyone that its phraseology studiously refers not to all the powers of the judges of the Courts of First Instance." meaning their qualifications. the Judiciary Act had to expressly provide for the grant of such authority to them. that the provisions of laws and Rules of Court. and to their powers and prerogatives in "the trial. instead of utilizing the same as premise for the proper construction of the Act in order that such policy may be legally effectuated. is there anything in the conduct of preliminary investigations that makes it more inherent or inseparable from the expressed power "to try and decide" that necessarily. that "special and limited jurisdiction" is "try and decide" the cases enumerated and this power does not have to be accompanied. which is plainly consistent with the scope of the power granted to them under Section 1 ""to try and decide. such function can be better performed by the prosecution staff of the government? The main opinion holds that it "is plain and evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic act. if in the case of inferior courts. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial. considering that these latter provisions contemplate circuit criminal courts which should not undertake the functions of conducting preliminary investigations. As I have already pointed out. This is readily implied from Section 3 of the Act which says: "'SECTION 3.

Thus. Section 87 provides in unmistakable terms: xxx xxx xxx "Said municipal judges and judges of city courts may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense alleged to have been committed within their respective municipalities and cities which are cognizable by Courts of First Instance and the information filed with their courts without regard to the limits of punishment. this section was "taken. when Rule 108 was revised in the 1964 Rules. from Section 4 of former Rule 108. that the Supreme Court can arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or grant any to the lower courts by merely promulgating a rule to such effect." xxx xxx xxx If. 117. but strictly "to take cognizance of. it was overlooked that under Section 99 of the Judiciary Act. try and decide" only the cases therein enumerated. Apparently. it can be clearly seen that as in the case of Act 194. I am of course assuming that the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations. which was a substantial re-statement of the ruling of the Supreme Court in one case. 1970 ed. The main opinion assumes the correctness of the generally prevailing impression that courts of first instance continue to possess the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations.) But Sec. There is another point which is more transcendental." citing People vs. the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in all our courts by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. p. No matter how many times one may read the provisions of the whole Judiciary Act of 1948 and particularly those that refer to the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.49 "xxx xxx xxx" In other words. It cites the Rules of Court as the source of such authority. Rules of Court. when Act 1627 was still in force. is not inherent in every court. 1 am not sure. to put it mildly. in the Judiciary Act itself. of what need is there for the provision just quoted? Upon the other . for the simple reason that jurisdiction is substantive and not adjective in nature. are the provisions of the Rules of Court invoked in the main opinion. And so. In pointing out this patent omission. assuming arguendo that circuit criminal courts have all the powers of the regular courts of first instance. the legislature had to expressly vest upon inferior courts the power to conduct such preliminary investigations. the question in my mind is simply this. (See 4 Moran. and may release. by Section 87 of the Act. I believe it is safer to hold that jurisdiction to act on any given matter may be granted only by statute or legislative enactment. Solon. supra. as the majority maintain. while sometimes given to courts in spite of its being basically an [2] executive function per Orendain. Section 13 of Rule 112. try and decide" them. is it clear that the latter courts continued to possess.For instance. with amendments. as in Section 44 of Judiciary Act. the power to conduct preliminary investigations? In other words. predicated on any law or statute? According to former Chief Justice Moran. or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court. one will never find any word therein that directly or indirectly confers upon said courts the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. "all laws and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act" was repealed thereby wiping away Section 37 of Act 1627. I adhered closely to the language of the statute and referred to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts as comprising of the power "to take cognizance of. 4 of Rule 108 was part of the Rules of Court of 1940. seventy-five years ago. which I dispute. after the Judiciary Act of 1948 went into effect. For my part. I did not concede that the authority was broadly "over" those cases.

Rule 112 is followed pursuant to Albano vs. such as. unless.. 44: . following Solon and Marcos.50 hand. and Republic Act 5180 governing preliminary investigations by fiscals. it also contained provisions about preliminary investigations. taken together with the fact that Section 99 of the Act repeals all laws and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. mention preliminary investigation by Circuit Criminal Courts. 2019. if really Congress intended to confer the power in issue on them? The reference to Republic Act 6425 is even more revealing of the insistence of the majority to cling to any drifting straw in their effort to prove their point. the applicable rule of statutory construction is that to the effect that when scattered statutes and provisions relative to the same subject matter are embodied subsequently in a single comprehensive legislation. the judges. just as the other later law. preliminary investigations in prosecutions under said laws have to be done by the Courts of First Instance." said provision is proof of a legislative assumption that said courts can exercise such power. Republic Act 1700 and the Dangerous Drugs Act. (Sutherland Statutory Construction. Republic Act 6425. Besides. that such pose overlooks the fact that the Judiciary Act of 1948 is indisputably in the nature of a codification of all laws existing at the time of its passage related to the judiciary. Vol. pp.. of course. Sec. as amended by Presidential Decree No. I have never denied that there are instances when by specific provision of the pertinent laws. Such being the case.) Which is but logical. the procedure [5] provided for in Section 13. . 1. while it perpetuates in the same breadth as a general rule a procedure which denies that right. 480-481. of what use is the integration? The main opinion points to certain legislations subsequent to' 1948 which it contends constitute recognition on the part of Congress of the continued authority of Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations. Republic Act 6425 originally granted to the Circuit Criminal Courts exclusively jurisdiction over cases for violation thereof. such as. cited in the main opinion expressly treated and referred to said courts separately from the Courts of First Instance and Domestic Relations Courts. My position is that the silence of the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter. As regards Republic Act 5180. indicates an unmistakable legislative intention to remove from the Courts of First Instance the prerogative under discussion. Arranz. as otherwise. I see no reason at all why there should be such an express confirmation of the power of inferior courts alone and none at all of that of the Courts of First Instance. the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or Republic Act 6425. Of course. I contend. in violations of the Election Law. 44. Here is the pertinent provision. the Anti-Subversion Act. but these did not in any manner indicate whether expressly or impliedly that the same courts would have authority to conduct such investigations. if such conferment is merely confirmatory of an existing constitutionally based authority. in accordance with law. which is likely to happen in a preliminary [3] [4] investigation in a Court of First Instance. It is argued that to thus argue is to rely on repeal by implication which is not favored. any particular provision incorporated therein and germane to the main subject matter is deemed to be repeated. the courts and their respective jurisdictions. however. if Republic Act 5180 is of any materiality in this discussion. why did not Republic Act 5180 which was approved on the same day as Republic Act 5179. . But as I see it. the main opinion claims that because Section I thereof makes mention of "investigation . it is in that it makes more patent that the policy of the law on preliminary investigations is to make them as expeditious as possible but without depriving the accused of the opportunity to be heard. conducted by a Court of First Instance . It sounds to me rather anachronistic for a law to emphasize the right of an accused to be heard before he is arrested. To start with. before it was amended by Presidential Decree No.

Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer and a prima facie case is established. the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. in this connection. Jurisdiction. to my mind. the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours. they now hold that the law in question allows a judge to conduct the preliminary examination of the witnesses of the prosecution to issue a warrant of arrest and to subsequently try the main case on the merits. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court. The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing. That in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. The mention of "the preliminary investigation (being) conducted by a judge" in the above provision contemplates. — The Court of First Instance. bearing in mind the considerations already discussed above relative to the tendency of the every new law to remove from superior courts the power to conduct preliminary investigations. the main opinion falls back on of all things the provision of the Bill of Rights of the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 enjoining that no warrant (of arrest) . I am not aware that any Court of First Instance has ever done so.51 "SECTION 39. even if the language of said law in issue is not really clear and the existence of the pretended power is just being gathered from inference of doubtful logic. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case. but the proper municipal judges. Indeed. there is a multitude of reasons strongly justifying the contrary construction. with the pardon I hope of my learned colleagues. not the judges of the courts specified therein. Presidential Decree 44 amended the above provision as follows: "SECTION 39. while. Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the tiling of the information. In what I consider. Does not this show that the preliminary investigation is not to be conducted by the court itself? But. The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be resolved within a period of seven (7) days from the date of termination of the preliminary investigation. prima facie case is found to exist. it is to me a mystery how easily my brethren have forgotten that when in another case the very same respondent judge here did nothing more than act as the officer before whom the accused swore a confession which the said accused later on repudiated as having been secured thru violence and intimidation. the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age." Quite inconsistently. as if to make it more patent that it is better that the investigation is undertaken by another authority. — The Circuit Criminal Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act. to be a desperate but vain effort to provide substantive law basis for Section 13 of Rule 112. and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over ail cases involving offenses punishable under this Act: Provided." It is to be noted that there is here a requirement that the corresponding information should be filed in court within 24 hours." That the foregoing provision does not vest any preliminary investigation authority in any of the courts mentioned is best proven by the fact that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts have never conducted any preliminary investigation whether under its original charter or under this provision. Circuit Criminal Court. Where aprimafacie case is established. on the other hand. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case. the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecuting officer within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case. We disqualified respondent from trying the case for fear that he might not be able to maintain "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. in Hashim vs. however." (at p. ergo. are constitutionally vested with jurisdiction to conduct preliminary examinations. Boncan. desertation of why Circuit Criminal Courts have all the powers of the Courts of First Instance to prove that they can like the latter courts conduct preliminary examinations. from where did our municipal mayors derive their authority under existing rules to perform such function? I have carefully perused with deep interest the elaborate statement in the main opinion of the "historical background of our law on criminal procedure. 104) According to the same decision. houses. 71 Phil. and for this reason. the preliminary investigation in criminal cases is not a creation of the Constitution. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge. it is only when there is a statute granting such right and slill it is denied to the accused in spite of his demand therefor that there is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. and since before doing so. I am not overlooking the fact that seemingly what the main opinion contends to be constitutionally based is the power of judges to issue warrants of arrest. judges. warrants of arrests may be issued only by judges (under the 1935 Constitution). My understanding of the Bill of Rights provision pertinent to this discussion. In Marcos vs. At this point. which corresponds only to the first stage of the prosecution known as preliminary examination. The right of the people to be secure in their persons.52 [6] "may issue but upon probable cause. that even after such a very refreshing intellectual excursion. they must examine the complainant and his witnesses under oath. when all they had to say is that Circuit Criminal Court Judges are among the judges the Constitution contemplates. 96. my reading of the history of the law on preliminary investigations in this jurisdiction indicates that this Court has been consistently holding that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right. then the jurisdiction of judges in the matter in issue cannot but be exclusive. its origin is statutory and the right thereto can be invoked when so established and granted by law. to conduct preliminary investigation. however. 216. and I presume that would mean all judges. after examination under oath or . if scholarly. But as I will demonstrate anon. which reads thus: "Sec. I still cannot see that such historical background traced by my scholarly brethren necessarily leads to the conclusion that the power of our courts to conduct preliminary investigation springs from the Constitution or that after the Judiciary Act of 1948 repealed all laws and rules inconsistent with its provisions. the statutory authority of Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations still continued to exist. 1 do not see it that way. if the theory of the majority is to be pursued to its logical conclusion. I will just make the observation that if it were true that all judges may conduct preliminary examinations by virtue of the above provision of the Bill of Rights.68 Phil. More authoritatively. this Court unanimously held: "In this jurisdiction. why did the majority have to go thru all the trouble of a lengthy and laborious. for the Constitution mentions no other officer who may issue warrants of arrest. But then the question would arise. if not investigations. Quite to the contrary. the right to preliminary investigation is statutory. I sense some kind of non sequitur here. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." (at p. As I understand it. not constitutional. assumingthe absence of any statutory basis." It is posited that this constitutional mandate is the ultimate source of the authority of the Courts of First Instance. the theory is that under the Constitution. at least in so far as the so-called second stage thereof is concerned. it is maintained the purported ruling can stand together with the Marcos and Hashim doctrines which relate to the second stage known as the preliminary investigation." I regret to state.) Of course. 3. in my opinion. Moreover. no less than Justice Laurel took occasion to say: "Viewed in the light of fundamental principles. papers. 225. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated. Cruz.

the Constitution does not vest uponjust anyjudge. to cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution and to present his own evidence. prescribe. 1. Literally. this provision which reads thus: "SECTION l. it merely limits and lays down conditions before anyjudge authorized by law to issue warrants may do so. such as. jurisdiction to issue warrants of arrests.) Of course. I always find his views illuminating. as long as the case has not passed to the jurisdiction of the court. X. I find it difficult to see his . Moreover. I would like to address myself to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. it does not sound realistic and in keeping with the trend of recent developments in the pertinent laws to further allow [7] prosecutions to be initiated in the Courts of First Instance. But on the point now in controversy. but only to "the judge" who will issue the warrant and that to me is presumably only the judge who by statute is authorized to act in the premises. to my mind. whose specialization in matters of constitutional law has won recognition not only for him but also for our country from no less than the organizers of the constitutional aspect of the bicentennial celebration of the American.) is that it is a prohibition against anyjudge issuing a warrant of arrest without complying with the requirements set forth therein. after all is constitutionally endowed with authority to precisely make such allocation.The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. the particular statute concerned expressly provides that the preliminary investigation be conducted by the Court of First Instance. also of the Bill. (Estrella vs. an arrest may even be made without a warrant. who. not to mention Our own ruling in Estrella recognizing his power of supervision and control over fiscals. sans the power to issue warrants of arrest. it follows that all courts in the Philippines may act in the premises. IV. I do not mind saying that whenever I want to be comprehensive in my study of constitutional issues. in special cases wherein it is required by what in the legislature's judgment is the public interest. and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts. In fine. 1973 Constitution. the provision does not refer to all judges. much less upon all judges. (Sec. The National Assembly shall have the power to define. Orenclain." (Art. In like manner.) Indeed. but also (2) to transfer the function of conducting preliminary investigations.53 affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." readily connotes that except in the case of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. and it is only when a warrant is needed that the judge who is to issue the same is constitutionally bound to adhere to the conditions therein laid down. just any court in the Philippines. to prosecuting officers belonging to the Executive Department to which the prerogative to prosecute or not to prosecute properly belongs in the exercise of the President's duty to see to it that the laws are properly executed. Justice Fernando. 1973 Constitution. according to Section 5. it is not the Constitution but the statutes that are the sources of the jurisdiction of all the various courts of the country. regardless of the definition and allocation of jurisdiction by the National Assembly or the legislature. and particularly describing the place to be searched. until lately when the right to cross-examine was eliminated by Presidential Decree 77 as amended by Presidential Decree 911. but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section five hereof. and the persons or things to be seized. it cannot be argued that because Section 4( 1) of the Bill of Rights provides that privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court. At this juncture. 37 SCRA 640. the development of the law on preliminary investigations in this jurisdiction evinces a clear tendency not only to give the accused in all such investigations the opportunity to be present. even a municipal court can grant such authority or that because the liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. In fact. Indeed. Art. in cases of violation of Election Code and cases of violations of the Anti-Subversion Law (Act 1700). with the broad control given to the Secretary of Justice over crime prosecution by Presidential Decree 911.

confers the power to conduct (the) preliminary examination preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest. of the origin of the competence of judges to issue warrants of arrest is to the effect that it is a prerogative that antedates both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions. rather said provision lays down the conditions and limitations which the particular judges authorized by law to perform such function must observe. but I regret I cannot accept the hypothesis emphasized in the main opinion that because said provision of the rules is supposed to be an implementation of the Bill of Rights provision against unreasonable searches and seizures. . for a moment I entertained earnestly the thought that I could probably join my brethren in the formulation of such a ruling. however. Thus. (p. the 1973 Constitution has given the practice explicit constitutional basis by providing that probable cause may also be determined by "such other responsible officer (not necessarily a judge) as may be authorized by law. Boncan." not without hastening to clarify. I now hold that the Bill of Rights provision under discussion has not been designed to confer the power to determine probable cause to every judge in the courts of the Philippines." . and other courts of equivalent rank to determine probable cause before the issuance of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information. including Judges of the Courts of First Instance. Justice Fernando's pose in his book on the Bill of Rights (1970 Edition) that the significance of entrusting the responsibility of determining the existence of probable cause exclusively to judiciary (under the 1935 Constitution) in the defense of freedom cannot be overestimated. searches and seizures as air tight as possible. I had in mind then Mr." More than ever before. of similar provisions of General Orders No. No doubt. supra. that "it is (his) understanding . it is not indispensable that all judges be vested with such power. ." or "the second stage. and instead of condemning such practice. but it is equally undeniable that giving the power to determine the existence of probable cause exclusively to judges is not the only guarantee that can ensure that end. I have arrived at the conclusion that such a proposition cannot stand close scrutiny. Surely. such military order cannot in any sense be deemed to be a mandate of constitutional stature. this Court has expressly sanctioned the same as being conducive to a more efficient system of prosecution of offenses. that the decision reached is at most an affirmation that the present Constitution. 58 and Section 37 of Act 1627." Of course.) What is more.54 point. We must perforce conclude that the Bill of Rights is the source of the jurisdiction of the judges to act in the manner provided in said rule. he particularly underlines his conformity to the ruling in the main opinion that the 1935 as well as the 3973 Constitution "provide the source of the power of all Judges. My knowledge. I feel I am supported in this view by the following excerpts . the Circuit Criminal Courts." such that as to the judges' competence regarding a preliminary investigation. that such specifically was what the members of the Court were made to understand during the deliberations by the distinguished writer of the main opinion is clear and distinct in my recollection. It was in fact recognized by the American military occupation authorities from the very inception of their rule over the Philippine Islands in 1901. as did the 1935 Constitution. if only because even if none but judges may issue warrants of arrest. to a circuit criminal court judge" and that "it is only the first stage in the criminal process that may lead to the apprehension of the accused that has been passed upon by the Court. 58. . 177) But after trying very hard to see it his way. There can be no dispute about the imperative need to make the safeguards against unreasonable arrests. Not only fiscals but even municipal mayors have for decades exercised said power in this jurisdiction. if limited. Section 13 of Rule 112 appears to be a mere reiteration. As a matter of fact. . I have to confess. if with substantial modifications. (See Hashim vs. our first code of criminal procedure of American vintage. "that question has been left open. so it is really up to the legislature to determine which court or judge should be endowed with it. (the) preliminary investigation proper. as evidenced by General Orders No.

Considerandose. cuya enmienda pido. Como ya he dicho.' De modo que mi enmienda es a tenor o en consonancia con esta disposicion legal. coma articulo 2 7. examinara bajo juramento al denunciante o al testigo presente. especialmente del denunciante. solamente mediante un documento jurado en el que aparezcan hechos probables. o mediante examen del denunciante. 58 esta disposicion que aparece en el proyecto del Comite de 7 que es una reproduccion o copia del precepto que aparece en el bill de Filipinos y luego en la Ley Jones. Los abogados que estamos en el ejercicio de la profesion hemos visto muchas veces casos en que agent es secretos consiguen mandamientos de registro solamente mediante la presentacion de un affidavit que reune los requisitos de la Ley. Tiene la palabra el Delegado por Cavite. Pero yo creo que ninguno de los miembros de esta Asamblea vera que mi enmienda no responde a una razon fundamentaly a una necesidad que se ha sentido en la practica.55 from the records of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 containing the apt observations of no less than Senator Vicente J. sin embargo. con tal de que la peticion vaya acompanada de un affidavit en el que aparezcan hechos y circunstancias que demuestren causas probables. y nosotros sabemos muy bien que si se aprobara una constitucion en la forma como esta el precepto. De ahi que si queremos salvaguardar en todo lo posible el derecho de unindividuo a arrestos o registros arbitrarios. Someto a la consideracion de esta Asamblea que es completamente peligroso permitir que un juez expida mandamiento de registro. o al menos no puede mantenerse este precepto por anti-constitucional. mandamientos de registro. creo que este ultimo tendria que quedarse derogado. nuestro mismo Codigo de Procedimiento Civil inserta en su Articulo 28 una disposicion que exige como requisito 'sine quanon' el que el Juez no pueda expedir mandamiento de registro sino mediante el examen de testigos. 58. 58 podra en cierto modo ser contradictoria al precepto del proyecto de constitucion. Parece ser que la diferencia es grande. Pero que expedido el registro e impugnados despues los terminos del affidavit se descubre que los hechos que aparecen en el mismo son completamente falsos. no ha sido acepfada por esta jurisdiction. FRANCISCO RAZONA SV ENMIENDA SR. que estos es verdaderamente peligroso para el derecho que tiene un individuo a la seguridad de sus bienes y papeles. antes de expedir el mandamiento. Como ya he dicho. un juez puede expedir un mandamiento de registro sino solo despues de haber examinado at denunciante y a sus testigos bajo juramento. como ya he dicho. o sea. FRANCISCO. Esta convencion. Este articulo viene a ser el Articulo 28 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil que dice lo siguiente: 'El Juez de Primera Instancia o el Juez de paz debera. Laurel: "EL PRESIDENTS. y si encontrara una discrepancia sustancial entre dicho precepto y el Codigo de Procedimiento Civil. Senor Presidente y Caballeros de la Convencion: bajo el proyecto del Comite de 7. no solamente en la practica sino tambien por la orden general Num. supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched. Esta idea de que se puede expedir mandamiento de registro mediante affidavit. 'peticion apoyada por juramento 'puede ser testimonio del festigo o affidavit. Francisco and Justice Jose P. esta disposicion de la Orden General Num. EL SR. creo. se puede expedir. si mantuvieramos el precepto del proyecto de constitucion. aparece reproducida. consignando sus declaraciones por escrito. El texto en ingles del projecto dice: 'xxx and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. and the persons or things to be seized. si queremos que . dice lo siguiente: 'No se expedir a mandamiento de registro sino por causa probable y por falta de peticion apoyada por juramento'. Este articulo 2 7. Bajo mi enmienda. en la Orden General Num.' Esta expresion ha sido interpretadapor los tribunates de America en el sentido de que el juez tiene dos medios: o puede tomar en cuenta para la expedicion de un mandamiento de registro un affidavit en el que consten hechos y demuestren la causa probable. atendiendoseexclusivamenie a lo que consta en un affidavit. se habra jijado que en dicha Orden General Num. 58.

which in my opinion is unauthorized and void. L-34243. considering that the consensus among the members of the Court. Nos. or the Code of Criminal Procedure.R. In no way can it have the effect of jeopardy. While as Mr. before a judge could issue a search warrant. which I understand some members of the Court are not ready to do. England. L-34038 insofar as the respondent judge's impugned order of July 6. No. It is only in G.1 agree that respondent judge exceeded his authority in providing that his order of dismissal is with prejudice and in ordering the return of the articles seized by the customs authorities to his co-respondent Makapugay. y quisiera dec'tr dos palabras. L-34038. reaches only preliminary examinations and not preliminary investigations. L-39525. Justice Fernando. I vote to grant the petitions in G.R. L-36376 and L-38688 that respondent judge has not been able to conduct even the preliminary examination. before issuing a search warrant. quite important that we impose this obligation upon the judge. In G . It is not stated whether or not it was in due form or under oath. L-36376. this decision recognizes only the power of respondent judge to conduct the first stage or the preliminary examination. Vol. so that he will not be issuing search warrant in . No L--34038.R. Now. L-34038.R. L. Frankly. the witnesses that he may produce.56 el derecho de! individuo a la seguridad de sus bienes o papeles este rodeado de todas las garantias que puedan impedir o que impidan la expedicion de registros inmotivados o infundados que pueden dar lugar a molestias o vejaciones injustas e irreparables. in legal contemplation the qualification "with prejudice" thus made by respondent judge means nothing. 1971 orders the return of the articles seized to his corespondent Makapugay. The General Order. if they ever occur at the present time. therefore. Francisco. Justice Fernando stresses. L-38688 and L-40031 are concerned. No.) "EL PRESIDENTE. in order precisely to avoid having to overrule Hashim vs. both the first and second stages. III. Mr. and if those irregularities pointed out by him really occurred. Mr. Of course. Regarding G. what are actually involved are preliminary investigations. he must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any witness.R. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING. there would be no need of setting aside the order of dismissal itself. And assuming it to be valid.1 notice that respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of nothing more than a letter-complaint of the petitioner Collector of Customs. now provides that the judge. MR.39525 and L-40031. in G. it is enough to say that it is a dismissal before arraignment and jeopardy has not thereby attached. It is. El Delegado por Batangas (Senor Laurel) acepta la enmienda? I cannot close this separate opinion without inviting attention to certain specific points of procedure which the main opinion seems not to have bothered to pass upon. must examine the complainant and his witnesses and that he must take their depositions in writing. SR. 750.752. The amendment introduced by the distinguished Delegate from Cavite is already covered by existing legislation. I am at a loss as to how the dispositive portion of Our judgment is to be understood. L-34243. it is because of the irregularities committed by some justices. creo que debemos hacer que en nuestra constitucion se consigne el precepto tal como yo propongo que se enmienda. LAUREL. " (Pp. the express qualification therein of "with prejudice" notwithstanding. It is not necessary for me to recall here one of the grievances of the early settlers in America which was one of the causes of the revolution against the mother country. as attested to by Mr. I am giving my concurrence to the judgment therein subject to the qualifications I have discussed in this separate opinion. The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are incorporating in our constitution something of a fundamental character. anyway. LAUREL.R. No. President and Gentlemen of the Convention: The anomalies pointed out by the Honorable gentleman from Cavite. the issuing of the so-called general search warrant. it is because some justices have not enforced and adhered to the specific provision of the General Order. Nos. Boncan and Marcos vs. and insofar as G. since what was conducted by him was only a preliminary investigation. notwithstanding what I consider to be their importance. Cruz. No. senor Presidente.

Regional Trial Court. Quirino. I have no alternative but to deny to Circuit Criminal Courts such power. respondent judge failed to issue the corresponding warrant of arrest against accused Michael Badangngayon and Peter Guinannoy. that she issued a warrant of arrest dated March 26. 2000 and March 1. In the anonymous letter-complaint. The necessity consists in that the constitution is something permanent for the protection of the individual citizen. but that he must consider the sanctity of the home. Branch 38. (3) directing her court personnel to render services in her house at Quezon City. November 29. Vol. when respondent judge came to know that an administrative case had been filed against her. J.57 blank. 2002] CONCERNED CITIZEN OF MADDELA and JUDITH B. JUDGE MA. THERESA DELA TORRE-YADAO. respondent judge is being denounced for: (1) sleeping with a female employee in her chambers. Maddela. Maddela. furnishings and equipment intended for office use. Branch 38. the committee accepts and approves of the amendment as suggested by Delegate Francisco" (Pp. (5) bringing to her house books. Theresa dela Torre-Yadao. You might say that as this amendment is already in the general legislation. Ermitanio against [1] Judge Ma. In her letter-complaint.M. since there is neither any constitutional provision nor statute that presently confers on Judges of the Courts of First Instance the power to conduct preliminary examinations. 757-758. vs. Quirino. Judith Ermitanio alleged that despite the filing on March 18. 2000. November 29. For this reason. except the very act of issuing the warrant of arrest. It was only on March 7.) And so. Regional Trial Court (RTC). JUDGE MA. 38-034 for murder involving the death of her husband. 1999. Branch 38. or after one (1) year. ERMITANIO. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. complainant. RTJ-01-1639. 2002] JUDITH ERMITANIO.: The present administrative cases stemmed from two letter-complaints dated February 23. respondent. (4) buying narra logs from a litigant and storing them in her chambers. or simply accompanied by affidavits. 00-9-427-RTC. and the trend of our laws is to leave such function to other responsible officers. 2000 filed respectively by a ―concerned citizen of Maddela‖ and Judith B. Quirino. respondent. It is proper that we incorporate that provision rather than general legislation in this constitution that we shall adopt. (2) collecting gasoline allowance from politicians. and (6) reporting at her sala only three days a month. No. THERESA DELA TORRE-YADAO. [A. complainants. vs. It is necessary that we surround that power with the necessary constitutional guaranty. 1999 of the Information in Criminal Case No. what is the necessity of incorporating this in the constitution. III. Maddela. . No. Regional Trial Court. [A.M.

2001. Due to the seriousness of the allegations in the letter-complaints against respondent judge. He. why did the latter seem not to know about the said warrant when the complainant went to their office to follow up the case? If a warrant of arrest has already been issued and delivered to the PNP Maddela as early as 26 March 1999. 2000 against respondent judge. Bello. That the complainant has been following up the case since April 1999 until March 2000 has been corroborated by the testimony of all the other witnesses for the complainant. that the complainant never went to the court to follow up the case is not at all believable. On March 15. It would be highly improbable for the complainant not to have gone to the court to follod ―It has also been established that the complainant had been following up the warrant with the PNP Maddela and the Fiscal‘s Office. one of the witnesses for the respondent judge. his Report and Recommendation deals mainly with the complaint of Judith Ermitanio. In a Resolution dated July 11. If a warrant of arrest had been issued as early as 26 March 1999 and was received by the PNP Maddela on the same date. she issued an order on March 2. On March 8. the latter was motivated by ill will in resorting to an anonymous letter-complaint. this Court referred the case to Justice Eloy R. Jr. therefore. respondent judge explained that after the filing of the Information in Criminal Case No. 38-034. report and recommendation. 2000 directing that the case be archived and that an alias warrant of arrest be issued. we do not find any reason or motive on the part of the PNP Maddela. of the Court of Appeals for investigation. She stated that the writer is actually Marilou Cabanatan. In his Report and Recommendation. Butale stated that after conducting an investigation. particularly the testimonial evidence presented by both parties. ―If indeed. this Court finds more reasons to believe the version of the complainant. 2000 order. Also. the complainant would not have filed the present administrative case in the first place. a court stenographer in her sala. since her only complaint is the non-issuance of a warrant of arrest in the case of her husband. to hide the fact of the issuance of the said warrant from the complainant. the fact that the complainant was able to write to Mayor Fred Lim and even went as far as the Supreme Court would show how persistent complainant is in fighting for the cause of her late husband. 2000. he found that there is reason to believe that respondent judge committed the acts complained of. In his report dated September 18. Hence. respondent judge received a request for the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest from the Maddela Police Station. Respondent judge explained that she sent Marilou memoranda and show-cause letters for her habitual absenteeism and tardiness. thus: ―Amidst the conflicting claims of the opposing parties and after a careful consideration and scrutiny of the evidence. respondent judge denied the allegations therein for being false and without basis. she issued the corresponding warrant of arrest against the accused. Considering that the accused could not be apprehended. disobedience and neglect of duty. 2000. why was not Fiscal Orias informed about the said warrant when he also went to the court to follow up the case and why did he not see a copy of the said warrant in the records of the case when he inspected the said records? . If a warrant had already been issued and served on the PNP Maddela. 2000. Justice Bello stated that no evidence was presented to support the allegations in the anonymous letter-complaint dated February 23. Moreover. recommended that an administrative complaint for serious misconduct and gross inefficiency be filed against her. a warrant of arrest had been issued and was served on the PNP Maddela on the date being claimed by the respondent judge. why was not the complainant told about the said warrant during the times she went to the court to follow up whether a warrant of arrest regarding her husband‘s case had already been issued? The testimony of Crisostomo Molina. 1999.58 In her comment on the anonymous letter. the PNP of Maddela received a copy of the alias warrant. On the complaint of Judith Ermitanio. a copy of which was received by the Maddela Police Station on the same day. the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for a discreet investigation. Obviously. or on March 26. but she only noted it in view of the March 2. NBI Special Investigator Gerard L.

or a warrant of arrest had been issued by the respondent judge on the date being claimed by her. ―Although the respondent judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of her official duty.59 ―The logical conclusion that could be drawn from all these is that. an alias warrant dated 02 March 2000 was issued. meaning. The aforesaid testimony was further corroborated by the testimony of SPO1 Honofre Reolalas. 1999 but . and so he called on SPO1 Honofre Reolalas to receive the same without indicating the same of receipt. together with her staff. Bernardo Baui testified that on 07 March 2000. he delivered the same to the PNP Maddela on 07 March 2000 and the same was received by SPO4 Raquipiso on the same date. she is guilty of simple negligence on the principle of [2] command responsibility. one of the staff of the respondent judge working as docket clerk in Branch 38. conclusive. ―What is more telling is the testimony given by Norman Ruabaro. he. ―According to the police. this presumption is not. but the same was not timely served on the PNP Maddela. but not the receipt of the PNP Maddela on the same date. But that part of his testimony which is most damaging to the claims of respondent judge and which at the same time further bolstered the allegations of complainant. He claimed that he refused at first. He also testified that OIC Molina was able to retrieve the said warrant from the PNP Maddela as per instructions of the respondent judge and claimed that he hid the same afterwards. He further testified that on 14 March 2000. ―Since the date of receipt by the PNP Maddela of the said warrant of arrest is being refuted by evidence to the contrary. went to the PNP Maddela to have another warrant of arrest dated 26 March 1999 received by the PNP Maddela without indicating the date and that they succeeded in having the same received by Sr. Hence. maybe. It is only a disputable presumption. the said warrant of arrest being presented by the judge could at most prove the issuance of the same on 26 March 1999. they have not received any warrant of arrest regarding the case of People of Philippines vs. dispelling Crisostomo Molina‘s testimony that the complainant never went to court to follow up the case. Maddela. He further testified that subsequently. RTC. He claimed that he typed a warrant of arrest in 1999 but the judge refused to sign the same. but consented eventually since they have earlier received the same warrant of arrest on 07 March 2000 indicating the date of receipt. he prepared a warrant of arrest dated 26 March 1999.‖ In determining the appropriate penalty. deserves scant consideration since the due execution of the same is being refuted by the testimonies of the witnesses for the complainant. is that part where he claimed that no warrant of arrest was issued on March 1999 and narrated how three warrants of arrest were issued all in all on March 2000. purporting to be the warrant of arrest dated 26 March 1999. a warrant of arrest dated 26 March 1999 was received by their office. But being the presiding judge. On March 2000. it is her duty to monitor the due service of legal processes in her court. went to the police station asking that another warrant of arrest dated 26 March 1999 be received by his office without indicating the date of receipt of the same. P/Chief Insp. however. Lastly. Thus. b) it was probable that she issued a warrant of arrest on March 26. the respondent judge. and which was received by the Maddela Police on the same date. He attested to the fact that complainant has been following up her husband‘s case with the court monthly. Justice Bello considered the presence of the following circumstances which he believed could mitigate respondent‘s liability: a) this is her first offense since her appointment to the judiciary. only that the same was not served to the PNP Maddela on time. the logical probability is that the respondent judge issued the subject warrant of arrest. together with the respondent judge and the other staff. The testimonies presented by the complainant dispelling the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest are more than enough to dispute this legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. it is satisfactory only if uncontradicted and may be overcome by other evidence to the contrary. ―The document being presented by the respondent judge. there was no warrant of arrest issued on the date being claimed by the respondent judge. Michael Badangayon and Peter Guinannoy until March 2000. Police Officer Onofre Reolalas without indicating the date of receipt. particularly by SPO4 Librado Raquipiso.

Branch 37 in Bayombong. or on March 7. then he is mandated by [4] law to issue such warrant. such fact does not justify her failure to [5] issue a warrant of arrest. 1999 or after the filing of the Information on March 18. he prepared a warrant of arrest dated March 26. We note that they even confirmed the fact that complainant was persistent and assiduous in following up the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The issue here is whether respondent judge actually issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1999 almost a year after. the warrant was retrieved by OIC Crisostomo Molina upon instructions of respondent judge. to dispose of the court‘s business promptly. The present clogged dockets on all levels of our judicial system cannot be cleared. While we understand that respondent judge at that time was designated Presiding Judge of two other RTC salas (Bayombong. Nueva Viscaya and Quezon City). If indeed respondent judge issued the warrant on that date. Nueva Viscaya and RTC. in turn. and Ferdinand Orias. Maddela has only a few pending cases. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. 38-034 and undermined complainant‘s trust in the judiciary. while respondent judge found probable cause which justified the issuance of warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. Clearly. Instead. RTC docket clerk. Maddela. went to Maddela Police Station to file another warrant of arrest dated March 26. 38-034 on March 26. she did not issue the same as mandated by law. unless each and every magistrate earnestly. and c) her failure to monitor the service of the warrant of arrest was an oversight on her part considering that she was designated Presiding Judge of RTC. Moreover. Chief Inspector Baui and Senior Police Officer Riolalas corroborated Norman‘s testimony. complainant should have been informed about it by the court personnel when she was consistently following it up from April 1999 to March 2000. the issuance of the warrant of arrest is a matter of extreme urgency to abate the possibility of flight of the accused. Here. together with respondent judge and the other members of her staff. Norman Ruaboro. she could have acted with dispatch. in addition to her regular duties as Presiding Judge of RTC. She herself admitted that Branch 38 of RTC. nor did the Maddela Police receive any warrant on that day. In such case. 1999. a docket clerk at the RTC. A judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. or a span of one (1) year. agree with his conclusion and recommendation.60 the PNP at Maddela was not furnished with a copy on time. This was received by SPO4 Librado Raquipiso on the same date. At this point it bears stressing that it is within the discretion of the judge to issue a warrant for the [3] arrest of an accused in a criminal case. she was always told by the OIC of the court that the judge was not around. Branch 38. among others. As a result. Provincial Prosecutor of Quirino. We thus hold that respondent judge violated Rule 3. However. However. brings the courts into disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of the . it did not escape this Court‘s attention that respondent judge even attempted to cover up her inaction when she issued a warrant of arrest dated March 26. painstakingly and faithfully complies with the mandate of the law. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishing all judges. While the findings of the Investigating Justice are well-taken. Justice Bello then recommended that respondent be merely reprimanded and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. 2000. Her inaction obviously delayed the proceedings in Criminal Case No. Branch 81 in Quezon City. Undue delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice which. 1999.05. the accused could no longer be apprehended. It is the sworn duty of judges to administer justice without undue delay under the time-honored [6] precept that justice delayed is justice denied. both of the Maddela Police Station. Norman Ruaboro. 2000 to the Maddela PNP. Maddela. Chief Inspector Bernardo Baui and Senior Police Officer Onofre Riolalas. 1999 with her instruction that the date of receipt should not be specified. 1999 and delivered the same on March 7. Norman further testified that he. if he finds probable cause. however. Branch 38. Quirino. we do not. Senior Police Officer Riolalas received the same without indicating the date. 38-034. attested to the fact that sometime in March 2000. all testified that respondent judge did not issue a warrant of arrest on March 26.

so must the gallant men tasked to guard her domain. concur. J. 71782. Lanao del Sur. judges are revered as modern-day sentinels.‖ Section 9(1). failure of judges to promptly dispose of the court‘s business constitutes [8] gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against them. this Court finds Judge Ma.00. WHEREFORE. judges ought to be mindful of the crucial role they play in keeping the flames of justice alive and forever burning. MACABIDAR PANGANDAMAN. as delay reinforces in [9] the people‘s minds that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly. 2) to prohibit the Judge from taking further cognizance of said Criminal Case No.61 [7] public in the judiciary. MACADAOB P. PETITIONERS. and 3) to compel the Judge to forward the entire record of Criminal Case No. PUYAT P. in the hour of service to their countrymen. She is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20. MANGORAMAS PANGANDAMAN. 1748 entitled ―People vs. Puno. MARIO PANGANDAMAN. CASAR. Code of Judicial Conduct. In a sense. DIMAPENGEN. SO ORDERED. judges are duty-bound to vigilantly and conscientiously man the wheels of justice as it grinds though eternity.00). DIMAPENGEN AND DIAMA OPAO.000. As this Court eloquently stated in one [10] case: ―On the whole. so to speak.: The petitioners ask this Court: 1) to annul the warrant for their arrest issued by respondent Judge Dimaporo T.000. SANTORANI P. DIMAPORO T. J. with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. (Acting Chairman). LANAO DEL SUR AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. like their erudite forerunners. AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE OF POONABAYABAO. and Carpio-Morales. VS.. in Criminal Case No. under Section 11(B) of the same Rule. Time and again.05. Hence. 1988 ] HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN. on official business.. Cognizant of this sacred task. RESPONDENTS. Panganiban. April 14. et al. or a fine of more than P10. [ G. . 1748 to the Provincial Fiscal [1] of Lanao del Sur for proper disposition. classifies violation of Supreme Court rules as a less serious charge which.00 but not exceeding P20. MAGAMBAAN PANGANDAMAN. we remind judges of the importance of high sense of duty in the administration of justice. PACALUNDO PANGANDAMAN. MAMINTAL PANGANDAMAN. who. Theresa dela Torre-Yadao liable for violation of Rule 3.R. as amended. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. TAMPARAN AND MASIU. DECISION NARVASA. KILATUN PANGANDAMAN. They should dispose of the court‘s business within the prescribed period. MACARIAN PANGANDAMAN. ROMAMPAT. ―For as lady justice never sleeps. Casar of the Municipal Circuit Court of Masiu. No. Canon 3.000. (Chairman). is penalized with either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months. PANGORANGAN. must never slumber. NASSER P.‖. Corona. 1748. JJ. Hadji Ibrahim Solay Pangandaman.

‖ No case relative to the incident was. which are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts.m. Another version has it that a group that was on its way to another place. had been ambushed. Jose L. only. transmitting Atty. What in fact transpired is still unclear. On the following day.‖ be [7] forwarded to his office. also in [5] Masiu. On that same day. to 1:00 p. 1985.‖ reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the latter‘s answers. hence the present petition. Mangurun Batuampar.and promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. According to one version. August 10. Lalabuan. While they concede the authority of the respondent Judge to conduct a preliminary investigation of the offenses involved. The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by the parties involved on both sides -. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. and that that failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading to the issuance of the warrant [14] for the petitioners‘ arrest. Muti). Masiu. Laru[8] an. which ―has first taken cognizance of said cases. 1985. filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City. however. however. 1985 by Atty. Thereafter the Judge ―approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest‖ against the fourteen (14) [10] petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) ―John Does.‖ and that there was undue haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the Judge who relied ―mainly on the supporting affidavits which were obviously prepared [16] already when presented to him by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator. with both attackers and defenders suffering [4] casualties. presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday. which left at least five persons dead and two others wounded.‖ . 1985. It is further contended that August 10. seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a ―thorough investigation‖ on the ground that the Judge‘s initial investigation had been ―hasty and manifestly [11] haphazard‖ with ―no searching questions‖ having been propounded. Pama L.‖ An ―ex-parte‖ motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14. the petitioners and the Solicitor General argue that the Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the [13] procedure prescribed in Section 3.C. The Solicitor General agrees and [3] recommends that their petition be granted and the warrant of arrest voided. Batuampar (joined by Atty. Masiu.m.62 Their plea is essentially grounded on the claim that the warrant for their arrest was issued by the [2] respondent Judge without a proper preliminary investigation. claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims. Sgt. 1748. the respondent Judge ―examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru * * (his) closed and direct [9] supervision. On July 27. Lanao del Sur. when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before him by P. a shooting incident occurred in Pantao. * * *‖ and ―* * * it would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to determine the existence of probable cause against sixty-four (64) persons whose participations were of varying nature and degree in a matter of hours and issue the [15] warrant of arrest in the same day. 1985 was a Saturday during which ―Municipal Trial Courts are open from 8:00 a. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a ―1st indorsement‖ to the respondent Judge. Atty. which was docketed as Case No. The respondent Judge denied the [12] motion for ―lack of basis‖. identified -. Batuampar‘s letter and requesting that ―all cases that may be filed relative ** (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27. asking for a ―full blast preliminary [6] investigation‖ of the incident.none of whom was. armed men had attacked a residence in Pantao.

Stated otherwise. and that he does not intend to undertake the second phase. together with the record. At this stage also. Failure to do so will result in a denial of due process. in which case he dismisses the complaint and transmits the order of dismissal. either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for trial. the respondent Judge issued the warrant now complained of against the fourteen (14) respondents (now petitioners) named and identified by the witnesses as the perpetrators of the killings and injuries. or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase. access to the complainant‘s evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. Here. The procedure above described must be followed before the complaint or information is filed in the [19] Regional Trial Court. need to be clarified. is whether or not the respondent Judge had the power to issue the warrant of arrest without completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation. in his view. insofar as the respondent Judge is concerned. The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and other documents offered in support thereof. that the offenses charged had been committed. to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action. And although not specifically so declared. no information has as yet been filed with the Regional Trial Court. had already taken cognizance of the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to conduct his own [17] investigation of the same. There is no pretense that the preliminary investigation has been completed. where no authority to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in such officials) must observe the procedure prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112. it cannot be said that he has failed to observe the prescribed procedure. and having come to believe. is completion of the procedure laid down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest? There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before . to the provincial fiscal. the procedure mandated by the Rule actually consists of two phases or stages. There can be no debate about the proposition that in conducting a preliminary investigation of any crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on matters that. In this situation. This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint. as said respondent well knew. which shall be transmitted. a judge of an inferior court (other than in Metro-Manila or the chartered cities. and that issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) ―John Does‖ transgressed the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the [18] persons or things to be seized.‖ The real question.63 The petitioners further assert that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges ―* * * in total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal * * *‖ who. The second phase concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution. therefore. And it ends with the determination by the Judge either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry. as well as against 50 ―John Does. on the basis thereof. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. together with the records of the case. What has happened is simply that after receiving the complaint and examining the complainant‘s witnesses.

the former Section 6 of Rule 112 provided: ―SEC. It suffices that facts are presented to him to convince him. it has thus been ruled that ‗the occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties‘ evidence. or preliminary investigation proper. and. incidentally. but that there is probable cause to believe that such person committed the crime charged. saying: ―Appellant should bear in mind that a preliminary investigation such as was conducted by the Justice of the Peace has for its purpose only the determination of whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof.If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it. a preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused. it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably [23] guilty thereof. And it should not be forgotten that a preliminary investigation has two stages: First.If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. Regarding preliminary investigation. -. the reading to the accused after his arrest of the complaint or information filed against him. 6. if he so desires. only the testimony of the complainant shall be in writing and only an abstract of the testimony of the other is required. When warrant of arrest may issue. he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest. the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent‘s arrest even before opening the second phase of the investigation if said court is satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a necessity to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. and his being informed of the substance of the evidence against him. he shall issue a [21] warrant of arrest. that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Indeed. 6. But nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant of arrest may issue. The proceeding is generally ex parte unless the defendant desires to be present and while under the old Rules the Justice of the Peace or investigating officer must take the testimony of the complainant and the latter‘s witnesses under oath. and if so. -*** (b) By the Municipal Trial Court.64 [20] a warrant of arrest may be issued. -. What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that procedure. not that a person has committed the crime. to affirm the power of a justice of the peace or municipal judge conducting a preliminary investigation to order the arrest of the accused after the first stage (preliminary examination). this Court found occasion to dwell in some detail on the process of preliminary investigation and. depends on the discretion of the judge or magistrate empowered to issue the warrant of arrest. ―Sec. Probable cause.‘ * * *‖ . Warrant of arrest. where the first phase of the investigation was expressly denominated ―preliminary examination‖ to distinguish it from the second phase. it is the contrary that is true. Thus. after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor.‖ [22] In Mayuga vs. in regard to the first stage of preliminary investigation. second. when issued. Maravilla.‖ This was equally true under the former rules.

not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation. that even after they had killed their victims.m. and Sanny Monib. the examination to be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. lacking proof to the contrary. Misandoning Monasprang.m. when they were ambushed and fired upon by an armed group which included the petitioners and about fifty other unidentified persons. said respondent could have put off the 1:00 p. The three witnesses to the complaint. been modified somewhat since the occurrence of the facts upon which Mayuga was decided. For all that appears. of course. must be accepted as an accurate chronicle of the questioned proceedings. 1963. The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a finding of probable cause.m. The record which. be dismissed as mere speculation. therefore.m. to 1:00 p. they declared that they were members of a party that was passing by Pantao on its way to Lalabuan from Talaguian. and the ―searching questions and answers‖ requirement is incorporated in the present Section 6 of Rule 112 already quoted. The contention that the witnesses to the complaint had merely sworn before the respondent Judge to statements prepared beforehand and submitted by a military [27] investigator must. amending Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. and a consideration of the latter‘s sworn answers to his questions satisfies this Court that the finding of probable cause against the petitioners was neither arbitrary nor unfounded. the . a student. shows prima facie that the respondent Judge had personally examined the witnesses to the complaint. but not to abrogate the authority of the investigating judge to order such arrest. an engineering graduate. he must examine the witnesses to the complaint. approved June 22. in view of the foregoing considerations and for lack of any support in the record.m. that five of the party had been killed and two (the witnesses Lawandato Ripors and Sanny Monib) wounded. The same argument also unwarrantedly assumes that the respondent Judge limited the proceedings on preliminary examination to the usual Saturday office hours of 8:00 a. must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in accordance with the prescribed procedure. This modification was introduced by Republic Act 3838.m. That argument founders upon the respondent Judge‘s positive affirmations that he had personally and closely examined [24] under oath the three witnesses to the complaint and that he had issued the warrant of arrest ―believing [25] that the offense thus filed had been committed. 1985. in addition to not making any persuasive showing that such proceedings could not have been completed within that timeframe. Lanao del Sur.65 The rule on arrest after preliminary examination has. gave mutually corroborative accounts of the incident. The argument. Under separate questioning. And there is really nothing unusual in completing within a three-hour period the questioning of three witnesses in a preliminary examination to determine the existence of probable cause. and only to prescribe the requirement that before he may do so. Lawandato Ripors. Also without appreciable merit is petitioners‘ other argument that there was scarcely time to determine probable cause against sixty-four persons (the fourteen petitioners and fifty ―Does‖) within a matter of hours on a Saturday when municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00 a. to 1:00 p..‖ Nothing in the record before this Court belies or discredits those affirmations which have. at about 10:00 a. all in Masiu. a farmer. on July 27. adjournment until he had finished interrogating the witnesses to his satisfaction. besides. the benefit of the legal presumption that official duty [26] has been regularly performed.

however. social attitudes. All of them also identified by name each of the fourteen petitioners as members of the ambush group. status. duty did not. this Court ruled that the term ―searching questions and answers‖ means ―* * * only. to which no irregularity has been shown to attach. * * *‖ Upon this authority. in the view of the Court.66 ambushers had continued to fire at the dead bodies. taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine ―whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial. Plaza. time. be voided. his age. etc. such issuance having been ordered after proceedings. The respondent Judge can hardly be faulted for finding enough cause to hold the petitioners named in the statements of three eyewitnesses to killings perpetrated in broad daylight. The points that are the subject of inquiry may differ than case to case. financial and social circumstances. opportunities to commit the offense. and that the ambush was an offshoot of a grudge between [28] the families of the ambushers and those of the victims. Courtesy may have dictated that in those circumstances he leave the investigation to the Fiscal and simply endorse to the latter the complaint filed with him. [29] In Luna vs. that the witnesses managed to escape their attackers and return to Talaguian. the victim. The fact that the Provincial Fiscal may have announced his intention of investigating the incident himself did not. as regards its unidentified subjects. financial and social circumstances. this Court is not prepared to question the propriety of the respondent Judge‘s finding of probable cause or substitute its judgment for his in the matter of what questions to put to the witnesses during the preliminary examination. as is made to appear here. What would be searching questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into. it was regularly brought before him and no formal complaint was filed before the Fiscal. the subject. as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) ―John Does‖ not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify. characteristics. therefore must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. Macrang Hadji Alawi. such as: the nature of the offense. his age. the warrant must. it is of the nature of a general warrant. Macacrao Guiling. and thence went to the municipal hall in Masiu to report to the authorities. status. The witnesses named and identified the dead victims as Cadar Monasprang. the possible motives for its commission. the warrant of arrest in question validly issued against the petitioners. the date. Upon the facts and the law. his attitude toward the investigation.‖ such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetuator thereof. family responsibilities. and place of its commission. legally inhibit the respondent Judge from conducting his own inquiry into the matter if. that the dead victims were recovered only late in the afternoon of that day because the authorities could not ―penetrate‖ the area and the ambushers refused to release the bodies. Alicman Ripors and Malabato Diator.‖ Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly [31] describe the person or persons to be seized. therefore. in which the respondent Judge found sufficient cause to commit the petitioners to answer for the crime complained of. education. one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as ―totally subversive of the liberty of the [30] subject. where they informed their relatives about what had happened. Insofar. and if he . The questions. and considering what has already been stated above.

the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Pangandaman v.67 nonetheless chose to conduct his own investigation. Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction thatwarrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND HON. RESPONDENTS. October 20. 1748 of his court for further appropriate action. Gancayco. However. C. Based on his description. all “JOHN DOES”. but hesurvived.R. one of a call of writs longprescribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject. [ G. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE. 129651. he could not recognize anyone of the50.‖ The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. PETITIONERS. J. But he filed a case against all 50 ambushers. VS.: . JJ. DECISION KAPUNAN. Casar Facts: The case originated in Lanao. concur. nothing in the rules states or implies that he could not do so. Be that as it may. The offended party was ambushed in Lanao.. since the action and final resolution of the respondent Judge after completing the second stage of the preliminary investigation are subject to review by the Provincial Fiscal. It is of the nature of a general warrant. and Griño-Aquino. there were around 50 persons who staged theambush from both sides of the hill. Without pronouncement as to costs.. Cruz. Teehankee. No. SO ORDERED. practical considerations of expediency and the avoidance of duplication of work dictate that the latter official be permitted to take over the investigation even in its present stage.J. So the courtissued a warrant of arrest against the 50 John Does. 2000 ] FRANK UY AND UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION. The warrant as against unidentified subjects will be considered as null and void. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) ―John Does. Issue: W/N the warrant of arrest is valid? Can a court issue a warrant of arrestagainst an unknown accused? Held: NO it is not valid. WHEREFORE.

. These tax exemptions are granted by the government on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local customers. 3. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as UNIFISH). [a]t that time. that is from 1980 to 1990. UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho delivers to the different supermarkets such as White Gold. These cans are never intended to be sold locally to other food processing companies. 5. and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof. is enjoying certain exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna for export. Prior to 1990. (6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had withdrawn from the corporation. being an export company registered with the Board of Investments. a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street. (3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and buys from UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme: (1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company. Abos. Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the canned sardines processed by UNIFISH. etc. These payments are also not receipted (sic). 4. UNIFISH also enjoys tax exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as containers for its processed tuna for export. PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent acts as what is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines without issuing receipt. This is a case of smuggling in the sense that UNIFISH. under the active management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [. Gaisano. 2. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans. a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code.] which corporation was being controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now running and controlling UNIFISH. who claimed to be a former [1] employee of Unifish. the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [.68 Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. (4) The moment he has the quantity he wants. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho's direction is the sale of imported oil locally to different customers.. On 30 September 1993. (5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by checks drawn payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho. executed an Affidavit stating: 1. (2) Being a director.

Plaintiff. applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Labaria. 93-1079 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos. Special Investigation Branch. sales invoices. and check disbursements books)] are kept and may be found is best described in the herein attached sketch of the arrangement of the office's furniture and fixture of the corporation which is made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex "A". Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the disputed [2] search warrants. Nestor N. Chief. 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253" ("Search Warrant A-1"). On 1 October 1993. Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR. 7.attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been . stock cards.69 6. 253 . journals. are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at H. of both UNIFISH AND PREMIER. Unifish Packing Corporation Hernan Cortes St. The particular place or spot where these records [official receipts. cash receipts books. BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic) probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 . after examination underoath (sic). The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.versus - UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY. Asst. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales. sales records or sales books. accounting records (such as ledgers. delivery receipts. The first is docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT NO. Cebu City x------------------------/ (with sketch) SEARCH WARRANT TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: G R E E T I N G S: It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned. Mandaue City. Cortes Street. 2338. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations and he is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No. SEARCH WARRANT NO. A verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU 7th Judicial Region Branch 28 Mandaue City THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. and consists of two pages.. Labaria. Nestor N.

Sales Books or Records. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [. Columnar Books. Job Order. Plaintiff. save for the portions indicated in bold print. Hernan Cortes St.70 committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing Corporation. Sales Records. 3. 2..] Stock Cards. and 7. reproduced below. 5. 4.) MERCEDES GOZODADOLE Judge [3] The second warrant is similarly docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 1993. 253 . SEARCH WARRANT NO. the following: 1. 93-1079 FOR: . (sgd. 253" ("Search Warrant A-2"). is almost identical in content to Search Warrant A-1. Cash Register Books. Mandaue City has in his possession. and Unifish Packing Corporation Hernan Cortes St. Corporate Financial Records. Mandaue City x------------------------ VIOLATION OF SEC. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices. Provisional & Official Receipts. 6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU th 7 Judicial Region Branch 28 Mandaue City THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Unregistered Delivery Receipts. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.. It consisted of only one page. Search Warrant A-2. Ledgers.versus UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY. care and control. Journals. st WITNESS MY HAND this 1 day of October. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts.

which was docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. Journals. searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [. BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic] probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 . agents of the BIR. among other things. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu . Asst. 3. Labaria. Nestor N. and 7. Except for the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant ("Section 238 in relation to Sec. Branch 28. Provisional & Official Receipts. Sales Books or Records. 2. Columnar Books. st WITNESS MY HAND this 1 day of October. Ledgers. 263" (hereinafter. the following: 1. .attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation. Chief. 1993. accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police. on 2 October 1993. Job Order. Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2. after examination underoath [sic].] Stock Cards. care and control. Corporate Financial Records.non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales invoices"). 4. (sgd. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts. Sales Records. On the strength of these warrants. Cash Register Books. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices. the records and documents of petitioner corporation.) MERCEDES GOZODADOLE Judge [4] Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant. 6. Special Investigation Branch. They seized. 263 . Hernan Cortes St. "Search Warrant B"). Mandaue City has in his possession..71 -/ (with sketch) SEARCH WARRANT TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: G R E E T I N G S: It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned. 5. Unregistered Delivery Receipts. 238 in relation to SEC.

which states: a. and in case of denial. 4. These remedies are as enumerated by respondent appellate court in its decision: "1. the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said Motion. Res. they can file a motion to quash the information in the trial court. they can appeal the judgment of the court after the case shall have been tried on the merits. On 31 March 1995. The RTC. RA 5180 as amended by P. or after the case shall have been tried. and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos. (2) the Motion for Reconsideration. do not reveal the nature of this case. a Motion to Quash the Information. This brings us to the case of Lai vs. thus: Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other remedies available. 1992). 911). however. What Should be Filed. Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA). On the contrary. remedy is not certiorari. the right to post bail.Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez. they can post bail for their provisional release. dated November 24.72 On 8 February 1995. and must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent documents and papers. They can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution denying the motion to quash.-.. The CA dismissed their petition. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of Justice. there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search Warrants without jurisdiction. are: a petition for reinvestigation.D. prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). the same should not have been granted. but to go to trial. The records.Ct. 1(). Petitioners were not without plain. Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement. In the event that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits. Purisima.Moreover. an appeal therefrom should be the next legal step. x x x Where motion to quash is denied. petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC. after judgment on the merits. in the case of Acharon vs. denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration. (Rule 117. (As amended by S. that the Search Warrants did not describe with . if their petition for review does not prosper. . (Sec. the available remedies to the petitioners. The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash. 3. however. xxx In this case now before Us. 2. it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the Court committed an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched. If the motion is denied. Rules of Court).The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof shall be served on each of the respondents. this Court held that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied. speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. In this case now before us. an appeal. -. holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a). assuming that the Department of Justice will eventually file the case. the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of Justice.

he acted whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3. As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile. herein above quoted. no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants. it is indisputable that Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Second. certainly not correctible by certiorari. If a technical and rigid [7] enforcement of the rules is made. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. which may be remedied by certiorari: Expressly announced in Section 1. Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings and documents listed above along with their Petition. technical sense. pointed out petitioners' failure to attach them to the Petition. reveals that petitioners first submitted the same in their Reply. and that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. however. especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. after respondents. however. Yap. the absence of probable cause. speedy." In the light of the findings of the lower court. In any event. Third. or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal." [8] The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court." . De Guzman. rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. the CA ruled. and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto" along with the petition. Indeed. We note that the case of "Lai vs. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that certiorari is available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions "has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. to its credit. Intermediate Appellate Court. even if the CA deemed them essential to the resolution of the case. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. So should it be in this case. are merely errors in the [5] Court's finding. as observed by petitioners. First. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid. Nevertheless. it appears that the case could have been decided without these pleadings and documents. nor any plain. The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to question the resolution denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although. to us. in a similar case. requiring the submission of a certified true copy of "material portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition]. and for having allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the properties were taken. Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. is inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash a complaint for qualified theft. An examination of the CA Rollo. but instead thru an appeal. as well as in their Motion for Reconsideration. [9] The applicable case is Marcelo vs. not a motion to quash a search warrant. appears to have been taken from the case of Yap vs. petitioners filed the instant petition for review.73 particularity the things to be seized/taken. Intermediate. 220 SCRA 245 (1993). and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. it [6] could have asked for the records from the RTC." cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in "220 SCRA 149. it did touch upon the merits of the case. where we held that the issuing judge's disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion. their aim could be defeated. in their Comment. we held that the submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3.

G. Petitioners also alleged that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of its business. June 29. It has been held that where the order complained of is a patent nullity.R. 1982. In this case. which. a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal. In relation to the above provision. No. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. would not be an adequate remedy that would afford petitioners expeditious relief. papers. We now proceed to the merits of the case. before issuing the warrant. the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.The judge must. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief. Presiding Judge. SEC. therefore. 3. The seizure of her personal property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which had been improperly seized. Section 2. Examination of complainant. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers. 114 SCRA 657. in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. if true. XXXIII. This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs. De Guzman. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. L-29077.A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search warrants. record. which also involved a special civil action for certiorari: Thus. Moreover. . RTC of [10] [11] Negros Oriental.74 The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule renders the warrant in question absolutely null and void. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Br. 4. "the capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion". would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. Appeal. . . As declared in Marcelo vs. an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. in issuing a search warrant. houses. Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party. Requisite for issuing search warrant.

and on inquiry [19] leads the officers unerringly to it. as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation. The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search [13] warrants. are: (1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause." In this case. (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same crime. "for there is not a description of process known to the law. going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1.. the judge must examine. Cebu City" while the body of the same warrant states the address as "Hernan Cortes St. These requirements. ascertain and identify [17] [18] the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. [20] Pabalan." The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can.75 A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their nullification. Thus. Mandaue City. under oath or affirmation. and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be [12] seized. they claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner . according to petitioners. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer [14] undertakes to justify under it. where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina.. however. it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. (3) in the determination of probable cause. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. Finally. for the validity of a search warrant. The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal. These defects. with reasonable effort." The warrants will always be construed strictly without." Parenthetically.Mandaue City. in outline form. that there be a particular description of "the [16] place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized. render the objects [15] seized inadmissible in evidence. Petitioners also dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes St. the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen." The Constitution requires. satisfies the constitutional requirement. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others. in Castro vs.. for the same place. Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St.

in the case at bar. Indeed. Since. That Search Warrant A-1." These discrepancies are hardly relevant. the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying the premises. [21] In Miller v. The alleged absence of probable cause Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search warrants. Two warrants. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against "Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy. Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person. the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant. was directed against "UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY. Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection [24] with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. from which Section 2. 253" of the National Internal Revenue Code). it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1 and A-2. Sigler. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1.76 corporation. were actually issued by the trial court for the same crime (violation of "SEC. it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two warrants authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense. and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant. Search Warrants A-1 and A-2. It appears. therefore. . on the other hand. Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place In any event. that Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1. because of [23] inconsistencies in stating their names. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place to be searched. as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the warrant was issued. however. does not require the warrant to name the person who occupies the described premises. the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises. and Unifish Packing Corporation. it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct [22] so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched. but only a search of the premises occupied by them. Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2. the latter should be deemed revoked by the former." Search Warrant A-2. Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived. inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrant's invalidation in this case.

the judge deposed two witnesses. the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath. would [26] not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant. From where did you get that information? A. but only as to the testimony of Labaria. and Rodrigo Abos. not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant. Therefore. in turn. nor on mere suspicion [28] or belief. is not based solely on Labaria's deposition but is supported by that of Abos. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation? I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer. however. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses. who stated during the examination: Q. which is based on hearsay. not merely routine or pro forma. We agree with this contention. Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. the deposition of Labaria. In his deposition.77 In the determination of probable cause. It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants. Q. Abos detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes. The above portion of the transcript shows that Labaria's knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied by Abos. A. Q. standing alone. The examination must be probing and exhaustive. The application for the warrants. must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. whose knowledge of petitioners' alleged illegal practices was apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish. of the existence of probable [27] cause. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation? Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts instead of the legal sales invoices. the former employee of that [29] establishment. From our informer. Mr. and conducting of examination in a general manner. No. Q Why do you know him? A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993. Nestor Labaria of the BIR. because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate. cannot justify the issuance of the [30] search warrants. namely. It is highly indicative of fraud. who claimed to be an old employee of Unifish. The witnesses. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant. Abos. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his [25] own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. vague or doubtful basis of fact. and described the place where the documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were located: Q Do you know Frank Uy? A Yes. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy? A. . Q. A. Search warrants are not issued on loose.

how is it done? A Thru delivery receipts. Q Is the delivery receipt official? A No. the whole Philippines. Q How is it done? A As an officer. He makes it appear that it is the company which is selling when actually it is him selling the goods and he does not issue any invoices. last month. Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets? Q A White Gold and Gaisano. he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time making his authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. It went to him and he is the one who paid the company for the goods that he sold. Is that correct? Yes.78 Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located? A Hernan Cortes St. 1993. Q For how long has this been going on? A Q As far as I know. When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing? A August. Q Since he does not issue any invoices. It is unregistered. it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines. I was the Operating Chief. Q How did you know this fact? A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the last three years. Q Until now? A No. Q When? . in fact. Q How did you happen to know about this last month? A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket did not go directly to the company. Q What is it being engaged of? A It is engaged in canning of fish. He sells these products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao. Q A You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business dealings that he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. I was separated already.

The records from these people are stored in this place which is marked as "C". is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain supermarkets? Q A Q A Q A Q A Q Yes. official receipts. In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the stocks. This first girl delivers the receipts. then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn. It is not made to be shown to the BIR. This is the bird's eyeview (sic) of the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all the confidential transactions of the company. These documents are records that you have stated. And these transactions. Exh. sales records. Unifish will deliver to his customers. not for the BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company and him. Gina Tan collects all the records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. "A"? A Yes. For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show? . "A" inside the office. In that books of account. in your affidavit. delivery receipts.79 A August. So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina because according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega? Q . Based on what? Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare. etc. not for the BIR Q Where are they kept now? A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or whatever? It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. which are only for the consumption of the company? A Yes. Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion. he pays to the company. It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything. The second girl prepares the bill of lading. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. 1993. In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. In this table you can find all the ledgers and notebooks. Exh. Q How does he do this manipulation? A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company. It is not for the public.

it does not reflect.80 A Yes. when actually in August have you seen the current records kept by Gina? I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records. What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of January. it did not appear. they profit more to dispose the product locally. Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the BIR? A As far as I know. How is it done? The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned tuna for export. The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me. If you go straight there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after opening the door. they show that these are for the months of January. Whatever excess of this soya oil are sold to another company. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for payment of sardines. April and May.) This delivery receipt was the A . the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material but instead they are selling it locally? Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. Q In other words. March. 3053 dated November 13. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection. February. Q But how can you enter the bodega? A Here. 1991. Q A Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies? A No. As far as I know. Are these transactions reflected in these xerox copies which appear in the ledger being shown to the BIR? Q A Q A Q As far as I know. I have the actual delivery receipt. what does it show? It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his customers. Q A Q Where are they now? A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records). The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. especially this one which seems to be pages of a ledger. Q What are these xerox copies of checks? A I think we cannot trace it up. The problem is that. from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here.

at a profit. COURT: Alright. ledgers. The deposition also shows that. [31] Abos stated that. the inquiries made by the judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness' affidavit. I have received information. credit journals. In other words. Q Do you have proof to that effect? A No. balance sheets and related profit and loss statements. When you export the product there is a 50% price difference. financial records. again to Virginia Farms. What do you mean by this? There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging materials. portfolios. In Stonehill. Bache & Co. Inc. receipts. the effects to be searched and seized were described as: "Books of accounts. Ruiz." This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set forth by the Constitution since: .). but we can get it there. typewriters. You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account kept by Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still there? A Yes. We find such inquiries to be sufficiently probing. Now. The contents of the deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise. and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Diokno. he had access to the company records. (Phil. of the 90 grams soya oil. Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since according to you. [34] Inc. contrary to petitioners' submission.81 Q A Q A delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. we reject the contention that this witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are seeling (sic) it? Yes. vouchers. they sold it to certain company here. Thus. and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts. Herrera. Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject warrants and [32] [33] those inStonehill vs. journals correspondence. and Asian Surety & Insurance Co. vs. as former Operating Chief of Unifish.. vs. taking that advantage of that exemption.

promissory notes and deeds of sale. 3. enumerated in the warrant. In Bache & Co. among others.). 384). . Sec. Rule 126. the dates. promissory notes. thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights . columnars. dissent of Abad Santos. regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. messages and communications. bank deposits and withdrawals." The purpose as thus explained could. checks. to the end that `unreasonable searches and seizures' may not be made. or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact . or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 2-M-70 in this manner: "Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers. and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. J. at least. etc. contracts..not of law . the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned. contracts. other than those articles. and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments. whatever their nature. and records of foreign remittances. of the Constitution. this Court had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. the applicant must necessarily have some evidence. covering the years 1966 to 1970. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. That is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision borne out by the American authorities. and of Sec. records of bank deposits and withdrawals. In this event. Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem. 896. this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as those in Stonehill: The documents.. The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests." The description does not meet the requirement in Art. be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case. deeds of sale. 3) and General Orders No. receipts and disbursements books. et al. that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. . 2.as well as tending to defeat its major object: the elimination of general warrants. journals. xxx In Uy Kheytin. persons. III.. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those.to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed. particularly described in the search warrant .. Villareal. receipts for payments received.that abuses may not be committed. amounts. papers.82 x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations. vs. accounting and business records. customers' ledgers). 886.. certificates of stocks and securities. business communications. Rubio. surely and effectively. 57 Phil. and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. to prove the said offense. records of foreign remittances. 68 (sec. and only those. et al.that the things to be seized be particularly described . 42 Phil. 1. checks and check stubs. telex and coded messages. Revised Rules of Court). certificates of stocks and securities. to wit: "x x x Both the Jones Law (sec.

Columnar Books. and the contents thereof. stock cards. Bordereau. 4. their description must be rather general. Corporate Financial Records. columnar books. the things to be seized were described in the following manner: 1.. And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued. we hold otherwise. invalid: x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation. it would be impractical to require the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice. as this would mean that no warrant could issue. As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase & sales invoices. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. including subrogation receipts and proof of loss. Adjusters' Report. The [35] failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general description in a warrant. Job Order. employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it. manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company." "production record books/inventory lists. therefore. and 7. 5. i. Journals. In the case at bar. especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are [36] unregistered.83 In Asian Surety & Insurance Co. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts. sales books or records.e. agents. cash register books. 6. Inc. including the government itself.. The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. 3. job order. Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger. vs. particularly because it is difficult to give a particular [37] description of the contents thereof. Ledgers.] Stock Cards. which if seized x x x. provisional & official receipts. Although it appears that photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge. by the nature of the goods to be seized. Where. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [. Cash Register Books." "corporate financial records. journals. it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described. ." however. The use by the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of accounts. to the minutest detail. and of the general public. Provisional & Official Receipts. ledgers." and "bank statements/cancelled checks" is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances of this case. etc. Loss Registers." "sales records. Unregistered Delivery Receipts. the description of the things to be seized. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices. petitioner in several motions filed for early resolution of this case. it is not required that a technical description be given. Sales Books or Records. Herrera. Sales Records. its workers. We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old. could paralyze its business. Loss. 2. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity. "Fire Registers." was held to be "an omnibus description" and.

Cook. a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two particularly described books and myriad other generally described items. Suppression of only the items improperly described prohibits the Government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the court from considering illegally obtained evidence. 53 Cal. xxx x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of state courts that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district judge should sever the infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional muster.1980). the California Supreme Court held that only the books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters. The search for and seizure of these books. 13 Cal. though not listed in the warrants. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices. 415 (1961). The leading decision is Aday v. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books x x x. Moreover. 459-60 (D. As the leading commentator has observed. Items that were not described with the requisite particularity in the warrant should be suppressed.2d 47. Giresi. 488 F. On appeal. the court chose to sever the defective portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not particularly described. but suppression of all of the fruits of the search is hardly consistent with the purposes underlying exclusion. Accordingly. the warrants remain valid. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing. . In United [38] States v.2d 789.6(f) (1978). the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the following pronouncement: x x x.Supp. Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. 445. 3. were also taken by the enforcing officers: 1. even though proper if viewed separately.J. the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to petitioners. The court acknowledged that the warrant was flawed. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles. but rather than suppress everything seized. See United States v.84 The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire warrant void. Superior Court. if otherwise valid. and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. LaFave. The search warrant is severable." 2 W. were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. suppression of only those items that were not particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to those in the Government who would be tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary description. 4. must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles." 2. Petitioners allege that the following articles. In Aday. 362 P. Two (2) packs of chemicals.Rptr. Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §4.N. "it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a search for other items as well.

it was held: Moreover. Lising. Section 2. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected right of an individual (People v. are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices. affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995. the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14 May 1987. 230. In Tambasen vs. 176 [1925]). 48 Phil. Bache & Co.85 5. People. Damaso. must be ordered returned to petitioners. 65 Phil. In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants. Uy Kheytin v. As the Court aptly puts it inBagahilog v. to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. we cannot order their return in the present proceedings." The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative to such violation. and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be [42] availed of by third parties. One (1) bound gate pass. such power must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. 198 SCRA 614 (1991). citing Rodriguez v. which shares an office with petitioner Unifish. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. v.]. Evangelista. Surety Agreement. 886 [1920]). and only those. 547 [1985]). the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. 231 SCRA 759 [1994]. 235 [1937]). "The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those. like those not particularly described. 169. Damaso. Villareal. People v. The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants. "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors. Veloso. The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home. 137 SCRA 541. Clearly then. [39] 6. 76 Phil. Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly [40] [41] described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder. 37 SCRA 823 [1971]. to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. the money which was not indicated in the search warrant. Fernandez. 42 Phil. 646 [1946]). supra. and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. In addition. the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and Development Corporation (PIDC). Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize. WHEREFORE. 637. Inc. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to . 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant. Cruz. had been illegally seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. Dizon." which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be seized. particularly described in the search warrant. [Phil. As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC. but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants. Ruiz.

UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. accompanied by members of the PNP. vs Bureau of Internal Revenue et al Search and Seizure – Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant In Sept 1993.86 return to petitioners all items seized from the subject premises and belonging to petitioners. the same was dated Oct st 1 2003. . The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy. A second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only one page. and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. They seized. (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. JJ.. except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices. the judge must examine. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. Frank Uy & Unifish Packing Corp.. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. searched the premises of the UPC. agents of the BIR. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. Pardo. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. and Ynares-Santiago. These requirements..J. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. C. Jr. In Oct 1993. are: (1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause. On the strength of these warrants. (Chairman). Puno. a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy. concur. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. on 2 Oct 1993. Rodrigo Abos. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued. manager of UPC. in outline form. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. among other things. the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. under oath or affirmation. was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. SO ORDERED. (3) in the determination of probable cause. the records and documents of UPC. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. Davide.

AZUCENA. VS. Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. PETITIONERS. PRESIDING JUDGE. RESPONDENTS. ALBINO T. DECISION PANGANIBAN. DACERA III. He used generic itineraries. CELESTIAL. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. FLORENTINO M. AVILA. 122092. RICARDO G. the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be followed strictly. AND THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND. DORMENDO. ELMEDENCIO C. ASUNCION. papers. 1999 ] PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. Section 2. May 19. or where the witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY. HAROLD B. No.. JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. JEREMIAS I. . ROBERTO A. the search warrant must be struck down. J. NARVAEZ JR. ABAD AND HERMINIO V. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. REYDANDE D. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. NICEFORO V. EVARISTO M.87 The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants.R. CARLITO S. SANTIAGO. BAITO. Where the judge fails to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter's witnesses. VILLAMIL. FELIX O. houses. CALIXTRO. MULA. BRANCH 104. LEGACION. [ G. LUBANG.: To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B.

[8] the Court in its September 24. ordered the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file its memorandum within thirty days from notice. together with 90 pages of annexes. of Quezon City. the required pleading was not yet received by this Court. In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General. Branch 104.[7] required State Prosecutor Leo B. In view of Dacera's manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that he had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP. In its October 23. After petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition. explosives. 1999 Resolution. 1995. Surigao del Sur. issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23. the petition will be deemed submitted for decision.[3] this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the respondents to comment on the said Petition. in its December 8. the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment[6] agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted. the Court. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for the public respondents. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23. stating:[10] "1. On December 20. or used or intended to be used in committing the offense."[9] Even after the expiration of the said period.[5] On February 22. and which xxx are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described. 95-167. this Court considered Respondent SOU's refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a waiver of its privilege to do so. represented by its Sr. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines. Dacera III. Barangay Tabon. 1995. the Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.88 The Case Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] praying for (1) the nullification of Search Warrant No. 1997 within which to file the required memorandum. the Court. "otherwise. 1997. Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. 1996. which are the subject of the offense.] Santiago. 1995. ammunitions. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City. ordering him to desist from proceeding with IS No. Respondent PNP Traffic Management Command filed its 31-page Opposition[4] to the Petition. 1995 Resolution. . Bislig. 1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31. 1993 and August 3. is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms. in its February 5. located at PICOP compound. The Facts On January 25.[2] and (2) the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Vice President Ricardo G[. Hence. 1997 Resolution.

38 revolver[s]. that there is probable cause to believe that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines. after examining under oath.[12] as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Bislig.[13] the pertinent portion of which reads: "It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned.45 pistol[s]. Surigao del Sur. ten (10) cal. Judge Maximiano C. two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. Morito. located at PICOP Compound.56 Ten (10) M14 US rifles Two (2) AK-47 rifle[s] Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s] Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.40mm. assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades. Santiago. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties: 'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. After propounding several questions to Bacolod. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. represented by its Sr. two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]. Vice President Ricardo G. two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s].56. 5. ten (10) M16 US rifles. Barangay Tabon. Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s] Ten (10) cal 38 revolver[s] Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s] Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms Ten (10) handgrenades . has in its possession or control the following: Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. Bacolod. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. 5.' Attached to the application[11] were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S.89 "2. ten (10) cal. SPO3 Cicero S. two (2) AK-47 rifle[s].

1995. of the aforementioned premises and to seize and bring the articles above-described and make an immediate return there[of]"[14] On February 4.56 RP 171702 Elisco . the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized the following:[15] MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND 01 M16 Rifle 5.m. Ammunition and Explosives). you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search daytime between 8:00 a.90 in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms. [and] 4:00 p. THEREFORE. and the same should be seized and brought before this Court.56 RP 175636 Elisco 02 M16 Rifle 5.m. "NOW.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco 03 M16 Rifle 5.

56 Defaced Elisco 05 M16 Rifle 5.91 04 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco 07 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco .56 RP171337 Elisco 08 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco 06 M16 Rifle 5.

92
09
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP171114 (Tampered)
Elisco
10
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP171167 (Tampered)
Elisco
11
M16 Rifle
5.56
170881 (Tampered)
Elisco
12
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP170897
Elisco
13
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP171509
Elisco

93
(With pending case-Casaway Case)
14
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP 171754
Elisco
15
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP170881 (Tampered)
Elisco
16
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP174637
Elisco
17
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP171366
Elisco
18
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP174637 (Tampered)

94
Elisco
19
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP174610
Elisco
20
M16 Rifle
5.56
RP171367 (Tampered)
Elisco
01
M14Rifle
7.62
1499694
Elisco
02
M14Rifle
7.62
889163
Elisco
01
BAR
Cal. 30
865975

95
Royal
01
Carbine M1
Cal. 30
384181
US Carbin
02
Carbine M1
Cal. 30
998201
US Carbin
01
Garand M1
Cal. 30
1194008
Springfield
02
Garand M1
Cal. 30
3123784
Springfield

01
Shotgun
12 Gauge

96
H359704
Omega
02
Shotgun
12 Gauge
9211
Homemade
(Paltik)
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY
QTY.

01 M16 (long)
29 pcs.

02 M16 (short)
48 pcs.

03 Carbine M1
171 pcs.

04 BAR
19 pcs.

97
LIVE AMMUNITION
QTY.

01 M16 2,023
rounds

03 Carbine M1
276 rounds

04 M-60 Cal. 7.62
1,800 rounds

05 M1 Garand
1,278 rounds

06 Rifle Grenade
11 rounds

07 Hand Grenade
4 pcs.

98
AMMO DAM POST NO. 24

MAKE/TYPE
CALIBER
SERIAL NUMBER
BRAND

01.
M16 Rifle
5.56
171425 (Tampered)
Gyno Corp.
02.
Machine Pistol
22
651 (Tampered)
Landmann

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY
QTY.

01. M16 (short)
3 pcs.

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY. Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs. 04. Cal .99 02. M14 8 pcs. M16 (long) 1 pc. M14 160 rounds . 05. Mag Assy. M16 73 rounds 02. 03. 01.22 1 pc.

56 RP 171725 Elisco 02. M16 Rifle 5. M1 Garand Cal .56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco . Rifle Grenade 1 round MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND 01.100 03. M16 Rifle 5.30 30 rounds 04.

M16 (long) 3 pcs. M16 Rifle 5.101 03. 01. Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec Pistol 05. . Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H) Shotguns MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.56 RP 132320 Elisco 04.

102 02. 04. 30 5 rounds 03. 03. M16 (short) 4 pcs. Intratec 1 pc. 02. 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds 04. 01. LIVE AMMUNITION QTY. Carbine 5 rounds . Cal. M16 147 rds. US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.

9MM 30 rounds NEW ARMORY POST NO.103 05. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 . Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds 06. 16 MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND 01.

Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor 06. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor 04.104 Armscor 02. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 . Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor 03. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor 05.

Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor 10. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor 08. Shotgun 12 Gauge . Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor 11. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor 09.105 Armscor 07.

Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor 14. Shotgun 12 Gauge .106 A359723 Armscor 12. Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB 16. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor 13. Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB 15.

Cal. 01. M16 (long-defective) . 02.107 Defaced Not Indicated LIVE AMMUNITION QTY. 22 -do16 pcs. 02. 03. 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds. Carbine (defective) 76 pcs. 01.349 rds. MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY. M16 2.

06. 1995. 07. they also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence. M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs. 05. the petitioners filed a "Motion to Quash"[16] before the trial court. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable. the trial court rendered its second contested Order[19] denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Subsequently.[18] On August 3. BAR (defective) 2 pcs.[20] Hence. Thompson (defective) 8 pcs. 1995. this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law. Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs. 04. the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners' motions."[17] On March 23. petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause:[21] .108 2 pcs. Issues In their Memorandum.

respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact. "II Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. "III Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse of discretion or exceeding his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. Probable cause [has] not xxx been sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of a general warrant. 799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or implemented.109 "I Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. As a preliminary matter. we shall also discuss respondents' argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising factual questions. They maintain that the . This Court's Ruling The petition is meritorious. petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Preliminary Issue: Alleged Factual Questions In their Opposition. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence." In the main. 799(95).

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Main Issue: Validity of the Search Warrant The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2. record. a procedure which they contend was violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge. houses. 3."[22] This argument is not convincing. -.110 Petition merely assails the "factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the regularity of its implementation. which reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons. rather.[25] In the present case. (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge." (Emphasis supplied) Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision. It is settled that "there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at. the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents. Sections 3 and 4. Requisite for issuing search warrant. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. We agree that the Petition raises only questions of law. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized."[23] In the present case. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers.A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. petitioners do not question the truth of the facts as found by the judge." "SEC. in writing and under oath or affirmation." More simply stated.The judge must. in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.[24] detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows: "SEC. -. 4. (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod. who appeared during the hearing . which may be resolved in the present case. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Examination of complainant. the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present. before issuing the warrant.

which argued that "it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not propound searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he produced. NAPOLEON PASCUA: SPO3 CICERO S. none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. BACOLOD. Your Honor. Morito. No Personal Examination of the Witnesses In his Order dated March 23. however. and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity. 1995. COURT: Swear the witness. had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms. Moreover. As earlier stated.) This was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to Quash. however. the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod:[28] "COURT: Where is the witness for this application for search warrant? P/Chief Insp. sir."[26] (Emphasis supplied. the whole truth and nothing but the truth before this Court? . the court propounded searching questions to the applicant and the witnesses in order to determine whether there was probable cause x x x."[27] The records. (2) a summary of information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.111 for the issuance of the search warrant. stating that "before issuing the subject warrant. Do you swear to tell the truth. Except for Pascua and Bacolod. proclaim otherwise. the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid. Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness) Please raise your right hand.

age. x x x x x x x x x" Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else. occupation. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause. In fact. as will later be shown."[29] Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him . xxxxxxxxx "It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive. to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose testimony. not merely routinary or proforma. Quezon City. c/o Camp Crame. Obviously. civil status. His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. policeman. 42 years old. Bacolod. address and other personal circumstances. SOU. if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. This Court has frowned on this practice in this language: "Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. TMC. married. is also improper). the trial judge failed to propound questions. STENOGRAPHER: Please state your name. let alone probing questions.112 WITNESS: Yes Ma'am. Contrary to his statement. and he said nothing more. to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. WITNESS: SPO3 Cicero S. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. he failed even to affirm his application.

Quezon City. Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP. I was dispatched by our Commander to investigate the alleged assassination plot of Congressman Amante. in violation of PD 1866."[30] When questioned by the judge. we gathered informations from reliable sources that subject properties [which] are in their possession and control [are] the herein described properties subject of the offense. Q . But his testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners. what happened? A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged assassination plot are employees of PICOP. Q In the course of your investigation. however. as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for several days. He declared: "Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries Corporation located at PICOP Compound. does not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge. How come that you have knowledge that there are illegal firearms in that place? A At Camp Crame. were not licensed to possess firearms. This. ammunitions or explosives. Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. Surigao del Sur. he stated: "Q How do you know that said properties were subject of the offense? A Sir. Barangay Tabon. not belief. (Summary of Information dtd Oct `94. what did you do? A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of PICOP in Tabon. SS's of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno both dtd 30 Nov `94 are hereto attached).113 Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. Bislig. In his Deposition.

Q By what means? A By pretending to have some official business with the company. Q How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP? A I exerted effort to enter the said compound. sir.114 What did you find xxx? A I found xxx several high-powered firearms. Q So. Q What did you f[i]nd xxxt? A I found xxx several high-powered firearms being kept in the compound of PICOP. Q . you were able to investigate the compound of PICOP? A Yes. in that aspect.

Q Inside the compound? A Located inside the compound. sir. Q You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the PICOP? A Yes. were kept in the security headquarters or office. Q Then what? A Others. sir.115 Where are those located? A Sir. they call it Blue Guards. there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam. Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own security guards? A Yes. Q .

As far as the verification at FEU. [is concerned. Q What did you find out? A They are using firearms owned by PICOP. Camp Crame.] they have no license.116 So. (Emphasis supplied. Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no firearms of their own? A No high-powered firearms.) Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency? A I conducted the inquiry. Q . sir. it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are illegally obtained? A I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms. Q Using firearms owned by PICOP? A Yes.

this Court has held that "this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity.[33] Thus.[32] the Court held: "The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. several handgrenades and ammos. M-203 Grenade Launcher. and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need. the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the aforementioned "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP. Witness. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guards were not licensed.117 By the way.for instance. aside from the security agency. what kind of firearms have you seen inside the compound of PICOP? A There are M-16 armalite rifles. the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. as in the present case . the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. he made no statement before the trial court that PICOP. He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Q What else? A AK-47. and then only under stringent procedural safeguards. In People v. the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in a particular place." Particularity of the Place to Be Searched In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search. Worse. had no license to possess those firearms. Judge Estrada.and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same.[35] . . at least under some circumstances. M-14 US rifles. Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was licensed."[34] Additionally. . considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based.45 caliber pistols.38 caliber revolvers. Such certification could have been easily obtained. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application. Yet. Mr. or to present it during the hearing. The introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged . the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that."[31] (Emphasis supplied) Moreover. armalites. the absence of a license required by law.

Court of Appeals.although not that specified in the warrant . enlarged or amplified by the police. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises. following the officers' theory. confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant . Moreover. however. in People v. Such conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforcers. in the context of the facts of this case.: "x x x. Barangay Tabon. 23 warehouses. the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement. "The place to be searched. 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures. 84 staff houses. all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.[37] In their Opposition. arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same."[36] Obviously.[40] this Court ruled that the police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store. even if they really intended it to be the subject of their application. which was the place indicated in the warrant. In the instant case. the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound. The warrant identifies only one place.[38] These arguments are not convincing. 1 airstrip. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument. as set out in the warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched. This should not have been done." but it did not specify such premises. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asuncion.118 In the present case. 15 plants. Indeed. located at PICOP Compound.[39] Otherwise. 3 piers/wharves.] Surigao del Sur. the place to be searched cannot be changed. all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares. the fact that the raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be searched. or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Bislig[. viz. or the evidence they adduced in support of . Thus. the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant. Indeed. not what the applicants had in their thoughts.[was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched . What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself. because they were not among those identified during the hearing." The PICOP compound.the place indicated in the warrant or the place identified by the police. is made up of "200 offices/buildings. and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines. and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant. cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises. there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant.

issued a subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits." Without this exclusionary rule. In the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and order in the country. 799 (95). Instead of complying with the subpoena. petitioners asked for the suspension of the preliminary investigation." (Emphasis supplied. effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree. the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint docketed as IS No."[41] Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. to whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process. that the illegally obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal Complaint."[42] As the Court noted in an earlier case. petitioners assert that "State Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 799 (95) issued by the respondent judge."[44] In the present case. explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible. however. it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. as they do now. State Prosecutor Dacera. They argued. even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. all the firearms.) Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence As a result of the seizure of the firearms. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched. 95-167. and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate.119 their application for the warrant. the constitutional right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence xxx. the Complaint and the proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on. the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No."[43] Verily. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so . and only in the warrant itself. Their motion was denied. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.

SO ORDERED. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to the described properties.. the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. stating: 1. After propounding several questions to Bacolod. 1995. 1995. 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. J.. 307 SCRA 253) (1999) FACTS: On January 25. On February 4. (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce .” On March 23. and Gonzaga-Reyes. the petitioners filed a “Motion to Quash” before the trial court. On August 3. the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search Warrant No. Asuncion. explosives. which are the subject of the offense. located at PICOP compound. JJ. is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms. concur. No pronouncement as to costs. 1995.120 only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people. . 2. ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid HELD: The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present. . the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners’ motions. Indeed. Vitug. Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Judge Maximiano C. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID."[45] WHEREFORE. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises described. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City. did not participate in the deliberations. they also filed a “Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash” and a “Motion to SuppressEvidence. Romero (Chairman). Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable. 1995. "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October 23. Subsequently. or used or intended to be used in committing the offense. Purisima. PICOP v. ammunitions. (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge. the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines. and which .

149878. in writing and under oath or affirmation. VS. 7659. 6425. Article I of Republic Act No.. convicting appellants Tiu Won Chua a. i. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Sun Tee Sy y Chua (Qui Yaling) for violation of Section 16.R. methamphetamine hydrochloride. and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity. 7659.A. Appellants were charged with the crime of illegal possession of a regulated drug. as amended by Republic Act No. as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. In the present case. 6425. did then and there wilfully. the said accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug. PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE. otherwise known as "shabu.K.5) grams of white crystalline substance. (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod. . (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them. J. in the City of Manila. Article III of Republic Act No. the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents. and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. committed as follows: That on or about the 3rd day of October 1998. Philippines. No. 179 and as further amended by Republic Act No.121 are personally examined by the judge. [ G. to wit: A sealed plastic bag containing two three four point five (234.A.a. 2003 ] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.e. Branch 27. July 01. DECISION PUNO.a. unlawfully. knowingly and jointly have in their possession and under their custody and control the following. had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms. who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant. Timothy Tiu (Tiu Won) and Qui Yaling y Chua a.K.k.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Article III in relation to Section 2 (e-2)." in an information which reads: The undersigned accuses TIU WON CHUA aka "Timothy Tiu" and QUI YALING Y CHUA aka "Sun Tee Sy Y Chua" of violation of Section 16. "TIMOTHY TIU" AND QUI YALING Y CHUA A.k." ACCUSED-APPELLANT. TIU WON CHUA A. "SUN TEE SY Y CHUA.

dated October 12. District Intelligence Division.122 Four (4) separate sealed plastic bags containing six point two two four three (6. Contrary to law. a plea of not guilty was entered. 1998. and Dangerous Drug Report No.2243) grams of white crystalline substance. "E-2" and "E-3". The existence of one plastic bag containing 234. to the effect that the specimen mentioned therein gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. to the Director of the NBI requesting the latter to conduct a laboratory examination of the specimen mentioned therein. Sixteen (16) separate sealed plastic bags containing twenty point three six seven three (20. additional 16 plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total net weight of 20. Exhibits "F". dated October 13. Exhibit "B". Manila.3673) grams of white crystalline substance.2243 grams. . United Nations Avenue. and one improvised tooter with a length of 8 inches more or less and with a red plastic band.5 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride. and the prosecution stipulated on the following facts: The authenticity of the following documents: The letter of Police Senior Inspector Angelo Martin of WPD. without the corresponding license or prescription thereof. Exhibit "G". "E-1". 98-1200 issued by Forensic Chemist Bravo. The Certification issued by Forensic Chemist Loreto Bravo of the NBI. 1998. Exhibit "D". Exhibits "E". or a total of 261.[1] During arraignment. four (4) plastic sachets also containing methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total net weight of 6. with the assistance of counsel.0916 grams. dated October 13. a regulated drug. "F-1" to "F-15". Appellants. and. to the effect that the specimen mentioned and enumerated therein gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. An improvised tooter with traces of crystalline substance known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride. Ermita.3673 grams. 1998.

they were able to implement the warrant on October 12.000. while sixteen (16) small packs of shabu weighing 20. . After several stakeouts. acting on an information that drug-related activities were going on at the HCL Building. as stated in the search warrant.3673 grams were found inside a lady's handbag allegedly owned by Qui Yaling. upon examination by the PNP crime laboratory.. of October 6. the third person. 1025 Masangkay St. registered in the name of the wife of Tiu Won and found four (4) plastic bags containing 6. they conducted a test-buy operation. proved positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Joji.00 worth of substance from appellants.2243 grams of shabu. an improvised burner and one rolled tissue paper. 864 Alvarado St. namely. Failing to get the cooperation of the barangay officials. They denied that Timothy Tiu and Tiu Won Chua are one and the same person. During the enforcement of the warrant. is his mistress with whom he has two children. which were likewise confiscated. appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. Manila. he admitted that his co-appellant. Binondo. Manila. 3. was found inside a black leather man's handbag supposedly owned by Tiu Won. who acted as witnesses. Nonetheless. parked along Masangkay Street.m. they proceeded to the place and learned that Tiu Won was not inside the building. A gun in the possession of Tiu Won was also seized and made subject of a separate criminal case. who was there to look at some of the pieces of jewelry sold by Tiu Won. Noel Olarte. Qui Yaling. there were three (3) persons inside the apartment. and a housemaid. but alleged that she only occupied one room. they did not immediately arrest the suspects but applied for a warrant to search Unit 4-B of HCL Building. They waited outside but Tiu Won did not come.5 grams of shabu. Binondo. Their application to search the unit supposedly owned by "Timothy Tiu" was granted by Judge Ramon Makasiar of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila on October 9. On top of a table inside the master's bedroom. Manila. containing 234. surveyed the place on October 2. and his wife. Qui Yaling admitted being the occupant of the apartment. Tiu Won also claimed that he does not live in the apartment subject of the search warrant. was actually a certain Chin. whom the prosecution identified as a housemaid. a weighing scale. They also denied that a gun was found in the possession of Tiu Won. They asserted that they are in the jewelry business and that at the time the search and arrest were made.[4] Armed with the warrant. a certain Lim and a certain Uy.123 Forensic Chemist Loreto Bravo has no personal knowledge as to the source of the regulated drug in question. PO2 Artemio Santillan and PO3 Albert Amurao. together with a Chinese-speaking asset.[5] The authorities also searched a Honda Civic car bearing Plate No. Both appellants denied that they were engaged in the sale or possession of shabu.. They were able to buy P2. They presented papers and documents to prove that appellant is Tiu Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu. WCP 157. Their testimonies show that the police authorities. Binondo. The defense presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. 1998. one (1) big pack. alleging that he is married to a certain Emily Tan and is a resident of No. At about 10 p. they requested the presence of the building coordinator. Also contained in the inventory were the following items: an improvised tooter.[2] The witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO1 Anthony de Leon. occupied the other rooms. and Tiu Won Chua and Qui Yaling y Chua as stated in the information are the true and correct names of the two accused. while two other persons. 1025 Masangkay St. The search was conducted on the sala and in the three (3) bedrooms of Unit 4-B.[3] Nonetheless. which. 4 and 5..

the pieces of jewelry they were selling and even Qui Yaling's cell phone.124 Qui Yaling recalled that upon asking who was it knocking at the door of her apartment on October 12. She was surprised when upon opening the door. They both denied that shabu was discovered in the apartment during the search.[6] Thus. together with Tiu Won and Chin. 2001. but came back a few minutes later with another person. was asked to remain seated in the sofa while the men searched each room. dated August 15. some of the policemen went out. In a decision. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION EVIDENCES (sic) WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AND DISREGARDED WHICH RESULTED IN THE ERRONEOUS CONVICTION OF BOTH ACCUSED. the police authorities represented that they were electric bill collectors. Tiu Won alleged that after a fruitless search.000.00 each. Afterwards. the RTC found proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellants and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500. IV . She. Appellants also claimed that the policemen took their bags which contained money. Appellants were arrested and brought to the police station. around ten (10) policemen barged inside her unit. he was made to sign a piece of paper. She let them in. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. appellants interpose this appeal raising the following assignment of errors: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE LEGAL DEFECTS OF THE SEARCH WARRANT USED BY THE POLICE OPERATIVES AGAINST BOTH ACCUSED.

[7] These issues can be trimmed down to two i. the evidence presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction. whereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building. are illegal. They can therefore be presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be searched although they may not have specifically known the names of the accused. We beg to disagree. (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge. a valid search of Unit 4-B was conducted. or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.[12] Moreover.[8] As correctly argued by the Solicitor General. the arrest.[10] We have also held that a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described. the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it. even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling. the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused. a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. such warrantless search must be limited to that point within the reach or control of the person arrested. that defect did not invalidate it because the place to be searched was described properly. which did not include appellant Qui Yaling. To be valid. appellants contend that because of this defect. appellants were arrested inside the apartment. the search conducted and consequently. and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Armed with the warrant. i.125 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF BOTH ACCUSED WERE SERIOUSLY VIOLATED BY THE POLICE OPERATIVES. It is mandatory that for the search to be valid. In fact. the legality of the search warrant and the search and arrest conducted pursuant thereto. . however. As regards the propriety of the search warrant issued in the name of Timothy Tiu. on the ground that it was not part of the description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant. Besides. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant.e. a mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant.. the search of the car was not incidental to a lawful arrest.[13] In this case.e. and the correctness of the judgment of conviction imposed by the RTC.[9] especially since in this case.[11] Thus. it must be directed at the place particularly described in the warrant. the illegality of the search conducted on the car. We affirm.: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause". Being fruits of an illegal search.

As a matter of fact. we need to look at the individual amounts possessed by each appellant. Binondo. However. the prosecution has sufficiently proved that the packs of shabu were found inside Unit 4-B. and (3) the appellants were freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. De Leon attested to the truth and genuineness of the receipt which was not contradicted by the defense. appellants were found in possession of shabu. (2) such possession is not authorized by law. the one I was carrying that day. 1025 Masangkay St. the seizure of the regulated drug from Unit 4-B is proven by the "Receipt for Property Seized"[16] signed by SPO1 de Leon. several packs of shabu from a man's handbag and a ladies' handbag inside a room in the unit subject of the warrant.5 grams of shabu were found. denied owning the handbag where 20. Though no arrest was made after the successful test-buy operation. Tiu Won admitted ownership of the man's handbag where 234. We note that nowhere in the information is conspiracy alleged. Q: Whose handbags were searched? A: My bag. in her appellant's brief. with jewelry and checks and others were taken by them. viz: . during her testimony. we cannot sustain the trial court's decision attributing to both appellants the illegal possession of the same amount of shabu. lack of criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. his wife. viz: Q: During those ten to 20 minutes. pursuant to which. they obtained a search warrant from Judge Makasiar. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are consistent in that after the test-buy operation. Noel.. they were able to confiscate. the building administrator. and Joji Olarte.3673 grams of shabu were discovered. Be that as it may. it must be shown that (1) appellants were in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug. In his testimony. hence. Manila. what were those policemen doing inside that unit? A: They went inside the rooms and started ransacking the drawers and everything. even handbags were searched by them. she admitted its ownership. who were also present. the seizing officer. this does not destroy the fact that in a subsequent search. HCL Building. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.126 In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug. Neither had it been proven during the trial. Surveillance was previously conducted.[17] (emphasis supplied) Qui Yaling. Furthermore. among others.[15] In the case at bar. As such.[14] We also note that the crime under consideration is malum prohibitum.

3673 grams of shabu is guilty of violating Section 20 thereof.A. Manila as to the penalty of appellant Tiu Won is affirmed. since 234. She contends that since the prosecution was not able to establish the ownership of the bag. The failure of the prosecution to present the bags and proofs that the bags belong to the appellants is immaterial because the bags. the license of Tiu Won found inside the man's handbag and the passport of Qui Yaling found inside the ladies' handbag are not illegal. Article III of R. and it is their fault if they do not. as amended by R. No. the police testified before this court that you has (sic) a bag and when they searched this bag.[20] Qui Yaling likewise argues that the lower court erred in attributing ownership of the handbag to her considering that there was another girl present at the apartment during the search. and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500. they manifested their intention to present her testimony. as amended by R. provided they are voluntary.) (W)hat can you say about that? A: That is an absolute lie. the authorities could not confiscate them for they did not have the authority to do so since the warrant authorized them to seize only articles in relation to the illegal possession of shabu. much more in the master's bedroom. A. it yielded some sachets of shabu(. No. although during the course of the presentation of their evidence. The defense failed to bring Chin to court. We now come to the penalties of the appellants.000. deemed to be owned by Tiu Won. R. 6425. Section 20 punishes the offender with the penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.127 Q: Now. No. applies. 27.5 grams of shabu were found inside the man's handbag. provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos where the amount of shabu involved is 200 grams or more.A.[21] Not within their control.A. 6425. while that of appellant Qui Yaling is modified. he is guilty of violating Section 16. 6425. it is more logical to presume that the handbag belongs to Qui Yaling.[19] These admissions. Qui . 7659. Tiu Won Chua is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. they could not have been presented in court. No. sir. A.[18] (emphasis supplied) An admission is an act or declaration of a party as to the existence of a relevant fact which may be used in evidence against him. a visitor does not normally leave her bag lying anywhere. 7659.00) in accordance with Section 16 and Section 20 (1st paragraph) of R. then such could have also been owned by Chin. Being the occupant of the apartment. while Qui Yaling. Thus. whose handbag contained only 20. What they saw in my bag were my cosmetics. IN VIEW WHEREOF. in connection with Section 20 (1st paragraph). Having no relation to the use or possession of shabu. Section 16. Where the amount is less than 200 grams. We do not subscribe to this argument. the decision of RTC Br. can be used against appellants because it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth. No. Furthermore.

and Commanding Officer. petitioners. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. HERCULES CATALUNA. Nos. Nos. NESTOR MARIANO. petitioners. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. SESE. No. 84583-84 October 3. ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE. G. 84581-82 October 3. OCAYA. RAMOS. DURAL. T/SGT. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. GEN. RAMOS. No. G. PIAD. Corona. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL. BRIG. FIDEL V.respondents. PC-INP Detention Center. RENATO DE VILLA. 81567 October 3. DOMINGO T. Camp Crame. S/SGT. G. G. vs. JJ. petitioners. FIDEL V. MAJ. GEN. and Carpio-Morales. REX D. EVARISTO CARIÑO. vs. vs. petitioners. CONRADO DE TORRES. Sandoval-Gutierrez. SO ORDERED. No. 1991 AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA. Panganiban. GEN. DE VILLA. BRIG. UMIL and NICANOR P. respondents. COL. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE.128 Yaling y Chua is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum. concur.R. vs. COL. Quezon City.R.R. RAMON MONTANO. MANOLITA O. 1991 . 83162 October 3. GEN. G. respondents. 85727 October 3. HON. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. GEN. there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. ARNOLD DURIAN.. RAMON MONTANO.R. COL. LT.R. BRIG. respondents. FELICITAS V. COL. GEN. RENATO S.

change or modify them. BRIG. 84583-84. No. Lim). Jr. GEN. RICARDO REYES.R. G. petitioner. particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest). It is elementary. in this connection. if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM:p Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions. in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant. No. respondents.00 to P10. 81567 and G. and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G. Nos. Valmonte for petitioners in G. the decision merely applied long existing lawsto the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions.R. it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal. Potenciano A. petitioners. in sum. . No.000. No. The Solicitor General for the respondents. Moreover. ELADIO TAGLE. with the following dispositive part: WHEREFORE. 85727. maintain: 1.R. Nos. disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested.129 IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU.R.ALFREDO S. P/SGT. vs. Ricardo C. Muntinglupa. for brevity) which dismissed the petitions. THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION. NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO. In their separate motions for reconsideration. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. R. P/SGT. The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.R.000. seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision. Metro Manila.00. No. and P/SGT. Mercado for petitioners in G.petitioner. Efren H. for petitioner in G. respondents. 84581-82 Josefina G. 83162. the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. That the assailed decision. COL. Flores. vs. No costs. JACINTO MEDINA. LEVI SOLEDAD. 86332 October 3. except that in G.R. LIM. the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60. 85727 (Espiritu vs.

within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed.130 2. when lawful. 3. There can be no dispute that. 4. the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. 7 and for subversion which. conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes. the focus is understandably on Section 5. without warrant. thus: The crimes of insurrection or rebellion. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. No. can be conducted. like rebellion is. Arrest without warrant. in his presence. (Emphasis supplied). and . 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5. The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G. . subversion. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic. In the petitions at bar. . without a warrant. 5. if the arrests were made in accordance with law. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it. the detainee may be ordered forthwit released. 4 Therefore. and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms. under the doctrine ofGarcia vs. or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration. as a general rule. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army. It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. 5. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that. to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not. inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions. when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army. no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest. In the present cases. he (Dural) was committing an offense. 5 so that if detention is illegal. — A peace officer or a private person may. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest. an outlawed organization. where membership penalized. Enrile 2 should be abandoned. filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. is actually committing. That G. except in those cases express authorized by law. which read: Sec. For. No.R. ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest.R. 8 a continuing offense. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. arrest a person: (a) When. would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law. paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113. Enrile. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts. the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the . the person to he arrested has committed.

at the time of arrest. were dispatched to the St. confined in the St. No. . In G. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5. Agnes Hospital. it will be noted. paragraph (b). at the St. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. . supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. .131 occasion thereof. had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense. i." in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause.. that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before. the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon. which generally end upon their commission. Lot 4. Rule 113. It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts..e. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses. is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief .R. to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital. Agnes Hospital. that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. Roosevelt Avenue. is based on actual facts. on 1 February 1988. subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained. and second. to verify a confidential information which was received by their office. or became less of a subversive. refers to arrests without warrant. Section 5(b). Dural. aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. before a road hump along Macanining St. 2045. murder. it may also be said. about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. simply because he was. etc. or incident thereto.e. Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government. His arrest was based on "probable cause. Biñan." twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. 81567 (Umil case). FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST. based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest. given another opportunity. adultery. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. Viewed from another but related perspective. 11 These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar. i. Quezon City. Caloocan City. military agents. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. without warrant. are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses. or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. South City Homes. Agnes Hospital." as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter. 12 Said confidential information received by the arresting officers. Bagong Barrio.. Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. Dural did not cease to be. arson. Laguna. or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon. that based on the same information. which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first. under the facts of the Umil case. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

Nos. Rules of Court. two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario. Rule 113. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before. that in view of this information. second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition. therefore. or on 31 January 1988. Marikina Heights. under Sec 5(a). the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and. They were. In fine. On 27 June 1988. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra. Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple(G. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. No. Parenthetically. third — as the records of this case disclosed later. are also justified. it was found to be true. Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural. explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. therefore. and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 84921.R. radio and other communications equipment. 16 2. ammunitions. without warrant. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration.R.R. As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law.. pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court. 84581-82). that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms.132 that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G. and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group. Rule 113. 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine. More specifically. Furthermore. without warrant. considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. 83162). the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988. C-30112). it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G. caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant. 14 and. Molave St. located in the Villaluz Compound. He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). without warrant. a search of the house was conducted. No. Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound. informations were filed in court against said petitioners. it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest. . came from reliable sources. in fact.R. Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse. an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are: 1. Parenthetically. the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith. of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5. their arrests. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest. he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988. Marikina. As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest. On 31 August 1988. "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural. Nos.

That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved. With regard to Vicky Ocaya. that when the agents frisked them. the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5. the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions. Roque. 20 It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque. the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. she was arrested. no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. Buenaobra. during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural. as in the case of Dural. 19 5. third: at the time of their arrests. subversive documents. ammunitions and/or subversive documents. without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA. Anonuevo and Casiple). with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.133 3. one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. Anonuevo. this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of . This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities. second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine. and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque. For. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment. who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. Buenaobra. The records also show that. the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque. Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations. And then. And at the time of the actual arrests. and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. With all these facts and circumstances existing before. Rule 113 are met. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PCIntelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. In view of these circumstances. On the other hand. Buenaobra. Rule 113. they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse. at the time of her arrest. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988. Casiple and Ocaya). 17 that. shortly after their arrests. and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date. Anonuevo. in their possession were unlicensed firearms. 18 4. In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5. do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.

Because of this development. the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. for investigation. to conduct an arrest without warrant. the Court has. No. in this case. without warrant. But. was arrested without warrant. the arresting officers are not liable. particularly paragraph (b) thereof.00. the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention. the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988.R. 29 Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988. Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang. was inciting to sedition. In G. Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. during the pre-trial or trial on the merits. Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60. the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113. but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers. Sta. which obviously becomes difficult at times. In G. . Espiritu had not lost the right to insist. In the balancing of authority and freedom. For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation. on 23 November 1988. the police agents arrested Nazareno. But. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5.000. 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions. Metro Manila." but for uttering the above-quoted language which. one of the suspects in the said killing. Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. without warrant. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions. then. at the time the words were uttered. the peace officers did not appear. 85727. No. where he said.. in the perception of the arresting officers. even without warrant.134 committing the crime for which they were arrested.00 to P10. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled. 86332 (Nazareno). that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988).R. tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. not for subversion or any "continuing offense. is still another thing. was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II. hanggang sa magkagulona. at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St. in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order. or soon thereafter. 27 (Emphasis supplied) and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. Espiritu. Ramil Regala. 22 Not evidence of guilt. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant. the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest. Mesa. Rule 113. (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight. while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988. . Muntinlupa. since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly. 23 The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted. that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988. .000. or 14 days later. Manila. among other things: Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988. Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers.

But again. 84581-82). the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan. earlier filed by his co-accused. on the other hand. it is true.135 As shown in the decision under consideration. This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno. is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. . Metro Manila. Parenthetically. Nos. with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati. . denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him). as follows: . i. In the case of Buenaobra (G. as revealed by the records. it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. At the conclusion of the hearing. still undocketed).e. ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest.R. in compliance with Section 5. . it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On the other hand. On 7 January 1989. belonged to her. these admissions. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731. Laguna. even as the motion to post bail. she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms. The Court. Branch 24. was granted by the same trial court. or on 1 February 1989. Ramil Regala and two (2) others. an information charging Narciso Nazareno. ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition. Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had. in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention. On 13 January 1989.R. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests. took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA. he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. this Court. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. in fact. Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989. are supported by probable cause. in the case of Amelia Roque. on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant). Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses. a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989. Manuel Laureaga. as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms. ammunitions and documents in their possession. retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant. the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus. Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits. To note these admissions. No. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.

JJ. are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers. but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5. Medialdea and Davide. further. Under these . the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. Rules of Court. and. Separate Opinions FERNAN.J. Espiritu "was arrested without warrant. and Ilagan vs. The second allegedly seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same afternoon (Decision.. Enrile should be abandoned. Griño-Aquino. I am inclined to agree with the. this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same. Narvasa. particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels.. hanggang sa magkagulo na. are DENIED. on the basis of. This denial is FINAL. inciting to sedition. in the perception of the arresting officers. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions. 1988. C. a long existing law. concur. ACCORDINGLY. as elucidated in this Resolution. Rule 113. 23-24). Enrile." I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions warrantless arrests provided they are made in accordance with law. as the records show. then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted. . SO ORDERED. Jr. 1990 and an exhaustive evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said decision. In the first place.. Melencio-Herrera. Rules of Court. Bidin. as warranted by the evidence. realizing that it is indeed possible that Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech. reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. not for subversion or any 'continuing offense.' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . are not met. 5 of Rule 113. . not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion. and which. Paras. concurring and dissenting: After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9. He allegedly first uttered seditious remarks at the National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12. then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released. with the least delay. such statement was. pp. In the words of the resolution. but if such conditions are met. the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990. Espiritu mav not be considered as having "just committed" the crime charged." Apparently. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups. for stress. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. what is important is that the Court be right. This Court.136 As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. majority's resolution on said motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and petitioner Alfredo Nazareno for the crime of murder. the resolution nonetheless supports the authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest. A Final Word This Resolution ends as it began. While not conceding the validity of such perception. Padilla.

Similarly. 408). It devolves upon the accused to prove membership by force or ciorcion. p. 18) that he was exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law. G. errneous perception. 1986.R." (Dissenting opinion in Ilagan vs. September 4. while the police should act swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in view of the jeopardy it may cause the government. 70748. especially if it would result in the violation of any right of a person. the necessity of balancing interests. Burgos (G. On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed. therefore. is beside the point. Certainly. 68955. it should be remembered that any of the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe upon the fundamental freedoms of speech and expression.orcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at the However. Section 5. may not be tolerated.144 SCRA 1). 524 [1951]). warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what particular provision of law had beeri violated by the person arrested. to secure a warrant for his arrest. We categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was provided by the Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). a single act of urging others to commit any of the acts enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to hold anyone liable for inciting to sedition. it should be underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator is knowing member of a subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs. "connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense 'has in fact been committed' no how long ago. the arrestor must have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it' (instead of just 'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed it' under the old rule). not to mention ineptitude among their ranks. December 27. those of the State as against those of its individual citizen. That the arrested person has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution. 1972. Here lies the urgency of judicial intervention before an arrest is made. Ferrer. While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and presents largely a question of policy (Espuelas vs. By its nature. "it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. There arises. Hence. 139 SCRA 349. speedy action should consist not in warrantless arrests but in securing warrants for such arrests. No. A crime must in fact or actually (has just) been committed first." The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14 days after the commission of the crime imputed to him. the law enforcement agents had time. True it is that law en. The fact of . 90 Phil. In People vs. a subversive may be arrested even if has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government such as bombing of government offices trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable cause to believe that he is in the roll of members of a subversive organization. 1985. Enrile. No. one may not be in such a roll without undergoing the concious act of enlistment.R. People. Espiritu's apprehension may not therefore be considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests "when an offense has in fact just been committed.. I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without warrants. short though it might seem. L-32613-14. the Court considered as illegal the warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's personal knowledge such subversion and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be strictly construed. October 21. 48 SCRA 382). It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. Secondly. Added to this is the subjectivity of the determination of what may incite other people to sedition. It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent application. No person should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived his action.137 circumstances. That crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. Thirdly. Thus. Moreover. inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested without a warrant duly issued by the proper authority.

whether exculpatory or inculpatory. However. Earlier. it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. good faith should be reposed on the officials implementing the law. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. triggered by the difficulty in finding evidence that could stand judicial scrutiny — to pinpoint a subversive. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. (121 SCRA at 554).. I believe we should move with the people of the world who are fast liberating themselves. for the orderly administration of government and the maintenance of peace and order in the country. 121 SCRA 538). Enrile (G. in Morales. April 26. 1983. we are not wanting in laws to hold any offending peace officer liable both administratively and criminally for abuses in the performance of their duties. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. If existing laws are inadequate.. 61016. we hail be entering the dangerous ground of judicial legislation. the policy-determining branches of the government may be exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. mandated b the Constitution to uphold the law. Jr. These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the military and civilian components of the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary citizen who faces a situation wherein civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in the community. in whole or in part shall be inadmissible evidence.R. can only go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit behind them. I. J. vs. Otherwise. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. by any person on his behalf. to wit: . No. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. JR. I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes with a political or ideological element. or appointed by the court upon petition on his behalf. Victims of abuses should resort to legal remedies to redress their grievances. police officers usually have to make long persistent surveillance.138 the commission of the offense must be undisputed. or appointed the court upon the petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. It is disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead of liberty in har cases coming before us. People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages freedom and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real progress. if any. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arressted. After all. GUTIERREZ. (Supra. vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without warrant. This Court. therefore. The person shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer. 15). the theory that enhancing order through constraints on freedom is deceptive because restrictions on liberty corrode the very values Govenment pretends to promote. Such abuses are more often than not. at p. the Court laid out the procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested: At the time a person is arrested. concurring and dissenting: The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order. and that any statement he might make could be used against him. a relative.

without a warrant. or is attempting to commit an offense. noisy. Otherwise.R. (3. "Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ when applied to actual cases. that the petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate warrantless arrests. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. G. (4) what constitute the five objects or ends of sedition. when lawful. Insofar as G. no matter how well grounded on past events. No. insurrection. and (5) what is a scurrilous libel against the Philippines. Ramon Casiple. or sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. They were actually committing a crime when arrested. In fact. among other (1) what kinds of speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of rising publicly and tumultously. arrest a person: (a) When. 5. The belief of law enforcement authorities.R.139 Sec. If we allow public speakers to be picked up simply because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of a peace officer or critical of government policy and action. I doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole country who would know the full dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the nation's interest in the liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national importance on one hand and the application of the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of national security and public safety are asserted. But until a person is proved guilty. Nos. I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations regarding "continuing oftenses. If warrantless searches are to be validated." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. 83162 involving Amelia Roque. the tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal. No. the non-rebels who are critical. I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. I cannot . which is freedom of expression. he may be arrested. I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G. the petitioners were arrested after having been apprehended while in possession of illegal firearms and ammunitions. and Vicky Ocaya are concerned. the percentage of knowledgeability would go down further if we consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the ability to define. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the ground that that was inciting to sedition. In case of doubt. Arrest without warrant. 81567 is concemed. we will undermine all pronouncements of this Court on the need to protect that matrix of all freedoms. Rebellion. it should be Congress and not this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards. Insofar as G. Wilfredo Buenaobra. is actually committing. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. or illegal method.R. a warrant of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is essential in this type of offense.R. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. 84583-84 and G. or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up arms against the Government. This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of speech. No. If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found roaming around. on the other. intimidation. At the very least. 84581-82. Domingo Anonuevo.) when does a certain effort amount to force. — A peace officer or a private person may. xxx xxx xxx Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. I concur in the denial of their motions for reconsideration. the person to be arrested has committed. Nos.R. in his presence.

We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation.and (4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G. No.R. 86332. No. A government of laws must abide by its own Constitution. Nos. No.140 understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time. 85727. 1988.) The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when a recognition of beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels. I do not think that under the applicable circumstances the petitioners can validly complain that they are being unlawfully detained. is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict. and G. await the petitioner's surfacing from underground. To say that the offense "has in fact just been committed" even if 14 days have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on warrantless arrests into ridiculous limits.R. CRUZ. the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govenment forces. whether as its fighting armed elements. No. 1988 or fourteen (14) days later.. (3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G. The information that Narciso Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers only on December 28. need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of the offense is bailable. therefore. 81567.R. I VOTE TO: (1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14. 121 SCRA 472. 84583-84.R. CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING. No. than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest. A warrant of arrest is essential in this case. Separate Opinion: I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of those who were arrested inflagrante. In G. to justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other petitioners on the ground that they were apprehended for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied crimes. which was quoted with approval in the originalponencia: The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion. or voluntarily permitted the search of the house without warrant. or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. to quell the rebellion.R. The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not the warrantless arrest. (Emphasis supplied. or subsequently posted bail or chose to remain in the custody of the military.R. J. Enrile. 86332. (2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G. and pounce on him with no legal authority instead of securing warrants of arrest for his apprehension. or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion. The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into the past and render legal what was illegal. G. No. 83162. But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla vs. The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures is not cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was seized. resulting in the application of . 84581-82. Obviously. I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous act of undergoing medical treatment. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion. (Emphasis supplied. International law is thus substituted for municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic with its own citizens in a purely domestic matter. The legitimate government cannot excuse the suppression of these rights by the "exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an intemal matter governed exclusively by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. In the case of Dural. not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary. all persons suspected as rebels are by such suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the unceremonious capture of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. particularly those guaranteeing due process." This is supposed to have validated the determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the absence of a warrant. the Court says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information" that he was in the hospital. aside front their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide manitude. however. But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended. which information "was found to be true. and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof. usually by simply placing the suspect "under surveillance. Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders — or combatants — is not justified in the present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own laws. subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided thereunder. engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. subversion. In the case of Espiritu. are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses.) The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities. moreover. and for allegedly seditious remarks made by him the day before. the decision contained the following pronouncement which this Court has also adopted as its own: ." to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension. or incident thereto. My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance of a warrant. conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes. It is in such a situation that the processes of the local courts are not observed and the rebels cannot demand the protection of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed to have renounced by their defiance of the government. The rebels are then considered alien enemies-to be treated as prisoners of war when captured-and cannot invoke the municipal law of the legitimate government they have disowned. he may at any time be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he is in the process of committing the "continuing offense.141 the laws of war in the regulation of their relations. and presuming the innocence of the accused. the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping. The Court says his case is not covered by the Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were supposed to continue their ." no matter that what he may be actuallly doing at the time is a perfectly innocent act. as he lay supine in his sickbed. . In further justification. Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla. prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Principal among these — in our country — are whose embodied in the Bill of Rights. allowing bail. Once so placed. not to dispense with it. or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. The decision itself says that the arrest "need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the absence of a judicial warrant is no impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the authorities of the "continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes. 2045. As for the duration of the offenses. the legitimate govenment must treat the rebels as its citizens. probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing the warrant. including and especially those guaranteed by the Constitution. The fiction was indulged that he was even then. .

it was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. No. as revealed by the records. according to Webster.R. these admissions. But again. Whatever their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours. out of mistaken zeal. the Court says that it was only on the day of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable killers. It seems some of us have short memories of that repressive regime. It was worse in the case of Nazareno. In sustaining this act. The offense was considered as having been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113. as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms. or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an offense "has in fact just been committed.. 1991. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself. means "a very short time ago. That is what democracy is all about. took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA. As the ultimate defender of the Constitution. no matter how long ago the offense was committed. strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon wmch the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant." which. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. In other words. of the Rules of Court) despite the considerable time lapse. are supported by probable cause. it is true. would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national security. It seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta.. the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights. I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the majority principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests without warrants." I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal arrests made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights were wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who. Section 5. which are carefully . I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. At the same time. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses. J. Malmstedt. i." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just. who was also arrested without warrant. is actually committing. not at any time after the suspicion of the arresting officer begins. ammunitions and documents in their possession. The subsequent developments in several of the cases here consolidated. Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter "has committed. I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not be the start of another dangerous doctrine: The Court. thus suggesting that the validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense but from the time of the Identification of the suspect. no more and no less than any other person in this country. and no less than fourteen days after the killing. since they are quite unnecessary for sustaining the actual results reached in the majority Resolution. June 19.142 effects even to the following day. in compliance with Section 5. however. concurring and dissenting: I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for Reconsideration. FELICIANO. G. where I noted: "The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. but I for one am not one to forget so soon. This was summarily pointed out in my very brief statement concurring in the result reached in the original Decision of the Court dated 9 July 1990.e. 91107." The arrest must be made almost immediately or soon after these acts.

I believe. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. must. the person to be arrested has committed. as a general rule. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. i. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending.. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. (Emphais supplied) Under the above provision. in his presence. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail. it is important to recall that judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for what they are: they areexceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights. and all doubts should be . and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Arrest without warrant. 1. houses. We start at the beginning.143 detailed in the majority Resolution. or a private person for that matter. be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest. make this even clearer. that is. — A peace officer or a private person may. need to be addressed to some extent and the inter-relation of the "continuing crimes" doctrine with constitutional rights explored. Those exceptions are. when lawful. is actually committing. or is attempting to commit an offense. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. essentially found in Section 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. papers. Exceptions to such a norm must be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless the constitutional rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of individuals may be lawfully constrained and seized. 3. The ordinary rule generally applicable to statutory provisions is that exceptions to such provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in which they are cast fairly warrants. the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual members of society. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the situations where an officer of the law. may lawfully arrest a person without previously securing a warrant of arrest. the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons. Rule 113 follows: Sec. Arrests made without a warrant issued by a judge after complying with the constitutional procedure. and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112. 5. they have been made and. without a warrant. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b).e. The full text of Section 5. arrests. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads: Sec. Section 7. the rendition of which complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2. arrest a person: (a) When. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. in our day. 2. There are. Although the above statements are obiter. are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons within the meaning of Article III Section 2. the majority Resolution has taken the time and trouble expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes" doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless arrests. Nonetheless. certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests are unreasonable seizures of persons. however.

such officer could not. The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. In Alvarez vs. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. moreover. 28 Fed. Section 5(a) may. he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document.. 2 Exceptions to such a guarantee must be read with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits of their language so to keep vital and significant the general constitutional norms warrantless arrests. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the presence of the arresting officer.. State. there is an obvious need for immediate. [2d]. cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court. State vs.144 resolved in favor of the general provision. 7 If no overt. 88. Perry vs. 237 Pac. For a crime to exist in our legal law. 8 It is elementary that purely mental or psychological phenomena. St. .. but with a constitutional guarantee. may be seen to be the substitute. action on the part of the arresting officer to suppress the breach of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there. U. Custer County. in fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest. or gradual depreciation of. these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual. under the circumstances. The term "presence" in this connection is properly and restrictively construed to relate to acts taking place within the optical or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. 14 Fed. 5 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms: There is no such personal knowledge in this case. 6 Fed. 6 (emphasis supplied) 4. In such situation. Cofer vs. [2d]. Burgos. He was. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often vilated and so deserving of full protection. rather than the exception. At the time of the appellant's arrest. 353. 4 In People vs. All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are reasonable. If no such overt acts are actually . recognizably criminal. of course. for the securing of a warrant of arrest. . it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. Since the proceeding is a drastic one. in the presence of the arresting officer. 965. 118 So. McDaniel.. 3 this Court. 231 Pac. acts occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer. Clair. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers. 613.. there must also be an actus reus. stressing that: II.. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described as subversive. 198 Pac. it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. [2d]. 189.S. 1 This rule must apply with special exigency and cogency where we deal. become aware at all that a crime is being committed or attempted to be committed in his presence. The statute or rule which allows exceptions the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. it is not enough that mens rea be shown. not with an ordinary statutory provision. the rights secured by them (State vs. even instantaneous. or of the attempt to commit an offense. Court of First Instance. Leonard vs. (emphasis supplied) held that: . Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. be seen to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. 362. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife. The fact of the occurrence of the offense. 373). to prevent stealthy encroachment upon. U.S. not externalized in overt physical acts of a human person.

In the first place. perceive through his own senses some act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of a crime which has "just been committed. quite beside the point. but winds up in the next page with a very diluted standard of "reasonable belief and "good faith" on the part of the arresting officers. the necessity which serves as the justification in law of warrantless arrests under Section 5(a). the majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal knowledge" in Section 5(b). cannot by any standard be justified under Section 5(b). In somewhat different terms.g. and thereto the offense can not be said to have been committed "in [his] presence. the magistrate may rely upon the personal knowledge of the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a warrant of arrest. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer who is determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime. or a person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. in the seclusion of his chambers. a person sprawled on the ground. In the present Resolution. not be that imperious necessity for instant action to prevent an attempted crime. No. Turning to Section 5 (b). The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the time interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief indeed. still it must be pointed out that at the time Dural was arrested in the hospital. a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been committed" would obviously render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime must have been committed "[in] the presence" of the arresting officer. There would. there would. 7. That the person unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be guilty of the offense he was suspected of in the first place is.145 taking place in the presence or within the sensor perception of the arresting officer. . In G. in other words. dead of gunshot wound. unless he has in fact committed physically observable criminal acts in the presence of the arresting officer or hadjust committed such acts when the arresting officer burst upon the scene. the first requirement imports that th effects or corpus of the offense which has just been committed are still visible: e. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not reasonably be said to have been just committed. be ample time to go to a magistrate and ask for a warrant of arrest. truth and reliability might be. The arresting officer may not ha seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim. the killing of the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City far away from the St. That requirement would exclude informtion conveyed by another person. the warrantless arrest of Alfredo Nazareno 14-days after the occurrence of the killing with which he was charged along with other persons. The stricter standard is properly applicable to the officers seizing a person without a warrant of arrest. In G. no matter what his reputation for. The arresting officer must himself have "personal knowledge". ascertains "probable cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him. the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b) by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures. in other words. 5. 81567. 9 Thus. is in a sense more exacting than the standard imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who. in principle. Dural was arrested without warrant while being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of the policemen in which he was suspected to have been a participant. and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating tha the person to be arrested has committed the offense. to repress the crime being committed. two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may be sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the arresting officer arrived in the scene. no doubt in order to underscore the point here being made. or to capture the doer of the perceive criminal act. In the second place. 86332. that the arresting officers had been in "hot pursuit" of Dural beginning at the scene of the killing and ending the next day in the hospital. There was no showing.R." 6. Even a person secretly guilty some earlier crime is constitutionally entitled to be secure from warrantless arrest. where the arresting officer comes upon a person dead on the street and sees a person running away with a knife from where the victim is sprawled the ground. nor did the Court require it." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from sense perception the arresting officer. he has personal knowledge of facts which render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the criminal deed. for they are acting in derogation of a constitutional right. No.R. course. The arresting officer must. While 1day may be substantially different from 14-days.

. The pertinent portion of the majority Resolution reads: . has jurisdiction to try a person charged with such offense. the second problem is that of determining whether a single crime or multiple crimes were committed where the defense of double jeopardy is raised. or because less of a subversive. In the latter case. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.e. where the acts of the accused constituted discrete. each act comprising a distinct and separate offense. estafa or malversation) either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. i. the double jeopardy defense is non-available. arson. Agnes Hospital. (Emphasis supplied) 9. evasion of service of sentence). that doctrine. which generally end upon their commission. . the gist of our case law is that where some of the ingredients or elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some other ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the territory of another court. . Where all of the essential elements of a crime take place within the territory of one court but "by reason of he very nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be "continuing." then the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed." shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under Section 5(a) that the offense "has in fact just been presence of the arresting officer arrived. Turning to the second type of problem.. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes. FOR PURPOSE OF ARREST. simply because he was. but rather because the person to be arrested is suspected of having committed a crime in the future. More specifically. Enrile 10 does not sustain warrantless arrests of person to be arrested is. . 11.. multiple offenses. the overt acts of the accused constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses. confined in the St. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually found in our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. In respect of the first problem. . the question is normally presented in terms of whether one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused.. (e. Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to two (2) problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. given another opportunity. It is in this sense that subversion like rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. 12 The point worth stressing is that in passing upon the issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of offense committed. subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objectives of overthrowing organized government is attained. would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. libel.146 8. . overt acts of the accussed constituting elements of the crime charged must be shown to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where he is charged. etc. as it were. in my submission. at the time of arrest. Upon the other hand. doesnot dispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably criminal in character must take place in the presence of the arresting officer. or must have just been committed when the arresting officer arrived. merely resting in between specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to do so. Dural did not cease to be. must be shown. . adultery. kidnapping and illegal detention.g. 11 Clearly. murder. Dural. the defense of double jeopardy becomes available where a second information is filed covering acts later in the series.g. 10. Where the series of acts actually alleged and proven to have been committed by the accused constituted only one and the same crime. The criminal acts are regarded as repeated or as continuing within the province or city where the defendant was found and arrested. if the warrantless arrest it to be lawful. the offense is deemed to be continuing because some or all of the elements constituting the offense occurred within jurisdiction of the second court (e. The "continuing crimes" doctrine in our case law (before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs.

leaflets. the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine." which has its own legitimate function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence. J. for instance. REGALADO. No. cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. For in such cases. planning action. the doctrine of "continuing crimes.: Separate Opinion: While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such concurrence. however. that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and seizures makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. correspondence. I wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the rationale adopted in G. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of Rights. loans or in any other forms.R. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested without warrant. to make life easy for police forces but rather to protect the liberties of private individuals. c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues. objectives. whether through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal. the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a crime. b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever. . 86332. and the Bill of Rights was not designed. or any other document of the organization. is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of. a subversive association or organization. or purposes of such association or organization. My final submission. the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive association:" 13 a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists. the very freedoms which make our polity worth protecting and saving. It is not our Court's function. continued to be committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. xxx xxx xxx It may well be. to enforce the law by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy. assessments. books. is that. begun or committed elsewhere. records.147 12. or any other type of publication to promote the objectives and purposes of such association or organization. xxx xxx xxx f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. xxx xxx xxx k) Participating in any was in the activities. and the unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. pamphlets. Note. xxx xxx xxx h) Preparing documents. as the majority implies.

The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest. as now required by Section 5(b). is another cause for controversy. that at about 5 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988. I take exception to the conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied with in this case. according to the resolution. while authorizing a peace officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest. It is correct to say that prevailing conditions affecting national security and stability must also be taken into account. precisely. that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable cause and it was not whimsical. Metro Manila. Further." It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. However. that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988). it is now required that the crime must have just been committed. more than a year ago but of which the arresting officer received information only today. for investigation. while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988." Since. Muntinlupa." I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which. without warrant. must have been dictated by the consideration. if not assured. "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988. Yet. and not the time when the person making the arrest learned or was informed of such commission. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. if the rules on arrest are . the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113. concocted such reports for variant reasons not necessarily founded on truth. the particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed. as an ad hoc proposition. that amendment requiring such personal knowledge must have been designed to obviate the practice in the past of warrantless arrests being effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information obtained from third persons who merely professed such knowledge or. Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang. one of the suspects in the said killing. the police agents arrested Nazareno. say. It may be granted. Definitely. at least. is the time when the crime was in fact committed.148 It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988. and not the time when the crime was in fact committed. or 14 days later. that by reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence. The recency contemplated here. for the reasons above elucidated. The longer the interval. and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant may result from imputations based on dubious motives. in this instance. clearly. Otherwise. at the risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum. the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced. the more attenuated are the chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration. the resolution has emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b) that the person making the arrest must have had personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the complicity or liability of the arrestee for the crime. since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II. among others. such warrantless arrests could be validly made even for a crime committed. the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the suspects. Ramil Regala. in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest. specifically conditions that grant of authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed. Now. the obtention of information of a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier necessarily undermines the capacity of the arresting officer to ascertain the reliability of the information he is acting upon and to acquire personal knowledge thereof after such verification. It is true that the corresponding information was filed against Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that. worse. Ramil Regala. was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II.

2 As I said. . SARMIENTO. i. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers.R. . . "Personal knowledge. we would have made "subversion" to mean mere "membership" when.. . Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as follows: . the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. he. 276.149 scrupulously observed. was after all committing an offense (subversion being supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military did have personal knowledge that he had committed it. Indeed. speaks of "personal knowledge". coupled with good faith" referred to by the majority. I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge. I respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without a warrant.e. when. "suspicion . and as I held. deceit.. . . . is based on actual facts. the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive organization to make the accused liable. No.: dissenting: I reiterate my dissent. Section 5(b) as amended. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution. is supposedly no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . subversion. it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court. willfully and by overt acts. to overthrow the existing government by force. as no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion. 1700." that is. . J. and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power. that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion. there would be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for unwarranted incursions into civil liberties. and otherwise. to justify police action. . A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause.e. i. Rule 113. in this case. 815667) was validly arrested without a warrant and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5. Rolando Dural (G. as the law alone. were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder. I respectfully . . as amended by Executive Order No. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. coupled with good faith ." as the majority would interpret it. According to the majority. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. . without more would suffice to secure their punishment. " 6 I submit that personal knowledge means exactly what it says — that the peace officer is aware that the accused has committed an offense. of suspicion. As Ferrer held." and suspicion is supposedly reasonable: . supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilty of the person to be arrested. I dissent. as Ferrer tells us. that above "overt acts" should be visible to the eyes of the police officers (if that is possible). Dural. 3 is made up of "overt acts. 167. otherwise the accused can not be said to be committing any offense within the contemplation of the Rules of Court. 1 the majority has not shown why the arrests in question should after all be sustained. of the Rules of Court. the Rules (then Section 6) spoke of simple "reasonable ground" — which would have arguably encompassed "actual belief or suspicion . . subversion means more that mere membership. however. . First. ." according to the majority. paragraph (b). membership in a subversive organization with intent to further the objectives thereof. [and] founded on probable cause. as an offense punished by Executive Order No. and that they joined the Party. knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective." and as Ferrer has taken pains to explain. based on actual facts . According to the majority. It is to be noted that prior to their amendment." 4 In People vs. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly. in relation to Republic Act No.

As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned. the subject of controversy. we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man" had been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital. I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. and that that person was Rolando Dural. allegedly admitted). 169. As the majority points out. Santos suggested that notwithstanding good faith on the part of the police. and needless to say." 8 I do not see how We can act differently here. As People vs. that Roque. the peace officer. the military had (again) acted on a mere tip-the military had no personal knowledge (as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar arrest because of lack of personal knowledge. We have. et al. and." 10 and as if. "[w]hatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers came in its entirety from the information furnished by [another] . and that "it was found to be true. I think it is imprudent for this Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the petitioners-since after all. the hospital authorities (the alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under existing laws. the arrest is valid. Clearly. it should be noted. information. As I said. . et al. 12 I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque. what we have is second-hand. hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of violence to "government health authorities" — not to the military. to which the Constitution after all. if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. the majority would quite evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the first place. in the second place. and as the majority points out. it is worse. et al. The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. What. we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. as the Court held. we are talking simply of the legality of the petitioner's arrests. I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense. I do not think that the majority can say that since Amelia Roque. 84581-82. 212. I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Likewise. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Santos involved a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest without a warrant). there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. however. hearsay.150 submit that to give to "personal knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the amendment as useless exercise. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question before the trial court and precisely. Ramon Caspile. . "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque. as the majority here says that the military was acting in good faith. furthermore. did in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved the peace officer on grounds of good faith. there truly was an information. and Vicky Ocaya (G. previously rejected such a species of information because of the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. Nos. amending Presidential Decree No. Domingo Anonuevo. and that it was reliable. Second. the arrest is nevertheless subject to question. . there was no reason for the military to ignore the courts. immediate arrests were "prudent" and necessary. Santos. Burgos held: More important. because we do not even know who that informant was. indeed.R." 11 Here. 83162) could have been lawfully picked up under similar circumstances. was acting in good faith. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest. Wilfredo Buenaobra. not personal knowledge. gives the authority to issue warrants. Santos did not say that so long as he. Santos 9 to be well-taken. Quite to the contrary.

it is the very question before the Court—whether or not the statement in question constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless arrest. Espiritu has not lost the right to insist. 1988. is still another thing. Espiritu was picked up the following day. either. 85727. But. Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting to sedition. Evidently.14 And obviously. 86332). Nos. we are speaking of simple arrests. is still another thing. at the time the words were uttered. Of course. in uttering supposedly. but that: . admit to being NPA's. I certainly hope not. which obviously becomes difficult at times. a day later-and in no way is "inciting to sedition" a continuing offense. 13 Espiritu however was arrested on November 23. et al. in this case. and as I said. (2) we are talking of mere arrests.R. 16 Secondly. It is to my mind plain. What the majority has not answered. the majority is not saying that it is either. we would have stretched the authority of peace officers to make warrantless arrests for acts done days before. titled the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). because it does not contain enough "fighting words" recognized to be seditious." 15 and (3) we have. It is a perfectly legal question to my mind and I am wondering why we can not answer it. It is to me immaterial that the guilt of the accused still has to be established. . the Court has. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently." It is to gloss over at any rate. or soon thereafter. hanggang sa magkagulo na. the majority would anyway force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest. accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G. or soon thereafter. the accused are in fact being deprived of liberty. protected speech.00. is something to crow about. it is nothing to crow about (a mere "administrative measure"). the very basis of the claim rests on dubious "confidential information. as I indicated. it is a question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without shirking the Court's constitutional duty. that Roque. we can not approve an arrest simply because the military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway")— that would be abdication of judicial duty and when. 1988. Obviously. . a mere say-so of the military.151 More important. again. without warrant. that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. Second. But. and in no way is "the following day" "soon thereafter". moreover. we are not talking of the guilt or innocence of the accused. the following: Bukas tuloy and welga natin . Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60. "the Court has. that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my mind. the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. titled in favor of authority. the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest. given a reduced bail to the accused. Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. . the majority is not apparently convicted that it is. without warrant. and evidently. I can not. then. the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all. is that inciting to sedition is in no way a continuing offense. First. Arrest to me. . and as far as arrests are concerned. after the majority referred to Rolando Dural as a "sparrow man" and having Amelia Roque. at the time the words were uttered." According to the majority.000. et al. in this case. anyway." 17 First. In the balancing of authority and freedom. . the Court is not bound by bare say-so's. but apparently. during the trial on the merits. even if in the opinion of the majority.00 to P10. since meanwhile.000. since: (1) that is a matter of defense. that is also of no moment. on November 22. I do not think this is the contemplation of the Rules of Court.

In no way can the authorities be said to have "personal knowledge" two weeks thereafter. as there was none in the case of Burgos. be in time made to defend such an indefensible pronouncement." and unless there existed an urgency as where a moving vehicle is involved. Aminnudin. that arrests may be done only through a judicial warrant. I am co-responsible for the acts of my colleagues and I am afraid that I may. 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or escape" 19 and there was no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes. the majority is not telling us neither. instant police action can not be justified. I do not understand why these cases are apparently. "the Court has. because it is supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side of Government). people who think differently from the rest of us. first." 21 It is a strange declaration. whatever "personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal knowledge" of a crime that had "just been committed. since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II. and second. Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and the authorities must have "personal knowledge. in this case.152 As in the case of Burgos in People vs. rightly or wrongly." whatever "personal knowledge" they have is necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks before. special cases. I am not saying that a suspected criminal. and apparently. can not be arrested at all — but that the military should first procure a warrant from a judge before effecting an arrest. . titled in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of the Rules. mandated by the Constitution no less. (or worse. if he can not be arrested without a warrant. this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. the scale in favor of authority . As it is. As it is. I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . or 14 days later. In the case of People vs. when the Rules have purposely limited it by way of an exception. the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act. in this case. ." 22 as if to say that normally. incidentally. I am wondering why. that I am "coddling criminals"). precisely. 20 this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed. It is not too much to ask of so-called law enforcers. 23 With all due respect. The majority goes on: Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988. by tradition. apart from the fact that these cases involved. . "In the balancing of authority and freedom. to the general rule. . the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113. the majority has in fact given the military the . I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases." states the majority." In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact (allegedly) committed. while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988. and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I am saying it. on the side of liberty — as the custodian of the Bill of Rights — even if we were talking of "simple" arrests. and I feel I am appropriately concerned because as a member of the Court. I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its pronouncement on individual rights (and statutory construction in general). because this Court has leaned. Burgos.

. supra).. 30 With all due respect. I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Garcia and Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified in a regime that respects the rule of law — that the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential document (Garcia) and that the filing of an information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan). I respectfully submit. when after all. Fourth and finally. in the first place. the basis for Buenaobra's arrest. I am not to be mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be presumed) but I can not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the military that he was an NPA courier so that the military could pounce on him. I reiterate one principle: The State has no right to bother citizens without infringing their right against arbitrary State action. . they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no longer be defended." the Charter likewise states. I submit that the majority has. and it will not minimize the significance of the petitioners' predicament. and sooner. . papers. of depriving people of liberty—even if we are not yet talking of whether or not people are guilty. as in the cases of Amelia Roque. et al.g. an uncounselled confession) was precisely. I submit that a year. I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent jurisprudence (e. we do not know if we are in fact dealing with "Communists." 28 First and foremost. precisely. But it is also to patronize the petitioners and simply. "What is important. a decade. Enrile 27 have been better days. a decade. to approve the military's action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed. Second." as the majority did not find it unreasonable for the Capital Command to claim that it "came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II" 25—and none of us can possibly dispute it." says the majority. in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered. doubtful. a discretion the law denies even judges 24 — today it is fourteen days. and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old excuses. would not be in fact unreasonable. It is to beg the question. and as the majority has conceded. this is not what constitutionalism is all about.. this Court is validating their continued detention. "Communism" and "national security" are old hat — the dictator's own excuses to perpetuate tyranny. one year. if they could have been defended. because Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military. and effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable . ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually." states the Constitution.153 broadest discretion to act. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the point. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. People vs. following the theory of the majority. "The right of the people. With all due respect. houses. "values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information" (manufactured or genuine. . "to be secure in their persons. I submit that it is nothing for which the public should be elated. pounced on him. hardly involves subversion. With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra. since the military can claim anytime that it "found out only later." 32 The Constitution states the general rule — the majority would make the exception the rule. I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are." 31 "The State. Third." The case of Deogracias Espiritu. Burgos. and the rule the exception. via habeas corpus proceedings. I do not see how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security and stability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. A Final Word As I began my dissent. I respectfully submit. "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality. tomorrow. to offer a small consolation. for one. I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure" alone—we are talking ofarrests. in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers in the bar. it is evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds for warrantless arrests under Section 5(b) of Rule 113." 29 I supposed that goes without saying.

Of those arrested. hamletting. not personal. the majority would approve the police's actions nonetheless because the police supposedly "found out only later. the rule the majority insists is the applicable rule. Forty (40) cases of massacres. 1989 to September. 361 children were detained for no apparent reason. As I indicated. as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso Nazareno are concerned. I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority insists on can not justify the arrests in question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113. Apparently. 1990. in approving the military's actions.409) have been injured as a consequence of bombing. 1990. Nonetheless. in effecting the arrests assailed." I submit that the majority has read into Section 5(b) a provision that has not been written there. the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found: An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988. as incidences of disappearances. and various human rights violations increase in alarming rates. 280 were eventually salvaged. 532 of those illegally arrested were women. a climate of fear persists in the country. of whether or not the military (or police). The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations. illegally. it is not the Section 5(b) I know. that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability. of frustrated salvage. I am hopeful that despite my departure. and food blockades undertaken by the military since 1988. 94% of them illegally. inciting to sedition. 40. 4. I am also disappointed that it is the portrait of the Court I am soon leaving. any information with which the military (or police) were armed could no more than be hearsay.010. Yet. on the contrary. 34 It is a bleak picture. In spite of "EDSA". 1986. in which 157 were wounded. it will not be too late. allegedly. One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1. 54 cases of frustrated massacre. shellings. with 218 killed. . bombings. Umil is a question. From January to June 1990. had complied with the requirements of law on warrantless arrests. In its update for October. Motions denied." 33 Nobody has suggested in the first place. Four thousand four hundred eight (4.408) political detentions from January.419. and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. Espiritu was arrested one day after the act. "what is important is that the Court be right. murder). is right. certainly. Nazareno was picked up fourteen days after it (allegedly. information. Since February." concludes the majority. torture. 535 showed signs of torture. Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule.154 we have no way of telling) and in the second place. and 109 remained missing after their arrest. Umil is a question of whether or not this Court. "More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups. saturation drives.

Cruz's Constitutional Law. the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony. 2. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim. cited in Justice Isagani A. accusedappellant. plaintiff-appellee. Search incident to lawful arrest. LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS. That circumstance. No. The eye-witness. LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME. — The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. vs. 588).R. 143. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. 199 SCRA 587. CASE AT BAR. In Adams vs. they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his person. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes. CRIMINAL LAW. . 150. — The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. RATIONALE. CONSPIRACY.155 G. REMEDIAL LAW. ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT. — There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. smashing it. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive. that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace. SEARCH AND SEIZURE. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO. he would have fled the law as his two companions did. what Dr. Hence. Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant.. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. March 10. Edna Edwina Reyes." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves. VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST. they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. CASE AT BAR. even if true. Belibet. p. RULE. 1993. since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him.S. 1991 Edition. Under those circumstances. the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. or within his immediate control may be seized. reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor. does not absolve the other two coconspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 95847-48.. ID. SYLLABUS 1. Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. ID. 47 U. without a search warrant." 3. Williams. Gerente. This is in accordance with Section 12. that acting in concert. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime. as one of the killers. the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

— The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30. Sison. the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." (p. and a fine of twelve thousand. together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads: "WHEREFORE. The Information reads: "That on or about the 30th day of April. 1990. unlawfully and feloniously." (p.A. 25. is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 6425. as follows: "That on or about the 30th day of April. in the municipality of Valenzuela. ID. as minimum. as maximum. confederating together and mutually helping one another. the above-named accused together with two (2) others who are still at large and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan." (p. hitting the latter on the different parts of his body. DECISION GRIÑO-AQUINO. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. and to pay the costs. and in the amount of P17. Philippines. 2. did then and there wilfully. Blace.) .156 4. and to pay the costs. II of R.000. without justification.00. Philippines. assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. 189 SCRA 643. Metro Manila. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs. Branch 172. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive imprisonment. Metro Manila. Rollo. attack.609. Rollo.) Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8.00 as funeral expenses. to twenty (20) years.000.000.A. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50.000. 10256-V-90. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. the above-named accused. with evident premeditation and treachery. 3. to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30. was charged with Murder in Criminal Case No. and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor mitigating circumstances. in the municipality of Valenzuela. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. Art. armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Metro Manila. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty years as maximum. in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No. and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 1990. conspiring. which was docketed as Criminal Case No. did then and there wilfully. which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day..00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. J p: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela.00. INCREASED TO P50. thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim. "In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. Blace.) The same accused. Metro Manila. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R. CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH. Rollo.

Fredo and Totoy Echigoren. On September 24. 1990. 6425. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. On May 2. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying. papatayin natin mamaya. of April 30. 1990. The other suspects. 1990. of R. followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell. "Gabriel. At about 4:00 p. proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.) Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p. started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. When arraigned on May 16. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. 1990.157 Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a. and 2. appellant Gabriel Gerente. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. Patrolman Urrutia. Right away. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace.A. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution witness. tsn. the following errors are ascribed to the trial court: 1. papatayin natin si Clarito Blace. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains. of the same day. Only the appellant. Art." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue. 1990. the trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R. together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren. the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges." (pp. Thereafter. two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8. for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. Edna Edwina Reyes. together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali. 3-4. They were informed by the prosecution witness. of the same day. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. was apprehended by the police. that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. A joint trial of the two cases was held. the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. In this appeal of the appellant. Edna Edwina Reyes.m. a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana.m. are still at large. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. and for Murder. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. We do not agree." and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya. testified that she witnessed the killing. . Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident.A. II. 6425 and of Murder. August 24. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. Gabriel Gerente.m. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution.

reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor.' The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. or is attempting to commit an offense. What Dr. 47 U. This is in accordance with Section 12. the person to be arrested has committed." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves. when lawful. Cruz's Constitutional Law. The eye-witness. p. Edna Edwina Reyes. Malasugui. 143." There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Ramos. .S. does not absolve the other two coconspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime. thus: "To hold that no criminal can. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. ." "(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. Section 5. 221. In Adams vs. is actually committing. In Umil vs. Paragraphs (a) and (b).158 The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim. would be to leave society. even if true. Under those circumstances. and the most depraved of criminals. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. Arrest without warrant. for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. smashing it. 187 SCRA 311. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide: 'SECTION 5. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant. since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. he would have fled the law as his two companions did. facilitating their escape in many instances. in any case. without a warrant. in his presence. to a large extent. 63 Phil. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. or within his immediate control may be seized. without a search warrant. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime. as one of the killers. the act of one . 1991 Edition. arrest a person: "(a) When. be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant. That circumstance. cited in Justice Isagani A. The arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs. . at the mercy of the shrewdest. it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person. Gerente. the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. 150. Williams. 228. the most expert. — A peace officer or a private person may." The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.

000. 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. which is hereby increased to P50. the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs.000. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes. Hence. 199 SCRA 587. J. According to his neighbors. WHEREFORE. [1] So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior. and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. this Court is made to choose between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive. Tudtud was engaged in [7] selling marijuana.R. 588). who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of [3] marijuana in their area. that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace. Bellosillo and Quiason. I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same way. SPO1 [4] Villalonghan. Clarito Blace. Reacting to the report. conducted surveillance [5] in Solier‘s neighborhood in Sapa. the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony. SO ORDERED.000. plaintiff-appellee. and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that it will pay for the fruits. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO BOLONG y NARET. No. Toril. Sison. with modification of the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim. For five days. We have to choose. the Toril Police Station. the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. JJ . It is desirable that criminals should be detected. [G. Davao City received [2] a report from a ―civilian asset‖ named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. PO1 Ronald Desierto.159 conspirator is the act of all.: …. Cruz. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud. Belibet. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime. they gathered information and [6] learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.. and to that end that all available evidence should be used. September 26.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. U. all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station. 144037. they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.00. 189 SCRA 643. that acting in concert. The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30. concur. vs. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes. On this occasion. DECISION TINGA. accused-appellants. . Davao City. Sometime during the months of July and August 1999.S.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50.

The man who resembled Tudtud‘s description denied that he was [18] [19] carrying any drugs. Tudtud replied that he did not know. which revealed several pairs of Levi‘s pants. Without even unwrapping [48] the cellophane. Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in her [30] report. Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1. All wore civilian clothes. Tudtud raised his arms and asked. [43] the box was already there when he disembarked the bus. and SPO3 Nicolas Algabre. [42] The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away. he returned to Davao City by [36] [37] bus. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal [17] drugs would be arriving that night. Region XI. the man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud. According to Tudtud. namely. a team composed of PO1 Desierto. got down the bus. what is this [40] about?‖ The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying. beneath which were two bundles. but [44] proceeded to open it out of fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him. The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for [28] examination. North Cotabato to sell pairs of [35] Levi‘s pants. Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. arresting officers PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta. exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory. ―it was alright. 1999. underneath which was something wrapped in cellophane. pointing a . Suddenly. ―Sir. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police [16] officers. Trial ensued thereafter.160 On August 1. At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day. [46] [47] ―What is that?‖ the man asked.200 grams of marijuana leaves while the [29] newspapers contained another 890 grams. Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short. Tudtud told the man the box was not his. reserved their right to question the validity of their [34] arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Physical Sciences Report No. The defense. however. Tudtud obliged. Upon reaching Toril. Dindo Bulong. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the [24] [25] packages. Tudtud discovered [45] pieces of dried fish. The plastic bag contained 3. one wrapped in a striped [22] [23] plastic bag and another in newspapers. informed them of their rights and brought them [26] [27] to the police station. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion. and [41] instructed Tudtud to open the bag. Tudtud. along with less than ten passengers. forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero. [31] Noel Tudtud and his companion. The box yielded pieces of dried fish. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999. The same man also toted a plastic [15] bag. were subsequently charged before the Regional [32] Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. their civilian informant Bobong Solier. PO1 Desierto and PO1 [14] Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud‘s description. Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be [8] back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory. two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a [12] [13] carton marked ―King Flakes.‖ Standing some five feet away from the men. The accused. and [9] usually wore a hat. a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him. Upon arraignment. denying the charges against them.38 caliber [38] [39] revolver. The man told him not to run.‖ Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. . PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers‘ suspicion. The prosecution presented five witnesses. The two did not resist.‖ At about 5:00 in the afternoon. cried frame-up. About 8:00 later that evening. PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to [10] [11] await Tudtud‘s arrival. 1999 he had gone to Kabacan. both [33] accused pleaded not guilty. Said witnesses testified to the foregoing narration of facts. which was his ―sideline. [20] [21] saying.

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. light threats. the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves. which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier. Claudio Bohevia. The defense asserted that the ―Bobo‖ or ―Bobong‖ Ramirez accused in these cases is the same [59] person as the informant Bobong Solier. papers. among other errors. less serious physical injuries and robbery. Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a cousin‘s wedding in [50] Hagonoy. 2. On appeal. 12. will be inadmissible in evidence ―for any [61] purpose in any proceeding. The proscription in Section 2.‖ The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties.‖ Section 3 (2). the defense offered the testimonies of Felicia [56] [57] Julaton. The right of the people to be secured in their persons. The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant. (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are. and any evidence secured thereby. They testified and presented court documents showing that one ―Bobo‖ or ―Bobong‖ Ramirez was charged in their respective branches with various crimes. The following instances are not deemed ―unreasonable‖ even in the absence of a warrant: 1. they would later claim.00. all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court. covers only ―unreasonable‖ searches and seizures. which states: SEC. another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other side of the street. The suspects were then taken to the police station where. otherwise. and particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. (Sec.161 Simultaneously. Search of evidence in ―plain view. . Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign. houses. Davao del Sur when he was accosted. Branch 7 Clerk of Court. Article III of the Constitution. Branch 9 Utility Clerk. such search and seizure becomes ―unreasonable‖ within the meaning of the above-quoted constitutional provision. Someone then approached him and pointed a gun at him. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent. Swayed by the prosecution‘s evidence beyond reasonable doubt. however. After alighting the bus. Branch 3 Clerk of Court. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. The man ordered him not to move [53] and handcuffed him.000. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2. Article III. the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and [60] to pay a fine of P500. they met each [55] other for the first time. specifically. [49] some eight meters from Tudtud. Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides: (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of… the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (d) ―plain view‖ justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. Bolong asked why he was being arrested but the man just told him to go with [54] them. Bolong crossed the [51] [52] street. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence). and Mercedita [58] Abunda. 2.

Bagista. i. therefore. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. Claudio. when lawful. Arrest without warrant. or is attempting to commit an offense. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. is actually committing. Section 5 (a).. Search incident to lawful arrest. Malmstedt.e. Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows: SEC. in his presence. that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he ―has committed. People [64] [65] [66] v. People v. Consented warrantless search. [62] The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants‘ belongings under the first exception. the person to be arrested has committed. Tangliben. in turn. and 7. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). and People v. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. The rule requires. Valdez. invokes the cases of People v. coupled with good faith of the peace [73] officers making the arrest. the vehicle‘s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. without a search warrant. …. arrest a person: (a) When. [67] [68] [69] Jr. Exigent and emergency circumstances.162 3. Recent jurisprudence holds [71] that the arrest must precede the search. Prior to its revision in [70] 2000. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Montilla. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction. Search of a moving vehicle. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. People v. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. allows warrantless arrests: SEC. 5. Highly regulated by the government. – A peace officer or a private person may. is whether the police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. is based on actual facts. is that ―reliable information‖ alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a). in addition. Maspil. The question. applied with a great degree of consistency. 12. Rule 113.. Rule 113 of the Rules. a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to [72] make the arrest at the outset of the search. 5. Customs search. 4. Nevertheless. Section 12. is actually committing. It cited as authorities this Court‘s rulings in People v. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed decision. without a warrant. Probable cause has been defined as: an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. 6. – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. or is attempting to commit an offense. the process cannot be reversed. Stop and Frisk.‖ . and People v. as a [63] search incident to a lawful arrest.

nor does holding a bag on board [84] [85] atrisikad sanction State intrusion. given the following circumstances: … the accused-appellant was not. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law.‖ In Burgos. the items seized were held inadmissible. looking at every person who came near. the arresting team searched his house and discovered a gun as well as purportedly subversive documents. this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and subsequent search of appellant therein illegal. this Court ruled. in declaring then Section 6 (a). riding a motorcycle. it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. the mere act of looking from side to side while holding one‘s abdomen. in fact. handing over one‘s baggage. this Court held that ―the officer arresting a person who has just committed. Thus. Malmstedt (a . Tangliben (accused was ―acting suspiciously‖). What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that he called for his arrest. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. In the following cases. Aminnudin. Recently. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. For the exception in Section 5 (a). Upon finding the accused. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon [78] Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. plowing his field at the time of the arrest. this Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused.163 [74] In the leading case of People v. At the time of the appellant‘s arrest. the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because of ―suspicious‖ [88] [89] circumstances: People v. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers. two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of [75] that fact. Rule 113 to apply. is committing. Neither does putting something in one‘s [81] [82] [83] pocket. or of [80] standing on a corner with one‘s eyes moving very fast. [77] In People v. Reliable information alone is insufficient. This Court. or is attempting to commit a crime. Doria. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant‘s wife. Binad [87] Sy Chua. [86] Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable. He was. People v. The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. To all appearances. notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the search [79] yielded contraband. is actually committing. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so [76] often violated and so deserving of full protection. and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. at the moment of his arrest. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. having been obtained in violation of the accused‘s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. does not justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. Consequently. the authorities obtained information that the accused had forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as member of the New People‘s Army. who was walking towards a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. The same rule applies to crossing the street per se. threatening the latter with a firearm. ruled that: There is no such personal knowledge in this case. in People v. Burgos.

Valdez. the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos. thus deviating from Burgos. gravely misplaced. another set of jurisprudence that deems ―reliable information‖ sufficient to justify a search incident to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a). come under some other exception to the rule against warrantless searches. People v. Thus. the accused. moreover. Mr.164 bulge on the accused‘s waist). Gonzales. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one. To this [91] [92] [93] class of cases belong People v. He argued that jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part of the officers making the in flagrante delicto arrest. or is attempting to commit the same. the arresting authorities were acting on information regarding an offense but there were no overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed. there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that. People v. In Tangliben and Malmstedt. Justices Melo and Puno. With these attendant facts. While concurring with the majority. [94] [95] [96] [97] Lising. Bagista was both. if now downright absurd under the circumstances. hence his arrest and the search of his [100] belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.. It would obviously have been irresponsible. is actually committing. thus arousing the latter‘s suspicion. Maspil. People v. There is. [90] (likewise a bulge on the waist of the accused. Bagista and Montilla were justified by other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches. to require the constable to adopt a ―wait and see‖ attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry. People v.. Maspil. Thus. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the discussion on the warrantless search being incidental to a lawful arrest. [99] The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are. these cases. who was seated aboard a bus in front of the arresting officer. except the last two. Justice Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. Jr. and People v.‖ . Balingan. the accused had also acted suspiciously. Rule 113. There. Here. that the drugs were in appellant‘s luggage. it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. Bagista. Mr. more faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a). majority of the Court held: Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. Rule 113. joined by Messrs. Jr. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. Nevertheless. and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them. Jr. involved a checkpoint search. filed a Separate Opinion. put her bag behind the latter. de Guzman who was wearing tight-fitting clothes). But precisely. Balinganwas a search of a moving vehicle. Note the phrase ―in his presence‖ therein. which. the appellant ―did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was embarking on some felonious enterprise. Justice Panganiban. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically [98] provided by law. Although likewise concurring in the majority‘s ruling that appellant consented to the inspection of his baggage. at the point prior to the search were already constitutive of probable cause. and People v. therefore. In Montilla. People v. was not without its critics. however. it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. In Claudio. Montilla. Montilla. the officers could reasonably assume. in turn. Significantly. As noted earlier. connoting personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. In these cases. Maspil. and Lising and Montilla were consented searches. the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed.

165 Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches without warrant than for the issuance of warrants therefore. Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganiban‘s concurring opinion in People v. Montillawas a consented search. At any rate. the same could not be said of this case. Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-called informants. however. with or without any conspiracy. reminiscent of the makapilis during the Japanese occupation. This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure. a dangerous precedent and places in great jeopardy the doctrines laid down in many decisions made by this Court. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without warrants. . which. searches and seizures. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house. he was asked to open the said box. prevented the arresting officer therein from obtaining a warrant. Justice Panganiban said that Doria ―rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches. That leaves the prosecution with People v. the arresting person must have actually witnessed the crime being committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested. Indeed the majority‘s ruling would open loopholes that would allow [101] unreasonable arrests. Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that would hint that a crime has been. for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless arrests and searches.‖ The urgency of the circumstances. committed. [Italics in the original. In the former. was being. however. therefore. but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. [103] which have seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. or was about to be.‖ this was only after. or he must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested perpetrated the crime that had just occurred. Although [104] [105] [106] appellant Tudtud did appear ―afraid and perspiring. involved an ―on-the-spot information. Doria. Ruben Montilla. Justice Puno‘s ponencia. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. an element not present in this case. the Narcom agents had no showing that the person who affected the warantless arrest had. searches and seizures. the judge simply determines personally from testimonies of witnesses that there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the accused. supra. appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box. Save for accused-appellant Doria‘s word. To say that ―reliable tips‖ constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search is in my opinion.‖ ―pale‖ and ―trembling. for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or afternoon before. in his own right. This is placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be required to affirm under oath their accusations. If the arresting officers‘ testimonies are to be believed. not before. the arrest is legally [102] objectionable. Valdez. PO3 Manlangit. …. knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense. has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions searches incidental to lawful arrest under similar circumstances. where this Court ruled: Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused.] Expressing his accord with Mr. declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his coaccused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit‘s) query as to where the marked money was. Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a possible violator of the law could then be subject to search and possible arrest.‖ Montilla. As will be demonstrated later. In the latter case. in its effort to zealously guard and protect the sacred constitutional right against unreasonable arrests. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business.

Solier. it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliablility of their informant.‖ This ―surveillance. the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own ―surveillance. [107] In other words. testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of appellant Tudtud: Q– What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to Cotabato and get stocks of marijuana? A – Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the person whou [sic] would point to him because he had been giving trouble to the neighborhood because according to them there are [sic] proliferation of marijuana in our place. Clearly. CAÑETE: Never mind. for his part. He did not even elaborate on how his neighbors or Tudtud‘s friends acquired their information that Tudtud was responsible for the proliferation of drugs in their neighborhood. Confronted with such a dubious informant.166 In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as ―personal. did not actually consist of staking out appellant Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade. ATTY. Q– Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in reporting him particularly? A – His friends were the once who told me about it.‖ having learned the same only from their informant Solier. is not reliable? A – He is trustworthy. Indeed. Q– For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in proliferation of marijuana? A – About a month. 1999? ….‖ it turns out. That‘s all. do not answer anymore. such information is also hearsay. on re-direct examination.‖ The police officers who conducted such ―surveillance‖ did not identify who these ―assets‖ were or the basis of the latter‘s information. . …. He testified on cross-examination: Q– You mean to say that Bobot Solier. Q– Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable? A – (witness did not answer). Q– Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of marijuana which led to his apprehension sometime in the evening of August 1 and according to the report [which] is based on your report my question is. A – Because of the information of his neighbor. [108] The prosecution. Solier‘s information itself is hearsay. not of personal knowledge. That was the complained [sic] of our neighbors. but of a mere ―gather[ing] of information from the assets [109] there. did not attempt to extract any explanation from PO1 Floreta for his telling silence. how did you know that Tudtud will be bringing along with him marijuana stocks on August 1.

167
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with
[110]
the requisite warrant, PO1 Desierto‘s assertions of lack of time
notwithstanding. Records show that
the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant, having received Solier‘s information at around
9:00 in the morning; Tudtud, however, was expected to arrive at around 6:00 in the evening of the same
[111]
day.
In People v. Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was sufficient time to procure a warrant
where the police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an intelligence report that the accused, who
was supposedly carrying marijuana, would arrive the next morning at 7:00 a.m.:
Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his house, there was
sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00
a.m. the following day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for search warrants even after
office hours:
―3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for search warrant may be
filed directly with any judge whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after office hours, or
during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required to certify under
oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays;‖ . . ..
The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series of 1987, entitled
―Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Application for search warrants for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas‖:
―This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications for search
warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes affecting peace and
order. There is a need for prompt action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these
amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued:
1.
All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes
against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms
and/or ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer be
raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the
place to be searched is located.
2.
In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of
and personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge, the
application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where application is
filed.
3.
Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall likewise be
taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to be
searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of
the judge, that its issuance is urgent.
4.
Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct the
examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of information. He shall
observe the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants provided for in
[112]
this Court‘s Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985.‖
[Italics in the original.]
Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floreta‘s testimony that the real
reason for their omission was their belief that they lacked sufficient basis to obtain the same assumes
greater significance. This was PO1 Floreta‘s familiar refrain:

168
Q – When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from Cotabato to get that
(sic) stocks, you did not go to court to get a search warrant on the basis of the report of
Bobot Solier?
A – No.
Q – Why?
A – Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.
Q – When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no real basis to
search Tudtud and Bulong at that time?
A – Yes, sir.
….
Q – And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring marijuana?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – And this was 9:00 a.m.?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is that correct?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the search warrant or
the prosecutor do [sic] not assist?
A – They help.
Q – But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?
[113]

A – As I said, we do not have sufficient basis.

It may be conceded that ―the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning the existence
of probable cause is not binding on [the courts] which must independently scrutinize the objective facts to
determine the existence of probable cause‖ and that ―a court may also find probable cause in spite of an
[114]
officer‘s judgment that none exists.‖
However, the fact that the arresting officers felt that they did not
have sufficient basis to obtain a warrant, despite their own information-gathering efforts, raises serious
questions whether such ―surveillance‖ actually yielded any pertinent information and even whether they
actually conducted any information-gathering at all, thereby eroding any claim to personal knowledge.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the
following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

[115]

169
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when
the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of
the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said ―it was alright.‖ He did not
resist and opened the box himself.
The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to
constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence
[116]
in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed.
The fact that a person failed to object to a
search does not amount to permission thereto.
…. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer‘s authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
[117]
law.
[Underscoring supplied.]
[118]

Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag
or the chairs
marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held there was no valid consent to the search.

[119]

containing

On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the
[120]
accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented.
In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by the allegation of
appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them before asking them to open the
subject box. Appellant Tudtud testified as follows:
Q–

This person who approached you according to you pointed something at
you[.] [What] was that something?

A – A 38 cal. Revolver.
Q – How did he point it at you?
A – Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding something
towards somebody).
Q–

This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?

A – He said do not run.
Q – What did you do?
A–

I raised my hands and said ―Sir, what is this about?‖

Q – Why did you call him Sir?
A – I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.
Q – Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?
A – Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is carrying a gun is a
policeman.
Q–

When you asked him what is this? What did he say?

A – He said ―I would like to inspect what you are carrying.[‖]

Q–

What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?

170
A – I told him that is not mine.
Q – What did this man say?
A – He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.
Q–

What did you do?

A – So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot.

[121]

Appellants‘ implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the
[122]
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Consequently, appellants‘ lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
[123]
warrantless search and seizure.
As the search of appellants‘ box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is
no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction
of appellants cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This
explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of
[124]
primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of
[125]
rights,
next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is protected
[126]
by the due process clause.
This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom
[127]
advocates,
the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the
right against unreasonable search and seizure ―includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of
life while existing.‖ Emphasizing such right, this Court declared in People v. Aruta:
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford
full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: ―I
think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.‖ It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
[128]
Constitution itself.
Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an
ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and ineluctable.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED. Appellants
Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants
from confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court
compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., please see dissenting opinion.

171

G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Fidencio S. Raz for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, under an Information which reads:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting as a pusher or
broker in the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away to another and/or
distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
without authority of law have in his possession and control nineteen (19) pieces of
marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves which were
confiscated from him by the police authorities of Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold
one tea bag of dried marijuana leaves to a customer. (Rollo, p. 9)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the
offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison Sucro guilty of the sale
of prohibited drug under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000,
and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of his sentence with the period
for which he has undergone preventive imprisonment to the date of promulgation of this
judgment. All the items of marijuana confiscated in this case are declared forfeited in
favor of the State. (Rollo, p. 41)
From the foregoing judgment of conviction, accused-appellant interposes this appeal, assigning the
following as errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E"-"E-4", TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA, TO BE
THE CORPUS DELICTI;FURTHERMORE, THAT THE SAME WERE TAKEN WITHOUT
THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS
NOT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.

172
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON SUCRO GUILTY
OF THE SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER SECTION 4, ARTICLE II, OF THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER A PENALTY OF
LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P 20,000.00. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)
The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:
On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to
monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by
Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2,1989).
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the
house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of
Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant
enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he
handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the
chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. (pp. 6-8,
15-18, Ibid). It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported
the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring
developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a
third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant. (pp. 1819, Ibid)
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers
were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept
Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the
crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing
the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of
marijuana. (pp. 6-8, TSN, June 19, 1989) When confronted, Macabante readily admitted
that he bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN,
May 24, 1989) The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of
C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana
from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante, The teabags of
marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo
City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all
found positive of marijuana. (pp. 47, TSN, Sept. 4, 1989)" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)
As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest without warrant of the
accused is lawful and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
We rule in the affirmative.
The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police
officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station
Commander of the activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.
This contention is without merit.

173
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without
warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12
Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the
activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away
from Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to
some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did
three times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going
transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught
throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from
accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and
therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being
members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that police
officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted
surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it stated:
When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would take
place and while positioned at a street comer, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and
Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from them (the
public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter handed a
wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants in
front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his
pocket. (p. 2)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their
testimonies were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events that took
place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing distance,
specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed tones, but they
were certainly near enough to observe the movements of the appellant and the buyer.
Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all law enforcers and are, therefore,

What is paramount is that probable cause existed.g. No. That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon. 87783.R. Lo Ho Wing. 1987) The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the former's joining the police force. Jr. As the Solicitor General has pointed out: There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e. August 6. Hence. to arrest appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. Aside from this. the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search. October 12. (G. Sandiganbayan.R. the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence. Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three days before the incident. of which appellant was touted to be a member. Bati. Still and all. et al. 12. Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years and that after Fulgencio joined the police force. Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former. 1990) The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant. Thus. it is possible that because of this friendship. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. However. they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. 73786. As the records reveal. without a search warrant. because of reliable information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday. the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. he was constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.R. which must still be present in such a case. it has been held in the case of People v. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers. it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. On the other hand. No. stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). As earlier discussed. it follows that the evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible. there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 88017. Castiller. which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. G. G. (People v. Agapito. he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. it was effected on the basis of probable cause. v.174 presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Ergo. . January 21. 1991): In the instant case. 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). supra citing People v. No.

In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution. Natipravat. The trial court's decision must be upheld. Khan. Alvarez. WHEREFORE. The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic Chemist that the items seized were all positive for marijuana. 161 SCRA 406 [1988]. (People v. 145 SCRA 483 [1986]). and People v.R. the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. 170 SCRA 681 [1989]) Premises considered. having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial. the presumption being that police officers perform their duties regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (Rule 131. 30 SCRA 53 [1969]. accused-appellant's defense is alibi which is unavailing considering that he was positively identified by Macabante to be the person from whom he bought marijuana. however. 84450. and spontaneous in his declarations. We have observed the demeanor of the witness in court. the best sources of information against drug pushers are usually their customers. and found him to be straightforward. It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the appellant as the seller of the prohibited substances. and People v. Espejo.175 Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante whose reason for testifying could be merely to escape prosecution. there is no other direct evidence of the selling except the testimony of the buyer. People v. this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense charged. is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v. But this does not necessarily taint the evidence that proceeds from his lips. Paco. Revised Rules on Evidence. . G. and should be employed by law enforcement authorities to bolster the drive against pushers who are the real felons in our society. the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by public officers Fulgencio and Seraspi. 3(m). No. it being acknowledged. We quote the trial court's finding as to the testimony of Macabante: The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of marijuana may have been the reason of (sic) his willingness to testify in court against the accused.. Furthermore. unhesitating. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by any motive than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime. remains that it does not preclude the possibility that he was present in the vicinity as established by his admission that he moved a lot and even had the occasion to meet Macabante on the street. Dorado. The fact. that the court below. Seraspi. especially if as in this case. Umali. supra citing People v. Sec. People v. so that we are satisfied as to his intention and disposition to tell the truth (Rollo. We accept this observation as a realistic appraisal of a situation in which drug users are. 163 SCRA 745 [1988]. February 4. Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his uncle and cousin distributing handbills for his Auntie's candidacy. 36 SCRA 400 [1970]). p. Castiller. As explained by Lt. 40) Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance. et al. 1991 citing People v.

PO3 Alfredo Cadoy. [1] KIZAKI. rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66). Feliciano. SPO1 Cabato and PO3 Cadoy to conduct surveillance of the area.: [2] Appellants Tomohisa Kimura and Akira Kizaki seek reversal of the decision dated June 27.R. SPO1 [6] Rolando Cabato. the trial of the case ensued. the above-named accused conspiring.768 grams of Indian hemp (marijuana). a prohibited drug. [3] Upon arraignment on October 10. No. unlawfully and feloniously transport and deliver without lawful authority approximately 40. whereupon. Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. received information from a confidential informant that a certain Koichi Kishi and Rey Plantilla were engaged in the selling of illegal drugs at the [7] Cash and Carry Supermarket. 6425.. Fernan. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Article II of Republic Act 6425. committed as follows: That on or about June 27. respondents. SPO1 Edmundo Badua.J. SPO1 Manuel Delfin and Forensic Chemist. [5] The testimonies of the following prosecution witnesses. head of Delta Group. Jr. 7659. in violation of the aforecited law. to wit: SPO4 Juan Baldovino. confederating and mutually helping one another. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. CONTRARY TO LAW. sought to establish the following facts: In the morning of June 27. entered their separate [4] pleas of Not Guilty to the crime charged. Bidin and Davide. C.A.000. . J. Maj.00 bill and five pieces of P100. Camp Karingal. Police Inspector Sonia Ludovico.. Article II of Republic Act No. 1994 in Makati. 94-5606. Maj. concur.. Makati City. 7659. 1994. 1994. Anso organized a team [8] composed of SPO4 Baldovino. Acting on said information.. petitioner. 1997 in Criminal Case No. vs. JJ. 2004] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. as amended by R. [G. through counsel. Quezon City. 1994 against the accused alleges: The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice accuses TOMOHISA KIMURA and AKIRA KIZAKI of violation of Section 4. A buy-bust operation was launched and PO3 Cadoy was designated to act as poseur-buyer and they [9] prepared the buy-bust money consisting of one P500. and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500. Chief Inspector Nilo Anso. No. the two accused. North Metro District Command. The Information dated August 8. Anso. April 27. Jr.A. Makati City.00 bill. TOKOHISA KIMURA and AKIRA DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ.176 SO ORDERED. did then and there willfully.00. finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4. Narcotics Command (NARCOM) I. as amended by R. Jr.. 130805.

Then. Boy approached the Sentra car and after a few minutes. Several minutes later. Koichi and Carlos were grabbed by two men from behind. Carlos was released and was not charged because Kimura‘s girlfriend. Koichi and Rey arrived and were met by [12] PO3 Cadoy and the informant. he was in the company of his friends. Appellants‘ defense is denial and alibi. 1994. Koichi requested Kimura to pass by Cash and Carry Supermarket because Koichi needed to meet a certain ―Rey‖ who was borrowing money from him. appellants got out of their car. PO3 Cadoy scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal of the [13] [14] consummation of the sale. arrived and parked the jeep two to three [18] parking spaces away from the Sentra car. Malate. The team brought Koichi to a safe area within the Cash and Carry Supermarket and interrogated him. 1994. While the team was approaching. Kimura borrowed the car of Kizaki in order to get his (Kimura‘s) television from his house located in Evangelista Street. appellant Kimura ran but was apprehended while Boy was able to board his jeep and together with [21] appellant Kizaki who was seated at the passenger seat sped off towards South Superhighway. The operatives were about five meters from the suspects. Then four men approached the car and one guy ordered him to sit at the back and together with Koichi and Carlos. and Mrs. then Koichi and Carlos alighted from the car and Koichi handed something to [31] Rey. On the other hand. served as Carlos‘ guarantor. Anso and SPO4 Baldovino. At around 8:00 in the evening. Kizaki was not with him at Cash and Carry on the night of June 27. Boy and appellant Kimura went to the rear of the Sentra car and opened its trunk. On their way to Kimura‘s house. a white Nissan Sentra car driven by appellant Kimura with his coappellant Kizaki seating at the passenger seat arrived at the parking area. Makati City. PO3 Cadoy held Koichi by the hand while Rey scampered away to the direction of the [15] South Superhighway. appellant Kizaki while having dinner with his friends at the Nippon Ichi Restaurant [27] located at Mabini. . In support thereof. Jose F. that appellant Kimura borrowed his car on [34] the night of June 27. the informant was able to contact the targets who told him that they will be arriving at 8:00 in the evening at the parking area of the [11] Cash and Carry Supermarket. without a plate number. his co-appellant Kimura. were approaching to check what was inside the wrapped newspaper. Anso reported the escape of appellant Kizaki to their [24] investigation section. 1994. Kimura was asked questions about the address and business of Kizaki. Kimura parked the car about twenty meters from its entrance. 1994 but claims that he saw marijuana placed at the car trunk the following day at Camp Karingal. 1994. Sally. While Maj. They brought Koichi and appellant Kimura to the headquarters and turned over the seized marijuana to the [23] investigator who made markings thereon. The seized packages which were contained in 3 sacks were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory [25] on June 29. The [22] police operatives then inspected the contents of the trunk and found packages of marijuana. Upon reaching Cash and Carry. near the Cash and Carry [30] Supermarket. 4 of Republic Act No.177 At around 3:00 in the afternoon of the same day. PO3 Cadoy gave the marked money worthP1. a certain Boy driving a stainless jeep. 6425. together with Koichi Kishi. In the evening of the said date. Appellant [20] Kimura got a package wrapped in a newspaper and gave it to Boy who walked back to his jeep. Later.000. Appellant Kizaki went to the stainless jeep and sat at the passenger [19] seat. Maj.768 grams and were positive to the test of marijuana. the team together with the informant arrived at the [10] Cash and Carry Supermarket and conducted surveillance of the area. Mr. Appellants remained inside the car for about ten to fifteen minutes. and his driver [33] Boy and maid Joan at his house in Dian Street. Kimura denied that there was marijuana in the car on the night of June 27. and bring the same to a repair shop. Jr. There was no stainless jeep near the car on the same night. Takeyama. 1994 to pick up Kimura‘s broken TV and bring it to the repair shop. Makati City. Kimura was in the house of his co-appellant Kizaki at Dian Street. both appellants were called to the witness stand.00 to Rey and Koichi who then handed him the ―shabu‖. Shortly thereafter. [28] Dayco. they [32] were all brought to Camp Karingal allegedly for violating Sec. Manila was arrested by another NARCOM group led by Maj. appellant Kizaki testified that on the date that the alleged crime was committed. They learned from Koichi that his friends/suppliers will arrive the same evening to [16] fetch him. Forensic Chemist Sonia Sahagun-Ludovico testified that the contents of the sacks [26] weighed 40. On June 29. Appellant Kimura‘s testimony is as follows: In the afternoon of June 27. Koichi pointed to them as the [17] ones who will fetch him. Luis Carlos and a [29] certain ―Sally‖ and ―Boy‖.

as amended by Republic Act 7659. the scene of the offense. He was having dinner with Lt. Appellant Kizaki was arrested on June 29. 1994. taking into consideration the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. On June 27. denial by the accused of the offense charged against him is also inherently a weak defense.. although the evidence show that there is a doubt in the illegality of the arrest of accused Kimura by Major Dayco. Akira testified that on the evening of June 27. Anita Takeyama and Akiyoshi Takeyama. two days after the Cash and Carry incident. Kizaki and Kimura. and the Court hereby sentences them to suffer. a man got near Kizaki and asked for his passport whom they thought was from the Immigration. his former housemaid. which is a walking distance to Cash and Carry Supermarket. 1994. to meet Rey Plantilla who was borrowing money from him. the accused must show that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene of the commission of the crime at the time of its commission. he was with his co-accused Kizaki at the Cash and Carry Supermarket but for another purpose. 1997. These witnesses executed a joint [36] affidavit and testified that while they were about to leave the restaurant. judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Akira Kizaki and Tomohisa Kimura GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act 6425. SO ORDERED. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is hereby ordered to deport Akira Kizaki and Tomohisa Kimura without further proceedings after the service of their sentence. he was in his house located at Dian Street corner Ampil Street. which is weak defense. the trial court rendered the herein assailed judgment. [38] In convicting appellants. Let the marijuana. Masami Y. Anso and PO3 Cadoy as the persons whom they arrested for drug trafficking in a buy-bust operation at the Cash and Carry Supermarket on June 27.178 Appellant Kizaki‘s alibi was corroborated by Rosario Quintia.00 each. Finally. Manila. in the Nippon Ichi Restaurant located at Mabini. Rodolfo Tan. who both testified that they were at Kizaki‘s house on the night of June 27.e. the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of P500. . the trial court made the following findings: The settled jurisprudence is that alibi is inherently a weak defense. the jurisprudence is that ―the illegality of warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its [39] right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability. were positively identified by prosecution witnesses SPO4 Baldomino. the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. Maj. Akiyoshi Takeyama. they learned that Kizaki was [37] brought to Camp Karingal. Metro Manila. i. Both accused. In fine accused Kimura merely denied the offense charged against him. and his friend. Nishino.000. Accused Kimura testified that on the evening of June 27. Like the defense of alibi. Later. It is also the settled jurisprudence that the defense of alibi and denial cannot prosper over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses. It was not therefore impossible for accused Akira Kizaki to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 1994. For alibi to prosper. Makati City. the amount of marijuana seized from the accused which weigh 40. 1994. [35] 1994 from 7:00 to 10:00 in the evening and never saw Kizaki leave the house.768 grams. Col. SPO1 Cabatu. the subject matter of this case be immediately forwarded to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.

1994. one of those who arrested appellant Kizaki at the Nippon Ichi restaurant. without a warrant. is legally inconsequential in this case considering that his conviction was not based on his arrest on June 29.768 grams of marijuana on June 27. this appeal before us. which is in violation of the Constitution. either before the trial court or before this Court. that the police operatives were able to seize the marijuana from the Sentra car they were using to transport the marijuana.179 Hence. that the marijuana introduced and offered at the trial were positively identified by the arresting officers as those seized from the car of the appellants. it nevertheless convicted him of the crime charged. 1994 but on his having participated in the transport and delivery of marijuana on June 27. Appellant Kizaki further contends that he was arrested two days after the alleged buy-bust operation without a valid warrant of arrest. any challenge against the search and seizure of the marijuana based on constitutional ground is deemed waived insofar as appellant Kizaki is concerned. Kizaki argues that he could not have been caught in flagrante delicto to justify the warrantless arrest when he was arrested two days after the alleged Cash and Carry incident while he was only having dinner with his friends at a restaurant. We will first resolve the issue on the alleged warrantless arrest of appellant Kizaki. all police officers. He points out that although the trial court expressed doubts as to the legality of his arrest. Indeed. SPO1 Delfin. 1994. Rule 113. that the trial court mainly relied on the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution. They argue that appellant Kizaki‘s claim that he was not at the Cash and Carry Supermarket on the night of June 27. it is still the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt to support a judgment of conviction. arrest a person only under the following circumstances: (a) When. II THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS HAD BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. the person to be arrested has committed. as among the three persons engaged in the transportation and delivery of about 40. the Solicitor General prays that the decision of the trial court finding appellants guilty as charged be affirmed. . that the contention of appellant Kizaki that his warrantless arrest two days after the alleged incident. In the appellee‘s brief. 1994 was corroborated by three independent witnesses including appellant Kimura who testified that he was not with appellant Kizaki at Cash and Carry Supermarket on the said night. or is attempting to commit an offense. was unlawful. Appellants claim that although the defense of alibi and denial are weak. is actually committing. admitted that they did not have a warrant of arrest when his group arrested Kizaki on the night of June 29. Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may. Appellants assert the following: I THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS‘ DEFENSE. Appellant Kizaki assails the legality of his warrantless arrest. that appellant Kizaki never questioned the validity of the warrantless arrest of his co-appellant Kimura on June 27. in his presence. He argues that appellants were positively identified by four prosecution witnesses. thus. 1994. 1994 at the Cash and Carry Supermarket. Appellants further question how the trial court could have been certain that the marijuana presented in court are the same articles confiscated from the appellants when the arresting officers did not place identifying marks on the confiscated items.

He thus waived objection to the illegality of his [42] [43] arrest. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending. the accused-appellant was granted an acquittal after the prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen submitted to the NBI for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly taken from the accused. Neither did he move to quash [41] the information on that ground before the trial court. which initially identified the seized item as marijuana. The dangerous drug is the verycorpus delicti of the crime of violation of the [45] Dangerous Drugs Act. It bears stressing that none of the arresting officers of appellant Kizaki was present on the night of June 27 where appellant Kizaki allegedly sold and transported marijuana and escaped. we find the other claims of appellants meritorious. In People vs. Neither was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even without a warrant. we acquitted appellant for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delictiand held: In People vs. thus the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that appellant Kizaki committed the crime. the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. 1994 and appellant Kizaki was arrested on June 29. and cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant. he was at a restaurant having dinner with a group of friends. At the time appellant Kizaki was arrested. In this case.180 (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. One policeman admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them for the first time in the police headquarters. was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime. Casimiro. The prosecution witnesses PO2 Supa. Laxa. The alleged crime happened on June 27. The narcotics field test. but only at the narcotics office. the records show that [40] he did not raise such question before he pleaded to the offense charged. . In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. SPO2 Madlon and PO3 Piggangay admitted they did not write their initials on the brick of marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing from accused-appellant outside the grocery store but only did so in their headquarters. However. Dismuke. [46] In People vs. the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged apprehension of the accused-appellant. None of the exceptions enumerated above was present to justify appellant Kizaki‘s warrantless arrest. Nevertheless. appellant Kizaki‘s application for bail which was denied by the trial court likewise constitutes a waiver of his right to question whatever irregularities and defects which attended his [44] arrest. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In People vs. this Court ruled that the failure to prove that the specimen of marijuana examined by the forensic chemist was that seized from the accused was fatal to the prosecution‘s case. Moreover. thus. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory for examination. Were the allegedly confiscated from the scene of the crime the same ones which the investigator marked in the police headquarters? This question gives rise to surmises and speculations. the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody. 1994 or two days after the subject incident. he was not committing or attempting to commit a crime. notwithstanding the unjustified warrantless arrest of appellant Kizaki. Mapa. It was held: This deviation from the standard procedure in the anti-narcotics operations produces doubts as to the origins of the marijuana.

did you make any markings thereat? WITNESS: None. . [47] The testimony of Maj. ATTY. did you not make any markings on them. When the packages contained in Exhibits ―B‖.. ―C‖ and ―D‖ were recovered at the car. is that correct? WITNESS: A. before you showed that to your investigation section. sir. further clarified on his re-direct examination why no markings were made. Why is it that no markings were made on these marijuana packages? . That is true. testified on cross-examination as follows: ATTY.. thus failing to prove that the marijuana presented in court was the very same marijuana seized from appellants. [48] SPO4 Baldovino.. and tested in the light of the Casimiro case. SENSON: Q. your honor. BALICUD: And did you see if any of those men in the investigation section did the corresponding markings? WITNESS: I did not already see sir. Jr. ATTY. Anso was confirmed by SPO4 Baldovino. COURT: You mean to say when you have already surrender(sic) the shabu(sic) to the investigation section that was the time when the investigator mark them? WITNESS: It is already their duty to mark them.. Anso. Extant in the records were the admissions made by the police operatives of their failure to place any markings on the seized marijuana immediately after they had allegedly apprehended appellants. when the latter testified on crossexamination as follows: ATTY. is that the investigation section is the one who will mark the evidence. we find that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the marijuana allegedly seized from appellants Kimura and Kizaki. Maj. sir. BALICUD: With respect to the packages which you identified yesterday. thus: FISCAL MANABAT: Q. BALICUD: Did any of your men place any markings at least to identify that that is the drugs confiscated by you at the Cash and Carry? WITNESS: What I know your honor. Jr. .181 After examining the evidence for the prosecution. head of the police operatives.

sir. MANABAT: Who ordered you to bring the marijuana to the Crime Laboratory? WITNESS: Superintendent Eduardo Cariño. sir. PROS. The failure to establish the chain of custody of the evidence is further shown by the testimony of SPO1 Badua. there was a press conference conducted and after that we submitted it to PCCL or Philippine Crime [49] Laboratory. MANABAT: Do you know the name of the Japanese nationals you are referring to? WITNESS. can you recall? WITNESS: . MANABAT: What kind of sacks were these.. June 29. MANABAT: Do you recall your activities on that day. if you know? WITNESS: In our office confiscated from Japanese nationals. MANABAT: Where did this marijuana come from. sir. WITNESS: We did not put markings there because after we confiscated those packages. PROS. COURT: How many sacks? WITNESS: Three (3).. PROS. His testimony is as follows: PROS. I do not know. the person assigned to bring the alleged seized marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. 1994? WITNESS: I was ordered to bring the marijuana to the Crime Laboratory.182 . sir. PROS. MANABAT: Can you describe this marijuana which you said you were required to bring to the PNP Crime Laboratory? WITNESS: They are contained in sacks. sir. PROS.

PROS. B. PROS. MANABAT: . MANABAT: Now. sir.183 Rice sacks. will you be able to identify these three (3) sacks of marijuana. COURT: What made you so sure that these are the same sacks that you brought from your office to the Crime Laboratory? WITNESS: Because of the markings A. sir. sir. WITNESS: These are the three sacks I brought.. COURT: Who was the investigator? WITNESSS: . I am showing to you SPO1 Badua.. C. these are the same sacks I brought. MANABAT: Now. will you please examine the sacks and tell us if these are the same sacks which you brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory? WITNESS: Yes. there are three (3) sacks (sic) here already deposited in Court.. COURT: Did you see the investigator affixed those markings? WITNESS: Yes.. Now. WITNESS: Yes. PROS. sir. three rice sacks. please examine these three (3) sacks carefully and tell us the relation of these three sacks to that marijuana contained in sacks which you said you were required to bring to PNP Crime Laboratory. you said that this marijuana was contained in three sacks. if you see this marijuana you said you were required to bring to the PNP Crime Laboratory which you described as being contained in three (3) sacks. COURT: Who affixed those markings? WITNESS: The investigator. .

BALICUD: And this was made on June 28. ATTY. BALICUD: Why did you not deposit or deliver it immediately to the Crime Laboratory? . 1994? WITNESS: Yes. MANABAT: Now. PROS. 1994. . sir. sir. BALICUD: But then this request was received already by the Crime Laboratory on June 29. what proof do you have that you actually brought these three sacks of marijuana which you identified to the PNP Crime Laboratory? WITNESS: There is a request for laboratory examination. where were the three sacks deposited from June 28 up to the time you picked it up on June 29 to be brought to the Crime Laboratory? WITNESS: It was deposited inside our supply room.184 SPO1 Delfin.. PROS. BALICUD: And then about what time on June 28 was it prepared? WITNESS: Morning. were you present when this request for laboratory examination was prepared? WITNESS: Yes. [50] And on cross-examination as follows: ATTY. ATTY. BALICUD: Who specifically typed the request? WITNESS: SPO1 Delfin. BALICUD: Now. ATTY. MANABAT: Who prepared this request for laboratory examination of the marijuana? WITNESS: SPO1 Delfin. sir.. ATTY. ATTY. sir. sir.

ATTY. ATTY. BALICUD: Who opened the sacks? WITNESS: The investigator. ATTY. medical. ATTY. ATTY. sir. when the request for laboratory examination was made. ATTY. BALICUD: You brought the same to the Crime Laboratory? WITNESS: Yes. sir. ATTY. BALICUD: Why did you open the sacks? WITNESS: Yes. BALICUD: What papers were still being prepared? WITNESS: Request for laboratory. did you already see the contents inside the sack? WITNESS: Yes. sir. ATTY. sir. BALICUD: So that they were placed in three sacks? WITNESS: Yes.. sir. BALICUD: Were there markings in the 3 sacks when the same were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory? . drug dependency. BALICUD: Now.185 WITNESS: We were still preparing the necessary papers.. . BALICUD: And you opened each and every sack? WITNESS: Yes.

thatunwavering exactitude is necessary. C on the three sacks containing the marijuana which he brought to the laboratory. ATTY. Moreover. proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish the guilt of the accused. should immediately after seizure or confiscation. Similarly. sir. there was no inventory made in the crime scene despite the fact that Maj. B. WITNESS: Yes. who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. there was no marking yet? WITNESS: Yes. the other sack is B and the other is marked C. the failure of the NARCOM operatives to place markings on the alleged seized marijuana coupled with their failure to observe the procedure in the seizure and taking custody of said drug seriously bring to question the existence of the seized prohibited drug. but it was marked at the Crime Laboratory already. 1994. BALICUD: So. i. the contents of these three sacks were only marked when he brought the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory on June 29. i. were they also marked when you brought the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory? WITNESS: Yes. it is clear that when the alleged marijuana was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. C. sir. in establishing the corpus delicti. the contents of these three sacks however had no markings when they were kept inside the supply room on June 28 since as Badua intimated.e. if there be any. B. Investigator Delfin did not initial said markings nor did he testify affirming his markings. B. Consequently. Evidently. Anso testified that he saw eighteen packages neatly wrapped in a newspaper but the inventory was made already in the headquarters. 1994. In criminal cases. SPO1 Badua testified that the marijuana confiscated from appellant Kimura was contained in three sacks. 3 Series of 1979 amending Board Regulation No.. It is not positively and convincingly clear that what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from the appellants. on June 27. sir.186 WITNESS: Yes. any apprehending team having initial custody and control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia. ATTY. sir. In this case. nowhere in his testimony did he say that such markings were made on the night the appellants were arrested. although the three sacks of alleged marijuana were marked as A. The records of the case do not show that the police operatives complied with the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs as embodied in the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation [52] No. 7 Series of 1974. Every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be [53] established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. BALICUD: So that one sack is marked A. . BALICUD: How about the contents of these three sacks. ATTY. and/or his representative.e. [51] While SPO1 Badua‘s testimony showed that it was investigator SPO1 Delfin who made the markings A. C. have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused. the prosecution has not proven the indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime which failure produces a grevious doubt as to the guilt of the appellants. A..

InPeople vs. In fine. for failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of both appellants beyond reasonable doubt. the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. which are inherently weak. Hence. Callejo. . Chief. respectively. co-appellant Kimura testified that appellant Kizaki was not one of his companions in going to Cash and carry Supermarket on June 27. are herebyACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately released from prison. Puno. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court of the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof. concur. The marijuana is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government for its proper disposition under the law.R.respondents. we have repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused must rest not [54] on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. NMDU. unless they are being detained for some other lawful cause. JJ. the operatives who were all [57] armed with service revolvers chased on foot the stainless jeep and did not even fire any warning shot to stop the driver and appellant Kizaki nor did they fire a shot at the tire of the jeep to immobilize it. NARCOM. In fact. Investigation Section. Laxa. the constitutional presumption of innocence has not been overcome by the prosecution. Dayco. The denial of appellant Kimura that he was caught in the Cash and Carry Supermarket delivering marijuana on the night of June 27. No.187 Although the defense raised by appellants Kimura and Kizaki were denial and alibi. the suspects named therein were only Koichi [59] Kishi and Tomohisa Kimura. It is quite difficult for us to accept its veracity considering that despite the short distance of the operatives from the jeep when it started to speed off. [58] 1994. 1994. an essential requirement in a drug related case. the prosecution also failed to indubitably show the identity of the marijuana which mere allegedly seized from appellants. 121917. (Chairman). Moreover. and Tinga. Let the PNP Director be furnished a copy of herein decision for the proper information and guidance of his police operatives. they must perforce be exonerated from criminal liability. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES. March 12.. signed by P/CI Jose F.. petitioner. In the present case. we acquitted the appellant for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. [G. The alibi of appellant Kizaki that he was in his house on the same night assumes weight and significance considering that the scenario depicted by the prosecution on the alleged escape of appellant Kizaki at the Cash and Carry left much to speculations and surmises. The alibi of Kizaki found corroboration from his friend Akiyoshi Takeyama and appellant Kizaki‘s former housemaid Rosaria Quintia that he was in his house and never left it on the night of the alleged delivery or transport of marijuana in Cash and Carry Supermarket. Costs de oficio. 1997] ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA. vs. in the request for laboratory examination dated June 28. Quisumbing. The prosecution tried to show that appellant Kizaki who was on board the stainless jeep was able to escape even if the police operatives [56] were only about five meters away from the jeep which was heading to the entrance of the Cash and Carry along South Superhighway. 94-5606 is hereby REVERSED and appellants Tomohisa Kimura and Akira Kizaki. Sr. WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. [55] 1994 may be weak but the evidence for the prosecution is clearly even weaker.

FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No." [16] Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26. high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) [2] of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P. 1994. Pending the appeal in the [13] respondent Court of Appeals.000. Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25. 1995. Angeles City. without having the necessary authority and permit to carry and possess the same. After trial. a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused. upon [8] [9] advice of counsel. and "(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of . 1995 he filed a "motion for [17] reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" but the same was denied by respondent court in its [18] September 20. the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE. During the [7] arraignment on January 20. the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions. did then and there willfully.00 bailbond posted by accused-appellant for his provisional liberty." [4] [5] [6] The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner. This shall be immediately executory. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28. SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .188 DECISION FRANCISCO. [15] SO ORDERED. the P200. . and furthermore.357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson. as [11] [12] maximum". Branch 61. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. but granted his application for bail.380 Pietro Beretta. is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal.: "(1) One . 1992." [1] Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3. 1992. Smith and Wesson.: On October 26. SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions. to make any plea. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M16 Baby Armalite rifle. 1995 Resolution. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's [14] conviction. 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years. copy of which was received by petitioner on September 27.380 Pietro Beretta. one (1) . the Solicitor-General. in the City of Angeles. SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions.357 Caliber revolver. 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt. SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions. should he appeal to the Supreme Court. JCR (2) 6523. The Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance herewith. Philippines. Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in any and all [10] stages of the case. 1992.38 caliber revolver. filed on December 2. the above-named accused. i. ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. "(3) One . the foregoing circumstances considered.D. 1866 thru the following [3] Information: "That on or about the 26th day of October. "(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle. 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum. J. is hereby cancelled. 1993. The Regional Trial Court. On August 9.e. SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions. to 21 years of reclusion perpetua.

TSN. Again. 8. TSN. 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office and the Abacan bridge (p. immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant. quite sure of what had happened. a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council. He called the Viper through the radio once again (p. The Viper. February 15. 1992. "Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. ibid. ibid). Manarang. While inside the restaurant. 11 ibid).) along McArthur Highway (ibid). TSN. September 28. The People's detailed narration of facts. June 8. The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his [24] reply.189 1995.' (p. TSN. Danny Cruz. 1996. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. Manarang noticed a vehicle. ibid). Kristo. to which the Court agreed [23] in a Resolution promulgated on July 31. 5-6. 11. rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 8. "Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. ibid). True enough. is as follows: "At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26. ibid). 1993). 10. By the time Manarang completed the call. after his vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court. Ibid) In the local vernacular. he said thus: 'Ka bilis na. During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. (p. SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p. the Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu [25] Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal. He took out his radio and called the Viper. ibid). 8-9. On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan. mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya. 1993). 11. 7. the radio controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. a "second [21] supplemental petition" and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for [22] bail. the Solicitor-General sought the denial of the application for bail. February 15. 5-6. ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 34. ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p. ibid). Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. February 23. 10. ibid). 20. March 8. 9-10. 1993). 7-8. SPO2 Juan C. 10. upon receipt of the second radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle (p. well-supported by evidence on record and given credence [26] by respondent court. being a member of both the Spectrum. 20. "He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant. Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp. 33. 8-9. "Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody (p. ibid). decided to report the incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. a Mitsubishi Pajero. ibid). 7. running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement weather. . The next day. 8-9. ibid). 1993). the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the north (p. ibid). 5-7. However. TSN. petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with [19] [20] application for bail followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels. remarked 'oy ta na' signifying that Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 3) and positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 9. ibid).

15. switched on the engine. SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p. Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. TSN. "Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine. instead. ibid). Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and run incident. 20. He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented (p. They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 19. February 15. SPOMercado saw this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle. 10. Upon learning that the two police officers already knew about the incident. 15. insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal papers. ibid). ibid). 17-21. SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp.ibid). even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. February 23. TSN. 1993). Appellant. February 23. After disarming appellant. SPO2 Borja. 14. ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were at his home (pp. arrogantlydenied his misdeed and. ibid). They recognized the driver as Robin C. played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan. ibid) towards the Abacan bridge. TSN. Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p. ibid). 1993). ibid). When he saw that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang. As the most senior police officer in the group. ibid). ibid). it would have to be shown in the office (p. SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17. ibid). 10-11. operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. he saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. 11-12. his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket (p. 16. When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from their position. he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 1993).ibid). 13-15. ibid). When Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant. 1617. 1993). 16. TSN. however.190 "In the meantime. a crowd had formed at the place (p. 17. TSN. March 8. ibid). 11. TSN. 12. 1993). 16. 13. 11.ibid). February 23. he found Mobile No. By that time. kinuha ang baril ko'(pp. "While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing. 15. SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which appellant complied. ibid). 1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands raised. Mobile No. SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. appellant in this case (p. a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 1214. 1993). When he reached the Abacan bridge. 13. February 15. "SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. TSN. March 8. 26-27. February 23. ibid). 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado. 3 (p. 10. He approached them and informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p. ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short. Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10. 16. its butt protruding (p. 3 (P. Mercado confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of . SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident (p. however. At that moment. ibid). 24). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 12. 12. 11-12. The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. ibid). Padilla. the two police officers boarded their Mobile car. ibid). 15. ibid).

" As testified to by Manarang. [27] After a careful review of the records of this case. 1993). During the investigation. and O. Rosario Street beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 1993). ibid). Senior Inspector Mario Espino. TSN.380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720. 2829. a . (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or [29] private person. Both elements concurred here. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. 16-18.A peace officer or a private person may.an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang." Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently. 3637. 14. an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280. 33-35. 1992. N. 5. ibid). TSN. Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. ibid). Padilla (p. TSN. were not registered in the name of Robin C. "On November 28. (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized. The Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant. a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending.191 firearms (p. ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm. pp. or is attempting to commit an offense. ibid). Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense. Padilla (p. he heard the screeching of tires followed . and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution. January 25. he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Arrest without warrant. March 4. A second Certification dated December 11. 10. a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain. to carry the subject firearms. but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND [30] proceeds at once to the scene. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: [28] "Sec. He was not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner. 28. under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt. 5-10. 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Chief. 6. who then sought to arrest petitioner. . 31-32. ibid). ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. without a warrant. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M. the person to be arrested has committed. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. ibid). notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart. is actually committing. the Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma. After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic Division. Anent the first defense. 7-8. arrest a person: (a) When. the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 1994). "The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp. a private person.357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a . appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense. PNP. but that per sedid not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal. in his presence. petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. when lawful. July 13. as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run .

2. Rule [45] [46] 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence . Furthermore. Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected [31] the actual arrest of petitioner. Verily then. a fleeing suspect. its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang). saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor). after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report. [44] are . could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself.192 by a thud. the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on [40] unreliable hearsay information. It is precisely through this cooperation. Besides. by applying for bail.all created a situation in which [35] speed is essential and delay improvident. petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of [37] firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. the public place and the raining nighttime . a moving vehicle. These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Moreover. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who [32] actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. the policemen saw for themselves the [38] fast approaching Pajero of petitioner. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12. in all probability. Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information. We beg to disagree. the admissibility in evidence of which. like petitioner herein. reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. we uphold. in accordance with settled jurisprudence. petitioner [43] patently waived such irregularities and defects. the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. Moreover. The exigent circumstances of . Likewise. did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties. [39] and the dented hood and railings thereof. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect. cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an [33] [34] urgent need to render aid or take action. [42] placed him in estoppelto assail the legality of his arrest. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the [36] vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. Seizure of evidence in "plain view". it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid. Moreover. any objection. that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest. when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine). as follows: 1.hot pursuit. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance. defect or irregularity attending [41] an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant. the elements of which are: [47] (a). inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who . his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence.

and 5. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively. as it is [51] commonly understood. is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are. (c). This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) [61] was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was [62] contemporaneous with the arrest. the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe. [48] [49] 3. "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.193 (b). customs search. . a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when. petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P. before the search. the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that [50] the occupant committed a criminal activity. and (d). In connection therewith." "Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to [54] seizure even without a warrant." With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines. that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal [63] offense. Anent his second defense. The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and [64] ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person. Thus it has been held that: "(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense. the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers [59] in the vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the [60] offense. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against [56] the alleged search and seizure . In conformity with respondent court's observation. petitioner voluntarily [55] surrendered them to the police. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as [52] they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner. . the . as in this case. they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty [53] person and the taking of the corpus delicti. 4. search of a moving vehicle.D. when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which. and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from [57] assailing any purported defect. their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). the evidence must be immediately apparent. . Once the lawful arrest was [58] effected. consented warrantless search. Highly regulated by the government.

the Mission Order itself." The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension. is explicit in providing that: "VIII. like herein petitioner. That is not so. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena [67] on January 13. 1994. If he had. Surigao del Sur. In . the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. On this score. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes. In fact. The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed long after appellant had been apprehended on October 26. he could have produced those documents easily. in actuality. the Mission Order should be shown without resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding. appellant could have produced these documents to belie the charged against him.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and. the witness cited was one James Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. As to be reasonably expected. At the initial presentation of his evidence in court. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential instruction will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an actuation in violation of laws. c.194 Rodialo Gumtang. we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. if not at the time of apprehension. petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. despite the ample time given him. Lianga. As to the second element. (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm [65] does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. Appellant did not. as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff. d. when apprehended. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. an accused claiming innocence. 1992. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement units/personnels such as PNP. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm. "IX. Thus: "Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized and confiscated from him by the police officers in Angeles City. Indeed. the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila. or that his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at home. "At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence. He did not even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms. two requisites must be established. at least during the preliminary investigation. identified and offered in evidence during trial. or that they were owned by the Presidential Security Group. further compound their irregularity. could not show any document as proof of his authority to possess and carry the subject firearms. present any proper document showing his authority. the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order. James Neneng appeared in court but was not presented by the defense. The first element is beyond dispute as [66] the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search. The contention lacks merit. During the preliminary investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions he could not. would grab the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent excuses. Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of AFP. "Appellant. "Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested contain no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms. Superintendent Gumtang was not even mentioned. viz.

1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt." Circular No.D. Besides. Further. the Mission [72] Order covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City. Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office." areas outside Supt. were ably controverted. 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides that: "No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without corresponding certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been officially taken up in that units property book. the civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major [75] services of the AFP. I found that a certain Robin C. or at higher levels of command. 1. we note. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. moreover. of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows: "If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service). & PCFORs. does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order. The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt. TCT 8214 and the following firearms being asked whether it is registered or not. dated January 6.357 and the caliber . His surname thereon. What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name. this Mission Order is rendered inoperative in respect to such [68] violation. they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for the service they are rendering. but a mere deputy commander. INP and NBI. and that report of such action has been reported to higher AFP authority. what did you find." That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed [76] or registered in the name of the petitioner." Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic.380 but there is a firearm with the same serial number which is . PNP Supt. 1986." In addition. as certified to by the Director for Personnel of the PNP. Ramos are clear and unambiguous. Witness. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his [69] [70] behalf. if any? "A. Smith and Wesson with Serial No. we see no reason why he cannot present the corresponding certification as well. MRs. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5. petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. I did not find any records. Fidel V. thus: "No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Gen. was glaringly misspelled as "Durembes. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby [73] needing prior approval "by next higher Headquarters" which is absent in this case. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm pistol. the M-16 and the caliber . a fact admitted by [74] petitioner's counsel. Thus: "Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Having emanated from an unauthorized source.195 the latter event." which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation. The implementing rules of P. only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts [71] under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs.

MM under Re-Registered License. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names of the accused in this case? "A. "Q. caliber 9 mm with Serial No. Padilla of 59 Labo St. sir. "FOR THE CHIEF.. TCT 8214? "A. PNP [78] Chief. Beretta with serial number 35723Y. So in short. Quezon City "PNPFEO5 28 November 1992 "C E R T I F I C A T I O N "TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: "THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla is a pistol. FEO: (Sgd. Quezon City is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 covered by License No. Records Branch" . "Q. ESPINO Sr. Inspector. Yes. Smith and Wesson. "Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per verification from available records on file this Office as of this date: M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120 Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219 Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723 "However. RL M76C4476687.. Capitol Pasig. [77] xxx xxx xxx And the certification which provides as follows: Republic of the Philippines Department of the Interior and Local Government GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE Camp Crame. we have on file one Pistol Cal 380. licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St. sir.) JOSE MARIO M. Yes.196 the same as that licensed and/or registered in the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina. "This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.

He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years [85] for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. we reiterate. And until its repeal. entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find no plausible reason. the constitutionality [91] of P. as minimum. To justify nullification of the law.' (24 C. to depart from the factual findings of both the trial [83] court and respondent court which. therefore.D. Tobias. not a doubtful and argumentative implication. The certification may even [81] be dispensed with in the light of the evidence that an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a . or is not.38 [82] caliber pistol. every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. the fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. Just recently. The contentions do not merit serious consideration. [92] . The penalty for simple possession of firearm. as a rule. as in the case of petitioner. without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.J. . we note. efficacy or morality of laws. eight (8) months and one (1) . are accorded by the Court with respect and finality. is to interpret and apply the laws. it should be stressed. should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor. or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. was not convincingly discharged. though perceived to be harsh." Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. Indeed. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. The severity of a penalty does notipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.197 In several occasions. the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession [79] [80] of firearm. The Court.. In fact. With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. as in this case.S. Expressed in other terms. and none was presented. The only function of the courts. excessive. it has been held that to come under the ban. are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P. Lian where the Court en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm. "It takes more than merely being harsh. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that [86] laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. as minimum. In People vs. 'wholly [88] disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community' " It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner. it is not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is. 1187-1188).D. Moreover. akin to the confiscated firearms. From the foregoing discussion. the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom. it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and [87] apply the law as it stands. to 21 years of reclusion perpetua. there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the [90] Constitution. [93] we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. as maximum). Anent his third defense.D. out of proportion. cruel and unusual and that sentences of [89] imprisonment. we reiterated that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. 1866 no longer exists. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed [84] under P. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden. respondent court can not be faulted for applying P. cannot be licensed to a civilian. the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. or a certification from. the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive'. Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. to eighteen (18) years.D.

Jr. hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. SO ORDERED Narvasa. as aforesaid.. Consequently. prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium [95] period. shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence. 18 years. Melo. premises considered. eight (8) months and one (1) day. that is. "This penalty. and Panganiban. This is discernible from the following explanation by the Court: "In the case at bar. 1866 is a special law. being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law. C. . no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or proved. to eighteen (18) years. (Chairman). the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1. In [94] accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. which is. WHEREFORE.198 day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal. from any period of the penalty next lower in degree. as maximum. Simon. concur. The minimum thereof shall be taken. as minimum. as maximum. although Presidential Decree No. Davide. the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code.J. the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1) day. 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.

and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. judgment is hereby granted: 1. they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore. the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding. 2. 114791. Ong for the following sums: a) P450. After a protracted trial. When private respondents came home from their honeymoon. It is in this light that we narrate the following undisputed facts: Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7.199 [G. Ordering the rescission of the agreement entered into between plaintiff Hermogenes Ong and defendant Nancy Go. the court a quorendered a decision.00. the down payment made at contract time.respondents. DECISION ROMERO. In our society. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private respondents‘ return. Dumaguete City. which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon. . as moral damages. Declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. as exemplary damages. petitioners. b) P75. in Dumaguete City. HERMOGENES ONG and JANE C. ONG. May 29. to wit: ―WHEREFORE.000. vs. J. 1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against th petitioners before the Regional Trial Court. 1997] NANCY GO AND ALEX GO. could no longer be delivered. therefore.000. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.: No less than the Constitution commands us to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution and [1] the foundation of the family. Three times thereafter. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1. Branch 33. No.00.00. 7 Judicial District. however. Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only record of their wedding. private respondents filed on September 23. the importance of a wedding ceremony cannot be underestimated as it is the matrix of the family and. an occasion worth reliving in the succeeding years.650.R. c) P20.00. 1981.

Clearly. as such. except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.000. the cameraman was employed by Pablo Lim who also owned the video equipment used. it is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding. It would not be unwarranted to assume that their failure to present such a vital witness would have had an adverse result on the [4] case. As regards the award of damages. If an agent acts in his own name. In addition. this petition.200 d) P5.000. dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court‘s decision. Hence. neither have such persons against the principal. should not have been held liable. Considering that private respondents were about to leave for the .00. This contention is primarily premised on Article 1883 of the Civil Code which states thus: ―ART. xxx xxx‖ xxx Petitioners‘ argument that since the video equipment used belonged to Lim and thus the contract was actually entered into between private respondents and Lim is not deserving of any serious consideration. Petitioners claim that for the video coverage. the principal has no right of action against the persons with whom the agent has contracted. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals. The use by petitioners of the video equipment of another person is of no consequence. The petition is not meritorious. SO ORDERED. for the video coverage of the wedding. as litigation expenses.00. that is. It must also be noted that in the course of the protracted trial below. petitioners did not even present Lim to corroborate their contention that they were mere agents of the latter. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence they presented to prove that they acted only as agents of a certain Pablo Lim and. as agreed upon in their contract. They further assert that they merely get a commission for all customers [3] solicited for their principal. petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which. on September 14. and e) P2.‖ Dissatisfied with the decision. In such case the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has contracted. as attorney‘s fees. the contract entered into is one of service. as if the transaction were his own. Defendants are also ordered to pay the costs. the erasure was done in consonance [5] with consistent business practice to minimize losses. 1993. We are not persuaded. 1883. they aver that there is no evidence to show that the erasure of the tape was done in [2] bad faith so as to justify the award of damages. They insist that since private respondents did not claim the tape after the lapse of thirty days. petitioners would impress upon this Court their lack of malice or fraudulent intent in the erasure of the tape. the fact that private respondents filed a case against petitioners belies such assertion. petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Consequently. In the instant case. it can hardly be said that the object of the contract was the video equipment used.

Petitioners‘ act or omission in recklessly erasing the video coverage of private respondents‘ wedding was precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo.000. as [6] reimbursement of the downpayment paid by private respondents to petitioners. the wife may exercise any profession.‖ In the instant case. As the appellate court aptly observed: ―Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever. [8] oppresive or abusive. SO ORDERED. pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between [13] the parties who execute them. reckless. sleepless nights and humiliation that the appellees suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 [9] and 2218 of the Civil Code. and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof. In the instant case. tortured feelings. are liable for damages. However. she was acting alone for her sole interest. He argues that when [12] his wife entered into the contract with private respondent.201 United States. Generally. the erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified. moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because this case is not among those enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private respondents and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the judgment award. moral damages are recoverable for the breach of contract which was palpably wanton. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code). Costs against petitioners. petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate courts holding him jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby. the award [10] of exemplary damages by the trial court is justified to serve as a warning to all entities engaged in the same business to observe due diligence in the conduct of their affairs. that [7] is. malicious or in bad faith. WHEREFORE. which was a great reduction from plaintiffs‘ demand in the complaint. the trial court was correct in awarding the appellees moral damages albeit in the amount of P75. We find merit in this contention. petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are thus liable for damages. . consistent with Article [11] 2208 of the Civil Code. it is also accepted in this jurisdiction that liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations. Finally. petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape. for a fee. Consequently. negligence or delay. we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below. The award of attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses are likewise proper. Clearly. In this regard.00. the act which violates the contract may also constitute a quasi-delict. we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. in compensation for the mental anguish. Thus. Consequently. they took care to inform petitioners that they would just claim the tape upon their return two months later.‖ Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by petitioners in the case at bar. The grant of actual or compensatory damages in the amount of P450. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that ―those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud. the assailed decision dated September 14. the former undertook to cover the latter‘s wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event.00 is justified. For whatever reason.

knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug.000 and to pay the costs. were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas. JR. The information filed against the appellant alleged: That on or about the 2nd day of March. GUTIERREZ. concur. MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO. (At p. 6. Pampanga. defendant-appellant. Jr.R. Pampanga. Tierra for defendant-appellant. Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. control and custody one (1) bag of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to Olongapo City. Province of Pampanga. J. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Philippines. Branch 41. Puno. G.. (Chairman). that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused. L-63630 April 6. 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. unlawfully and feloniously have his possession. that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo. more or less. San Fernando. vs. 1982. Rollo) The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is narrated by the trial court as follows: It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late evening of March 2. Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to life imprisonment. Branch 41. No. the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO.202 Regalado. Mendoza. plaintiff-appellee. Third Judicial Region at San Fernando. together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan. only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves. to pay a fine of P20. that the person was . did then and there willfully. finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4. The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. that it was around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a traveling bag (Exhibit G) who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court. 1982. in the municipality of San Fernando. and Torres. that the surveillance was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers.. Katz N. without authority of law to do so. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station. JJ..

Rizal. and used to conduct his business at Taytay. Pampanga. San Fernando. that inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat. Pampanga he crossed the street to wait for a bus going to Manila. 1982 (Exhibit A and A-1) and when examined. for further investigation. that upon alighting at the Victory Liner Compound at San Fernando. sleeping but was awakened when he arrived that Pat. raised the lone assignment of error in his appeal: THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3. that he was able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the evening and he stayed in Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock because he had a drinking spree with Nena's son. that Pat. that the accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando.203 asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. Enrique Chan.00 from a customer thereat and to buy C-rations. Rollo) Only the accused testified in his defense. Pat. Punzalan got the wallet and took all the money inside the wallet amounting to P545. that he was thereafter placed under detention and somebody told him that he is being charged with possession of marijuana and if he would like to be bailed out. Rizal. identified by him later as Pat. (At p. that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from Olongapo City but he failed and was able to take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening that it was a Victory Liner Bus that he rode and because he was tipsy. It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or on March 3. the same were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1). on March 2. that on March 3. 1982. that he never left his residence at Antipolo. 1982. Quevedo took the same. telling him that it shall be returned to him but that it was never returned to him. 10-11) Appellant. Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out everything from his pocket saying that the prisoners inside the jail may get the same from him. and that Pat. Pampanga. that Pat. he went to Subic to collect a balance of P100. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana leaves and found positive result for marijuana (Exhibit E). that at the municipal building. 1982. he did not notice that the bus was only bound for San Fernando. (Rollo. that when he took out his wallet.00. 1982. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows: The accused declared that he got married on October 25. approached him and asked him if he has any residence certificate. pp. that when he was visited by his wife. that he was formerly employed in the poultry farm of his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo. he told his wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he told his wife not to complain anymore as it would be useless. Silverio Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat. Pat. he saw a policeman. (At pp. Punzalan. Pampanga. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report (Exhibit F). that he goes to Subic at times in connection with his business and whenever he is in Subic. including chicks. and. a man whom he came to know later as Pat. 1981 and his wife begot a child on June 10. 48. Roberto Quevedo. through counsel de oficio Atty.Rollo) . 9-10. who happens to be his brother and who has had special training on narcotics. that he is engaged in the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds. Rizal. that while thus waiting for a bus. that the remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at Camp Olivas by Pat. Punzalan told him that he'll be taken to the municipal building for verification as he may be an NPA member. he used to buy C-rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose the same in Manila. Silverio Quevedo. to conduct a field test on a little portion of the marijuana leaves and to have the remaining portion examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas. somebody is willing to help him.

counsel de oficio Atty. Sec. without a warrant. Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Section 12. in behalf of the Clerk of Court. arrest a person: (a) When. Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. This contention is devoid of merit. Atty. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. this court appointed a new counsel de oficio. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. 5(a) provides: . in his presence. before this Court had the chance to act on appeal. In the case of People v. Pat. in her brief. Katz Tierra and pursuant thereto. basically reiterating ating the lower court's findings. . held that: Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. without a search warrant. Search incident to a lawful arrest. Accused was caught in flagrante. Claudia. is actually committing. Enrique Chan died. Meanwhile. Rollo) It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence. (At pp. the person to be arrested has committed. Thereafter. the Deputy Clerk of Court. Rule 113. [1988] this Court. or is attempting to commit an offense. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus. confronted with the same issue. . raised the following assignment of errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT.204 The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief. However. The warrantless . required the new counsel to file her appellant's brief. 92-93. 160 SCRA 646. A peace officer or a private person may. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER AUTHENTICATED. The latter complied and. since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest.

Viola. 163 SCRA 402 [1988]. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it. where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative. We cannot therefore apply the ruling inAminnudin to the case at bar. they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause. The date of its arrival was certain. however. Lastly. it is clear that they had at react two days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. that there were certain facts. is not fatal to the prosecution's case. 160 SCRA 533 [1988]. Therefore. We discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. People v. 1989. not sing in the case before us. and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said letter-request bore the name of the accused.R. Capulong. This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer. Amininudin. still. the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accusedappellant as carrying marijuana. Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was never authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana package together with a letter-request for examination. He capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused." In contrast. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. however. the police officers had to act quickly. As stated therein: The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses. (People v. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. (Nolasco V. In that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant. Asio. 64262. (People v. smugglers of contraband goods. jueteng collectors. And from the information they had received. the case before us presented urgency. September 1. etc. would make it extremely difficult. Acting on this tip. they waited for him one evening. G. People v. we cannot discount the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded positive results for marijuana. In attacking the sufficiency of evidence. 147 SCRA 509). approached him as he descended from the gangplank. Yet they did nothing.1 kilos of marijuana. . if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated. to justify the issuance of a warrant.R. No effort was made to comply with the law. there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1. Cerelegia. pp. illegal possessors of firearms. The vehicle was identified. indeed. which led the Court to declare the seizure as invalid. (TSN. had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary. His name was known. No. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally. 84960. March 16. 1989. We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. robbers. the appellant avers that the informer should have been presented before the lower court.205 search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. The records show. detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly authenticated. the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient and doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt. 147 SCRA 538). G. then the requirements of proper authentication of evidence were sufficiently complied with. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information. No. The marijuana package examined by the forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers. We rule. Paño.

the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which. well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court. presented by the prosecution in this case were all based on personal knowledge acquired by the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their official duties and there is nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or that they have any prejudice against the herein accused. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge. We take exception. the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed himself through compulsory court processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. These prosecution witnesses have no motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against the accused. all the evidence. the inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated testimony remains. their testimonies deserve full credit. 1989. we find no reason to disturb the following findings: The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan are positive and sufficiently clean to show the commission by the accused of the offense herein chatted.206 As to doubtfulness of evidence. Turla. October to Salangad of the PCCL. Moreover. San Fernando. Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1). It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses. If the policemen really got any money from the accused and that the marijuana leaves do not belong to the accused. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the accused? This is unnatural. 81520. p. The intent to transport the same is clear from the testimony of Pat. to the trial court's finding that: The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs one (1) kilo.R. however. p. oral and documentary. Between the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses and that of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the accused. why will the two policemen still produce in Court as evidence that expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from the accused and which contained the marijuana in question if the instant case is a mere fabrication? As already stated. Punzalan still bring the accused to the municipal Building for interrogation and/or verification? Would not Pat. No. as correctly observed by the lower court. if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat. 167 SCRA 278). the former should prevail. (Rollo. And this is also true on the testimony to the accused that Pat. is an added circumstance tending to establish his guilt. 13) Likewise. more or less. G. (Rollo. People v. Silverio . February 21. The knowledge on what these witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the official performance of their duties and then. 11) Moreover. who had first hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their testimony (People v. Tejada. with station at camp Olivas. Since not one other witness was presented nor was any justification for the non-appearance given. (sic) being no showing that they are prejudiced against the accused. The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in the possession of the accused were marijuana leaves were corroborated by the examination findings conducted by Pat. Punzalan got all the money from his wallet when he was accosted at the Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet otherwise he will be "salvaged" why will Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill arid never returned the same to him.

Duero 104 SCRA 379 [1981].00) Pesos. HON.. The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo. WHEREFORE. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO. Fernan. (Rollo. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6. he categorically denied in court. ANTONIO . petitioners. HON. G. where the Court added that: In effect. This ruling was reiterated in People v. during custodial investigation. Feliciano. L-69803 October 8. the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. Pampanga. on the other hand. however. 145 SCRA 597 [1986]. TOLENTINO. the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official acts relative to admissibility of statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. the latter told him that he (accused) is bringing the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City. Executive Judge. 1985 CYNTHIA D. the forensic chemist who examined the marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams Such amount is not a considerable quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to transport the marijuana leaves. pp. that although the information stated the weight to be approximately one kilo. The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic Act No.000. that when he confronted the accused that night. that he is transporting the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Bidin and Cortes. Even assuming it to be true. Moreover.J. SO ORDERED. a place where the accused is not residing. concur. Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused was arrested at San Fernando. and from this finding extracted a clear intent to transport the marijuana leaves. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a trial that prior to questioning. considering the quantity of the marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused and the place he was arrested which is at San Fernando. his confession is inadmissible in evidence. MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. C. vs. JJ. Conviction of a crime with an extremely severe penalty must be based on evidence which is clearer and more convincing than the inferences in this case. more or less. the extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted because it does not appear in the records that the accused. 13-14) The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which. No.. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Tolentino. a place which is not his residence.207 Quevedo who declared. among other things. It may be pointed out.R. In People v. was apprised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended). What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana leaves but his actual session. Pampanga. the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights. NOLASCO. it can be said that the intent to transport the marijuana leaves has been clearly established.

documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front. Judge Panos Court was Branch 88. 3. In connection with the Search Warrant issued. GEN. Lt. Margall Street. at around 9:00 A. Saldajeno to Judge Paño. JUAN PONCE ENRILE. Saldajeno of the CSG. AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. HON. Joker P. AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO. J. APOSTOL. On August 6th. the following may be stated: (a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Quezon City. respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day". Quezon City.84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). (b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Sarmiento. and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. et al. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge. applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon.Diokno. Jose W . particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases. 2. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO. Col. Sison. Col." She was then still at large. 4. Quezon City.M. (c) According to the record. At 12:00 N. elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street. AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No. In their COMMENT. Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners. however. respondents. 1. Quezon City. V. 239-B Mayon Street. not specifically denied by respondents. 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year). At 11:30 A. not denied by respondents. SANTOS. SERGIO F. Branch XLII. Mila AguilarRoque. Lt. The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO. on August 6th. Jose Ma. . Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines. 25. Accused. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A.208 P. Arroyo. both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners. City Fiscal.: The facts before the Court in these Certiorari. determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE.. Search Warrant No. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. Prohibition. after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA. 80.M. were examined under oath by Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. Col. Presiding Judge. JESUS ALTUNA. MELENCIO-HERRERA. Virgilio G. on August 6th. MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. Ernani Cruz Paño. to be served at No. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. Lapus. Prior to August 6. there were kept in the premises to be searched records. Rene A. LT. including support 1 money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. that is late on august 6th.

No mention was made that TOLENTINO was present." 8. Marciana Galang. on February 12. Galang. for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion. the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying. Santos. This Court. (c) On August 16th. Hence. making 431 items in all. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods. 6. (c) On December 13. and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. NOLASCO and TOLENTINO. were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL. but not by Dra.209 5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. (a) On December 12th. submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th. He was arrested by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE). (a) On August 10th. and additionally a portable 3 typewriter. 1984. praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. He was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Paño of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7. respondent Judge Antonio P. petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE. which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th. presiding. the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant. Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Paño. praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. 2 (b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials. 1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. . AGUILAR-ROQUE. and 2 wooden boxes. of August 6th the following may be stated: (a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. this Petition for Certiorari. issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or their duly authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant. Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent. CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL. in connection with cases that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office 5 and the court. inter alia. (b) On September 28th. and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress. (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items. 1985. owner of the premises. the search was made in the presence of Dra. The Motion was denied on November 16th. 7. (a) On September 10th. the three petitioners." (b) On August 13th. 4 (c) According to the Return. petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return. It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles.

papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. List of possible supporters.embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. duplicating machines. 7 et al. etc. and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. The disputed Search Warrant (No. manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication. FAs. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as. houses. what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. the Chief of Staff"which this Court declared null and void for being too general. taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. manuals not otherwise available to the public.210 The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure. mimeographing and tape recording machines. books. the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. Thus. adding that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are. propaganda materials. contend otherwise. Programs. articles. and even typewriters. In the case at bar. Said description is no different from if not worse than. the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times. Plans of these groups. search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general. guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons.. newspaper dummies subversive documents. The search warrant under consideration 8 was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable. printing paraphernalia and all other subversive materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to the search team as to what articles might be lawfully seized thereunder. v. in fact. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows: Documents. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. such as Minutes of the Party Meetings. Thus: Subversive documents. We find merit in the Petition. the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos. represented by the Solicitor General. and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free 6 Philippines. and support money from foreign or local sources. It is an all. subversive books and instructions. The respondents. pamphlets. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. leaflets. . In the recent rulings of this Court. Section 3. The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as 'subversive documents. Article IV of the Constitution.

Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque? A Because of our day and night surveillance. Q What else? A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front. Your Honor. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Mr. Programs. Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon 10 them and act in pursuant thereof. Q How long did it take you for the surveillance? A Almost a month. Q Are you a lawyer. Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines .. which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack . sir. The 6th. Plans of these groups.211 The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant. there were so many suspicious persons with documents. Q And may include what else? A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings. Your Honor. 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized. Q What kind of documents do you refer to? A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's Army. List of possible supporters. manuals not otherwise available to the public and 9 support money from foreign and local sources.. Col. you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search warrant? A Yes. but I was a student of law. sir. Your Honor. Q So. there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. subversive books and instructions. Of the 8 questions asked. the 1st. Lapus? A No. Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition? (The deposition instead)— A Yes.

it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Rules of Court. that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the Court that issued it instead of this original. whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court. and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court. this. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE. "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained. for possible effective results in the interest of public order. It is also a general rule that. 80-84 issued on August 6. they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant. of a person who had been arrested. 239-B Mayon Street. 1984. the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned. The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search. even during the inquest investigation on August 10. Rule 126. there is some confusion in the decisions as to what 12 constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12. the personalities seized may be retained. as a result of the service of the Search Warrant. In fact. without a search warrant. they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Substantially. Parenthetically. the search at No.212 of particularity. as an incident of an arrest. Section 12. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although. It should be advisable that. in the application of general rules. Quezon City.—A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. while Search Warrant No. while not denominated as a motion to quash. 1984. Some searches may be made without a warrant." Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion. dated October 18. 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside. "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the 13 apprehension of criminals. The records show. however. explicitly provides: Section 12. which is a crime against public order.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable 11 cause upon which a warrant may issue. and it has been stated that. by CSG. Search without warrant of person arrested. that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling. Respondents claim. the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. however. petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search Warrant. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. WHEREFORE. or Branch. for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case. Such being the case. or Branch. that petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment. therefore. ordinarily. that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time. the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. Thus. leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission No. and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest. did not need a search warrant. independent action to quash. In this latter case. and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the . The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding. we are of the opinion that in her respect.

393-394) The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar. reserves his vote. sec. Jr.. for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. J. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or modify. Justice Vicente Abad Santos. as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in the dissenting portion of his separate opinion. pending before Special Military commission No. De la Fuente. concurring and dissenting: I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. 1. Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE. Plana. SMC-1-1. sec. Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group themselves knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant in question. SO ORDERED. even without a warrant. Concepcion Jr. The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons. or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. Alampay and Patajo concur. Nos. This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. houses. 239-B Mayon Street. The Court has held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. C. the. August 30. . her dwelling at No. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon.. All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners. The exception of Rule 126... Pamaran (G. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person.. Escolin Relova. concurs in the result. Aquino. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.Roque's) arrest." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. Bayona. 71208-09. The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . Makasiar. . took no part.J. without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles. 3). Quezon City could have been searched. at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. J.R. Mr. 1985). 4[2]). J.213 Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent. 128 SCRA 388. Gutierrez. In . papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated" (Bill of Rights." (Mata vs. section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec..

I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. ABAD SANTOS. In addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he allowed himself to be used by the military. it violates the constitutional mandate that the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by. of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. In either case his action can only be described as deplorable. and things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. for the reasons stated by him.214 this case. on board a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. 80-84 issued by Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño for the reasons adduced by Justice Melencio Herrera." Hence— An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . 12. the subject. 80-84 issued by the Hon. 439: People vs. Veloso. Search without warrant of person arrested. 1. 3. Sec. I vote to grant the petition in toto. 12. To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation.. if not nullification.. thus copies of Playboy magazines were seized from a labor leader now deceased and medicines were also seized from a physician who was suspected of being a subversive. 169) . (Art.—A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. He refers to "the subversive materials seized by the government agents. however.m. 12. J. Ernani Cruz Paño Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St. concurring and dissenting: I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant No. But then again I cannot agree with Justice Cuevas. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides: SEC.... that their retention cannot be justified by the provisions of Sec. I say return everything to the petitioners. objects or properties that may be seized hereunder. regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the basis of Sec. As to subject. 48 Phil. Ago Chi. The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the aforequoted provision (Sec. 'must be particularly described. the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect. not of fact. 12. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." What are subversive materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is a conclusion of law. CUEVAS. Quezon City It does not specify with requisite particularity the things. I agree with Justice Cuevas. concurring and dissenting I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant No. Margall Streets). 1973 Constitution) I. Who will make the determination? Certainly not the military for it is not competent to do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. statement that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to their owners. (In Re Moreno vs. 12 Phil. SMC-1-1 pending before Special Military Commission No. IV. and place of said arrest. time. petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a. J. Being in the nature of a general warrant.

US.30) The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to the general rule is that. not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest. cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. No.S. 199. the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St. not all the things so seized can be ordered returned to their owners. The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed. and P. Stated otherwise. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN. to be valid. it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. 269 U. in addition to a lawful arrest. 163) In the instant case. it is said that the officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. therefore. was conducted after the arrest. (Papani vs. How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record. US 267 US 122.. .M. the conspiracy was ended and the defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere. accusedappellant. 1976. 1984 citing Castro vs. Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent. it is not incident to the arrest. But the right does not extend to other places. When it was entered and searched. the search must be incident to the arrest. 158. Objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law.AGNELLO vs.S.. In this latter case. then search is not incidental to arrest. as well as weapons or other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. However. 1999] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.R. June 17. plaintiff-appellee. 269 U. 20 at 30. at 11:30 A. Quezon City. The search. but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest. on the other hand. MARSON vs. Thus. the subversive materials seized by the government agents which cannot be legally possessed by anyone under the law can and must be retained by the government.. Bayona. U.S. 273 U. vs. Margall St. 70 SCRA 478). otherwise. Pabalan. that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B May• n St. 28 ET AL.S. U. 128 SCRA 388. (Emphasis supplied) (Agnello vs. 275 US 192. But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a place other than the place of arrest and. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an arrest. CAROLL vs. It cannot be said. U. the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested..S.215 With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law. BYARS vs. 84 F 2d 160. 20. That search cannot be sustained as an incident of the arrests... DECISION . (Mata vs. [G. Not being an incident of a lawful arrest. The things and properties seized on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary rule. of August 6. U. 128222. Frank Agnello's house was several blocks distant from Alba's house where the arrest was made. supra.S. The search must be made at the place of the arrest. S.

Later that same day. Speaking in English. 7659. Region I. weighing 28. Eliciting no response from the man. to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Carlatan. CID then requested the man to open his bag. . but the latter did not to comprehend.‖ he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. CID surmised. CID then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent. BADUA. Go Ping Guan. SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA). he ordered his men to take up positions thirty meters from the coastline. after having observed the facial features of the man. 7659.. He then walked towards the road. Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the [3] Philippine National Police. in violation of Section 15. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon.: Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquittal and the reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando. Branch 66. CID ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband. the man apparently understood and acceded to the request. CID then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. [2] otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by R. the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. to have the assistance of a counsel. carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances which he and CID suspected was shabu. Mr. but still to no avail. the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag. ALMOITE. he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p." The police authorities were satisfied that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their uncertainty as to what language was spoken. she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets. however. The interpreter. then Ilocano. as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station. D-025-95. received a letter request from CID – incidentally her husband – to conduct a laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a multicolored [4] strawbag. 6425. prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. CID then resorted to what he termed ―sign language." In view thereof.D. the man appeared impassive. became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his I.A. and sentencing him to "die by lethal injection.A. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers. Article III of Republic Act No. he signaled the man to follow. No. CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang. La Union for laboratory examination. Hence. the male passenger alighted.m. San Fernando. CID and six of his men led by his Chief Investigator. the judgment was brought to this Court for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. and using both hands. C. CID and BADUA. proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with ALMOITE. In the meantime.J. No. which he did. When the speedboat landed. CHUA was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. According to ALMOITE. finding him guilty of transporting. La Union. In her Chemistry Report No. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. as amended by Section 11 of R. etc. This time. a regulated drug. the regulated substance [1] methamphetamine hydrochloride. finally arrived. through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights. that he was probably Taiwanese. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995. As it was routine for CID to deploy his men in strategic places when dealing with similar situations. As CID wished to proceed to the police station. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog. without appropriate legal authority. But when the policemen asked the man several questions. Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID).7 kilos. By this time. At the police station. JR. In the meantime. but he seemed not to understand.216 DAVIDE.

CHUA heard RONG asked the person on the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they were riding. the police arrived. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and was employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. RONG made several phone calls using his mobile phone. The tasks completed. Most significantly. low on fuel and telephone battery. in turn.m. However. The State presented evidence tending to establish the above narration of facts which were culled chiefly from the testimony of CID. they decided to dock. came back without the fish.7 kilos of [m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to transport the same" in violation of Section 15." particularly of his right to counsel. emphasizing that RONG alone exercised dominion over the same. He also . RONG then showed to CHUA a document purportedly granting them authority to fish on Philippine waters. While sailing. led by an officer who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag. A child thereafter pointed out to him that one bag was missing much to RONG‘s dismay when he learned of it. and whose testimony. Consequently. RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 1/2) meters away from one bag. Later.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure. and with nary any spoken word. his arrest was tainted with illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have been regarded inadmissible as evidence. So they sailed towards the Philippines and reached Dagupan. was substantially corroborated by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE. he denied ownership and knowledge of the contents of the bag. it was only after directing the request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA. they disembarked on a small speedboat with the two bags RONG brought with him from China. CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be found. that the facts of the case could support an indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug. The RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking interpreter. Thelma Sales Go. La Union. Elmer Parong. He also maintained that CID never graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao beach. recalled that on the date in question. CHUA anchored the boat while RONG carried the bags to shore. they escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. RONG left the ship. only gestures and hand movements. 6425 as amended by R. the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. inspected and weighed the contents. the person on shore could not see them so they cruised over the waters for about five hours more when finally. he was instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the latter‘s 35-tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port. unlawfully and feloniously transpor(ted) 28. pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando. CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter Steven Yu. They presented the bag to him. as such thought failed to make an impression in his mind. CHUA entered a plea of not guilty. 7659. its first witness. unadulterated methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. confirmed the entries of her chemistry report in that the contents of the 29 plastic packets weighing 28. he arrived at the beach with the police. Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. then proclaimed them as methamphetamine hydrochloride. The police immediately approached CHUA. Trial finally ensued. Mainland China where they would buy fish. (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan member.217 CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the case as Criminal Case No. opened it. BADUA certainly never prevented him from running away. but with two bags. However. Thereafter. She also explained that they were unwashed. 4037.A.A. At around 10:30 a. the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a Taiwanese Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs.. On 21 March 1995. Upon arrival at their destination. For the defense. When a crowd started to mill around them. Article III of R. hence they appeared yellowish. CHUA denounced the prosecution‘s story as a distortion of the truth. At his arraignment on 31 July 1995. the information was subsequently amended to allege that CHUA "willfully. Apparently. He denied he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed of his "constitutional rights. the police. Expert witness Theresa Ann Cid.

7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride [5] without legal authority to do so. and in view of all the foregoing. 7659 that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the quantity sold/possessed/transported is ‗200 grams or more‘ in the case of Shabu. the mayor took charge of the situation -. and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. No.218 remembered hearing from the people congregating at the beach that CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman Anneb had chased the latter‘s car. considering the language barrier and the observation that such irregularity was ―rectified when accused was duly arraigned and … (afterwards) participated in the trial of this case.A. They were about to get a bag situated near CHUA when they detected the arrival of the local police. the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that CHUA transported 28. having no other recourse but to impose the maximum penalty to accused.000. The confiscated 28. and considering. and to pay the costs. as amended by R. but with several other members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic. Art. and considering the provisions of Sec. further that the quantity involved in this case is 28. 6425. The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores. he called for a forensic chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the contents of the bag. to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10. The RTC also noted the futility of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to remain silent. Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG.7 kilograms which is far beyond the weight ceiling specified in said Act. as well as the whereabouts of the other bag. to wit: WHEREFORE. the police decided to bring CHUA to police headquarters. Tagliben as authority. coupled with the findings of conspiracy or that accused is a member of an organized syndicated crime group. III of R. who will conduct an exhaustive investigation regarding this case to determine whether there was negligence or conspiracy in the escape of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who approached the accused in the seashore of Tammocalao.00). Bacnotan. The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the Philippine National Police to immediately form an investigating Committee to be composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity.000. as proven and established by convincing and satisfactory evidence that the accused had conspired and acted in concert with one Cho Chu Rong. this Court hereby sentences the said accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San to die by lethal injection. Throughout the proceedings. a farmer and resident of Tammocalao who narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the beach when two men and a lady arrived. and attempted to take the remaining bag from accused. the Skipper of the 35-tonner ship they used in coming to the Country from China and Taiwan. No.A. and he ordered his officials to find an interpreter. this Court. 15. Invoking People v. La Union. Such predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive portion. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and PARONG at the beach but not CID.‖ The RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor details which did not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred on the testimonies thus delivered.A. and to furnish this Court a copy of the report/result of the said investigation in order to show compliance herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.7 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu is ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with the law. hence it allowed the admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. this Court finds the accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Sec. He additionally claimed that when the crowd became unruly. They quickly disappeared. photographers were busy taking pictures to document the event. the RTC characterized the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest. 7659 as charged in the Information. .he opened CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police. There. not to mention Chen Ho Fa. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997. No. 20 of R.

therefore. the rule is. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a judicial question. (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search). The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not. a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant. Expectedly and quite understandably. an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. of course. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest. (2) [13] arrests effected in hot pursuit. (4) waiver or [12] consent searches. and in (3) appreciating conspiracy between him and an organized syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited drugs since this was not alleged in the information. the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests. ―otherwise such search and seizure become ‗unreasonable‘ within the meaning of the aforementioned constitutional [10] provision. while as a rule. We reverse the RTC. The arresting officer. personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Inseparable. houses. the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. for use in their Bantay-Dagat operations against all illegal seaborne activities. to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons. however. SO ORDERED. is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible [8] for any purpose in any proceeding. and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. the person to be arrested has committed. and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution. in his presence. This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless arrest. must have personal knowledge of [14] [15] such fact or as recent case law adverts to. is not absolute and [11] such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles. forestall reasonable searches and seizure. for. personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court.‖ This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures. CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting as competent evidence the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine hydrochloride since they were indubitably "forbidden fruits. Specifically with respect to arrests. papers and effects against [7] unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Verily. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man‘s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is [16] charged. The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1) the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and contemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the police action. it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person . (3) customs searches. the prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident.219 The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and to be turned over to the Philippine National Police. and (2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and seizures since he consented to the search. La Union Command. (2) seizure in plain view. and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. determinable from a consideration of the [9] circumstances involved. search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests. when. But this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. [6] Before this Court. is actually committing. or is attempting to commit an offense. arrest a person." (2) granting weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite glaring inconsistencies on material points.

The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities. This Court. however. wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized. for effecting warrantless arrest. that the investigating fiscal ‗finds cause to hold the respondent for trial.‘ or where ‗a probable cause exists. A With the company of Sgt.‖ (emphasis [19] supplied) Guided by these principles.accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. In People v. Montilla. where were you. and correlatively.g. and the urgency of the situation) constitutive of probable cause impelled police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or [21] [22] the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same. by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to ‗engender as well founded belief‘ as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondent‘s probable guilt thereof. the Court acknowledged that ―the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges.‖ None of the telltale clues. finds that these do not constitute ―probable cause.. Tangliben. those problems and confusing concepts (referring to prima facie evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set aright. Q In relation to you. the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable cause -. the Court agreed with the lower court's finding that compelling reasons (e. . There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question.g. e. CHUA‘s illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa). thus: Q How far were you when the accused put the bag on his shoulder? A We were then very near him about three meters away from the male person carrying the bag. suspicious demeanor or behavior and [23] suspicious bulge in the waist -. ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely walking and oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the officers approached him.‖ Noting that the previous statutory and jurisprudential evidentiary standard was "prima facie evidence" and that it had been dubiously equated with probable cause. English and Ilocano which accused did not understand because he did not respond. In the case at bar.persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles. This cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the claim. has been reduced and liberalized.‘ It should. At least in People v. CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas. accused was acting suspiciously. that is. beyond the reach of Philippine laws. be in that sense. on the spot identification by an informant that accused was transporting prohibitive drug. Reynoso and Maj. and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas. Cid went near him. he spoke in Tagalog.. at least on the issue under discussion.e. CHUA‘s suspicious behavior. this Court finds that there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA‘s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. i. but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended. there is no probable cause. And despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA attempted to flee. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule.‖ In short. Cid we approached the accused and when Maj. bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited [20] drug. the Court explained: [F]elicitously. Q To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his shoulder? A To the east direction. therefore.220 [17] [18] sought to be arrested.

actually or constructively of his right against unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the same. that the person involved had knowledge. the search was not incidental to an arrest. To reiterate. It is worth mentioning here that after introducing themselves. as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. that said person had an [29] actual intention to relinquish the right. In this instance.221 Q When Maj. and lastly. That is why Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused? A Yes sir and he stopped. whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches. the police officers immediately inquired about the contents of the bag. CHUA never exhibited that he knew. a valid arrest must precede the search. But gossamer to the officers‘ sense perception and view were CHUA disembarking from a speedboat. [24] True. however. so there was no reason for you to approach the accused because he was not doing anything wrong? A No. thus: . actual or constructive. Q To what direction he was walking? A He was walking to the east direction.in effect to "retroactively establish probable cause and validate an illegal search and seizure. the law requires that there be first [27] a lawful arrest before a search can be made . The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. what was the accused doing at that time? A He was walking. Neither were these overt manifestations of an ongoing felonious activity nor of CHUA‘s criminal behavior as clearly established in CID‘s testimony. There was no warrant of arrest and the [28] warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown.. This can be inferred from the manner by which the search was performed. that to constitute a waiver.g. Q No. It is fundamental.the process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest. (sic) Q He was walking away from you or going near you? A He was going away from us. e. Cid was talking. to approach the person and if ever or whatever assistance that we [25] can give we will give. Q Was Sgt. What else could have impelled the officers from displaying such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony had indeed been committed by CHUA -. the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases. This was not obvious to the police. sir. the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. Reynoso held the right arm of the accused." The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a consented search. of the existence of such a right. it must first appear that the right exists. sir. thus: Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced yourselves: A No. The process cannot be reversed. From all indications. These acts did not convey any impression that he illegally entered Philippine shores. secondly. that is our objective. CHUA walking casually towards the road. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control [26] where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy. and CHUA carrying a multicolored strawbag.

(sic) witness? A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like this sir. *** SHERIFF: The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and then manifesting a sign to open the zipper of the straw bag moving his right hand from left to right or from the opening to the end of the zipper. Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to open his bag? A No. why did you request the accused to open the bag? A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir. it is also our duty to inspect the baggage. sir. Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to open his bag? . (sic) witness. Okey (sic) now.222 Q Together with your Chief Investigator. it is our routine duty of a police (sic). there is no answer. Is it normal procedure for you to examine anybody or to request anybody to open his bag? A The fact that he was a foreigner.no. sir.) COURT: Did you open that personally? WITNESS: A No. Q Okey. Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you demonstrated that sign language of opening the bag mr. sir. sir. Witness: Yes. what was the first thing that you did when you approached him (CHUA)? A We introduced ourselves as police officers. mr. COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the end of the zipper. Q Now. Q When he did not utter any word. sir. and then I made a motion like this. What else did he do? A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir. Q And when there was no answer what did you do next? A I used sign language sir. *** Q If it is possible . in the first place why did you introduce yourselves? A That is normal practice in our part. (The witness repeating the motion described on record. Q Why. I reform my question your honor. Q No answer? A Yes. why was it . after introducing yourselves what did you do? A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word. no answer. your honor. sir. sir.

"There are those who say that… 'the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported methamphetamine hydrochloride cannot be quickly dispelled. When CHUA failed to respond again to the police‘s request to open the bag. to open his bag? A No. it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the ―sign language‖ that he deliberately. Q But you simply requested him to open the nag? A Yes. the remaining evidence on record are insufficient. Conspiracy was not included in the indictment nor raised in the pleadings or proceedings of the trial court. but it is the law that sets him free. [34] that is. the accused even verbally replied to the request [31] demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him.because the police admitted that they never harbored any initial suspicion. WHEREFORE. otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. SO ORDERED. But this is a trifling matter. this Court calls the attention of the trial court regarding its erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. its disregard of the charter of its own existence. But in these cases. feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUA‘s conviction. the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case . This aggravating circumstance is without question unsupported by the records. this Court considers them trivial as they refer to insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the case. [30] CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and overwhelmed him.‖ More importantly.'… The criminal goes free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than [33] its failure to observe its own laws. If evidence obtained during an illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose [32] in any proceeding. Fealty to the Constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds. The police officers already introduced themselves to CHUA in three languages. In some instances. La Union in Criminal Case No. Costs de oficio. It is also fundamental that conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal accusation. but he remained completely deadpan. 4037 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accusedappellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated substance. how could he understand the police‘s ―sign language. independently and beyond reasonable doubt. (sic) witness. intelligently. sir. But the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. This Court disagrees. sir. Indeed. Branch 66.‖ They claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand motions and gestures.the imperative of judicial integrity. they resorted to what they called ―sign language. if he must." As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. But… 'there is another consideration -. Q Okey. (sic) you did not ask the accused. the evidence not being sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. the decision of the Regional Trial Court. On a passing note. or worse. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence. San Fernando.'… In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result. This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and seizure. for all the foregoing. mr. . The police hence concluded that CHUA failed to comprehend the three languages. and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. sir.223 A yes.

Purisima. accused-appellants.. and Ynares-Santiago. no part. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO. Gonzaga-Reyes. and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. JJ. NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMAT @ “BOBONG” and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ “BOBOY”. [G.. On official leave. No. February 19. Panganiban. Pardo. concur. J. J. finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias ―Bobong‖ and [3] Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias ―Boboy. Vitug.‖ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8. 37. Quisumbing.264-96. Kapunan. vs. 2001] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.R. plaintiff-appellee. Buena. on leave. 6425).. Melo. J. Branch 17. 133917. The information against accused-appellants reads: . 7659. as amended by Republic Act No. Bellosillo. Puno. [2] For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. Mendoza. of the [4] Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.224 Romero. in Criminal Case No.: To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate [1] freedom and liberty depend.

finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence from both accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their counsels.‖ SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house. accused-appellants. The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. a ―trisikad‖ carrying the accused-appellants passed by. accused-appellants Mula and Molina were [15] handcuffed by the police officers. Ma-a. Davao City. which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. 24 of Rep. Thereafter. sub. through counsel. 20. Jr. SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon). and SPO1 Pamplona. Precinct No. the team boarded their [11] vehicle and overtook the ―trisikad. A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. SPO1 Leonardo Y. the trial court rendered the assailed decision. the above-named accused. CONTRARY TO LAW. contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been [16] obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. of the same day. Subsequently. in conspiracy with each other. par. Jr. reads: [18] the decretal portion of which WHEREFORE. SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the [9] alleged pusher will be passing at NHA. he called for assistance at the PNP. The antecedent facts are as follows: Sometime in June 1996. SPO1 Marino Paguidopon. As to accused-appellant Molina. ―Boss. as witnesses. and SPO1 Marino S. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver. Moreover. Thereupon. accused-appellant Mula. At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8. Matina. 1997. received an information regarding the presence of an [7] alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. Molina [14] replied. Pamplona. thirty meters from where [12] the accused-appellants were accosted. Davao City. wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca. accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA. are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under Republic Act 8176. which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader). The police officers then ordered the ―trisikad‖ to stop. to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino [10] Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. to be effected and implemented as therein provided for by law. 1996. in relation to Sec. did then and there willfully. the names and addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 [8] Paguidopon only after they were arrested. 1996. accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Consequently. as the pusher. Trial ensued.225 That on or about August 8. 1996. while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon.‖ SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag. if possible we will settle this. Act 7659. in the City of Davao. On December 6. Davao City any time that morning. [5] Upon arraignment on September 4. 5 of Republic Act 7659.9 grams of dried marijuana which are prohibited.M. 3. jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence. Matina. unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946. At that instance. SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. at around 8:00 A. 1996. more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. 3.. then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. On April 25. accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation [6] against them. but this was likewise denied. The [17] demurrer was denied by the trial court. SPO1 Pamplona [13] introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. 1996. Paguidopon. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Philippines. At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8. pursuant to Sec. At that point. . SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by.

Section 3. FINALLY. IN THE [20] ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. The foregoing constitutional proscription. 8 OF RA No. ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III. SO ORDERED.226 The Branch Clerk of Court of this court. the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT. however. The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Brief). 7659 (sic). which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and [22] seizures. papers. Manila. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may [21] produce. THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 2. paragraph 2. The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion. Accused-appellants contend: I. NOT DEATH. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court‘s high regard as a [23] freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Thus: Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides: SEC. wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants. valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties. that is. by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. AND III. Without this rule. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following . II. for the automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the case may be. THAT. houses. THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS‘ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. the right to privacy would be a form of words. is not without exceptions. so too. without this rule. Section 10 of the Rules of Court. is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. [19] Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122.

a peace officer or a private person may. in his presence. As [30] discussed in People v. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.. the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --. or is attempting to commit an offense.‖ So also. and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers... in People v. in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning. are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited [28] drugs. (3) search in violation of customs laws. This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest.227 instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest. therefore. i. [34] Then. without warrant. the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was ―‗standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard‘ with his [35] eyes ‗moving very fast‘ and ‗looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. Thus. must have personal knowledge of such fact or.‘‖ In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal. the person to be arrested has committed. committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. [while] holding . What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. arrest a person: (a) when. The arresting officer. arrest a person when. darting from side to side . or was at least being attempted in [the arresting [33] officers‘] presence. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. a peace officer or a private person may. Encinada. absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers. Chua Ho San. Doria. the person to be arrested has committed. The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. The Rules of Court. however. According to the Court. he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests.. ―[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed.‖ [32] Likewise. as recent case law adverts to. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. In the case at bar. and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending. too. the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped [27] prisoners). [29] In People v. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. in his presence.. In this instance. Aminnudin. or was actually being committed. probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. is based on actual facts. Court of Appeals. is actually committing. and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search). As a rule. Thus. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. inPeople v. the Court did not consider ―eyes. in Malacat v.the process cannot be [26] reversed. as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto). the Court said: . are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. is actually committing.. (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit). A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. [31] in People v. at the moment of his arrest. it is settled that ―reliable information‖ alone. it was held that ―the accused-appellant was not. To all appearances. Mengote. (2) search of a moving motor vehicle. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests. without a warrant. the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants. an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. (5) when the accused himself waives his [24] [25] right against unreasonable searches and seizures. [one‘s] abdomen‖. search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. (4) seizure of evidence in plain view.e..

therefore. however. indicating that a crime had just been committed. to wit ―Q.228 Here. could not have been visible to Yu. probable or otherwise. admitted that he only learned Mula‘s name and address after the arrest. attempting to commit or have committed a crime. In holding a bag on board a trisikad. assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade. While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accusedappellant Mula. any [37] telltale bulge. accused-appellants could not be said to be committing. . was not even aware of accused-appellants‘ name and address prior to the arrest. and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the [38] arresting officer.. the alleged grenade was ―discovered‖ ―inside the front waistline‖ of petitioner.. In the case at bar. who allegedly conducted the surveillance. the arresting officer. was being committed or was going to be [36] committed. What is more. two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed. regarding Mula and Molina. on the part of petitioner. He told that the one who is big [39] one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina‖ The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona. he was able to see Mula in person only once. It is worthy to note that. is actually committing. before the arrest. there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto . Such response which allegedly reinforced the ―suspicion‖ of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. for as he admitted. arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu. Clearly. or is attempting to commit a crime. This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before the arrest... With respect to accusedappellant Molina. it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner. if possible we will settle this‖ to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. there was nothing in petitioner‘s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were ―moving very fast‖ .m. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula. there was at all no ground. when they pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers). It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded ―Boss. pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest. Third.When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and how did you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person? A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon.. to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. or an overt physical act. considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. accusedappellants could not be the subject of any suspicion. reasonable or otherwise. thus presumably dusk. It went on to state that Second. accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest. SPO1 Paguidopon. None was visible to Yu.an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p. SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself. is entirely baseless. is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest.

vs. Kapunan. 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. in Criminal Case No... could not have been certain of accused-appellants‘ identity. and Sandoval-Gutierrez.J. While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive. accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias ―Bobong‖ and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias ―Boboy‖. ANTONIO C. 37.. lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. Pardo. left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants. Hence. Melo. Puno. Jr. Nos. thus. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Mendoza. it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure. and the Court is thus. Davide. SO ORDERED. is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Withal.concur. are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. Implied acquiescence to the search. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed [40] to appellant under such bare circumstances. Consequently. Nevertheless. DECISION . Compared to People v. appellee. and were. WHEREFORE. appellant. holding that ―[t]he prosecution‘s evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. De Leon. SPO1 Paguidopon. No costs. who acted as informer of the arresting officers. the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.R. which protection extends even to the basest of criminals.‖ Moreover. Branch 17.. ESTELLA. the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada even before the arrest because of the latter‘s illegal gambling activities. C. Vitug. JJ. could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered [41] no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accusedappellants. 264-96. Encinada. the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. January 21. all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. more so the arresting officers themselves. Quisumbing. 138539-40. from all indications. [G. Jr.229 Evidently. Buena. Gonzaga-Reyes. if there was any. Panganiban. the Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal. Bellosillo.

[o]ne (1) tin can labeled ‗CLASSIC‘ containing dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 41.710 kilograms each wrapped with a piece of newspaper. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 1997.D. Estella is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 8. J. charged appellant thus: th ―That on or about the 20 day of November. all in the total of 8. custody and control. ―In Criminal Case No. or used by appellant for residential or any other purpose.230 PANGANIBAN. 1996 at about 11:15 o‘clock in the morning. accused Antonio C. [t]wo (2) white sando plastic bag each containing one (1) [brick] of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 1.[6] The Facts . The trial court found him guilty of violating Section 8. On November 4. the illegal drug was searched for and found in a hut that has not been proven to be owned. Barangay Baloganon. ―The .320 kilograms of dried marijuana is ordered confiscated in favor of the government. 1998. he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found therein. [o]ne (1) white sando plastic bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 1. The Case Antonio C.: The Constitution bars the admission of evidence gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. Estella is ACQUITTED and the Information dated 07 January 1997 filed against him for violation of P.270 grams each wrapped with a piece of reading material. The Sheriff is directed to deliver the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition. In the present case. as amended by RA 7659.820 kilograms each wrapped with a piece of newspaper. assisted by his counsel de parte. controlled. After due trial. Estella appeals the August 25. are ordered delivered to any authorized representative of the Philippine National Police. Article II of RA 6425. without any authority to possess the same. in Criminal Case No. Firearms and Explosives Division. subject of the offense. wil[l]fully. at Purok Yakal.A. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. Article II of R. Hence. 6425 as amended by R. RTC 2143-I.38 caliber revolver without serial number and four (4) live ammunitions. Province of Zambales. in the Municipality of Masinloc. accused Antonio C.320 kilograms of dried marijuana. Zambales (Branch 69) in Criminal Case No. 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. said accused. RTC 2144-I.A. but acquitted him of illegal possession of firearms. his counsel filed a Notice of Appeal. did then and there. [o]ne (1) tin can labeled ‗CLASSIC‘ containing twenty (20) small bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 589. foregoing considered. [4] appellant.‖[3] After the Information had been read to him in Filipino. RTC 2143-I. Quezon City. Camp Crame. a language he fully understood. 1866 is dismissed with costs de oficio. the RTC convicted appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs (marijuana). 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba.126 grams. and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua as follows: ―WHEREFORE. Philippines.[5] pleaded not guilty when arraigned on March 11.‖[2] The Information dated January 7. ―The 8. 1997.

SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca brought the seized items to San Antonio. together with SPO1 Jose Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group based in Burgos. ―On their way to Purok Yakal. Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. ―On November 29. Masinloc for the enforcement of the search warrant. SPO1 Arca kept the seized items under his custody.‖[8] (Citations omitted) Version of the Defense For his version of the facts.[7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution‘s version of the facts as follows: ―Prior to November 20. examined the suspected marijuana dried leaves and issued Chemistry Report No. ―At their office in San Marcelino. Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Bulor[o]n.710 kilograms. The team seized the prohibited drug. SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested appellant and brought him to San Marcelino. then Intelligence and Investigation Officer. Zambales. ―In the morning of November 20. Specimen A weighed 1. ―While inside the hut. Barangay Baloganon. The next day. where Police Senior Inspector Florencio Sahagun examined the suspected marijuana dried leaves. SPO1 Buloron asked appellant if indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and if so. Masinloc. Masinloc. 1996. the revolver and ammunitions.820 kilograms. while Specimen D weighed 1. the suspected marijuana dried leaves were delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas for further examination. Zambales. 1996. Inspector Sahagun prepared a certification of field test. One can contained twenty (20) bricks of fruiting tops. brother of appellant. They showed appellant the search warrant and explained the contents to him. 1996. SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca placed their markings on the seized items for purposes of identification.231 Version of the Prosecution In its Brief. D-768-96 stating that the specimens are positive for marijuana. They approached appellant and introduced themselves as police officers. named Eva. appellant merely reproduced the narration in the assailed RTC Decision as follows: . Barangay Captain Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the receipt as witnesses. Barangay Baloganon. appellant surrendered to the team two cans containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. Senior Inspector Daisy Babor. and being rented by appellant‘s live-in partner. San Marcelino. the place mentioned in the search warrant. to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty. SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2) meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella.38 caliber revolver with four live ammunitions. which contained four (4) big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a . They found a plastic container under the kitchen table. Zambales. a forensic chemist. Zambales. The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items. The team searched the hut in the presence of appellant and his live-in partner. They coordinated with the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon. Barangay Captain Barnaceha accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal. a prohibited drug. Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of appellant at Purok Yakal.

. Jr. Zambales where he informed the police officers of the fact that the house they searched was occupied by Spouses Vicente and Fely Bakdangan. the trial court accorded full faith and credence to the police officer‘s testimony. The group introduced themselves as policemen and told them that they were looking for Antonio Estella because they have a search warrant issued against him.232 ―Accused Antonio C. The police did not believe him and insisted that accused‘s house (according to their asset) is that house located about 5-8 meters away from them. Accused identified himself to them. the court a quo relied heavily on the testimony of the prosecution‘s principal witness.‖[9] (Citations omitted) Ruling of the Trial Court In finding appellant guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. while accused was talking with his friends Rael Tapado and Victor de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the house of Camillo Torres and about 70 meters away from his house. Moreover. The trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the conjectural and conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Accused told the policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to where his house is and heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near the Abokabar junk shop. Estella [I]s married to Gloria Atrero Estella. Zambales. Zambales. He was among the members of the police team that searched appellant‘s alleged house. Antonio Estella has been [a] resident of Barangay Baloganon. As to the charge of illegal possession of firearms. Intelligence and Investigation Officer SPO1 Antonio Buloron. ―Miguel Buccat. the RTC held that no less than the barangay captain of the place named in the search warrant led the police to the house. identified the house depicted on a photograph as that house belonging to the accused. Masinloc. Antonio Estella. They photographed the accused and brought him to their office at San Marcelino. The policemen inquired from the accused as to where his house is located and accused told them that his house is located across the road. After about half an hour. Since 1982. ―Accused denied having surrendered to policeman Buloron tin cans containing marijuana and likewise having any firearm. Accused Antonio Estella was investigated a[t] San Marcelino. namely: Carmen Estella (8 years old). Hence. making it inadmissible against appellant. the policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came out.[10] The Issues In his appeal. Thus. a group of men approached them. ―On 20 November 1996 between 10:30 o‘clock and 11:00 o‘clock in the morning. He was thus acquitted of the charge. Since the defense failed to present proof of any intent on the part of SPO1 Buloron to falsely impute to appellant such a serious crime. the lower court ruled that the search warrant did not cover the seized firearm. (5 years old) and Roen Estella (3 years old). they had with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to the accused. appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration: ―A. appellant could not deny that he owned it. They have three (3) children. who personally knew the accused for about ten (10) years. this recourse.

the prosecution would not be able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the person renting the hut was indeed the live-in partner of appellant -. Main Issue: Legality of the Search Undertaken Once again. Estella by one Odilon Eclarinal. the position of the prosecution. ―Narding‖ Estella. bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of this right.k.233 ―B. instead of judgment of acquittal demanded by the constitutional presumption of innocence[. the testimony of Barnachea serves to undermine. argues that just because ―appellant has another house in a place away from the hut that was searched does not necessarily mean that the hut is not occupied by him or under his full control. to show that the hut in question belongs to appellant. We quote from his testimony: ―Q Do you know who is the owner of that house? A What I know is that Narding Estella bought that house. The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject hut is that it was bought by his brother Leonardo a.[14] which was searched by the police and where the subject marijuana was recovered. The Court’s Ruling The appeal is meritorious.‖ [17] The prosecution cites the testimony of Rey Barnachea. In the first place.a. not advance. He points to another house[15] as his real residence. the barangay captain of that place. The OSG. this Court is confronted with a situation that involves a well-enshrined dogma in our Constitution: the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures. sir.if he indeed had any. the pivotal issue here is the legality of the police search undertaken in the hut where the subject marijuana was seized. ―C. other than SPO1 Buloron‘s uncorroborated testimony. . as well as the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.[18] We cannot sustain the OSG‘s supposition that since it was being rented by the alleged live-in partner of appellant. it follows that he was also occupying it or was in full control of it. Article III of the Constitution. Ownership of the Subject House Appellant claims that the hut. on the other hand. Moreover.]‖[11] Though not clearly articulated by appellant. To support his claim.[12] The exclusionary rule prescribed by Section 3(2). does not belong to him. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged has been prove[n] beyond reasonable doubt. Without that evidence. The trial court gravely failed to consider the serious contradictions in the facts and evidences adduced by the prosecution. [13] The conviction or the acquittal of appellant hinges primarily on the validity of the police officers‘ search and seizure. he presents a document[16] that shows that the subject hut was sold to his brother Leonardo C.

[22] Indeed.] sir. The OSG maintains that when appellant was ―shown the search warrant and asked about the existence of prohibited drug in his possession. sir. Q And you do not know if the accused was renting [it] or not? A I don‘t have any information. sir. sir. who was purposely presented by the prosecution to corroborate SPO1 Buloron's story. we believe that the trial court erred in adopting the prosecution‘s dubious story. or that it was under his full control. We have often ruled that courts do not rely on evidence that arouses mere suspicion or conjecture. which he turned over to the police. Q Now. took his stock of marijuana and turned it [over] to the police officers. sir. evidence must do more than raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt. is merely conjectural and speculative. Ironically. Q How long has Eva been renting that house? A I do not have any information about that[. Q Why did you know that that place was rented? A Because when I asked Eva she replied that they [were] only renting that house. to uphold this proposition would be to stretch our imagination to the extreme. the prosecution's principal witness. sitting on a rocking chair and drinking coffee. [20] To lead to conviction. sir. belied it when he testified thus: ―PROS.‖[19] At most.‖[23] This. Q And you know that that has been rent[ed] to people? A Yes. [24] It is well-settled that this Court is not precluded from assessing the probative value of witnesses‘ testimonies on the basis of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs). sir. Q So. Captain Barnachea. and that the latter had done so to get his stock of illegal drugs. but was in fact using it to store the prohibited drug. what you know is that Eva lives alone in that house? A Yes.[21] It must engender moral certainty.234 Q Who is that Narding Estella? A The brother of Tony Estella. since he was found in front of it. clearly showed that he was not only occupying the hut. sir. the testimony shows that the subject hut was bought by Narding Estella and rented by someone named Eva. It failed to see patent inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses‘ testimonies about the search undertaken. QUINTILLAN: . testified that appellant had allegedly gone inside the hut. Q Do you know who was living with Eva? A No. according to the prosecution. Neither do we find merit in the OSG‘s argument that appellant cannot deny ownership or control of the hut. appellant went inside the hut. so far how many people [rented] that place or that house? A I do not have any information about that[. Q And you do not know anybody who is renting that house? A I have no information.] sir. [25] In the case at bar. A review of the TSNs shows that SPO1 Buloron. The attempt to make it appear that appellant occupied it.

In fact. QUINTILLAN: Q And when the police entered the house did not Tony go with them? A I did not notice. sir. after being served the search warrant. In a criminal prosecution. sir. Without any independent or corroborative proof.[27] Barnachea‘s statements sow doubts as to the veracity of SPO1 Buloron‘s claim that. Q And you saw him and then the search warrant was presented. sir. sir. The NARCOM g[o]t inside the house. appellant voluntarily surrendered the prohibited drug to the police.which contradicted rather than validated the story of SPO1 Buloron -no other evidence was presented to corroborate the latter‘s narration of the events. the police officers were already being assisted by Barangay Captain Barnachea. Q And where did Antonio Estella go when the police entered the house? A He was just outside the house. his testimony completely contradicted the policemen‘s version of the events. He testified that appellant. verifiable.235 Q When the police officer showed that search warrant what did Antonio Estella said. PROS. it has little or no probative value at all. Q And when it was presented what did Tony Estella do? A What they did they show to Tony the search warrant and I also read the contents of the search warrant. Q And when Tony was shown that search warrant what did he do immediately after being shown that search warrant? A He just [sat] and then he stood up.[29] While the guilty should not escape. after being apprised of the contents of the search warrant. Q And when he stood up what else did he do? A Nothing. and in harmony with the usual course of human experience -. appellant remained seated on a rocking chair outside. if any. sir. Your Honor. if you hear[d]? A What I saw is that Tony Estella is sitting in the rocking chair outside the house drinking coffee.not by mere conjecture or speculation. COURT: Do the prosecution and defense agree to 5 meters? BOTH COUNSEL: Yes. And yet. sir. the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible. it was highly improbable for him not to see personally appellant‘s alleged voluntary surrender of the prohibited drug to the authorities.‖[26] It is undisputed that even before arriving at the hut. the innocent should not suffer. isn‘t it? A Yes. Q And how far is that house from Antonio Estella? INTERPRETER: Witness estimating the distance of about five (5) meters. sir. remained outside the hut and did nothing. sir. Thus. [30] .[28] Apart from the testimony of Barnachea -. the former categorically stated that when the police officers had gone inside the hut to conduct the search.

the person to be arrested has committed. the police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case. when lawful . Given this backdrop. the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy.236 Search Incident to Lawful Arrest The OSG argues that ―[e]ven assuming that appellant was not the occupant of the hut. Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. therefore. Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers.[33] . was in possession of the subject prohibited drug during the search. Search incident to lawful arrest. there is no convincing proof that he indeed surrendered the prohibited drug. there could have been no search incident to a lawful arrest. and ―(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending. In fact. in his presence. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5. that there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 12. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. ―(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. whether voluntarily or otherwise. it still cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of the law. arrest a person: ―(a) When.‖[31] The above argument assumes that the prosecution was able to prove that appellant had voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. It follows. the fact remains that he voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers.‖ However. After appellant had surrendered the prohibited stuff. ―In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above. and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful. As earlier adverted to. which reads: ―Section 12.‖ Never was it proven that appellant.that which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime. which we quote: ―SEC. Without that knowledge. 5.[32] The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latter‘s person -. the police had a right to arrest him even without a warrant and to conduct a search of the immediate vicinity of the arrestee for weapons and other unlawful objects as an incident to the lawful arrest. the testimony of Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecution‘s story. is actually committing. who was the person to be arrested.A peace officer or a private person may. or is attempting to commit an offense. Arrest without warrant. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. or which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping. without a warrant.

Obviously. This Court is thus constrained to view his testimony with caution and care. any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso facto inadmissible. ―There is no comparable justification. for that matter. we hold that the presence of appellant or of witnesses during the search now becomes moot and academic. Objections to the Legality of the Search . the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding these crucial circumstances were contradictory. the officer‘s safety might well be endangered. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. therefore.[34] the Supreme Court of the United States of America laid down this rule: ―When an arrest is made. The Presence of the Accused or the Witnesses During the Search Having ruled that the prosecution failed to prove appellant‘s ownership. There is ample justification. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must. should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs – or. Thus.[36] In the case before us. They erode SPO1 Buloron‘s credibility as a prosecution witness and raise serious doubts concerning the prosecution‘s evidence. be governed by a like rule. therefore. for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered -. In addition. it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. and the arrest itself frustrated. as we have noted. Besides. California.‖[35] The purpose of the exception is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person being arrested.we hold that the search was illegal. it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee‘s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. Otherwise. With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken -. which cannot be said to have been within appellant‘s immediate control. and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. the search exceeded the bounds of that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest. Without the badge of legality. of course. for a search of the arrestee‘s person and the area ‗within his immediate control‘ – construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. who might be armed with a concealed weapon. however. control of or residence in the subject hut.237 In the leading case Chimel v. searched was the entire hut. The exception. appellant need not have been present during the search if he was neither the owner nor the lawful occupant of the premises in question.

as amended by Republic Act No. [38] appellant once again questioned the legality of the search conducted by the police. the former‘s counsel objected to the offer of the latter‘s testimony on items allegedly confiscated during the search.[37] Further. had been seized illegally and were therefore inadmissible. Our criminal justice system dictates that if the prosecution fails to do so. Antonio C. J. Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.R. 7659.: Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula. which consisted of the marijuana and the firearm. but also the constitutional duty of the court to set them free. Puno. Cavite in an information which alleges: . Branch 90. alias "Joy. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and to INFORM this Court. among the fundamental rights of the accused is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. the prosecution failed to establish his guilt with moral certainty. January 30. Republic Act No. concur. [G. during the trial. in his Comments and Objections to Formal Offer of Exhibits. Finally. it has also failed to present any evidence at all. on October 21. he filed a Demurrer to Evidence [39] reiterating his objection to the search and to the eventual use against him of the evidence procured therefrom. Estella is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody. Costs de oficio. DECISION REGALADO. On the contrary.[40] Not only did its evidence fall short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction. SO ORDERED. 6425. before the Regional Trial Court. All told. of Dasmariñas. In fact." was charged on August 22. 1997. the OSG argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to object to the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence seized through that search because. appellant constantly questioned the legality of the search. within five (5) days from receipt hereof. plaintiff-appellee. Appellant‘s counsel argued that these items.. vs. accusedappellant. No. [42] This principle leaves this Court no option but to acquit Appellant Antonio C. 123872. when SPO1 Buloron was presented as a prosecution witness. Corona and Carpio-Morales. without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant.238 Finally. a search that had yielded the evidence being used against him. it becomes not only the right of the accused to be set free. the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. he did not raise these issues. Sandoval-Gutierrez. during the trial. Estella for insufficiency of evidence. Under our Bill of Rights. RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA. the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 1998] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. [41] To overcome such presumption. (chairman). WHEREFORE. JJ. 1994 for violating Section 4. of the date appellant was actually released from confinement. unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

He claimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City. after which he would return to Baguio City. It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A. Appellant. whom said informer could recognize. 1. since the police officers "testified only on the alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. she never presented any document to prove her alleged employment." Further. Melita Adaci. had informed them the day before. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality. the cousin.A. The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved. and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently selfserving in nature. Dasmariñas. unlawfully. 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran. These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant. or on June 19.239 That on or about the 20th day of June 1994. aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him. Firstly. according to Talingting and Clarin. Province of Cavite. transported. after an objective and exhaustive review of the evidence on record. would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran. did then and there. It finds unassailable the reliance of the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be attributed. which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8. He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmariñas. Upon the other hand. and place. appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. which are considered prohibited drugs.00 which he had with him. In the present appellate review. of June 20. This Court. Cavite with only some pocket money and without any luggage. Dasmariñas from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. in Section 4 of Article II thereof. Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter [4] alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day. and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14. and deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves. he traveled to Dasmariñas.M.M. Cavite. he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500. 1995 and which imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant. Municipality of Dasmariñas. although. Trial was held on scheduled dates thereafter. the above-named accused. which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos. 6425 thereby causing damage and prejudice to the public interest. hour. unlawfully and feloniously. and feloniously administered. discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. in [1] violation of the provisions of R. the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is supposedly corrosive of the People's cause since. appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he wilfully. wilfully. according to the two officers. 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from [2] appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte. both members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmariñas. That informer. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the [3] amount of P500. as the trial court observed. transport.000. that a drug courier.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings. is as follows: . 1994 at about 2:00 P. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. at Barangay Salitran. was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box. that informant was a vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them. appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. not being authorized by law. administer. corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment [5] factory where she reportedly worked as a supervisor.. as amended.

the prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. Once again. the testimony of the [8] informer could be dispensed with by the prosecution. giving away. These assertions are. delivery. or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. appellant's asseverations must fail. appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4. hence. or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P. In appellant's case. some of the [6] various modes of commission being the sale.M. . shall sell. and transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4. For one. Now. the non-presentation of the informer in this instance was justified and cannot be faulted as error. give away to another. Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. such as selling. administer. merely corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court. but which remedy was not availed of by him. deliver. if the victim of the offense is a minor. distributing. it is up to the prosecution [10] whom to present in court as its witnesses. The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one. delivered. administer. and not for the defense to dictate that course. at best. distribute. 1994. as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn. or a combination thereof. Finally.240 SEC. and the like. however. appellant could very well have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to [11] appear before the court below. As already stated. and transported marijuana. deliver. Article II of said law. appellant had already run afoul of that particular section of the statute. give away to another. delivering. 4. Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary. much too strained. The text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitive scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these who shall sell. of the preceding day. June 19.The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had personally taken part. the testimony of said informer would have been. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana. Delivery. the Court is not persuaded. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. more so where what he would have corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal presumption. the transgressive acts alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered. administration. Sale. This is so as allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and the information [7] cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness. hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Besides. two or more modes specified therein. dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. 2. unless authorized by law. dispatching in transit or transporting. administering. distribution. Far from compromising the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation. the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act." Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts specified therein. Administration. The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him. the police authorities had already been apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City. By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs. distribute. . or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. Moreover. informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their [9] identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. As such.

a peace officer or a private person may. (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. is actually committing. (1) customs [13] [14] [15] searches. and (2) those [19] that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. experience shows that although information gathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal. the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier.241 Section 2. the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. A legitimate warrantless arrest. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier. (2) searches of moving vehicles. he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations. If the courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies. not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered. Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant. or were being brought by someone separately from. On the other hand. such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional spymaster. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants. Under that provision. Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. SPO2 Cali. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. in his presence. especially in rural areas. where their suspect would show up. necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons. assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor. the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant. and how he would do so. without a warrant. On such bare information. or his means of transportation. 3. In appellant's case. under these circumstances. the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section . and (6) "stop and frisk" measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions. and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. the person to be arrested has committed. the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with. the records do not reveal that he knew him by name. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival. Thus. as above contemplated. an absolute and rigid proscription. it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a). (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest. instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers. Moreover. absent which such search and seizure [12] becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. 1994. as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled. unsure as they were of the time when and the place in Barangay Salitran. This exclusionary rule is not. On the other hand. had to reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup. arrest a person when. it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him. While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the warrant applied for. however. In fact. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time. that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for. this would be beside the point for. it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the latter. In the language of the fundamental law. or is attempting to commit an offense. (4) consented [16] [17] [18] searches. the courier. Their leader.

and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. Accordingly. if not downright absurd under the circumstances. to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry. or an apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed [24] the crime. Furthermore. correlatively. if we may digress. it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. In the case at bar. and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense. and that the objects sought in connection with the offense [21] are in the place sought to be searched. be in that sense. With these attendant facts. discreet. they asked him about the contents of his luggage. it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges and. Felicitously. they approached appellant. When an individual voluntarily submits to a . at the point prior to the search. as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. at least on the issue under discussion. they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning." Yet. there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that. so. Thus. and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause. when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen. In the past. These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. therefore. even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept. Appellant readily acceded. while largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case. and after he replied that they contained personal effects. the bag yielded the prohibited drugs. Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized. To repeat. our statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima facie evidence. hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified. Here. and requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag. the officers asked him to open the traveling bag. probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the [23] proceedings complained of. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. It would obviously have been irresponsible. and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them. were already constitutive of probable cause. which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Parenthetically. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright." It should. without bothering to further search the box. precisely. which was of [22] a higher degree or quantum. is understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable. The conventional view is that probable cause. for effecting a warrantless arrest." or where "a [26] probable cause exists.242 [20] 5(a). that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's [25] probable guilt thereof. introduced themselves as policemen. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. the officers could reasonably assume. But. that is. that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial. has been reduced and liberalized. that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence.

while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's regard [28] for the supremacy of the law. Thus. they forthwith asked him where he had come from." thus confirming the veracity of the report of the informer. and the latter readily answered "Baguio City. and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof. the right to be secure from unreasonable search may. however. like other rights. the arresting officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since. the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt. No other conclusion can therefore be derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio City. As amended by Republic Act No. Complementarily. properly and adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court. the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Assuming the existence of such irregularities. in fact they did not have to do so. the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant appeared to be marijuana. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally. As found by the trial court. In said Section 4. detained. in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. In the present case. Thus. no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. reclusion perpetua and death. as well as the duties of the arresting. detaining. satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant. which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian hemp. Firstly. hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply. he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or [29] intimidated to do so. in the case of indian hemp or marijuana. and which subsequently proved positive as such.243 search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or premises. It should be noted that the prosecution presented in the court below and formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton box in which the same were contained. [30] 7438 which defines certain rights of persons arrested. 7659. The trial court. Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be observed in the application of said penalties. Secondly and more importantly. Contrary to the . here. Thus. the case of herein appellant is evidently different for. the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his custodial investigation. appellant has a point. The police authorities here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 5. there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending appellant's violation of the law. or under custodial investigation. 4. therefore. The articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination. be waived either [27] expressly or impliedly. After all. the proceedings in the lower court will not necessarily be struck down. he is precluded from later complaining thereof. Section 20. Indeed. claiming that he was not allowed to communicate with anybody. were the same drugs taken from appellant. particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the court below. 750 grams or more. and investigating officers. correctly admitted them in evidence." Indeed. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the crime. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution. Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is.

[G. Branch 06. concur but reserve his vote on the discussion on the warrantless search of appellant as his incidental to a lawful arrest. Hence. JJ. MACARAMBON. these two facts do not constitute generic aggravating circumstances. In all other respects. While the minority or the death of the victim will increase the liability of the offender. 6425 as . In herein appellant's case.. the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern. July 11. 06-7542. JJ. C. concur.244 pronouncement of the court a quo. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y DECISION PUNO. separate opinion. if the victim is a minor. J. accused-appellant. or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof. and Puno. 2002] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon [2] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16. the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed. the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20. SO ORDERED.. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. plaintiff-appellee. Francisco.: [1] This is an appeal from the Decision dated December 27. No. and Martinez. regardless of Section 20 of Article IV. there was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4 whereby. Mendoza. it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20. 143944. Cavite in Criminal Case No. WHEREFORE.. Branch 90. In that situation. as the law simply provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if the offense is attended by either of such factual features. Narvasa. join Panganiban J. Jr. in Criminal Case No. Kapunan. On the contrary. 7659 did [31] not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. of Dasmariñas. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. Article III of Republic Act No. the maximum penalty shall be [32] imposed. Bellosillo. 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. J. obviously the rules on the graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply.. this Court has already concluded that Republic Act No. with costs against accused-appellant.J. the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Melo. Romero. Davide. Vitug. the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. vs..R.

but no jewelry was found. in the City of Iligan. at about 10:00 p. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied [4] Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section.‖ During the arraignment.. and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. M/V Super Ferry 5. The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.m of March 13. as amended by RA 7659. without authority of law. Lt. Article III of RA 6425.000. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. he was asked to get his baggage. commonly known as ―shabu.m. Ansari Ambor. custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. Manila where he met Alican ―Alex‖ Macapudi. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride. otherwise known as the Dangerous [3] Drugs Act of 1972. He left the small ―maleta‖ containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the security . received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. YN Aurelio Estoque. he met a friend. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 1999. did then and there wilfully. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused testified and proffered his own version. Basher Bongcarawan. With his consent. Contrary to and in violation of Section 16. He stayed at cabin no. a brown bag and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline substance. so he went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi‘s Samsonite suitcase. a small luggage or ―maleta‖ containing the [11] sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila. he was bodily searched. on March 13. CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items--the Samsonite [6] [7] suitcase. Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to the PAOCTF [9] Headquarters. while the packs of white crystalline substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City.m. 1999. thus: ―That on or about March 13. and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi. Philippines. a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no. The suspect was identified as the accused. the said accused. and to give it to Macapudi‘s brother at the Iligan port. Robert Patrimonio. When asked about the contraband articles. the accused pleaded not guilty. weighing approximately 400 grams. 106 came and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry.m. Trial ensued. 1999. Subsequently.. 106 where he was frisked. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 1999. 106 as the culprit.245 amended. he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers.‖ weighing 399. Suspecting the substance to be ―shabu. While they were conversing. At about 4:00 a. The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).‖ the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase [5] and its contents. On March 11. a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu. the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer. 106. Mark Diesmo. 106. and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500.3266 [10] grams. five (5) members of the vessel security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. carrying a big luggage full of clothes. the accused explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican ―Alex‖ [8] Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter‘s brother in Iligan City. without the corresponding license or prescription. the accused opened the suitcase. as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port. 1999. There. When requested by the security. At about 3:00 a. Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads. At about 6:00 a. an interisland passenger ship. sailed from Manila to Iligan City. Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11. he was in Quiapo.

the trial court rendered judgment. Whenever this right is challenged. III. the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or ―shabu‖ was forcibly opened and searched without his consent. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure. in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. SO ORDERED. .00) PESOS. No.‖ They took pictures of him with the merchandise. On December 27.― On the first assignment of error. this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors: “I. No. Art.246 personnel. II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED [14] EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. Thus. It should be stressed. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. he claims. it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is [20] imposed. 1999 until the present. The 399. the period of such preventive detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence. The contentions are devoid of merit. that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent.A.A. however. he voluntarily opened the big luggage. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any [17] proceeding. The security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance inside which they suspected to be ―shabu.000. R. 1999. is inadmissible in evidence [15] against him. He also contends that People v. then to the PAOCTF. Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13. [19] liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500. As [18] held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti. the dispositive portion of which reads: ―WHEREFORE. and asked him to sign a turn [12] over receipt which was later given to the Philippine Coast Guard. Marti is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman. and hence.‖ [13] Hence. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered to the National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition. When requested. an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. 6425 as amended by R.‖ The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the [16] Constitution. ―[i]n the absence of governmental interference.

uncorroborated. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living. [31] The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.247 In the case before us. the following facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Surely.‖ He submits that without [21] knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug. He also claims that he did not present his small ―maleta‖ for inspection for [29] fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated. the accused-appellant has utterly failed. he has friends.‖ . the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of [26] knowledge or animus possidendi. and were in fact undisputed. evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. Tan Misa. Hence. We find no reason to disagree. who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment of the imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City. Historically and until now. however. the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. As aptly observed by the trial judge: ―First. was not given credence by the trial court. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. In this case. he knew it would be inspected. self-serving and incredulous. that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such [25] possession. breathing. We are not persuaded. the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained ―shabu. if he does exist. or that animus [24] possidendi existed together with the possession or control of such articles. it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked. and hence. and even [30] watches. but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses. In this respect. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. On the second assignment of error. The first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case. We are left with the third. the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could [32] testify and support the claim of the accused. [23] As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. In this case. it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. (2) that such possession is not authorized by law. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. the accused[28] appellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage. the accused points to a certain Alican ―Alex‖ Macapudi as the owner of the contraband. and (3) that the [22] accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention. Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear. It was only after they found ―shabu‖ inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. To overcome this presumption. It has been ruled. viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug. but presented no evidence to support his claim. he cannot be convicted of the crime charged. In contrast. this Court has ruled that to warrant conviction. the [27] trial court‘s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter. police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Moreover. His testimony. the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused. the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.

lists. as in the case at bar. JJ. and. On several occasions. Alfredo Salas. Almeda. Judge of First Instance of Tarlac. The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed. L-45950 June 20. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several Papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. Tarlac. Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac. Branch 06. and Carpio. Tarlac. Tarlac and. receipts. Mariano G. and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500. a search warrant(Exhibit B) commanding any officer of the law to search the person. 1937. documents. after showing the search warrant to the petitioner's bookkeeper.: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant and two orders of the respondent judge. accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary." The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there (is) just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria. Aquino and Marcial P. It appears that on November 10. by motion.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. and the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board. is AFFIRMED. LAUREL. through counsel. without the presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined at the time. six separate criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. the said Mariano G. obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac. the . all of which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same. lists. Lichauco for petitioner Adolfo N. vs. No. proceeded with the execution thereof. documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer.. On January 7. Sandoval-Gutierrez. FELIX IMPERIAL. for "certain books. and other papers relating to her activities as usurer. concur. Article III of Republic Act No. demanded from the respondent AntiUsury Board the return of the documents seized. chits. respondents. petitioner. and the ANTI-USURY BOARD. Tarlac. after seizure. as amended. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE. certain books. Almeda. Panganiban. chits.000. Feliciano for the respondent Anti-Usury Board. DIEGO LOCSIN. 6425. 06-7542. it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Costs against the accused-appellant. went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria. Benigo S. the petitioner. 1938 LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA.R. house or store of the petitioner at Victoria. 1934. J. the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City.248 Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if. and. in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board. G. on June 4. Stories can easily be fabricated. in Criminal Case No. Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for other respondents. convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16." On the same date. receipts.

58). The lower court is. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. and (2) that the application for the return of the documents illegally seized was made after an unreasonable length of time after the date of seizure. G. ha renunciado implicitanmente a su derecho a no ser sometido a un registro irrazonable. O. they were turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against the petitioner. Gaz." A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of January 3. 1183. and particularly describing the place to be searched. the judge must examine.. 58. the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. (See. In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. he maintains "(1) that the petitioner had waived her constitutional right by her acquiescence after the search and seizure. Gaz. Gaz. and the persons or things to be seized. Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law.. . People vs.R. secs. "En el caso presente. por lo que no le es pemitido quejarse despues..) instead. 95 and 104. Paragraph 3. Rodriguez vs. the search warrant was illegally issued. These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure (G. 41957. section 1 of the bill of right of our Constitution provides as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. Sy Juco [1937].R. 1935) and we do not deem it necessary to reiterate what has been said or observed in these cases. 1178. Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be valid.249 legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. 44328. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending against the petitioner.. correct in reaching the conclusion that the search warrant (Exhibit B) was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac. in the light of decisions of this court. o despues de un tiempo rezonable. and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. therefore." Doubtless. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses. 2163. since the approval of the Constitution. Petitioner registered her exception. No. 1938. 2164. G. to be judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. and Molo vs. if any. ha quidado implilcitamente subsanado. By resolution of October 5. 1937 and the order of January 3. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board [1937].J. the respondent Judge of First Instance denied the petitioner's motion of June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal. 35 Off. 34 Off. Yatco [1936]. houses. While the Solicitor-General admits that. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person. together with the search warrant. there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. no presento protests alguna contra el registro de autos. He did not decide for himself. under oath or affirmation. pp. Kagui Malasugui. 1938 are sought. we had emphasized the necessity of adherence to the constitutional requirements on this subject (Alvarez vs. The resolution of October 5. "teniendo en cuenta que la acusada Por si o por medio de su representante. 1937. The important question presented is whether upon the facts and under the circumstances of the present case. the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant. No. puesto que cualquier defecto queha adolecido lo expedicion de la orden de registro y su ejecucion. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. el juzgado declare que la citada con su silencio y conducta. (3) in the determination of probable cause. particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding court (secs. G. 56 C. to be nullified in these proceedings. 35 Off. O. as required by law. pp. 102-104). No." declared the respondent judge. On more than one occasion. the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. Villamiel [1937]. Exhibit B. No. there has been a waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures. at verificarse el mismo. the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. Tarlac. (People vs. (1) it must be issued upon probable cause. papers.

1937 and January 3. that the right exists. GEN. No express waiver has been made in the case before us. 1938 of the respondent judge are set aside. Branch XIV. 1180. J. It must be observed. 304).) It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. No. LUISA VEROY. PANTALEON DUMLAO. PARAS. Diaz and Concepcion. In the light of these circumstances. had demanded verbally.) As a general proposition. 1992 SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA. the orders of October 5.. documents. that the petitioner. the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents.) Of course. In any event. Lim. Certainly. In view of the foregoing.J. but a submission to the authority of the law. She could not have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas. the writ prayed for is granted. C.s. within forty-eight (48) hours from the time this decision becomes final. Imperial. It is urged.n. supra.) On July 7. (T. Avanceña.) The waiver may be either express or implied (67 C. who said that the demand was refused simply because no habiamos terminado con nuestra investigacion. p. Exhibit B. JJ. PC-Criminal Investigation Service. pp. that there has been a waiver by implication. 1937.. and prior to the filing of criminal actions against her. Commanding General. Feliciano. Vol.. petitioners..J.. (56 C. THE HON. counsel for the petitioner wrote a letter to the Anti-Usuary Board demanding again the return of the documents withheld. Rodriguez vs. But this was precisely the reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board to demand the return of the documents seized. the return by the Anti-Usuary Board of the properties seized. we find that the petitioner did not waive her constitutional right. or waiving his constitutional rights. vs. either actual or constructive. secondly. it may be admitted that waiver may be the result of a failure to object within a reasonable time to a search and seizure illegally made. LAYAGUE. of the existence of such right. however.R. papers and effects illegally seized from her. Cf. the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force. p. pp. The delay in making demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result in waiver by implication.250 1179.) As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen. J. cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. (67 C. similar demands were made on January 7. lastly.respondents. as Judge Cooley observes. 299. on several occasions. G. (56 C. that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. acting chief of the board. p. and BRIG. I. Without costs.. and. L-95630 June 18. It is. through counsel. but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto. 1937 and on June 4. 1183.. the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. The search warrant. So ordered. that the persons involved had knowledge. Villa-Real. is hereby declared void and of no effect.: . first. WILLIAM L. Abad Santos.. but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Presiding Judge. it must appear. are hereby ordered to return and restore to the petitioner all the properties. 1936. J. (Const. Regional Trial Court at Davao City. And in connection with the criminal cases pending against the petitioner. 630. 8th ed. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right. 1181...J. and the respondents Anti-Usuary Board and the provincial fiscal of Tarlac or those acting in their behalf. however. 24-25. concur. Villamiel. This is admitted by Adolfo N. being a personal one.

men's brief. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet. raided the house of herein petitioners in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP (samples of which were attached as Annexes "H" and "H-1" of the petition) (Rollo. Capt. Petitioner Ma. Skyline Village. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. an officer of the PC/INP. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts. acting upon a directive issued by Metrodiscom Commander Col.45 cal. the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house. Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. Franco Calida. was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency. However. the locksmith. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. sweat shirt. two (2) pairs men's socks. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation". Gandhi brand. since 1988. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. to enjoin further proceedings on the ground that the legal basis therefore is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The following day. in the house (Annex "F" of the Petition. to review the Order of the respondent Judge dated October 2. a locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt. The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the Department of Justice . Sgt.A. one blanket. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Rollo. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station. they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. On April 12. Said receipt was signed by Eric Burgos. 1990 denying herein petitioner's Motion for Hospital Confinement. who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. a towel made in U. East Kamias. Hence. one of the caretakers. Catalunan Grande. Davao City. Sgt. 1990. pp. Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos. Capt. as witnesses. he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St. a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. and prohibition. Obrero recovered a . p. Rodolfo Urbano at the police station. 1988. 49-55) were also found in the children's room.251 This was originally a petition for certiorari. to compel respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' long pending motion for bail. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys. 13 Isidro St. Capt. and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon. a telescope. Petitioner Ma.. only the key to the kitchen. a road map of the Philippines. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on the condition that the search be conducted in his presence. where they are presently residing.. Luisa Veroy. mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:certiorari. mandamus. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house. a small black bag.. and George Badiang. PC/INP. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized.S. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Justalero turned over the articles to Sgt. 48). Quezon City. The facts of this case are as follows: Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. where the circuit breakers were located. two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. The authority given by Ma.

Davao City pending trial on the merits. Rollo. respondent Judge required the CIS to produce the bodies of herein petitioners on October 1. However. 1990 to enable the prosecution to present evidence it opposition to said motion. On September 21. Leopoldo Veroy and Ma. 1990 for being premature since at that time. herein petitioners were admitted to the St. 1990. i. p. Dumlao informed them that unless otherwise restrained by the court. Hence. 1990. 11th Judicial Region. 1990. 1990 of Fiscal Ponferrada was received by the petitioners on August 13. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion) (Annex "L" of the Petition. Leopoldo Veroy and Mrs. an Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners made representations that the tenor of the court order warranted maintenance of the status quo. On August 17. 74). In a resolution dated August 6. Upon their arraignment. petitioners had not yet been arrested. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the October 2.252 through Department Order No. Dumlao granted their request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard thereat. 88 dated May 16. Gen. 1990. petitioners were returned to the St. p. In an Indorsement dated August 20. Rollo. Maria Luisa Veroy" (Annex "K" of the Petition. 77) which was denied by the court in its Order dated October 2. PC-CIS Chief. p. Gen. on August 8. Rollo.e. In the meantime. herein petitioners were informed that Brig. Brig. Luisa Veroy". this petition on October 25. the CIS through Capt. 1990. since it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. Brig. 20595-90 entitled "People of the Philippines v. 80). The prosecution filed its written opposition (Annex "N" of the Petition. Gen. arguing that the evidence of petitioners' guilt was strong and thereafter presented its evidence. set the continuance thereof to October 17. 1990 Order (Annex "Q" of the Petition. It likewise ordered their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center. Rollo. Luke's Hospital for various ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. 83). they would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of the trial court. p. Atty. No bail was recommended by the prosecution. the latter refused to receive them on the ground that his office has not yet received copies of their warrants of arrest. Dumlao had issued a directive for their transfer from the St. It was further ordered that the petitioners shall remain under the custody of the PCCIS pending resolution of the case. the latter filed a Motion for Bail before herein respondent Judge Layague which was denied on August 17. Hence. 1990 (Annex "M" of the Petition. 1990 this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order. Herein petitioners argued orally a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the prosecution.Rollo. made its return to the trial court informing the latter of the voluntary surrender of herein petitioners and the fact that they were under hospital confinement. Pantaleon Dumlao. 70). 1990. ordering: (a) respondent Hon. p. Davao City. and (b) . Gen. The aforementioned resolution dated August 6. Ma-a. effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court. Meanwhile. 76). In an Order dated August 24. At the conclusion thereof. Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. p. 83) denying then motion for reconsideration and as to the alternative prayer to reopen the motion for hospital confinement. the court a quo issued a second order annex "Q" of the Petition. However. On or about October 18. 20595-90 and entitled "People of the Philippines v. Herein Petitioner reiterated their Motion for Bail. Layague to refrain from further proceeding with petitioners' "Motion for Hospital Confinement" in Criminal Case No. 1990. 1990 (Annex "P" of the Petition. 1990. they were to continue their hospital confinement. on August 15. William L. 1990 for arraignment (Annex "O" of the Petition. herein petitioners voluntarily surrendered themselves to Brig. Rollo. 71).. 1990. p. p. docketed as Criminal Case No. Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them. 75) on August 28. On the same day. 1990. herein Petitioners entered a plea of not guilty and filed an "Urgent Motion for Hospital Confinement" (Annex "OO" of the Petition Rollo.Rollo. Rollo. p. the hearing for the Motion for Ball was set for August 31. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition remained erratic. Benjamin de los Santos. 1990.

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. 1990. 1866. 1866 the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in admitting in evidence certain articles which were clearly inadmissible for being violative of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Acting on the Supplemental Petition filed by Petitioners and taking into consideration several factors such as: a) that the possibility that they will flee or evade the processes of the court is fairly remote. coup d' etat. respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' Motion for Bail (Annex "A" of the Second Supplemental Petition. Rollo.R. Presidential Decree No. this Court. pp. 141). 182-191) as their Memorandum while. 1866 has been repealed by Republic Act No. Br.000. 1990 (Rollo. 83341. granted petitioners' provisional liberty and set the bail bond at P20. 1989 [171 SCRA 1]). No. 1990. 120) which sought to review the order of the trial court dated November 2. pp. 1991 (Rollo. the petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' Motion for Bail. 2. Pantaleon Dumlao to refrain from transferring petitioners from the St. The petition was given due course on July 16. and c) the matters in their Second Supplemental Petition especially since the prosecution's evidence refers to constructive possession of the disputed firearms in Davao City through the two (2) caretakers while petitioners lived in Manila since 1988. petitioners filed their Memorandum on September 9. b) their poor medical condition. 34695. respectively. 133). 1990. No. A perusal of the aforementioned laws would reveal that the legislature provided for two (2) distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. Likewise. 1866 is bereft of merit. The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 218-269). 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. On November 2. IV. 3. p. petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866. G. 143-145). 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy. As submitted by the respondents. where this Court held that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1991 (Rollo. 1990 (Rollo.00 each (Rollo. March 7. evidently involving different subjects which were not clearly shown to have eliminated the others. .R. Luke's Hospital (Rollo. p. 105) and a Second Supplemental Petition on November 16. P. were rendered moot and academic by the resolutions of this Court dated November 20. pp. Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition on November 7. or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof. Presiding Judge of Cebu. Presidential Decree No. and (2) rebellion. p. 1990 (181 SCRA 648). is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Gen. 6968. p. and accepted by petitioners. Petitioners posted a cash bond in the said amount on November 23. CFI. Panga. G. January 30. 1990 (Rollo. 1990 and October 25. pp. 211).253 respondent Brig. on November 20. 1990 (Rollo. What remains to be resolved is the petition for prohibition where petitioners raised the following issues: 1. and the petition for certiorari to review the order of respondent judge initially denying their Motion for Hospital Confinement. Respondents adopted their Comment dated December 28. sedition and disloyalty under Republic Act 6968. 84-A to 84-C). its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed. there is no room for construction (Provincial Board of Cebu v. 1990 denying their petition for bail. Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No. and where there is no ambiguity in the words.

No. G. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant. At least there is a very serious doubt whether he knew of the existence of this revolver. 1866 is couched in general or vague terms.R. In a similar case. the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. products of an illegal search. when considered with the fact that there were a number of employees in the store. Rollo. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence. but we think that this inference is overcome by the positive testimony of the appellant. Neither was it shown that they had the intention to possess the Firearms or to further rebellion (Ibid. v. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to them (Memorandum for Petitioners. (U. The terms "deal in". 88017. could have placed the revolver in the secret place where it was found without the knowledge of the appellant. "acquire". pp. who.S. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house.254 But petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). they are inadmissible in evidence against them.. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest. therefore. P. hence. 252). and the Government's principal witness stated that there were a number of employees in the store. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. The items taken were. The appellant denied all knowledge of the existence of the revolver. In such case the doubt must be resolved in favor of the appellant. there was no other evidence whatsoever that herein petitioners possessed or had in their control the items seized (Ibid. 248-250). Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. 34 Phil. They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being charged under Presidential Decree No. Lo Ho Wing. January 21. (2) a search of a moving vehicle. Jose and Tan Bo. violative of their constitutional rights As such. houses. and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Obrero was able to enter the compound. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. other than their ownership of the house in Skyline Village.. "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be applied. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but . The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons. None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. pp. petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. This Court held that: The animus possidendi must be proved in opium cases where the prohibited drug was found on the premises of the accused and the same rule is applicable to the possession of firearms. The only testimony which tends to show that the appellant had the possession or custody of this revolver is the inference drawn from the fact that it was found in his store. 724 [1916]) But more importantly. While Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma.. 242-244). he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. the revolver in question was found in appellant's store and the question arouse whether he had possession or custody of it within the meaning of the law. it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III. However. Otherwise stated. 1991 [193 SCRA 122]). of course.

. A search warrant is still necessary. G. Davide. People v. 1990 [190 SCRA 538]). J. In a number of cases decided by this Court. Cendana.. De Villa. assuming that there was indeed a search warrant. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. Romero and Bellosillo. the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED. Castro. Hence. G. October 17.. Gonzales. JJ. 84715. The objects seized. 1987 [151 SCRA 279]).J. were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants (People v.R. Narvasa. Besides. Aminnudin. Gutierrez.R. the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable. No. the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. Regalado. July 6.R. while there is no need of criminal intent. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. Feliciano. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. Padilla. the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Griño-Aquino.255 only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. 90640 March 29. concur. (Guazon v. No. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. L-69401. Medialdea. is on leave.. 1994 . still in mala prohibita.R. PREMISES CONSIDERED. C. Jr. there must be knowledge that the same existed. L-74869. SO ORDERED. No.. June 23. supra. G. 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Alih v. G.. Cruz. Undeniably. No. (Roan v. warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search Warrant. Bidin. 1988 [163 SCRA 402]. Nocon. being products of illegal searches. Jr.

as amended (known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers [who] the owner of the carton [was] . Mountain Province. 18 after putting the carton under his seat. 1 After trial. vs. in an information which read as follows: That on or about September 6. Ayan. Thereafter.: Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan. J. Macliing for accused-appellant. 6425. from Chackchakan. both members of the P. James Ayan.256 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton. knowing fully well that said marijuana is a prohibited drug or [a] source of [a] prohibited drug. 3 The relevant facts as found by the trial court and as set forth in the court's decision are as follows: That on September 6. the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. and (3) misappreciation of facts. No. No. destined for Baguio City.C. rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate No. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. the above-named accused while being a passenger in a Dangwa Bus with Plate No. Sabangan. BONIFACIO BARROS. FELICIANO. saw accused carrying a carton. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Contrary to law. to Nacagang. Mountain Province. accused-appellant.00. 1987. the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of R. it being their station.000.A. 6425 as amended 2 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20. Mountain Province. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. board the bus and seated himself on seat No. 18. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. ABZ 242. M/Sgt. Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and essentially asks this Court to determine — Whether the [trial] court deprived [the] accused of his right to due process by: (1) ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search of the accused. the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan. Ayan before they alighted. who were seated at the back. Upon reaching Chackchakan. Mountain Province. Bontoc. (2) admitting confessions extracted from the accused after two hours of interrogation conducted by four (4) soldiers one after the other under intimidating circumstances. called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat No. M/Sgt. Bontoc. without lawful authority did then and there willfully. unlawfully and feloniously carry with him as part of his baggage and transport about four (4) kilos of dried marijuana which the accused intended for distribution and sale at Baguio City.A. Bartolome F. plaintiff-appellee. Mountain Province Command. 1987.

. That upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of accused and accused Bonifacio Barros was asked if he owned the carton of marijuana and accused denied [this]. Mountain Province. Bontoc. Bontoc. . Mountain Province. The defense of the accused on the facts consisted of a simple denial of the ownership or possession of the carton box containing the four (4) kilos of marijuana. "D-2"). So accused asked the man if Billy left [in] his room the tapes and records and the man said he did not know. 1987. Baguio City. "B3" and "B-4"). Engineer Arsenio Cuanguey to Bontoc. "B-2". the P. Benguet for laboratory test. he finally admitted ownership of the carton (Exhibit "B") containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped packages of dried marijuana. to the P. the Forensic Expert conducted two kinds of test on the four samples sent by the court and found them to be positive of marijuana as per his report No. Mountain Province. after taking breakfast.C. Thereafter. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited the herein accused to the detachment for questioning as accused was the suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. and "B-4" and placed in four separate envelopes. Danna Aleta inquired from accused Bonifacio Barros if he smoked marijuana and accused admitted having smoked marijuana. That the following day. he was escorted by three members of the P. indicating that accused suffered no physical injuries and that accused was probably under the influence of marijuana. 1987. "D".C. Bauko.C. following an order of the court to that effect and were hand-carried by Police Officer Jack Masilian to Camp Dangwa. September 6. "A-1". officers Yag-as and Ayan saw accused. As both P. That after accused was medically examined. That accused asked the man if Billy Cuanguey was there and the man answered that he did not know where Billy went. Ayan and C2C Bongyao have correspondingly executed their sworn statements (Exhibits "A". officers who figured in this case namely M/Sgt. [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four packages marked Exhibits "B-1". . (Exhibits "I" and "I4 1"). 1987. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. (Exhibits "B-1".C. Carlos Figueroa. accused. "B-2". to get their records from one Billy Cuanguey at Chackchakan. Mountain Province.C. Yagas and S/Sgt. "D-1". . That Dra. [A]fter he was orally investigated. accused Bonifacio Barros boarded the Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan. On that morning of September 6. . "A-2". That at Tadian. The trial court summarized the story of the accused in the following manner: That accused Bonifacio Barros since 1984 was employed at the Honeymoon Disco Pad. where the carton of marijuana (Exhibit "B") was also brought. C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. That on September 5. accused looked for the residence of Billy Cuanguey and he was pointed to a house where someone was tending a store. accused asked the man to stay over night in that house where Billy was staying as it was the instruction of his manager. That Capt. That upon arriving at Chackchakan.257 but nobody answered. That when accused denied ownership of the carton of marijuana. . That during the oral investigation of accused. [the accused] was brought to the Abatan General Hospital. was going back to Baguio. detachment at Tadian. "B-3". Awisan (Exhibit "C-2"). Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan. accused was sent by his Manager. Mountain Province. the P. La Trinidad. Thereafter. for physical examination and a Medico Legal Certificate was issued (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"). Bontoc. D-011-88. That in connection with the confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and the apprehension of accused Bonifacio Barros. a seizure receipt was made together with a certification (Exhibit "C") pointing out to the fact that approximately 4 kilos of dried marijuana leaves were from accused Bonifacio Barros and which certification was signed by the accused (Exhibit "C1") and subscribed before Judge Romualdo P. Mountain Province bound for .

Mountain Province. That a soldier fished out a carton under the seat of [the] accused and shouted who owns the carton but nobody answered. accused was brought back to Sabangan and later transferred to the Bontoc Provincial 5 Jail. That upon reaching Tadian. That the bus conductor pointed to accused at the checkpoint of Sabangan." Thereafter. That accused was threatened and if he refused to sign the papers that something will happen to him. Mountain Province. September 6. "E" and "B-5. "under intimidating circumstances. accused. Mountain Province. Bontoc. so far as can be determined from its decision. totally disregarded Exhibits "C". they proceeded to the Municipality of Tadian. The trial court. Danna Aleta. That when the Dangwa Bus reached the P. we consider first his allegation that the police authorities had impermissibly extracted confessions from him after two (2) hours of interrogation. For the trial court in reaching its judgment of conviction had not taken into consideration the statements which had been obtained from the appellant during the interrogation conducted by the police officers. 1987. The trial court made very clear the bases of its conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. three soldiers escorted accused to the hospital and from the hospital. . smoked marijuana. James Ayan testified that they saw the accused carrying the carton (Exhibit "B") when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan. Turning to the legal defenses of the accused.C. "B-2". That accused is the owner of the carton (Exhibit "B").C. We find. That Mr. accused was threatened [by] a soldier [who] pointed a gun to him and told him to sign the paper and because of fear. the soldiers allegedly presented to accused some papers which he was asked to sign but accused refused. however.258 Baguio City. "B-3" and "B-4") was fished out from under the seat of the accused which fact was admitted by the accused himself. (See Exhibits "F" and "F-1" and TSN — Page 24 — Orpecio). The accused complains that he was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel. that it is not necessary to pass upon the above contention of appellant Barros. the soldier went down with the carton and moments later returned to the bus and called accused Bonifacio Barros to alight from the bus. soldiers went inside the bus and checked the baggages. Barros was surprised why he was ordered to alight and accused took his baggage which consisted of a pasiking and went down the bus. That accused was led by the soldiers to a house where his pasiking was taken and his clothes removed and his wallet taken. Aleta also found that the accused was under the influence of drug[s] and that the accused admitted [to] her that he." by four (4) soldiers one after the other. That moments later. and this fact was also admitted by accused to the effect that he was never harmed by the police nor the soldiers. she examined accused Bonifacio Barros and that he suffered no physical injuries that would show that the accused was in anyway maltreated by the police authorities. the soldiers allegedly threatened again accused and asked him to sign his name on the inside part of the cover of the carton of marijuana. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt." the alleged uncounselled confessions. and that he had signed a confession involuntarily and without the assistance of counsel. Checkpoint. . Exhibit "X" for the court and Exhibit "B-5" for the prosecution. he had to sign the document marked Exhibit "C. [A]t 11:00 o'clock that same day. Thereafter. . That after staying at Tadian for one night. that he had not waived his rights as an accused person. He essentially contends that the confession is inadmissible as evidence against him. Later. accused was brought to the P. Dra. . Camp and there he saw someone typing. Accused was made to accept ownership of the carton of marijuana but he refused. Second — That per testimony of Dra. That the carton (Exhibit "B") which contained four packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1". This is clear evidence that accused is not only a pusher of marijuana but also a user of said prohibited drugs. those bases did not include the alleged confessions: First — M/Sgt.

.e. 148 SCRA 142).. one of which relates to the 9 search of moving vehicles. positive and straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses [sic]. In Valmonte vs. 2. Our Supreme Court in this respect said: The weak and uncorroborated denial of the accused cannot prevail over the clear. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Where. De Villa. peace officers are limited to routine checks. "B-3" and "B-4" sent by the court for laboratory test at Camp Dangwa. however. forensical expert. houses. Besides. the Court stated: [N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. that is. La Trinidad. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. — without need of a warrant. it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds. trucks. . D-011-88 (Exhibits "I" and "I-1") of Captain Carlos Figueroa. The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2]. the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual 11 inspection. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant. Benguet were all positive of marijuana per Report No. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles.. since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in 10 which the warrant may be sought. or simply looks into a vehicle. therefore. for example." (People vs. otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above quoted constitutional 7 provision. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness as he may produce. (Citations omitted) . A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Sec.e. . 6 Acelajao. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. the "fruits" of the search and seizure — will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any 8 proceeding. that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the police authorities. however. etc. not absolute. to the second legal defense asserted by appellant Barros — i. 3. the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches. or flashes a light therein. "B-2". Lastly. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. these do not constitute unreasonable search. The evidence secured thereby — i. Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows: Sec.259 Third — The samples taken from Exhibits "B-1"." We turn. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles — automobiles. it is devoid of any corroboration. accused's testimony in his own behalf does not impress the court at it lacks the ring of truth.

and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same 17 physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. James Ayan). nor in the course of being asked whether he owned the carton box later ascertained to contain four (4) kilos of marijuana.260 When. especially those coming from the rural areas since such boxes constitute the most economical kind of luggage possible. however. Q: What transportation did you use? A: Dangwa Bus with Plate No. In the case at bar. a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search. no such a "tip-off" was alleged by the police officers before or during the trial. The carrying of such a box by appellant onto a passenger bus could not. that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal 12 offense. however. This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of 13 marijuana. such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe. because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline. before the search. simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable cause. 1987. The carrying of carton boxes is a common practice among our people. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs be brought into the country 15 on a particular airline flight on a given date. Francis Yag-as testified as follows: Direct Examination by Fiscal Moises Ayochok: xxx xxx xxx Q: On September 6. Q: And where did you go on the morning of September 6. The police officers also did not contend that they had detected the odor of dried marijuana. (C2C Fernando Bongyao). (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be 14 transported along the route where the search was conducted. James Ayan either that the appellant was a law violator or the contents of the box were instruments or the subject matter or proceeds of some criminal offense. or appellant Barros had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and taking a seat during the trip to Sabangan. ABZ-242. The peace officers here involved had not received any information or "tip-off" from an informer. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian. Mountain Province. by itself. and who had searched the box in his possession. sir. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. do you recall if you reported for duty? A: Yes. we have been unable to find in the record of this case any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by appellant Barros. (4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada. M/Sgt. sir. 1987? A: I went to Sabangan. . have convinced M/Sgt. he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do 16 so.

and while it stopped at Chackchakan. Q: And after this person boarded the bus at sitio Chackchakan and holding a carton and placed it in front of seat No. Q: And where did he place that carton which he was carrying? A: In front of seat No. Q: What was he carrying that time Mr. Q: What happened when you stopped for the routinary inspection? . 18. 18. witness? A: A carton. what happened. ABZ-242 which started for Baguio City from Bontoc. Mountain Province.261 Q: Where did you board the Dangwa Bus? A: At the Dangwa Terminal at Bontoc. Q: When they [were at] the routinary checkpoint. Q: You mean inside the bus? A: Yes. what happened? Atty. if any? A: The bus stopped for the routinary checkpoint and inspection. was there anything that happened? xxx xxx xxx A: When the bus stopped at Sitio Chackchakan. we saw a person carrying a baggage or carton and boarded the bus then took his seat. Mountain Province. Fiscal Ayochok: We substitute the words inspection with checkpoint to satisfy the objection of counsel. Q: And at Sabangan. Q: When you said you boarded the bus with Plate No. seat No. He said routinary inspection. Bontoc. 18 where he sat. what happened to the bus afterwards? A: It proceeded to Sabangan. Mountain Province. Sokoken: He did not say routinary checkpoint.

1987. Atty. A: When Bongyao inspected the baggage of the suspect and he found out that it contained MJ. Fiscal Ayochok: He is answering the question. Sokoken: We request that [the] witness answers the question that he testifies [to] not in the narrative way. Q: And where did this civilian who boarded the bus which you were riding on place that carton? A: He placed the carton under the seat of No. Mountain Province. Who was your companion that time? A: Master Sgt. Yag-as. we rode on a Dangwa bus [with Plate] No. what did you see? A: We saw a civilian board the bus we were riding carrying a carton. Bontoc. Q: And when this bus reached Chackchakan. 1987. James Ayan testified as follows: Direct Examination: xxx xxx xxx Q: And in the morning of September 6. .262 A: We called C2C Bongyao a member of the detachment to inspect the baggage of the suspect and when C2C . S/Sgt. 18. ABZ-242 going to Sabangan. Q: You said we. Q: What do you mean MJ? A: Marijuana. do you recall where you were particularly in the afternoon? A: In the morning of September 6. sir. xxx xxx xxx 18 For his part. Court: Let the witness finish.

Q: And what about the passenger who boarded the bus carrying the carton baggage. it was stopped for routinary inspection. sir.263 Q: Inside the bus. sir. 18 and the seat seated by the civilian who brought the carton. where did he go? A: He sat facing the seat No. Mt. Q: You mean marijuana? A: Yes. 18. where was the carton exactly located? A: As far as I know. Q: When this bus which you rode on which the passenger carrying the carton luggage you saw reached Sabangan what happened there? A: When the bus reached Sabangan that we were riding. sir. sir. sir. Q: What happened next? A: We called C2C Bongyao to inspect the baggage that we have just seen at Chackchakan. Q: Between seat No. witness? A: Inside the bus. Province for purposes of military check-up. 1987. it was located just beneath seat No. Mr. is that correct? A: Routinary inspection. a Dangwa bus stopped at Sabangan. Q: And what was the contents of that baggage if there was any? A: It turned out that the contents of the baggage was MJ sir. xxx xxx xxx Cross Examination: xxx xxx xxx Q: You stated that on September 6. 18. Q: But it was not you who entered the Dangwa bus for routinary checkup? . Q: Did he inspect the baggage? A: Yes.

there is already marijuana being carried inside that bus? A: That is only our suspect [should be suspicion]. at Nacagang.264 A: We were there riding in the bus. Q: Could you give us a very special reason why you have to wait in Sabangan? A: Because we are stationed in Sabangan and that is the checkpoint. and we called C2C Bongyao to come. sir. Q: Are you now admitting that you do not have authority to inspect the baggage here in Bontoc? A: We just wanted it checked in Sabangan. xxx xxx xxx 19 The testimony of C2C Fernando Bongyao is much briefer. Court: Sustained. sir. Fiscal Ayochok: Why argue with the witness? It is up for them to check it at the proper checkpoint. but equally uninformative: Direct Examination: Q: On September 6. Q: Would you please tell this Honorable Court why you have not inspected it when you arrived at Alab? Why have you waited to reach Sabangan to inspect it? A: Because it is the checkpoint. 1987. . sir. going to Sabangan. sir. Bontoc. Q: So your purpose in riding inside the Dangwa bus was actually to see that person carrying this carton which is marked Exhibit "B"? A: No. Sabangan. because I am a detachment commander at Sabangan and that is why I called one of my men.m.. sir. sir. Q: So that you have full knowledge that from Chackchakan. do you recall having reported for duty at Nacagang. Sabangan. Mountain Province? A: Yes. at around 9:30 a. sir.

. that "posting . still the same cannot be questioned at this late stage. in other words.265 Q: And while you were on duty at Nacagang. sir. did you inspect that carton? A: I inspected it. however. Sabangan. [E]ven assuming in gratia argumenti that irregularities attended the arrest of appellant. ABZ-242. There was. Villanueva (77 SCRA 377). Accordingly. Q: You said you inspected that carton.e. Master Sergeant Yag-as and Ayan called for me. The two (2) police officers. sir. . sir. witness? A: When we were on the checkpoint. the Solicitor General also argues that appellant Barros has waived the non-admissibility of the carton (Exhibit "B") which contained four (4) packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1". it would appear that there existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited the suspicion of the two (2) police officers riding in the same bus as appellant Barros. was there anything unusual that happened that time? A: Yes. sir. the four (4) kilos of marijuana — should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against appellant Barros. "B-2". Q: And when you were told to inspect that carton under seat No. nothing to show that appellant 21 Barros was then in the process of "actually committing" or "attempting to commit" a crime. "B-3" and "B-4"). moreover. xxx xxx xxx 20 So far as the record itself is concerned. contends that appellant Barros had waived any irregularities which may have attended his arrest. what did you do? A: While on my way to check the bus. The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure — i. Presumably.. Villaraza (120 SCRA 525). The Solicitor General said: . it was a stuff of marijuana. and they told me that a carton was placed under seat No. in brief. had no "personable knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it. therefore. The Solicitor General. what did you do in inspecting that carton? A: I inserted my hand inside and when I removed my hand. the bus stopped bearing Plate No. nothing on the record that could have reasonably led the two (2) police officers to believe that "an offense [had] in fact just been committed" when appellant Barros boarded the bus at Chackchakan or when he was asked whether he owned the box here involved at the checkpoint in Sabangan. the search and seizure of the carton box was equally non-permissible and 22 invalid. according to the record. Well-settled is the doctrine laid down in the case of Callanta vs. There was. and later reiterated in the more recent case of Bagcal vs. Q: When the bus stopped. no basis for a valid warrantless arrest. 18. sir. They asked the police officers at the checkpoint at Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried by appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess that appellant Barros might be carrying something in the nature of contraband goods. Q: What was that Mr. 18." There was.

Waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed. albeit his application was subsequently denied (see TSN. . actual or constructive. To constitute a waiver. p. . Kagui Malasugui (63 Phil. In the case at bar. In Burgos. waiver of the former — an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. however. First ed. this Court ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object" — . de Garcia vs. It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. he should be deemed to have waived any irregularity attending his arrest. or carries with it. Feb. . J. . therefore. appellant had in fact posted the required bail to obtain his provisional liberty. 3. Constitution of the Republic of the 25 Philippines.266 of [a] bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person and estops him from questioning its validity. 108). that Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the case at bar. As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. with respect. applying for and posting of bail) necessarily constitutes. 1988. . Consistent with jurisprudence. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia vs. when the police authorities inspected the carton of marijuana and asked accused-appellant who owned the box. secondly. 65 Phil. that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. p. . if any there be. It is submitted. and lastly. Decision). . and cannot 23 now be heard to assail the same. In the dissenting opinion. 10. In point of fact. that is applicable. . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen.. Palacio.g. takes the view that appellant Barros had waived his rights by his "stoic deportment" consisting of failure to object to the search by the police authorities immediately after the opening of the carton box: ." Here. under the circumstances. Locsin (supra): xxx xxx xxx . We do not believe. that the person involved had knowledge. of the existence of such a right. 65). or waiving his constitutional rights. 689). de Garcia vs. but instead they hold that a peaceful . rather it is People 26 vs. or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty. 221 [1936]). accused-appellant denied ownership of the box or carton and failed to even mutter the least bit of protest (p. . if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. that waiver of the latter (by. 770). Burgos. defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in 24 evidence by the prosecution. 1987. . no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during during the trial. it must appear first that the right exists. 1 Bernas.. His demeanor should therefore be construed as implicit acquiescence to the search inasmuch as the objection thereto is vulnerable to express or implied waiver (People vs. promulgated fifty (50) years after Kaqui Malasuqui. 80 Phil. my learned brother Melo. the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force. e. Locsin. We consider that appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that. so as to estop as accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation.

It is a sanction which this Court has no choice but to apply in the instant case. for it renders inutile the work done by the police officers. laconically answered. 458). Justice Laurel. Zerbts.. (Cooley. He died in the hospital to which he had been immediately brought by a policeman. Before the body search of the accused was carried out. because there the Court explicitly found that there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the accused and therefore. Malasuqui became a suspect because when the victim was found. it is relevant to note that the law (the Rules of Court) specifies the proper time when objections to admission of evidence must be raised and that in the case at bar. J. like every right. Bontoc. 631. without any objection from him. The police thereupon conducted a body search of the accused. still alive. in Criminal Case No. the accused Kagui Malasugui was arrested and a search of his person was conducted without objection from the accused.267 submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may. of course. in a trembling voice. by the prosecutor and by the trial court. Mountain Province.. but 28 rather construed as explained by the Court in Burgos.. the search resulted in the production of additional personal effects belonging to the deceased victim. Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case.S. answered in the negative. a "demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Mr. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied) . the sanction is a powerful one. the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter was equally lawful. Constitutional Limitations. dissents. Melo. one resulted in skull fracture and proved fatal. Bidin. 304 U." On the same day. for all the foregoing. Romero and Vitug. concur. His guilt must. but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. [V]ol. a timely objection was made by appellant Barros. 687 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. the accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities a couple of bracelets belonging to the deceased victim and when asked if he had anything else to surrender. possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been guilty of transporting the four (4) kilos of marijuana. J. No costs. 8th ed. Finally. he is precluded from complaining later thereof. Branch 35. In Kagui Malasugui. the Court ruled that: When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises. The non-admissibility of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by the Constitution for disregard of such right. the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Under these circumstances. I. (Citation omitted). be established by constitutional means. the evidence lawfully before the trial court not being sufficient to establish his guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt. a Chinese merchant was found lying on the ground with several nasty wounds in the head. "Kagui. and as pointed out by Mr. be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of 27 fundamental rights.'s suggestion that the right against an unlawful warrantless search or arrest is personal and may not be invoked by the accused's counsel during trial. JJ." (Johnson vs. he. WHEREFORE." It is. A propos my distinguished brother Melo. and upon being asked who had attacked him. . however. the accused's silence during the warrantless search should not be lightly taken as consent to that search. p.

of cal. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 95-936 reads as follows: That on or about the 5th day of April. together with Julian D.3143 kilograms of "HASHISH". in violation of the above-cited law. Nos. DECISION DAVIDE. did then and there willfully. 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. Lopez. Branch 64. in Criminal Case No. as amended. Article II of Republic Act No. . distribute and transport 3. accused-appellants. 1995. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. a prohibited [2] drug. 990255. 95-937 and No. 1866. Escaño. the above-named accused did then and there willfully. 6425. without first securing the necessary license or permit from the proper government authorities and which firearm and ammunitions he carried [3] outside of his residence. were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.J. Usana and Jerry C. without being authorized by law. The charge against accused Julian D. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession.45 pistol containing 7 live ammos each. government model with Serial No. conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another. JR. JULIAN DEEN ESCAñO. C. 1995. the above-named accused.268 [G. accused. VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ. 129756-58. The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. in the City of Makati. . VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ. plaintiff-appellee. Metro Manila. Metro Manila. vs. .: Accused-appellants Virgilio T.. 95-937 reads as follows: That on or about the 5th day of April. unlawfully and feloniously sell. in the City of Makati. direct custody and control one (1) pc. January 28. Escaño and Usana were also charged in Criminal Case No. with magazine containing 7 live ammos and two (2) more magazines for cal. Escaño in Criminal Case No.45 pistol. 95-936 with violation of [1] Section 4.R.

95-938 to the Court of Appeals. 95-936 was appealed to this Court. namely. which. PO3 Eduardo P. Escaño in Criminal Case No. Accordingly. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. PO3 Bernabe Nonato. the decision in Criminal Case No. and appellant Usana in Criminal Case No. manifesting therein that they were appealing to this Court and to the Court of Appeals.269 The accusatory portion of the information against Virgilio Usana in Criminal Case No. They noticed a blue bag inside it. The prosecution has this version of the events: On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban. upon order of the police. [5] In its Decision of 30 May 1997. did then and there willfully. SPO4 [10] Juan de los Santos. which was promulgated on 17 June 1997. direct custody and control One (1) pc. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). When Escaño. which was granted by the trial court in its Order of 17 July 1997. he filed a Manifestation and [6] [7] Withdrawal of Appeal. an M-1 US Carbine. Due to the differing versions of the parties. the above-named accused. At about [12] past midnight. to open the door. They asked the driver. 95-938. Their search yielded a . the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal Case No. Upon reaching the precinct.3143 kilograms. some law enforcers of the Makati Police. Gil Puyat Ave. Considering the penalties imposed. lex A certification was issued by the Firearms and Explosive Office of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) to the effect that Escaño was not a licensed/registered firearms holder of any kind and . unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. in the City of Makati. Escaño readily agreed [16] [17] and opened the trunk himself using his key. Es-mso The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. In its Order of 30 June 1997. which they asked [18] Escaño to open. Metro Manila. he requested Escaño to open the trunk. PO3 Suba seized the long firearm. 95-938 reads: That on or about the 5th day of April. and Inspector Ernesto Guico. 95-938. 95-937. They were checking the cars going to Pasay City. 95-936. 95-936 that is now before this Court. upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. parked along Sen. 7176644 with a banana type magazine loaded with 28 live ammunitions without first securing the necessary license or permit from the proper government authorities and which firearms and [4] ammunitions he carried outside of his residence. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape. The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3 [14] Nonato. the other passengers were search for more weapons. Rosaldos. it is only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case No. from Usana. Escaño filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal. was found positive for hashish weighing [19] 3. while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the [9] appeal from Criminal Case No. and imposing merely a running stop on the others. they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No.. but on 16 July 1997. the trial court convicted Escaño and herein appellants in Criminal Case No. who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. 1995.45 caliber firearm which they seized [13] from Escaño. Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. of rifle carbine with Serial No. there is a need to narrate each of the testimonies of the key players in this case. [8] Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 June 1997. Since SPO4 de los [15] Santos was suspicious of the vehicle. TBH 493. stopping those they found suspicious. identified as Escaño. 95-936 to this Court and the record of Criminal Case No. were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator [11] Gil Puyat Ave. PO3 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat. Suba.

On the other hand.. Lt. Eco explained that that was the reason why they were going to search his car. PO3 Nonato immediately saw the gun tucked in Escaño‘s waist and asked if he was a policeman. LexjÓ uris They went home via Sen. Inside the car. No firearm was. He then inquired if he was not entitled to a lawyer and why they needed to conduct a search when they had not even told him what he had violated.270 caliber. Ramon Cabrera. they [28] went to Pasay City to see a certain Jerry. Using his wife‘s car. who had borrowed his wife‘s car. Lopez had a different story. to meet with his business partners. He gave his seat to Usana but was unaware if the latter noticed the rifle beneath the [29] seat.m. he continuously refused.45 caliber pistol and two spare magazines tucked in the right side and left side of Escaño‘s waist. they were flagged down by one of the policemen. a pistol and a package wrapped in masking tape or packing tape on his desk. he could see a group of policemen. He also saw a carbine under the right passenger seat. Cabrera readily gave him the keys of the car. Gil Puyat Avenue. 9mm. between 11:00 and 11:30 in the morning. they left Usana‘s house in Escaño‘s metallic gray Kia Pride. and said these items constituted evidence of illegal possession of firearms and transporting of drugs. but PO3 Nonato accused him of being drunk. he was brought back to Lt. Lieutenant [23] Eco. The policemen asked if they could search his car. Eco‘s office. they cruised southward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and turned right at Sen. he was working on Usana‘s pick-up truck at the latter‘s house when Escaño dropped by at around 4:30 in the afternoon looking for Usana who was then working in [27] Forbes Park. at Pioneer St. He parked the car then they were brought to the office of the Deputy Station Commander. For his part.45 caliber with license issued on 14 October 1994 and to expire on April 1996. but he did not budge and instead reiterated that there was no reason for him to surrender his license for he had not committed any violation. Usana also has an application for a pistol Uzi Cal. Since it was his wife‘s birthday the following [21] day. . After two hours. with his companions.. He was surprised that they found those items from his car because his key had been with him all the time. according to the same certification is a licensed/registered holder of a pistol Colt . he thought they were there only for verification purposes. Although the police were insistent in asking for the keys to his car. Lt. On 4 April 1995. Escaño replied that such did not pose any problem since they were licensed. Usana. Gil Puyat Avenue but were stopped at a checkpoint after crossing SLEX. From the other side of SLEX. They met Usana at the Sen.m. Mandaluyong City. Escaño (or Jovy) testified that on the 4th of April 1995. and [25] again was surprised to see its trunk open. The [30] policemen directed their flashlights at them and one opened the front passenger door. He claimed he was the mechanic of Usana and they lived [26] in the same subdivision. Eco asked his men to usher [24] the trio into the detention cell. When he inquired about the guns. Gil Puyat Station of the LRT at around 9:00 p. brought to his car. Neither of the two guns seized were licensed/registered with the [20] NAPOLCOM. found in his possession. Lt. Usana and Escaño were ordered to get out of the car. He asked if he had committed any violation. A verbal tussle ensued resulting in the drawing of firearms by the policemen which prompted Usana to suggest that they go to the police station because the policemen were carrying guns and they have not done [22] anything wrong. he saw a . Jjjä uris He stated further that he was the one who drove to the police station along Dian St. to see if he had done anything illegal. he was at the lobby of Legend Hotel. The policemen persisted in asking for his license. Before going to Usana. He saw his friend and erstwhile co-employee at Philippine Airlines. he asked Cabrera if he could get back the car. He left the hotel at around 11:45 in the evening with Usana and Lopez. Escaño replied that everything would be explained at the police station. He was also asked to step out. which he denied. including Usana and Lopez. They stopped before crossing SLEX because the traffic light turned red. He was handcuffed. Upon crossing SLEX. Eco pointed to a bag. PO3 Nonato asked him to roll down the window and demanded to see his license. however. a rifle. Apparently. At around 5:30 p. so he slowed down and stopped. The latter saw the rifle under Usana‘s seat. [31] however.

.m. Policemen knocked on the car windows so he and Escaño rolled down their windows. who lives in Bernabe Subdivision Phase II where he also lives. Usana testified that he was a duly licensed architect who was gainfully employed by Rolando [35] [36] de Asis and Taytay Management Corporation. was introduced to him by a certain Roberto Samparado. they were stopped at a checkpoint along Sen. and the other arresting officers. On their way to Roxas Boulevard. Suba and Erwin Eco. Escaño was on board a metallic Kia Pride with Lopez on the passenger seat. They all saw something in brown paper.m. Eco opened the bag before them. and met at around a quarter past nine. and he said he was an architect. The three came back with a blue bag which he had never seen before. Eco came out of his office and urged Lopez to tell the truth. Jä lexj He and Lopez waited outside the office of Lt. Eco. They rode the Anfra service vehicle of the police. He and Lopez simultaneously exclaimed that they knew nothing about the contents of the bag. neither did he see anything inside the car [41] because it was dark and he was not wearing his eyeglasses. The two replied it was the first time they saw that bag.m. He told him that all he knew about Escaño is that he was a wealthy flight attendant with military connections.m. Escaño reiterated that his two companions had nothing [33] to do with the bag." They subsequently went to police [32] station Block 5." He was surprised because he did not carry anything when he boarded the car. SPO4 de los Santos entered the office of Lt. at around 7:30 p. The person who took the gun asked if he was a policeman. so they asked if he was a policeman.. They arrived there at 11:30 p. . then frisked. He admitted owning a licensed . He and Usana stayed overnight in their cell and only saw Escaño in the morning of April 5. he noticed a gun and magazines tucked in Escaño‘s waist. For his part. he hired as mechanic Lopez. Escaño on the other hand. Eco and Escaño. Upon reaching the police station. One of the policemen asked Lopez to handcuff him and Escaño. At around 4:00 p. Escaño was also asked to alight from a car. these two don‘t know anything about it. They saw a gun tucked in his waist.271 When confronted about the guns. Eco‘s office. Gil Puyat Ave. After a few minutes. and they implored [43] Escaño to tell the police that they had nothing to do with it. All six went out to the parking area and returned after about five minutes. After returning to Lt. Escaño [34] admitted he owned the bag/case. also supplied materials to the Philippine Army and planned to engage in a construction [37] business. took something from the side of his seat and shouted. and Escaño answered in the negative. Eco was carrying a bag which he placed on top his desk. Lopez was then ordered to get out of the car by the person in civilian clothes and was also searched. he paged Escaño to talk about the materials for the five prototype gunship helicopters they were supposed to supply. a neighbor of Lopez. an international flight attendant of Philippine Airlines and a businessman who owns Verge Enterprises. [40] Upon inquiry. The policeman who asked Escaño to get out [42] of the car drove the Anfra van to Block 5 where they arrived at 1:30 in the morning of 5 April. Lopez vacated the seat for him. they were transferred to the CID and stayed in the office of a certain Inspector Sipin. Escaño said it was not a problem and only for his protection. I just took them for a drive. He was then asked to alight from the car. While they were talking with Garcia. Eco to talk to him. the person in civilian clothes. Lopez and Escaño were asked about the contents of the bag. The bag was opened before the three suspects.. On 4 April 1995. In March 1995. A person in civilian clothes suddenly opened the right door. He heard Lopez say that they were both just with Escaño and that they knew nothing about the guns. neither do they own any. They went to Magallanes Village to meet a certain Norman Garcia and talk [39] about the documents relating to the helicopter gunship of the Air Force. PO3 de los Santos came out of the office of Lt. "There‘s a gun. Lt. Escaño. Station of the Light Rail Transit. Lt. drove the Kia Pride to Block 5. Escaño was immediately brought to the office of Lt. Eco while Escaño was inside with the arresting officers. Eco while he and Usana were asked to sit on the bench. They talked on the phone.45 caliber pistol. Escaño tried to intercede for his two companions and said that ". PO3 de los Santos went out of the police station with Lt. Eco and came out five minutes later with Escaño.. Lt. Nonato. A certain Toto. at the Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Lt. a policeman. agreeing to meet between [38] 8:30 and 9:00 p.

[46] We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution imposing a gun ban during the election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election Code . and 2. They also complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. Quezon City for its appropriate disposition. in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. 95-936. accused JULIAN ESCAÑO y DEEN and VIRGILIO USANA y TOME are GUILTY as charged in the two separate informations respectively filed against them and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term from TEN (10) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR maximum. Before going any further. accused JULIAN ESCAÑO y DEEN. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the hashish seized without search warrant when the police officers already had the opportunity to secure a search warrant before searching the bag found at the baggage compartment at the back of the car. and 4. 2.00. VIRGILIO USANA y TOME and JERRY LOPEZ y CASABAAN are GUILTY as charged and are sentenced to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board the 3. the trial court erred in finding appellants to have conspired with Escaño in transporting the hashish when the evidence clearly shows that the hashish was owned and possessed solely by Escaño. Assuming that the hashish is admissible in evidence. In Criminal Case No. 3. The trial court erred in not considering the exculpatory testimony of Julian Escaño in favor of appellants. Courtä The firearms and ammunitions subject matter of these cases which are still with the City Prosecutor‘s Office are forfeited in favor of the Government are directed to be turned over to the Firearms and Explosive Unit. [45] Accused-appellants Usana and Lopez anchor their appeal on the following arguments: 1. as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS. FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL maximum [44] as maximum. some words are in order regarding the establishment of checkpoints. SO ORDERED. and to pay a fine of P500. 95-937 and 95-938. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced.272 The trial court found the prosecution‘s version more credible than that of any one of the accused. and ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused as charged.314 kilograms of Hashish (marijuana) for its appropriate disposition in accordance with law.000. It decreed: WHEREFORE. PNP. The trial court erred in convicting appellants of illegal possession of hashish despite the fact that they were neither in actual nor constructive possession of the illegal drug. Camp Crame. In criminal Cases Nos.

Even so. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. the second Monday of the month. 6425. (2) search of moving vehicles. in convicting the three accused for violation of R. There was no apparent objection made by Escaño as he seemed to have freely accompanied the police officers to the car. For. to a certain extent. and (6) stop-and-frisk situations. badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are [49] operated. The trial court. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search. (5) consented warrantless search. which happened on 5 April 1995. The incident.273 (Batas Pambansa Blg. he refused the request of the [54] police officers to search his car. was well within the election period. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC.A. when conducted in a fixed area. No. and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search.A. Esmsc Despite the validity of the search. testified that "Escaño readily agreed to open the [53] trunk. We must give credence to the testimony of PO3 Suba. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of [47] public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño. But according to Escaño. Not only would it be impractical. admittedly. on the other hand. (4) customs [50] [51] searches. PO3 Suba. The national and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May. for there are indications that the search done on the car of Escaño was consented to by him. Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) search incidental to an arrest. as amended. The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. Supremeä This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of R. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians." but it cannot be denied that. are even less [48] intrusive. Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the search. it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle‘s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two." upon request of SPO4 de los Santos. these routine checks. We see no need for checkpoints to be announced. 6425. Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant. it is also deemed admitted by Escaño in failing to appeal the decision. without the presence of . such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious. on motorists‘ right to "free passage without interruption. In fact. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. we cannot invalidate the search of the vehicle. (3) evidence in plain view. accepted as aboveboard the search done by the Makati Police of the trunk of the car. without opening the car‘s doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. 881). Both Lopez and Usana testified that Escaño was with the police officers when they searched the [52] car. with the permission of Escaño. (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station. (4) the car‘s trunk was opened. said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual‘s right against unreasonable search. (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms. No. routine checkpoints do intrude. The findings of fact of the trial court are thus deemed final as against him. Not only is it buttressed by the testimony of Usana and Lopez that Escaño freely accompanied the police officers to the car. as the accused have invoked. as a rule.

. Puno. plaintiff-appellee vs. JJ. USANA and JERRY C. 1991 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Branch 64. Article II of R. insofar as Criminal Case No. Rogacion for accused-appellant. writing therein his name. Kapunan. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich. concur. as amended. Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b). The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to report to the Court the release of said accusedappellants within five (5) days from notice of this decision. In fact. the appellant and his common-law wife. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.R. Ermita.:p This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court. SO ORDERED. Reynaldo B. Makati. unless their further detention is justified for any lawful ground. No 6425.m. ANDRE MARTI. Article IV in relation to Section 4. as amended. Shirley Reyes. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction. that portion of the challenged decision of 30 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court. between 10:00 and 11:00 a. Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i). Their having been with Escaño in the latter‘s car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling. The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows: On August 14. carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. Switzerland. holding them guilty of violation of Section 4.. J. No. and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the car‘s trunk. Article 1 of Republic Act 6425. 1987. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. passport number. Tatoy and Abelardo E. G. went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex.A.274 Usana and Lopez. 81561 January 18. and Ynares-Santiago. BIDIN. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Manila. 95-936 is concerned with regard to accused-appellants VIRGILIO T. or transporting the prohibited drug. IN VIEW WHEREOF. Pardo. the date of shipment and the name and . accused-appellant. LOPEZ. is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby rendered ACQUITTING them therein on ground of reasonable doubt and ORDERING their immediate release from confinement at the New Bilibid Prison. the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. distributing.

Mr. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn. On August 27. (Appellee's Brief. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. p. pp. 8052 Zurich. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office. August 14. Therefore. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn. pp. 29-30. 1987. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts. 6) Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. p. . Mattacketr II. p. October 6.. 132-134). On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision. Opening one of the bundles. Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and. p. removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. 2-3. pp. opened the top flaps. 9-11. 1987). 1987. 1987. His curiousity aroused. namely. the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof. 1987). he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). 1987.275 address of the consignee. assuring her that the packages simply contained books. October 7. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn. October 6. 1987). the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn. 30. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. in the presence of the NBI agents. was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. Emphasis supplied). while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office. Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents. pp. refused. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. however. Rollo. Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape. went to the Reyes' office at Ermita. October 6. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. Switzerland" (Decision. i. Manila (tsn. 8). and a photographer. The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. 39. p. 1987). opened the boxes for final inspection. Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. Thereupon. pp. October 6.e. Appellant. following standard operating procedure. 38. at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date. and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes). a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. 5-6. "WALTER FIERZ. cigars. appellant. October 6. When he opened appellant's box. In view of appellant's representation. Emphasis supplied).

1 [3]. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 55) 1. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. As such. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Sections 2 and 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court. Article III of the Constitution provide: Sec. Art. 2 and 3. and particularly describing the place to be searched. Art. In this appeal. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. worded as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. p. Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. to wit: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS. the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction. accused/appellant assigns the following errors. 3 (2). an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425. Article III) was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. III). p. After trial. and the persons or things to be seized. Rollo. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (Sec. houses. Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 1. Sec. III. 2. houses. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED. the court a quo rendered the assailed decision. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.276 Thereafter. . to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

GR No. Inc. et al. following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. There the state. whether citizen or alien. Roan v. that in all those cases adverted to. Ponce de Leon. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921). Art. as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property. 145 SCRA 687 [1987]. See also Salazar v. Hon. United States.. the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. March 14. however powerful. 4 [2]. Lim v. . (Phil. . . his papers. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution. however.Ed. Gonzales.). the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person. allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights.Ed. (Bache & Co. is his castle. his house. (Cf. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government. 1081 [1961]). People's Court (80 Phil.. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority. 116 US 616 [1886]. . from interference by government.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead. It must be noted. In Burdeau v. and other possessions. 547.. 66 SCRA 299 [1975]. 1684. the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. however humble. which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. . California. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. 81 S. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643. Ruiz. . does not as such have the access except under the circumstances above noted. declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant.277 Thus. Bryan (457 P. In a number of cases. 1990). Burgos. Under the circumstances. 144 SCRA 1 [1986]. abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. in Stonehill v. As this Court held in Villanueva v. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person. 41 S Ct. and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies. may an act of a private individual. On the other hand. 65 L. and as shown in previous cases. the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that: (t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures. The above ruling was reiterated in State v. 1048). this Court. . 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise. 81510. Achacoso. included in which is his residence. 37 SCRA 823 [1971]. Schermerber v. without the knowledge . The 1973 Charter (Sec. 6 L. Emphasis supplied). People v. . its protection applies to governmental action. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]).Ct. v. subject to the right of seizure by process duly served. be invoked against the State? We hold in the negative. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]: 1. In the absence of governmental interference. for in the traditional formulation. .

the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. State. would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.. pp. Rptr. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes.Ed. is not search (Chadwick v. 71 L. Mo. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer. 49 Cap. it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents. 119-122. State. Rather.2d 621. called the local police.2d 903 (1965). October 6 & 7. Moore v. App. Ker v. the proprietor of the forwarding agency.2d 938 (1957). The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Second. And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. 892 (1966). and made it available to the authorities. 7-8. contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant. 391 S. the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. he became suspicious. 317 P. Appellant. was made by a private citizen — the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence*** complained of. 1202 [1927]. or the lack of it. It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo. Olsen. In both instances. Having observed that which is open. State of California 374 US 23. Because of it. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Original Records. Or. was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics. the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN. the amendment only proscribes governmental action.2d 517 (1967). The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Lee 274 US 559. State v. 726 [1963]. where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof. 167-168). First. Potter. he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. US (373 F. much less an illegal one.278 and participation of police authorities. Clearly. the argument stands to fall on its own weight. The Court there said: The search of which appellant complains. 15-18. 240 Cal. 429 SW2d 135). however. Thereafter. the NBI agents made no search and seizure. State (429 S. 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).2d 121). pp. Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v.. State v." The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure. who made search/inspection of the packages. however. . there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. not upon private individuals (citing People v. informed them of the bag's contents.W.2d. 1987.W. Brown. he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. 10 L. pp.Ed.

III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. not the law enforcers. Circular No. as follows: First. the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. p. Rollo. 62).279 In Gandy v. p. Corolarilly. 674. Appellant argues. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. In sum. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. 1987]. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. p. the general reflections. Makasiar. alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas . Emphasis supplied) The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Watkins (237 F. The argument is untenable. however. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution. Moreover. it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term. Thus. is involved. the constitution. in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people. Art. 1. 167 SCRA 393 [1988]. 1986. Record of the Constitutional Commission. 2. it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. and without the intervention of police authorities. does not govern relationships between individuals. a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. . Its concern is not the relation between individuals. that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers. 266 [1964]). Vol. For one thing. 13 [October 1. as in the case at bar. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed. Supp. between a private individual and other individuals. 8. 1985] and Circular No. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. True. the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. July 17. if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes. 12 [June 30. expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure. However. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy.

p. 62. appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael.000.000. What about the accused here. self-serving and contrary to human experience. TSN. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error. 2. and Mrs.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. as an "undisputed fact". on the other hand. We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to indicate.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15. 1987. 2-10). 240) The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on crossexamination. if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita.000. sir. the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies. (TSN. to the alleged violation. As stated by the trial court. non-governmental as it is. Rollo. pp. October 8. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. there being no evidence to the contrary. 1987. Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation. did you investigate the accused together with the girl? WITNESS: Yes. The Accused. Job Reyes. 5(m). on the other hand. a German national. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2. we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous.280 Similarly. is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Rather than give the appearance of veracity. 91). "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced. As borne out by the records. Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence. Again. As to why he readily agreed to do the errand. In his second assignment of error. the contention is without merit. Original Records. It can easily be fabricated. p. Lastimoso of the NBI. would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision. 19. are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of . of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication. 3. p. in pari passu. appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed. that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. What is clear from the records. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. appellant failed to explain. we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. What is more. p. we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional right not to give any written statement. and the cash amount of P2. Denials. Thus: Fiscal Formoso: You said that you investigated Mr. neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated.

Eg. also a Swiss national. Furthermore. the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. Sunga. appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name. 171 SCRA 571 [1989]. 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment. Walter Fierz. No.: [1] This is an appeal from the decision. p. No. the above-named Accused did then and there willfully. the German national was the owner of the merchandise. he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1. 40). On the contrary. concur. Esquillo. Gutierrez. 2000] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. a regulated drug. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). Fernan. People vs. SO ORDERED. appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. as per records of the Interpol. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 26 SCRA 342 [1968].R. "B". as amended by R.J.5) grams. finding accused-appellant Leila Johnson y Reyesguilty of violation of §16 of R. see alsoPeople v. CA. his complete address or passport number. . DECISION MENDOZA. 174 SCRA 237 [1989]). was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich. People v. Pasay City.A. if indeed. Branch 110. 244. [G. October 8. Rule 131).281 credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. At this point.A. 93). p. 1987. Premises considered. Decision. 37 N. 123 SCRA 327 [1983]). p. citing Daggers v. of the Regional Trial Court. 172 SCRA 651 [1989]. Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that.00 and the costs of the suit. 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise. Castañares v.. p. C. but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v.J.000. Sarda. p. and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500. must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness. 7659. Sariol. Alto. 138881. December 18.LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES.. Original Records. each bag weighing: #1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187. No. The information against accused-appellant alleged: That on June 26. appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses. 5 [j]. plaintiff-appellee. dated May 14. or exercises acts of ownership over. Evidence to be believed. accusedappellant. J. WHEREFORE. Rollo. Van Dyke. Switzerland (TSN. 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). vs. and Feliciano. Jr. unlawfully and feloniously possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride. 66. 1999. are owned by him (Sec. As records further show. 130. we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment. 21. JJ. Original Records. No costs.

The confiscated packs. At around 7:30 p. The facts are as follows: Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was. .S. prohibited drugs. bombs.0) grams. [3] whereupon trial was held. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an [7] operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. contained a total of 580.2) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride. namely. Inside the women‘s room. hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. [2] Upon being arraigned. in convalescent homes in the United States.A. The defense presented accused-appellant who testified in her own behalf.282 #2 ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198. SPO4 Reynaldo Embile. the next day. and #3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194. C-2 and C-3. The prosecution presented four witnesses.‖) She was directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest women‘s room for inspection. Laguna. and crew and check for [6] weapons. and a resident of Ocean Side. Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. On July 25. Upon inquiry. saying ―Sir. June 26. at the time of the incident. she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son‘s family in Calamba. 1998. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26.‖ Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs. Not satisfied with the explanation. and explosives. 58 years old. Mrs. outside the women‘s room. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on June 16. she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at [5] 5:30 p. NBI Forensic Chemist George de Lara.m.‖ (―Sir.‖ Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or [10] ―shabu. accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina [8] Bernal. Ramirez then asked her ―to bring out the thing under her girdle. When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson. I do not believe that it is just a panty. accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Ramirez reported the matter to her superior. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room. accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Embile stayed outside. marked as Exhibits C-1. CONTRARY TO LAW.m. and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. taking care of geriatric [4] patients and those with Alzheimer‘s disease. she felt something hard on the latter‘s abdominal area. or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580. 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse. U. respectively. a widow. employees. 1998. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. contraband goods. On June 16.7) grams. a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912. That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug. SPO4 Reynaldo Embile. duty frisker Olivia Ramirez. where accused-appellant‘s passport and ticket were taken and [11] her luggage opened. [9] which Ramirez then turned over to Embile. California. of that day.

No statement. After two hours.S. She claimed that throughout the period of her detention. The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at the City Jail of Pasay City during the pendency of this case provided that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.283 In her defense. without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights. 1999 [13] when she was taken before a fiscal for inquest. There. or ―shabu. Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines. she was transferred to [12] the office of a certain Col. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended and hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and condemns said accused to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500. therefore.‖ First. judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES. accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile and two female officers. Castillo. She insisted that nothing was found on her person. The contention has no merit. SO ORDERED. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white packages on the table.2 grams (Exhibits ―G‖. Her passport and her purse containing $850. the dispositive portion of which reads: [15] WHEREFORE. The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net weight of 580. There is. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the women‘s room. They told her to admit that the packages were hers. she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search.‖ should have been excluded from [17] the evidence. what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit. if any. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) ―despite failure of the prosecution in proving the negative allegation in the information. On the other hand. she argues. from the night of June 26 until June 28. she was never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she [14] allowed to call the U. Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: .‖ and (4) [16] ―when guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. garbage. the methamphetamine hydrochloride. Hence. §12(1) and (3). III. was taken from accused-appellant during her detention and used in evidence against her. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights. and a chair. On May 14.00 and some change were taken from her. no basis for accused-appellant‘s invocation of Art. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the packages. for which no receipt was issued to her. The trial court held: The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28. Col.000. ―C2‖ and ―C-3‖) are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to cause the transportation thereof to the Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law. She argues that the ―shabu‖ confiscated from her is inadmissible against her st because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1 RASO office. 1999.‖ (3) ―despite violation of her constitutional rights. After another two hours. the trial court rendered a decision. she said.‖ (2) ―despite failure of the prosecution in proving the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

284 Sec. A peace officer or a private person may. C-2 and C-3 herein) had been obtained while she was in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel. and the reduced privacy expectations [20] associated with airline travel. and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and. Indeed. There is little question that such searches are reasonable. no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellant‘s passport. her subsequent arrest. which expectation [19] society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. were presented by the prosecution in proving its case. Corollarily. the Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was required to affix her signature to the packs. §2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the search and seizure only of the following: . when lawful. although likewise without warrant." The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. signs. arrest a person: (a) when in his presence. and her signature thereon. their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. as are the girdle taken from her. they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. 5. luggage. This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or [a] confession from him. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1. physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. the person to be arrested has committed. v. was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of ―shabu‖ in her person in flagrante delicto. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. and (Underscoring supplied) xxxx A custodial investigation has been defined in People. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation‘s airports. hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from [18] being accurate. such would be subject to seizure. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. There is. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible. only the signatures of Embile and Ramirez thereon. along with their testimony to that effect. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as ―the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. the gravity of the safety interests involved. however. and other personal effects. without a warrant. Arrest without warrant. airline ticket. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors. In fact. Rule 126. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search. travelers are often notified through airport public address systems. (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects. if any prohibited materials or substances are found. or is attempting to commit an offense. given their minimal intrusiveness. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy. is actually committing.

or methylamphetamine hydrochloride. 40 grams or more of morphine. 6425. She argues that the examination conducted by the NBI forensic chemist was a qualitative one which merely yielded positive findings for shabu. ¾ A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense. 4. Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds or Instrument Of The Crime – The penalties for offenses under Section 3. 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act. or 8.2 grams of shabu. but failed to establish its purity. George De Lara. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Otherwise.A. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride. 7659. Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative and a qualitative examination of the substance contained in Exhibits C-1. 40 grams or more of heroin.Application Of Penalties. 14-A. No. 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14. 200 grams or more of shabu. Second. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana. 6. as amended by R. the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board. This contention is likewise without merit. (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense. after public consultation/hearings conducted for the purpose.A. states: Section 20 . the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her. 40 grams or more of opium. shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: 1. and (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. The expert witness. 7. 3. stated that the tests conducted would have indicated the presence of impurities if there were any. He testified: . 4. 7. Section 20 of R. the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. Under this provision. its exact quantity remains indeterminate and unproved. hence. No. Accordingly.285 Personal property to be seized. if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities. accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for her possession of 580. In case of other dangerous drugs. 2. 5. C-2 and C-3. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil.

. At any rate. what will be your findings. . if there are any adulterants present in the chemicals you have examined. what color it will register. De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents of Exhibits C-1. a qualitative identification of a powder may reveal the presence of heroin and quinine. PROS. it will appear in a thin layer chromatographic examination. Chromatography is a means of separating and tentatively identifying the components of a mixture. Mr.286 PROS. as the Solicitor-General has pointed out. ATTY.. The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were thorough. VELASCO And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in layman‘s term? WITNESS It is only a tawas. your Honor. PROS. it will not react with the reagent. the task of identifying an illicit drug preparation would be an arduous one [23] without the aid of chromatographic methods to first separate the mixture into its components. C-2 and C-3. negative or positive. it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate. Witness. whereas [22] a quantitative analysis may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent quinine. illicit drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically any material that is at the disposal of the drug dealer to increase the quantity of the product that is made available to prospective customers. AGOOT That is qualitative examination.. Witness? WITNESS In my thin layer chromatographic plate. all the specimens reacted on the re-agents. if accused-appellant was not satisfied with the results. VELASCO So. Hence. therefore it will not dissolve. . for instance. did you find any aluminum sulfate or tawas in the specimen? WITNESS None. This she did not do. Witness? WITNESS It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. whereas a quantitative analysis requires the determination of the percentage combination of the components of a mixture. AGOOT I will cite an example.. COURT In this particular case. PROS. Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative allegation in the information that she did not have a license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or ―shabu. Hence. [21] A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material.. Mr.‖ . if there are any adulterants or impurities. In my examination. WITNESS And also positive for aluminum sulfate. It is particularly useful for analyzing the multicomponent specimens that are frequently received in a crime lab. Witness. VELASCO Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr.. if any? WITNESS In sample. it will be discovered by just mixing it? WITNESS If some drugs or additives were present... supposing ten grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is mixed with 200 grams of tawas. in chemical examination. ATTY. it would have been a simple matter for her to ask for an independent examination of the substance by another chemist. it only appears one spot which resembles or the same as the Methamphetamine Hydrochloride sample . you will submit that to qualitative examination. Mr. sir. VELASCO By mixing it twice.. but also that the [24] scientifically correct method of obtaining an accurate representative sample had been obtained. For example.

charged with a violation of the law. courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. it therefore falls short of the quantum of proof needed to sustain a conviction. Lastly. . subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. No. as amended by Republic Act No. there is nothing in R. it is more logical as well as more practical and convenient. Hence where one is charged with a violation of the general provisions of the Opium Law. Chan Toco. procure the advice of a physician to use opium or some of its derivatives. Mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she has a license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug. who are law enforcers. . Indeed. This Court denied the motion and said: The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to penalize generally the smoking of opium in these Islands. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself. . if in fact he did so. no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting accused-appellant. 6425. which requires the prosecution to present a certification that accused-appellant has no license or permit to possess shabu. 16. [25] The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United States v. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. Fourth. when to meet it is an easy thing for him to do.The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription. But the legislator desired to withdraw from the operation of the statute a limited class of smokers who smoked under the advice and by prescription of a licensed and practicing physician . 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. in a particular case. he has no one but himself to blame. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.‖a regulated drug. III of Republic Act No.287 Art. Moreover. when it is considered that under the law any person may. The contention has no merit. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt. She points out that since the prosecution failed to present any certification that she is not authorized to possess or use regulated drugs. does so without such advice or prescription. and that in the nature of things no public record of prescriptions of this kind is or can be required to be kept. An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. that he should set up this fact by way of defense. if he did in fact smoke opium under the advice of a physician. is not unlawful unless the possessor or user does not have the required license or prescription. accused-appellant contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to support a finding that she is guilty of the crime charged. Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or ―shabu. . The accused in that case was charged with smoking opium without being duly registered. that one using opium does so without the advice or prescription of a physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility without the aid of the defendant himself. as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General. This Court accords great . than that the prosecution should be called upon to prove that every smoker. He demurred to the information on the ground that it failed to allege that the use of opium had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician. it is manifest that it would be wholly impracticable and absurd to impose on the prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium does so without the advice of a physician. in case of need and at any time. 7659 provides: SEC. In this case.A. while a defendant charged with the illegal use of opium should find little difficulty in establishing the fact that he [26] used it under the advice and on the prescription of a physician. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused. as amended. This contention must likewise be rejected.

No.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride. Branch 110. the above named accused did then and there willfully. The decision of the trial court must accordingly be upheld. WHEREFORE. Considering that five hundred eighty point two (580. JJ.000. a regulated drug. finding accusedappellant guilty of violation of §16 of R. December 27. As has been held. Buena. has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense [29] ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. aside from the denial of accused-appellant. unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998. under an Information whose accusatory portion reads as follows: That on February 12. without the corresponding prescription or license. appellee. airline ticket. denial as a rule is a weak form of defense. Jr.000.. As regards the fine imposed by the trial court. Costs against appellant.00. No. The passport. Her denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. and De Leon.A. luggage. concur. The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person may be validly charged with and convicted of illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R. particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accusedappellant is reduced to P50. It is noteworthy that.J. SUSAN CANTON. Bellosillo. DECISION DAVIDE.2) grams of shabu were confiscated from accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.288 respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses in the absence of any [27] palpable error or arbitrariness in its findings. The defense of denial or frame-up. JR. 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. vs. C.. 148825. 6425.. 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.: Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. as amended. the fine imposed by the trial court may properly be reduced to P50. have been complied with by the prosecution in this case. 6425.A. as amended. it has been held that courts may fix any amount within [30] the limits established by law.00. . no other witness was presented in [28] her behalf. like alibi. girdle and other personal effects not yet returned to the accused-appellant are hereby ordered returned to her. (Chairman). appellant. No. Quisumbing.R. as amended. [G. [1] 6425).

yielded [10] positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. When Mylene passed her hand. At the trial. SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment. and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages. when submitted for laboratory examination. SPO2 Jerome Cause. 98-0189 and raffled to Branch 110 of said court. since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police officer. Mylene Cabunoc. and the third. from her right [7] [8] thigh.. a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time. testified [11] that no investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN. Consequently. from in front of her genital area. When she passed through the metal detector booth. can I search you?‖ Upon frisking SUSAN. the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness and had prosecution witness Mylene Cabunoc recalled to be presented as hostile witness.‖ Mylene forthwith reported the matter to [5] SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Upon further frisking in the ladies‘ room. pinched the package several times and [4] noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules. Bernadette Arcena because it was not presented in court nor marked or admitted. a regulated drug. The latter forthwith informed his superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the incident. but the latter refused and said: ―Money. alleging therein that the trial judge erred in (1) giving weight to the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Mylene touched something in front of SUSAN‘s sex organ. It opted not to let SUSAN take the witness stand. girdles and panty. and (4) two panty girdles. When recalled as witness for the defense.289 CONTRARY TO LAW. and SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes. Mylene merely reiterated the circumstances surrounding [15] the arrest and search of SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her person. Together with SUSAN. an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office. The first was taken from SUSAN‘s abdominal area. lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc. 6425. For the defense. her supervisor on duty. SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. [17] SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial. money only. being a departing passenger bound for Saigon. [16] After consideration of the evidence presented. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed [6] in gray colored packing tape. SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). and (4) deliberately ignoring the decisive issue of how the . as amended. He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the [13] [14] receipt. at about 1:30 p. and is therefore hearsay evidence. which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them. they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table. opened the same and found that they [9] contained white crystalline substances which. The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998. (2) upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of police officers. the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores. the trial court rendered a decision finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN. She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt. saying ―Excuse [3] me ma‘am. Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De los Reyes. (3) making statements which gave the impression that the burden of proof was shifted to the accused. [2] Vietnam. For its part. Ma. Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign the receipt. (3) one Continental Micronesia plane [12] ticket with stock control number 0414381077. called her attention. SUSAN signed a receipt of the following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1.m. the second. she felt similar packages in front of SUSAN‘s genital area and thighs. Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. However. a beeping sound was emitted. (2) one American passport bearing Number 700389994.100 grams. SUSAN obliged.

but the latter chose to magnify the judge‘s statement which was uttered in jest. (2) SUSAN‘s conviction was not based on the medical report which was not presented in court. Johnson. such stop and frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments in order to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the security of the aircraft. SUSAN questions the application of People v. and using the same in determining her guilt. (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has not been offered in evidence. At that point then. . detained her. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares that SUSAN was found flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law.‖ In its Appellant‘s Brief. SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in the ladies‘ room was constitutionally infirmed because it was not ―incidental to an arrest. (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. which was violative of Section 12. Bernadette Arcena. which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. Verily. it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. Thus. she was under custodial investigation without counsel. According to the trial judge (1) he explained to SUSAN‘s counsel the effects of the filing of a motion for reconsideration. SUSAN also assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the seized items were not in plain view. as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge. and (7) in [20] applying the ruling in People v. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Ma. Johnson because of its sweeping statement allowing searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity of the safety [23] interests involved.‖ The arrest could not be said to have been made before the search because at the time of the strip search. whi