BARRIENTOS v DAAROL

FACTS
Victoria BARRIENTOS is single, a college student and about 20 years and 7 months old during her relationship with Transfiguracion
DAVID, a lawyer and the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative who was about 40 years old and married to
SUMAYLO.
Flashback Parang sine
DAVID had been known by the BARRIENTOS family for quite sometime being the former student of Victoria BARRIENTOS
father and a former classmate of Victoria BARRIENTOS mother. DAVID courted BARRIENTOS and after a week of courtship,
BARRIENTOS accepted DAVIDS love. At this time, DAVID was separated from his wife for 16 years.
BARRIENTOS, with her parents permission, was DAVIDS partner during the Chamber Commerce affair. After the event and
before going home, they parked the jeep at the beach and after the usual preliminaries (what a term), they consummated the sexual act.
This was their set up until BARRIENTOS got pregnant. DAVID suggested abortion but BARRIENTOS disagreed. During her
pregnancy until she gave birth, it was BARRIENTOS family who took care of her.
BARRIENTOS then filed an administrative case against DAVID with the National Electrification Administration which was however
dismissed. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE

W/N DAVID SHOULD BE DISBARRED

HELD

YES, LACK GOOD MORAL CHARACTER --- A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT TO BE ABLE TO

PRACTICE LAW

RATIO
From the records, it is indubitable that BARRIENTOS was never informed by DAVID of his real status as a married individual. The
fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by DAVID only after BARRIENTOS became pregnant. Moreover, DAVID
misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been separated from his wife for 16 years and even dangled a marriage
proposal.
Interestingly enough, DAVID lived alone in Dipolog City though his son also studies in the same area. Moreover, he never introduced
his son and went around with his friends as though he was never married. These circumstances belie DAVIDS claim that the
BARRIENTOS family knew about his marital status at the very start of the courtship.
But what surprises the Court is the perverted sense of DAVIDS moral values when he said that I see nothing wrong with this
relationship despite my being married. Worse, he even suggested abortion.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness.
DAVID having exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action --disbarment.

ALAWI V ALAUYA

PARTIES
ALAWI, sales rep of E.B. Villarosa
ALAUYA, incumbent executive clerk of court
FACTS
Through ALAWIS agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by ALAUYA of a housing unit
A housing loan was also granted to ALAUYA by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
Subsequently, ALAUYA wrote a letter to the President of Villarosa advising termination of his contract on the grounds that
his consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by ALAWI and
proceeded to expound using acerbic language
A copy of the letter, which bore no stamps, was sent to the VP of Villarosa
ALAUYA also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as void his contract with Villarosa and asking for cancellation of his loan

Finally, ALAUYA wrote 3 other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions from his salary regarding the loan from
NHMFC
NHMFC also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions
Learning of the letters, ALAWI filed a complaint alleging that ALAUYA
o Committed malicious and libelous charges
o Usurped the title of attorney

ISSUE

W/N ALAUYA VIOLATED THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

HELD

YES, PARTICULARLY SECTION 4

RATIO
Section 4 public officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law,
public order, public safety and public interest
ALAUYA, being a member of the Sharia Bar and an officer of the Court, may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing or otherwise improper
His radical deviation from these norms cannot be excused
ISSUE

W/N ALAUYA BEING A MEMBER OF THE SHARIA BAR CAN USE THE TITLE ATTORNEY

HELD

NO, RESERVED ONLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR

RATIO
Court has already had an occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar and may practice law only before Sharia courts
ALAUYAS wish of not using counsellor because of confusion with councilor is immaterial because disinclination to
use said title does not warrant his use of the title attorney

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA

A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
Facts:
Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of
Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of
absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for
free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his
cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.
He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is
assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.
Issue:
WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? NO
Held:

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which
prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.
THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE:
In People vs. Villanueva:
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is
not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in
Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law profession contemplated by law.
DECISION: Reprimanded.

CAYETANO V MONSOD
Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Pres. Aquino nominated Christian Monsod to the position of COMELEC chairman.

The Commission on Appointments affirmed the nomination and appointed Monsod to the position.
Renato Cayetano now assails the appointment. He says that Monsod is not qualified to the position because he has not been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years (requirement is provided by Consti Art. 9-C Sec. 1(1)).
W/n Monsod is qualified for the position of COMELEC chairman.

SC says yes. Monsod passed the bar in 1960 and had been consistently paying his professional fees. He worked in a law
firm for several years after graduating but after that, had been more engaged in business and politics (for a list of his jobs, see
p.238). Still, the SC said that he can still be considered as practicing law, if we consider the modern concept of the practice
of law. This modern concept pertains to any act, whether in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
SC now says that since most of Monsods jobs involved the law, even if he has not been engaged in traditional lawyering (i.e.
making pleadings or appearing in court), he can still be considered as to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Dissents:
Most of the dissents focused on the issue that the Consti requirement pertains to habitual practice of law. The dissenters
pointed out that for the past ten years, Monsod really seldom practiced law. This group believed that the Consti required that
the practice of law be on a regular basis. Justice Padilla even came up with qualifications habituality; compensation;
application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure; and atty.-client relationship to determine w/n a person has been
engaged in the practice of law..

ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC

FACTS:
Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease, issuing advertisement similar to or of the same tenor as that
of annexes A and B (p381). Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of said advertisement that claims that it is not engage
in the practice of law but in the rendering of legal support services through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machine.
ISSUE:
W/N the services offered by Legal Clinic as advertised by it constitutes practice of law
Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisement complained of
HELD:
According to the IBP, notwithstanding the manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the 2 terms, legal support
services and legal services, common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction.

The use of the name the Legal Clinic gives the impression that the respondent corporation is being managed by lawyers and
that it renders legal services. The advertisement in question is meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy. This is in violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.02 that is counseling illegal activities.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court which requires that application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. Applying the case Cayetano vs. Monsod, the court agrees that the activities of the respondent Legal
Clinic constitute the practice of law. Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent does not represent
clients in court since law practice is not limited merely to court appearances.
Regarding the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Profession Responsibility provides that a
lawyer, in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, and objective information or statement of facts.
The proscription against advertising of legal services rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession.
Exceptions:
o Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon
o Ordinary, simple professional card. The card may contain only the statement of his name, the law firm, address and
branch of law practiced.
Considering that Atty. Nogales who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of the legal clinic is a
member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded with a warning that the repetition of the same or similar acts which
are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

IN RE INTEGRATION TO THE BAR

FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation on the basis of the said Report and
the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the
Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar
that (the) Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of
the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar
associations.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
HELD:
YES. On all issues.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning x x x the admission to the practice of law.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable, within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained the integration of the Bar of
the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

IN RE CUNANAN

Facts:
This is the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 case.
As per the Rules of Court. A bar candidate must have a general average of 75% in all subjects without failing below 50% in any
subject.
In spite of this, the court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only:
72% in 1946
69% in 1947
70% in 1948
74% in 1949
In 1950 to 53, the 74% was raised to 75%
A few candidates who missed the above marks set by the courts approached Congress. Congress made a bill, which was allowed by
the president to become a law without his signature. This is RA 972.
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5
per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in
1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950.
A breakdown of the numbers is on page 538.
The additional candidates who want to be admitted claim that they suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and of inadequacy
of preparation.

Issue:
W/N RA 972 is valid.

Held:
RA 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession. The public interest demands of the legal profession, adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so
as legal problems evolved by the times become more difficult.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the years affecting the bar candidates concerned
Although the SC certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only the SC, and not
the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as in this case.

Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.

Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

"Section 13.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall
not diminish increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the SC equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The
primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in the SC.

Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the
power granted to it.
The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this
Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
There is no motive stated by the authorities for the qualification in RA 972 because of this, the classification is fatally defective.
1.
That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2
of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2.
That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10,
article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are
denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After
this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on
the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set.

GUEVARRA VS EALA
FACTS:
Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committe on Bar Discipline
(CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a Noli Eala for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's
oath."
In his complaint, Mr. Guevarra alleged that his wife Irene Moje have been maintaining an illicit affair with Atty. Eala during their
marriage, and presented certain facts proving such allegation. These includes a social card, the preparation of which was admitted by
the respondent and their (Atty. Eala and Ms. Moje) living together in a house which was a few blocks aways from the church where
Ms. Moje had exchange marital vows with the complainant. Also alleged and proven was the fact that the respondent was the father of
the complainant's daughter. The complainant further went on saying that Atty. Eala and his wife have been openly flaunting their
adulterous relationship.
For Mr. Guevarra, respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to
uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, Atty. Eala was charged to have mocked the institution of
marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Committee on Bar Discipline found the charge against sufficiently proven and recommended
that Atty. Eala be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of
Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the
case for lack of merit. The complainant then went to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Where or not Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's
oath"?

RULING:
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null and void. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying
on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ARRIETA vs LLOSA
Facts;
A disbarment case was filed against the respondent for allegedly notarizing a Deed of Absolute sale, wherein, vendors noted were
already dead prior to its execution.
However, in a later date, the respondent sought to dismiss the disbarment case admitting to the fact that he committed a mistake and
notarized the documents in an urgent request of his clients, and that said acts are now clear to him and that no further damage was
done anyways.
Issue;
WON Atty. Joel A. Llosa be disbarred or suspended from practice of law.
Ruling;
The Supreme Court did not agree to the recommendation of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines who
approved the initial dismissal of the disbarment case against the respondent. Instead, they ordered the SUSPENSION of the
respondent for 6 months with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. The court further emphasized and
quoted the lawyer's oath which the respondent failed to adhere

BURBE vs MAGULTA
Facts:
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared
demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result,
petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several
follow-ups in the lawyers office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to
come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutors office while
the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the
Clerk of Court was absent that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his
case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court
personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the
money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioners feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2)
checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows: It is evident that the
P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants
deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to
file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to
his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law
profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not
exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.