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PIER 8 ARRASTRE V.

ROLDAN-CONFESOR 241 SCRA 294 (1995)


FACTS: Petitioner corporation and private respondent labor union entered into a 3-year
CBA which was set to expire in November 1991. During the freedom period, the
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) questioned the majority status of the
private respondent through a petition for certification election. In the election, the private
respondent won as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners rank-and-file
employees
1. Respondents consist of various foremen and legal secretaries, as well as timekeeper of petitioner. Respondents subsequently joined private respondent labor
union.
2. In June 1992, private respondent and petitioner engaged in collective bargaining;
because of a bargaining deadlock, private respondent filed a notion of strike with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NMCB), which failed to settle the
parties controversy
3. Thereafter, public respondent Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute by issuing an order which included foremen, legal secretaries, etc as
members of the private respondent union
4. Petitioner now questions the public respondent for including foremen, legal
secretaries, and time-keepers from the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file
employees represented by private respondent labor union. ISSUE:
ISSUE: WON the public respondent committed grave abuse in including respondents
as members of private respondent labor union
HELD: Yes, as to most of respondents. Art 245 Labor Code states that: managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-andfile employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
The test of supervisory or managerial status is whether an employee possesses
authority to act in the interest of his employer which authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires use of independent judgment. What governs the
determination of the nature of employment is not the employee's title, but his job
description. If the nature of the employee's job does not fall under the definition of
"managerial" or "supervisory" in the Labor Code, he is eligible to be a member of the
rank-and-file bargaining unit.
Foremen are chief and often especially-trained workmen who work with and are
commonly in charge of a group of employees in an industrial plant or in construction
work. They are the persons designated by the employer-management to direct the work
of employees and to superintend and oversee them. They are representatives of the
employer-management with authority over particular groups of workers, processes,
operations, or sections of a plant or an entire organization. In the modern industrial
plant, they are at once a link in the chain of command and the bridge between the
management and labor. In the performance their work, foremen definitely use their

independent judgment and are empowered to make recommendations for managerial


action with respect to those employees under their control. Foremen fall squarely
under the category of supervisory employees, and cannot be part of rank-and-file
unions.
Upon the other hand, legal secretaries are neither managers nor supervisors. Their
work is basically routinary and clerical. However, they should be differentiated from
rank-and-file employees because they are tasked with, among others, the typing of legal
documents, memoranda and correspondence, the keeping of records and files, the
giving of and receiving notices and such other duties as required by the legal personnel
of the corporation. Legal secretaries therefore fall under the category of
confidential employees. Thus, the ineligibility of managerial employees to form,
assist or join a labor union equally applies to them.
As for the timekeeper and assistant timekeeper it is clear from petitioner's own
pleadings that they are neither managerial nor supervisory employees. They are
merely tasked to report those who commit infractions against company rules and
regulations. This reportorial function is routinary and clerical. They do not
determine the fate of those who violate company policy rules and regulations
function. It follows that they are included in the subject bargaining unit.

SAN JOSE ELECTRIC SERVICE (SAJELCO) V. MINISTRY OF LABOR 173 SCRA


697 (1989)
FACTS: Private respondent Manggagawang Nagkakaisa ng SAJELCO-Association of
Democratic Labor Organization (MAGKAISAA-ADLO) filed a petition for direct
certification election with the regional office of DOLE. The petition alleged that
MAGKAISA-ADLO is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with MOLE
a. There are 54 more or less rank and file employees in SAJELCO and almost
62% of the employees sought to be represented have supported the filing of
the petition
b. There has been no valid certification election held in SAJELCO for the past
12 months prior to the filing of the petition and there is no other union in the
bargaining unit
1. SAJELCO opposed the petition for direct certification election contending that the
employees who sought to be represented by the private respondent are
members-consumers of the cooperative itself and at the same time composed
the General Assembly, which according to the By-laws, is also the final arbiter of
any dispute arising in the cooperative
2. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for direct certification election on the basis
of the pleadings filed, citing that while some of the members of the respondent
union are the members of the cooperative, it cannot be denied that they are also
the employees within the contemplation of the Labor Code and as such, they are
entitled to all the benefits of employees including the right to self-organization
3. In its appeal, SAJELCO asserted that under in electric cooperatives, there is a
merger of the consumer-members that comprise the assembly and that of the
rank-and-file members of the union into one person or juridical status thus
rendering the proposed collective bargaining agent ineffective
4. The Director of Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed the appeal and sustained
the ruling of the Med-Arbiter
ISSUE: WON the employees-members of an electric cooperative can organize
themselves for purposes of collective bargaining
HELD: Yes. A cooperative, therefore, is by its nature different from an ordinary business
concern being run either, by persons, partnerships or corporations. Its owners and/or
members are the ones who run and operate the business while the others are its
employees.
An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner
thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner
cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. The employees of cooperatives
who are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join
labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves
co-owners of the cooperative.

However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not


members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise
the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and
others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country.
The provisions of the SAJELCOs By-laws, however, mention two types of employees:
the members-consumers and the members of their immediate families. With regard to
the employees of SAJELCO who are members-consumers, the rule is settled that
they are not qualified to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of
collective bargaining. The reason for withholding from employees of a
cooperative who are members-co-owners the right to collective bargaining is
clear: an owner cannot bargain with himself. However, employees who are not
members-consumers may form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of
collective bargaining notwithstanding the fact that employees of SAJELCO who
are not members-consumers were employed ONLY because they are members of
the immediate family of members-consumers. The fact remains that they are not
themselves members-consumers, and as such, they are entitled to exercise the
rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as
are Constitution, Labor Code and other related special laws.

VILLUGA V. NLRC 225 SCRA 537 (1993)


FACTS: Petitioner Villuga was employed as a cutter in the tailoring shop owned by
private respondent Zapanta. As cutter, he was task to distribute work to the shops
tailors or sewers when both the shops manager and assistant manager would be
absent. He saw to it that their work conformed with the pattern he had prepared and if
not, he had them redone, repaired or re-sewn
1. From February 17 to 22, 1978, Villuga failed to report for work allegedly due to
illness. For not properly notifying his employer, he was considered to have
abandoned his work
2. Villuga, then, filed a complaint for illegal termination, nonpayment of overtime
pay, holiday pay and premium pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month
pay. Villuga alleged that the was terminated due to his active participation in the
union organized by private respondents tailors
3. LA held in favor of private respondent and dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit but ordered the payment of Villugas claim for 13th month pay for the years
1976, 1977 and 1980. NLRC affirmed the same
ISSUE: WON petitioner falls within the category of a managerial employee
HELD: No, Villuga is a rank-and-file employee.
Under Rule 1, Section 2(c), Book III of IRR of Labor Code, to be a member of a
managerial staff, the following elements must concur or co-exist: (1) that his
primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management
policies; (2) that he customarily and regularly exercises discretion and
independent judgment in the performance of his functions; (3) that he regularly
and directly assists in the management of the establishment; and (4) that he does
not devote his twenty per cent of his time to work other than those described
above.
Applying the above criteria to petitioner Villuga's case, it is undisputed that his primary
work or duty is to cut or prepare patterns for items to be sewn, not to lay down or
implement any of the management policies, as there is a manager and an assistant
manager who perform said functions. It is true that in the absence of the manager the
assistant manager, he distributes and assigns work to employees but such duty, though
involving discretion, is occasional and not regular or customary. He had also the
authority to order the repair or re-sewing of defective item but such authority is part and
parcel of his function as cutter to see to it that the items cut are sewn correctly lest the
defective nature of the workmanship be attributed to his "poor cutting." Elias Villuga
does not participate in policy-making. Rather, the functions of his position
involve execution of approved and established policies. In Franklin Baker Company
of the Philippines v. Trajano, it was held that employees who do not participate in policymaking but are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe are
not managerial employees.

The test of "supervisory or managerial status" depends on whether a person


possesses authority that is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but one that
requires use of independent judgment. In other words, the functions of the
position are not managerial in nature if they only execute approved and
established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement said
policies or not.

PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS V. SECRETARY OF LABOR 312 SCRA 104 (1999)
FACTS: Private respondent Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UEOF (Union) filed a
petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive
bargaining agent of the supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines
1. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition, expressly stating that the Union was an
affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (Federation) together with 2
rank-and-file unions: Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees
Union of the Philippines (PCEUP)
2. Subsequently, PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to set
aside, cancel and/or revoke the charter affiliation of the union on the grounds that
the members of the union were managers and that the supervisors union cannot
affiliate with a federation whose members include the rank and file union of the
same company
3. The Secretary of Labor held that Art 245 Labor Code does not preclude the
supervisors union and the rank-and-file union from being affiliated with the same
federation since a federation of local union is not the labor organization
contemplated in Art 245 Labor Code but it only becomes entitled to all the rights
enjoyed by the labor organization when it has complied with the registration
requirements found in Art 234 and 237 Labor Code. What is prohibited by Art 245
is membership of supervisory employees in a labor union of rank-and-file
employees
4. Pepsi assailed the Secretary of Labors decision that credit and collection
managers and accounting managers are eligible for membership in a
supervisors union
ISSUE: WON confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank-and-file
employees
HELD: No. A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate
matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's
property. While Art 245 Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible
to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary
implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
In the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be
on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its
interests are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if
these employees themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in such a
situation can become one-sided. It is the same reason that confidential
employees considered as included in the disqualification found in Art 245; it is as
if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If
confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for
themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather than the
interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the

purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or
individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the employers. It is not
farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest
which they are duty bound to protect. As held in Golden Farms v. Ferrer-Calleja,
"confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators
who, having access to confidential information, may become the source of undue
advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective
bargaining agreement.
Route Managers, Chief Checkers and Warehouse Operations Managers are
supervisors while Credit & Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly
confidential employees. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description
of subject employees. What is essential is the nature of the employee's function and not
the nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether the employee has
rank and file or managerial status, or whether he is a supervisory employee.

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY V. DLSU-EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 330 SCRA 363


(2000)
FACTS: DLSU and DLSU Employees Association-National Federation of Teachers and
Employees Union (DLSU-NAFTEU)which is comprised of regular non-academic rankand-file employeesentered into a CBA for 3 years, which was set to expire in
December 1989.
1. During the freedom period (60 days before the expiration of the CBA), the union
initiated negotiations with the university for a new CBA. However, it turned out to
be unsuccessful and as such, the union filed a notice to strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
2. After several meetings, 5 out of 11 issues raised in the notice to strike were
resolved by both parties. A partial CBA then was executed by the university and
the union.
3. Thereafter, both parties entered into a submission agreement and identified 6
issues to be resolved for arbitration, to wit: scope of the bargaining unit, union
security clause, security of tenure, salary increases in for the 3 rd and 4th year of
the CBA, indefinite union leave, reduction of union presidents work load, special
leave and duration of the CBA.
4. On the scope of the bargaining unit, the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) held that: the
computer operators at the Computer Services Center (CSC) should be included
as members of the bargaining unit since said operators were doing clerical and
routinary work and had nothing to do with the setting of management policies for
the university. While they may have access to vital information regarding the
universitys operation, they are not necessarily confidential employees. With
respect to the employees of the College of St. Benilde, the VA found that CSB
has a personality separate and distinction from DLSU and as such, the CSB
employees are outside of the bargaining unit of DLSU-NAFTEU
5. The university, then filed a petition for certiorari with TRO and/or preliminary
injunction assailing the decision of the VA as having been rendered in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
6. DLSU argued that the computer operators of CSC and discipline officers are
confidential employees, whose status has been recognized even by the union as
confidential employees.
a. The computer operators process data that are needed for strategic planning
and evaluation of systems and in fact, handle the universitys confidential
information and data including those involving and/or pertinent to labor
relations.
b. As to the discipline officers, the university maintained that they were also
excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees under the
parties 1986 CBA. Since the discipline officers are the alter egos of
management as they perform tasks which are inherent in management (e.g.
enforce discipline, act as peace officers, secure peace and safety of the
students inside campus, conduct investigations on violations of university
regulations etc). Discipline officers are also privy to highly confidential
information ordinarily accessible only to management

ISSUE: WON the computer operators assigned at CSC and the universitys discipline
officers may be considered as confidential employees and should therefore be excluded
from the bargaining unit which is composed of rank-and-file employees of the university
HELD: No, computer operators and discipline officers are not confidential employees
and are as such, eligible to join the labor union. The express exclusion of the computer
operators and discipline officers from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees in
the 1986 collective bargaining agreement does not bar any re-negotiation for the future
inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit. During the freedom period, the
parties may not only renew the existing collective bargaining agreement but may also
propose and discuss modifications or amendments thereto. With regard to the alleged
confidential nature of the said employees' functions, after a careful consideration of the
pleadings filed before this Court, we rule that the said computer operators and discipline
officers are not confidential employees. As carefully examined by the Solicitor General,
the service record of a computer operator reveals that his duties are basically clerical
and non-confidential in nature. As to the discipline officers, we agree with the voluntary
arbitrator that based on the nature of their duties, they are not confidential employees
and should therefore be included in the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.
With regard to the employees of CSB, they should be excluded from the bargaining unit
of the rank-and-file employees of DLSU, because the two educational institutions have
their own separate juridical personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify
the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.

PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE V. TORRES 231 SCRA 335 (1994)


FACTS: Philphos Movement for Progress Inc (PMPI) filed with DOLE a petition for
certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner Phil Phosphate,
seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Phil Phosphate
1. Petitioner welcomed the creation of a supervisory employees union provided that
the necessary requisites of law were properly observed and that the companys
superintendents who were managerial and not supervisory employees. Phil
Phosphate also maintained that its professional or technical employees were not
within the definition of supervisory employees under the Labor Code.
2. Consequently, petitioner prayed for the exclusion of its superintendents and
professional/technical employees from PMPI supervisory union
3. Med-Arbiter ordered the certification election among supervisory excluding
superintendents and the professional and technical employees
4. PMPI filed an amended petition with the Med-Arbiter seeking to represent not
only supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and
confidential employees. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition. Secretary of Labor
affirmed the same
ISSUE: WON professional/technical and confidential employees may validly join
respondent PMPI union which is composed of supervisors
HELD: No, being a supervisory union, PMPI cannot represent professional/technical
and confidential employees of petitioner since such positions are more of a rank-and-file
status than supervisory.
Under Art 212(m) Labor Code, supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of
the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment." The definition of managerial employees is limited to those having authority to
hire and fire, while those who only recommend effectively the hiring or firing or transfer
of personnel; are considered closer to rank and file employees. The exclusion therefore
of mid-level executives from the category of managers has brought about a third
classification, the supervisory employees. The peculiar role of supervisors is such that
while they are not managers, when they recommend action implementing management
policy or ask for the discipline or dismissal of subordinates, they identify with the
interests of the employer and may act contrary to the interests of the rank and file.
The
certification
of
Personnel
Officer
Duhaylungsod
that
its
professional/technical employees occupy positions that are non-supervisory is
evidence that said employees belong to the rank and file. Quite obviously, these
professional/technical employees cannot effectively recommend managerial
actions with the use of independent judgment because they are under the
supervision of superintendents and supervisors. Because it is unrefuted that
these professional/technical employees are performing non-supervisory
functions, hence they should be classified, at least for purposes of this case, as

rank and file employees. Consequently, these professional/technical employees


cannot be allowed to join a union composed of supervisors. Conversely,
supervisory employees cannot join a labor organization of employees under their
supervision but may validly form a separate organization of their own.
This is precisely the situation which the law prohibits. It would create an obvious conflict
of views among the members, or at least between 2 groups of members espousing
opposing interests. The intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would
merge with the rank and file, or where the supervisors' labor organization would
represent conflicting interests, especially where, as in the case at bar, the supervisors
will be commingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own
bargaining unit. Members of the supervisory union might refuse to carry out disciplinary
measures against their co-member rank and file employees.
Supervisors have the right to form their own union or labor organization. What
the law prohibits is a union whose membership comprises of supervisors
merging with the rank and file employees because this is where conflict of
interests may arise in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and strikes.
The professional/technical employees of petitioner therefore may join the existing
rank and file union, or form a union separate and distinct from the existing union
organized by the rank and file employees of the same company.
As to the confidential employees of the petitioner, the latter has not shown any proof or
compelling reason to exclude them from joining respondent PMPI and from participating
in the certification election, unless these confidential employees are the same
professional/technical employees whom we find to be occupying rank and file positions.

ADAMSON & ADAMSON V. CIR 127 SCRA 268 (1984)


FACTS: Adamson and Adamson Inc Supervisory Union (FFW) informed petitioner that
it had organized and established a union on the same date the Adamson & Adamson
Salesmen Association (FFW) advised the petitioner that the rank-and-file salesmen had
formed their union.
1. Petitioner questioned the legality of the affiliation of both unions with FFW.
Adamson & Adamson Inc filed a petition to set aside the orders of respondent
CIR which held that Adamson & Adamson supervisory Union (FFW) can legally
represent supervisors of the petitioner corporation despite the affiliation of the
rank and file union of the same company with the same labor federation, the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW). CIR dismissed the petition
2. Subsequently and during the pendency of the present petition, the rank-and-file
employees formed their own union, naming it Adamson & Adamson Independent
Workers (FFW)
3. Petitioner argued that the affiliation of the respondent union of supervisors, the
salesmen association and the Adamson & Adamson Independent Workers union
of rank-and-file personnel with the same federation (FFW) violates Sec 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act because:
a. It results in the indirect affiliation of supervisors and rank-and-file employees
with one labor organization
b. Since the respondent union and the unions of non-supervisors in the same
company are governed by the same constitution and by-laws of the national
federation, in effect, there is only one union
c. Such would result in the respondent unions losing its independence because
it became the alter ego of the federation
4. The petitioner also argued that should affiliation be allowed, this would violate the
requirement of separateness of bar units under Sec 12 of the Act because only
one union will in fact represent both supervisors and rank-and-file employees of
the company
5. On the other hand, the respondents contended that even if the salesmen of the
petitioner are under the supervision of the members of the supervisory union, the
prohibition does not apply because the salesmen and the supervisory employees
of the company have their separate and distinct labor organizations, as
evidenced by the facts that their respective unions sent separate proposals for
CBAs. Respondents further argued that the FFW has, as its affiliates,
supervisory as well as rank-and-file employees. Should both the supervisory and
rank-and-file employees of a certain employer who have separate certificates of
registration affiliate with the same federation, the prohibition does not apply since
the federation is not the organization of the supervisory employees contemplated
in the law.
ISSUE: WON a supervisors union may affiliate with a federation with which unions of
rank-and-file employees of the same employer are also affiliated

HELD: Yes. As held in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, the
locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain the
equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-member in the
economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the
association of the locals into the national union was in the furtherance of the
same end. These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such
legal relations with their members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the
local unions into a common enterprise to increase by collective action the
common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet
the locals remained the basic units of association; free to serve their own and the
common-interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and
By-laws of the Association; and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual
welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into
existence.
CIR correctly pointed out that the confusion seems to have stemmed from the prefix of
FFW after the name of the local unions in the registration of both. Nonetheless, the
inclusion of FWW in the registration is merely to stress that they are its affiliates
at the time of registrations. It does not mean that said local unions cannot stand
on their own Neither can it be construed that their personalities are so merged
with the mother federation that for one difference or another they cannot pursue
their own ways, independently of the federation. This is borne by the fact that
FFW, like other federation is a legitimate labor organization separate and distinct
from its locals and affiliates and to construe the registration certificates of the
aforecited unions, along the line of the Company's argument. would tie up any
affiliates to the shoe string of the federation.
The Adamson and Adamson Supervisory Union and the Adamson and Adamson, Inc.,
Salesmen Association (FFW), have their own respective constitutions and by-laws.
They are separately and independently registered of each other. Both sent their
separate proposals for collective bar agreements with their employer. There could be no
employer influence on rank-and-file organizational activities nor could there be any rank
and file influence on the supervisory function of the supervisors because of the
representation sought to be proscribed.

VILLAR V. INCIONG 121 SCRA 444 (1983)


FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly
registered labor organization which was the existing bargaining agent of the employees
in Amigo Manufacturing Inc. The company and Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a
CBA governing their labor relations which was set to expire on February 28, 1977
1. On January 5, 1977, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees, the
Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a petition for certification election with
Med-Arbiter. This was opposed by PAFLU on the ground that Amigo Employees
Union was, at the time, affiliated with PAFLU. Consequently, FUR withdrew its
petition
2. Immediately thereafter, petitioner Villar, representing herself to be the authorized
representative of the Amigo Employees Union, filed a petition for certification
election.
3. Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU moved for the dismissal of the petition for
certification on the following grounds citing that the petition lacked the mandatory
requisite of at least 30% of the employees of the bargaining unit and Villar had no
legal personality to sign the petition since she was not an officer of the union nor
is there a factual claim that she was the authorized representative of the union.
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition
4. PAFLU, then, formed a trial committee to investigate the local unions charges
against petitioners Villar for acts of disloyalty inimical to the interest of the local
union.
5. Meanwhile, Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU and the company concluded a new
CBA which provided for union security clause
6. In their answer petitioners stated that their disaffiliation of the Amigo Employees
Union form PAFLU or the filing for a petition for certification election do not
constitute acts of disloyalty as these were in the exercise of their constitutional
right to self-organization. Moreover, PAFLU had no jurisdiction to investigate their
case since the charges were intra-union problems within the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU and should be conducted pursuant to the local unions constitution
and by-laws.
7. PAFLU found the petitioners guilty of the charges. Pursuant to the union security
clause in the CBA and upon PAFLUs demand, the company terminated the
petitioners
8. The regional office granted the application of the company for clearance to
terminate petitioners. Upon appeal, Inciong affirmed the same
ISSUE: WON petitioners acts were an exercise of their right to self-organization
HELD: Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for
certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to selforganization. They contend that these acts were done within the 60-day freedom period
when questions of representation may freely be raised. Such arguments are untenable.

In the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the. Amigo Employees UnionPAFLU, there could be no legal objections thereto for it was their right to do so. But
what petitioners did by the very clear terms of their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan"
was to disaffiliate the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which
they could not have done with any effective consequence because they
constituted the minority in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
It is clear from the facts that petitioners were among the ninety-six (96) who signed the
"Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234) union
members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners constituted a
small minority for which reason they could not have successfully disaffiliated the
local union from PAFLU. Since only 96 wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that
the majority wanted the union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not
denied or disputed by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore,
prevail over that of the minority members.
Neither is there merit to petitioners' contention that they had the right to present
representation issues within the 60-day freedom period. It is true, as contended by
petitioners, that under Art 257 Labor Code and Section 3, Rule 2, Book 2 IRR,
questions of exclusive bargaining representation are entertainable within the 60 days
prior to the expiry date of an existing CBA, and that they did file a petition for
certification election within that period. But the petition was filed in the name of the
Amigo Employees Union which had not disaffiliated from PAFLU, the mother union.
Petitioners being a mere minority of the local union may not bind the majority members
of the local union.
Moreover, the Amigo Employees Union, as an independent union, is not duly
registered as such with the Bureau of Labor Relations. As such unregistered
union, it acquires no legal personality and is not entitled to the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration.
A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution. Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union members who
cease to be in good standing shall immediately be dismissed, such dismissal does not
constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively cognizable by the CIR.

SAN MIGUEL FOOD INC V. LAGUESMA 263 SCRA 68 (1996)


FACTS: Private respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggawa (IBM) filed a petition for
certification election, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of petitioner
SMFI
1. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that a similar
petition was pending involving the same parties for the same cause of action
2. IBM filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, contending that the case
referred by SMFI had already been resolved by Med-Arbiter in which the petition
for certification election was denied due to IBMs failure to company with certain
mandatory requirements of the law. Since there was no pending petition, another
petition for certification election may be re-filed as soon as the said requirements
are met
3. Subsequently, Med-Arbiter granted the second petition for certification election
4. SMFI appealed to the DOLE Secretary alleging that the local chapter of IBM at
SMFI was not a legitimate labor organization for the reason that:
a. The authenticity and due execution of the Charter Certificate submitted by
IBM cannot be ascertained since the legitimate and authorized representative
of IBM Federation is yet to be identified
b. IBM at SMFI was not issued a certificate of registration by the Bureau of
Labor Relations pursuant to Art 234 Labor Code
5. Laguesma denied the petitioners appeal
6. Petitioner argues that IBM at SMFI is not a legitimate labor organization despite
the fact that it is a local or chapter of the IBM Federation because under Art 234
Labor Code, a labor organization shall acquire legal personality only upon
issuance of a certificate of registration by the Bureau of Labor Relations
ISSUE: WON IBM of SMFI is entitled to certification election
HELD: Yes. Art 212 Labor Code defines a legitimate labor organization as one
duly registered with DOLE, including nay local or chapter thereof. Ordinarily, a
labor organizations attains the status of legitimacy only upon the issuance in its name of
a Certificate of Registration by the Bureau of Labor Relations pursuant to Arts 234 and
235 Labor Code. The foregoing procedure is not the only way by which a labor union
may become legitimate, however. When an unregistered union becomes a branch, local
or chapter of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are
no longer required.
In Progressive Development Corp v. Secretary of Labor, the SC held that a local
or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon
submission of the following to the BLR:
a. A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and
b. The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the
books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or

treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by
its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does
not become a legitimate labor organization.
Corollarily, the satisfaction of all these requirements by the local or chapter shall
vest upon it the status of legitimacy with all its concomitant statutory privileges,
one of which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
In the case at bar, a close scrutiny of the records shows that at the time of the filing of
the subject petition on 24 September 1993 by the petitioner Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa, for and in behalf of its local affiliate IBM at SMFI-CEBU B-MEG, the latter
has been clothed with the status and/or character of a legitimate labor organization.
This is so, because on 19 July 1993, petitioner submitted to the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), this Department, the following documents: charter certificate,
constitution and by-laws, names and addresses of the union officers and certification of
the union's secretary on the non-availability of the union's Books of Accounts. Said
documents (expect the charter certificate) are certified under oath and attested to by the
local union's secretary and President, respectively.
The contention of the respondent that unless and until the issue on who is the legitimate
national president of IBM is resolved, the petitioner cannot claim that is has a valid
charter certificate necessary for it to acquire legal personality is untenable. The
resolution of the said issue will not, in any way, affect the validity of the charter
certificate issued by the IBM in favor of the local union. It must be borne in mind that the
said charter certificate was issued by the IBM in its capacity as a labor organization, a
juridical entity which has a separate and distinct legal personality from its members.
Since there is no showing that the Federation acting as a separate entity is questioning
the legality of the issuance of the said charter certificate, the legality of the issuance of
the same in favor of the local union is presumed.

PHOENIX IRON V. SECRETARY OF LABOR 244 SCRA 173 (1995)


FACTS: Private respondent PISCOR Workers Union-Alliance of Nationalist and
Genuine Labor Organization (PISCOR-ANGLO), asserting to be a legitimate labor
organization, filed a petition for certification of election with the Med-Arbiter.
1. Phoenix Iron and Steel Corp (Phoenix) questioned the legal personality of the
PISCOR-ANGLO
2. The Med-Arbiter subsequently found that the union failed to attain the status of a
legitimate labor organization for failing to comply with the requisites of the law
since:
a. No books of account were filed before the Bureau of Labor relations
b. The constitution, by-laws and the list of members who ratified the same were
not attested to by the union president
c. The constitution and by-laws were not verified under oath
d. The supporting documents submitted were not duly notarized
3. The Med-Arbiter cited the case of Progressive v. Secretary of Labor in which the
SC held that failure to certify the required documents under oath is fatal to the
acquisition of a legitimate status
4. Upon appeal, the Secretary of Labor issued a resolution calling for the immediate
conduct of a certification election and held that the union is not required to
submitted duly certified copies of its constitution and by-laws to establish its
legitimacy the account that doubts should be resolved in favor of its regularity
and not as adversely affecting the legal standing of the union
ISSUE: WON PISCOR-ANGLOs failure to comply with the requisites for registration of
legitimate labor organization is a mere technicality
HELD: No, as held in the Progressive case, a local or chapter becomes a legitimate
labor organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or
national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of
accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the
case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does
not become a legitimate labor organization.
In the case of union registration, the submission of the required documents (and
payment of P50.00 registration fee) becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of
the application for registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal
personality and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by the law to a
legitimate labor organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the
union it is dealing with is a bona-fide organization, one which has not submitted
false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the
certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these

apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and
misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration, it is also a ground for a
criminal charge of perjury.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the
commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting
employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose
sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends.
In the case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are
found in Rule II, Section 3 (e), Book V of the Implementing Rules provides that: "The
local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a
constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes,
the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or
national unions shall be observed"

THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA V. PIGLAS-HERITAGE G.R. NO 177024 (2009)


FACTS: Some rank-and-file employees of petitioner Heritage Hotel Manila formed the
Heritage Hotel Employees Union (HHE union). DOLE later issued a certificate of
registration to this union
1. HHE union filed a petition for certification election which petitioner company
opposed. The company alleged that the HHE union misrepresented itself to be
an independent union but in truth, it was a local chapter of NUWHRAIN.
Petitioner claimed that that HHE union intentionally omitted disclosure of its
affiliation with NUWHRAIN because the companys supervisors union was
already affiliated with it
2. Med-Arbiter granted HHE unions petition for certification election.
3. Subsequently, the rank-and-file employees of petitioner formed another union,
PIGLAS-Heritage Manila. HHE union, then, filed a petition for cancellation of its
union registration
4. When PIGLAS union filed a petition for certification election, the petitioner
opposed the same alleging that the new unions officers and members were also
those who belonged to the old union. The company averred that this was an
attempt to circumvent the CAs injunction against the holding of certification
election sought by HHE union. Despite this, Med-Arbiter granted the petition
5. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to cancel the union registration of PIGLAS,
claiming that the unions application for registration bore false information.
Petitioner alleged that the misrepresentation was evidenced by the discrepancy
in the number of union members appearing in the application and the list as well
as in the number of signatories to the attendance and signature sheets. The
company further alleged that 33 members of respondent PIGLAS union were
members of the defunct HHE union
6. DOLE-NCR denied the companys petition to cancel respondent PIGLAS unions
registration for the reason that the discrepancies in the number of members
stated in the applications supporting documents were not material and did not
constitute misrepresentation. As for the charge of dual unionism, the same is not
a ground for canceling registration. Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed the same
ISSUE: WON the union made fatal misrepresentation in its application for union
registration
HELD: No, the Labor and its implementing rules do not require that the number
of members appearing on the documents in question should completely dovetail.
For as long as the documents and signatures are shown to be genuine and
regular and the constitution and by-laws democratically ratified, the union is
deemed to have complied with registration requirements.
Here, the discrepancies in the number of union members or employees stated in the
various supporting documents that respondent PIGLAS union submitted to labor
authorities can be explained. While it appears in the minutes of the December 10, 2003
organizational meeting that only 90 employees responded to the roll call at the

beginning, it cannot be assumed that such number could not grow to 128 as reflected
on the signature sheet for attendance. The meeting lasted 12 hours. There is no
evidence that the meeting hall was locked up to exclude late attendees. There is also
nothing essentially mysterious or irregular about the fact that only 127 members ratified
the unions constitution and by-laws when 128 signed the attendance sheet. It cannot
be assumed that all those who attended approved of the constitution and by-laws. Any
member had the right to hold out and refrain from ratifying those documents or to simply
ignore the process. Finally, the 100 names submitted by respondent was substantial
compliance with the LC requisite on the names of members in the bargaining unit, for
20% of the employees in petitioner corporation is merely 50 members.
The fact that some of respondent PIGLAS unions members were also members of the
old rank and file union, the HHE union, is not a ground for canceling the new unions
registration. The right of any person to join an organization also includes the right to
leave that organization and join another one. Besides, HHE union is dead. It had
ceased to exist and its certificate of registration had already been cancelled. Thus,
petitioners arguments on this point may also be now regarded as moot and academic.

SAMMA-LIKHA V. SAMMA CORP G.R. NO 167141 (2009)


FACTS: Petitioner SAMMA-LIKHA filed a petition for certification election. Claiming that
it was a local chapter of the LIKHA Federation, it sought to represent the rank-and-file
employees of SAMMA Corp.
1. Respondent SAMMA Corp moved for the dismissal of the petition on the
following grounds:
a. LIKHA Federation failed to establish its legal personality
b. SAMMA-LIKHA failed to prove its existence as a local chapter
c. It had a prohibited mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees
2. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition. Subsequently, the Secretary of Labor
reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and held that the legal personality of a
union cannot be collaterally attacked but may only be questioned in an
independent petition for cancellation of registration. Thus, he directed the holding
of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the respondent
3. Meanwhile, the regional director of DOLE issued a resolution revoking the
charter certificate of petitioner as a local chapter of LIKHA Federation on the
account of having a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in the
union
ISSUE: WON the inclusion of a supervisory employee in the union of rank-and-file
employees is a ground to impugn the unions legitimacy as a labor organization
HELD: No, the erroneous inclusion of one supervisory employee in the union of rankand-file employees is not a ground to impugn its legitimacy as a legitimate labor
organization.
LIKHA was granted legal personality as a federation. Subsequently, petitioner as its
local chapter was issued its charter certificate. With certificates of registration issued
in their favor, they are clothed with legal personality as legitimate labor
organizations. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral
attack, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation of
certificate of registration. Unless petitioners union registration is cancelled in
independent proceedings, it shall continue to have all the rights of a legitimate
labor organization, including the right to petition for certification election.
Furthermore, the grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election based on
the lack of legal personality of a labor organization are the following: (a) petitioner is not
listed by the Regional Office or the Bureau of Labor Relations in its registry of legitimate
labor organizations or (b) its legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality
in accordance with the rules.
Respondent filed a petition for cancellation of the registration of SAMMA-LIKHA on
December 14, 2002. In a resolution dated April 14, 2003, petitioners charter certificate
was revoked by the DOLE. But on May 6, 2003, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of this resolution. Neither of the parties alleged that this resolution

revoking petitioners charter certificate had attained finality. However, in this petition,
petitioner prayed that its charter certificate be "reinstated in the roster of active
legitimate labor [organizations]." The proceedings on a petition for cancellation of
registration are independent of those of a petition for certification election. This
case originated from the latter. If it is shown that petitioners legal personality had
already been revoked or cancelled with finality in accordance with the rules, then
it is no longer a legitimate labor organization with the right to petition for a
certification election.

GABRIEL V. SECRETARY OF LABOR 328 SCRA 247 (2000)


FACTS: Petitioners comprise the executive board of the Solid Bank union, the duly
recognized bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of Solid Bank Corp while
private respondents are members of said union.
1. In 1991, the unions executive board decided to retain the services of Atty.
Lacsina as union counsel in connection with the negotiations for a new CBA. The
resolution confirming the same provided that 10% of the total economic benefits
that may be secured through the negotiations shall be given to Lacsina as
attorneys fees. It also contained an authorization for the company to check-off
said attorneys fees from the first lump sum payment of benefits to the employees
under the new CBA
2. The bank then, on request of the union, made payroll deductions for the
attorneys fees from the CBA benefits paid to union members
3. Private respondents, then, filed a complaint against petitioners and the union
counsel for illegal deduction of attorneys fees as well as for quantification of the
benefits in the CBA
4. The Med-Arbiter held in favor of private respondents and ordered the union
officers to return or refund the amount deducted as attorneys fees from the
package of benefits due the complainants under the new CBA
5. Upon appeal, the Secretary of Labor modified the Med-Arbiters resolution and
ordered that the refund shall be limited to those union members who have not
signified their conformity to the check-off of attorneys fees
6. Petitioners argue that the general membership resolution authorizing the bank to
check-off attorneys fees satisfies the legal requirements for such assessment
7. On the other hand, private respondents maintained that the check-off provision is
illegal because it was never submitted for approval at a general membership
meeting called for the purpose and that it failed to meet the formalities mandated
by Labor Code
ISSUE: WON the public respondent erred in ruling that the workers through their union
should be made to shoulder the attorneys fees
HELD: No.
In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from
employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them
directly to the union. It assures continuous funding; for the labor organization. As this
Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union
and only indirectly for the individual employees. The pertinent legal provisions on checkoffs are found in Art 222(b) and Art 241(o) Labor Code.
Art 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union's
incidental expenses, attorney's fees and representation expenses:
1) Authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the
general membership meeting called for the purpose;

2) Secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting; and


3) Individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the employees
concerned.
Clearly, attorney's fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an
employee without his written consent.
Solid Bank Union did not satisfy the requirements laid down by law and
jurisprudence for the validity of the 10% special assessment for union's
incidental expenses, attorney's fees and representation expenses. There were no
individual written check off authorizations by the employees concerned and so
the assessment cannot be legally deducted by their employer.
In the case of ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members vs. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corp, the SC held that (1) the prohibition against attorney's fees in
Article 222, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code applies only when the payment of
attorney's fees is effected through forced contributions from the workers; and (2)
that no deduction must be taken from the workers who did not sign the check-off
authorization.
The obligation to pay the attorney's fees belongs to the union and cannot be shunted to
the workers as their direct responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the union itself may
require the individual worker to assume the obligation to pay attorney's fees from their
own pockets. So categorical is this intent that the law makes it clear that any agreement
to the contrary shall be null and void ab initio.