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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-32328. September 30, 1977.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO
CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners-appellants,
vs. PANFILO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees.
Ramon C. Zamora, Lorenzo E. Coloso, Jose L. Castigador, Arthur Defensor & Sixto
Demaisip and Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.
Nacianceno G. Rico & Felipe G. Espinosa for oppositors-appellees.

DECISION

FERNANDEZ, J :
p

This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch
III, in Special Proceeding No. 2176 dismissing the petition for the probate of a will. 1
One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence.
Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews,
respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4,
1963 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed as Special Proceeding No.
1736. In the course of said intestate proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo
Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate of Adriana Maloto on February
1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share
for each. 2 The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, then presided by Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, approved the
extrajudicial partition on March 21, 1964. 3
On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last will and testament of
Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. 4 It appears
that Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named as heirs
but Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said will which are bigger,
different and more valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said will also
allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo,
the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
LibLex

On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736
a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last
will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and

Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of
Adriana Maloto. 6
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto.
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued an order dated November
16, 1968 denying the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been filed
out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied. Petitioners appealed from the order
of denial. On motion of Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the
ground that it was filed late. A motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied. A
supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating as additional ground that the appeal is improper was
issued.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R.
No. L-30479. This Court dismissed the petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:
"L-30479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) — THE COURT
RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for certiorari and mandamus, without passing on the issue
of whether or not the petitioners appeal from the order of November 16, 1968 of respondent
Judge was made on time, it appearing that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the
premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate
of the alleged will in question." 7

Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and clarification, this Court issued a resolution dated
July 15, 1969 which reads:
"Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L30479, Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11, 1969,
the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration, with the clarification that the matter
of whether or not the pertinent findings of facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject order
of November 16, 1968 constitute res adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for probate of
the alleged will in question indicated in the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969, wherein
such matter will be more appropriately determined." 8

Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 9
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
"I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE PROBATED HAD BEEN DESTROYED
AND REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.
II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR
JUDGMENT OR ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).
III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO HAD ALREADY PASSED
OUT OF EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO HAD ALREADY VESTED IN THE
DISTRIBUTEES OF THEIR ASSIGNS.

IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO MALOTO
ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE REMEDY UNDER THIS PROCEEDING,
THEY HAVING CEASED TO BE INTERESTED PARTIES." 10

In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the will on
the basis of the finding of said court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged will sought to be
probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The probate court sustained the oppositors'
contention that the petition for probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate
estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736. 11
The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the following errors:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ADMITTEDLY GENUINE LAST
WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO (THE SUBJECT OF
PETITION FOR PROBATE - SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO) HAD
PREVIOUSLY BEEN REVOKED BY HER (ADRIANA MALOTO).
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID PETITION (FOR PROBATE OF
THE AFORESAID LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO)
IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT THE MATTER CONCERNED IS
NOW RES ADJUDICATA.
III
THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFORESAID
PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE
ADRIANA MALOTO AND IN NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT (THE PETITION ABOVECITED DUE COURSE." 12

The instant petition for review is meritorious.
The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana
Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the proceedings was denied
because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate
proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate
action for the probate of the will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The
more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to
initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question."
In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to
the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.
WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will
of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the
petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the respondents.

JOSE C. G. Ortañez were transferred in the names of private respondents. T. ORTAÑEZ. Picazo Buyco Tan Fider & Santos for petitioner. Guerrero for petitioners. Later. JJ. LEE and ALMA AGGABAO. ORTAÑEZ and LIGAYA S. Juvencio Ortañez owned 51% of the capital stock of Philinterlife at the time of his death and special proceedings were pending with the RTC for the settlement of his intestate estate. On the mere contention that the shareholdings of private respondents belong to the estate of the late Dr. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. Petitioners also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.SO ORDERED. Ortañez which is still the subject of settlement before the RTC. PAZ C. ORTAÑEZ. Maloto. LEE. 1999. BENJAMIN C. Muñoz Palma. MA. Carpio for private respondents. vs. The Court of Appeals ruled that the denial by the SEC of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction was proper and valid. No. whether preliminary or final. CARMENCITA Y. JUVENCIO P. ORTAÑEZ. ANGEL ONG. for herself and as the Judicially Appointed Special Administratrix of the Philinterlife Shares of Stocks of DR.R. 128525. Teehankee (Chairman). TAN. Makasiar. 1977) FIRST DIVISION [G. LEE. Petitioners failed not only to establish a threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing the right to be protected.. L-32328. CARLOS LEE. Arnold V. SYNOPSIS The late Dr. SEC. No. when 112 of the shares of stock of Dr. ROMEO JOVEN N.P. is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Ramon L. petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive relief against private respondents. respondents. Case 11-94-4909 was instituted for the annulment of the same and such other acts exercised by them. JOSE N. DIVINA ORTAÑEZ-ENDERES. September 30. ORTAÑEZ. Petitioners had not established clear existing legal rights to entitle them to a writ of injunction to enjoin private respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of Philinterlife. petitioners. ENRICO N. Martin and Guerrero. concur ||| (Testate Estate of Maloto v.] MA. December 17. Fernandez Law Offices for private respondents. HCDAac . but the same was denied by the hearing officer and the SEC En Banc.R. Injunction. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. CESAR N. NOVICIO.

over his protest and remonstrance. Further.SYLLABUS 1. ID. PROBATE COURTS. Moreover. NOT WARRANTED IN CASE AT BAR. where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the possession of the property pendente lite. is one of the petitioners in this case. — Ma. 1996. Divina Enderes was a party in the main case docketed as SEC Case No. 3. TEHIaA 2. Not being a party in the proceedings below. JURISDICTION. NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SEEK REVIEW OF THE SAME. — The special proceedings for the intestate estate of the deceased Dr. Notwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the intestate court. the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of violation of an actually existing right of petitioner's over the shareholdings presently in the possession of private respondents is no ground for an injunction being a mere damnum absque injuria. Ortañez represented by the Special Administratrix on the ground that the estate is not a stockholder of Philinterlife. NOT EXTENDED TO THE DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP THAT ARISE DURING THE PROCEEDINGS. In an Omnibus Order dated March 6. Before an injunction can be issued. The SEC acted correctly in denying the issuance of the writ until the merits of the case can be heard. Ortañez. Ortañez was not included as petitioners. When the case was elevated to the SEC En Banc and later to respondent Court of Appeals. the Special Administratrix does not have any legal personality to seek a review by this court of the decisions of the SEC and the Court of Appeals. whether preliminary or final. On the mere contention that the shareholdings of private respondents belong to the estate of the late Dr. Ortañez which is still the subject of settlement before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. ID.. the petitioners' rights or interests over the estate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of private respondents are still future and unsettled rights which cannot be protected by the writ of injunction. WHEN NOT A PARTY TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. Divina Ortañez-Enderes. INJUNCTION. petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive relief against private respondents. We agree with the findings of the SEC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that petitioners failed not only to establish a threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing the right to be protected. REMEDIAL LAW. Ortañez are still pending before the court and the estate had not been partitioned and distributed. during the pendency of the main case. it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected. Records show that neither the estate of Dr. PARTIES. Ortañez nor the Special Administratrix Ma. the SEC denied the Motion to Intervene filed by the estate of Dr. Injunction. is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. LIMITATION. 11-94-49099 before the Securities and Exchange Commission. who represents herself to be the Special Administratrix of the Estate of Dr. the injury being a continuing one. where the right to the possession. where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff's right. Therefore. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions . the grant or denial of an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the lower court. of the property involved is very clear. and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. — Injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency. it is a basic procedural postulate that a preliminary injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take the property out of control or possession of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception of the case and whose title has not been clearly established by law.. CIVIL PROCEDURE. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES. the estate of Dr. And the grant of the writ of injunction against private respondents by restraining them from exercising their rights as stockholders would in effect dispose of the main case without a trial.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals as well as that of the SEC En Banc and SEC Hearing Officer denied the prayer of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain private respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of Philippines International Life Insurance Co. (Philinterlife. Juvencio Ortañez. where Rafael S. that special proceedings were pending with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Ortañez and hence. 1 for the annulment of transfer of shares of stocks to private respondents. Ortañez and Jose S. 11-94-4909. and that private respondents had been conveying and disbursing corporate properties and funds as well as preventing petitioners from inspecting the corporate books and records. that the shares of stocks of private respondents lawfully belonged to the estate of Dr. 1996 which affirmed the rulings of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC for brevity) En Banc and the SEC Hearing Officer. The court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. that at the time of his death in 1980. and damages. Ortañez and without the prior authorization of the intestate court. onehalf (1/2) of the shares of stock of Dr. The intestate court may pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining whether the same should or should not be included in the inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the parties. Ortañez owned at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the capital stock of the company. Ortañez.. Branch 85. cdasia This case stems from a complaint filed on November 7. Petitioners also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against private respondents to enjoin them from exercising their rights as stockholders of Philinterlife on the ground that their shares of stock were acquired through illegal and fraudulent schemes. . Petitioners alleged that Philinterlife is a registered corporation founded in 1954 by the late Dr. Dr. for brevity). EcTaSC DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO. Inc. J : p This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31. docketed as SEC Case No. for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Dr. Petitioners further stated that after the death of Dr. accounting and inspection of corporate books and records. 1994 by petitioners before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Lee misrepresented himself as president of Philinterlife and sold the parcel of land owned by the corporation located in Manila to Citiriser Development Corporation without the indispensable requisites prescribed by the Corporation Code. they are not entitled to enjoy and exercise their rights and privileges as stockholders of the company. devices and machinations of the latter. Ortañez were transferred in the names of private respondents through the manipulations. annulment of subscriptions on increased capital stocks. that private respondents obtained additional subscriptions without consideration by way of unlawful corporate machinations. Petitioners also contended that respondent Jose C.of ownership that arise during the proceedings. Ortañez were jointly appointed as special administrators. annulment of sale of corporate properties authorized by private respondents who compose the management of the corporation.

Manila. Sta. the principal stockholder at that time. 1983 when Jose S. that contrary to the contentions of petitioners. Not satisfied with the Order. Private respondents also alleged that they did not violate the provisions of the Corporation Code in the sale and disposition to Citiriser Development Corporation of the parcel of land and improvements owned by Philinterlife in Soler Street. the surviving spouse Juliana Ortañez. 1994. Ortañez. and that the right of petitioners to question the Memorandum of Agreement and the acquisition of shares of stock of private respondents is barred by prescription. on her behalf and for her minor son Antonio. Ortañez. 1984 and thru said resolution. unsettled and of doubtful character. executed a deed of sale of his shares of stock to the private respondents. petitioners elevated the same to the Securities and Exchange Commission En Banc. . that records of all the business operations of Philinterlife have always been open and available for examination and inspection not only by petitioners but by all other stockholders as well. as stockholders of Philinterlife. Hence. One of the pieces of evidence submitted is the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife which showed that private respondents are owners of Philinterlife shares.In their answer. 1987 which approved the authority of the corporation’s president. 3 Hearings were thereafter held to determine the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. executed a Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons Rafael and Jose. 1982. that private respondents did not commit any violation of law when Philinterlife increased its capital stock from Five Million to Ten Million Pesos in 1984 as this increase was based on a resolution passed by the stockholders owning more than two-thirds of the outstanding capital stock during the stockholders' meeting held on March 21. 1995.250 Million was offered for subscription. the SEC En Banc issued a resolution 5 dismissing the petition and stating in part: After a careful perusal of the arguments raised in the petition and answer as well as the evidence submitted during the hearing. that on March 4. LibLex On March 24. Ortañez acquired as his share of the estate the 1. that this is evidenced by the Board Resolution dated June 15. Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of Philinterlife on March 23. dividing the estate of the deceased composed of his one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal properties. and the pretended rights of the petitioners are still contentious. Carlos Lee.329 shares of stock in Philinterlife. that petitioners Ligaya Novicio and children represented themselves to be the common law wife and illegitimate children of the late Dr. On February 10. Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective shares of stock in Philinterlife to Jose. that said increase was likewise approved by the majority of the board of directors of the corporation. they are entitled to exercise all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto. that in the said Memorandum of Agreement. 2 private respondents stated that the subject matter of the complaint is not within the jurisdiction of the SEC but with the Regional Trial Court. wherein both parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. Jose S. the unsubscribed capital stock of the corporation in the amount of P1. 1982. to sign in behalf of the company all documents pertaining to the sale. private respondents Jose Lee. SEC Hearing Officer Alberto Atas issued a temporary restraining order. Lee. Jose C. that on March 4. both surnamed Ortañez. 1995. On December 7. SEC Hearing Officer Atas issued an Order 4 denying petitioners' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioners failed to make a valid cause to entitle them to the relief applied for. Cruz. we find that the Hearing Officer did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

(2) there is no valid and lawful basis for private respondents' claim that they are the stockholders of Philinterlife. no evidence being adduced to show that the transfer taxes were paid. 6 Aggrieved by the resolution of the SEC En Banc. Injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency. docketed as CA-GR SP No. 1997. With regard to the assigned errors which are interrelated. will not take cognizance of suits to establish title and will not lend its preventive aid by injunction where the complainant's title or right is doubtful or disputed. is no ground for an injunction. over his protest and remonstrance. Petitioners alleged that the SEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the resolution because (1) the stock and transfer book of the company was not adduced throughout the proceedings and. . 9 . . this petition was filed stating that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) not holding that the ownership of the shares of stocks of Philinterlife is still an issue to be resolved by the SEC. the injury being a continuing one. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 7 dismissing the petition on the ground that the denial by the SEC of petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction was proper and valid. petitioners contend that private respondents cannot rely on the deeds of assignment of shares of stock in their favor because the same are void. during the pendency of the main case. we rule that the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the regular court where the intestate proceedings are currently pending.With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares of stocks owned by the late Dr. where the right to the possession. private respondents have not yet been declared as stockholders thereof. where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the possession of the property pendente lite. Juvencio Ortañez. hence. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated March 11. The complainant's right or title moreover must be clear and unquestioned for equity. Petitioners also claim to possess legal personality to bring this suit on the ground that they are stockholders of the corporation and that co-petitioner Ma. 8 Hence. and (2) not finding that the private respondents' claim as stockholders of Philinterlife has no legal and/or factual support. On May 31. 1996. The possibility of irreparable damage. petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners further allege that private respondents cannot exercise the rights and privileges of stockholders of Philinterlife because there was no valid disposition or transfer to the latter of the shares of stock belonging to the estate of the late Dr. Divina Ortañez-Enderes is the Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Dr. where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff's right. seeking to annul the aforesaid resolution and the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents. as a rule. being mere damnum absque injuria. 36923. Juvencio Ortañez. We cannot sustain petitioners' stand. of the property involved is very clear. . Juvencio Ortañez with regard to Philinterlife shares. The sole issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the SEC when it ruled that petitioners had not established clear existing legal rights to entitle them to a writ of injunction to enjoin private respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of Philinterlife. . without proof of violation of an actual existing right.

Before an injunction can be issued. Injunction. 18 Moreover. Ortañez. Ortañez which is still the subject of settlement before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Not being a party in the proceedings below. Divina Ortañez-Enderes. the petitioners' rights or interests over the estate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of private respondents are still future and unsettled rights which cannot be protected by the writ of injunction. It is admitted that the special proceedings are still pending before the court and the estate had not been partitioned and distributed. 16 The court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. Records show that neither the estate of Dr. 15 The intestate court may pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining whether the same should or should not be included in the inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the parties. The following findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the SEC are binding and conclusive on this Court: LLphil . 17 Therefore. the Special Administratrix does not have any legal personality to seek a review by this court of the decisions of the SEC and the Court of Appeals. whether preliminary or final. 1996. Ortañez nor the Special Administratrix Ma. the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of violation of an actually existing right of petitioners over the shareholdings presently in the possession of private respondents is no ground for an injunction being a mere damnum absque injuria. the grant or denial of an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the lower court. In an Omnibus Order dated March 6. petitioners cited in their reply the issuance of an Order by the intestate court declaring that the shares of stock of Philinterlife belong to the estate. 11 On the mere contention that the shareholdings of private respondents belong to the estate of the late Dr. it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected. When the case was elevated to the SEC En Banc and later to respondent Court of Appeals. is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. 12 Ma. the estate of Dr. petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive relief against private respondents. 13 the SEC denied the Motion to Intervene filed by the estate of Dr. who represents herself to be the Special Administratrix of the Estate of Dr. 14 In support of their position. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. 1194-49099 before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Notwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the intestate court. Ortañez represented by the Special Administratrix on the ground that the estate is not a stockholder of Philinterlife. 10 We agree with the findings of the SEC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that petitioners failed not only to establish a threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing the right to be protected. is one of the petitioners in this case. Divina Enderes was a party in the main case docketed as SEC Case No. and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Ortañez was not included as petitioners.

Juvencio Ortañez. No. Jr. this issue could be properly brought to the attention of the probate court.J. Petitioners failed to show a clear and positive right to the questioned shares of the late Dr. SO ORDERED. Q-30884. petitioner have mere expectance on the properties of the late Dr. JJ. December 17. An actual.R. Juvencio Ortañez. Puno. Petitioners' alleged right over the shares of stock in question as well as other properties spring from their yet to be established position as heirs of the late Dr. Kapunan and Pardo. branch 85. 190 October 18. in the estate proceedings in Sp. 128525. Juvencio Ortañez.. As it is now. C. The SEC acted correctly in denying the issuance of the writ until the merits of the case can be heard.Applying the above jurisprudence in the instant case. and positive right should exist before the mantle of the powerful writ of injunction can protect its movant who prays for the preservation of the status quo pending the hearing of the main case on the merits. cdphil Davide.. 1996 is AFFIRMED.. clear. Juvencio Ortañez in Philinterlife from which respondents allegedly acquired their possible respective shareholdings. Petitioners. It was only in 1994 that petitioners sought the annulment of the shareholdings of private respondents before the SEC. having only contingent and future right as alleged heirs of the late Dr. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31. 1977 . concur. this Court rules that the respondent SEC En Banc did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Juvencio Ortañez. Further. The grant of the writ of injunction against private respondents by restraining them from exercising their rights as stockholders would in effect dispose of the main case without a trial.M. Juvencio Ortañez. No. Proc No. 19 Contrary to the contentions of petitioners. G. 21 WHEREFORE. 1999) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A. it is a basic procedural postulate that a preliminary injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take the property out of control or possession of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception of the case 20 and whose title has not been clearly established by law. If respondents are dissipating the said shares of stocks and properties of Philinterlife which allegedly form part of the estate of the late Dr. Said issue of heirship has to be established in the probate court particularly in the settlement of estate of the late Dr. ||| (Orta. the petition is DENIED. Records show that they have been stockholders of Philinterlife since 1983 up to the present. the SEC found that private respondents are bona fide owners of shares of stock in Philinterlife constituting the majority thereof or 94% of the outstanding capital stock of the company. The judicial protection of a writ of preliminary injunction does not cover contingent or future right. are not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction. the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age. Hence. both of which are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last employer. MA. The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government Service System. Mrs. He did not have any pending criminal administrative or not case against him. and duly recognized by the deceased. Jan.£ªwph!1 RESOLUTION MAKASIAR. . JR. both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo. CHANLIONGCO an attorney in this Court. under the provisions of R. the GSIS determination of the amount of the retirement the kill heirs and their e shares as indicated in its letter to US. From the records now before US. 4986. as amended by R.£îhqw⣠This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY.ñé+. dated March 15. 30. 37 SCRA 315. 1616. the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits. for being in accordance with law.. ANGELINA C. which was approved by this Court in its resolution of August 19. No.A. with more than 38 years of service in the government. MARIO V. 325). According to law. GSIS. Except Mario. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. all the claimants are of legal age.. What. Insofar therefore as the retirement benefits are WE adopt in toto. should he die before retirement.RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. claimants. therefore. de vs. The highest salary he received was P18. 1971. and the refund of rent to the claimants. Total creditable service 37. CHANLIONGCO. to wit: ñé+. CHANLIONGCO. The record also shows that the late Atty. to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave. who is only 17 years of age. Fidel B. as in the caw of a fife if no benefit is named in the policy (Vda.A. Atty. MARIO B.00 per annum. neither did he have any money or property accountability. 1977. the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate s . Angelina C. Dra. CHANLIONGCO.£ªwph!1 (a) Amount of retirement grautity: 1.57169 years .:têñ. (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium. J. Jr. effective on July 12. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed or over to state in his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits. Jr. L-28093. FIDELA B. Aside from his widow. 1976. (2) money value of terminal leave. No. 1976 it a g from the records that at the time of his death on July 12.. 1976. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely. it appears that the GSIS had already the release the life insurance proceeds. CHANLIONGCO II.700.

unpaid salary and 10% adjustment pursuant to Budget Circular No.140. 240. Buenaventura illegitimate child 4.33333/mo. Buenaventura and Mario Chanliongco. Angelina C. Chanliongco 19.9245.10 (b) Legal heirs: 1. Chanliongco. P228. of grautity months) P78. 1974. illegitimate child (c) Distribution (1) 8/16 share to Mario II P39. Fidela B. Ma.962. 3.100 Coming now to the money value of the terminal leave.66/mo.2. legitimate son 3.87 Less: Withholding Tax P1. Fidela B.535.33 21.050 (2) 4/16 share to the widow.140.49 10% salary adj. 19 535 25 TOTAL P78.84 Money value of terminal leave for the period from July 13. indicated the breakdown of these items as follows: Unpaid salary for July 8-12. Jr. dated July 22. Highest rate of salary Pl.558.5125 each to the two illegitimate children Ma. Angelina C. Gratuity in terms of months 50.025 (3) 2/16 share.558.1977 @ P1. 1976 to September 14. 1976 @ P1. for July 1-12. Mario B.767. Amount of gratuity (highest salary) x (No.54 Sub-Total P22. Chanliongco II. Mario Chanliongco Jr.416.400. widow 2.070. 1976 54. or P9. this Court's Finance Officer.00 .14338 months 4. 1977. in a memorandum dated March 23.

844.505. 296 Mich. Accordingly.18 TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P27.45.36 3.340.725 is to be distributed to the deceased's kill him. HER 4/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P19.752. CHANLIONGCO A.740.688.740. onehalf (l/2) goes to the widow as her share in the conjugal hip and the other half P6. representing withhold tax due from him. WHEREFORE. Mario Jr.752. FIDELA B. Chanliongco a. 449).72 b.505. Ma.42 NET PROCEEDS 8.09 TOTAL P13.400. State. As her conjugal share P 6. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TEAL LEAVE. THE FINANCE AND/OR DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS COURT IS ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH AND EVERY CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS HEREUNDER INDICATED OPPOSITE THEIR NAMES.Supreme Court Savings & Loan Association 7.340. Mario Chanliongco II P 3. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II .45 It will be seen from the f distribution that the money value of the unused vacation and sick leave." (Ramey vs.72 (2) AS A LEGAL HEIR P1.87. from above sub-total sum of P22. Chanliongco had an outstanding account with the Supreme Court Savings & Loans Association in the sum of P7.376.42 P13. 296 NW 323. AS FOLLOWS: 1. WE have at the net sum P13.505.245.18 2. As a legal heir P 1.42.975. This is so because "Vacation with pay is not a gratuity but is compensation for services rendered. unpaid will and 10% adjustment due to the has been treated as conjugal property. Angelina C.688. Fidela B.42. using the same one WE used in distributing the retirement benefits. THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. Buenaventura 844.535.00. UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT: (1) AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE 6.45 It further appears that at the time of his death the late Atty.93 2. or a total of P8.752.10 4. Deduction this amount plus another sum of P1. available for distribute to the claimants as follows: 1.025 B.

Santos. vs. J. Castro. TO BE PAID THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN.446.36 TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P42. Ceferino Padua Law Office and Gatmaytan Law Office for petitioner. ANGELINA CRESPO): A. Fernandez and Guerrero. UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT 3.070. MARIO CHANLIONGCO JR.61 SO ORDERED.. UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT 844.767.10 TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P10. is on leave.ñët Fernando. No. Jr.767. petitioner.1äwphï1. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE.41 3. The issue here is the applicability of the rule on proximity among collateral relatives. or a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree of the decedent. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE. Concepcion. BUENAVENTURA: A. Antonio. HER 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P9. December 8. Respondent. concur. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P39. 140975.376. C. UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT 844.51 B.61 4.10 TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P10.05 B. respondent. SYNOPSIS Petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased. ANGELINA C. Jose & Associates for respondent. Martin.R. is the maternal aunt of the decedent. P. a collateral relative within the third civil degree of the decedent. JJ. Thus.J. PASTORA PIEDAD.C. 2000. MA.. THIRD DIVISION [G.611. on the other hand.. Muñ. the question is: Can petitioner inherit alongside respondent? .611. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P9.. Barredo.oz Palma.] OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU.A.51 B.

the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. — The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern. the legitimate parents and ascendants. ID. . thirdly. either by will or by operation of law. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent. ID. respondent relative within the third civil degree excludes petitioner relative within the fifth civil degree from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent. RULE ON PROXIMITY. ID.The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. . from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent. . APPLICATION OF RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION. By right of representation.. "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. CIVIL LAW. the surviving spouse. the legitimate children and descendants.. Piedad excludes petitioner.. the transmission of property. a relative of the fifth degree. . secondly." — The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following. the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. ID. DECISION VITUG. line. by operation of law. 2. is an absolute rule. and fifthly.. Respondent. except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts. of the late Augusto H. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds. fourthly. not from the latter. firstly.. a more distant blood relative of a decedent is. In the collateral line. the rule of proximity. — The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. the illegitimate children and descendants.. the system set out by the Code. Among collateral relatives. In the collateral line. Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. SacTCA 3. Applying now the rule on proximity. expressed in Article 962 of the Code. APPRECIATION OF THE LAW. INTESTATE SUCCESSION. SYLLABUS 1. but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. . ID. rather than in isolation of. ID. Each article is construed incongruity with. SUCCESSION. NOT APPLICABLE TO "OTHER COLLATERAL RELATIVES WITHIN THE FIFTH CIVIL DEGREE. of the decedent. ID... never in the ascending. The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference. . In the direct line. rights and obligations of a person upon his death. being a relative within the third civil degree. the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces.. DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP. right of representation is proper only in the descending. ID. J : p . ID.

thus: "There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"). intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from the estate of Augusto H. entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the deficient publication or notice of hearing. "In this case. 3652. Branch 117. including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing. Piedad. existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances. prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Piedad. In a well-written resolution. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. There is question of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses. and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. in spite the absence of an order of . The trial court denied the motion. there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or falsehood on alleged facts. citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court. and their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation. and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.On 28 August 1995. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H. speaking for the appellate court. lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors. the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Labitoria. ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest over the case. and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated. Finding merit in that argument. thus: "The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts not in dispute. "These facts are undisputed. Piedad. petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities. The question as to whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree. that as such. Piedad. herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention. and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. of Pasay City. Piedad." 1 Justice Eugenio S. the appellate court dismissed the appeal. Piedad to petitioner-appellee. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. that the notice of hearing was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact. Piedad to petitioner-appellee. that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court.

a more distant blood relative of a decedent is. and of Article 987. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood. a third-degree relative of the decedent. by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented. does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives? Augusto H. "ARTICLE 970. rather than in isolation of. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent. and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated. the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. There is doubt as to what law is applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts. Article 962 of the Civil Code provides: "ARTICLE 26. Resolution on the issues may be had even without going to examination of facts on record. aHCSTD "The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence. concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines. by operation of law. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. the transmission of property. Thus. but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court." "ARTICLE 971. petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. either by will or by operation of law. except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. nor the credibility of witnesses presented. a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree." 2 Still unsatisfied. all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law. Each article is construed in congruity with. can petitioner.closure of the intestate court. or a fifth degree relative of the decedent. not from the latter. paragraph 2. "Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares. In every inheritance. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds. the system set out by the Code. rights and obligations of a person upon his death. nor the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances. By right of representation. inherit alongside respondent. saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. Representation is a right created by fiction of law. "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern." . Specifically. while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased.

the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces. . "ARTICLE 972. Among collateral relatives. ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. is an absolute rule. of the decedent. four from his first cousin and so forth. thirdly. of the Code. and fifthly. . three from his uncle. right of representation is proper only in the descending. "In the collateral line. fourthly. expressed in Article 962. the illegitimate children and descendants. the division of the estate shall be made per stirpes. But if they alone survive." The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in order of preference following. it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sister. Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. the legitimate parents and ascendants. . whether they be of the full or half blood. the legitimate children and descendants. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive. "ARTICLE 966. never in the ascending." "ARTICLE 975." "ARTICLE 974." SCHATc Accordingly — . the surviving spouse. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent. the rule of proximity. Whenever there is succession by representation. they shall inherit in equal portions. Thus. "In the collateral line. in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line. firstly. if he were living or could inherit. secondly.In the direct line. the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. In the collateral line. they shall inherit from the latter by representation. a person is two degrees removed from his brother. except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts. but never in the ascending. line. aforequoted. if they survive with their uncles or aunts. who is the brother of his father.

" Article 1010. excludes the cousins of the decedent.R. G. and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood. a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle." In fine. ISADET WHEREFORE. Piedad excludes petitioner. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters. the instant Petition is DENIED. Panganiban. JJ.. in turn. the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. a relative of the fifth degree. being a relative within the third civil degree. being in the fourth-degree of relationship. Melo. 140975. concur.Respondent. and Gonzaga-Reyes. No. of the late Augusto H." — invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. but an uncle or an aunt. "The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood. being a third-degree relative. No costs. December 08. SO ORDERED. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line. no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood. the latter. The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code — "ARTICLE 1009. 2000) . The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession). from succeeding ab intestato the estate of the decedent. ||| (Bagunu v. Piedad.

he was substituted by his widow. SALAO. several of the parties have died and their estates partitioned and thereafter. prescription and laches.. SALAO.R. Salao. OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA ALCURIZA. Salao. Upon his death. Salao. DE SANTOS. Jr. ALMARIO ALCURIZA. SALAO. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds. Administrator of the Intestate of JUAN S. On the other hand. ROBERTO P. Sr. ARTURO ALCURIZA. Eusebio V. interest over the fishpond has been the bone of contention — whether or not the same was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. for plaintiffs-appellants. ISABEL SALAO DE SANTOS. the now defendants. and Ambrosia Salao and whether the property can still be subject to an action for reconveyance. the defendants contend that the fishpond in question consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. Plaintiffs' version is that Juan Y. 1976. and Ambrosia Salao who had secured a Torrens Title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 and who exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew Valentin Salao. later substituted by PABLO P. Jr. LUCIANA P. Navarro. MARIA SALAO VDA. Sr.. de Peralta for defendants-appellants. JUAN S. Salao. and one of the several properties left by the parties predecessors. L-26699. SALAO. his sister Alejandra and Ambrosia and their nephew Valentin Salao were engaged by joint venture in the fishpond business. Sr. ARTURO ALCURIZA. Juan S. children and the administrator of his estate. Navarro and Eusebio P. now MERCEDES P. Salao of a share in the fishpond and for reconveyance to them of the property as Valentin Salao's supposed 1/3 share in the 145 hectares of the fishpond registered in the name of Juan Y. SALAO. SALAO. No. plaintiffs-appellants. with an area of 47 hectares. Nicolas Belmonte and Benjamin T. in his answer with counterclaim. assisted by her husband. GREGORIO MARCELO.] BENITA SALAO. vs. the latter two being minors are represented by guardian ad litem. defendants-appellants. together with PABLO P. SALAO. Administrator. Since then. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in the CFI of Bataan against defendants. and PABLO P. that the funds used by them were earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from their father. pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. has given rise to the present controversy. and Ambrosia Salao. as successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S. March 16. asking for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. SALAO.. Salao. RESTITUTO P. Jr. . and that these earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond.SECOND DIVISION [G. The property was sold a retro and later redeemed. VDA. DE SALAO. SALAO. located in that part of Lubao which later became a part of Bataan. SYNOPSIS The question of ownership over the Calunuran fishpond.

" Material averments in the complaint." Section 7 of the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specifically with each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and. Valentin Salao. ID. RULES OF COURT.000. because their action for reconveyance was dismissed. Salao. an affirmative defense is an allegation of new matter which. ruling that there was no resulting trust over the questioned property as the plaintiffs failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear. SYLLABUS 1. If further held that the donation was validly executed. On the other hand. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements prescribed therein. CONTENTS. The Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of defendants' claim for damages since the circumstances of the case do not show that plaintiffs' action was manisfestly frivolous or primarily intended to harass the defendants. 9). other than those as to the amount of damage. plaintiffs' action for reconveyance is barred by prescription or laches. whenever practicable. because their counterclaim for damages was likewise dismissed. — Under section 6. and the defendants. Sr.00. 16 of Rule 46. ID. The Court of Appeals elevated the case to the Supreme Court as the amount involved exceeded P200. — A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential to the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. expressly or implied. It includes all matters set up "by way of confession and avoidance. Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court the answer should "contain either a specific denial or a statement of matters in avoidance of the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint. they might make a competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case and lighten the burden of the Court. 2." (Sec. "The defendant may set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he may have.. when they prepare their briefs. PLEADINGS. would do well to read and re-read Sec.. the plaintiffs. that a co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirs after her death in 1914. AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE DEFENSES DISTINGUISHED.The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Salao. Jr. RULE 46. — An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page reference" to the contents of the brief. 3. Both parties appealed. shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial. Lawyers for appellants. Judgment affirmed. while admitting the material allegations of the complaint. as a result of which. shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied" (Sec. they have no right and personality to question the validity of the donation made to Juan S. Rules of Court).. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. All such grounds of defenses as would raise issues of fact not arising upon the preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 5. ANSWER. Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran lands were acquired. . 8). FORMAL REQUISITES. would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff. APPEAL. satisfactory and convincing evidence and even assuming that there was an implied trust. Rules 6. when her estate was partitioned among her 3 children and grandson. that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918.

but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary. — In its technical legal sense. by some writing or deed.S. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trust or or of the parties.. 724)." (Art. INSTANT CASE. ID. 7. 1444). 6. On the other hand. ID.J. but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance (89 C. a trust is defined as the right. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law." It does not arise "by agreement or intention. There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain property. 1441. real. The answer substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court where obviously defendant did so because he found it impracticable to state piecemeal his open version as to the acquisition of the questioned properties or to make a tedious and repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting the allegations of the plaintiff's cause of action. S. personal. DISTINGUISHED. one in whom confidence is reposed as regards the property for the benefit of the another person is know as the trustee. KINDS OF. They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C. J. — "Trusts are either express or implied. Civil Code). .J. the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction.. a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law. RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST DISTINGUISHED. or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity.. money or chooses in action." (89 C. without being expressed. 8.J. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Arts.S. or will or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C. TRUST. EFFECT OF. ID.. but by the constructions of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. the contention that there was in effect an admission of plaintiff's allegation that there was co-ownership cover the questioned property is unfounded. 726-727). "No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by parol evidence. 5. ID. EXPRESS AND IMPLIED TRUSTS. ID. — Where the answer setting forth defendant's positive defenses contained matters in avoidance of plaintiff's cause of action which supported his denials thereof. are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent. "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties. "No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust. 1443 and 1457). independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C. ID. — An answer containing the statement that it denied "generally and specifically each and every paragraph of the complaint" is really a general denial which is tantamount to an admission of the allegations of the complaint and which justifies judgment on the pleadings. ID. GENERAL DENIAL. or arising by operation of law.4. to the beneficial enjoyment of property.. 722).S.725). but by operation of law. enforceable solely in equity.S." In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished from a resulting trust.. DEFINITION. "Implied trusts are those which.J. the legal title to which is vested in another. A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS. 722).. either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust. a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words. it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Art. — A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or construction of law.

13.. 12. DAMAGES. incurring considerable expenses therefor. — The record shows that the plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of the case and that they fought tenaciously. PAROL EVIDENCE CANNOT BE AVAILED OF TO PROVE AN EXPRESS TRUST CONCERNING REALTY. Valentin Salao slept on their rights.. 1443 of the Civil Code are peremptory and unmistakable. The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the law.. parol evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty. It is legally indefensible because the terms of Art. The plaintiffs and their predessor-in-interest. — There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y. NO TRUST CREATED OVER QUESTIONED PROPERTY. ID. The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. ID.. GOOD FAITH IN FILING SUIT SHOWN. RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST. ID. ID.. — Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. PARTIES. Sr.. There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was vitiated by fraud or mistake. Sr.. Salao. Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. it is no longer necessary to pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. — Under Act No.. RULING ON THE VALIDITY OF DONATION UNNECESSARY. CASE AT BAR. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. — Where the Court has reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond. Salao. 190. — Where it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs' action was manisfestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass the defendants does not appear to be just and proper. ID. yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed their claim were considered to indicate their sincerity and good faith. Jr. the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten years.9. equivocal or indefinite declarations. The worries and anxiety of a defendants an award for moral damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and proper. PLAINTIFFS ACTION BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES. AWARD THEREOF NOT JUST AND PROPER IN INSTANT CASE. IMPLIED TRUST MAY BE PROVEN BY ORAL EVIDENCE. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose. ID.. ID. whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case. 15. for the heirs of Valentin Salao. Plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that donation. satisfactory and convincing evidence. ID. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty bears from the date of registration. PROOF OF. — Article 1457 of the Civil Code allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. MORAL DAMAGES. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond as being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. . Purely parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their claim that in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao is legally untenable. 10. ACTIONS. Their causes of action turned out to be unfounded. 11. Plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear. if they had any rigths at all. Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because oral evidence can be easily fabricated. Salao. of her half-share in the two fishponds. 14.

Rizal begot four children named Patricio. Patricio.418 (3) Fishpond inherited from her parents 6. Alejandra. His eldest son. J : p This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran. ATTORNEYS' FEES. Juan and Ambrosia. 1895 with a bodega for salt 11. After her death. there would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the defendants for attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. 1919 (Exh. Patricio. Aguinaldo 5. His widow died on May 28. The facts are as follows: The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit. Valentin Salao. 12 acres and 5 centares purchased from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by Valentina Ignacio on November 9. namely. her three children. It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29. 21).454 (9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January 27.989 (4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt 50. were as follows: Nature of Land Area in square meters (1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents. in representation of his deceased father.700 (2) Fishpond inherited from her parents 7. Hermosa. if any. and her grandson. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party. The deed was signed by her four legal heirs. and the other half of which was owned by her co-owner.205 (6) Fishpond 8. Alejandra. DECISION AQUINO.424 square meters. Bataan involves the law of trusts and prescription.000 (7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10. all located at Barrio Dampalit. Ana 21. the other half was owned by A.16. Valentin Salao. Josefa Sta. Manuel Salao died in 1885.217 (8) Riceland 50. Malabon. The lands left by Valentina Ignacio. her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia. died in 1886 survived by his only child. Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. — Where it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action. 1914.065 prcd . It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. 1918 but notarized on May 22. AWARD THEREOF NOT JUST AND PROPER IN INSTANT CASE. 1890 with a house and two camarins thereon 8. There is no documentary evidence as to what properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate. Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza.469 (5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare.

Lubao. and Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew. with an area of 11. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture. the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of Bataan.75. Salao. in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran. Salao. It was expressly stipulated that Ambrosia Salao was not obligated to render any accounting of her administration "en consideracion al resultado satisfactorio de sus gestiones. en la forma como se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las adjudicaciones" (page 20. 21). secured a Torrens title. that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao. Pampanga (Exh. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte de Valentina Ignacio y Mendoza. 21). Juan Y. Salao.(10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia Salao.505 TOTAL 179. mejoradas los bienes y pagadas por ella las contribuciones" pages 2 and 11. Sr.365. .501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive share.905 square meters. Exh. 1907 and 1908 as shown in their Exhibits 8. Exh.469 square meters. OCT No. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs. However. a smaller fishpond with an area of 6. On the other hand. Valentin Salao. Valentin Salao (who was then already forty-eight years old) was given the biggest fishpond with an area of 50. It is also known as Lot No. there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y. 1906. was beneficial to Valentin. Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory. In satisfaction of his distributive share. ha venido administrando sus bienes la referida Ambrosia Salao" "cuya administracion lo ha sido a satisfaccion de todos los herederos y por designacion los mismos". and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. of which 2. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga. Salao. 9.173 square meters were sold to Justa Yongco 9.25. Those parcels of land had an aggregate appraised value of P13. Sr. 14).678 square meters. and Ambrosia Salao.989 square meters and the riceland with a net area of 9. y podran inmediatamente tomar posesion de sus bienes. which was obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands. So in the deed of partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of P5. By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueños absolutos de sus respectivas propiedadas. That arrangement. The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children.135. Sr. In that deed of partition (Exh. 10 and 13.022 square meters To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share valued at P8.

Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the Calunuran fishpond
to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption was one year. In the deed of sale (Exh. 19) Ambrosia
confirmed that she and her brother Juan were the dueños proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On December
7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease for an
annual canon of P128 (Exh. 19-a).
After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914 Ambrosia and Juan sold it under
pacto de retro to Eligio Naval for the sum of P3,360. The period of redemption was also one year (Exh.
20). The fishpond was later redeemed and Naval reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a document dated
October 5, 1916 (Exh. 20-a).
llcd

The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals that the Calunuran
fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao,
while the Pinañganacan fishpond (subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952
square meters (Exh. 22).
Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911 Ambrosia Salao bought for four
thousand pesos from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of swampland planted to bakawan and nipa
with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and 73 centares located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinañganacan, Lubao,
Pampanga (Exh. 17-d).
The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144, Court of First
Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an application for the registration
of that land in their names on January 15, 1916. They alleged in their petition that "han adquirido dicho
terreno por partes iguales y por la compra a los herederos del finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17a).
At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir, Ambrosia testified for the applicants.
On that same day Judge Moir rendered a decision, stating, inter alia, that the heirs of Engracio Santiago
had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao. Judge Moir "ordena la adjudicacion y registro del
terreno solicitado a nombre de Juan Salao, mayor de edad y de estado casado y de s esposa Diega Santiago
y Ambrosia Salao, de estado soltera y mayor de edad, en participaciones iguales" (Exh. 17-e).
On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was
issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.
That Pinañganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre (Exh.
23). It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond (See sketch, Exh. 1).
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years (Exh. C). His nephew, Valentin
Salao, died on February 9, 1933 at the age of sixty years according to the death certificate (Exh. A.
However, if according to Exhibit 21, he was forty-eight years old in 1918, he would be sixty-three years
old in 1933).

The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December 28, 1934 between his
two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza (Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the
two fishponds which he had inherited in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.
If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds with a total area of
145 hectares registered in 1911 and 1917 in the names of his aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan
Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that no mention of such interest was made in the extrajudicial
partition of his estate in 1934.
It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita
Salao, three lots located at Barrio Dampalit with a total area of 5,832 square meters (Exh. L). As donee
Benita Salao signed the deed of donation.
On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the children of her sister,
Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of
Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.
But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that she thought of
filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and
which had become the sole property of Juan Salao y Santiago (Juani).
On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's
death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she
donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr.
(Juani). At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the other half of the
said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli). The deed of donation
included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the
said properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2 or M).
The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page 39, Defendants' Record on Appeal).
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951
informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani
took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share
of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000 (Exh. K).
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not
have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof were his father Banli and his aunt
Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he (Juani) was the donee of
Ambrosia's one-half share (Exh. K-1).
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on
January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on
January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the
reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145
hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his
father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he
asked for moral damages amounting to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than
P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the
receivership. Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by his widow,
Mercedes Pascual, and his six children and by the administrator of his estate.
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question were adjudicated
to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties would remain under
administration during the pendency of this case (page 181, Defendants' Record on Appeal).
After trial the lower court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten printed pages dismissed the
amended complaint and the counter-claim. In sixty-seven printed pages it made a laborious recital of the
testimonies of plaintiffs' fourteen witnesses, Gregorio Marcelo, Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo
Mangali, Fidel de la Cruz, Dionisio Manalili, Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio Sapno, Elias Manies,
Basilio Atienza, Benita Salao, Emilio Cagui, Damaso de la Peña, Arturo Alcuriza and Francisco
Buensuceso, and the testimonies of defendants' six witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia, Tiburcio
Lingad, Doctor Wenceslao Pascual, Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao. (Plaintiffs presented Regino
Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal witness).
The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao
and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinañganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a coownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirs after her death in 1914;
that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when her
estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.
The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914 to 1918 misled the plaintiffs and
their witnesses and caused them to believe erroneously that there was a co-ownership in 1905 or
thereabouts. The trial court speculated that if Valentin had a hand in the conversion into fishponds of the
Calunuran and Lewa lands, he must have done so on a salary or profit-sharing basis. It conjectured that
Valentin's children and grandchildren were given by Ambrosia Salao a portion of the earnings of the
fishponds as a reward for his services or because of Ambrosia's affection for her grandnieces.
The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime to assail the Torrens titles of Juan
and Ambrosia signified that "he was not a co-owner" of the fishponds. It did not give credence to the
testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses because their memories could not be trusted and because no strong
documentary evidence supported the declarations. Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged trust
were already dead.
It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it were void Juan S. Salao, Jr., the
donee, would nevertheless be the sole legal heir of the donor, Ambrosia Salao, and would inherit the
properties donated to him.
LexLib

Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed because their action for reconveyance was dismissed. The
defendants appealed because their counterclaim for damages was dismissed.

The plaintiffs contend that the answer of Juan S. 30014-R). 185 and 472 were issued "more than 37 years ago" in the names of Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia under the circumstances set forth in Juan S. — An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page references" to the contents of the brief (Sec. As noted in an old case. (Banli) and Ambrosia Salao. 16[a] Rule 46. 181). regarding the Dampalit property as early as 1904 or 1905. However. Under section 6. Juan S. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied "each and all the allegations" in paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action with the qualification that Original Certificates of Title Nos.'s "positive defenses" and "not under the circumstances stated in the amended complaint". in justice to other litigants. they might make a competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case and lighten the burden of the Court. were made to the Court of Appeals. which deal with factual and legal issues. Alejandra and Valentin. 1970. Salao. Section 7 of the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specifically with . 38 Phil. February 18. 1940 Rules of Court). L-27654. Rule 48 of the 1940 Rules of Court. 17. See In re Almacen.R. unless the attorneys who desire us to make such examination have themselves taken the trouble to read the record and brief it in accordance with our rules" (Palarca vs. Their statements of the case and the facts do not contain "page references to the record" as required in section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46. that the 47-hectare Calunuran fishpond was verbally adjudicated to Valentin Salao in the 1919 partition and that there was a verbal stipulation to register "said lands in the name only of Juan Y. Rule 48. 1966 (CA-G. Sr. motions and interlocutory matters (Alzua and Arnalot vs. 573). Salao. 31 SCRA 562. formerly section 17. 177. as the amounts involved exceed two hundred thousand pesos. twenty-one witnesses having testified). Lawyers for appellants. was in effect an admission of the allegations in their first cause of action that there was a co-ownership among Ambrosia. Jr. In paragraphs 1 to 14 of their first cause of action they made certain averments to establish their theory that Valentin Salao had a one-third interest in the two-fishponds which were registered in the names of Juan Y. Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court the answer should "contain either a specific denial or a statement of matters in avoidance of the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint". the Court of Appeals elevated the case to this Court in its resolution of October 3.553 pages in this case. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements prescribed in section 16. 21 Phil. Salao. Jr. when they prepare their briefs. Baguisi. would do well to read and re-read section 16 of Rule 46. Sec. 1964 Rules of Court.The appeals. No. this Court decides hundreds of cases every year and in addition resolves in minute orders an exceptionally considerable number of petitions. 395. undertake to make an examination of the voluminous transcript of the testimony (1. Salao. Plaintiffs' appeal. Salao". What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work upon this Court is so great that we cannot. all surnamed Salao. The plaintiffs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not comply with that requirement. Juan. 308. Johnson. that the common funds were invested in the acquisition of the two fishponds. That contention is unfounded. Jr. Plaintiffs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue.

it was held that defendant's specific denial was really a general denial which was tantamount to an admission of the allegations of the complaint and which justified judgment on the pleadings. 9). It did not interpose any affirmative defenses. he did so because he found it impracticable to state piecemeal his own version as to the acquisition of the two fishponds or to make a tedious and repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting the allegations of the first cause of action. They mentioned trust for the first time on page 2 of their appellants' brief. allegedly violated. That is not the situation in this case. it is necessary to make some exegesis on the nature of trusts ( fideicomisos). 74 Phil. Obviously. Santos Investments. "The defendant may set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he may have. shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial". 8). 712). Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in his "positive defenses" the matters in avoidance of plaintiffs' first cause of action which supported his denials of paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action. 646). Sr. "an affirmative defense is an allegation of new matter which. would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff". That issue is tied up with the question of whether plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had already prescribed. The existence of a trust was not definitely alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. Salao."A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor. On the other hand. Salao. "Material averments in the complaint. What defendant Juan S. It did not set forth in its answer any matter by way of confession and avoidance. All such grounds of defenses as would raise issues of fact not arising upon the preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. Under those circumstances.J. We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The case of El Hogar Filipino vs. The other nine assignments of error of the plaintiffs may be reduced to the decisive issue of whether the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. whenever practicable.S. to the beneficial enjoyment of property. In the El Hogar case the defendant filed a laconic answer containing the statement that it denied "generally and specifically each and every allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint". 46 Phil. Rule 6. expressly or impliedly. shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied" (Sec. The plaintiffs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which defendant" Juan S. To determine if the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the enforcement of a trust. a trust is defined as the right. enforceable solely in equity. It may be noted that under the present Rules of Court a "negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential to the plaintiff's cause or causes of action". and Ambrosia Salao. one in whom confidence is reposed as . the legal title to which is vested in another. relations. while admitting the material allegations of the complaint.each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and. Trusts in Anglo-American jurisprudence were derived from the fideicommissa of the Roman law (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Salao. Affirmative defenses include all matters set up "by way of confession and avoidance". Rules of Court). but the word 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties. 642. other than those as to the amount of damage. and responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts" (89 C. "In its technical legal sense. Jr. (Sec. Abadilla. 79 and similar cases is distinguishable from the instant case. 5.

either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid. "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud. They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C. Graño.J. the person obtaining it is by force of law. Civil Code). Court of Appeals. It does not arise "by agreement or intention. L-31569.. 35). Purely parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes" (Art. Civil Code)." (89 C. Dalandan. "Trusts are either express or implied. 546). and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary" (Art. by some writing or deed. but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. without being expressed. Martinez vs.J. the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction. 21 SCRA 543. "No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust. Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment. independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C. (Gayondato vs. September 28. 724). 244).S. 96 Phil. 981. 179. 53 SCRA 168. Arro. 1444. 722). "A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or construction of law. 725). Civil Code). Art. Such a constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense.J. real.J. 85 Phil. In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished from a resulting trust. a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words.I.S. Treasurer of the P. "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties.J. 722). Examples of resulting trusts are found in articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. (See Padilla vs. . Tuason de Perez vs. 49 Phil. 1456. "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by parol evidence. L-19012. but by operation of law. Julio vs.regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee. Their claim that in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao is legally untenable. or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C. October 30.S. 1443 and 1457). 505). 42 Phil. money or choses in action (Pacheco vs. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties.S. "Implied trusts are those which. but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice". 1440. 1973. it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid. a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law. 1441.S. courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party". but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C. or will. Arts. or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity. On the other hand. 726-727). personal. There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain property. 1967. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art. or arising by operation of law". Thus. Caluag. LibLex Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent.

of which sixteen hectares pertained to Valentina Ignacio and eleven hectares represented Manuel Salao's estate. who died in 1885. But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. nay the very root. never bothered for a period of nearly forty years to procure any documentary evidence to establish his supposed interest or participation in the two fishponds is very suggestive of the absence of such interest. The fact that Valentin Salao and his successors-in-interest. . In their amended complaint. Ambrosia. 21). Alejandra and Valentin partitioned twenty-eight hectares of lands located in Barrio Dampalit is not credible. and necessarily. 50. That means that any transaction affecting the registered land should be evidenced by a registerable deed. They theorized that the eleven hectares "were. Rizal. the nucleus. In their brief they alleged that the fishponds. It is quite improbable because the alleged estate of Manuel Salao was likewise not satisfactorily proven. Incredible because for the partition of the seventeen hectares of land left by Valentina Ignacio an elaborate "Escritura de Particion" consisting of twenty-two pages had to be executed by the four Salao heirs. regarding the two fishponds? Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust. the plaintiffs. Malabon. Manuel Salao was not even mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints. The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident when it is borne in mind that the two fishponds were registered land and "the act of registration" is "the operative act" that conveys and affects the land (Sec. Is plaintiffs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust. It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would be adjudicated to Valentin Salao merely by word of mouth. As noted by the defendants.It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already in force when the action herein was instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable: parol evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty. they alleged that the co-ownership was over seven hectares of fishponds located in Barrio Dampalit. plaintiffs-appellants' brief). for the partition of one hundred forty-five hectares of fishponds among three of the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication would not have sufficed. resulting or constructive. ricelands and saltbeds owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an area of twenty-eight hectares. The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered about seventeen hectares of fishponds and ricelands (Exh. those eleven hectares would have been partitioned in writing as in the case of the seventeen hectares belonging to Valentina Ignacio's estate. Act No. Benita Salao's testimony that in 1918 or 1919 Juan. of the property now in litigation" (page 6. 496). Surely. If at the time that partition was made there were eleven hectares of land in Barrio Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao. The trial court's firm conclusion that there was no community of property during the lifetime of Valentina Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by defendants' documentary evidence. But the eleven hectares were not proven by any trustworthy evidence. The existence of the alleged co-ownership over the lands supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention that the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao. The plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that there was a co-ownership over two hectares of land left by Manuel Salao.

according to the plaintiffs. 593). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. The plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose. 13. satisfactory and convincing evidence. And even assuming that there was an implied trust. Now. Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient hearsay. "Trusts. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond as being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. 64 Phil. Molo-Peckson.25 to ambrosia Salao. Not a shred of documentary evidence shows Valentin's participation in the two fishponds. Act 496). There was no such stipulation. Suarez vs. evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. Santa Juana vs. Salao. upon vague and inconclusive proof .The matter may be viewed from another angle. On the other hand. in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate Valentin was obligated to pay P3. 21). 1267. the deed of partition for Valentina Ignacio's estate was notarized in 1919 (Exh. Court of Appeals. Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because oral evidence can be easily fabricated. 17-18). . equivocal or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. — In order to establish a trust in real property by parol evidence. 31 Phil. Tirambulo. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance. contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title. 1273). 47. "Once a title is registered. Quiñiano vs. without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court. If. Sr. the owner may rest secure.. A trust cannot be established. Ambrosia administered the two fishponds and was the custodian of its earnings. certainty of proof .355. 110). 116 Phil. 59 Phil. 50 Phil. a Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Sec. The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which. Ramos. Rivera and Dizon. "Trust and trustee. L-19872. As already stated. the proof should be as fully convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. Del Rosario. for the heirs of Valentin Salao. or sitting in the mirador de su casa. December 3. 303). Saleeby. — Where a trust is to be established by oral proof. 1974. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land. 590. as already noted. the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown. to avoid the possibility of losing his land" (Legarda and Prieto vs." (Syllabus. Sr. The plaintiffs assert that the two fishponds were verbally partitioned also in 1919 and that the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao as his share. Salao. plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by prescription or laches (Ramos vs. proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing (Yumul vs." (Syllabus. allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. establishment of trust by parol evidence. 61 SCRA 284. then it could have been easily stipulated in the deed partitioning Valentina Ignacio's estate that the amount due from Valentin would just be deducted by Ambrosia from his share of the earnings of the two fishponds. There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y.

representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters. Juan Jr. Valentin Salao.." (Buenaventura vs. Inc. 1972. 114 Phil 377). if they had any rights at all. Diaz vs. together with his first cousin. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line. Defendants' appeal. "Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the claim. 39 SCRA 221. 440-441). The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. . — The defendants dispute the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs filed their action in good faith. 435. 103 Phil. Salao. Navarro.L-23024. moral damages. Iturralde. it is no longer necessary to pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. be destructive of the right itself. the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. They ask for P25. "Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may. We hold that defendants' appeal is not meritorious.J. The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-grandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest. Under Act No. 266). Civil Code). vs. 190. Valentin Salao. Even if the donation were declared void. since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights more strongly when they are threatened or invaded". according to the circumstances. Alzona vs. of her one-half share in the two fishponds. if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died. 972. citing Esguerra vs. the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten years (Sec 40. 37 Phil. 1011. whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case. 5 Phil. 521). Jr. Varsity Hills.S. February 29. The record shows that the plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of this case which lasted from 1954 to 1959. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. 261.000 attorney's fees and litigation expenses and. 21 Phil. Benita Salao. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights (92 C. They obviously incurred considerable expenses in prosecuting their case. Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond. slept on their rights. whether they be of the full or half blood (Art. May 31. yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed their claim indicate their sincerity and good faith. The defendants contend that they are entitled to damages because the plaintiffs acted maliciously or in bad faith in suing them. L-30889. Tecson. (Juani). 176). the daughter of Valentin. her nearest relative within the third degree. David. 1971. Capunitan and Reyes. 43 SCRA 503. Although their causes of action turned out to be unfounded. The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that donation. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew. Jr. in addition. Gorricho and Aguado. They fought tenaciously. Juan. 518. would have been also her legal heir.

The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the law (Solis & Yarisantos vs.. and Martin. it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs' action was manifestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass the defendants. Antonio. Court of Appeals. vs.R. "The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. G. Luy Kim Guan. 61 O. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of common ancestors.G. 1967. Heirs of Justiva vs. 6959). 20 SCRA 61). May 16. was designated to sit in the Second Division. The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which provides that attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff" (defendant is a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable" that attorney's fees should be awarded. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Herrera vs. such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. Ramos vs. No pronouncement as to costs. L-23729. Gustilo. 1965. concur. Salao. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those articles. March 16. took no part. L-17022. 1976) . An award for damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and proper. Concepcion. Inc. No. L-26699. J. the spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio. 771. Martin.. of the Second Division). 110 Phil. Arevalo. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. August 14. The instant case is not among the cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein moral damages may be recovered. 1020. Jr. JJ. It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. J. (Chairman). Ramos. Salvador.. Barredo. and that plaintiffs' action was based on their honest supposition that the funds used in the acquisition of the lands in litigation were earnings of the properties allegedly inherited from Manuel Salao. supra). SO ORDERED." (Barreto vs. 99 Phil.. 779). Considering those circumstances. 14 SCRA 887. Fernando (Chairman. But once it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action there would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the defendants for attorney's fees and litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. ||| (Salao v. 1028.

such as an heir. ID. Crisostomo. Gatchalian & Sison for petitioner-appellant. the argument of the petitioner that only the facts alleged in the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency was properly overruled and the lower court was correct in considering the evidence presented during the hearing of said motion to prove petitioner's lack of legal capacity to commence the proceedings. — The rule is that the hearing on the motion to dismiss should be conducted as an ordinary hearing where the parties are allowed to present evidence. Delgado. the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct. Flores.) Consequently. Zambales. L-17759. Espinosa vs. PLEADING AND PRACTICE. On May 27. p. (Trillana vs. WHEN SISTER OF DECEDENT MAY NOT BE APPOINTED.. APPOINTMENT. WHEN EVIDENCE MAY BE PRESENTED. 3807.And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings. (Asejo vs. Barrios. 1171). DIONISIO LINDAYAG. CONCEPT OF "AN INTERESTED PERSON" IN THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT. 2. 78 Phil. 70 Phil. — Where it is undisputed that the decedent left a husband and three legally adopted children. and not merely indirect or contingent.. December 17. oppositors-appellees. petitioner-appellant. Gaz. she being neither an heir nor a creditor thereof. ET AL. 311). 10. or one who has a claim against the estate.R. 3. Leonoso. DECISION DIZON. MOTION TO DISMISS. filed with the Court of First Instance of said province a verified petition for . No. Isabel V. WHO MAY BE APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR. Saguinsin.. ID.. SYLLABUS 1. No. 89 Phil. a petition for issuance of letters of administration in favor of the sister of said decedent was properly dismissed for lack of interest in the estate. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo. vs.] ISABEL V. 1962. LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS AS GROUND. where the motion to discuss the petition was grounded on the petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings. — An interest party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate. J : p On November 10. SAGUINSIN.. ID. such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 Off. 710. 467. 1960 her sister. Gaz. 1959 Maria V. 07 44 Off. HEARING. Macapagal & Dizon for oppositors-appellees. except when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint r of the petition to state a cause of action..EN BANC [G. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

On July 28. surviving husband. Concepcion and Catherine. No pronouncement as to costs. sister of the deceased. Saguinsin. all surnamed Lindayag who were adopted by the deceased on July 6. No. the decedent left no debts at the time of her death. 1171). According to Section 2. the Court issued the following order of dismissal: "It appearing that the herein petitioner is only a sister of the deceased Maria V. dated July 6. the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct. the surviving spouse. On June 21. natural or illegitimate child. "WHEREFORE. in his behalf and in representation of the minors Jesus. that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the provinces of Zambales and Bulacan worth approximately P100. and (4) Ines V. after due hearing in the motion aforesaid. 311) . and that. Zambales." Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the above order having been denied. 70 years of age. sister of the deceased. Bulacan. residing at Olongapo.G. and that the surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the ground that they want to settle the estate extra-judicially among them to avoid unnecessary expenses in prosecuting this case. and not merely indirect or contingent.R. she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. that the herein petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in the estate. 1960. And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings. The motion alleged that the late Maria V. Lindayag. Crisostomo. or one who has a claim against the estate. 1953 decreeing the adoption of said minors by the descendent and her husband was attached to the motion. let this case be dismissed. and Catherine. sister of the deceased. 54 years of age. Sacdalan. ages and residence of her surviving heirs were: (1) Dionisio Lindayag. 46 years of age. a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an "interested person".the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said deceased. residing at Hagonoy. Calayag. such as an heir. filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of petitioner's lack of interest in the estate. Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. that the deceased is survived by her husband and her three (3) adopted children named: Jesus. The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Barrios. G. L3378. and Catherine. Lindayag. August 22. 60 years of age.000. (3) Aurora V. Concepcion. Lindayag was survived by her husband — the movant — and legally adopted minor children named Jesus Concepcion. Espinosa vs. such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O. 1960 Dionisio V. An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate. In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts alleged in the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency. that the names. alleging. (2) Isabel V. 1951. both residing at Paombong. A certified true copy of the decision of the Justice of the Peace of Olongapo. the Court finds the oppositors' opposition to be well taken. (Trillana vs. she took the present appeal. Lindayag. the descendent having left no legitimate. 1953. among other things. all surnamed Lindayag. Zambales. Bulacan. 70 Phil. as far as petitioner knew. all surnamed Lindayag.

Barrera. Labrador. the rule is that at said hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of evidence. Reyes. No. PRIMITIVA MIRANO.R. Diokno for petitioners.L. L-17759. vs.B. through a motion to dismiss her petition.. with costs. Bengzon. as already stated heretofore. Upon these facts — which petitioner does not dispute — it is manifest that she is not an heir of her deceased sister and. 3832). No. only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into account is not entirely correct. Paredes. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING. No. CASIANO AMPONIN and GLICERIA ABRENICA. JULIANA MENDOZA. for that purpose. the hearing should be conducted as an ordinary hearing. May 16. Jose W. and it has been held that.] DOROTEO BANAWA. Padilla. 44 O. except when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action (Asejo vs. G. p. the order appealed from is affirmed. 10. JJ. by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. To the contrary. 1980. JUANA MIRANO and MARCIANO MIRANO. Lindayag was disputed. established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband but three legally adopted children named Jesus.. Recto Law Office for respondents. In the present case. Concepcion. J. and Catherine. all surnamed Lindayag. Concepcion. C. was fully substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing. 467.. and the parties should be allowed to present evidence. December 17. the motion to dismiss the petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which.J. Bautista Angelo. Regala and Makalintal. respondents.R. concur. L-24750. Lindayag. DECISION . therefore. 1962) FIRST DIVISION [G. 78 Phil. took no part. petitioners. In the course of the hearing held in connection with said motion. evidence was introduced in support thereof which according to the lower court.Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. ||| (Saguinsin v. GREGORIA MIRANO. Leonoso.G. Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is filed. has no material and direct interest in her estate.

Appellants spouses being childless. Batangas. 1956.. SO ORDERED. "(c) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Roman Biscocho. and No. to be null and void. 4 As found by the Court of Appeals. dated April 4. a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Paula Biscocho and Maria Carmen Mendoza in favor of Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Plaintiffs-Appellees. as well as Tax Declarations No.500 and attorney's fees in the amount of P500. et al.R.FERNANDEZ. 1965. and "(e) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs actual damages in the amount of P4. "(b) Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the said parcels of land to the plaintiffs. entitled "Primitiva Mirano.00. They supported her. Maria Mirano. gave her money." The judgment of the lower court which was affirmed reads as follows: "WHEREFORE. Taal. judgment is hereby rendered: "(a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of the two parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint. the dispositive part of which is: "In view of the foregoing. Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. evidenced by Exhibit 'D' executed by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza in favor of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica. They have been substituted by the petitioners Casiano Amponin and his wife Gliceria Abrenica. legally adopted daughter of one of the deceased petitioners and donee of the Carsuche property. Defendants-Appellants". the facts are: "It appears that sometime in 1911. Said motion was denied on June 28. and the costs of this action. with costs against defendants-appellants. 1965. 26845 in the names of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica. as evidenced by Exhibit 'E' and its registration in the registry of deeds of Batangas. et al. 1965 1 in CA-G. and who was then about nine years old. 1940." 2 The spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza both died during the pendency of this case in the Court of Appeals. J : p This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 12. and the registration of the said deed of donation in the registry of deeds of Batangas. "(d) Declaring null and void the deed of donation. 23597-R. writing and arithmetic. treated and reared her up like their own child. No. was taken in by the appellants-spouses. They hired a private tutor to teach her the rudiments of reading. Doroteo Banawa. dated August 7. the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed. 3 The petitioners filed on May 20. 26818 in the names of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. in the latter's house in Mahabang Lodlod. versus. .. a niece of appellant Juliana Mendoza.

1921. Plaintiffs' evidence upon this point tends to show that the acquisition of the said parcel of land was pursuant to a deed of sale contained in a public instrument acknowledged before Notary Public Ramon A.00 for stamps in the name of Maria Mirano since 1923 (Exhs. A parcel of sugar land situated in the barrio of Carsuche. moreover. "By contrast. the spouses opened up a store for general merchandise in barrio Lutucan. who are the children of a deceased brother. 'A-1' to 'A-7'). Sariaya. or the Iba Property.000.093 square meters. by the property of Leodovico Garcia. and on the West. Gregorio de la Rosa and Andres Moratilla. Maria Mirano died in Taal. 19786 in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed at P2. after a lingering illness. Defendant Doroteo Banawa impliedly admitted the execution of this notarial document when he declared that in the execution of the document concerning the purchase of the Iba property from Punzalan the notary public charged him P20.210. Martin Mirano. on the South. by the properties of Filomeno Diomampo. Maria reciprocated their care and affection by helping with the household chores. Bounded on the North. Bureau of Libraries. Juana and Marciano. "On July 31. "The parties agree that the Iba Property was originally owned by Placido Punzalan from whom it was acquired on May 5. Under Tax Declaration No. At the time of her death she left as her only nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs.' "For purposes of clearness and convenience. on the East. more or less.200 square meters. and Gregoria. we shall treat and discuss the two separately. the same having been secured from an original copy on file with the Division of Archives. with an area of 44. Batangas. on the East. The deed of sale in question states that the Iba property consisted formerly of two parcels of land and that they were sold for the amount of P2. a photostatic copy of which was introduced in evidence as Exhibit 'A'. Batangas while still living with the spouses. by Ravine.00 and another P5. Batangas. "The parties do not dispute the identity of the two parcels of land in controversy. namely Primitiva Mirano. 1949. '2. on the South. by the property of Gregorio Maria Aniversario (now Doroteo Banawa). and since the respective assertions and evidences adduced by the parties regarding the two parcels of land are in sharp divergence.00 in favor of Maria Mirano.00. Taal. by the property of Gregorio Amponin. defendants' claim of ownership over the Iba property is predicated upon their assertion that the money used in buying said land pertained to the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Bounded on the North. Under Tax Declaration No.760. Defendants contend that since 1919 Placido Punzalan borrowed money from .clothes and even jewelry. by an Alley. and on the West. which are described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as follows: '1. Cabrera on the date aforesaid. Quezon. we shall refer to the first parcel as the Iba Property and to the second parcel as the Carsuche property and. A parcel of sugar land situated in the Barrio of Iba. Taal. from which they derived considerable income and which enabled them to acquire several parcels of land.00. all surnamed Mirano. with an area of 54. more or less. by the property of Agapito Aro and Alley. who is a surviving sister. by the property of Agapito Aro. "Parcel 1. "A few years later. 25994 in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed at P2.

"Parcel 2.200. however. they agreed on the purchase price of P3.00 of which a down payment of P1. Ilagan would not accept at first. the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. The defendants.700. but as the total value of the three loans was P4. asked the latter's permission to use his typewriter on which he prepared a document in English and which he asked Atty. who was a classmate of Atty. however. on the other hand.defendant spouses on three different occasions for the sums of P1. they would continue to be the owners thereof. or the Carsuche Property. that after paying him P20. Ilagan nor the private writing supposedly prepared by Roman Biscocho was presented before the lower court. '9'). on the other hand.00. 1936 (Exh. Defendants likewise maintain that the sale was made to appear in favor of Maria Mirano because said spouses being already old. they wanted to leave something to Maria Mirano for her to lean upon when they would have been gone. They.00 with him when the deed was prepared by the notary public. went to the office of Atty.080. assert that the sale was evidenced by a private writing prepared in the handwriting of Roman Biscocho and that it was in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Batangas. Roman Biscocho. the plaintiffs presented Atty. The document of sale stated the price to be only P2.800.200. Maria Mirano. that the document involved the sale of the Carsuche property in favor of Maria Mirano.00 in view of the fact that Doroteo Banawa had only P25.000. to wit: Roman Biscocho. Maria supposedly expressed her conformity to and appreciation for the said arrangement.00.00. The plaintiffs claim that the sale was evidenced by a public instrument executed before and ratified by Notary Public Vicente Ilagan of Taal. There is. '1'. Regino Aro. made Maria understand that although the property was placed under her name. Punzalan had to reimburse to said spouses the difference of P380.00 and P1. respectively.080. Ilagan to ratify. Vicente Ilagan and Roman Biscocho to testify upon the execution of the aforesaid public instrument in December. Upon the failure of Placido Punzalan to discharge said obligations in 1921. to administer and enjoy the fruits of the same as long as they live. an additional sum of P100.00 was given to Roman Biscocho. Doroteo Banawa asked Atty. that Atty. Ilagan translated into Tagalog the contents of the said document to the parties and. Neither the public instrument allegedly ratified by Atty. respectively. 1935. A few days . his sister Paula Biscocho. These two declared that sometime in December.00 for every one thousand pesos mentioned as the consideration of the contract. and that she would become the owner of the land only after their death. the witnesses. "Doroteo Banawa.00 was made and. a sharp conflict of evidence between the parties concerning the form of the document evidencing the same and in whose favor the sale was made at that time.700. stated that on being offered the Carsuche property by the owners thereof. and sisterin-law Carmen Mendoza. Aro. Maria Mirano was 19 years old when the deed of sale was executed. 1935. "There is no dispute between the parties that the Carsuche property was acquired by way of purchase from its original owners. P1. Ilagan in the law school. The sale took place sometime in December 1935. to which Atty. and '3'. Batangas.00. Ilagan answered in the affirmative.00. Paula Biscocho and Carmen Mendoza. Ilagan in Taal. accompanied by Atty. both payments being evidenced by a receipt dated December 15. he agreed to sell the land aforementioned to the spouses for P3. each of which was evidenced by Exhs. after which they all signed the same. and that the vendee mentioned in the said document was Maria Mirano. that Atty. '2'.00 for his services which Atty. and the latter was charging P10. Ilagan in Tagalog whether the document that he ratified was 'strong enough' (Matibay) to safeguard the rights of Maria Mirano. later. "After laying the proper predicate for the presentation of secondary evidence.

second. Roman Biscocho prepared in his own handwriting a private document selling the Carsuche property in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza for the sum of P4. parcel 1.00 increase in price. IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT SECTION 5. . This wish of Doroteo Banawa was done by his thumb-marking an affidavit. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 632 OF THE OLD CIVIL CODE IS TOO LITERAL AND IGNORES THE RATIONALE OF THE LEGAL PROVISION. assert title to the lands as heirs of Maria Mirano. respondents herein. III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT THE 'EXCEPTIVE CLAUSE' OF ARTICLE 1448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.000. to whom he expressed the desire to have the land declared in the name of Maria Mirano so that the latter might attend to the payment of taxes over the land whenever he was away. thus accounting for the fact that said land appears in the name of Maria Mirano in the tax declarations covering the same from 1934 to 1956." 6 The first. 7 As may be discerned from the assignment of errors. RULE 100 OF THE OLD RULES OF COURT DOES NOT APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE MARIA MIRANO WAS NOT LEGALLY ADOPTED. The plaintiffs appellees. Lot 2. Defendants-appellants.00. V THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING WITH RESPECT TO THE CARSUCHE PROPERTY (LOT NO. the basic issue is the ownership of the two parcels of land in question.later. thereafter brought said private document to the municipal treasurer of Taal Batangas. the vendors having asked for a P300. third and fourth errors assigned refer to the Iba property. while the fifth error assigned refers to the Carsuche property." 5 The petitioners assign the following errors: "I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT THE PLACING OF IBA PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF THE LATE MARIA MIRANO WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DONATION INTER-VIVOS. Doroteo Banawa. claim ownership over them by virtue of purchase from the original owners. petitioners herein. 2) THAT THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN 1940 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS DOROTEO BANAWA AND HIS WIFE JULIANA MENDOZA AND WHICH WAS DULY REGISTERED DID NOT IMPAIR THE PRETENDED SALE TO MARIA MIRANO.

Jan. et al. 38 SCRA 138. et al. Nov. vs. CA." The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Feb. 36 SCRA 611). vs. L-25563. March 27. L-28523 July 16. (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents [Garcia vs. 1971. Callejo. Shotwell. Peña. L-29831. 10 The finding of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which was sustained by the Court of Appeals is that what was donated by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza to Maria Mirano was the money used in the purchase of the lands in question. et al. 1971." The respondents 9 correctly pointed out that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court of First Instance of Batangas categorically stated that the placing of the properties in the name of Maria Mirano was in the nature of a donation intervivos. vs. (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken. 30 1971. 39 SCRA 227. et al... March 29. 136-137. under the facts and circumstances narrated by the petitioners. (3) there is grave abuse of discretion. 37 SCRA 130. L-28466. L-20264. the Court of Appeals said that. 1972. 1971. 1971. CA. Dela Cruz. vs. (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. vs. Buan. De Garcia. In rejecting the petitioners' contention that a donation mortis causa was executed. 30. giving its reasons and citing the applicable law and decisions of this Court on the matter. and (9) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record [Salazar vs. L-24000. Aro. 46 SCRA 27. June 30. This conclusion of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was supported by the testimony of Macario B. April 27. L-23024. The first error assigned reads: "The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that the placing of the Iba Property in the name of the late Maria Mirano was in the nature of a donation intervivos. L-22459.. 29. 33 SCRA 243]. Limjoco vs.. 31. 29. Gutierrez. L-29049. 41 SCRA 105. Viacrucis vs. L-28175. L-20656. Lorenzo.Considering that in the case at bar the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not contrary to those of the trial court. In Tolentino vs. 115. vs. 1970. Dec. L26490. et al. 1971. Sept. Quiñano. L-22519. CA. March 27. Pineda. July 28. CA. CA. 42 SCRA 68. Oct. 37 SCRA 663-669. Reyes. L-23096 & L-23376. 8 this Court held: "The findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on this Court (Tamayo vs. May 29. (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. 1971. The Court of First Instance made the same hypothetical conclusion. a minute scrutiny by this Court of said findings is not necessary. 1967. et al. 1971. Naga Dev. CA. unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation. CA. Lacson & Basilio vs. Nery. 142. Corp.. 40 SCRA 35. surmise and conjectures. 1970. de Jesus. 11 . L-21727. a nephew of the deceased Doroteo Banawa. et al. 21 SCRA 648]. However. CA. 44 SCRA 176. 1970. 27. et al. 44 SCRA 431. et al. (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. that the money used by Maria Mirano in the purchase of the Iba and Carsuche properties was given to her by Doroteo Banawa. all the issues raised by the petitioners shall be passed upon individually. et al. 38 SCRA 112-117. et al.. May 31. Simeon vs. the placing of the Iba property in the name of Maria Mirano — if it was to be called a donation at all — was not in the nature of a donation mortis causa but rather it would be in the nature of a donation inter-vivos. 1972. 1972. (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellees [Roque vs. 33 SCRA 622]. Gotamco Hermanas vs.

Maria Mirano purchased and paid for the said properties with her money. . then the money had belonged to her.00) que me ha pagado Maria Mirano . 14 Moreover. As a matter or fact. therefore. however. their nullity is based on the want of true consent of the parties. "Yes. the late spouses and their successorsin-interest. There is no intent to be bound or the true intent is hidden or concealed. and (2) a donation of lands by the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano. namely: the absolutely simulated contract and the relatively simulated one. In both instances. The purpose. the testimony of Vicente Ilagan. . . From the record. The petitioners had full knowledge of the facts surrounding the execution of the document of sale. They are equitably estopped 17 to deny that the transfer of the lands in question in favor of Maria Mirano was the actual and true intent of the parties as embodied in the documents of sale of the Iba and Carsuche properties. Such contracts are even generally regarded as fraudulent with intent of injuring third persons. 12 recites as follows: "Que en consideracion a la suma de Dos Mil Pesos moneda filipina (P2. 13 There are two kinds of simulated contracts. The conduct of the spouses at the time of the execution of the contracts are inconsistent with those which the petitioners. The petitioners' contention that "the contract of sale had been intended to be a contract of sale between the vendors and the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza" has no merit. It is also contended by the petitioners that the deeds of sale executed by the owners of the land in favor of Maria Mirano were simulated contracts intended to shortcut two different transactions: (1) a sale in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Exhibit "A".000. The transactions which transpired were purely: (1) donations of money or things representing or equivalent to money by the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano which could be made and accepted verbally. to the effect that he was asked by Doroteo Banawa in Tagalog: "Kung matibay ang documentong ito para kay Maria" 15 and to which query he answered. The documents are what they purport to be — contracts of sale from the vendors to the vendee. or by either of them. nor of concealment of intent of the parties as to the sale of the Iba property by the vendors in favor of Maria Mirano. The petitioners were present when the sales were made to Maria Mirano. sir". there is no showing of deception or fraud. Maria Mirano. and (2) purchase of lands by Maria Mirano with the use of that money or credits (pre-existing indebtedness in favor of the spouses) as consideration thereof. Their intention to make Maria Mirano the owner of the said parcels of land was clearly shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of the deeds of sale which influenced the vendors to believe that Maria Mirano was indeed the vendee in their agreement.". or to deceive or defraud third persons. now assert. of a simulated contract which may be annulled is to conceal the parties' true intent. the notary public before whom the deed of sale was executed. They were the ones who caused the titles to the properties to be placed in the name of Maria Mirano because they wished "that after our death Maria Mirano could have something for her maintenance". 16 supports this conclusion.If the money used by Maria Mirano in purchasing the properties was given to her by the spouses Doreteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. the deed of sale.

The petitioners submit that since there was transfer of title to the land in litigation to Maria Mirano when
the purchase price was in fact actually paid by the petitioners-spouses, an implied trust was created. The
present law on implied trust is Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one
party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having beneficial interest of the property.
The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However if the person to whom the
title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no
trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child."

The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code of the Philippines became effective on
August 30, 1950. Hence Article 1448 of said Code is not applicable. 18
Moreover, there is no showing that Maria Mirano bought the lands in question in trust for the petitioners.
The petitioners also claim that they have become owners of the properties by acquisitive prescription
under Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code which provides:
"Ownership and other real rights in immovable property shall prescribe by possession in good
faith and under a just title for ten years as between persons present and for twenty years as
between absentees."

The above-cited provision speaks of two essential requirements: (1) possession for ten (10) years as
between persons present and twenty (20) years, for absentees; and (2) a just title.
As regards the Iba property (Lot No. 1), petitioners have not presented any title, just or otherwise, to
support their claim. And Article 1954 of the Old Civil Code provides, further, that a "just title must be
proven; it never can be presumed."
Not having a just title, as required by Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code, the petitioners cannot invoke
prescription with respect to the Iba property.
llcd

The petitioners also assert ownership by acquisitive prescription over the Iba property under Section 41
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The pertinent portion of Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
"Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any
land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants,
or otherwise in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in
every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the persons
under disabilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by
prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or
through whom he claims must have been actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title
exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants . . ."

It is a fact that while Maria Mirano was alive she possessed the property in question as the owner thereof.
Hence, it is error for the petitioners to claim ownership over the Iba property by acquisitive prescription
under Article 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure for their possession of the said property became adverse
and exclusive only in July 1949 after Maria Mirano's death. From 1949 to the date of the filing in 1957
of the present action by the respondents only eight years had elapsed.

The second error assigned is:
"The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that petitioners' interpretation
of Article 632 of the Old Civil Code is too literal and ignores the rationale of the legal provision."

Article 632 of the Old Civil Code provides: "Donations of personal property may be made verbally or in
writing. Verbal donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the gift. In the absence of this requisite
the donation shall produce no effect, unless made in writing and accepted in the same form."
It is contended by the petitioners that oral donation of personal property requires simultaneous delivery
of the gift. As regards the Iba property, the consideration given by Maria Mirano for the purchase of the
said property from Placido Punzalan was the pre-existing debts of the latter to the spouses Doroteo
Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.
The contention of the petitioners that there was no simultaneous delivery of the credits to Maria Mirano
is not meritorious. Delivery may be actual or constructive.
Actual delivery consists in the giving of actual possession to the vendee or his agent, as for example, in
manually transferring the possession of a thing from the vendor to the vendee.
Constructive delivery is a general term comprehending all those acts which, although not conferring
physical possession of the thing, have been held by construction of law equivalent to acts of real delivery,
as for example, the giving of the key to the house, as constructive delivery of the house from the vendor
to the vendee.
In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of pre-existing obligations of the vendor,
Placido Punzalan, was simultaneous or concurrent with the constructive delivery thereof to Maria Mirano
when the spouses consented to the execution of the deed of sale of the Iba property in favor of Maria
Mirano. The execution of the said deed of sale constituted payment by the vendor, Placido Punzalan, of
his outstanding obligations due to the spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Consequently,
there was constructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of the spouses over the property in
question to Maria Mirano.
It is no longer necessary to discuss the third error assigned because of the holding that Article 1448 of
the New Civil Code has no retroactive application to the instant case.
Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioners urge that the donor-spouses are entitled to the land in
question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:
". . . In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption,
shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from
either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate
relatives who shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estate".

The submission of the petitioners is that extrajudicial adoption is within the contemplation and spirit of
this rule of reversion adoptiva. However, the rule involved specifically provides for the case of the
judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule of construction that when the language of the law is clear
and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
prcd

The fifth error assigned is:
"The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling with respect to the Carsuche
property (Lot No. 2) that the deed of sale executed in 1940 in favor of the petitioner Doroteo
Banawa and his wife Juliana Mendoza did not impair the pretended sale to Maria Mirano."

The Court of Appeals found that there was a sale of the Carsuche property in 1935 in favor of Maria
Mirano and that such sale was embodied in a public instrument. However, in 1940 the same land was
sold to the petitioners. The sale was duly registered. The petitioners immediately entered into the
possession of the land as owners.
The claim of the petitioners that they have acquired by acquisitive prescription the Carsuche property
(Lot No. 2) is meritorious.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Period of prescription as to real estate — An action
for recovery of title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within
ten years after the cause of action accrues."
That the aforesaid Section 40 governs the instant case is clear from Article 1116 of the New Civil Code
which provides that "prescriptions already running before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, shall be
governed by the laws previously in force." The prescriptive period commenced to run since 1940, the
date the sale in favor of the Banawas was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas. Hence the
Code of Civil Procedure governs.
The instant case, not having been filed within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued in
1940, prescribed under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1950 because the same was filed
only in 1957, seventeen (17) years later.
The possession of the Banawas over the Carsuche property ripened into full ownership in 1950, ten (10)
years after 1940, when the possession of the petitioner-spouses which was actual, open, public and
continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claims, commenced.
(Sec. 41, Code of Civil Procedure). The sale in favor of the Banawas was registered in 1940 with the
Register of Deeds of Batangas. The actual and adverse possession of the petitioner-spouses was
continued by their present successors.
The alleged bad faith of the petitioners in that they knew that the land was previously sold to Maria
Mirano is of no consequence because Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that there is
prescription "in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced." As held in one case ". . . guilty
knowledge is of no moment for under the law title by prescription may be acquired in whatever way
possession may have been commenced or continued and so long as the possessor had possessed the land
openly, publicly, continuously and under a claim of title for a period of over ten years." 19
The trial court found that the two parcels of land in question with a combined area of a little less than ten
(10) hectares had an average annual net yield of P500.00, A total amount of P4,500.00 as actual damages
was awarded in as much as Maria Mirano had been dead for nine (9) years when the decision of the trial
court was rendered. An adjustment should be made in view of the finding of this Court that the Carsuche
property, Lot 2, belongs to the petitioners.
LibLex

Guerrero. ||| (Banawa v. B-21. all surnamed SANTERO. Case No. Forty-five percent (45%) of the annual net income of P500. They should pay as actual damages the total amount of P6.000.The Iba property.975. Maria Mirano has been dead for about thirty-one (31) years now.00. No.00) as attorney's fees. Ambrosio Padilla. concurs in the result. guardian of VICTOR.R. L-24750. de . The petitioners are ordered to pay the private respondents the total amount of Six Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Five Pesos (P6. SO ORDERED.00 representing the net income for the period of thirty-one (31) years on the basis of P225.00. J : p Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23. is about 45% of the combined area of the two lands in question. et al. No. Teehankee (Chairman). "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. JJ. concur. the petitioners have been in possession of the Iba property and receiving the products thereof. WHEREFORE. the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed as to the Iba property (Lot No. During all this period. Sarino for respondent F. respondents.00 is equivalent to P225.975. Lot 1.00) as actual damages and the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1. ANSELMINA and MIGUEL..] ANSELMA DIAZ. May 16. 1) but reversed as to the Carsuche property (Lot No. The respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of P1. 1980) SECOND DIVISION [G.00 a year. without pronouncement as to costs.000. RODRIGO. 2) which was acquired by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza who could validly donate the said property to Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica.R. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN.. and FELIXBERTA PACURSA.P. DECISION PARAS. June 17. guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO. Jardin. Proc. De Castro and Melencio-Herrera. petitioners. Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners. vs. Pedro S. Mirano. 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. L-66574. 1987. G.

Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda." Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. de Santero. Proc. filed by Anselma Diaz. "b) Sp." 3 . LLphil Before the trial court. On May 20. was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24. de Santero. "e) Sp. 1980. as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be. de Santero. It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa. No. 6) that Pablo Santero. Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children. de Santero.Santero. Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976. Proc. Proc. de Santero. No." praying among other things. that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. Simona Pamuti Vda. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person. 1980. Judge Ildefonso M. Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. de Santero. de Santero. 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti. 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. 1976 1 and December 9. 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero. Proc. "c) Sp. de Santero. No. 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy. 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970. as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero. filed thru counsel. Proceedings Nos. from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti-Jardin dated March 13. there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit: "a) Sp. not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. B-4 and B-5. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pablo Santero. No. her Manifestation of March 14. 1977. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. as guardian of her minor children. Petitioner Anselma Diaz. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero.

A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14. The Decision erred in applying Art. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. II. the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9. her son and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero. IV. de Santero. 989 and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on intestate succession. Jardin who is a niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. . The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9. III. de Santero (Art. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. V. No." The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17. when Arts. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November 1. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G. The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. 992. the present petition for Review with the following: LexLib ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS I. 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art." "Costs against the oppositors-appellees. 1003). finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law applicable. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. 1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads — "WHEREFORE. 1980. 988) and prefering a niece. 982). who is a collateral relative (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 1984 hence. 69814-R. who are her direct descendants and/or grand children. de Santero. de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero. by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. Felisa P. 988. de Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero.R. and VI. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)? The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

because of the barrier provided for under Art. the family is in turn. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. the former. 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants. de Santero. who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero. nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: Cdpr ART. sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin. 992. So that while Art. 941. 6 Thus. in subsequent articles (990. the latter considers the privileged condition of the former. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family. On the other hand. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. and the resources of which it is thereby deprived. petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. Pablo Santero is a legitimate child. whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists. the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a . We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. whether legitimate or illegitimate. Justice Jose B. Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. 992. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother (Simona Pamuti)" 5 Petitioners' contention holds no water. de Santero. but with fine inconsistency.Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. by avoiding further grounds of resentment. but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life. the applicable law is the provision of Art. 970) to descendants. 992. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted. hated by the illegitimate child. In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code. They may have a natural tie of blood. 992 of the New Civil Code. in turn. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent. the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. the law does no more than recognize this truth. he is not an illegitimate child.L. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. to wit: "In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family. (943a).

Fernan (Chairman). and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Subsequently.choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation. 992 must be suppressed. JJ. de Santero.. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. No. 40-41). in which case Art.. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. June 17. Number 1.R. after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution. SO ORDERED. February 28. No. Gutierrez. cdll Lastly. this petition is hereby DISMISSED. took no part. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30. Such contention is without merit. The only power retained by the lower court.R. dated December 9. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1. concur. L-51263. or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. Hence. 1976. Judge Jose Raval issued an order. First Quater. which declared Felisa PamutiJardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. G. 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. 1976 are final and executory. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Intermediate Appellate Court. hence null and void. said orders which long became final and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1. 1976. Jr. and Cortes. L-66574." WHEREFORE. Padilla and Bidin. JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. ||| (Diaz v. pp. Volume 4. J. 1976 and December 9. The Hon. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992. It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. 1987) SECOND DIVISION [G. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.] . 1983. the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

(3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion. 1938. jointly with defendant Maria Cailles. COURT OF APPEALS. — Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo. CIVIL LAW. SYLLABUS 1. EVIDENCE. 1979. as found by the Court of Appeals. his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. 43476-R. — It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are. by right of representation. and what is more. however. JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE. No. respondents. REMEDIAL LAW. petitioner. exists in the case at bar. David for petitioner. (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken. absurd or impossible. promulgated on February 21. INC. EXCEPTIONS.) DECISION DE CASTRO. INTESTATE SUCCESSION. . (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation. hence. At most . claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that. in making its findings. his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married. reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor of petitioner: LLjur "(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of deceased FRANCISCA REYES. 2.R. Marquez & Marquez for private respondent. there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals. still he cannot. The exceptions are.CRESENCIANO LEONARDO. MARIA CAILLES. GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON REVIEW. went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. J : p Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. Porfirio C. vs. (Article 992. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN NOT ENTITLED TO INHERIT AB INTESTATO FROM THE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND RELATIVES OF HIS FATHER OR MOTHER. generally. CASE AT BAR. he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13. entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased. None of the abuse exceptions. final and conclusive upon this Court. (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.. Civil Code of the Philippines. and (5) when the Court of Appeals. petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father like the Deceased Francisco Reyes.

From said judgment. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944. claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. filed a complaint for ownership of properties. "(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected.00 as attorney's fees. petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo. private respondent James Bracewell. claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo. of the properties subject of this litigation. the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted. it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12. and "(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim. 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters. cdrep After hearing on the merits. Inc. sometime in September 1963. Sotero Leonardo. (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes. within 30 days from the finality of this decision. to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties. entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant. private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. delivering to him his share therein with legal interest. On October 29. partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles. "(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell to pay jointly and severally plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2. the son of her daughter. to be the properties of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell. described in the complaint. and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been made."(b) Declaring the properties. between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo. For his part." 1 From the record. Maria and Silvestra Cailles. and a grandson. private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which. 1964. Answering the complaint. private respondent herein. as already stated. finding the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit. sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes. "(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell. and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum. while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue. "(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision. Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. share and share alike. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Parañaque. the other defendant. this petition for review was filed on the following assignment of errors: . reversed the decision of the trial court" thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint. Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court. Maria Cailles. "(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs. subject of this complaint. the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.000.

erroneously thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes. '60').' "After declaring it in her name. '3') which describes the property as follows: '. declared in 1949 the property in her own name. she paid and declared the same in her own name. . por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea. . established their residence in Nueva Ecija. Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948. plaintiff decided to run after this property. The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. . Thinking that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes. Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax of the land. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell. III "RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER. y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio' "After declaring it in her name. which describes it as follows: '." To begin with. Narciso Bracewell. was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. de una extension superficial de 1229. left for Nueva Ecija. por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada. for unexplained reasons. AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES. Francisca Reyes administered the property and like in the first case. However. . the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive properties of the private respondents. Thereafter when she and her son. as each has its own distinct factual setting. . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via ferrea del Railroad Co. claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents the share of his father. "There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately. II "RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.I "RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948.00 metros cuadrados. HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION. una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal. plaintiff filed the instant complaint. he had some proprietary right over the same.. Because of this. que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga. "The second parcel on the other hand.

Co. there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals. absurd or impossible. which is now being sought after by the plaintiff. "With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed. . only questions of law may be raised. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co. Hence. hence. final and conclusive upon this Court. (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken."As earlier stated. "To begin with. "Carefully going over the evidence. in making its findings. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes. there is indeed an assurance that the property described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and the same property. "The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades have already passed between the deed and the declaration and 'during that period.) 2 Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact.'). '60') of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria Cailles is 'en la calle Desposorio' in Las Piñas. forgetting that since the present petition is one for review on certiorari. the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. "With these natural boundaries. (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. there is no reason to doubt that this property is the same. (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion. went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and that his father. the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally because defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917. who subsequently died in 1944. it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. many changes of abode would likely have occurred. 1917 until 1948. however. It is a wellestablished rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are. the deed of sale (Exh. exists in the case at bar. the description fits the land now being sought by the plaintiff. Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time. are the same as the properties sought by the plaintiff. Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation.' "Besides." (Reference to Exhibits omitted. "With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917. Anent the second assignment of error. it is true that there is no similar boundaries to be relied upon.R. 3 None of the above exceptions. including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. and they have paid the realty taxes of this property from May 29. plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo. and (5) when the Court of Appeals. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her name. and is bounded by the M. 1948.R. the Court of Appeals made the following findings: "Going to the issue of filiation. Sotero. We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the lands in question. if not identical to the property in Desposorio St. generally. 1914 up to May 28.

Other than his bare allegation.. "Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital evidence. Guerrero and Escolin JJ. and what is more. this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale. 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. by right of representation. J. looking for that vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. his alleged mother. claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that. However. plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.R. like the deceased Francisca Reyes.R. J. Aquino. 1983) SECOND DIVISION [G. Thus. prLL Referring to the third assignment of error. Jr. October 23. the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed. (Article 992. even without taking time and space to go into further details. February 28. even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo. Concepcion. still he cannot. 1938. plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. married to Socorro Timbol. L-51263. on leave.] . his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo. or that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact. L-22469. Abad Santos. "This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13.. petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. G. ||| (Leonardo v. No. 1978.survived Francisca Reyes." 4 That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial evidence.. with costs against the petitioner. No.) WHEREFORE. cdphil SO ORDERED. We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. At most. Makasiar (Chairman).. We have minutely scrutinized the same. as found again by the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. Civil Code of the Philippines. "In support of his claim. he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13. concur. I concur with the observation that I would have dismissed the petition by minute resolution for lack of merit. his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married.

CASE AT BAR. That will is now part of a public or official judicial record. Petitioner Tomas Corpus is the son of Juana Corpus. SUCCESSION. cannot prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in Section 69. AMALIA CORPUS. CORPUS. the widow of Tomas Corpus.00 pursuant to the Judiciary Law before it was amended. is legitimate". Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco. S. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground of res judicata stating that the intrinsic validity of Teodoro R.TOMAS CORPUS. defendants-appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on another ground. dated June 14. CORPUS. PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY. SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO. ID. claiming that the project of partition made pursuant to the order of the probate court as invalid and hence. As the sole heir of Juana Corpus. Yangco's will had already been passed upon in a special proceedings approving the project of partition. W. Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus. ID. CIVIL LAW. Yangco. vs. the first with Ramona Arguelles (Teodoro's mother) and the second with Victoria Obin have no merit. Yangco was his acknowledged natural son. CORPUS. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.. absolute or from bed and board. 2.. — Appellant's contentions that the probative value of the will of Luis R. himself a legitimate child. STAGG. plaintiff-appellant. one of whom was Jose Corpus. 3. (Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio) "that a child born in lawful wedlock. and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus. namely that since Teodoro R. DULY PROBATED WILL FORM PART OF JUDICIAL OR PUBLIC RECORDS. there being no divorce. The appeal was certified to the Supreme Court as it involved more than P50. 1907 which states that Teodoro R. the estate should be disposed of under the rules of intestacy. Yangco. CHILD BORN OUT OF A UNION OF A MAN AND A WOMAN IS PRESUMED LEGITIMATE. SYLLABUS 1. SYNOPSIS Teodoro R. because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supported hereditary share of his mother. petitioner Tomas Corpus filed an action in the Court of First Instance to recover his mother's supposed share in the Yangco's intestate estate.. ID. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and the statement of Teodoro Yangco's biographer that Luis Yangco had two marriages. V. ENRIQUE J. — Article 943 of the old Civil Code "prohibits all successory reciprocity . — It is disputably presumed "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage". Juana Corpus. Jose Corpus had a daughter. NO SUCCESSIONAL RECIPROCITY BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE RELATIVES. and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life". JOSE A. WILL. FILIATION. RAMON L. The authenticity of that will which had been admitted and duly probated is incontestable. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child. Yangco was the acknowledged natural son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles. RAFAEL CORPUS.

nor shall such children and relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child". RULE ON SUCCESSION OF ACKNOWLEDGED OR LEGITIMATE CHILDREN. Corpus. It was also opposed by Atty. Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. — Under Article 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code. ID. 1944 at Palauig. 922 NEW CIVIL CODE). J : p Teodoro R. Roman A. BASIS OF.mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother. Paz Yangco. OLD CIVIL CODE (ART. (2) his half sister. they shall inherit from it share and share like. 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. Pablo Corpus. 4. In default of natural ascendants.. At the time of his death. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.. ID. ID. ID. Teodoro R. in turn.. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared because the will does not contain an institution of heir.. Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus. Cruz appeared as her counsel. ID. if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue. Corpus. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision. ID. Luis R. Zambales. Yangco. V. while the legitimate family is. Juanita died in October. and Ramon L. His will dated August 29. Atty. 54863. (3) Amalia Corpus. the wife of Miguel Ossorio.. The rule is now found in article 992 of the new Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Yangco. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. the children of his half brother. either legitimate or acknowledged. ID. two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus. the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to his entire estate and if both acknowledged it and are alive. Yangco died in Manila on April 20. and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus. who represented Juanita Corpus. Jose A. decedents' natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco. the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Pursuant to the order of the probate court. cdphil Atty. — The rule found in Article 943 of the old Civil Code prohibiting successional reciprocity between legitimates and illegitimates is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family. the widow of Tomas Corpus. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. a project of partition dated November 26. 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. hated by the illegitimate child. ID. 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. ARTICLE 943.. 73 Phil. . Yangco had no forced heirs. 5. Cruz. DECISION AQUINO.. 527.. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles.

the heirs of Pio V. 1947. 1964 in CAG. Pedro Martinez. He alleged ill his complaint that the dispositions in Yangco's will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26. In the compromise dated October 7." (See Barretto vs. D or 17). Pursuant to the compromise agreement. y que señale un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto". the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2. 50 Phil. On September 20. that condition would be regarded "como no puesta o no existente".Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a los mismos. which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails. 1946 in Special Proceeding No. Corpus.) From that order. Yangco appealed to this Court (L-1476). entries of judgment were made on those dates. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 1949. 27 SCRA 546. Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23. Tuason. filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco' intestate estate. Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R.000 to Pedro Martinez. March 28. Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 1946 approved the project of partition. On October 5. the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35. 17[5]. Tomas Corpus signed a receipt dated October 24. LLphil The trial court in its decision of July 2. Juliana de Castro. Those appeals were dismissed in this Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31. No. as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus.R. L-28734. 1969. Yangco sea declarada intestada. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate. Court of Appeals.000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz. 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. As the resolutions dismissing the appeals became final and executory on October 14 and November 4. the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. therefore. The estate of Luis R. . 1951. It concluded that "no hay motivos legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. 2613). our attorney in this case" (Exh. Yangco entered into a similar compromise agreement. 888. and Rodriguez vs. Tomas Corpus. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar rados por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a perpetual prohibition against alienation. The probate court in its order of December 26. That did not set at rest the controversy over the Yangco estate.

Francisco Ortigas. it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. It is disputably presumed "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage". Yangco's will. in Yangco's estate. was a legal heir of Yangco. The trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco. llamados Teodoro. is legitimate". Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez. Yangco was a natural child. Yangco. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco). there being no divorce. The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus. Yangco". the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. 5[z]. and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches. that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation. Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. the mother of Teodoro. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record. Yangco. absolute or from bed and board. hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. [bb] and [cc]. His exact words are: "Primera. The appeal may be resolved by determining whether Juanita Corpus. dated June 14. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos. los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos. and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. Paz. Rules of Court). .Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. In the disposition of this appeal. That will was attested by Rafael del Pan." (Exh. On the other hand. Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20. we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother. 1907. Luis Rafael Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate? To answer that question. "that a child born in lawful wedlock. These contentions have no merit. implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles. in incontestable. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father. 54863. Rule 131. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69. llcd Since Teodoro R. that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco. as a legal heir. himself a legitimate child. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. (2) that his will had been duly legalized. as reproduced in Exhibit 1 herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Juanita Corpus. identified as Exhibit 1 herein. as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. Luisa y Luis.

Where the testatrix. a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is. the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle. Civil Code. No costs. No. 10 Phil. pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Sevilla. Aquino and Ortiz. the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate.. Chairman). appellant's brief). 57 Phil. Udan. Appellant Corpus concedes that if Teodoro R. 8. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle. JJ. See 16 Scaevola. G. L-19996. October 23." Hence. 465-6) . Centeno. Concepcion Jr. . (Actg. April 30. Rodriguez. Allarde vs. Antonio. SO ORDERED. concur. was the legitimate daughter of Jose Fabie. and if both acknowledged it and are alive. formerly article 943. were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue.. 128). 63 Phil. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa. in turn. Barredo. Under articles 944 and 945 of the spanish Civil Code. Abaya. had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. 47 Phil. either legitimate or acknowledged. 29). 1978) . Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" (6 Sanchez Roman. 185-6). ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child". Aguas. 4th Ed. Teodoro R. LLpr WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. L-22469. Fabie. . 13 SCRA 693. ||| (Corpus v. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side. The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Centeno vs. Rosario Fabie. 909). Corpus. 1965. they shall inherit from it share and share alike. the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. 585. 52 Phil. he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p.Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que lo haya reconocido. Codigo Civil. natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters. In default of natural ascendants. Following the rule in article 992. 287.. 279.R. 991). Ramon Fabie. it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. 38 Phil. Codigo Civil. Yangco was a natural child. and Santos. who were legitimate. hated by the illegitimate child. pp. 7th Ed. See De Guzman vs. By reason of that same rule. 88 Phil. her father's brother. 322.

CIVIL LAW. Marcelo C. Intermediate Appellate Court (150 SCRA 645) and De la Puerta v.] BENIGNO MANUEL. although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. BASILISA MANUEL. (181 SCRA 861) In Diaz. whether legitimate or illegitimate. of such brothers and sisters. LIBERATO MANUEL. on the one hand. 117246. Branch 37. in the early case of Grey v. of such brothers and sisters. Presiding Judge. nephews and nieces' as legal heirs of an illegitimate child. Consequently. in turn. when the law speaks of 'brothers and sisters. however.THIRD DIVISION [G. Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession. the latter considers the privileged condition of the former. too.R. (Desiderio Jurado. the legitimate family is. WILLS AND SUCCESSION. MADRONA MANUEL. They may have a natural tie of blood. Espinoza for Modesta Baltazar. 196 citing 7 Manresa 110) and. . p. August 21. Nolan R." The Court. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family. on other hand. pp. and illegitimate relatives. EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL. CONSTRUED.. 423-424. as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. Regional Trial Court. CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES. — Article 992 of the Civil Code. Pangasinan. it has no application. Bermudez for petitioners. 992. nephews and nieces." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives. but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992." firstly. it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children. ESPERANZA MANUEL. on testamentary dispositions. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. [First S] No. AGAPITA MANUEL. there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. 1995. vs. . SYLLABUS 1. the . ART. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier. respondents. 8th ed. 1991. prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. then.) His thesis: "What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters. has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain.G. 3. Eufrocino L. This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. No. in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent. cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. PLACIDA MANUEL. 992 of the Code. petitioners. FERRER. "BARRIER" BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FAMILY. and the resources of which it is thereby deprived. Court of Appeals. NICODEMO T. LORENZO MANUEL. Lingayen. HON. whether legitimate or illegitimate. a basic postulate. hated by the illegitimate child. Fabie(40 O. the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children. enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family. we have said: "Article 992 of the New Civil Code . Evangelista for Estanislaoa Manuel.

ID. Allarde v. by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Tayo. (Sotto v. 57 Phil. (b) and Legitimate Ascendants. Abaya. the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent. (Anuran v. viz: Order of Preference Order of Concurrence (a) Legitimate and Children Descendants (a) Legitimate and Illegitimate and Children Descendants. in turn. (Leonardo v. any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. the latter had no right to the former's inheritance. and Surviving Spouse (b) Legitimate and Ascendants Parents Children and Surviving Spouse (c) Illegitimate Children and Descendants (in the absence of ICDs and LPAs. Surviving Spouse (c) Illegitimate Children and Descendants and the illegitimate Parents) (d) Surviving and Illegitimate Parents (e) Brothers Nephews and Surviving Spouse Spouse and and Sisters/ Nieces (f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone (within the fifth civil degree) (g) State (g) Alone (d) (e) Surviving Brothers Nephews Spouse and and Sisters/ Nieces ." The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. and thus no part should be rendered inoperative (Javellana v. 909) that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father. 120 SCRA 890) Indeed. Rodriguez. collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014. 10 Phil. 99 Phil 709) 2. in easy graphic presentation. Araneta v. Corpus. it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate. 13 SCRA 693) that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent.. 85 SCRA 567) that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child. palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life. Children Descendants. (Cacho v. of the Civil Code. Concepcion. inclusive.. (Llorente v. Aquino and Ortiz. 38 Phil. ORDER OF PREFERENCE AND CONCURRENCE IN INTESTACY. the law does no more than recognize this truth. Thus. 29) and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. Court of Appeals. ID. but must always be construed in relation to.former. sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin. Sotto. — We might. and Parents Illegitimate Descendants. 43 Phil 688. GRAPHIC PRESENTATION. 6 SCRA 1042) by. 585. (Corpus v. Udan.

41134. 184223. 184225. covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No.. 69679. TCT No. Juan Manuel. No. 18 October 1988) 4. (Lim vs. 228 SCRA 51) DECISION VITUG. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling. On 05 March 1992. his wife Beatriz. TCT No. the three titles (OCT P-20594. ID. married Esperanza Gamba. were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter.3. Court of Appeals. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. Pangasinan.R. Juan Manuel was born. — An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor. Two other parcels of land. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. Tiu v. with an area of 2. covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. Esperanza Gamba also passed away. a month after the death of Esperanza. 184224 and TCT No.. DAMAGES. (Rubio v. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. During his marriage with Beatriz. Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. In consideration of the marriage. initiated this suit. a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land. OCT P19902 and TCT No. without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption. 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles. Petitioners. G. . Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No.700 square meters. On 19 October 1992. Court of Appeals.. J : p The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant. Intermediate Appellate Court. 06 August 1960. were issued in the name of Modesta ManuelBaltazar. — A ward (ampon). 141 SCRA 488. WHEN A WARD IS NEITHER A COMPULSORY HEIR NOR A LEGAL HEIR. respectively. or on 04 February 1992. WHEN NOT JUSTIFIED. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen. From this relationship." On 03 June 1980. Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594. 41134. CASE AT BAR. Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two years later. and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on. ID. OCT P-19902 and TCT No. the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. ID. the illegitimate son of Antonio.

a basic postulate. not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel. an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse. AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY. enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family. in turn. dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners. "3.) Respondents.00 for litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5. which reads: "ARTICLE 992. Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay (a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5.000.000. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG. P5.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for exemplary damages and P500. "If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters.00 for exemplary damages. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR.000. (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW. P5.000. "2." 1 Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code. and the latter the other half . nephews and nieces. MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY. there being no material dispute on the facts. In default of the father or mother. THE LOWER COURT.00 for moral damages. nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.The case." (Emphasis supplied. were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. providing thusly: "ARTICLE 994. she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate.00 for attorney's fees. AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE. who shall be entitled to the entire estate. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS. submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code. IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF. The trial court. WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL. was submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between .000. P5. The petition before us raises the following contentions: That — "1.00 for moral damages." (Emphasis supplied.) Article 992.

although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Court of Appeals. in turn." The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. we have said: "Article 992 of the New Civil Code . nephews and nieces. as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent. 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father. 2 His thesis: "What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters. the former. but must always be construed in relation to. the law does no more than recognize this truth. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v. then. on testamentary dispositions. 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate. collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent. prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. Thus. Fabie 3 and. palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family. This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist.legitimate relatives. 992 of the Code. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier. the latter considers the privileged condition of the former." (Emphasis supplied) The Court. too. has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain. hated by the illegitimate child. the latter had no right to the former's inheritance. the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children." firstly. however. 12 In passing. on the one hand. the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent. Illegitimate . sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin. the legitimate family is. and illegitimate relatives. we might. . 5 In Diaz. 10 Indeed. it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children. in turn. whether legitimate or illegitimate. and thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by. nephews and nieces' as legal heirs of an illegitimate child. viz: Order of Preference Order of Concurrence (a) Legitimate Children (a) Legitimate Children and and Descendants Descendants. of the Civil Code. whether legitimate or illegitimate. of such brothers and sisters. by avoiding further grounds of resentment. . any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. They may have a natural tie of blood. on other hand. when the law speaks of 'brothers and sisters. of such brothers and sisters. and the resources of which it is thereby deprived. it has no application. there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. in the early case of Grey v. in easy graphic presentation. but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. inclusive. 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child. Consequently.

Ferrer. as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. however. that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta. Illegitimate Children and Descendants. Romero. sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and exemplary damages. Feliciano. was properly dismissed by the trial court. Acting C. and Melo.. concur. Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED. A ward (ampon). G.J.Children and Descendants.R. 1995) FIRST DIVISION [G. The Court. attorney's fees and litigation expenses. 13 We must hold. 1983. No. Petitioners. as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel. SO ORDERED. An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor. 15 WHEREFORE. which portion is hereby DELETED. and Surviving Spouse (b) Legitimate Parents (b) Legitimate Parents and and Ascendants Ascendants. except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages. She is right. and Surviving Spouse (c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children Descendants (in the and Descendants and absence of ICDs and Surviving Spouse LPAs. No special pronouncement on costs. is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. May 30. in favor of private respondents. nevertheless. 117246. ||| (Manuel v. without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption.] . had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint. No. the Illegitimate Parents) (d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and Illegitimate Parents (e) Brothers and (e) Brothers and Sisters/Nephews and Sisters/Nephews and Nieces Nieces and Surviving Spouse (f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone (within the fifth civil degree) (g) State (g) Alone In her answer to the complaint..R. not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case. August 21. JJ. the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor. L-43905.

. A PROPER REMEDY. it was the Court that was called upon to order the publication. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. ID. Hermin E. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. as the individual most affected.. Tolentino for petitioner. — The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. — Considering that Amado. Amelita G. but petitioner. EDGARDO L. After all. REQUIRED PUBLICATION UNDER RULE 108. is a party defendant. TOLENTINO. that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established.. In the ultimate analysis. SYLLABUS 1.. HON. upon his own plea. PLEA OF GUILT IN BIGAMY. DISPUTABLE. Amado. then. The suit below is a proper remedy. 4. Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions as with their substance. that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado. ACTION FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION AS THE SURVIVING SPOUSE. BULACAN. she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased. RULES OF COURT NOT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY WHERE NO OTHER PARTIES ARE INVOLVED. EVIDENCE. Private respondent. respondents. ID. NO BETTER PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF MARRIAGE THAN THE ADMISSION BY THE ACCUSED. PARAS. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may. PRESUMPTION THAT ENTRIES IN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS SUCH AS DEATH AND BIRTH CERTIFICATES ARE CORRECT. It can be safely concluded. but it did not. MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG. since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private respondent and that the entry made in . ID. ID. — Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. was convicted for Bigamy.. petitioner. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. 3. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. Besides. ID. vs. REMEDIAL LAW.SERAFIA G. THOUGH THE ULTIMATE OBJECT IS CORRECTION OF ENTRY CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT. even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108. The Solicitor General for respondents. 2. Arceo for Maria Clemente. in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. be validly made. — In fine. and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. therefore.

and (3) in a sense. respondent Court. which Court. for the reasons therein mentioned. Serafia G. In Special Proceedings No. was still subsisting (Annex "A". Arceo. the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry. LLphil Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Tolentino". as the lawful surviving spouse of deceased Amado Tolentino and the correction of the death certificate of the same". also for lack of the proper requisites under the law. is hereby GRANTED. Maria Clemente. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him. stating: "The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in this case. dated October 21. 1974. Tolentino.the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false. "In view of the above dismissal. While documents. her name. DECISION MELENCIO-HERRERA. he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25. 1948 (Annex "C". which this Court has already dismissed. . 108. 1943. sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. Further: (1) the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship. Branch II. Petition). and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. dismissed the case. Bulacan. are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct. for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria Clemente. is sought in this Petition for Review on Certiorari. 1975. it may be corrected. at Paombong. dismissing petitioner's suit for her "declaration . celebrated on July 31. The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein. Petition)." 1 .". upon private respondent's instance. and up to now. . while his marriage with petitioner. 412 of the Civil Code — publication is needed in a case like this. 2768 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. J : p The reversal of respondent Court's Order. read together with Art. Hermin E. such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. "SO ORDERED. there has been no such publication. petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. In an Order. on November 1. Conformably thereto. such as death and birth certificates. thru counsel Atty. upon Amado's plea of guilty. petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong. all other motions in this case are hereby considered MOOT and ACADEMIC. Bulacan. 1587-M. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding.

hereby declared the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. First. that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado. even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108. Bulacan. for the merits. but petitioner. In the ultimate analysis. Private respondent. JJ. 6 No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased. Serafia G. Let the corresponding correction be made in the latter's death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong. 2 Besides. publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below. be validly made. No costs. Jr. 3 but it did not.. was convicted for Bigamy. therefore. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may. dated October 21. it was the Court that was called upon to order the publication. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false. Tolentino. Amado. upon his own plea. Teehankee (Chairman).. that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. Vasquez and Gutierrez. Considering that Amado. such as death and birth certificates. Plana. as the individual most affected. it may be corrected. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct. 9 WHEREFORE. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all. then. in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. 5 The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. for the remedy. 4 Second. 1975. Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions as with their substance. 7 It can be safely concluded. such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. the Order. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. In fine. prcd Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the collection of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.Thus. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. concur. petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent Court in ordering dismissal. and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. the other issues raised need no longer be discussed. SO ORDERED. 8 While documents. of respondent Court is hereby set aside and petitioner. We rule for petitioner. . is a party defendant.

L-43905.).). 1983) FIRST DIVISION [G. "PETITIONER admits that MARILOU DEL ROSARIO. petition. No. del Rosario. pursuant to a verbal agreement forged between the parties. is the legally adopted child of the late FELIX L. rec. the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts: "OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late FELIX L. Rizal (Partial Joint Stipulation of Facts. DOROTEA O. respondents filed their opposition.. vs. petitioner filed with the court below the above-said petition. Rizal in a plane crash and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.R. On March 17. . ||| (Tolentino v. 1973. "PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the legitimate surviving wife of the deceased FELIX L. "THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO. who died in a plane crash on September 12. DEL ROSARIO died last September 12. Mercado for petitioner. 1969 at Antipolo. 6. 2. Ruiz & Associates for respondents. dismissing petitioner's petition for settlement and partition of estate. DEL ROSARIO. 1973.] GERTRUDES L. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO. March 30. 1973.R. Paras. 1969 at Antipolo. DECISION MAKASIAR. On November 13. May 30. rec. No. petitioner. the court a quo. respondents. 1977. Laig. 9. L-37903. 1972. p. G. J. issued an order requiring them to come up with a joint stipulation of facts (p. DEL ROSARIO and DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO CONANAN. p. 1973.On May 19. DEL ROSARIO. Dante P. On April 26. subject of which is the estate left by her late son. is on leave. Felix L.Relova. J : p Review of the order of Court of First Instance of Rizal dated June 21.

pertinent portions of which read: "A perusal of the petition shows that the instant case was filed under the provisions of Section 2. rec. whether he died testate or intestate. which reads as follows: 'Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person. clearly alleges that the value of the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix del Rosario amounts to P33. the petition must perforce be dismissed. and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct. "The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the instant case finds no basis for the said article is applicable in cases where there are no other concurring intestate heirs of the adopted child. if proper. and without delay. The action taker. . the lower court issued the challenged order.000. to grant. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings. Based on the foregoing observation alone. shall be recorded in the proper registrar's office. . 1973."That the only surviving nearest relatives of deceased FELIX L. "WHEREFORE.00 which is obviously over and above the value of the estate allowed under the rules. if otherwise. DEL ROSARIO are the petitioner and oppositors DOROTEO O. the same rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of which does not exceed P10.00. On June 21. . allowance of the will. The instant petition. the law on intestate succession is clear that an adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession. if any there is.000. . . shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. the court may proceed summarily. Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court. 9-10. and such persons. . or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified. and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due. if it involves real estate. . to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate. and all orders and judgment made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk. "While it may be true that a petition for summary settlement is allowed under the aforequoted provision of the rules. does not exceed ten thousand pesos. and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. without the appointment of an executor or administrator. in their own right. however. . "But granting arguendo that this Court may consider the petition as an exercise (of) the powers of a probate Court in determining and declaring the heirs of the deceased as prayed for in the aforequoted partial joint stipulation of facts. and the order of partition or award. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO. "Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in the amount to be determined by the court.). the Court declare the heirs of the deceased" (pp. it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that on the basis of the facts stipulated. if they are of lawful age and legal capacity. . by the petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed under an intestate proceeding as the requirements provided by law for the same has not been complied with.

on the grounds of equity and fair play. to wit: 1. both parties jointly affirmed that the value of the realty left by the deceased Felix del Rosario is in the aggregate amount of P33. L-7855. such action must be commenced or instituted by the party in interest. record on appeal and appeal bond (see respondents' comments. the requirement that the amount of the estate involved should not exceed P10.00 which.R. the petitioner not being included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of or have any right over the properties sought to be partitioned and under the provisions of Section 1. 18. and 2. especially herein petitioner. therefore. In the instant case. for the guidance of the parties.). 910) and Gutierrez vs. November 23. in the present case. 978 and 979 on the other. A couple of important issues are posed for our consideration. On July 10. 1968.000. 341. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply. De la Cruz (No. I WE rule that on purely jurisdictional consideration. L-21027. "WHEREFORE." II However. in the sense that once wholly sustained.). Article 343 on the one hand. by virtue of the transcendental implications of the holding of the court a quo. WE uniformly held that for the court to acquire jurisdiction in a petition for summary settlement of estate under the rules. is obviously "over and above the value allowed under the rules. said holding would preclude petitioner from re-filling the proper action — a consequence which. in a litany of precedents dating as far back as the 1938 case of Utulo vs. ex cathedra. WE cannot allow to befall on petitioner — WE deem it essential.000. the Court hereby DISMISSES THE PETITION WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS" (pp. The adoption shall: . Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Cruz (G. in view of the foregoing findings. the instant petition should be dismissed."Based on the foregoing.00 under the old rules) is jurisdictional. 24 SCRA 69). 10-12. Whether the material data rule enunciated by Rule 41. No. 1955. rec. petitioner filed a notice of appeal. to point out the demerits of the appealed verdict. Indeed.000. p. rec. or Articles 341. July 20.00 (P6. A The lower court found the following provisions of the New Civil Code germane to the instant case: "Art. as the court a quo correctly found. Rule 69 in relation to Section 2. 1973. de Garcia (66 Phil. Section 6 of the New Rules of Court should be followed. Pasiono Vda. 302) and reaffirmed in Asuncion and Castro vs. 97 Phil.

It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted. without distinction as to sex or age. Succession pertains." Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the adopted child and the legitimate parents or ascendants only. "This fourth shall be taken from the free portion. in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said law. "(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature. which directs that: "Art. consonant with the cardinal rule in statutory construction that all the provisions of the New Civil Code must be reconciled and given effect. The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the deceased adopter. OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply. It is. in the first place. to the descending direct line. 343. "(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname. than those who are naturally related to him by blood in the direct ascending line." "Art. 978. p. This is affirmed by Article 898 of the New Civil Code which states: "If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants. but also because in intestate succession. the latter shall not have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child. not only because a contrary view would defeat the intent of the framers of the law. 92)." Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to Article 341 which gives an adopted child the same rights and duties as though he were a legitimate child."(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he was a legitimate child of the adopter. the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance. The reason for this is that: "(I)t is unjust to exclude the adopter's parents from the inheritance in favor of an adopted person" (Report of the Code Commissioner." "Art. "(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants. . the surviving spouse shall have a right to one-fourth (only) of the hereditary estate. 979. thus. and a contrary view cannot be presumed. but leaves legitimate ascendants. where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased. who is only related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted person. The language of the law is clear." WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted Article 343 of the New Civil Code. and even if they should come from different marriages.

Court of Appeals (No. 1973 and that the expiry date to file petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court is December 14. And although this is not mentioned in the record on appeal. No. 1973. L-29719. 1973 (53 SCRA 228) and Villanueva vs. No. it is shown that the date of notice of the Court of First Instance decision is July 3. the defect or deficiency is not fatal. the surviving spouse and illegitimate children are left. "If the appellate court is convinced that the appeal was perfected on time. the illegitimate children the other fourth. and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate. The cases of Berkenkotter vs. WE resolve this issue in favor of petitioner. 1975. 1000. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is that the Record on Appeal shall show that the appeal was really perfected within the reglementary period. emphasis supplied). Antonio. Perforce. After all. although such fact did not evidently appear on the face of the record on appeal. 220) are particularly in point. G. the respective shares of the surviving spouses ascendant and adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code.R. appeal bond and record on appeal on July 10. in their comment of June 29. cdll . a fact of record. If it could he ascertained from the record of the case that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period. there being substantial compliance with the requirement of the Rules of Court. respondents.Under Article 343. an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased adopter. the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on appeal must contain such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. Consequently. October 19. Court of Appeals. WE held: "The deviation from the rigid rule adopted in the case of Government of the Philippines vs. 1965. 1973 — or still very much within the reglementary period to perfect an appeal. 68 SCRA 216." B Anent the other issue. L-23736. November 28. "It does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed with the lower court in disregard of the requirement of Section 6. which is comprehended in the term "illegitimate children". whenever circumstances and substantial justice warrant. the veracity of which this COURT does not doubt. Court of Appeals. September 28. 1973. Petitioner filed her notice of appeal. nevertheless. If legitimate ascendants. L-36629.. 68 SCRA 220. is due to our realization that after all what is of vital importance in the requirement of Section 6. emphasize that the petitioner's record on appeal violates the material data rule in that. From the docket and process slip of this case. it should not throw out but assume jurisdiction over it. that procedural requirement is only intended to enable the appellate court to determine if the appeal is still within its jurisdiction and nothing more" (Villanueva vs. et al. which reads: cdrep "Art." Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the material data rule. In Villanueva. it is. has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED.R. 64 SCRA 475. — The widow who claims without contradiction to be coowner with the deceased in the property he left.. Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE. No.The liberal interpretation of the material data rule aimed at serving the ends of substantial justice has found amplification in the recent cases of Pimentel. RIGHTS OF INHERITANCE. Concepcion Jr. under article 838. 328-332. ||| (Del Rosario v. June 27. vs. October 21. 506.. Felix Sevilla y Macam for appellants.] MANUEL SARITA ET AL.. lacks such right of representation. Muñoz Palma. Court of Appeals. October 30. CONJUGAL PROPERTY. L-40495. Court of Appeals. who are brothers and nephews of the predecessor in interest. and so long as this usufruct of hers is not paid this half of the remaining half is subject to payment thereof.. 2. COLLATERAL HEIRS. exclude such a remoter relative as the grandnephew. SO ORDERED. 67 SCRA 322. Vicente Urgello for appellee. Capati. and Manuel R. L-37903. ESTATES. March 30. plaintiffs-appellants. Tomas Carag. — The plaintiff who joins as the representative of his grandfather in a complaint with others. No. JJ. vs. 1975. according to articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code. Teehankee (Chairman). concur. Hence. ANDRES CANDIA. L-37123.R. L-39423 and L39684. 1975. et al. ID. and also to usufruct of a half of the remaining half. which the law presumes to be conjugal partnership property. as the nearest of kin. Republic of the Philippines vs. 1912. NO COSTS. 1977) FIRST DIVISION [G. a sister and nephews of the deceased having appeared to claim the inheritance. is entitled to one-half thereof. Conanan. November 14. 7768. DECISION . they. for it belongs in the collateral line only to the nephews and not to the grandnephews. et al. et al. 67 SCRA 503. Luna vs. SYLLABUS 1. et al.. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER'S FILING THE APPROPRIATE ACTION IN A COMPETENT COURT. WIDOW'S RIGHTS. 1975. G.. defendantappellee. and Martin.

and Cristeta. by styling themselves the heirs of Apolinario Cedeno. among them Tomas Cedeno. Domingo. appropriated the land and claimed ownership thereof. there was no proof whatever that they were in the possession of the spouses at the time of their death. Andres Candia was holding and cultivating the said land.ARELLANO. who held it in quiet and peaceable possession for twentyfour years and at his death such possession was continued by his sons. from 1886 to April. testified that he had been brought up. on the 24th of June. and. acquired the property by purchase. Apolinario Cedeno had three brothers and one sister. otherwise known as Isidario Cedeno. Domingo. who is a sister of the deceased Apolinario Cedeno. on another. assisted in the cultivation of the land. in order to bring it. it being evident that during this very long period of time they did not obtain possession of the property. sold the said land to Juan Basa Villarrosa. from whom witness. and is certainly in accord with the merits of the case. that the opinion of the trial court is unchangeable. we determine: With respect to the personal property. he did so merely under a lease and paid the said spouses one hundred pesos semiannually. of whom only the last mentioned is living. Gregorio Cedeno. 1881. in this regard. as concerns the land. that. . who died leaving a son. on the 24th of June. as. and that he also took possession of four mares. 1909. that he worked on the house which those spouses left at their death when it was under construction. they requested the Court of First Instance of Cebu to sentence the latter to return to them and. with regard to the animals and real property sued for. It is alleged that during the lifetime of these spouses. and that he never had in his possession the animals mentioned in the complaint. 1909. apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees. and. Cristeta Cedeno. that at no time di he hold the same as a lessee nor pay for it any emphyteutic rent whatever. a nephew of Roberta Montesa. 1881. Sinforoso and Vicente Villarrosa. further. since the ownership thereof was conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeno to Juan Basa Villarrosa. with respect to the land: (1) That the defendant was the possessor in good faith continuously and was presumed to hold under just title so long as the contrary should not be proved. and Leon. on which latter date Roberta Montesa died. as stated in the complaint. among them. C. who. together with the fruits thereof. and. among them a daughter named Sofia. as the son of her sister. Leon.J : p The spouses Apolinario Cedeno and Roberta Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece of land. Apolinario Cedeno died in 1895 and Roberta Montesa in 1909. (2) that the plaintiffs are. Andres Candia. the same number. and (2) that neither the plaintiffs nor their alleged predecessors in interest made demand for it during the period of twenty-six years. and. in order to pay certain shortages of the cabeceria under his charge. Andres Candia. he refused to pay the emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land. in the house of the spouses Cedeno and Montesa. Manuel Sarita. Macario. on the one side. four. but that. The scour absolved the defendant from the complaint. on the grounds that. All of these except Gregorio Cedeno and his brothers sue for the ownership of the land and the other personal property of ownership of the land and the other personal property of Andres Candia which. from May. that said Apolonio Cedeno. and several pieces of furniture which were in the house erected on the said land — a house worth 50 pesos — which he also seized and claimed as his property. Macario left five children. it has not been impugned as erroneous on appeal. from his boyhood. from the time he was very young. (1) that this action is one for the recovery of possession from the present possessor. The judgment having been appealed through a bill of exceptions and the appeal having been heard. that he indemnify them in the amount of P800. and pay the costs. twelve carabaos. the plaintiffs make use of hereditary right. was a cabeza de barangay of the pueblo of Sibonga.

"Q. especially by the plaintiffs' witnesses. No. in the collateral line the right of representation can only take place in favor of the children of brother or sisters. that it was manifestly imprudent also to include as plaintiffs Gregorio. Lorenzo. Have you employed him? — A. in representation of his deceased mother. as established hypothetically. "Q. and on the other. some children of Domingo Cedeno. was the daughter of Domingo Cedeno. in turn. No. No. Manuel Sarita. from the fact that they are collateral relatives of this woman's husband: so that the claim to all the land is manifestly unfounded. with respect to the exercise of the hereditary right derive from the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeno: First. the children of Macario Cedeno. do so by representing her father. and those of Domingo Cedeno. No. "Q. you were never in Mr. the principal plaintiff. and the others." Elsewhere this same witness said: "My uncles and cousins spoke to me about the institution of this suit. they did not attempt to take part in this litigation: "JUDGE. in whose house. since. there was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the plaintiffs to confide the suit to the attorney who has conducted it. in representation of his mother. on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeno. sir. I told them that it could not be. Domingo.some nephews and nieces of the latter. but not the other half which belonged to Roberta Montesa. does exist. Estanislao Solano and Irineo Tormis. and that the land in question was the community property of the deceased spouses. such being the case. such as is the said Manuel Sarita. according to Exhibit D. it is manifestly unfounded in so much as Sofia's son. but not in favor of the grandson of a brother. (3) that they assert their hereditary right in an intestate succession. it was sheen that he sold the land. moreover. 2). That Manuel Sarita. Have you authorized this action against Andres Candia? — A. his brother Macario's children. Manuel Sarita. art. as the first of them testified. (4) that. sir. excepting the right of representation in . as the legitimate heirs of Apolinario Cedeno. as are the children of Macario and Domingo Cedeno. because he cannot represent his grandfather Domingo. Have you spoken to him about this case? — A. of whom they are not heirs ab intestato. Abundio and Jose. the son of Sofia Cedeno who. "Q. Cedeno and Montesa. has absolutely no such right. That. par. then. and the said Manuel Sarita is not a child of a brother. Is M Sevilla your attorney? "WITNESS. Second. we decide. 925. also a daughter of Domingo Cedeno. No. (5) that. could not act as a plaintiff. but not by Manuel Sarita. the children of Leon Cedeno. and. Have your brothers. a brother of the deceased Apolinario Cedeno. because the land was purchased by Juan Villarrosa at the time that our deceased uncle found himself obliged to cover certain shortages against him in the cabeceria. as aforesaid. when. So that in this suit neither you nor your brothers now have any claim against Andres Candia? — A. Juan. sir. it could only be exercised by Cristeta Cedeno. They have not. among them. they could demand. Sofia. I do not know where it is. "Q. because in inheritances the nearer relative excludes the more remote. done so? — A." In view of the foregoing considerations. So. nor could she. finally. Sofia. the principal plaintiff. Lorenzo. Sevilla's office? — A. on the hypothesis that the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters (Civil Code. only one-half of the land. "Q.

his predecessor in interest. Exhibit H of the plaintiffs. it should have been noticed that the personality of these parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita. has proved that he has such a title. in pushing forward Cristeta Cedeno.proper cases (Civil Code. Isidario Cedeno. art. inasmuch as. Third. That. 921).) Fourth. Against this finding of the lower court. 838. Sinforoso Villarosa. Tomas Cedeno. in order to destroy the contrary presumption in favor of that prior ownership. has in his favor the legal presumption that he holds under lawful title and cannot be compelled to exhibit it. by the exhibition of three documents: one. she was entitled to one-half of the other half of the same. to the defendant (Exhibit 3). The averment of the appellants that "the finding of the court is precisely contrary to the agreement made by both parties. Andres Candia (Exhibit 4). Roberta Montesa. . they say. no other name than that of Apolinario was recorded and admitted to be the name of the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest. "In the said agreement. pursuant to the provisions of articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code. By that same agreement the defendant could not be heard to prove another so different name as that of Isidario for the purpose of confusing it with that of Apolinario . to exercise such a hereditary right. wherein it is made to appear that the widow of Apolinario Cedeno. and. 2. in the capacity of owner. That the land in Talamban known as that of Juan Basa Villarosa is about 15 or 20 brazas distant from the land in Talamban which is concerned in this litigation. 446). according to the finding of the trial judge. This transfer of the land affected by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeno was originally the title alleged by the defendant — a title which must not be presumed in the present case. and hence logically the necessity for the latter to prove his title and exhibit it. Domingo Cedeno. was better known by the nickname of Adiot. but proved. 8) is in all respects incorrect. this held of the other half remained liable for the payment of such part of usufruct. said that the original owner of the land in question was "his deceased uncle. the appellants allege: 1. Therefore. of a more remote degree. of the sale of Isidario or Apolinario Cedeno to Juan Basa Villarrosa (Exhibit 2). on the same hypothesis. art. according to a conclusion established by the trial judge. testified that his uncle Apolinario had the baptismal or Christian name of Isidario. the existence is thereby admitted of a right of ownership opposed to title of the present possessor. The defendant. cannot exist. has nothing to do with Apolinario Cedeno. It is true that the possessor. and until she was satisfied for her part of usufruct. of the sale with pacto de retro by the latter's son. That Isidario Cedeno. the children of Macario Cedeno and those of Domingo Cedeno. one of the plaintiffs. from which it is inferred that. implored of the heirs of her deceased husband that she be allowed to continue in the possession of the land and the house of the family. but it also true that when the defendant agrees with the plaintiffs that the thing demanded belonged to a determinate person during his lifetime from whom these latter claim to derive their right. and the other of a final sale by the other son. as coowner of such property. another. art. Vicente Villarosa. the land in question was not owned by him. (Civil Code. the son of Sofia Cedeno." (brief. in the eyes of the law no meaning whatever could be given to the document. (Civil Code. who was erroneously made to appear as a plaintiff. and we the only cabeza de barangay in Sibonga with the surname of Cedeno. But the finding impugned is in no wise erroneous. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is proved that at the death of such alleged predecessor in interest in the inheritance. the action for the recovery of possession. it having been transferred in 1881. the vendor. to the same party." and that Isidario was the true name. derived from such alleged inheritance.

7768. is substituted for the name of Apolinario Cedeno. . and on the west. No. Gaudioso Sosmeña and C. on the east. but it was not agreed that the party Apolinario might not be known by any other name than that of Apolinario. on the south. . For the preceding reasons. written in other documents as on the south. Mateo C. . Calixto Nejarda ." The only point that appears to be agreed upon is that where the plaintiffs say in their complaint Apolinario. concur. besides the river.. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees. Solano and Cuestas. by the same river. vs. and so it is that in subsequent documents it also appears as the western boundary. by Calixto Nejarda. the complaint in this case is understood to be amended in the sense that the name of Apolinario Cedeno. by the river called Grande and Alejandro Mirafuentes. The complaint says: "Boundaries: On the north. FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO. is perfectly explained by the defendant: It refers to Miguel Calixto who broke up the ground between the large rock and the land in dispute. Mapa. oppositors-appellees. which occurs in the first line of the first paragraph of the complaint. is different from the land in Talamban which the defendant claims was sold by Isidario Cedeno to Juan Basa Villarosa. 1912) FUENTES VS. August 31. the same shall be read Apolinario. giving also as the eastern boundary. the subject matter of the complaint. It is also in all respects inexact that the land in Talamban.R. it being agreed that the amended answer which the court has just admitted refers to the complaint so amended. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO. G. The agreement only says: "By agreement between the attorneys for both parties. Torres." The plaintiffs' witnesses. Bacalso and Cesar A. and Trent. the judgment appealed from is affirmed.R. and the plaintiffs themselves. petitioner-appellant. Carson. 1965. No. JJ. with the costs of this instance against the appellants.. on the south by Alejandro Mirafuentes. nor that the defendant should not try to prove another name as that of Isidario. JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS. Candia. Sarita and Tomas Cedeno.] IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELOIDA FARRARIS. CATALINA FERRARIS DE VILLEGAS. on the east by Calixto Nejarda. 8). November 14. Grande. which formerly belonged to Apolinario Cedeno. The interposition of "Miguel" as being on the west. (brief. L-19382. CRUZ EN BANC [G. and on the west by Miguel and a large rock. designate the same boundaries as does the defendant. by a large rock. Johnson. ." Defendant's Exhibit 2 says: "Bounded on the north by Calixto Nejarda. ||| (Sarita v.

nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles. as well as from the order. Third Branch. DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP OF COLLATERAL RELATIVES TO THE DECEASED. and half. up to the filing on December 22. excluding petitioner-appellant herein. INTESTACY. Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros.) being called to the succession. but was survived only by collateral relatives. COLLATERAL RELATIVES EXCLUDED BY NEPHEWS AND NIECES.. and by Gaudencia. consisting of one third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt. and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No.e. cousins. or spouse. Filomena Abellana de Bacayo. and Juanito. who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood. J.sister of decedent's father. dated October 16.00. Rosa Ferraris. sisters. Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City.000.. degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code Art. 2. ascendant. directly brought to this Court on points of law. — An aunt of the deceased is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong. ID.L. per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive.. Filomena Abellana de Bacayo. WHEN COLLATERALS ENTITLED TO SUCCESSION.. 4... she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. — A decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. ID. etc. her nieces and nephew. an aunt. J : p This is a pauper's appeal. The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties. dated September 20. namely.SUCCESSION. 1961. 1961. all surnamed Ferraris. more or less. valued at P6. 1009 Civil Code.B. Anacleto Ferraris. — The absence of brothers.. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant. ID. DECISION REYES. Arturo . 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris.SYLLABUS 1.ID. Conchita. Thereafter.) 3.ID. — Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i. 966). from a resolution. denying a motion to reconsider said resolution.. WHEN NEPHEWS AND NIECES INHERIT BY RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION.ID. Manila. 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate. 13-V of the same court. Catalina. Special Proceeding No. she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs. (Art.

or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code. 975. they shall inherit in equal portions.Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower. 1005. they shall inherit in equal shares. This is readily apparent from articles 1001. But if they alone survive. etc. and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. to wit: an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise. if they survive with their uncles or aunts. as in the case at bar. Art." "ART. 966). first cousins.Ferraris. 1004. petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors-appellees." Nevertheless. reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephew succeed by right of representation. Against the above ruling. brothers and sisters of the full blood. who pre-deceased her (the decedent).appellant is three degrees distant from the decedent. and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right or representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt. The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending parties to said Melodia Ferraris: The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives.) from the succession. nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles. while petitioner. per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. 1001. Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i. but rather the former succeed in their own right. in case of intestacy. and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters. 1004. she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code.When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive. the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. they shall inherit from the latter by representation. will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter? The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees. as provided expressly by Article 975: "ART. as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent. We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased.Should the only survivors be.. three degrees removed from the decedent.e. the trial court was correct when it held that. These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris. that provided as follows: "ART. exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent." .

They are. the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased." It will be seen that under the preceding articles. as established by Article 962. nor children of brothers or sisters. saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. sisters. Thus. Under the law. 962." Under the last article (1009).— The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. 1005. we can safely say. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. "ART. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote). cousins. The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of the whole blood. 954. brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse. if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. the surviving spouse.) being called to the succession. Tolentino expressly states: "Other Collaterals. etc. there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals.In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces. nor a surviving spouse.In every inheritance." "ART. Beyond this. II. whether of the whole blood or not. the absence of brothers. however. limited to relatives within the fifth degree. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased. p. Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows: "ART. Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals. since preference among them is according to their proximity to the decedent. On the contrary. paragraph 1."ART. 386)." "The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among by reason of relationship by the whole blood. 1009. therefore. nor children of brothers or sisters. and the latter per stirpes.Should there be neither brothers nor sisters. the former shall inherit per capita. the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. children of the former." But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of equal degree. that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood. .Should there be neither brothers nor sisters. 952. persons beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives. for successional purposes. Which is true as to "other collaterals". in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol." "ART. the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles. A.

||| (De Bacayo v. and so rule. Regala. concur. that under our laws of succession. DECISION GUERRERO. C. GERONIMO ALMANZA. Bengzon.. Antonio E. Ricardo A. November 29. Bengzon. et al.J.. J : p This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the provisions of Sec. therefore. However. there being no right of representation. Lacsam & Cesar A. and Zaldivar.. Fabros. August 31. The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil Case No. 1859 (Exh. No. J.] GAUDENCIO BICOMONG. Concepcion.. L-19382. hold. show that: "Simeon Bagsic was in married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8. as amended. et al. defendant. No. Bautista Angelo.. Dizon. The decision appealed from. J. 17. Makalintal. a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. in so far as it conforms to this rule. since the only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a legal question.R. No costs. L-37365. 1965) FIRST DIVISION [G. SP-265. took no part. Jr. paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. De Borromeo.P. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G). Jr. is hereby affirmed. JJ. and adopted by the Court of Appeals. plaintiffs-appellees. defendant-appellant. for appellees.R."Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. Igmedia Bagsic . 1977. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts. vs. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship." (Italics supplied) We. Azucena. for appellant. G. this article should be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. FLORENTINO CARTENA.

Felipa Bagsic. On June 3. by Rosendo Banaad. by Anacleto Glorioso. by Jacinto Alvero. the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong. m. by German Garingan. with an area of 9. 1959. on the E. Maura Bagsic died also on April 14.(Exhibit F). by Paulino Gajuco. Silvestra Glorioso also died. planted with fruit bearing coconut trees. C. 2-3) The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. by Laureano Ambion. now Tax No. LexLib Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1. Felicidad Bicomong.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza. m. 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino. now Tax No. Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18. planted with 38 fruit bearing coconut trees. Salome Bicomong.. B. assessed at P610. the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza. m. A parcel of land. planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of 11.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza. on the S. with an area of 1. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother. Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River. Bounded on the N. pp." (Rollo. 21452. and on the W. Covered by Tax No. to wit: "A.455 sq. and on the W. Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. on the E. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. 31232. by Bernandino Alina. and on the W. situated at P. Bounded on the N. sq. D. San Ignacio. A residential lot. by Juan Aliagas. Covered by Tax No. and . with an area of 153. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July 23. on the S. 12714 for the year 1948 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza. Of this second marriage were born two children. Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband. Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Bounded on the N. A parcel of land in Bo. by Melecio Cabrera.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza.077. and Gervacio Bicomong. by Esteban Calayag. by Bernandino Alina. on the S. Int. by Petronilo Cartago. 1885. 1945 (Exhibit A). by Ignacio Yerro. Silvestra Glorioso. Surviving her are her heirs.720. City of San Pablo. on the E. City of San Pablo. Alcantara Street. Covered by Tax No. Anacleto Glorioso and Bernandino Alina. Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. 31234. Covered by Tax No. on the E. by Feliciana Glorioso. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19. 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso. sq. by heirs of Pedro Calampiano. San Ignacio. San Ignacio. City of San Pablo. also situated in Bo. sq. 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. m. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso. and on the W. and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). City of San Pablo. now Tax No. on the S. Of the children of the second marriage. assessed at P170. by Felisa Gavino and German Garigan. Bounded on the N. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso. assessed at P2.739 sq.

who are represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena. and (c) Francisca Bagsic. in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic. Area — 24. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza. (SGD) JOSE G. with legal interest from the time this decision shall have become final. Thereupon. Bounded on the N. they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. 1959 the sum of P625. However. assessed at P910. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia. After the death of Maura Bagsic. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala. A parcel of coconut land. Quezon. 21452. planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. 2 . judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in dispute. the above described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. children of Igmedia Bagsic. With costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED. The other defendant. and on the W. are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23. Candelaria. (b) the Tolentinos. the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE. Florentino Cartena. City of San Pablo. the court rendered judgment. Buenavista. situated at Bo.E. on the E. on the S. 47 From the aforesaid decision of the trial court. that is. 1959. she died without the division of the properties having been effected.00. by Taguan River. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same. the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. accordingly.990 sq. pp." (Record on Appeal. had already been paid. Unfortunately. the substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza. thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to the defendants. After trial. daughter of Ignacio Bagsic. by Julian Garcia. namely: (a) the Bicomongs. appealed to the Court of Appeals. p. the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the onehalf undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A. 1962. B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. 4-6) Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1. Hence. children of Perpetua Bagsic. BAUTISTA Judge" Record on Appeal. did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession. m. those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. September 21. Covered by Tax No. the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. Engracio Manese.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs.

1006. These Articles provide: cdll "Art. the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code. 995." and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones." "Art. L-19382. N.C.C. New Civil Code) On the other hand.. if they survive with their uncles or aunts.On appeal. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood. Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive. he cites Art. 1008. 1952. 975. In support thereof. 975. 1965. plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. Ferraris-Borromeo." Under the same provision. (Art. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14. which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood. 14 SCRA 986. 1008. and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her." "Art. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood. the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and nieces of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. 1955. they shall inherit in equal shares. applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. But if they alone survive. 3 The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the trial court and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue. ascendants. or a surviving spouse. she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives. this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. We hold that the provisions of Art. died on May 9. they shall inherit from the latter by representation. plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic. namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood. August 31. 975 of the New Civil Code. illegitimate children. 962. It was even the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9. in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood. Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate." In the absence of descendants. 1945. in accordance with the provision of Art. they shall inherit in equal portions. By virtue of said provision. the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. He asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic. . Art. defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. hence the appellate court certified this case to Us. 975.

SYLLABUS 1. These provisions of the will are clear. POLICARPIO. defendants-appellants. ACCRETION AMONG USUFRUCTUARIES.C. vs. in effect. G.R. concur. Eugenio Balabat for the plaintiffs and appellees. the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955.] GIL P. 1977) EN BANC [G. to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. June 30. plaintiffs-appellees. JJ. Alviar.. 104 Phil. defendants. 1966.in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra). vs. prcd The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic. 1945. Melania Baldovino. L-21809. Martin and Fernandez. Teehankee (Chairman). thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic. 1004. is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption. that is. Muñoz Palma. ET AL. ET AL. November 29. VICENTE ASUNCION. December 27. L-37365. ET AL.. her sister of full blood. should any of them die. SALAMAT. from which it can be implied that. USUFRUCT. No. — There is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct. is not true as she died on May 9. the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones.. there is none. We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision.C. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. which provisions.R. Makasiar.. No costs. They do not admit of any other interpretation. entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. L-22402. Tansinsin & Tansinsin for the defendants and appellants. the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favor of the children of her three cousins with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live. On the contrary. . 28 SCRA 610). No.. 1969. N. L-11960. DEATH OF ONE OF USUFRUCTUARIES BEFORE END OF USUFRUCT. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura. JOSE V. et al. which as indicated here before. EXCEPTION. January 31.. No. In the instant case. No. 1958. Almanza. et al. ||| (Bicomong v. ACCORDINGLY.

Victoria. all surnamed Perez. Subsequently. 1962. the naked owner. said lessee was also constrained to withhold the corresponding part of the usufruct of the property. The fishpond is situated at a barrio of Hagonoy. Policarpio who used to give them proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them. 1963. the surviving usufructuaries are entitled to receive the shares corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries. Fructuosa. Francisco Lorenzo. Leoncio Perez and Servillano Perez. 1962. adhere to the theory that since the usufructuaries were instituted simultaneously by the late Damasa Crisostomo. The surviving usufructuaries. The children of Antonio Perez. she gave the naked ownership of a fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz while its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio Perez.714. namely: Maria. Salamat entitled to the sum of P10. On the other hand. The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to one Gil P. three of the usufructuaries died. Teodora. the trial court rendered decision the dispositive part of which reads as follows: "Wherefore. Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo turned out to be fourteen. Bulacan. namely. however.714. Salamat avers as special defense that he is the successor-in-interest of Teodorica dela Cruz and as such he is entitled to the shares corresponding to the three deceased usufructuaries in as much as the usufruct in their favor was automatically extinguished by death and became merged with the naked owner. the death of the three usufructuaries did not extinguish the usufruct. Francisco Lorenzo. bequeathed in her will all her rights to the fishpond to Jose V. Vicente Asuncion. Bonifacio Lorenzo. Perez and Servillano Perez. Teodorica dela Cruz. the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Batas Riego de Dios who. both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries in the amount of (P10. the two lessees commenced the present action for interpleader against both the naked owner and surviving usufructuaries to compel them to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims. after executing the contract of lease. ordering the latter to deliver to said defendant the aforesaid . Graciano. Because of these conflicting claims. on the other hand. Pio.26 representing the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries in the lease rental due from plaintiff Gil Policarpio. the lessee withheld said amount. Leoncio M. hence. and so. Salamat. When the case was called for hearing. the usufruct to continue until the death of the last usufructuary. on May 31. and on March 29. Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo.DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO. and Juan. the parties agreed to submit the case for decision upon the submission of their respective memoranda considering that the issue involved was purely legal in nature. on November 15. During the term of the lease. came to know of the existing conflicting claims. judgment is hereby rendered declaring defendant Jose V. So. J : p In a duly probated last will and testament of one Damasa Crisostomo. upon their death. Apolonio Lorenzo.26. Vicente. and not knowing to whom of the claimants the shares of the deceased usufructuaries should be paid. Defendant Jose V.

. lib. I. Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous. y es claro que al morir el último llamado. Appellants argue that it is the surviving usufructuaries who are entitled to receive the shares of the deceased by virtue of Article 611 of the Civil Code which provides: "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. The important issue to be determined is whether the eleven surviving usufructuaries of the fishpond in question are the ones entitled to the fruits that would have corresponded to the three deceased usufructuaries. VII del Digesto. Civil Code). sobre la no extinción del usufructo simultáneo. and likewise declaring said defendant Jose V. salvo expresion en contrario. Salamat. . ". su porcian acrece á demás á no ser que el testador exprese lo contrario. said theory would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct. ". Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español. because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears." (Manresa. also uphold the view we here express. 621) al usufructo constituido en provecho de varias personas vivas al tiempo de su constitucion. with the parties bearing their own costs and expenses of litigation. refiriendonos al caso de muerte natural. hasta la muerte de la última persona que sobreviva . 1023). the following is their comment on the matter: "Al comentar el art. therefore. p. el art. parece referirse al usufructo simultáneo. hasta la muerte del primero. because a usufruct is extinguished by the death of the usufructuary unless a contrary intention clearly appears (Article 603. Thus. . Salamat entitled to share with the eleven usufructuaries in the proceeds of the lease contract executed by them with plaintiff Batas Riego de Dios. Sin embargo. puesto que en esta especie de usufructo el segundo usufructuario no entra en el disfrute. según el art. when the three usufructuaries died. que es precisamente lo que ordena el presente articulo. Hence. The theory of appellee cannot. . appellee contends that the most a usufruct can endure if constituted in favor of a natural person is the lifetime of the usufructuary. que habla del derecho de . 486). Al referirse . 521 (now Art. del disfrute simultaneo y sucesivo. muerto uno. es indudable que se refiere tambien al sucesivo. ordering the latter to deliver to him such amount as would be equivalent to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries. Tomo IV. Ninguna duda cabe. their usufructuary rights were extinguished and whatever rights they had to the fruits reverted to the naked owner. If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of the three usufructuaries has the effect of consolidating their rights with that of the naked owner were correct. . . 469 (now Art. se extingue el usufructo. ha de tenerse presente que si son muchos los llamados al usufructo simultáneamente. ó se infiriera así del título en que se constituyó el usufructo. 987 (now Art. 564) hablamos. contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. or the naked owner Jose V." The surviving usufructuaries took the present appeal. puesto que el derecho de acrecer es aplicable a los usufructuaríos. be entertained. Furthermore. 1931. . appellee argues. tit.amount. entre las formas de constitución del usufructo. The well-known Spanish commentators on the counterpart of Article 611 we have copied above which implicitly provides that the share of a usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the benefit of the surviving usufructuaries." On the other hand. . para lo cual puede verse la doctrina de la ley 33.

Bengzon. y Pothier reprodujo dicha doctrina. Wherefore.L. JJ. therefore. en que se proponen algunos casos de excepcion. que habiéndose legado el usufructo vitalicio del remanente de sus bienes. J. should any of them die. appellees Gil P.acrecer en el usufructo. appears that the Spanish commentators on the subject are unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct. y sí por aplicación de la voluntad presunta del testador. el Digesto admitió. o una misma parte de ella. la solución afirmativa. o cualquiera de las dos que sobreviviere a la otra. C. art. y el tit. 25966. Here there is none. They do not admit of any other interpretation. The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and. and Zaldivar. No costs. no se extinguírá hasta la muerte de la última que sobrevívíere.B. concur. the decision appealed from is reversed. Civ. Lecciones Elementales de Derecho Civil.] .. p. Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil. took no part. IV del mismo libro. November 1.J. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision. no constituyendo la separación de partes sino una previsión del testador. Barrera. pp. según un texto de Paulo. Regala. "La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo español ha admitido y sancionado también en le sentencia de 29 de marzo de 1905. No. J. the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. Dizon. On the contrary. J. 86." (Colin and Capitant. as a corollary. Concepcion. 521.R. ||| (Policarpio v. 1926.. 605-606) It. No. para el arreglo del usufructo total durante la vida de las dos usufructuaries. a dos hermanas. Reyes.R. aunque no por aplicación del derecho de acrecer. Tomo I. por partes iguales. January 31. — El usufructo constituido en provecho de varias personas vivas al tiempo de su constitución. These provisions of the will are clear. sexta edicion. debe entenderse que ellas.P. L-21809." (Del Viso.. 1966) EN BANC [G. Makalintal. sobreviviendo otro y otros? — Como dice la obra anotada. Cód. Bengzon. Tomo VIII. se da el derecho de acrecer cuando uno de ellos muere despues del testador. Salamat. hence. from which it can be implied that. 1957.. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to them the money withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries.) "Si a varios usufructuarios se les lega la totalidad de una herencia. había de disfrutar dicho usufructo. G. the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favor of the children of her three cousins with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live.

The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno. and LOPEZ DE BUENO. 1924..In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez. upon the subsequent death of the testator. J : p This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez. On January 7. The appellant. WILLS. the part pertaining to such heir will. Delgado & Recto for appellant. Vicente F. opponent-appellant. while the appellee. died on February 25. and Margarita Lopez appealed. go by accretion to the coheir. Tomas Rodriguez. and the testator. Tomas Rodriguez. — When one of two joint heirs called by will to an inheritance without special designation of shares dies before the testator. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Marcaida. Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament. had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. deceased MANUEL TORRES. heir. MARGARITA LOPEZ. special administrator. and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives. Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that. claims the same by accretion and in the character of universal heir under the will of the decedent. Lopez died. Lopez. by reason of his being then the legal guardian of the testator with accounts unsettled. 48 Phil. and the additional circumstance that the predeceasing heir was. Capili & Ocampo and Camus. Luz Lopez de Bueno. in the second clause of which he declared: " I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property. appellees. thereafter. Lopez. DECISION STREET. no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by award in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. Margarita Lopez. The will referred to." Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator. after having been contested. claims said half by intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir. vs. The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3. 772). Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian. decedent. SYLLABUS 1. 1924. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Araneta & Zaragoza for appellees. at the time of the making of the will. my cousin Vicente F. disqualified to take. or only four days after the will abovementioned was made. 1924. Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. JOINT HEIRS UNDER WILL. has been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. ACCRETION. as guardian. does not make a case for intestate succession as to his part of the estate. This provision is of undoubted application to the .

Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared. In case of conflict. defining the right of accretion. and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant. in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to. as it does with the general topic of intestate succession. Indeed. secondly. when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualified to receive it. under paragraph 4 of article 912. but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties. the provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the latter. In this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared. yet it must be so understood. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. that accretion takes place in a testamentary success when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares. The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that. This article (982) is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand. among other things. in effect. but also the half which pertained to him. not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take. Lopez and his daughter. this interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code. by which the more specific is held to control the general. and.succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de suceder). one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator. In applying the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as far as possible. while the latter is more specific. Luz Lopez de Bueno. in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion. therefore in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate. But it is obvious that the incapacity of Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part. giving due effect to all. under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982. As between articles 912 and 983. Lopez must be considered invalid. Margarita Lopez. defining the particular conditions under which accretion takes place. among other things.situation before us. dealing. while. accretion occurs when one of . therefore. it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two. that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit. as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. and in case of conflict between two provisions the more general is to be considered as being limited by the more specific. Luz Lopez de Bueno. owing to the incapacity of the latter. It is there declared. Besides. We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable the appellee clearly has the better right. In addition to this. this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. intestate . The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. and its effect is to give to the survivor. that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible." It is that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912. Upon these provisions an argument is planted conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid. There was no error whatever. In addition to this. notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified that as a consequence Margarita Lopez is inherit the share of said disqualified heir. to the same inheritance without special designation of shares.

if he dies before the testator. vol. 25966. 310. Ostrand. amounting to a mild presumption. 372.. 34. 13 Mucius Scaevola. 285-287. . with costs against the appellant. JJ. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the Code. pp. a consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession. and it is so ordered. concur. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy. and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Johns. A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed incapacity to take. to the extent supposed in appellant's brief. Lopez. November 01. and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. as is well known. 186). 16 Mucius Scaevola. 373. id. if the condition be not fulfilled. 4th ed. I. 225. Villamor. tend to the conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation of the inheritance is governed by article 912." (Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia. The judgment appealed from will be affirmed. Romualdez. or if he renounces the inheritance or legacy. Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español. or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject.R.. without being limited. 311.) In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and in the common law a certain legal intendment. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912 rather than 982.J. The opinions of the commentators. by the provisions of the Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa. Avanceña. VII. No. vol. .and Villa-Real.. — a presumption which has its basis in the supposed intention of the testator. partial testacy was not allowed and there has remained in the derived systems a presumption against it. Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the time of the making of the will. G. In Roman law.. pp. p. ||| (In re: Estate Rodriguez v. 1926) . against partial intestacy. .the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de recibirla). C.