Journal of Leadership &

Organizational Studies
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Can Electronic Performance Monitoring Be Fair? Exploring Relationships Among Monitoring

Characteristics, Perceived Fairness, and Job Performance
Robert H. Moorman and Deborah L. Wells
Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 2003 10: 2
DOI: 10.1177/107179190301000202
The online version of this article can be found at:
http://jlo.sagepub.com/content/10/2/2

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Can Electronic Performance

Monitoring Be Fair?
Exploring Relationships Among Monitoring
Characteristics, Perceived Fairness, and Job
Performance
Robert H. Moorman
Deborah L. Wells

Creighton University, Omaha, NE

Authors Note: An earlier version of this paper
Management, St. Louis, MO.

was

With the increased use of technology in all areas

of human resource management, many
organizations are using electronic and
computerized means for monitoring and assessing
employee performance. We tested three path
models that explored whether the perception of
electronic
certain
characteristics of an

performance monitoring (EPM) system might

relate to 1) the perceived fairness of that system
and 2) employee performance. Results suggest
that perceptions of three of the characteristics –
opportunity to challenge, feedback tone, and
amount of monitoring were related to the
perceived fairness of the performance monitoring
system. In turn, perceived fairness of the system
fully mediated the relationship between the
monitoring system characteristics and dimensions

of contextual performance. However, the bestfitting path model did not support any linkages to
task performance.
Electronic performance monitoring (EPM)
systems use electronic technologies to collect,
store, analyze, or report the actions or performance
of individuals on the job (Nebeker & Tatum,
1993). Methods of EPM include telephone call

accounting, keystroke or computer time

accounting, cards and beepers to monitor locations,
computer file monitoring, screen sharing
capabilities on networks, telephone call
observation, and video camera observation (Alder
& Tompkins, 1997). EPM has become standard
practice in many organizations. In 1997, the

presented

at the 2003

Meetings of the

Midwest

Academy of

American Management Association estimated that

about 35% of mid- to large-sized companies in the
US were conducting electronic monitoring
activities. Today, that proportion has grown to
78%, encompassing over a quarter of the US
workforce (AMA, 2001).
The increased use of EPM may be based on
the belief that such systems offer an improvement
over more traditional forms of supervisory
monitoring (Alder, 2001, Stanton, 2000a). EPM
can
provide managers with more useful
information on employee performance because it
can continuously monitor performance, record a
great deal of data, and measure this data
unobtrusively (Stanton, 2000a). Studies on the
impact of EPM systems have uncovered a variety
of positive results. For example, Bylinski (1991)
reported that customer satisfaction with the
performance of customer service representatives
improved after the implementation of a telephone
surveillance system for customer service calls.
Additional research has suggested that EPM may
increase employee satisfaction because employees
perceive that EPM results in more objective
performance appraisals and improved performance
feedback (Angel, 1989; Eisenman, 1986;
Henriques, 1986a, 1986b; Westin, 1986). Such
objectivity and accuracy could contribute to more
fair performance appraisals and an increased
likelihood that supervisors could identify positive
employee performance. In addition, because EPM
can monitor performance remotely, it may be

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especially useful for telecommuting arrangements

and for flextime work schedules (Aiello, 1993).
Opponents of electronic performance
monitoring systems claim that such systems invade
worker privacy and greatly increase performance
pressure throughout an employees work day
(Attewell, 1987; Boehle, 2000; Bylinski, 1991;
Cook, 1999; DeTienne, 1993). Parenti (2001)
labeled the use of EPM &dquo;digital Taylorism,&dquo; where
the continuous monitoring and emphasis on results
takes all control away from the employee and
places it with an unseen manager, potentially
creating a work environment filled with such
pressure that workers experience increased stress,
greater dissatisfaction, a loss of valued privacy,
and lower morale (Aiello & Kolb, 1995; Aiello &
Shao, 1993; Alge, 2001; Irving, Higgins, &
Safayeni, 1986; Nebeker & Tatum, 1993).
Schleifer, Galinsky, and Pan (1995) reported that
EPM affected many employee attitudes including
greater workload dissatisfaction, increased tension,
and perceived time pressure. Alder (2001, p. 323)
characterized electronic performance monitoring as
&dquo;constant, pervasive, and unblinking&dquo; and notes
that for these reasons &dquo;a number of US senators
and members of Congress have proposed
legislation intended to restrict the amount of
monitoring organizations can conduct.&dquo;
Based on this potentially onerous nature of
electronic performance monitoring, researchers
have begun the search for ways to enhance the
advantages of EPM while reducing its negative
effects. Following the discussion of Alder (1998)
and Alder and Tompkins (1997), we believe that
certain system characteristics actually can
influence whether employees perceive EPM as fair.
In turn, those fairness perceptions may directly or
indirectly mitigate the many concerns raised by
critics of EPM (Alge, 2001; Ambrose & Alder,
2000; Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989; Kidwell &

Bennett, 1994; Stanton, 2000b; Stanton & BamesFarrell, 1996). This study is designed to provide at
least a partial answer to the question, &dquo;What
features can be built into EPM systems so that they
seem fair to employees, and how might those
features impact employee performance?&dquo;

Study Setting
We assessed the perceived fairness of a call
monitoring system used to assess customer service
performance in a call center. This system was set

randomly tape both incoming and outgoing

phone calls. Not all calls were recorded, but
employees of the call center were aware that any
call could be recorded at any time. Additionally,
since the calls were recorded unobtrusively,
employees did not know when their calls were
recorded. Once recorded, a member of the quality
assurance team evaluated the employees customer
service performance. Direct supervisors could also
conduct real time monitoring by listening to calls
as they occurred.
The information gathered by
and
supervisors
quality assurance team members
was then used in the employees performance
appraisal.
It is important to acknowledge that since we
are assessing the EPM system within one
organization, the actual characteristics of that
system, as implemented by the company, would
not differ markedly from employee to employee.

up to

However, our interest is not to assess the effects of

different EPM characteristics themselves, but to
assess
whether differences in employees
perceptions of system characteristics are related to
their judgments about the system and their
subsequent performance. Given this focus on
individual perceptions, there should be variance
even when we are assessing only one monitoring
system in one organization.

EPM and Fairness

The potential fairness of monitoring and
feedback systems has been explored by a number
of authors. Folger, Konovsky, and Cropanzano
(1992) note that performance appraisal (into which
EPM provides feedback) can be structured to
contain elements of due process (e.g., adequate
notice, fair hearing, and judgment based upon
evidence) and thus be perceived by employees as
procedurally fair. Again with regard to feedback in
general, Alder and Ambrose (2000) propose that
the perceived fairness of feedback will be affected
by three dimensions, including employee control
over when feedback is delivered, whether the
feedback is constructive in nature, and whether the
source of the feedback is a computer or a
supervisor. Their research indicates that the
content of the feedback (constructive v.
destructive) and feedback source are both
important elements of procedural fairness.
Stanton (2000a) reported evidence of
significant and positive relationships between

Downloaded from jlo.sagepub.com at Uni Babes-Bolyai on November 25, 2014

characteristics of performance monitoring systems

and the systems perceived fairness. He examined
characteristics such as monitoring consistency,
knowledge of performance from monitoring,
monitoring control, monitoring justification and
the perceived fairness of both traditional and
electronic monitoring systems. He found support
for
monitoring
relationships between
characteristics and the perceived fairness of the
systems. Furthermore, he found that the use EPM
systems were related to increased perceptions of
monitoring control and monitoring justification.
These results suggest that for two sources of
fairness judgments,
electronic forms of
performance monitoring could yield increased
fairness perceptions. Similarly, Alge (2001) found
that characteristics such as relevance and
participation in system design improved fairness
perceptions and decreased perceptions that the
electronic system invaded the subjects privacy.
Ambrose and Alder (2000) provide a detailed
examination of the hypothesized relationship
between characteristics of an EPM system and its
perceived fairness by describing ten possible
fairness dimensions of an electronic performance

monitoring system: employee participation in

system design, disclosure of monitoring activities,
tasks monitored, amount of monitoring, production
standards, feedback tone, feedback purpose,
opportunities to challenge, the object of monitoring
(individual or group performance), and link to
incentive systems. They use Leventhals (1980)
justice rules such as ethicality and correctibility as
the link between EPM characteristics and
perceived fairness. They also drew from Thibaut
and Walkers (1975) notion that the degree
employees believe they maintain control over the
appraisal process affects their perceptions of
fairness. So, for example, the opportunity to
review information and challenge its interpretation
could increase the perceived fairness of the system.
The ten possible dimensions of an electronic

performance monitoring system developed by

Ambrose and Alder (2000) and described above
served as the basis for our
characteristics. Based on the

of EPM
of
design the call
used
at
our
research site, we
monitoring system
were able to assess employee perceptions of four of
these proposed system characteristics: feedback
tone, opportunities to challenge, link to incentive
systems, and amount of monitoring.
measure

Feedback Tone describes whether the

feedback offered by the monitoring system
provides timely, clear, and ultimately useful
information to the employee, and is thus
constructive.
2.
Opportunities to Challenge describes
whether the company allows employees to appeal,
or challenge the information collected by the
1.

monitoring system.
Link to Incentive Systems assesses the
the
degree
employees believe the information
the
call monitoring system is used to
gathered by
determine performance-based rewards.
4.
Amount of Monitoring assesses the
employees judgment as to whether the amount of
monitoring is sufficient. Too little monitoring does
not give enough information to render fair
judgments; too much monitoring may be too
invasive and may set up what they cited as an
&dquo;atmosphere of suspicion&dquo; (Alder, 2001; Ambrose
3.

&

Alder, 2000).

Following Ambrose and Alder (2000), we

propose the following hypotheses:
Hla:
Perceptions that the feedback
offered by the call monitoring system is
constructive will be positively related to perceived
system fairness.
H 1 b:

Perceptions that the company allows

challenges
by the call
monitoring system will be positively related to
perceived system fairness.
Hlc:
Perceptions that the information
the
call monitoring system is used to
gathered by
determine performance-based rewards will be
positively related to perceived system fairness.
H 1 d:
Perceptions that the amount of
information gathered by the call monitoring system
is sufficient will be positively related to perceived
to the information collected

system fairness.
Perceived Characteristics of
Performance Monitoring Systems and
Job Performance
We defined and measured job performance
using Borman and Motowidlos (1993)

conceptions of task and contextual performance.

performance involves behaviors that are
directly involved in producing goods or services,
or activities that provide indirect support for the
organizations core technical processes.
Contextual performance involves behaviors that

Task

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support the psychological and social

which the task behaviors

are

context in

performed (Van

Scotter, Motowidlo, & Cross, 2000). Contextual

performance is similar to organizational citizenship

behavior (OCB) and includes such behaviors as
helping fellow employees in their jobs, showing
courtesy to supervisors, supporting the
organization by pitching in during difficult times,
and seeking new ways to improve current
processes (Organ, 1997; Wemer, 2000).
EPM Characteristics and Task
Performance
A primary reason for the implementation of
performance monitoring systems is to collect
information that can be used to improve the
performance of the workforce (Larson & Callahan,
1990). Therefore, if the performance monitoring
system is working as intended, it should result in
performance improvements. Research on the
proper design and implementation of more
traditional performance monitoring systems (i.e.,
supervisor observation) has supported the value of
certain system characteristics in improving the
likelihood that the system will promote increased
performance. For example, feedback source
(supervisor v. self or peers) and source credibility,
specificity of feedback, frequency of feedback, and
ability of the feedback to direct the receivers
attention toward performance deficits are all
thought to be related to better performance (Bretz,
Milkovich & Read, 1992; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor,
1979; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).
A
relationship between performance
monitoring and task performance may first be
based on the degree to which supervisors use the
information collected as part of other motivation
programs. For example, if supervisors use the
information collected from the system to determine
pay raises or bonuses, reinforcement theory would
predict that the use of such information to
distribute rewards would result in performance
improvement (Komaki, 1986). Similarly, if the
information gathered by EPM systems is used to
offer instructive feedback to employees, goal
setting theory would predict performance

improvements (Locke & Latham, 1990). Larson

and Callahan (1990) suggest this is evidence that
the impact of performance monitoring on task
performance is a conjunctive one, i.e., performance
monitoring impacts task performance because it is

coupled with subsequent managerial action.

Therefore, characteristics of a monitoring system
such as a link to other rewards or the use of
information for feedback could explain a
relationship between the system and task

performance.
However, Julian and Stanton (2001) report
that performance monitoring can also influence
task performance even if the information gathered
is not used in motivation efforts. Drawing on the
work of Larson and Callahan (1990), they used
social information processing theory to explain
how the practice of monitoring could influence
performance by providing social cues as to which
aspects of performance are most important and
most deserving of effort (Salancik &
Pfeffer,
be
The
could
related
to the
monitoring
1978).
certain
of
behaviors
because
performance
simply
the monitoring could affect the salience and
importance of those behaviors in the eyes of

employees.
Characteristics of

monitoring such

as

the

nature and timing of feedback, the link to incentive

systems, and the amount of monitoring may then
relate to performance because they might provide
social cues to employees concerning the key

elements. For example, extensive,

constructive, and timely feedback provides clear

performance

evidence of the importance of the task being

evaluated. Similarly, the amount of monitoring
offers information about how important the
monitored task would be.
Indeed, too little
monitoring of a certain task might suggest that it is
of less consequence.
Given the preceding discussion, our second
hypothesis is that three of our four measured
characteristics of EPM systems will predict the
level of employee task performance.
H2a:
Perceptions that the feedback
offered by the call monitoring system is
constructive will be positively related to task

performance.
H2b:

Perceptions that the information

gathered
monitoring system is used to
determine performance-based rewards will be
positively related to task performance.
H2c:
Perceptions that the amount of
information gathered by the call monitoring system
is sufficient will be positively related to task
performance.

Downloaded from jlo.sagepub.com at Uni Babes-Bolyai on November 25, 2014

by the call

EPM Characteristics and Contextual

Performance
it may suggest a
EPM
characteristics

Although
between

relationship

and
task
social
information
performance,
processing theory
does not imply that EPM characteristics should
necessarily influence contextual performance.
Unlike task performance, the monitoring system
may not provide cues for contextual performance
because such performance may not be directly
monitored. Contextual performance is not part of
the core requirements of the job, nor is its
performance directly related to the organizations
reward system (Organ, 1988). In other words,
monitoring may have a direct effect on task
performance, but would not be expected to have a
direct effect on contextual performance.
However, lack of a direct effect does not
necessarily mean that EPM characteristics would
have no effect on contextual performance. The
effect could be indirect through its relationship
with perceived fairness.
Past research on
organizational citizenship behaviors has
established a robust and positive relationship
between perceptions of fairness and OCB (Farh,
Podsakoff, & Organ, 1990; Konovsky & Pugh,
1994; Moorman, 1991; Moorman, Blakely, &
Niehoff, 1998; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Organ
& Moorman, 1993). Organ (1988) and others have
explained this relationship as the result of the norm
of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) where employees
would seek to reciprocate fair treatment with some
form of increased participation and performance.
If employees believe the use of a performance
monitoring system is fair, they may reciprocate
such fair treatment with increased contextual
performance. In fact, given the constraints on task
performance found in the types of jobs that are
typically monitored electronically, employees in
such jobs may have more freedom to vary their
levels of contextual performance as a response to
the perceived fairness or unfairness of the EPM
system. Thus, it is possible that there will be
stronger relationships with contextual performance
than with task performance.
To test these ideas, our third hypothesis is that
the perceived fairness of the EPM system will be
related to contextual performance and our fourth
hypothesis is that characteristics of EPM systems
will predict dimensions of contextual performance
indirectly through perceptions of system fairness.

H3:
Perceptions of EPM system fairness
will be related to contextual performance.
H4:
Characteristics of an EPM system
will only be indirectly related to contextual
performance through perceptions of system
fairness.

Methods

Subjects
Three hundred

thirty customer service and

sales representatives employed by a national
customer service and sales telecommunications
center participated in this study. Sixty percent of

the responding subj ects fielded incoming telephone

requests for customer service on various credit
cards and insurance plans. The remaining forty
percent engaged in inbound and outbound
telephone sales of goods and services. The average
age of subjects was 38 years, and 65 percent were
female. Forty percent of these employees had
completed at least some college. Twenty eight
percent had at least a high school education, while
the rest held either associate, four-year, or graduate
college degrees. Subjects had worked for the
company as little as one month and as many as 180
months ( 15 years).

Data Collection Procedure

Every first-shift employee in both of the

companys teleservices facilities in this city was

asked to complete a questionnaire at their work
sites during their regular work shift in groups of 10
to 20 at a time. Three hundred one completed
questionnaires for a response rate of 91 percent.
Within two to three days, each subjects supervisor
rated each subjects performance. Two hundred
fifty one useable supervisors questionnaires were
completed, for a final response rate of 83 percent.
Therefore, the sample size for our data analyses
was

N=251.

Measures
Electronic Performance Monitoring
System Characteristics
Four of the ten possible dimensions of an
electronic performance monitoring system
developed by Ambrose and Alder (2000) and
described above served as the basis for our
measure of EPM characteristics.

Downloaded from jlo.sagepub.com at Uni Babes-Bolyai on November 25, 2014

7
Feedback Tone: Four items: &dquo;The feedback I
received from the call monitoring system was clear
and understandable,&dquo; &dquo;I received feedback from
the call monitoring system in a timely fashion,&dquo; &dquo;I
receive useful feedback from the call monitoring
system,&dquo; and &dquo;The feedback I receive from the call
monitoring system does not help me improve my
performance (reverse scored).&dquo; Coefficient alpha
.73.
Opportunities to Challenge: Four items:
&dquo;There is no way for me to appeal how the
information collected by the call monitoring
system is interpreted by the quality assurance
representative&dquo; (reversed scored), &dquo;There are
informal mechanisms in place that allow me to
appeal the information collected by the call
monitoring system,&dquo; &dquo;If I disagree with how the
information collected by the call monitoring
system is interpreted, the company will respond to
my concerns,&dquo; and &dquo;My quality assurance
representative listens to any concerns I might have
about the information collected by the call
monitoring system.&dquo; Coefficient alpha = .73.
Link to Incentive Systems:
Two items:
&dquo;Information gathered by the call monitoring
system is linked to my compensation, such as
annual pay raises,&dquo; &dquo;Information gathered by the
call monitoring system is used by my supervisor
when determining rewards that I may receive.&dquo;
Coefficient alpha = .68.
Amount of Monitoring: Select one of three
statements that best represents your opinion about
the amount of monitoring. &dquo;The amount of call
monitoring done by the company is sufficient to
get an accurate assessment of my work.&dquo; &dquo;The
amount of call monitoring done by the company is
too little to get an accurate assessment of my
work.&dquo; &dquo;The amount of call monitoring done by
the company is more than necessary to get an
accurate assessment of my work.&dquo; We recoded
these responses so that &dquo;too little&dquo; or &dquo;too much&dquo;
would be a &dquo;1&dquo; and &dquo;sufficient&dquo; would be scored a
&dquo;2.&dquo; In order to determine whether &dquo;too much&dquo;
monitoring would predict different results than
&dquo;too little,&dquo; we also report the results of a one-way
ANOVA.
We assessed the fit of our data to a model that
included three characteristics measured with
multiple indicators using confirmatory factor
analyses from AMOS 4 (Arbuckle & Wothke,
1999). The three-factor model included feedback
=

tone, opportunities to challenge, and link to

incentives. This model had a x score of 67.8 for
32 degrees of freedom (p < .001), indicating a
good fit. All items loaded significantly on their
hypothesized factor; the NFI, TLI, and CFI were
all .99; and the RMSEA was .061.

Perceived Fairness of Monitoring

fairness of the monitoring
measured using the five-item scale
developed by Alder and Ambrose (2000), a general
measure of perceived fairness that has been used
previously to assess the fairness of an electronic
monitoring system. The five items that make-up
the scale are &dquo;Given the opportunity, I would
change the way the company uses call monitoring
to monitor my performance,&dquo; &dquo;I think the call
monitoring system used by the company is fair,&dquo; &dquo;I
am satisfied with the way the company uses call
monitoring to monitor my performance,&dquo; &dquo;I feel
good about having the company use call
monitoring to monitor my performance,&dquo; and &dquo;The
way the company uses call monitoring to monitor
my performance is unfair&dquo; (reverse scored). Alder
and Ambrose reported a coefficient alpha of .87.
In our sample, the coefficient alpha was .83.
Confirmatory factor analyses using AMOS 4
(Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999) found support for the
fit of a four factor model that included feedback
tone, opportunities to challenge, link to incentives,
and perceived fairness. This model had a # score
of 154.7 for 84 degrees of freedom (p < .001),
All items loaded
indicating a good fit.
significantly on their hypothesized factor; the NFI,
TLI, and CFI were all .99; and the RMSEA was
.053.
The

system

perceived

was

Job Performance
Job performance was measured by asking the
of each employee who completed a
survey to assess his or her task and contextual
performance (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993). Task
performance was measured specific to the jobs
being sampled following the methods described by
Van Scotter et al. (2000). Seven items were drawn
from the performance appraisal form used by the
company to assess employee behaviors that were
associated with the core technical aspects of the
job (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993). These seven
items were: identifies the customers needs and
responds appropriately, delivers the correct

supervisors

Downloaded from jlo.sagepub.com at Uni Babes-Bolyai on November 25, 2014

solution, follows procedures and guidelines, can

prioritize multiple tasks and meet deadlines, works
without mistakes at an efficient level, follows
through on tasks to completion, and adheres to
company and client standards. The coefficient
alpha for these seven items was .93.
Contextual performance was measured using
the 15 item, two-dimensional measure described in
Van Scotter et al. (2000). Seven items were used
to assess Interpersonal Facilitation - described as
helpful, considerate, and cooperative aspects of
contextual performance. Eight items were used to
assess Job Dedication - described as the use of
effort, initiative, persistence, and self-discipline in
the job.
Sample items for Interpersonal
Facilitation include, &dquo;says things that make people
feel good about themselves or the work group,&dquo;
&dquo;supports or encourages a co-worker who has a
personal problem,&dquo; and &dquo;helps someone without

being
Sample items for Job Dedication
in
include, &dquo;puts extra hours to get work done on
time,&dquo; &dquo;asks for a challenging work assignment,&dquo;
and &dquo;persists in overcoming obstacles to complete
a task.&dquo; The coefficient alpha for Interpersonal
Facilitation was .91 and the coefficient alpha for
Job Dedication was .92. A confirmatory factor
analysis of the measurement model that included2
the three performance dimensions resulted in a X
score of 839.1 for 206 degrees of freedom (p <
.001 ), indicating a good fit. The NFI was .96; the
TLI was .97; the CFI was .97; and the RMSEA

the EPM characteristics to task performance (H2)

and the paths from perceived fairness to the two
contextual performance dimensions (H3).
Third, we assessed a fully mediated model
(Model 3), where we further constrained all the
direct paths from the EPM characteristics to task
performance, but maintained the paths from each
of the EPM characteristics to perceived fairness
and the paths from the perceived fairness of the
system to the three performance dimensions. As
noted above, we also examined the hypothesized
relationship between amount of monitoring and
both perceived fairness and job performance by
using a one-way ANOVA to compare the means of
the dependent variables across the three responses
for amount - sufficient amount of monitoring, too
little amount of monitoring, and too much.

Results

asked.&dquo;

was

.094.

Analyses
We used AMOS 4 (Arbuckle & Wothke,
1999) to assess the fit of three models that would
allow us to test our hypotheses. We first tested the
fully saturated model (Model 1 ) containing paths
among all included variables. We then assessed a
model (Model 2) that represents our hypothesized
model. This model constrained the direct paths
from the EPM characteristics to the two contextual
performance dimensions, the path from
opportunities to challenge to task performance, and
the path from perceived fairness to task
performance . The hypothesized model maintained
the paths from EPM characteristics and perceived
fairness (HI), the three hypothesized paths from

Scale means, standard deviations, reliabilities,

and correlations are reported in Table 1. The
significant correlations reported in Table 1 offer
preliminary support for both hypotheses 1 and 3.
For example, the significant correlations between
feedback tone, opportunities to challenge, amount
of monitoring and perceived fairness support
hypotheses 1 a, 1 b, and 1 d that these EPM
characteristics predict the perceived fairness of the
system.
Only link to incentives was not
significantly correlated with perceived fairness
{Hlc). Similarly, the significant correlations
between perceived fairness and interpersonal
facilitation and job dedication suggest support for
hypothesis 3 that perceived fairness predicts
contextual
performance. The significant
correlations between the EPM characteristics and
the job performance dimensions suggest
preliminary support for hypotheses 2 and 4 that
there may be either direct and/or indirect effects
between the EPM characteristics and either task or
contextual performance. Significant correlations
exist between 1) feedback tone and both
interpersonal facilitation and job dedication , 2)
opportunities to challenge and interpersonal
facilitation, and 3) link to incentives and all three
performance dimensions.

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)5 g 8

I~~=
OO

~x U ::

s&copy;
z ii *oI o

,00.c - ~

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10

Structural Model

Comparisons

The first structural model evaluated was

Model 1, the fully saturated model that contained
all direct and indirect paths between the variables
in the model. The x2 for this model was 1490.7 for
647 degrees of freedom; the CFI was .97; the NFI
was .95; the TLI was .97; the Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) was .07; and
the Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) was .84.
All these measures indicate that the data fit the
model reasonably well.
The second model evaluated was Model 2 the hypothesized model - that contained paths
from EPM characteristics and perceived fairness
(H 1 a-Hid), the three hypothesized paths from the
EPM characteristics to task performance (H2aH2c) and the paths from perceived fairness to the
two contextual performance dimensions (H3). The
for this model was 1918.6 for 657 degrees of
freedom; the CFI was .96; the NFI was .94; the
TLI was .96; the RMSEA was .08, and the PNFI
was .84. All of these fit indices again suggest that
model fits the data reasonably well.
Comparing Models 1 and 2 to determine
which fits the data better presented some
conflicting results. Usually the first step in
determining the better fitting model would be to
determine if the change in)? for a less constrained

model is significant. This would suggest that the

paths constrained to zero were significant to the
model and should in fact be estimated (Anderson
& Gerbing, 1988). Using this criterion, the better
fitting model was the fully saturated model because
the change in # between it and Model 2 was
significant (A~for 9 df = 427.9). However, use of
alone to assess fit has been questioned
because of the effect of sample size
scores
(Marsh, Balla, & McDonald, 1988).
To further assess which model provided the
better fit, we also examined the changes in other fit
indices that are not as affected by sample size and
the significance of the individual paths in the
models. Using these comparisons, we found that
Model 2 provides a better fit (see Table 2). First,
the fit indices for Model 2 were similar to those of
the saturated model. For example, the change in
the CFI was on the order of .O1 which lies within
the recent standard suggested by Cheung and
Rensvold (2002) and indicated no significant
change. Second and more convincingly, none of
the paths that were included in Model 1 but were
constrained in Model 2 were significant at p < .05,
suggesting that even though the change in x was
significant, Model 2 did not constrain any

the ~

on x

significant paths.

Table 2
Model Comparisons

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111
The third and final model evaluated

was

the

fully mediated model that contained only direct

paths from the EPM characteristics to perceived
fairness and from perceived fairness to the two
contextual performance dimensions. Model 3
allows us to test hypothesis 2 that there is a direct
relationship between EPM characteristics and task
performance (since those paths are constrained in
this model). This model also allows us to test
hypothesis 4 that any relationship between EPM
characteristics and contextual performance would
be indirect through their relationship with
perceived fairness. The x for Model 3 was 1926.6
for 660 degrees of freedom; the CFI was .96; the
was .94; the TLI was .96; the RMSEA was
.08; and the PNFI was .84. All of these fit indices
again suggest that Model 3 fits the data reasonably

NFI

well.

three models evaluated. By accepting this model,

we must conclude that our data do not support
hypothesis 2 that EPM characteristics are directly
related to task performance, but we are able to
offer support for hypothesis 4 that the relationship
between EPM characteristics and contextual
performance is mediated by perceptions of
fairness.

Significance of Individual Paths

The standardized 0 coefficients

for both
in
Table
3. The
reported
significant paths in the fully mediated model
support both hypotheses 1 and 3. Significant paths
in the fully mediated model include the path from
feedback tone to perceived fairness (standardized

Model 2 and Model 3

are

(3 .54, p < .001), opportunities to challenge to

perceived fairness (standardized (3 .66, p < .001 ),
amount of monitoring to perceived fairness
(standardized (3 .12, p < .05), perceived fairness
to interpersonal dedication (standardized (3 =.16, p
<
.05) and perceived fairness to job dedication
(standardized = .16, p < .05). The path between
link to incentives and perceived fairness
(standardized (3 .02, p > .10) was non-significant.
These paths are illustrated in Figure 1.
=

This time, when compared with Model 2, all

comparisons suggest that the fully mediated model
provides the better fit. First, the change in ~ was
not significant (O~for 4 df = 8.0), suggesting that
the constrained paths should be excluded from the
model. Second, the fit indices showed no real
change, and finally, none of the paths excluded
were significant at the p < .05
level. Therefore, the
fully mediated model provides the best fit of the

Table 3
Path Coefficients for Hypothesized Relationships
;:,to;:nr1o;:rr117pr1 Rpto;:

***

p <.001 1
1

**p<.O1
*p<.05

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12

Figure

Amount of

1: Standardized Paths in

Monitoring

Fully Mediated Model (Model 3)

On the other

To
assess
further the hypothesized
relationships among amount of monitoring,
perceived fairness of the monitoring system, and
job performance, we also conducted a one-way
ANOVA comparing the means of the job
performance dimensions and perceived fairness for
the three categories of amount. A sufficient
amount of monitoring was category 1, too little
monitoring was category 2, and too much
monitoring was category 3.
For perceived fairness, the overall F test
suggesting that the means are different was
significant (F (2,296) 16.37, p < .001). The
mean fairness score for category 1 (sufficient) was
3 .51; the mean fairness score for category 2 (too
little) was 2.91; and the mean fairness score for
category 3 (too much) was 3.11. Planned
comparisons using SNK were significant at alpha

hand, for the dimensions of job

performance, the overall F test suggesting job

performance means were different for different
amounts of monitoring was not significant for any
of the three job performance dimensions. For task
performance, the F was (2, 245) = 0.193, p > .05;
for interpersonal facilitation, it was (2, 245) =1.56,
p > .05, and for job dedication, the F was (2, 245)
= 0.09, p > .05. We found no support for a direct
relationship between amount of monitoring and
any dimension of job performance.
Discussion

.05 for differences between category 1 and both

2 and 3, but the difference between
2 and 3 were not significant. These
results support hypothesis 1 that a judgment
concerning the amount of monitoring predicts the
perceived fairness of the monitoring system,
however, we found that there was no significant
difference in the fairness perceptions based on too
little or too much monitoring.

categories
categories

The purpose of this study was to explore

whether certain characteristics of an electronic
performance monitoring system could affect
whether that system was perceived as fair.
Additionally, we explored whether such
characteristics could then affect dimensions of job
performance both directly and indirectly through
perceived fairness. To do this, we assessed the
relationships among characteristics of an electronic
performance monitoring system, the perceived
fairness of that system, and dimensions of both
task and contextual performance.
We found support for three of our four
hypotheses concerning the relationship of system

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13

characteristics to fairness.

Following the research

propositions developed by Ambrose and Alder
(2000), we found that perceived feedback tone,
opportunity to challenge, and the amount of
monitoring were significantly related to perceived
fairness. If the monitoring system is perceived to

provide feedback that is constructive in its tone, if

employees perceive opportunities to challenge the
interpretation and use of that feedback, and if the
amount of monitoring is perceived as appropriate
and not either too much or too little, the EPM
system can be perceived as a fair method for

monitoring performance.
These results are consistent with those of Alge
(2001), who found that the system characteristics
of participation and relevance influenced the
degree subjects perceived the system to be fair.
Similarly, Alge, Ballinger, and Smithson (2001)
showed that the degree of notice subjects received
about whether their behavior was being monitored
influenced whether they perceived the system as
fair. Alder and Ambrose (2000) reported that
whether participants could control when they
received the feedback, whether the feedback was
constructive, and whether the feedback came from
a supervisor or the computer all influenced the
perceived fairness of the computer monitoring

system.
Taken together, our results and the results of
other studies suggest that monitoring systems can
be designed and implemented in ways that
employees consider fair. Research results cited
earlier that suggest that electronic monitoring
would increase employee stress and reduce privacy
(Aiello & Kolb, 1995; Aiello & Shao, 1993; Alge,
2001; Irving, Higgins, & Safayeni, 1986; Nebeker
& Tatum, 1993) may reflect more the manner in
which the monitoring is performed than the nature
of the monitoring itself. Electronic systems can be
designed and implemented that collect needed
information and communicate that information
back to employees constructively and fairly.
We also found support for our hypotheses that
EPM characteristics would influence contextual
performance, but only indirectly through
perceptions of fairness. We hypothesized no direct
link between EPM system characteristics and
contextual performance because the monitoring
system did not directly assess contextual
performance and thus would not provide any social
cues as to the importance of such performance.

based on the well-established

relationship between perceived fairness and
contextual performance and the hypothesis that
EPM characteristics would be related to perceived
fairness, we hypothesized that any relationship
between EPM characteristics and contextual
performance would be fully mediated by perceived
fairness.
Our results suggest that EPM
characteristics
do
influence
contextual
but
do
so
because
performance,
they
they help
determine perceptions of fair treatment. Thus,
designing and implementing EPM systems that are
perceived as fair offers the added benefit of
providing motivation for employees to offer higher
levels of contextual performance.
Perhaps surprisingly, our results do not
support hypotheses 2a-2c that perceived EPM
characteristics would be related to task
performance. We proposed that, based on social
information processing theory, EPM characteristics
could influence task performance because they
could provide social cues as to which aspects of
performance are most important and most likely to
be rewarded. In our case, characteristics such as
the tone of the feedback, the amount of monitoring,
and the link between the monitoring and incentives
could provide those social cues. Even though there
was a significant bivariate correlation between link
to incentives and task performance, no significant
and direct relationships were found in the path
analyses between the EPM characteristics and task
performance. We propose three possible reasons
why we found no support for hypotheses 2a - 2c.
First, the EPM characteristics we studied may
not have offered the social cues needed to affect
task performance. Link to incentives has the
potential to offer the social cues needed to direct
performance, but feedback tone may not
necessarily identify which aspects of performance
are most important and deserve the most attention.
Providing constructive feedback may say much
more about the fairness of the process than about
what aspects of the task are a priority to the
organization. Similarly, the amount of monitoring
may not focus attention on task performance either.
Perhaps a lack of monitoring would suggest to
employees that certain types of performance are
not a priority, or perhaps an excessive amount of
monitoring would suggest that these same types of

However,

performance are clearly important. However, we

measured whether the employee perceived the

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14

&dquo;just right,&dquo; which would have

for
whether the amount was seen as
implications
would
not
but
serve to focus attention.
fair,
In
retrospect, the perceived EPM
characteristics we measured may not have been the
most effective ones for examining effects on task
performance. Further research is needed using
characteristics that more clearly communicate the
importance of task performance before we can
determine whether a relationship exists between
EPM characteristics and task performance.
Additionally, EPM characteristics may not
affect task performance because employees may
not have much opportunity to really change or vary
their levels of task performance, much like the
work examining the relationship between job
satisfaction and job performance for assembly line
workers (Herman, 1973). In those studies, the
employees had little discretion over the pace of
work, so changes in their job satisfaction could
have little effect. The work pace of our subjects
was greatly determined by the volume, length, and
pace of calls over which each subject had little
control. The lack of a relationship between EPM
characteristics and task performance could simply
reflect the lack of control this sample of employees
had over their levels of task performance. In jobs
where the employees have more discretion over the
performance of the tasks being monitored, the
relationship between EPM characteristics and task
performance may be more significant.
Finally, it is possible that our initial
expectation that the EPM system would have an
impact on task performance may have been overly
optimistic. It has been suggested that feedback
interventions, in general, improve performance by
as little as four tenths of a standard deviation. In
fact, in over one-third of the studies reviewed in a
large-scale meta-analysis, feedback interventions

amount to be

actually reduced performance (Kluger & DeNisi,

1996).

previous work (Alge, 2001; Douthitt &

Aiello, 2001; Stanton & Bames-Farrell, 1996) that
tested similar hypotheses in laboratory settings,

upon

and found largely supportive results in a field

setting. Our findings are strengthened by the use
of supervisors to rate the task and contextual
performance of their employees.
Second, we offer initial measures for four of
the EPM characteristics suggested by Ambrose and
Alder (2000) as fundamental to a fair EPM system.
Clearly, more research is needed to increase the
reliability of these individual scales. Additionally,
we could not assess the remaining six EPM
characteristics because they were not relevant to
the type of performance monitoring system used in
our sample. Further research is needed on EPM
systems used in other work settings where it may
be possible to study the complete set of monitoring
system characteristics.
Third, we extend our understanding of the
possible influences of EPM characteristics beyond
perceived fairness to include various aspects of job
Our results concerning task
performance.
performance did not support our hypotheses.
Consistent with previous research on the effects of
fair treatment in organizations, we found that EPM
characteristics influenced contextual performance
by increasing perceptions of fairness in the

workplace.
Although not intended, our discrepant
findings concerning task and contextual
performance demonstrate the value of tapping both
types of measures when evaluating individual
employee performance (Wemer, 1994). Although
related to

one

another, task and contextual

performance often have differential relationships

with important organizational variables (Kiker &
Motowidlo, 1999; Van Scotter et al., 2000). In our
study, we found stronger support for the effects of
EPM characteristics on contextual performance
than on task performance.
Some potential practical implications from

Contributions

this research involve the

This study offers the following contributions

to the literature on electronic performance
monitoring, perceived fairness, and job
performance. First, we provide a test of the
relationship between EPM characteristics and the
perceived fairness of that system using data
gathered from employees who are regularly
subjected to such a monitoring system. We extend

resource

of various human
management practices to increase the
perceived fairness and acceptance of electronic
performance monitoring by employees. Since we
assessed perceptions of the characteristics, our
results suggest that managers might find value in
making even greater efforts to communicate the
design and purpose of electronic monitoring
systems. For instance, realistic job previews might

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use

15
the &dquo;fair&dquo; characteristics of the EPM
system. Also, orientation and training programs
could include explanations of the reasons why
monitoring is conducted and how the information
that is collected will be used.
In conclusion, our findings suggest that it is
possible to design EPM systems that will be seen
as fair by the employees subject to them. It is also
likely that in the presence of a fair system,
employees will engage in desirable contextual
performance, such as assisting colleagues, showing
concern and care, and putting in extra hours to get
an important job done. Given the value of creating
workplaces that motivate contextual performance,
we encourage managers who use electronic means
to assess performance to continue to work to
ensure the fair design and implementation of these

highlight

systems.

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Enhancing organizational justice.
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