Running Page #1

Blue Ribbon
Rant.part Review
Panel
POIul Choir
Constance L. Rice
POIul Members
Jan L. Handzlik
Laurie L. Levenson
Stephen A. Mansfield
Carol A Sobel
Edgar Hugh Twine
POIul Members Emeriti
Erwin Chemerinsky
Andrea Ordin
Maurice Suh
Executive Director
Kathleen Sal vary
Lead Investigator
Brent A. Braun
Additional!nvestigators
Eusebio Benavidez
Morris D. Hayes
Jack Keller
Pete McGuire
Michael Wolf
Additiolwl Stoff
Kenneth Berland
Jenna Cobb
John Mathews
Pilar Mendoza
Margaret Middleton
Natasha Saggar
Rishi Sahgal
Regina Tuohy
Running Page #2
Special
Thanks
Hon.James K.Hahn
Akin Gump Strauss
I-Iauer & Feld LLP
Burke, Williams
& Sorenson, LLP
Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher LLP
Howrey LLP
Lindahl, Sclmabel,
Kardassakis & Beck LLP
Nossaman Gurhner
Knox Elliott LLP
O'Meiveny & Meyers LLP
Orrick, Herrington
& Sutcliffe LLP
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky
& Walker LLP
Sidley Austin LLP
Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP
The James Irvine
Foundation
Linder & Associates
Los Angeles Police
Foundation
Los Angeles City
Personnel Depanment
Technicalllueat
Analysis Group, Inc.
LAPD Office of the
Inspector General
Latin American Law
Enforcement Association
Law Enforcement
Association of Asian Pacifics
Los Angeles Police
Protective League
Oscar J oel Bryant
Foundation
Chief William j. Bratton
Corina Alarcon
Hon. Lee Baca
Andre Birotte,Jr.
Merrick Bobb
Rick j. Caruso
Gerald Chaleff
Warren M. Christopher
Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.
Hon. Steve Cooley
David S. Cunningham III
Hon. Rockard j. Delgadillo
Donna Denning
Richard E. Drooyan
Paul Enox
Shelley Freeman
James j. Fyfe
Bonifacio Bonny Garcia
Michael j. Gennaco
Gigi Gordon
Michael P.Judge
E. Richard Larson
Barrett S. Litt
John Mack
Cheryl White Mason
Winston K. McKesson
Hon. Cindy Miscikowski
Rose M. Dchi
Anthony Pacheco
R. Samuel Paz
Ramon L. Quintana
Gilbert TRay
Hon. Ed P. Reyes
Lael Rubin
Anthony Asad ullah Samad
Alex Sanchez
Silvia Saucedo
Alan j. Skobin
Michael j. Strumwasser
Richard Tefank
Karen Wagener
Sam uel Walker
Hon. Jack Weiss
Hon. Debra W. Yang
Roberta Yang
Gregory A. Yates
All ofthe dedicated
LAPD officers and
employees ~ ' h o gave
their time mId insight
to this Panel in
order to improtle
the departmetlt.
Running Page #3
This report is dedicated iJl memoriam to Edgar Hugh TwiJle
Running Page #4
Running Page #5
Contents
I Introduction
9 The Road Ahead
9 I. THE RAMPART RECOVERY
12 Conclusion 1.1.
T/It New Rampart Lrodrrsnip ond Crime Fighting A/odrl Would HoVf:
Prroented CRASH A/iscondudfrom Metastasizing into 0 Crisis
13 Conclusion 1.2.
The N_ Rampart Lmdership ondCrime Fighting Alodel Hod the
Fol//jf",ing Kq Attributes
13 Conclusion 1.3.
Tlu New Rampart Lrodrrship ond Crime Fighting A/odrl Hod
tlte Following undership Quolities
14 Conclusion 1.4.
The New Rampart Lmdership ondCrime Fighting Model Hod
the Fol/(J(,,,ing Conditions Pll!Udrot
15 Conclusion 1.5.
TIre New Rampart lLndo-ship and Crime Fighting Mode/Is Not
tlte Norm Throughout LAPD
15 Conclusion 1.6.
The New RBmporf Leadership ondCrime Fighting Model Is Unlikely to Lost
16 II. EXTERNAL BARRIERS TO REPLICATING THE
RAMPART TRANSrORMATION
17 Conclusion 11.1.
Los Angel,s Has An Undff·l7sourad, "Thin BIIM Lin," Poliang Model
18 Conclusion 11.2.
TIl' 'Tnin Blu, Lin," Modr/ Suds ProoctM Poliring tnot Dr/Mrs
Contnimnent and Suppl7ssion of Violena in High Crim, Al7os, but Not
Public Sofety
19 Conclusion 11.3.
Aggll!SsM, Untorgeted ProoetiVt! Poliang Dutroys Publie-Poli« Trust
20 Conclusion 11.4.
Th, City Beors Ruponsibility for Foiling to Provid, Ruourrzs
for a Cifyalide Public Safety Model
20 Conclusion 11.5.
Tne City Has Failed to Heed tile 40· Year·OId MtCone Commission
Worning to Fix tn, "SicJn= in tn, Center of Our City" tnot Fuels
Public·Poliu Friction ond Riots
21 Conclusion 11.6.
Public and Private Institutions Have Not Done Enougn to Stabilize
Distl7sSM Communiti,s
22 Conclusion 11.7.
Communitiu ond Fomiliu Hen;, l

ot Don, Enougn to Confront
ond Counter tne Culture of Violrnu ond Drstruction Otxrtol:ing Somt
Poor N,ig/lborilOods
22 Recommendation 11.1.
In OrdfftO Inel70u Trust and Publie·Polia Coopffotion, LAPD Snould
Transition from ProoctMISuppression Poliring to tnt Hign Rood Poliring
DemonstraUd in tile Rnmpdft Division TUl7loround
23 Recommendation 11.2.
Tn, City and LAPD Snould End "Tnin Blu, Lin," Poliangond Develop
o Blu,print for Funding ond Providing CityfJI:id, Public Sofety
Running Page #6
23 Recommendation 11.3.
The City Should Fulfill the McCone Commission Mandate to End
"The Spiml of Failul1!" that Seeds Public-Police Conflict
23 Recommendation 11.4.
Public and Privote Institutions Must Find and FundMon Effective
Solutions for Improving Conditions in Poor, High Crime Communities
23 Recommendation 11.5.
Residents of High Crime Communities Must TaJe Responsibility for
and Receive Resources Needed to Counter the Cultul1! of Violence
24 III. THE INTERNAL BARRIERS TO REPLICATING THE
RAMPART TRANSFORMATION: CHANGES NEEDED IN
LAPD EVEN IF THE EXTERNAL BARRIERS REMAIN
24 Conclusion 111.1.
Current &forms, While Significant, An Not Sufficient to Prevent
COrniption Recurrence, Fix Longstanding Problems or TaJe the Rampart
Tronsformation Department.fJI:ide
25 Conclusion 111.2.
Supervision Has Improved in Specific Divisions but Not Sufficiently
to Prevent Scandal Recurrence
27 Conclusion 111.3.
Im;estigation Quality Has ImpfVf)ed Significantly, but Remains Uneven
27 Conclusion 111.4.
Cultuml Factors that Contributed to the CRASH Mindset Remain
30 Conclusion 111.5.
In Addition to Internal Barriers by Unresolved Problems
Stemmingfrom the CRASH Scandal, Deeper Cultuml Dynamics within
LAPD also BlocJ Solutions to LAPD's Longstanding Problems
34 Conclusion 111.6.
LAPD Can Fix Itself When Change Agent Officers Drive the
Tronsformation Process
35 Conclusion 111.7.
The Office of Inspector Generalis the Only LAPD Entity f,I:ith
the Potential Capacity to Effectively Enforce LAPD Accountability
ooer the Long Term
35 Conclusion 111.8.
The OIG Currently Operates Under Constraints that Prevent It
from Functioning as the Potent ChteJ It Should Be
36 Conclusion 111.9.
Discipline Decisions by the Chief of Police An Important Tools for
Implementing the PolicingShofJI:cased by the New Rampart Model
37 Conclusion 111.10.
The Federal Court and the Consent Decree Are Central to Department
Advancement and Tmnsformation
38 Recommendation 111.1.
LAPD Leoden Nud to Forge a Cleor Consensus among Officen
to Permanently Tmnsition to the High Rond Policing in
Rampart Division Turnaround
39 Recommendation 111.2.
The Police Commission Should Significantly Expand the Indq>cndence
and &sources ofthe Inspector Geneml
39 Recommendation 111.3.
LAPD uaders Should Continue to Discipline as a Tool for
Implementing the PolicingShofJI:cased by the New Rampart Model
39 Recommendation 111.4.
Federal Court Enforcement of the ConSOlt Deem! Should Continue
the Current Focus on Achieving "Real Reform" to Remedy the Underlying
Causes of the CRASH Crisis
40 Recommendation 111.5.
An ExpeditedJoint Action TasJforce Should Chart Actions Needed to Mooe
LAPD to High Road Policing
Running Page #7
46 The Road Behia.d
50 I. LAPD
50 Conclusion I. 1.
UPD IJmltrS K",., of Rmgadr Po/mIlK, ExcIJunx of DI'JIgCn'fus,
i" Romport DiWio" o"dits CRASH GO"K V"it Y'OfY 840rr CRitSH
Crisis ErlIptl'fi
50 Conclusion 1.2.
OtMrCRrlSH U"its Had Sillfilor RI'IIl'gad, SlIblts
50 Conclusion 1.3.
UPD IJadtrS Did Not rltll'f{lIlIleJ, rlrlrlrus SP«if/£ WOfll'iqr of
II/,gol Polia"g Tactics by Romport CRASH Offian 1Jtf0rr tk &OIuial
Erwpml P"hlidy
51 Conclusion 1.4.
Prrzll'nrilOlio" 0"0 Co"Pkts of 1"ll'rrsl U"rlumilld Eff«tWe
and Arrollntability in Romport Division
51 Conclusion 1.5.
IVllistlNJlOfan IVllo Inll'rapleJanti Cllallmgtri Romport CRASH Offiun
We" Pl/niWo or Igllo"rI
52 Conclusion 1.6.
Evide"aCOlltrols Lorhrl to Pmxwt TII,ft
63 Conclusion I. 7.
LAPD Paikd to Appronrll 1M IIIfJl!Stigotioll of DfJlg Thl'ft
os 0 Polia COfTllplion Cosl'1I:'iln Syslnnic Implicolions
63 Conclusion 1.8.
[,l(e1"1l01 uols JroporrliZl'd Ihl' InfJl!SJigotion of Rofod Pun
......p"'"a--....._c III
54 Conclusion 1.9.
UPD's Nomport Tosi Forre Foiletl 10 Desigll 011 l/lvl'SIigalioll
Approprioteforo Compla. 1l/l/lJi-lkfmrlonl Polia Corf71ptio/l Ca.Je
54 Conclusion 1.10.
As 1M Romport TosJ Fora GTnIJ, AlolI] IIItXSligalofY Did Not HI1fJl!
Adl'f{lIlIleSiills and Experielf« to COlldlld Imlesh"galio"s into 0 Compln
PoI'-'e COfTllpriOIl &011001
54 Conclusion 1.11_
UPD Foiktl to Ampr Ca.Je !UspotuiIJility /() 0", I,,'mirillal all' Uyd
a Tl'OlII AppT"DlKl J101 DiI"tn/ PoaIS. J);rr<ho" tUuJ Rmtlts
55 Conclusion 1.12.
In Conolldi"g tk PoJ,.grop.f &omi"oliolf of Rofael Ptrn. UPD's
PoIJUophr Elllp/OJeo f"l0PUi Tl'l'II"iqlll's llal U.tI".",i.,tI Iii' l'olidi"
of till' &olll;"atio.
55 Conclusion 1.13.
UPDs Poi/,," 10 Offer rldmi.isJraIM 1",,,,lIIIi,, Limit"" Effl'CTiwttl'SS
ofllIfmligatio"s
56 Conclusion 1.14.
Co.pirts of 1.lensl U.denlfi.ed lit, [,nmtigaliolls
56 Conclusion L15.
UPD FO£lmdD;sproport;onat"] 0" P"TS";,,g ,It, Boorrl of1"I/II;ry
0I1d Atlmi/1islrolnx IlfVl!SligolioltS 10 lite o,lrimt,,1 of Cnm;lIal IlfVl!SlignlioltS
57 Conclusion 1.16.
The Drportme/1I'S Disproportio/10le F«lIs 0/1 P"TS"illg Atlm;lI;stm1;WCases
Ruoltrrl;n Contom;notion of Crim;nol Invtltigations
58 Conclusion 1.17.
Nost LAPD Romport Tosk POfT'e IntmtigotofY Ditl a Profrss;olltll Job
Invest;got;ng Perez' Allegations of Polite M;sconrlul'I, Despite Clt/ll/enges
Running Page #8 task force
board of inquiry
blue ribbon committee
58 Conclusion 1.18.
A Small Il/umMr of LAPD lnustigoton on tne Rampart Task Forcr
Undrrminrd tne Criminall1f!)estigations
59 Conclusion 1.19.
Tne Laci of Cooperation LAPD and tne DA's Office Hindered
Progress in the Investigations
60 Conclusion 1.20.
Many Brlieve that j usticr Was II/ot Served
60 Conclusion 1.21.
Conflicts of Intenst Ron througn the Boord of Inquiry
61 Conclusion 1.22.
The Boord of Inquiry Report Omitted Critical Information in
Its Discussion of Pcrsonnel and Hiring
61 Conclusion 1.23.
"Affirmative Action" Did Not Cause tne Rampart CRASH Crisis
62 Conclusion 1.24.
Tne Boomof Inquiry Limitcd l1f!)estigations into tne Extcnt of Misconduct
62 Conclusion 1.25.
LAPD Foiled to Issue Follow Up Reports on Incomplete lnustigotion Anos
62 Conclusion 1.26.
LAPD Foiled to Fulfill Its Commitment to Produce on After-Action
&porton tire CRASH Crisis
63 Conclusion 1.27.
LAPD Cannot Provide an Acceptable Explanationfor tire Failure
to Produce tire Aftrr.Action Report
64 Conclusion 1.28.
The Rampart Refotrd Booms of Riglrts Largely Foilrd
65 Conclusion 1.29.
LAPD Foilrd in its Attempt to lnustigote Itzlf in Connection
the Rampart CRASH Crisis
66 Recommendation 1.1.
The Deportment Should Not Ignon Early Indicoton of Larger Problems
66 Recommendation 1.2.
Develop Conflicts of Interest Policy
66 Recommendation 1.3.
Implement Anti·&toliation and Wnistleblower Protections
66 Recommendation 1.4.
Dedicate Additional &sources to Protecting Evidence Stomge Facilities
67 Recommendation 1.5.
Develop Protocol for Investigating Serious Police Misconduct Case
as Police COfTUption Cases fJI,itn Systemic Implications
67 Recommendation 1.6.
LAPD Should Tmnsfrr Investigation of the Next Corruption
Crisis over to a Properly Resourced, Independent, Multi.Agency
l1f!)estigation Force
67 Recommendation 1.7.
Prioritize Criminall1f!)estigations
67 Recommendation 1.8.
Drjrr Conducting Internal AnolySfl, sucn as the Boord of Inquiry,
Until Criminollnustigotions An Lorgrly Completrd
67 Recommendation 1.9.
When Conducting on Internal Analysis ofa Lorge.Scole Corruption Crisis,
tne Department Snould Conduct an Unlimitrd Assessment of Systems and
Should Bring in Outside Experts
68 Recommendation 1.10.
Product a Thorougn and Cndible After.Action Report for Public Distribution
68 Recommendation 1.11.
The Curnnt Boards of Rights System Should Be Replorrd
Running Page #9
68 II. PROSECUTORIAL AGENCIES
68 Conclusion 11.1.
AI IAt Tilllt oflAt CRASH Crisis, 1M DA i Offiu IVaI NoIS.jfItitIlIIJ
Proaehw ilt ils ApproacA locard Polia COlT1lpliolt i. LIn it-gdts CoulJ
69 Conclusion 11.2.
TAt D." i Offta Did Not M'fIll1It1J Slaff 1M RHD TosJ Foru Prior
10 Ptrn' Dist/oSlIn of IVidtsprtmf Corr.ptio.
69 Conclusion 11.3.
TAt DA i Offia's d'uJ Nol Adtqlll1ltly Sloffo.d S.pm;ist IAt Tria/,
Pita 01111 Sdstq_1 },'tnTogtlhOtlS of RBfad Pnn
70 Conclusion 11.4.
TAe IlIltrrogorioll Prouss of hra Was FJa-J
71 Conclusion 11.5.
7k DA i Offitt 1V0ntnf Oilier" 10 Drodop II Fair SllIIulard
ftlr DtltrMiltiltg cAtlAtr CtlJtVirtitlJlS SAtlMId SllIttd
71 Conclusion 11.6.
IlItlllhtrl tlf 1M Dil 's Offiu RNall F«littg
hy JkScllkoflhCRASH Crisis
71 Conclusion 11.7.
TAt DIl 's Spuial Prost.t:Mliolt Ttnm 1I'0nt&1 Hard itt Cltalltttgittg
Environmtnllo PursUt CostS Tltf!)' Tltoug/tl Viuble
72 Conclusion 11.8.
AlulIY ProSKulion TtIIm Aftmlxrs Rt.t:1I11u1 Bt'ing VnucCl/slomtd
10 lilt CllUlkngts of Prosn:uting Polia Offiars
72 Conclusion 11.9.
7'lu DA sOffice Did Nol ApIMar 10 Adequaldy Consider lite Mtllls
0/ Tuntillg rlttsf' Cases OVff to all IlIdtpmdmt Pro=tillg Agmcy
72 Conclusion 11.10.
Tht DA's O//ice Did Not Follow Up 011 All 0/ Alltgati01ls,
in port OteuMSII LAPD Did Nol Submil Full Submissions
",,,,p"""'__C_''''. V
73 Conclusion II.11.
Th COllltlJ's CNil GraltdJilT] Fuikd 10 Prodll<t Olt AsstSSMtlrI
oftilt CRASH Cnsis
74 Conclusion 11.12.
TIlt Dlt 's Offia Did Nol Crmdlld a"J {Jduiltd Assess",nrl
ofirs JUsPOtlSllo Jk CRASH COrnlptio" &o"dol
74 Conclusion II.13.
TAe U.s.llllonrq's O/fia i" LIn Has Histori<ol" ApproachJ
Polia AlisaJ"dlld Cogs as /St1loltd Cosn dol Caw St Addl"tSSNi eiJlJ
Tromlioltol hnxsrigotirN oltd Prvstullorial JIIuu"rrs
75 Conclusion II.14.
TAt U.s. AlIonrq's O/fia DidNol Devise a Coonli"old, JII./ti'."rq
SrroltfD 10 AddrtSS 1MCRASH Crisis
75 Conclusion II.15.
I"iliol", Iltt LIn Attgdts U.S. AIIo,...tJs Offitt Did1I00I:.JfKtivdy
Co",,,,.,,iealt or Coorrli"olt cillt Iltt Los Attgt/ts CO/lltlJ DA's OjflCt
76 Conclusion 11.16.
A Sig.jflCa" Gap Erists 1N1c«. Ito&:> Crimi.ol Dtfrllst Illlo,...tJ
ultd Prostnllors Ptrrmx Iltt LIn AJtgt'1n Crimi"ol SJsum lVontittg
77 Conclusion 11.17.
TAe DA 's Eslablisltmtttl of0 Brody Complim,ct Dn;isio. a"d Dalnbast,
IVltilt Commendablt, WOIlId nOlldtntih AllleA of Iltt Jl/iseo"du£t at Issut
in lilt CRASH Crisis
78 Conclusion 11.18.
Institutions of Tltt Los Angtln Criminal Jllstire Syslem Do NOI HarM
Suffidmtly Rohnsl CItt.t:Js and InltrVt'nlions 011 Polict Ptrjury alld
Misrondurl
78 Recommendation 11.1.
Conducl nn Analysis ofthe Inltgrity 0/ the Los Angtlts COllnty
Criminnl Justice Systnll
Running Page #10
79 Recommendation 11.2.
Prosecutor! Should Develop Mort Robust Checks and IntefUntions
on Police Perjury and Miscondut:t
79 Recommendation 11.3.
ProslXutorial Agencies Should Improve Inter-Agency Coordination
79 Recommendation 11.4.
A Standing Task Foree Should Be Created ~ , i t h Federal and Local
Authorities to Coordinate Investigation of Police Corruption Case
80 Recommendation 11.5.
Proseeutorial Agrneies Should Improve Trainingfor Handling
Police Corruption Cases
80 Recommendation 11.6.
Federal ProSIXutOrs Should Be Prepared to Handle Local Police Misconduct
Cases ~ , i t h o u t Being Gvuly Reliant on DOl Washington
80 Recommendation 11.7.
The LAPD andthe City Attorney's Offict Should Improve Information
Disclosure Proasses
81 Actions and Solutions
82 Aftcl'notcs
Appendices included in separate document
Running Page #11
l1Iilll Willilll J.ltlllll
Since joining [LAPU]...I hav' heen
focused on one job: r n h u i ~ i n g ... Dust
between tAPO and the communrties rt
is sworn to protect and serve. while at
the same time rebuilding trust between
officers and their department
Int..oduction
The CRASH Crisis and Its Aftermath
In 1999. allegations by a convicted former Los Angeles Police
Dcpanmcnr Rampan CRASH 1 officer of widespread polie<:: abuse
:lOd corruption exploded inro Los Angeles headlines. The
chargC5-l:h:u beyond his own drug crimes. he and dozens offcllow
officers commined routine framing, evidence planting and fabrica-
lion. perjury, and brutality-swept the City and the department
into -one of the WOnil police scandals in American hislory."l The
scandal was not simply that a few corrupt officers had stolen dmgs
and frJrncd suspects---percnnial risks that all police dCIYJttmcnts
face. It was the scale of the abuses, if eyen by a few. the impunity
with which they acted, and the co"cr afforded their crimes by the
dcpanmcms cu]rurcand rhe City's long csublishcd inability to c.xert
conuol O'"er LAPD. The CRASH crisis torpedoed the imegrityof
the entire Los Angeles criminal justice system and placed LAPD
under the jurisdiction of a federul court and the Consent Dceree.
J
One elected official nored the groniry of the corruption as Ma dagger
:limed:n the heart of constirutional democmcy.M'
How did it happen?
111e CRASH crisis happened because burned out and feuding
supervisors in Rampart Division Hopped doing their jobs: weak
supen-isars ignored early warnings: corrupt supervisors silenced
whistleblowers-and then removed the good supelVisors who tried
to restrain mmpant misconduct by ###BOT_TEXT###quot;.\Unted "hard ch;lrgers" in
CRASI-!. It happened because LAPD le.lders in P;lrker Center
either ignored warnings or were clueless, and because Centr.d
Bureau leaders, who nicknamed Rampart '''lbrnp<lge' Division"
years before the scandal, dismissed pleas for help. It happened
because division bosses steeped in a police "culture of war"l
responded to intense political pressure to cou ntcr a en me \"Jve and
signaled open season on gangs [Q :l reneg:lcle anti-gang unie It
happened because a clique within that :lIlti-g:lllg unil went beyond
its "'gunslinger" mentality and gangster l:Jctics to become gangsters
themselves. It happened bec-.mse fear of CRASH rogues and the
code of silence licensed officers who were aware of CRASH
brutality to look dle odler way. It happened because LAPD's
"'culrure of warM severely discounts the human worth of gang
members and orher suspects to the point of sanctioning brutality.'
It happened because LAPD brass. the Police Commission, the City
Council, the District Anomey, federal authorities and the couns
failed to heed decades of warnings to change that police culture and
the City's policing paradigm. And \ithout the inept oversight of
these same institutions, none of LAPO's systems failures in lcader-
ship,supcn·ision, accountability and management would have been
possible.
In short, the CRASH crisis did not happen because a few LAPD
rogues stole drugs. It happened because the Los Angeles criminal
justice system's anemic checks on police :lbuse :lnd LAPD's feeble
constraints on its "'warrior policing" f:liled actoss the board.
The Context For This Report
This report is the btest in a long line of tomes :lboUl this City's
century-old struggle widl its police department and public safety.
AS:ln analysis of a crisis, it necessarily focuses on failures-and nor
just in LAPD but in se\·eroll
orher criminal justice institu-
tions as wen. It should nor,
however, be misread as a
condemnation of department
leaders, officers, command
staff, union leaders or civil-
l;lns. On the contrary-
Chief Br:mon and the Police
Commission insisted on this
Running Page #12
lAPO 0"aM, .11 fill 25 ,., • illl:l
Overview of the Recovery
The real about Rampart is
that no ooe really knows. Iknow
people on this joh that were part
of this crew. The iJvestigatil.. WI!Ie
hotched so emy on, and the guys on
Pele" aew sat dow. illt at
one or two are still working, The
ilVestiJatillls were ootthed so hadly
hy IA .. , Now [PSB] wouldn't botch
[the ilVestigations 1o, thatl.. They
wouldn't tell Perez' sergeant that
they're following him, Th,y WDuldn't
have shown [Porol] alist of cops and
say 'identify th, bad cops:
re

Related Interests

iew, and scores of LAPD staff and union Icadcrs offered
unflinching criticism of [hemselves md [he dqlJrtmenl in hopes
Iha[ [his repon will lead [Q [he deeper changes Ihey bclic

Related Interests

e arc
needed. Indeed. [his repon affirms [he delY.U1menl's considerable
ad###BOT_TEXT###quot;'<lnccs and confirms [he conclusions of key LAP!) leaders [hal
eurrem rcco

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ery and reform efforts are good. bUI insuffieiem [Q
lock in recem successes. pre

Related Interests

em anmher CRASH crisis. or resolve
LAPO's other longs[anding problems [hal block closing Ihe public-
police nusl gap in high crime areas. Wilhout Ihe drive of LAPO
leaders from command, rank and file, retired offICers and police
unions, this opportunity [Q forrify the reform agenda would not
exist. If this depanmem e

Related Interests