EBRALINAG v.

THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF

CEBUG.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
AMOLO et al vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and
ANTONIO A.SANGUTANG.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993 ; GRIO-AQUINO,
J.:
Facts:
The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by
thepublic school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem andrecite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265
(An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions)
of July 11, 1955 , and by DepartmentOrder No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All
EducationalInstitutions)
dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)making
the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses
admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag,sing the national anthem,
and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are"acts of worship" or
"religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyoneor anything
except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They
think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledgetranscends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere
of theintellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control.
Issue:Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelledfrom
school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8
Held:No.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the
highestpriority and the amplest protection among human rights, for
it involves therelationship of man to his Creator
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religiousfreedom
is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave andimminent, of a serious
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any otherlegitimate public interest,
that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such athreat to public safety,
the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.(Teehankee) The
petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsoryflag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend
theircountrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance
of theflag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to
show theirrespect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Sincethey do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for
their expulsion.

IN RE: EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980)

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in
the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues assailing the provisions ofthe Rule of Court 139-A and
the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment ofmembership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he
is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership
fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of
the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and
it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does
not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment ofannual
dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the
regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is
not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the
court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, [G.R. No. L-9637 April
30, 1957]
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation
duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency
established in Manila in November, 1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation
with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409,
known as the Revised Charter ofthe City of Manila.
During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious materials at a very
minimal profit.
On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself
with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as
amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within
three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the
period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45
(Annex A).
Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains
the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).
Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the biblesand other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean
that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for
profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No.
2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any
charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of
religious practices.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional,
however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No.
2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to
license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.

Issue: Whether the Society is required to secure municipal permit toallow it to

sell and distribute bibles and religious literature, and topay taxes from the sales
thereof.
Held: No. Section 27 (e) of Commonwealth Act 466 (NIRC) exemptscorporations or
associations organized and operated exclusively forreligious, charitable, or
educational purposes, Provided however,That the income of whatever kind
and character from any of itsproperties, real or personal, or from any activity
conducted for profit,
regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable tothe tax imposed
under the Code. Herein, the act of distributing andselling bibles, etc. is purely
religious and cannot be made liable fortaxes or fees therein. Further, Ordinance
2529, as amended, cannotbe applied to the Society, for in doing so it would
impair its freeexercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship aswell
as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. The fact thatthe price of the bibles
and other religious pamphlets are little higherthan the actual cost of the same does
not necessarily mean that it isalready engaged in the business or occupation of
selling said merchandise for profit. Furthermore, Ordinance 3000 of the City
of Manila is of general application and it does not contain anyprovisions whatsoever
prescribing religious censorship norrestraining the free exercise and enjoyment of
any religiousprofession. The ordinance is not applicable to the Society,
as itsbusiness, trade or occupation is not particularly mentioned in Section3 of the
Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permit isrequired therefor under
existing laws and ordinances for the propersupervision and enforcement of
their provisions governing thesanitation, security and welfare of the public and
the health of theemployees engaged in the business of the Society.

American bible Society Vs City of Manila

FACTS : plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or
gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29
1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without
providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in
violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028
and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding
permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the
4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45
ISSUE : WON the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at
bar.
HELD : Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal
Revenue Code, Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That
the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or
personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition
made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not
be taxed The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some
instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean
that American Bible Society was engaged in the business or occupation of selling
said "merchandise" for profit Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in
doing so it would impair American Bible Societys free exercise and enjoyment of
its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Villacicencio Vs Lukban
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at
night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends
or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the
women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the
mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak
their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and
practically admitted by the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a
new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action.
On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized
by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the
same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice
of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like
Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said
prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women
have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being
given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even
consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be
severely punished

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R.

No. 23794 February 17, 1968]
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4
imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal
taxequivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and
other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were made, under
protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the
City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor
alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the
equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The
court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of
theordinance. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation,
specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of
taxation, were infringed?
Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is
based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present
conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those
present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to
the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive
as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the
coverage of the tax.

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the
resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction
and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that
Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to
the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly
violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in
business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental
motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order,
dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating
CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the
CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the
CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation,
involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power
that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has
no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the
Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.